Cases 427-428 Ownership

PROPERTY

1. ENCARNACION V AMIGO
Ejectment

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169793

September 15, 2006

VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner,
vs.
NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 73857, ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial
Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121-B-1, consisting
of 100 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting
of 607 square meters with TCT No. T-256651, located at District 1, National Hi-way,
Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a single 707 square
meter track of land owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on
January 18, 1982. On March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay.
After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of
Waiver2 on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law,
herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of
the land into two lots3 and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18, 1996.4
Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion
of the property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then owner, Victoriano
Magpantay. Said occupation by respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and
T-256651 were issue to petitioner.
Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter5 dated Febuary 1, 2001
demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property. As evidenced by the registry
return receipt, the demand letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent on
February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent still refused to
vacate the subject property. Thereafter, on March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint6 for
ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with the Municipal Trial

Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV-01-030. In his Answer, respondent
alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the subject
land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner
was tainted with irregularities.7
On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment, which reads:
WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a JUDGMENT is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION and against the
defendant NIEVES AMIGOE (sic) as follows:
a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the parcels of land described in
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 he is now occupying and
surrender it to the plaintiff;
b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000) as attorney's fees, and
c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] P500.00 per month from
February, 2001 until the portion of the land occupied by him is surrendered to the plaintiff.
COSTS against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case on the ground that as the
Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, this Court acquired no appellate
jurisdiction thereof. Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before
the Court of Appeals which promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to the
Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to Branch 20,
Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence the present petition raising the sole issue:

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPER
ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS
DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER.12
The petition lacks merit.
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property
are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of
physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and
should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession,
which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has
lasted for more than one year; and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of
ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.13
Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the proper action
to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in this case is the length of time
of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the possession to file at any time
within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.14 Thus, if the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court
acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year,
the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper
Regional Trial Court.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the proper action in this case is accion
publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan,
Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of

whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of
the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.15 On its face, the complaint must show
enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.16
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the owner of the
property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law.
He filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to
the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. While it
is true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001,
thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year
from last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner
became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived
possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up
to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length
of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action
beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana.
After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the Regional Trial
Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently
of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.17
Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another person was
occupying his property way back in 1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for
ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one for accion publiciana and not one under
the summary procedure on ejectment. As explained by the Court:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are indeed the owners of the subject
lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they should present their claim
before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not
before the metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible
entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
wrested from another who had been in physical or material possession of the same for
more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.18
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:
The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 1985 but it was only on
March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his ejectment case. The
respondent should have filed an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.

Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an
appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the
merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of
affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the
case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section,
without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the
Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no
longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no
longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence
presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings
and additional evidence in the interest of justice.19
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June
30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to
the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is
AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

2. RIVERA V RIVERA
Ejectment
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154203. July 8, 2003]
REY CARLO A. RIVERA and GLADYS ABAGA RIVERA, petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO
RIVERA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners assail the
March 21, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in connection with an ejectment
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 7529, ordering them to vacate the disputed
premises and pay rentals.
The subject of the dispute is a 228-square meter lot with a two-storey duplex house
located in Pasig City. The property was originally owned by spouses Remigio
Rivera, Sr. and Consuelo Rivera. The spouses had eleven (11) children, two of whom
were Remigio, Jr. (petitioners’ father) and respondent Virgilio Rivera.
In 1974, when the spouses migrated to the United States, they asked their son
Remigio, Jr. and his children (two of whom are petitioners Rey Carlo and Gladys
Rivera) to occupy one unit of the duplex house without payment of rentals. In 1985,
respondent, another son of the spouses, moved into the other unit of the duplex
house and likewise occupied it gratuitously.
After Remigio, Sr. died in 1992, his widow Consuelo and their eleven (11) children
executed an extrajudicial settlement[1] where the children voluntarily waived their
hereditary rights to four (4) real properties owned by their parents, including the lot
with the duplex house, in favor of their mother Consuelo.
In 1993, Remigio, Jr. together with his three (3) sons migrated to the United States,
leaving behind petitioners who continued to reside in one of the units of the duplex
house. Respondent likewise migrated to the U.S.
On April 6, 1999, Consuelo sold the duplex house and lot to respondent for five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).[2] At the time of the sale, both Consuelo and
respondent were residing in the same house in San Jose, California. In the Deed of
Sale, Consuelo and respondent were represented by respondent’s daughters Ma.
Theresa R. Ferreria and Ma. Dolores A. Rivera.
Title to the property was
subsequently transferred in the name of respondent.
Respondent, represented by his daughter Dolores, asked petitioners to sign a lease
contract over the unit of the duplex house they were occupying, covering the period
from April 30, 1999 to June 30, 1999, with a monthly rental of P6,000.00.
As the petitioners refused to sign the lease contract or vacate the premises,
respondent,[3] through his daughter Dolores, filed an unlawful detainer case (Civil
Case No. 7529) against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City.

