Cant Buy Me Love
Content
Psychological Inquiry, 19: 167–173, 2008
C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Copyright
ISSN: 1047-840X print / 1532-7965 online
DOI: 10.1080/10478400802631295
“Can’t Buy Me Love”: An Attachment Perspective on Social Support
and Money as Psychological Buffers
Mario Mikulincer
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel
Phillip R. Shaver
University of California, Davis, California
We are pleased to see that 44 years after the Beatles told us that while money can make us feel all
right, it ultimately “Can’t Buy Me Love,” Zhou and
Gao (this issue) have written a provocative review of
research on the ways in which these two resources
act as buffers against physical and psychological pain.
Zhou and Gao, like the Beatles, emphasize the importance of love and money as stress or pain reducers,
and the possibility of using money to complement or
replace the more natural resource of love. However,
Zhou and Gao’s argument suggests a different song title and lyrics. Whereas Lennon and McCartney argued
that money cannot restore or replace love, Zhou and
Gao might suggest a new song, “Money Can Do the
Job of Love.”
In this commentary, we consider the connections
between love and money and also their potential roles
as psychological stress and pain buffers through the
lenses of Bowlby’s (1973, 1980, 1982) attachment
theory and our own conceptualization of the activation and functioning of the attachment behavioral system in adulthood (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007a,
2007b; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002, 2007). Attachment
theory is a theory of emotion regulation that emphasizes the importance of seeking and receiving love
and support in times of need and stress. It characterizes social support as an innate form of amelioration and protection from physical and psychological
pain. Attachment theory has been tested in hundreds
of studies—some observational, some experimental,
and some longitudinal—and the theory has been expanded to apply to all phases of the human lifespan.
It has been explored and tested at all different levels of analysis, such as genes, neurons, conscious and
unconscious mental processes, and interpersonal relations in a variety of settings: from the bedroom and
nursery to large businesses and military organizations.
As such, attachment theory offers a broad and wellvalidated perspective on the role of social support as a
pain-buffering mechanism.
Although attachment theory does not deal directly
with the potential pain-buffering role of money, and
has generated no published research on this issue, it
may still provide important insights into the ability of
money to restore or replace love. Specifically, we agree
with Zhou and Gao (this issue) that money can act as
a secondary defense against physical and psychological pain mainly when potentially supportive others
(whom Bowlby, 1982, called attachment figures) fail
to provide love, support, and relief in times of need.
However, we disagree with Zhou and Gao that money
can replace or restore social support, nor do we agree
that its psychological effects are identical to those resulting from loving a attachment figure’s provision of
a safe haven and secure base when a person is bothered
by stress or pain. Our analysis looks back to England
in the 1960s, where Bowlby developed his theory of
attachment and the Beatles sang “Can’t Buy Me Love.”
Our commentary contains four sections. The first
explains attachment theory’s perspective on supportseeking as a distress-buffering mechanism. The second
section considers the empirically documented psychological benefits of receiving love and support, which
we summarize in terms of a “broaden-and-build cycle
of attachment security” (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003,
2007a, 2007b). In the third section, we argue that
money can act as a pain buffer mainly among people
who fail to receive love and support from others and
do not possess a solid and stable sense of attachment
security. Specifically, we focus on individual differences in attachment orientations and review evidence
showing that money-seeking and an avoidant attachment orientation have similar correlates and outcomes.
We also present new evidence concerning the association between avoidant attachment and money seeking.
In the last section, we consider why money “can’t buy
love,” according to an attachment-theoretical perspective. To save space and keep references to a minimum
we rely heavily on our prior reviews of the attachment
literature.
An Attachment Perspective on Support-Seeking
Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) claim that the anticipation of physical and psychological pain heightens
the desire for social support is a main tenant of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1973, 1980, 1982). According to
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COMMENTARIES
Bowlby (1982), acts of seeking support are behavioral
manifestations of an innate regulatory system called the
attachment behavioral system, which is thought to have
emerged over the course of primate evolution (Simpson & Belsky, 2008). It is presumed to have evolved
as an adaptation because it increased the likelihood
of survival and reproduction in a species whose offspring are born months before they can walk, talk, explore their environment, find food and water, or protect
themselves from predators and other dangers. Infants
who were equipped with a neural system that automatically activated behaviors aimed at gaining proximity
and support from what Bowlby (1982) called “stronger
and wiser caregivers” (behaviors such as making eye
contact, smiling, crying, calling, following, hugging,
or clinging) would have had better odds of surviving
to reproductive age than infants who lacked such a
regulatory system.
Attachment theory identifies the three kinds of support people seek from attachment figures in times of
need (e.g., Hazan & Zeifman, 1994). First, an attachment figure can provide comfort simply by being physically or psychologically present, because this implies
that support will be available if needed. Conversely,
anxiety, worry, or protest may be elicited if proximity
to an attachment figure is threatened by separation or
loss. Second, an attachment figure can provide what
Bowlby (1982) called a safe haven in times of distress:
helping a person overcome threats and obstacles and
providing instrumental and emotional support until the
threat passes or is dealt with successfully. Third, an
attachment figure can provide a secure base for exploration (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978;
Bowlby, 1988), helping a person to pursue personal
goals in a safe and effective way. In other words, human beings seek a haven of safety when the world
seems dangerous, and they seek support for autonomy
and self-expansion when the world offers interesting
challenges that promise pleasure and an opportunity to
develop new knowledge and skills. Whereas Zhou and
Gao (this issue) focused on the safe haven function of
attachment figures, they failed to address the role that
love and support play in facilitating autonomy, growth,
self-expansion, and self-actualization.
Although behavior governed by the attachment system is most noticeable, and perhaps most crucial, early
in life when a human being is most helpless, Bowlby
claimed that it is active throughout the human lifespan
and is evident in thoughts and actions related to seeking
love, support, and guidance in times of need, whatever
a person’s age may be. During infancy, primary caregivers (such as parents) are likely to occupy the role
of attachment figures (Ainsworth et al., 1978). During adolescence and adulthood, peers (including close
friends and romantic partners or mates) often become
attachment figures as well (Ainsworth, 1991). Teachers and supervisors in academic settings or therapists in
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clinical settings can also serve as important providers
of support (Bowlby, 1988). Moreover, groups, institutions, and spiritual figures, real or imagined (e.g., God,
the Buddha), can also be used, at least mentally, as
attachment figures. In fact, mental representations of
attachment figures (such as thoughts, memories, and
images—both conscious and unconscious) can serve
as internal sources of protection, support, and encouragement. They may also provide internal models of
supportive behavior that help a person self-soothe in
the absence of physically present attachment figures
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004; Shaver & Mikulincer,
2007).
