Case Digest Criminal Procedure

Case Digest Criminal Procedure
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167764
Facts: That on or about July 5 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines both Vicente Foz. Jr and Danny G
Fajardo as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious
intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and
publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled “MEET DR.
PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN,” wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of
professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and
insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and
therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the
said Dr. Edgar Portigo. .Petitioners pleaded not guilty, but the RTC found them guilty as charged.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied they appealed to CA but their appeal and their
motion for reconsideration were denied hence, this petition. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue
that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest, jurisdiction in
the RTC of Iloilo City.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as
charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
Held: Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The jurisdiction of a court over the case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may
validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. In
Agbayani v. Sayo, the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission
of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense.
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of
the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city
where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The allegations in the Information that “Panay
News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region”
only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not
establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the
province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed
against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that “Dr.
Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City,” such allegation did not clearly and
positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the
offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place. Considering that the
Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds
that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of
the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court
of competent jurisdiction.
Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas vs People of the Philippines
GR no. 192565
Facts: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping that the Union Bank of the
Philippines has not commence any other action or proceedings involving the same issue in another
tribunal or agency. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing that the venue was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not
the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has
jurisdiction over the perjury case. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was notarized there. When the case was elevated to the
RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set
aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. They also cited the ruling Ilusorio v. Bildner which state
that "venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented”. The
petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy
Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality where the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occured.
The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court to address the seeming conflict between
the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.

Issue: where is the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should it be in Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court.
Held: The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be
determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “make*s+ an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized
person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of
the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his
or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When
the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the
actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath
was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime
committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to
be constitutive of the crime committed.
Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas vs People of the Philippines
GR no. 192565
Facts: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing
that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. The case was referred to the court
en banc primarily to address the seemeing conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy.
Issue: Whether or not MeTC- Makati City has jurisdiction over the perjury case.
Held: MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners. Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not
only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to
try and hear the case. A finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences.
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has

jurisdiction over it, Section 10 and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where
the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words,
the venues of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states
that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum
Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second
and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary
public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City. It was also
found that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have
been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information.
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City
is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas,
pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential
elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati
City, not Pasay City.

JULIETA E. BERNARDO vs ANDREW (CHONG lUJAN) L. TAN
G.R. No. 185491
Facts: That on or about the November 22, 2000, in the City of Makati, Philippines the accused, being
then the responsible officers of Megaworld Corporation and Sedeño Manor, Inc. and in charge
of the business of said corporation sold to complainant JULIETA E. BERNARDO a condominium
unit described as 23E Tower, that while complainant was paying the monthly amortization due
on the said condominium, accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously failed to register
the reservation agreement in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Makati City. Ms. Bernardo
filed a complaint before the city Prosecutor against the respondents for violations of P.D. 957
and Estafa. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint of Ms. Bernardo. Consequently, she
filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. Her petition was granted by the
Secretary of Justice; hence, it ordered the filing of the corresponding Informations for violations
of Sections 5, 17 and 20 of P.D. No. 957. The respondents moved for the reconsideration of the
filing of the Informations against them. This time, the Secretary of Justice ruled in their favor
and granted their motion. Hence, pursuant to the Resolution, the Secretary of Justice ordered
the City Prosecutor to move for the withdrawal of the Informations filed before the trial court.

The RTC allowed the withdrawal of the Informations filed against respondents. The CA issued its
questioned Decision upholding the Orders of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the withdrawal of
informations filed against respondents.
HELD:
Once a complaint or an information is filed in court giving it jurisdiction over the criminal case, a
reinvestigation thereof by the prosecutor requires prior permission from the court.10 If reinvestigation
is allowed, the findings and recommendations of the prosecutor should be submitted to the court for
appropriate action.11 If the prosecutor moves for the withdrawal of the information or the dismissal of
the case, the court may grant or deny the motion. It may even order the trial to proceed with the proper
determination of the case on the merits, according to its sound discretion. The court “is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it.”
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the motion to withdraw the first
and the third Informations against respondents on the basis of a grossly erroneous interpretation and
application of law. The law is unambiguous when it states that it shall be the National Housing Authority
(now the HLURB) that would fix or extend the date of completion of the subdivision or condominium
projects if justified. The RTC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it decreed that the time of
completion as mandated by Section 20 should not be applied “mechanically against respondents”; and
when it relied on the completion time as indicated in the Contract to Buy and Sell. Moreover, nowhere
can it be found that the law requires a contract of sale before an offense can be committed under
Section 20.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA
G.R. No. 199877
Facts: On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City the accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and
confederating together with one unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of them mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money
amounting to P230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. represented
by Enrique Sumulong. On the occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which directly caused his death. On June 7, 2001 at around 7:55 in the evening, Sumulong went to the
police station and informed SPO1 Cruz that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street. Four police
officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified; they
then approached Lara and invited him for questioning at the police station. Lara was placed in a line-up
where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie. On October 1, 2008, the RTC

convicted Lara of robbery with homicide. On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly
attended his conviction. The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the court gained jurisdiction over the accused considering that irregularities may
have attended Lara’s arrest. WON Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on
appeal for the purpose of nullifying his conviction.
Held: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a
warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to
the court. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must
be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to
the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this
precludes him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived
upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.
Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up
did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without
the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to
counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made
to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.