Bowlby (1982) claimed that the main goal of support seeking is to increase one’s sense of security—the
sense that the world is generally safe and positively
challenging, that one can rely on others for protection
and support when needed, and that it is easy and rewarding to explore the world and engage in social (affiliative) and nonsocial (skill-learning) activities without fear of injury or demoralizing failure. This goal of
attaining felt security is made particularly salient by
actual or symbolic threats, which automatically activate the attachment system and motivate a person to
seek either tangible or symbolic support from an attachment figure. These bids for support persist until a
sense of security is restored, at which time a person
can comfortably return to other activities. During infancy, the primary strategy includes mostly nonverbal
expressions of need, such as crawling toward the attachment figure, reaching out to be picked up, crying,
clinging, and so on. In adulthood, the primary strategy involves seeking support through many additional
methods (e.g., talking, calling someone on the telephone, sending an e-mail or text message, driving to
the person’s home or workplace) and mentally conjuring up soothing, comforting, and encouraging mental representations of attachment figures (Mikulincer
& Shaver, 2004, 2007b). Such mental representations
can bolster a person’s sense of security, allowing him
or her to continue pursuing other goals without making
bids for proximity and protection.
In a series of laboratory experiments (Mikulincer,
Gillath, & Shaver, 2002), we found that turning part
of one’s mind to representations of attachment figures is such a basic and well-practiced regulatory process that it does not require conscious deliberation. In
these experiments, we subliminally presented threatening words (e.g., failure, separation) to young adults;
then, we indirectly assessed, by measuring reaction
times in a word-identification or word-color-naming
task, which names of relationship partners became
more available for processing following the unconscious threat. It turned out that the names of attachment figures (identified with the WHOTO questionnaire, developed by Hazan & Zeifman, 1994) became
more available following unconscious exposure to a
COMMENTARIES
threatening word. But the threatening words had no
effect on the mental accessibility of names of other
people who were not viewed as attachment figures.
These results imply that, in times of need, the attachment system automatically searches memory for
representations of special people who might provide
protection and support. In other studies (Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2004), we found that this kind of mental socialreferencing of attachment figures caused securely attached individuals to see themselves as more similar
than usual to their security-providing attachment figures, which seemed to be part of a self-soothing routine
that measurably reduced stress.
In their analysis of social support as a pain buffer,
Zhou and Gao (this issue) failed to address these internalized sources of love and support that allow some
people to maintain emotional stability without relying
on external sources of support or material resources
(e.g., money). We believe, instead, that Zhou and Gao’s
claim that social exclusion results in an upsurge of
pain, and that failure to gain social support leads people to rely on money as a pain buffer, applies mainly to
individuals who do not have an inner sense of attachment security. Social exclusion leaves them defenseless again physical and psychological sources of pain,
and money or power are sought as alternative ways
to reduce pain. Recently, we found that experimental
interventions that heighten mental representations of
attachment security reduced the intensity of “hurt feelings” caused by interpersonal rejection or social exclusion (Cassidy, Shaver, Mikulincer, & Lavy, in press).
This is an example of evidence that even momentary
boosts in security allow people to cope with pain.
The Psychological Benefits of Social Support:
The Broaden-and-Build Cycle of Attachment
Security
Viewed within the perspective of attachment theory,
Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) second claim, that social
support alleviates pain, is just one example of the broad
psychological benefits gained by a sense of attachment
security. In our model of attachment-system functioning in adulthood (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007a),
we summarize episodes of feeling loved and supported
by others and the consequent formation of a sense of
security as the foundation of what Fredrickson (2001)
called a broaden-and-build cycle of positive emotion.
According to our model, pain alleviation and the
restoration of emotional equanimity (the focus of Zhou
and Gao’s second proposition) are the most immediate psychological benefits of having reliable, dependable access to one or more supportive others in
times of need. Indeed, several studies show that having a stable sense of attachment security is associated
with other measures of well-being and mental health
and is inversely associated with measures of negative affectivity and psychopathology (Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2007a). Moreover, several experimental studies show that priming thoughts of available and supportive others, whether accomplished consciously or
unconsciously, has positive effects on mood and reduces cognitive distortions associated with emotional
problems (reviewed by Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b).
The model also explains how repeated experiences
of support contribute to resilience and emotional stability. Gratifying experiences with supportive others
are thought to be mentally represented in what Bowlby
(1973) called inner- or internal-working models of self
and others: (a) representations of the self as special,
valued, and able to elicit others’ support, and (b) representations of other people as good, trustworthy, and
helpful. These experiences are also recorded in the
form of procedural knowledge about distress management, which is organized around a relational securebase script (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b; Waters &
Waters, 2006). Theoretically, this script includes the
following if-then propositions: “If I encounter an obstacle or become distressed, I can approach a significant other for help; he or she is likely to be available
and supportive; I will experience relief and comfort as
a result of proximity to this person; I can then return to
other activities.” Once activated, this script serves as a
guide for adaptively coping with pain and distress.
Activation of the secure-base script guides and sustains the broaden-and-build cycle of attachment security. One of the core components of the secure-base
script is the proposition that relief and comfort will result from calling upon an attachment figure. This belief
promotes a pervasive sense of safety, assuages distress,
and allows secure people to remain relatively unperturbed during times of stress and experience longer periods of positive affectivity. This belief also sustains appraisals of life difficulties as manageable, which helps
a person maintain an optimistic and hopeful stance regarding distress management. The secure-base script
also includes the proposition that others will be available and supportive when one asks for support, which
sustains positive beliefs about others’ intentions and
traits and assuages worries about being rejected, criticized, or abused. This knowledge, presumably, makes
it easier to optimistically seek support when needed
and to maintain a positive emotional state while seeking relief from distress. Indeed, experimental studies
have shown that priming security-related mental representations lead to higher scores on measures of optimism, hope, and self-confidence, and more favorable
appraisals of romantic partners (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007b).
Having experienced available and responsive support makes it less necessary to rely on other kinds
of psychological defenses that can distort perception, limit coping flexibility, and generate interpersonal
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COMMENTARIES
conflict. As a result, a secure person can devote mental
resources that otherwise would be employed in preventive, defensive maneuvers to growth-oriented activities. The secure person can also attend to other people’s needs and feelings rather than, or in addition to,
the individual’s own. Being confident that support is
available when needed, a person can take calculated
risks and accept important challenges that contribute
to the broadening of perspectives and skills. Indeed, the
experimental priming of security-related mental representations encourages relaxed exploration of new or
unusual information and phenomena, favors the formation of open and flexible cognitive structures (despite the uncertainty and confusion that a broadening
of experience might evoke), and has positive effects on
compassionate feelings, altruistic behavior, and tolerance toward outgroup members (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007b).
Overall, mental representations of attachment security can make less necessary the reliance on material resources for buffering physical and psychological pain, even when external sources of support are
absent. Moreover, the broaden-and-build cycle of attachment security can move a person from a defensive position in which he or she seeks money in order
to “buy” love or comfort toward the ideal advocated
by classic and contemporary “positive” psychologists
such as Rogers (1961) and Seligman (2002). This theoretical ideal person is curious and confident, with a
deep and genuine sense of self-worth: a person who
can establish intimate, caring relationships, and take
risks and challenges to grow personally toward selfactualization while helping others thrive as well. Future
research should determine the extent to which experimental interventions aimed at heightening access to
mental representations of attachment security can reduce defensive, materialistic strivings as a way to cope
with threatening conditions.
Money Seeking and Insecure Forms of
Attachment
In this section, we focus on Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) third proposition, which states that people seek
money when social support fails to alleviate pain.
Specifically, we argue that the reliance on moneyseeking as a secondary pain buffer depends on a person’s attachment orientation or style. In the previous
sections, we noted that the possession of a solid and
stable sense of attachment security makes less necessary the reliance on money as a pain buffer, even when
external support is absent, because previous social support from attachment figures has provided the person
with internal methods of self-soothing. This makes it
likely that Zhou and Gao’s analysis more specifically
applies to insecurely attached people who have failed
170
to establish an internal sense of attachment security.
In this section, we refine this point by considering the
two major kinds of attachment insecurity: anxiety and
avoidance.
According to attachment theory, a history of interactions with attachment figures who are available,
responsive, and supportive in times of need allows a
person to form a stable and pervasive sense of attachment security (Bowlby, 1988). However, when a
person’s attachment figures are not reliably available
and supportive—that is, when a sense of security is
not attained—serious doubts about the effectiveness of
support seeking are aroused and other strategies of affect regulation (which Main, 1990, called secondary
attachment strategies) are adopted. Disappointing or
frustrating interactions with attachment figures erode a
person’s reliance on support seeking and replace it with
either attachment-system hyperactivation—energetic,
anxious, controlling, or intrusive attempts to force a
relationship partner to pay more attention and provide better care (which may, paradoxically lead to
rejection and separation)—or with attachment-system
deactivation, which involves suppressing or inhibiting support-seeking tendencies and developing what
Bowlby (1973) called “compulsive self-reliance.”
Attachment theory proposes that a particular history
of experiences with attachment figures and the resulting internal working models culminate in relatively
stable individual differences in attachment orientation
or style: A habitual, ingrained pattern of expectations,
needs, emotions, and behavior in interpersonal situations and close relationships (Fraley & Shaver, 2000).
Research suggests that attachment orientations are best
conceptualized as regions in a two-dimensional space
(e.g., Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998). One of these dimensions, attachment-related avoidance, concerns discomfort with emotional closeness, discomfort with dependence on relationship partners, and a preference
for interpersonal distance, low emotionality, and extreme self-reliance. The other dimension, attachmentrelated anxiety, includes a strong desire for closeness
and safety, intense worries about partner availability
and responsiveness, and worries about one’s value to a
partner. People who score low on both dimensions are
said to be secure or securely attached.
One corollary of this conception of attachment orientations is that people with an insecure attachment
orientation are likely to rely on money as a pain buffer
because they do not have a history of comforting interactions with supportive attachment figures. This idea
is corroborated in Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) review
showing that lack of stable and loving primary attachment figures results in materialistic tendencies. However, the motives for seeking money as a substitute for
love might be different for people with different kinds
of attachment insecurity. For people scoring high on
avoidant attachment, who deactivate attachment needs
COMMENTARIES
and try not to seek support, money might be an alternative path to gaining a sense of identity and self-worth. It
might promote or support autonomy and self-reliance,
making it less necessary to rely on others for love and
support. For people scoring high on attachment anxiety,
who hyperactivate their attachment needs and attempt
to gain others’ love and support, even if this requires
acting intrusively or even coercively, money might be
a way to “buy” others’ love (or, at least, admiration
and attention). In other words, although both avoidant
and anxiously attached people may be driven to pursue
money they may desire this materialistic resource for
different reasons, like standing above others or buying others’ love. If so, gaining such resources might
have different psychological consequences (e.g., selfreliance vs. interpersonal acceptance).
A detailed analysis of Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) description of materialism as a coping strategy
reveals that people who use money to alleviate pain
strongly resemble people we have studied who score
high on avoidant attachment. For example, Zhou and
Gao (this issue) report that more materialistic people
have stronger needs for control and self-enhancement,
and are more likely than other people to use money
as means to reduce self-doubts and feelings of helplessness. Attachment research has shown that avoidant
attachment is associated with a desire for personal control and dominance (mainly in interpersonal situations)
and the use of defensive self-enhancement strategies to
quell self-doubts (reviewed by Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007a). Moreover, Zhou and Gao (this issue) review
findings showing that materialism is associated with
envy, self-criticism, and public self-consciousness and
lower-than-usual levels of generosity, happiness, and
life satisfaction. All of these correlates of materialism have also been empirically linked with avoidant
attachment (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a). In addition, Zhou and Gao (this issue) present new experimental data showing that money can be a means for
becoming more independent and self-reliant and for
increasing the distance between self and others—all
major goals of people with an avoidant attachment
orientation.
By contrast, people with an anxious approach to
attachment do not abandon their desire to attain love
and support. In fact, they beg for support, insist on
other people’s availability, cling to their relationship
partners, and perceive themselves as highly threatened
if their relationship partners seem to be losing interest
or to be preoccupied with other matters (Mikulincer
& Shaver, 2007a). This pattern of behavior does not
fit well with Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) description
of materialistic people who use money to achieve selfreliance and who are willing to replace love and support
with material resources. However, anxiously attached
people might also be interested in using money as a
means of buying love and attention. As Zhou and Gao
(this issue) claim, money can make a person more attractive to others, increase access to potential romantic
partners, and increase the likelihood of social approval
and respect.