Bureau of Customs vs Peter Sherman et al. and the Court of Tax Appeal
GR no. 190487
Facts: Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. (MSPI) caused the importation of finished bet slips and rolls of
finished thermal papers from June 2005 to January 2007. MSPI facilitated the release of the shipment
from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), where it was brought, to the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) for its lotto operations in Luzon. MSPI did not pay duties or taxes, prompting
the Bureau of Customs (petitioner) to file, under its Run after the Smugglers (RATS) Program, a criminal
complaint before the Department of Justice against herein respondents MSPI for violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended and Republic Act No. 7916. State Prosecutor Rohaira
Lao-Tamano found probable cause against respondents and accordingly recommended the filing of
Information against them. Respondents filed a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice during
the pendency of which the Information was filed on April 11, 2009 before the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA). The Secretary of Justice reversed the State Prosecutor’s Resolution and accordingly directed the
withdrawal of the Information. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, it elevated
the case by certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, the prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information with Leave of Court before the CTA, which granted the withdrawal of, and

accordingly dismissed the Information. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner. The CTA
issued a Resolution merely noting without action said motion.
Issue: Whether or not the participation in the case of private complainant, Bureau of Custom, is limited
to that of a witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case.
Held: Prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal
power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right
to prosecute violators. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted
under the direction and control of public prosecutors.[19] In the prosecution of special laws, the
exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different
government agencies to assist the public prosecutor. The designation does not, however, detract from
the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the case. As stated in the Resolution, the CTA
noted without action petitioner's motion for reconsideration. By merely noting without action
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion because it is the
public prosecutor who has control and supervision over the cases. The participation in the case of a
private complainant, like petitioner, is limited to that of a witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of
the case. As petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the challenged CTA Resolution did not bear the
imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution of the case belongs, the
present petition fails.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. SANDIGANBAYAN IMELDA R. MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ
and GILBERT C. DULAY
G.R. Nos. 153304-05
Facts: The petition stemmed from two criminal information filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging
the respondents with the crime of malversation of public funds. The charges arose from the transactions
that the respondents participated in, in their official capacities as Minister and Deputy Minister of the
Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) under the MHS’ Kabisig Program. After the pre-trial conference, a
joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The prosecution’s chief evidence was based on the lone
testimony of Commission of Audit (COA) Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the documentary evidence used
in the audit examination of the subject funds. COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not
conduct a physical inventory of these motor vehicles; it based its report on the information given by the
Presidential Task Force. She emphasized that the audit team found it highly irregular that the motor
vehicles were registered in the name of University of Life (UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for this
reason, she believed that no proper liquidation was made of these vehicles by MHS. After COA Auditor
Cortez’ testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
Subsequently, the accused filed a demurrer to evidence which the Sandiganbayan granted and acquitted
the accused. The Sandiganbayan found no evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds in the two
criminal cases considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecutor’s actions and/or omissions in these cases effectively deprived the
State of its right to due process

HELD: As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. In the
conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has discretionary power to control the conduct of
the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose what evidence to
present or who to call as witness. In this case, the State was not denied due process in the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and wilfully
failed to present available evidence or that other evidence could be secured.
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan is under no obligation to require the parties
to present additional evidence when a demurrer to evidence is filed. In a criminal proceeding, the
burden lies with the prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt. Whether the Sandiganbayan will intervene in the course of the prosecution of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction. The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or
allow the prosecution to present additional evidence after a demurrer to evidence is filed. This exercise,
however, must be for good reasons and in the paramount interest of justice. Thus, the court may
require the presentation of further evidence if its action on the demurrer to evidence would patently
result in the denial of due process; it may also allow the presentation of additional evidence if it is newly
discovered, if it was omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to correct the evidence
previously offered.
In this case, we cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan when it
exercised restraint and did not require the presentation of additional evidence, given the clear weakness
of the case at that point. The petitioner failed to show what and how additional available evidence could
have helped and the paramount interest of justice sought to be achieved.
ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
BERNARDO VERGARA, JR
G.R. No. 172829
Facts: The MeTC dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public documents upon motion
of the petitioners based on lack of probable cause. The MeTC dismissed the criminal case. With the
express conformity of the public prosecutor, the private complainant Vergara Jr. appealed the dismissal
to the RTC. The RTC set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the MeTC for trial.
Petitioners questioned the order of the RTC by petition for review before the CA which dismissed the
petition saying that the order of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and therefore not appealable.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, the instant
petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal personality to appeal the July 9, 2004 order of the MeTC
Held: Suffice it to say that the appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the
public prosecutor who handles the case. It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has
authority to file an appeal with the RTC. The Administrative Code of 1987 mandates the OSG to

represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.”
On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled “Reorganizing the Prosecution
Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the
Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was the law in force at the
time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor)
“shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal
ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the
institution of criminal prosecutions.” In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has been held
by this Court that the fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses
before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial
courts and the regional trial courts. Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with the RTC of
Manila, it is clear that the City Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had
authority to file the same.
Moreover, petitioners' reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited
provision refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to file information or
dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city
fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law, which provides that in cases of
appeal, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or
approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. In other words, unless otherwise
ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning
the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval
of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.
GERLIE M. Uy vs JUDGE ERWIN B. Javellana
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666
Facts: This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug
(Bascug) of the (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Javellana of the MeTC, La Castellana,
Negros Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint:
First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public
Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several occasions as examples:
O In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a
warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure;
oIn Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did
not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and
19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading;
oAlso in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when
the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses
were all hearsay evidence; and

oIn Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not
apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and
preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case
for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no
personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for
dismissal of said case.
Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their
witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge
Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when
a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v.
Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said
investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel
Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious; and the acts being
complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the proper subject of an
administrative complaint. Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint
against him. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report, found Judge Javellana liable for
gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
in cases appropriately covered by said Rule.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Held: Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in
People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the
case was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find
irrelevant Judge Javellana’s argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The
following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. were not referred to the Lupon, and the accused
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the
Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.
(hindi ko sure) Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary
investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct
proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby
lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were
charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised
Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two

(2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602
Fatcs: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with three
counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson. The
accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
86, in Quezon City. They were penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered to pay to
the heirs’ actual damages civil indemnity, and moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
upheld the RTC with some modifications as to the civil indemnity. The accused came to the Court to
seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007 Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court
granted, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. Hence, the Court hereby resolves only
the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez. In his appeal, PO2 Valdez contends among others that the State did
not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Issue: Whether or not PO2 Valdez may be convicted of murder considering that the attendance of
treachery was not sufficiently allege in the information.
Held: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the information to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack
and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting *them+ with a gun, hitting
*them+” on various parts of their bodies “which *were+ the direct and immediate cause of [their]
death*s+” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended
each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and
specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the
use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that
could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient
averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact.
In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the information. Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED
by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE.
PEOPLE OF THE Philippines vs DINA DULAY y PASCUAL
G.R. No. 193854

Facts: That on or about July 3 2005, in the City of Parañaque, the accused Dina P. Dulay delivered and
offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias “Speed,” who with lewd design
and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against
her will and without her consent. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The appellant in this case was charged in the
Information as having committed the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. She was eventually convicted by the trial
court of the crime of rape as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua as provided under Article 266-B of the RPC.
Issue: Whether or not the information is sufficient to convict the accused considering that, there was a
defective designation of the crime
Held: It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused of Rape
under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A.
7610, and then went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610 in its body as appellant
acted as a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution.
It must be remembered that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in
the complaint or information. The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or
defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration
of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby dismissed. However the Decision of
the CA is hereby MODIFlED as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, but
of violating Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610.
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184274
Facts: That on or about August 13 2004, or prior thereto, in Las Piñas City, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with each other, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant HENRY
YU by applying a credit card from METROBANK CARD CORPORATION, using the name of complainant
Henry C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the
name of Henry Yu was successfully issued and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and
addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu. The RTC rendered a decision
finding petitioner GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act 8484
(Access Device Regulation Act of 1998). On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner
assails the validity of the Information and claims that he was not informed of the accusation against him.
He explains that though he was charged with “possession of an access device fraudulently applied for,”
the act of “possession,” which is the gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
Issue: Whether or not the Information is valid considering the act of “possession,” which is the
gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information