To our knowledge there is no published study of
possible links between attachment insecurities and attitudes toward money. Here we wish to present some
of our own recent correlational data. Using a Hebrewlanguage Internet site designed to collect psychological research data, we asked people to complete two
self-report scales: (a) the Experiences in Close Relationships scale (ECR; Brennan et al., 1998), which
measures the two forms of attachment insecurity,
anxiety and avoidance; and (b) the Money Beliefs
and Behaviors Scale (Furnham, 1984), which measures three aspects of a person’s relationship with
money: obsession (i.e., excessive preoccupation with
money), power (i.e., the belief that money can purchase
power, prestige, and control over others), and retention
(i.e., parsimony and hoarding). Participants register
on the site, provide sociodemographic information,
and receive an individual code that allows investigators to avoid repetitive participation. Two hundred
thirty-two participants (34% men and 66% women,
aged 17–56, Median age = 25) responded to the two
questionnaires.
Pearson correlations indicated that avoidant attachment was significantly associated only with the power
dimension, r(230) = .29, p < .01, and anxious attachment was significantly associated with the obsession
and retention dimensions, rs of .34 and .31, ps < .01.
That is, more avoidant participants were more likely
to believe that money can purchase power, prestige,
and control over others. This is reminiscent of findings from studies of attachment orientations and sexual motives (e.g., Schachner & Shaver, 2004), which
have shown that more avoidant people are interested
in short-term sexual relations partly to enhance their
self-image. Anxious attachment was not associated significantly with a desire for power and prestige, but it
was still associated with a preoccupation with money
and attempts to accumulate and hoard it. Unfortunately,
the money-related measure available on the website is
not adequate to determine why the more anxious respondents were obsessed with money. There were no
questions about what anxious people might hope to
do with their accumulated money. Further research is
needed to probe these matters.
Can Money Buy Love?
Zhou and Gao (this issue) contend that money can
replace social support as an alleviator of distress and
pain. However, they seem to contradict this claim when
they review findings showing that materialism is associated with social anxiety, self-criticism, depression,
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COMMENTARIES
and lower levels of happiness and life satisfaction.
These are some of the well-documented correlates
of insecure attachment styles (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007a). We suspect that, although money may substitute for or purchase love in some circumstances,
in the long run it may not fully replace the primary need for love, support, and comfort from other
people.
Take, for example, the case of avoidant people who
attempt to suppress attachment needs and concerns and
rely exclusively on themselves to cope with pain and
distress. Attachment research has consistently found
that, although avoidant attachment is associated with
lack of happiness and life satisfaction, it is not generally associated with measures of psychological distress and negative affectivity, which we interpret as a
sign that avoidant strategies are somewhat successful
at reducing or at least inhibiting self-doubts, insecurities, and worries (reviewed by Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007a). This partial benefit of avoidant attachment
was noted by Fraley and Shaver (1997), who used a
thought-suppression paradigm and found that avoidant
people were effective at suppressing thoughts related
to relationship separations and losses. More avoidant
people reported less frequent thoughts of loss following a loss-thought-suppression task and also had lower
skin conductance (a measure of autonomic arousal)
during the task. In contrast, anxious people thought
more often about the loss following suppression and
had higher skin conductance during the task. A recent
fMRI study (Gillath, Bunge, Shaver, Wendelken, &
Mikulincer, 2005) replicated these findings while examining patterns of brain activation when people were
thinking about breakups or attempting to suppress such
thoughts. Anxious participants showed higher activation in emotion-related brain regions and lower activation in frontal areas needed to down-regulate negative
emotions. Avoidant participants were able to suppress
thoughts and feelings related to loss when they were
instructed to do so.
At the same time, however, there is evidence that
avoidant strategies sometimes lead to emotional and
adjustment problems. For example, Berant, Mikulincer, and Florian (2001) found that avoidant attached
mothers of infants with congenital heart disease, based
on measures of avoidance at the time of the diagnosis
of the infant’s disorder, predicted maternal distress one
year later. We (Berant, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2008)
contacted these women (and their children) 7 years
later, finding that the mother’s avoidant attachment at
the time of the birth predicted deterioration in her mental health and marital satisfaction over a 7-year period,
especially if the child’s heart disorder was severe. In
addition, the mother’s level of avoidance at the beginning of the study predicted her child’s emotional
problems and poor self-image 7 years later. Moreover,
Mikulincer, Horesh, Eilati, and Kotler (1999) found
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that avoidant attachment was associated with the severity of psychiatric symptoms among Israeli Jewish settlers whose lives were chronically endangered by residing in disputed territories controlled by the Palestinian
Authority. These findings imply that, although avoidant
strategies allow people to maintain a defensive fac¸ade
of imperturbability, they leave problems unresolved,
which may impair adjustment and mental health in the
long run.
In two laboratory studies, we (Mikulincer, Dolev, &
Shaver, 2004) examined attachment-related variations
in thought suppression, paying special attention to
conditions that can impair the effectiveness of avoidant
strategies in preventing the rebound of previously
suppressed material. Using a Stroop color-naming task
to assess implicit activation of previously suppressed
thoughts about a painful separation, we found that
avoidant individuals were able to suppress thoughts
related to the breakup. For them, such thoughts
were relatively inaccessible, and their own positive
self-traits became even more accessible than usual
(a possible indication of self-inflating defenses,
perhaps related to the desire to lord it over others by
virtue of having money). However, their ability to
maintain this defense was disrupted when a cognitive
load—remembering a 7-digit number—was added to
the experimental task. Under a high cognitive load,
avoidant individuals suddenly exhibited color-naming
interference due to thoughts of separation and negative
self-traits. That is, the suppressed material resurfaced
in experience and behavior when a high cognitive
demand was imposed, and this material included suppressed negative aspects of the self. We believe that
a similar resurfacing occurs when a high emotional
demand is imposed, as in the studies mentioned here
that dealt with prolonged exposure to terror or caring
for a child with a congenital heart defect.
Overall, these studies emphasize the fragility of
avoidant defenses and indirectly imply that strategies
aimed at replacing love and support may collapse under prolonged threatening circumstances. It is under
these circumstances that the availability, sensitivity,
and responsiveness of loving others become critical
for soothing oneself and maintaining or restoring emotional equanimity. Perhaps money can buy better medical treatments, housing conditions, and luxuries, but
it cannot prevent illness, death, and natural and manmade disasters and traumas. During these extreme conditions, human beings need the love, support, and comfort from others—the “kind of thing that money just
can’t buy,” in Lennon and McCartney’s words. This
does not mean that insecure people will give up trying
to replace or buy love with money, but it does suggest that people who use secondary stress reducers to
replace or coerce a simulated version of the primary
ones may come up short, no matter how much money
and prestige they accumulate.
COMMENTARIES
Note
Address correspondence to Mario Mikulincer, New
School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC),
Herzliya, P.O. Box 167, Herzilya, 46150, Israel.
E-mail: [email protected]
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C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Copyright
ISSN: 1047-840X print / 1532-7965 online
DOI: 10.1080/10478400802631295
“Can’t Buy Me Love”: An Attachment Perspective on Social Support
and Money as Psychological Buffers
Mario Mikulincer
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel
Phillip R. Shaver
University of California, Davis, California
We are pleased to see that 44 years after the Beatles told us that while money can make us feel all
right, it ultimately “Can’t Buy Me Love,” Zhou and
Gao (this issue) have written a provocative review of
research on the ways in which these two resources
act as buffers against physical and psychological pain.
Zhou and Gao, like the Beatles, emphasize the importance of love and money as stress or pain reducers,
and the possibility of using money to complement or
replace the more natural resource of love. However,
Zhou and Gao’s argument suggests a different song title and lyrics. Whereas Lennon and McCartney argued
that money cannot restore or replace love, Zhou and
Gao might suggest a new song, “Money Can Do the
Job of Love.”
In this commentary, we consider the connections
between love and money and also their potential roles
as psychological stress and pain buffers through the
lenses of Bowlby’s (1973, 1980, 1982) attachment
theory and our own conceptualization of the activation and functioning of the attachment behavioral system in adulthood (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007a,
2007b; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002, 2007). Attachment
theory is a theory of emotion regulation that emphasizes the importance of seeking and receiving love
and support in times of need and stress. It characterizes social support as an innate form of amelioration and protection from physical and psychological
pain. Attachment theory has been tested in hundreds
of studies—some observational, some experimental,
and some longitudinal—and the theory has been expanded to apply to all phases of the human lifespan.
It has been explored and tested at all different levels of analysis, such as genes, neurons, conscious and
unconscious mental processes, and interpersonal relations in a variety of settings: from the bedroom and
nursery to large businesses and military organizations.
As such, attachment theory offers a broad and wellvalidated perspective on the role of social support as a
pain-buffering mechanism.
Although attachment theory does not deal directly
with the potential pain-buffering role of money, and
has generated no published research on this issue, it
may still provide important insights into the ability of
money to restore or replace love. Specifically, we agree
with Zhou and Gao (this issue) that money can act as
a secondary defense against physical and psychological pain mainly when potentially supportive others
(whom Bowlby, 1982, called attachment figures) fail
to provide love, support, and relief in times of need.
However, we disagree with Zhou and Gao that money
can replace or restore social support, nor do we agree
that its psychological effects are identical to those resulting from loving a attachment figure’s provision of
a safe haven and secure base when a person is bothered
by stress or pain. Our analysis looks back to England
in the 1960s, where Bowlby developed his theory of
attachment and the Beatles sang “Can’t Buy Me Love.”
Our commentary contains four sections. The first
explains attachment theory’s perspective on supportseeking as a distress-buffering mechanism. The second
section considers the empirically documented psychological benefits of receiving love and support, which
we summarize in terms of a “broaden-and-build cycle
of attachment security” (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003,
2007a, 2007b). In the third section, we argue that
money can act as a pain buffer mainly among people
who fail to receive love and support from others and
do not possess a solid and stable sense of attachment
security. Specifically, we focus on individual differences in attachment orientations and review evidence
showing that money-seeking and an avoidant attachment orientation have similar correlates and outcomes.
We also present new evidence concerning the association between avoidant attachment and money seeking.
In the last section, we consider why money “can’t buy
love,” according to an attachment-theoretical perspective. To save space and keep references to a minimum
we rely heavily on our prior reviews of the attachment
literature.
An Attachment Perspective on Support-Seeking
Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) claim that the anticipation of physical and psychological pain heightens
the desire for social support is a main tenant of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1973, 1980, 1982). According to
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COMMENTARIES
Bowlby (1982), acts of seeking support are behavioral
manifestations of an innate regulatory system called the
attachment behavioral system, which is thought to have
emerged over the course of primate evolution (Simpson & Belsky, 2008). It is presumed to have evolved
as an adaptation because it increased the likelihood
of survival and reproduction in a species whose offspring are born months before they can walk, talk, explore their environment, find food and water, or protect
themselves from predators and other dangers. Infants
who were equipped with a neural system that automatically activated behaviors aimed at gaining proximity
and support from what Bowlby (1982) called “stronger
and wiser caregivers” (behaviors such as making eye
contact, smiling, crying, calling, following, hugging,
or clinging) would have had better odds of surviving
to reproductive age than infants who lacked such a
regulatory system.
Attachment theory identifies the three kinds of support people seek from attachment figures in times of
need (e.g., Hazan & Zeifman, 1994). First, an attachment figure can provide comfort simply by being physically or psychologically present, because this implies
that support will be available if needed. Conversely,
anxiety, worry, or protest may be elicited if proximity
to an attachment figure is threatened by separation or
loss. Second, an attachment figure can provide what
Bowlby (1982) called a safe haven in times of distress:
helping a person overcome threats and obstacles and
providing instrumental and emotional support until the
threat passes or is dealt with successfully. Third, an
attachment figure can provide a secure base for exploration (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978;
Bowlby, 1988), helping a person to pursue personal
goals in a safe and effective way. In other words, human beings seek a haven of safety when the world
seems dangerous, and they seek support for autonomy
and self-expansion when the world offers interesting
challenges that promise pleasure and an opportunity to
develop new knowledge and skills. Whereas Zhou and
Gao (this issue) focused on the safe haven function of
attachment figures, they failed to address the role that
love and support play in facilitating autonomy, growth,
self-expansion, and self-actualization.
Although behavior governed by the attachment system is most noticeable, and perhaps most crucial, early
in life when a human being is most helpless, Bowlby
claimed that it is active throughout the human lifespan
and is evident in thoughts and actions related to seeking
love, support, and guidance in times of need, whatever
a person’s age may be. During infancy, primary caregivers (such as parents) are likely to occupy the role
of attachment figures (Ainsworth et al., 1978). During adolescence and adulthood, peers (including close
friends and romantic partners or mates) often become
attachment figures as well (Ainsworth, 1991). Teachers and supervisors in academic settings or therapists in
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clinical settings can also serve as important providers
of support (Bowlby, 1988). Moreover, groups, institutions, and spiritual figures, real or imagined (e.g., God,
the Buddha), can also be used, at least mentally, as
attachment figures. In fact, mental representations of
attachment figures (such as thoughts, memories, and
images—both conscious and unconscious) can serve
as internal sources of protection, support, and encouragement. They may also provide internal models of
supportive behavior that help a person self-soothe in
the absence of physically present attachment figures
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004; Shaver & Mikulincer,
2007).