Held: In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly stated that the accused is petitioner “Mark
Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur.” It was also specified in the preamble of the Information
that he was being charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e) for possessing a counterfeit
access device or access device fraudulently applied for. In the accusatory portion thereof, the acts
constituting the offense were clearly narrated in that “*petitioner+, together with other persons*,+
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded private complainant by applying [for] a credit card, an
access device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484, from Metrobank Card Corporation, using the name of
complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit
card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious
identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.” Moreover, it was
identified that the offended party was private complainant Henry Yu and the crime was committed on
or about the 13th day of August 2004 in the City of Las Piñas. Undoubtedly, the Information contained
all the necessary details of the offense committed, sufficient to apprise petitioner of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. As aptly argued by respondent People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, although the word “possession” was not used in the accusatory
portion of the Information, the word “possessing” appeared in its preamble or the first paragraph
thereof. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, he was apprised that he was being charged with
violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically section 9(e) thereof, for possession of the credit card fraudulently
applied for.
Even if the word “possession” was not repeated in the accusatory portion of the Information,
the acts constituting it were clearly described in the statement “*that the+ credit card in the name of
Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses
of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.” Without a doubt, petitioner was given
the necessary data as to why he was being prosecuted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL
G.R. No: G.R. No. 159450
Facts: The accused is one of the tellers of Prudential Bank in Angeles City. She was charged of the crime
of qualified theft “…with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer, with
intent to gain and without theknowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging
to the Prudential Bank…” Among the six tellers of Prudential Bank in the said branch, she was the only
teller assigned to handle dollar deposits and withdrawals. Virgilio Frias, Prudential Bank’s Senior audit
examiner, inventoried the cash accountabilities of the said bank by manually counting the money in
each of the teller’s cash boxes. The books of the branch showed that appellant, Olivia, had a cash
accountability of $15,040.52, the money in her cash box was only $5,040.52. When asked about the
shortage, appellant explained that there was a withdrawal of $10,000.00 on December 29, 1995 after
the cut-off time which would be treated as a withdrawal on January 2, 1996 and showed to Frias a
withdrawal memo dated January 2, 1996. The next day, Frias checked the account ledger of FX-836, and
found a "hold jacket" indicating that no withdrawal from the said account should be allowed to reduce
its balance below $35,000.00; he also found in the ledger that a deposit of $10,000.00 was made on
January 2, 1956. He found the deposit memo on file. Thereafter, Frias compared the signature on the
withdrawal memo with the specimen signatures of the depositors in their signature card. Finding a "big
difference" in the signatures, he referred the matter to the branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio. Asked by
Panlilio to explain, appellant reiterated that the withdrawal was made after the cut-off time on
December 29, 1995. Doubting her explanation, Frias conducted another cash count. At that time,

appellant’s accountability based on the books of the bank was $21,778.86, but the money in her cash
box was only $11,778.86, thus, short of US$10,000.00. When Panlilio again asked appellant to explain,
the latter started to cry and said she would explain to the bank president.The next day, January 4, 1996,
appellant told Panlilio that she gave the $10,000.00 to a person on December 29, 1995 because her
family was being threatened. In her letter to the bank president dated January 4, 1996, appellant
apologized and explained her shortage of $10,000.00 and another shortage of P2.2 Million which the
audit team had also discovered, stating the same reason that she and her family was threatened.Upon
the State resting its case against the accused, her counsel filed aDemurrer to Evidence and Motion to
Defer Defense Evidence,praying for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that the evidence of the
State did not suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the RTC denied
theDemurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidenceand deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis that her filingher demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required
by Section 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence. The Court of
Appeals, affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the information filed against the accused was fatally defective
Held: The petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified theft that allegedly
transpired on December 29, 1995, but the evidence at trial could not be the basis of her conviction
because it actually proved that the taking had transpired on January 2, 1996; and that the discrepancy
would unduly prejudice her rights as an accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to
prepare for her defense. But the petitioner’s submission is untenable.The sufficiency of the allegation of
the time or date of the commission of the offense, Section 6 and Section 11, Rule110 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the rules applicable, provide:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. –A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the actsor omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission
of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information.
Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. –It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the
actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.
Conformably with these rules, the information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of
the commission of the offense through the words "on or about the 2nd of January, 1996," and the
accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she was charged from a
reading of its contents as well as gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the charge
to enable her to prepare her defense. The information herein did not have to state the precise date
when the offense was committed, considering that the date was not a material ingredient of the
offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.

LITO BAUTISTA vs SHARON G. CUNET A-PANGILINAN

Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two (2) informations with the RTC,
Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, against Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista
and Alcantara, for the crime of libel, committed by publishing defamatory articles against respondent
Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera. On November 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order
granting petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the Criminal Case. On August 19, 2008,
respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC Orders dated April 25,
2008 (which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against
them) and June 3, 2008 (which noted and admitted respondent's Comment to form part of the records
of the case). In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby reversing
and setting aside the RTC Order. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated which,
however, was denied by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not respondent lacked the personality or legal standing to question the trial court’s
order
Held: Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the
State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of
the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor
general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned the criminal
aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition should have
been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the
instance of the OSG, the same should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA. Respondent lacked the
personality or legal standing to question the trial court’s order because it is only the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), who can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal proceedings, before the
Supreme Court and the CA. Thus, the CA should have denied the petition outright.