Bowlby (1982) claimed that the main goal of support seeking is to increase one’s sense of security—the
sense that the world is generally safe and positively
challenging, that one can rely on others for protection
and support when needed, and that it is easy and rewarding to explore the world and engage in social (affiliative) and nonsocial (skill-learning) activities without fear of injury or demoralizing failure. This goal of
attaining felt security is made particularly salient by
actual or symbolic threats, which automatically activate the attachment system and motivate a person to
seek either tangible or symbolic support from an attachment figure. These bids for support persist until a
sense of security is restored, at which time a person
can comfortably return to other activities. During infancy, the primary strategy includes mostly nonverbal
expressions of need, such as crawling toward the attachment figure, reaching out to be picked up, crying,
clinging, and so on. In adulthood, the primary strategy involves seeking support through many additional
methods (e.g., talking, calling someone on the telephone, sending an e-mail or text message, driving to
the person’s home or workplace) and mentally conjuring up soothing, comforting, and encouraging mental representations of attachment figures (Mikulincer
& Shaver, 2004, 2007b). Such mental representations
can bolster a person’s sense of security, allowing him
or her to continue pursuing other goals without making
bids for proximity and protection.
In a series of laboratory experiments (Mikulincer,
Gillath, & Shaver, 2002), we found that turning part
of one’s mind to representations of attachment figures is such a basic and well-practiced regulatory process that it does not require conscious deliberation. In
these experiments, we subliminally presented threatening words (e.g., failure, separation) to young adults;
then, we indirectly assessed, by measuring reaction
times in a word-identification or word-color-naming
task, which names of relationship partners became
more available for processing following the unconscious threat. It turned out that the names of attachment figures (identified with the WHOTO questionnaire, developed by Hazan & Zeifman, 1994) became
more available following unconscious exposure to a
COMMENTARIES
threatening word. But the threatening words had no
effect on the mental accessibility of names of other
people who were not viewed as attachment figures.
These results imply that, in times of need, the attachment system automatically searches memory for
representations of special people who might provide
protection and support. In other studies (Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2004), we found that this kind of mental socialreferencing of attachment figures caused securely attached individuals to see themselves as more similar
than usual to their security-providing attachment figures, which seemed to be part of a self-soothing routine
that measurably reduced stress.
In their analysis of social support as a pain buffer,
Zhou and Gao (this issue) failed to address these internalized sources of love and support that allow some
people to maintain emotional stability without relying
on external sources of support or material resources
(e.g., money). We believe, instead, that Zhou and Gao’s
claim that social exclusion results in an upsurge of
pain, and that failure to gain social support leads people to rely on money as a pain buffer, applies mainly to
individuals who do not have an inner sense of attachment security. Social exclusion leaves them defenseless again physical and psychological sources of pain,
and money or power are sought as alternative ways
to reduce pain. Recently, we found that experimental
interventions that heighten mental representations of
attachment security reduced the intensity of “hurt feelings” caused by interpersonal rejection or social exclusion (Cassidy, Shaver, Mikulincer, & Lavy, in press).
This is an example of evidence that even momentary
boosts in security allow people to cope with pain.
The Psychological Benefits of Social Support:
The Broaden-and-Build Cycle of Attachment
Security
Viewed within the perspective of attachment theory,
Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) second claim, that social
support alleviates pain, is just one example of the broad
psychological benefits gained by a sense of attachment
security. In our model of attachment-system functioning in adulthood (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007a),
we summarize episodes of feeling loved and supported
by others and the consequent formation of a sense of
security as the foundation of what Fredrickson (2001)
called a broaden-and-build cycle of positive emotion.
According to our model, pain alleviation and the
restoration of emotional equanimity (the focus of Zhou
and Gao’s second proposition) are the most immediate psychological benefits of having reliable, dependable access to one or more supportive others in
times of need. Indeed, several studies show that having a stable sense of attachment security is associated
with other measures of well-being and mental health
and is inversely associated with measures of negative affectivity and psychopathology (Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2007a). Moreover, several experimental studies show that priming thoughts of available and supportive others, whether accomplished consciously or
unconsciously, has positive effects on mood and reduces cognitive distortions associated with emotional
problems (reviewed by Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b).
The model also explains how repeated experiences
of support contribute to resilience and emotional stability. Gratifying experiences with supportive others
are thought to be mentally represented in what Bowlby
(1973) called inner- or internal-working models of self
and others: (a) representations of the self as special,
valued, and able to elicit others’ support, and (b) representations of other people as good, trustworthy, and
helpful. These experiences are also recorded in the
form of procedural knowledge about distress management, which is organized around a relational securebase script (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b; Waters &
Waters, 2006). Theoretically, this script includes the
following if-then propositions: “If I encounter an obstacle or become distressed, I can approach a significant other for help; he or she is likely to be available
and supportive; I will experience relief and comfort as
a result of proximity to this person; I can then return to
other activities.” Once activated, this script serves as a
guide for adaptively coping with pain and distress.
Activation of the secure-base script guides and sustains the broaden-and-build cycle of attachment security. One of the core components of the secure-base
script is the proposition that relief and comfort will result from calling upon an attachment figure. This belief
promotes a pervasive sense of safety, assuages distress,
and allows secure people to remain relatively unperturbed during times of stress and experience longer periods of positive affectivity. This belief also sustains appraisals of life difficulties as manageable, which helps
a person maintain an optimistic and hopeful stance regarding distress management. The secure-base script
also includes the proposition that others will be available and supportive when one asks for support, which
sustains positive beliefs about others’ intentions and
traits and assuages worries about being rejected, criticized, or abused. This knowledge, presumably, makes
it easier to optimistically seek support when needed
and to maintain a positive emotional state while seeking relief from distress. Indeed, experimental studies
have shown that priming security-related mental representations lead to higher scores on measures of optimism, hope, and self-confidence, and more favorable
appraisals of romantic partners (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007b).
Having experienced available and responsive support makes it less necessary to rely on other kinds
of psychological defenses that can distort perception, limit coping flexibility, and generate interpersonal
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COMMENTARIES
conflict. As a result, a secure person can devote mental
resources that otherwise would be employed in preventive, defensive maneuvers to growth-oriented activities. The secure person can also attend to other people’s needs and feelings rather than, or in addition to,
the individual’s own. Being confident that support is
available when needed, a person can take calculated
risks and accept important challenges that contribute
to the broadening of perspectives and skills. Indeed, the
experimental priming of security-related mental representations encourages relaxed exploration of new or
unusual information and phenomena, favors the formation of open and flexible cognitive structures (despite the uncertainty and confusion that a broadening
of experience might evoke), and has positive effects on
compassionate feelings, altruistic behavior, and tolerance toward outgroup members (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007b).
Overall, mental representations of attachment security can make less necessary the reliance on material resources for buffering physical and psychological pain, even when external sources of support are
absent. Moreover, the broaden-and-build cycle of attachment security can move a person from a defensive position in which he or she seeks money in order
to “buy” love or comfort toward the ideal advocated
by classic and contemporary “positive” psychologists
such as Rogers (1961) and Seligman (2002). This theoretical ideal person is curious and confident, with a
deep and genuine sense of self-worth: a person who
can establish intimate, caring relationships, and take
risks and challenges to grow personally toward selfactualization while helping others thrive as well. Future
research should determine the extent to which experimental interventions aimed at heightening access to
mental representations of attachment security can reduce defensive, materialistic strivings as a way to cope
with threatening conditions.
Money Seeking and Insecure Forms of
Attachment
In this section, we focus on Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) third proposition, which states that people seek
money when social support fails to alleviate pain.
Specifically, we argue that the reliance on moneyseeking as a secondary pain buffer depends on a person’s attachment orientation or style. In the previous
sections, we noted that the possession of a solid and
stable sense of attachment security makes less necessary the reliance on money as a pain buffer, even when
external support is absent, because previous social support from attachment figures has provided the person
with internal methods of self-soothing. This makes it
likely that Zhou and Gao’s analysis more specifically
applies to insecurely attached people who have failed
170
to establish an internal sense of attachment security.
In this section, we refine this point by considering the
two major kinds of attachment insecurity: anxiety and
avoidance.
According to attachment theory, a history of interactions with attachment figures who are available,
responsive, and supportive in times of need allows a
person to form a stable and pervasive sense of attachment security (Bowlby, 1988). However, when a
person’s attachment figures are not reliably available
and supportive—that is, when a sense of security is
not attained—serious doubts about the effectiveness of
support seeking are aroused and other strategies of affect regulation (which Main, 1990, called secondary
attachment strategies) are adopted. Disappointing or
frustrating interactions with attachment figures erode a
person’s reliance on support seeking and replace it with
either attachment-system hyperactivation—energetic,
anxious, controlling, or intrusive attempts to force a
relationship partner to pay more attention and provide better care (which may, paradoxically lead to
rejection and separation)—or with attachment-system
deactivation, which involves suppressing or inhibiting support-seeking tendencies and developing what
Bowlby (1973) called “compulsive self-reliance.”
Attachment theory proposes that a particular history
of experiences with attachment figures and the resulting internal working models culminate in relatively
stable individual differences in attachment orientation
or style: A habitual, ingrained pattern of expectations,
needs, emotions, and behavior in interpersonal situations and close relationships (Fraley & Shaver, 2000).
Research suggests that attachment orientations are best
conceptualized as regions in a two-dimensional space
(e.g., Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998). One of these dimensions, attachment-related avoidance, concerns discomfort with emotional closeness, discomfort with dependence on relationship partners, and a preference
for interpersonal distance, low emotionality, and extreme self-reliance. The other dimension, attachmentrelated anxiety, includes a strong desire for closeness
and safety, intense worries about partner availability
and responsiveness, and worries about one’s value to a
partner. People who score low on both dimensions are
said to be secure or securely attached.
One corollary of this conception of attachment orientations is that people with an insecure attachment
orientation are likely to rely on money as a pain buffer
because they do not have a history of comforting interactions with supportive attachment figures. This idea
is corroborated in Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) review
showing that lack of stable and loving primary attachment figures results in materialistic tendencies. However, the motives for seeking money as a substitute for
love might be different for people with different kinds
of attachment insecurity. For people scoring high on
avoidant attachment, who deactivate attachment needs
COMMENTARIES
and try not to seek support, money might be an alternative path to gaining a sense of identity and self-worth. It
might promote or support autonomy and self-reliance,
making it less necessary to rely on others for love and
support. For people scoring high on attachment anxiety,
who hyperactivate their attachment needs and attempt
to gain others’ love and support, even if this requires
acting intrusively or even coercively, money might be
a way to “buy” others’ love (or, at least, admiration
and attention). In other words, although both avoidant
and anxiously attached people may be driven to pursue
money they may desire this materialistic resource for
different reasons, like standing above others or buying others’ love. If so, gaining such resources might
have different psychological consequences (e.g., selfreliance vs. interpersonal acceptance).
A detailed analysis of Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) description of materialism as a coping strategy
reveals that people who use money to alleviate pain
strongly resemble people we have studied who score
high on avoidant attachment. For example, Zhou and
Gao (this issue) report that more materialistic people
have stronger needs for control and self-enhancement,
and are more likely than other people to use money
as means to reduce self-doubts and feelings of helplessness. Attachment research has shown that avoidant
attachment is associated with a desire for personal control and dominance (mainly in interpersonal situations)
and the use of defensive self-enhancement strategies to
quell self-doubts (reviewed by Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007a). Moreover, Zhou and Gao (this issue) review
findings showing that materialism is associated with
envy, self-criticism, and public self-consciousness and
lower-than-usual levels of generosity, happiness, and
life satisfaction. All of these correlates of materialism have also been empirically linked with avoidant
attachment (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a). In addition, Zhou and Gao (this issue) present new experimental data showing that money can be a means for
becoming more independent and self-reliant and for
increasing the distance between self and others—all
major goals of people with an avoidant attachment
orientation.
By contrast, people with an anxious approach to
attachment do not abandon their desire to attain love
and support. In fact, they beg for support, insist on
other people’s availability, cling to their relationship
partners, and perceive themselves as highly threatened
if their relationship partners seem to be losing interest
or to be preoccupied with other matters (Mikulincer
& Shaver, 2007a). This pattern of behavior does not
fit well with Zhou and Gao’s (this issue) description
of materialistic people who use money to achieve selfreliance and who are willing to replace love and support
with material resources. However, anxiously attached
people might also be interested in using money as a
means of buying love and attention. As Zhou and Gao
(this issue) claim, money can make a person more attractive to others, increase access to potential romantic
partners, and increase the likelihood of social approval
and respect.