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL vs MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060
Facts: Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner received summons to appear before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before
the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City issued an Order holding that the pendency of the case before
the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before

it. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC Quezon City denied the motion. CA dismissed
the petition.
Issue: whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
Held: The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.
The civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since
the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The issue in the civil case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.*16+ At
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will
have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.
In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be
held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
JESSE Y. YAP vs HON. MONICO G. CABALES
G.R. No. 159186
Facts: Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through
their company Primetown Property Group. Yap purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn
Te. Inconsideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several BPI postdated checks to Evelyn.
Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta,
rediscounted the checks from Evelyn. Some of the checks were dishonor by reason of account closed.
Despite of the demand, Yap failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks. Spouses
Mirabueno filed a civila ction for collection of sum of money against Yap. Subsequently, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of BP 22 against the
petitioner. In the criminal cases, Yap filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the
existence of a prejudicial question. The MCTC denied the motions for lack of merit. On appeal, the RTC
likewise denied the petition. CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA
opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the
petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the
proceedings in the MTCC.

HELD: None. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related
to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other
element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in
the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined
first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs CLEOFE S. JANIOLA
G.R. No. 184861
Facts: This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding
filed by the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with
respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent. The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied
Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for
violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Correspondingly, the former also
filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTCn.On
September 20, 2006, Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter respondent
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent claim
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the
Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on prejudicial question for the following
grounds;
(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing
checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent
violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a
prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in this case,
the criminal casehaving preceded the civil case. The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend
Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition
raised.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal
Case on the basis of “Prejudicial Question “, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.
Held: This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question. The elements
of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed by the State with
the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the
Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of
private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks
which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution
under BP 22.Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164435
Facts: That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, the above-named
accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and
without the said marriage having been legally dissolved feloniously contract a second marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999. Emmanuel Uy
filed against the appellant a Civil Case for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City. Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati a Civil Case for declaration of nullity of their marriage. The trial court rendered the
assailed decision, holding Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On Appeal, the
CA confirmed the ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where Jarillo filed a civil case against
Alocillo rendered judgement declaring Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground
of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Jarillo, in her motion for reconsideration, invoked the ruling of the
trial court as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. In a Resolution by the CA, the latter denied
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE
CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
Held:
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy and in such a case the criminal case may not
be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.
It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for
suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her
appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by
the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension,
while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court categorically stated that

as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to
be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop,
any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
( Pwede hnd na pag hnd na kasya) The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two
marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment
petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null
and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration
of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.*10+ As held in Tenebro, “[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A
plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.”
Galvez vs Hon. Court of Appeals
671 SCRA 222
Facts : Radio Marine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (RMSI) claiming to do business under the name Smartnet
Philippines, Inc. (SPI), applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various credit facilities with Asia United
Bank (AUB). To induce AUB to extend the Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI presented its Articles of
Incorporation with its 400-peso million capitalization and its congressional telecom franchise. Satisfied
with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted it a P250 million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name
of Smartnet Philippines, RMSI’s Division. On 1 February 2000, the credit line was increased to P452
million pesos after a third-party real estate mortgage by Goodland Company, Inc. in favor of Smartnet
Philippines, was offered to the bank. RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the Omnibus Credit
Line and peso and dollar accounts in the name of Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which Gilbert Guy, et al.
represented as a division of RMSI. Prior to this major transaction, however, and, unknown to AUB, while
RMSI was doing business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and that there was a division under
the name Smartnet Philippines, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a paidup capital of only P62,500.00. Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines AUB granted to it,
among others, Irrevocable Letter of Credit in the total sum of $29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz
Support Centre Asia Ptd. Ltd., which is the subject of these consolidated petitions. When RMSI’s
obligations remained unpaid, AUB sent letters demanding payments. RMSI denied liability contending
that the transaction was incurred solely by SPI which has a separate and distinct personality from RMSI.
RMSI further claimed that while Smartnet Philippines is an RMSI division, SPI, is a subsidiary of RMSI,
and hence, is a separate entity. Aggrieved, AUB filed a case of syndicated estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)
of the Revised Penal Code. AUB alleged that the directors of RMSI deceived it into believing that SPI was
a division of RMSI, only to insist on its separate juridical personality later on to escape from its liabilities

with AUB. the Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Gilbert G. Guy, et al. for estafa. Accordingly, an
Information was filed against Gilbert Guy, et al. with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
ISSUE: whether or not there is probable cause to prosecute Gilbert Guy, et al. for the crime of
syndicated estafa on the basis of fraudulent means employed to deceive AUB into releasing the
proceeds of Irrevocable Letter of Credit in favor of SPI.
Held: It is worth emphasizing that under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the function of a preliminary investigation is to determine “whether there is a sufficient ground to
engender a well-grounded belief that a crime x x x has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.”A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused committed the crime. Preliminary investigation
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation
of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity and merits of a party's accusation or defense, as
well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper. We,
therefore, sustain the findings of the CA and the City Prosecutor’s Resolution finding that probable
cause exists against Gilbert Guy, et al. for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code and that Gilbert Guy, et al. are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. AUB’s
voluminous documents submitted to this Court overcome this difficulty and established that there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Lest it be misunderstood, we reiterate that this Court’s finding of probable cause is grounded on
fraud committed through deceit which surrounded Gilbert Guy, et al. transaction with AUB, thus,
violating Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code; it is neither their act of borrowing money and not
paying them, nor their denial thereof, but their very act of deceiving AUB in order for the latter to part
with its money. In these cases, the accused used the legitimacy of their entities to perpetrate their
unlawful and illegal acts. We see no reason not to apply this law to a banking institution, a corporation
imbued with public interest, when a clear reading of the PD 1689 reveals that it is within its coverage.
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO vs JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804
Facts: The case sprang from a Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr. City
Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado filed the Information in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City,
which was eventually raffled to Branch 7 thereof presided by respondent Judge Abraham A. Bayona.
Respondent ordered the office of the City Prosecutor to present additional evidence, relevant records
and documents to enable the Court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause. the
Office of the City Prosecutor submitted a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation and
informed respondent that the documents submitted by the parties for preliminary investigation were
already appended to the complaint. Complainant explained that there was no memorandum of transfer
of the case from the investigating prosecutor to him. Complainant discussed that the case was initially
handled by ACP Jarder who found no probable cause against Cresencio Palo, Sr., accused in Criminal
Case No. 09-03-16474. However, complainant, upon review found that there was probable cause against
Palo. Thus, complainant disapproved ACP Jarder’s Resolution and filed the Information in court. The
Office of the City Prosecutor sent a letter explaining the impossibility of submitting the Jarder Resolution

to the court but respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City Prosecutor
and insisted that the Jarder Resolution should form part of the records of the case.
Issue: Whether or not respondent erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution when all
other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have been submitted to his court
Held: The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. Thus, the courts must
consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An examination of the 2008 Revised
Manual for Prosecutors of the Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service31 (DOJ-NPS Manual),
therefore, is necessary.
There is nothing in the DOJ-NPS Manual requiring the removal of a resolution by an investigating
prosecutor recommending the dismissal of a criminal complaint after it was reversed by the provincial,
city or chief state prosecutor. Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to an
information filed in court is optional under the aforementioned manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states
that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as
practicable.” Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. In view of the
foregoing, the Court finds that respondent erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution
when all other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have been submitted to his
court, and in going so far as to motu proprio initiating a proceeding for contempt against complainant.

BURGUNDY CORPORATION vs JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES
G.R. No. 181021
Facts: Josefa “Jing” C. Reyes (Reyes) offered her services to petitioner as the latter's real estate agent in
buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She informed
petitioner that more or less ten (10) lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties.
Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be
used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land, converted and
misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a formal
demand for Reyes to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail despite her receipt of the said
demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant
City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City. After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes,
the Assistant Prosecutor of Makati City filed an information for the crime of estafa against reyes before
the RTC of Makati.
Issue: Whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that estafa has been
committed by respondent and should be held for trial
Held: It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a
preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether
there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. In a preliminary investigation, the
public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof

that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at
this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of
evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims. A review of the records would show
that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of
estafa.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs VICENTE ATILANO
G.R. No. 166758
Facts: MERALCO filed a complaint for estafa. MERALCO alleged that in 1993, MERALCO started investing
in commercial papers (CPs) through CIPI. As of May 2000, MERALCO’s investment with CIPI already
amounted to P75,000,000.00.At various points in time, MERALCO delivered funds to the respondents for
investment in CPs and government securities (GS). Sometime in May 2000, respondent Atilano, who was
at that time the President of CIPI, conveyed to Manuel Lopez, MERALCO’s President, that CIPI was facing
liquidity problems. Lopez agreed to extend help to CIPI by placing investments through CIPI, on the
condition that CIPI would secure these investments with GS and CPs issued by the Lopez Group of
Companies (Lopez Group). Pursuant to this agreement, Fernando, who was at that time the Head of
MERALCO’s Treasury Operations Group, and respondent Vicente, who was the Assistant Manager of
CIPI’s Funds Management Group, allegedly entered into the following transactions:
1.Investment: 20,000,000; Term 30 Days; Securities: GS and CP’s of Lopes Group
2.Investment: 45,000,000; Term: 30 Days; Securities: CP’s of Rockwell and Benpres Corp.
MERALCO further alleged that it informed CIPI of its requirement to have the above-listed securities
delivered to it within twenty-four (24) hours after the transaction, which CIPI failed to deliver despite
repeated demands. Contrary to its specific instructions, MERALCO alleged that CIPI diverted MERALCO’s
funds by placing the investments in CIPI’s own promissory notes (PNs) and in CPs of companies that are
not members of the Lopez Group. (i.e. the 10M investment of CIPI in Pilipino Telephone Corporation’s
CP’s) CPIP failed to deliver the securities on time. In a resolution Prosecutor Denis Pastrana dismissed
MERALCO’s complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Prosecutor Pastrana noted that considering the
amount of money that MERALCO invested, there was no documentary evidence to show any specific
instruction for CIPI to invest the funds only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group. MERALCO merely relied on
the Minutes of the June 8, 2000 Meeting to prove that MERALCO indeed made such an instruction.
Prosecutor Pastrana concluded that the transaction between MERALCO and CIPI was a money market
transaction partaking of a loan transaction whose nonpayment does not give rise to any criminal liability
for estafa through misappropriation or conversion. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals,
where they ruled that the relationship between MERALCO and CIPI is that of a Creditor and Debtor, thus
the case is not one for estafa, but a civil case for recovery.
Issue: Whether the DOJ Resolution complied with constitutional and legal requirements when it stated
its legal basis for denying MERALCO’s petition for review.
Held: The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of preliminary investigation to
determine whether, based on the evidence presented to him, he should take further action by filing a
criminal complaint in court. In doing so, he does not adjudicate upon the rights, obligations or liabilities