To our knowledge there is no published study of
possible links between attachment insecurities and attitudes toward money. Here we wish to present some
of our own recent correlational data. Using a Hebrewlanguage Internet site designed to collect psychological research data, we asked people to complete two
self-report scales: (a) the Experiences in Close Relationships scale (ECR; Brennan et al., 1998), which
measures the two forms of attachment insecurity,
anxiety and avoidance; and (b) the Money Beliefs
and Behaviors Scale (Furnham, 1984), which measures three aspects of a person’s relationship with
money: obsession (i.e., excessive preoccupation with
money), power (i.e., the belief that money can purchase
power, prestige, and control over others), and retention
(i.e., parsimony and hoarding). Participants register
on the site, provide sociodemographic information,
and receive an individual code that allows investigators to avoid repetitive participation. Two hundred
thirty-two participants (34% men and 66% women,
aged 17–56, Median age = 25) responded to the two
questionnaires.
Pearson correlations indicated that avoidant attachment was significantly associated only with the power
dimension, r(230) = .29, p < .01, and anxious attachment was significantly associated with the obsession
and retention dimensions, rs of .34 and .31, ps < .01.
That is, more avoidant participants were more likely
to believe that money can purchase power, prestige,
and control over others. This is reminiscent of findings from studies of attachment orientations and sexual motives (e.g., Schachner & Shaver, 2004), which
have shown that more avoidant people are interested
in short-term sexual relations partly to enhance their
self-image. Anxious attachment was not associated significantly with a desire for power and prestige, but it
was still associated with a preoccupation with money
and attempts to accumulate and hoard it. Unfortunately,
the money-related measure available on the website is
not adequate to determine why the more anxious respondents were obsessed with money. There were no
questions about what anxious people might hope to
do with their accumulated money. Further research is
needed to probe these matters.
Can Money Buy Love?
Zhou and Gao (this issue) contend that money can
replace social support as an alleviator of distress and
pain. However, they seem to contradict this claim when
they review findings showing that materialism is associated with social anxiety, self-criticism, depression,
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COMMENTARIES
and lower levels of happiness and life satisfaction.
These are some of the well-documented correlates
of insecure attachment styles (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007a). We suspect that, although money may substitute for or purchase love in some circumstances,
in the long run it may not fully replace the primary need for love, support, and comfort from other
people.
Take, for example, the case of avoidant people who
attempt to suppress attachment needs and concerns and
rely exclusively on themselves to cope with pain and
distress. Attachment research has consistently found
that, although avoidant attachment is associated with
lack of happiness and life satisfaction, it is not generally associated with measures of psychological distress and negative affectivity, which we interpret as a
sign that avoidant strategies are somewhat successful
at reducing or at least inhibiting self-doubts, insecurities, and worries (reviewed by Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007a). This partial benefit of avoidant attachment
was noted by Fraley and Shaver (1997), who used a
thought-suppression paradigm and found that avoidant
people were effective at suppressing thoughts related
to relationship separations and losses. More avoidant
people reported less frequent thoughts of loss following a loss-thought-suppression task and also had lower
skin conductance (a measure of autonomic arousal)
during the task. In contrast, anxious people thought
more often about the loss following suppression and
had higher skin conductance during the task. A recent
fMRI study (Gillath, Bunge, Shaver, Wendelken, &
Mikulincer, 2005) replicated these findings while examining patterns of brain activation when people were
thinking about breakups or attempting to suppress such
thoughts. Anxious participants showed higher activation in emotion-related brain regions and lower activation in frontal areas needed to down-regulate negative
emotions. Avoidant participants were able to suppress
thoughts and feelings related to loss when they were
instructed to do so.
At the same time, however, there is evidence that
avoidant strategies sometimes lead to emotional and
adjustment problems. For example, Berant, Mikulincer, and Florian (2001) found that avoidant attached
mothers of infants with congenital heart disease, based
on measures of avoidance at the time of the diagnosis
of the infant’s disorder, predicted maternal distress one
year later. We (Berant, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2008)
contacted these women (and their children) 7 years
later, finding that the mother’s avoidant attachment at
the time of the birth predicted deterioration in her mental health and marital satisfaction over a 7-year period,
especially if the child’s heart disorder was severe. In
addition, the mother’s level of avoidance at the beginning of the study predicted her child’s emotional
problems and poor self-image 7 years later. Moreover,
Mikulincer, Horesh, Eilati, and Kotler (1999) found
172
that avoidant attachment was associated with the severity of psychiatric symptoms among Israeli Jewish settlers whose lives were chronically endangered by residing in disputed territories controlled by the Palestinian
Authority. These findings imply that, although avoidant
strategies allow people to maintain a defensive fac¸ade
of imperturbability, they leave problems unresolved,
which may impair adjustment and mental health in the
long run.
In two laboratory studies, we (Mikulincer, Dolev, &
Shaver, 2004) examined attachment-related variations
in thought suppression, paying special attention to
conditions that can impair the effectiveness of avoidant
strategies in preventing the rebound of previously
suppressed material. Using a Stroop color-naming task
to assess implicit activation of previously suppressed
thoughts about a painful separation, we found that
avoidant individuals were able to suppress thoughts
related to the breakup. For them, such thoughts
were relatively inaccessible, and their own positive
self-traits became even more accessible than usual
(a possible indication of self-inflating defenses,
perhaps related to the desire to lord it over others by
virtue of having money). However, their ability to
maintain this defense was disrupted when a cognitive
load—remembering a 7-digit number—was added to
the experimental task. Under a high cognitive load,
avoidant individuals suddenly exhibited color-naming
interference due to thoughts of separation and negative
self-traits. That is, the suppressed material resurfaced
in experience and behavior when a high cognitive
demand was imposed, and this material included suppressed negative aspects of the self. We believe that
a similar resurfacing occurs when a high emotional
demand is imposed, as in the studies mentioned here
that dealt with prolonged exposure to terror or caring
for a child with a congenital heart defect.
Overall, these studies emphasize the fragility of
avoidant defenses and indirectly imply that strategies
aimed at replacing love and support may collapse under prolonged threatening circumstances. It is under
these circumstances that the availability, sensitivity,
and responsiveness of loving others become critical
for soothing oneself and maintaining or restoring emotional equanimity. Perhaps money can buy better medical treatments, housing conditions, and luxuries, but
it cannot prevent illness, death, and natural and manmade disasters and traumas. During these extreme conditions, human beings need the love, support, and comfort from others—the “kind of thing that money just
can’t buy,” in Lennon and McCartney’s words. This
does not mean that insecure people will give up trying
to replace or buy love with money, but it does suggest that people who use secondary stress reducers to
replace or coerce a simulated version of the primary
ones may come up short, no matter how much money
and prestige they accumulate.
COMMENTARIES
Note
Address correspondence to Mario Mikulincer, New
School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC),
Herzliya, P.O. Box 167, Herzilya, 46150, Israel.
E-mail: [email protected]
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