of the parties before him. Since the power exercised by the public prosecutor in this instance is merely
investigative or inquisitorial, it is subject to a different standard in terms of stating the facts and the law
in its determinations. This is also true in the case of the DOJ Secretary exercising her review powers over
decisions of public prosecutors. Thus, it is sufficient that in denying a petition for review of a resolution
of a prosecutor, the DOJ resolution state the law upon which it is based.
We rule, therefore, that the DOJ resolution satisfactorily complied with constitutional and legal
requirements when it stated its legal basis for denying MERALCO’s petition for review which is Section 7
of Department Circular No. 70, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if
he finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised
therein are too insubstantial to require consideration.
GERLIE M. Uy vs JUDGE ERWIN B. Javellana
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666
Facts: This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and Bascug of the PAO, La Carlotta
District, against Presiding Judge Javellana of the MeTC, La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged that Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several occasions as examples, and among
these is Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v. Bautista where Judge Javellana failed to observe the
constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge
Javellana set People v. Bautista for preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel, and
proceeded with said investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and to
have a counsel. In a Criminal Case entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana
did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary
examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have
been a ground for dismissal of said case.
Judge Javellana argued that while a judge can ask clarificatory questions during the preliminary
investigation, a preliminary investigation is mandatory only when the law imposes the penalty of
imprisonment of at least four years, two months, and one day.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Held: Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required or justified.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the
filing of a criminal case under said Rule. Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established herein, the maximum
penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just six 6 months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation
in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted

to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the
constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.37 Judge Javellana cannot be allowed
to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express
purpose of said Rule.

PCGG CHAIRMAN MAGDANGAL B. ELMA vs REINER JACOBI
G.R. No. 155996
Facts: There were several letters showing that there exists agreement between PCGG and respondent
Jacobi entitling the latter of incentive percentage for efforts in recovering ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. Respondent Jacobi filed before the Sandiganbayan thru his counsel Atty. Reyes a petition for
mandamus, prohibition and certiorari (with prayer for injunction) against PCGG for allegedly re-hiring
two “trojan horse” consultants preventing the enforcement of claims against the Marcoses. Another
similar thrust was filed before the Ombudsman against PCGG in violation of R.A. No. 3019, with a later
manifestation of withdrawing a letter because Jacobi is allegedly part of said letter. PCGG claimed that
said that the letter is a falsified document there being nothing on their records that such ever existed.
PCGG through Chairman Elma filed before the DOJ criminal complaint under Art.171 par.2 and Art. 172
pars.1 and 3 of RPC against respondents. No summons were issued to respondents. DOJ found no
probable cause on the complaint and the case was dismissed.
Issue: Whether certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the DOJ’s determination of
probable cause.
Held: The respondents claim that a petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy in
questioning the assailed DOJ resolutions. The respondents are mistaken. By weighing the evidence
submitted by the parties in a preliminary investigation and by making an independent assessment
thereof, an investigating prosecutor is, to that extent, performing functions of a quasi-judicial nature in
the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, since he does not make a determination of the
rights of any party in the proceeding, or pronounce the respondent’s guilt or innocence (thus limiting his
action to the determination of probable cause to file an information in court), an investigating
prosecutor’s function still lacks the element of adjudication essential to an appeal under Rule 43. As an
extraordinary remedy, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not require that summons be issued to the
respondent; the service upon him of an order to file its Comment or Memorandum is sufficient. But it is
required that this be filed before the Court of Appeals and not directly to SC under the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. SC’s original jurisdiction may be allowed only if there are special and important
reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
(pwede hnd na isama) The Court has consistently adopted the policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
Courts cannot order the prosecution of one against whom the prosecutor has not found a prima facie
case; as a rule, courts, too, cannot substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive. To justify
judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly
show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to

establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial relief
from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained. All these, the petitioner failed to establish.
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA
G.R. No. 182677
Facts: Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged with homicide for the death of
Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner
was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a
bond which the trial court approved, he was released from detention, and his arraignment was set. The
private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor
to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007 deferring petitioner’s arraignment and
allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a
recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January31, 2007 denying
reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from
the trial court an investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner
contends that the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent has the right to cause the reinvestigation of the criminal case
when the criminal information had already been filed with the lower court.
Held: A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an
offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without
regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in
cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where
available, has been conducted.
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in
criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued
by the court for the purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in court. The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature
and the attendant risk of running against Article 125, ends with either the prompt filing of an
information in court or the immediate release of the arrested person. Notably, the rules on inquest do
not provide for a motion for reconsideration. Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant
should have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of
inquest. Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by "petition by a proper party
under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe. "The rule referred to is the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall "apply to appeals
from resolutions in cases subject of preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation." In cases subject of
inquest, therefore, the private party should first avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if
any, before elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary. In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable
cause, the private complainant may pursue the case through the regular course of a preliminary

investigation. ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the
accused with another opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation within five days from the time
he learns of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether
the private complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar
right to ask for a reinvestigation.
The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the
ensuing disquisition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JOSE ALMODIEL alias "DODONG ASTROBAL,"
G. R. No. 200951
Facts: On March 20 2003, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) received a report from a
confidential agent that a certain “Dodong” was dealing with shabu. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, PO2
Virtudazo, PO3 Lumawag, and the confidential agent proceeded to Purok 9, Brgy. 15, Langihan Road,
Butuan City to conduct the buy-bust operation. When the accused arrived, the confidential agent
introduced PO2 Virtudazo to the accused as customer of shabu. PO2 Virtudazo told the accused that he
wanted to buy two sachets of shabu worth P400.00. The accused agreed, and then left. After thirty
minutes, the accused returned bringing two sachets containing white crystalline substance, which he
handed to PO2 Virtudazo. Thus, PO2 Virtudazo gave a pre-arranged signal to PO3 Lumawag to approach
them. PO2 Virtudazo and PO3 Lumawag introduced themselves as PDEA agents, and arrested the
accused after informing him of his constitutional rights. They took him to the PDEA Regional Office, and
seized from him other items, two aluminum foils and one lighter. On the other hand, the accused failed
to present clear and convincing evidence to prove his defense of frame-up and planting of evidence.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of RA 9165.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest was unlawful making the sachets of shabu inadmissible in evidence
Held: Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a person may be arrested without a warrant if
he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” The accused was
caught in the act of committing an offense during a buy-bust operation. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police officers are not only
authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. An arrest made after an entrapment
operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid “warrantless arrest.
Considering that an arrest was lawfully made, the search incidental to such arrest was also valid. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched, without a search warrant, for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense. Accordingly,
the two sachets of shabu seized in the present case are admissible as evidence.
People of the Philippines vs Godofredo Mariano y Feliciano
GR. No. I 9 I I 9 3
Facts: On 17 October 2004, a buy-bust operation was conducted in the house of a certain Gerry Angustia
located at Pier Uno, Zone 2, Bulan, Sorsogon. PO1 Olleres, PO3 Razo and the asset proceeded to the
target house and they witnessed an ongoing pot session. They looked for “Galog” and they were

introduced to Godofredo. They asked Godofredo if they can “score.” Godofredo immediately left the
house and went to a street at the back of the house. He returned carrying two (2) sachets of shabu,
which he handed to PO1 Ollares. In exchange, PO1 Olleres paid him the One Thousand Peso marked bill.
Allan also offered PO3 Razo two (2) more sachets of shabu. The latter asked for the Six Hundred Peso
marked bills from PO1 Olleres and handed them to Allan as payment for the shabu. After these
exchanges, they requested appellants for an actual test of shabu. Godofredo provided them with a
tooter and aluminum foil. While they were testing said shabu, they declared an arrest. The trial court
held that the prosecution was able to establish that the buy-bust operation was successfully conducted
when appellants were caught in flagrante delicto selling drugs, resulting in their apprehension. The trial
court dismissed the defense of alibi and denial over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest
Held:
While both appellants admitted their presence in the scene of the crime, they both denied the
existence of a buy-bust operation. The defense of denial, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted. Denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing
evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellants cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is no evidence of any improper motive on the
part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation to falsely testify against appellants.
Appellants’ insistence on the illegality of their warrantless arrest equally lacks merit. The warrantless
arrest was effected under the first mode enumerated in section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court or
aptly termed as in flagrante delicto. PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo personally witnessed and were in fact
participants to the buy-bust operation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substances
placed inside the four (4) separate plastic sachets were found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Under these circumstances, it is beyond doubt that
appellants were arrested in flagrante delicto while committing a crime, in full view of the arresting team.