In the complaint,[4] it was alleged: that respondent is the registered owner of the
duplex house; that he merely tolerated petitioners’ occupancy of one of the units
thereof, conditioned upon the execution of the lease contract between the parties;
that petitioners initially agreed thereto as they claimed they would remain in the unit
only for a few more months; and that after respondent caused the preparation of the
lease contract, petitioners refused to sign it or vacate the property.
In their Answer with counterclaim,[5] petitioners alleged that the deed of sale
between Consuelo and Virgilio Rivera was fictitious. They claimed that their
occupancy of the premises was not by mere tolerance as they have a right to occupy
it as co-owners. Hence, they averred that they could not be compelled to pay rentals
for the use of the property. Petitioners likewise raised the affirmative defense that
respondent had no cause of action against them as no title was conferred to him
because: the deed of sale was fictitious; the subject property was part of the
conjugal property of Remigio, Sr. and Consuelo and after the former’s death, all the
compulsory heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement transferring all the conjugal
properties to Consuelo out of love and respect for her; Consuelo and all the
compulsory heirs have migrated to the States; Consuelo was living with respondent
in the States; Consuelo and respondent hid from the other heirs the transfer of the
subject property to respondent; the deed of sale was executed in the Philippines
through a special power of attorney granted by respondent to his daugthers, Ma.
Theresa Rivera-Ferreria and Ma. Dolores Rivera; assuming that the sale was
legitimate, Consuelo did not notify petitioners thereof, with deliberate intent and bad
faith to disinherit her grandchildren, petitioners herein, in violation of their right of
first refusal, having resided in the premises since birth, or for more than 20 years;
the P500,000 consideration for the sale was clearly inadequate; assuming that the
sale was valid, it nonetheless deprived the other compulsory heirs of their share over
the subject property; and with the attendant defects in the sale of the property, no
right or title was transferred to respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment in the ejectment case in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against defendants Rey Carlo Rivera and Gladys Rivera in the manner
following:
1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to
immediately vacate the subject premises unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of
unpaid rentals from April to September 1999, without prejudice to collecting the
reasonable compensation for occupancy that may be forthcoming until defendants
vacate the premises;
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of
attorney’s fees; and

4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the grounds
that: (a) the respondent had no right over the property as he did not have actual or
prior physical possession thereof; (b) the non-existent lease contract was not
binding between the parties; and (c) respondent’s title was not indefeasible.
On March 16, 2001, the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC and ruled in favor of
the petitioners. It held that there was no valid contract of lease between the parties
and petitioners occupied the subject property in the concept of a co-owner.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated March 21, 2002, reversed the
RTC’s decision and reinstated the original decision of the MeTC.[7] It held that as
registered owner of the land, respondent is entitled to possession thereof.
Hence, this petition for review with petitioners raising the following issues: (a)
whether petitioners, being in actual physical possession of the property since 1974,
are entitled to continue in possession of the premises until the issue of ownership
thereof is resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) whether Civil Case No.
7529, the ejectment case, is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court; (c)
whether respondent holds the subject property in trust for the legitimate heirs at the
time the ejectment case was filed; and (d) whether petitioners, who are in actual
physical possession of the premises, exercised the right of a co-owner in
representation of their father, Remigio Rivera, Jr.
We find no merit in the petition.
We cannot sustain petitioners’ contention that as they had actual, physical
possession of the property as co-owners, in representation of their father Remigio,
Jr., they are entitled to remain in the premises. In an unlawful detainer case, prior
physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that he shows that
he has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property
by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases, not in unlawful detainer
cases where the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property
but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of
his right to possess.[8] Thus, the fact that petitioners were in prior physical
possession of the duplex unit does not automatically entitle them to continue in said
possession and does not give them a better right to the property.
Petitioners claim that the unlawful detainer suit should have been dismissed as the
respondent relied only on his title to the property in bringing the action. They
contend that respondent’s assertion of ownership in the unlawful detainer case
removed it from the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Moreover, they insist that their

possession of the property was not merely by tolerance of the original owners and
later on by the respondent as they assert their father’s right as co-owner of the
property.
Again, petitioners’ arguments must fail. It is well-settled that a person who occupies
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment may be filed against him.[9] In
the case at bar, respondent’s allegations in his complaint specifically show that
petitioners occupied the subject unit only with the express permission of the
spouses as the original owners. Thus, when title to the property passed on to
respondent by virtue of a contract of sale, petitioners’ refusal to sign the lease
contract prepared by the respondent for their use of the duplex unit rendered their
continued occupation thereof unlawful.
Although petitioners impugned the validity of respondent’s title over the property as
they claimed to have the right to occupy it as co-owner, this allegation did not divest
the MeTC of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer suit. It is settled that the sole
issue in an ejectment case is physical or material possession. Neither a claim of
juridical possession nor an assertion of ownership by the defendant can deprive the
court of jurisdiction over the disputed property.[10] Courts in ejectment cases are
mandated to decide questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to decide the
question of possession. They cannot be divested of jurisdiction over ejectment
cases just because the defendants assert ownership over the litigated property.[11]
The underlying reason for this ruling is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the
summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership
over the disputed property.[12]
In the case at bar, the lower court properly adjudicated ownership of the property to
respondent in the unlawful detainer case on the basis of his title thereto. Full
ownership of the subject property was surrendered to Consuelo Rivera upon the
death of Remigio, Sr. through an extrajudicial partition signed by all the compulsory
heirs. Thus, Consuelo had every right to dispose of the property as she deemed fit.
Moreover, the lower court correctly ruled that petitioners had no hereditary rights
over the property in representation or substitution of their father as the latter was
still alive.
We stress, however, that this adjudication, is only an initial determination of
ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of
ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The lower court’s adjudication of
ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[13]
Lastly, respondent rightfully omitted Remigio, Jr. as party in the illegal detainer case
as he was not the one in actual, physical possession of the subject property, but

petitioners. While petitioners insist that the TCT issued to respondent shows that
the property was part of the inheritance left by Remigio, Sr. which gives them the
right to assert and protect the interest of their father Remigio, Jr. over his share in
the property, this issue, coupled with the alleged fictitious or fraudulent sale of the
property to respondent, must be tried by petitioners in a separate proceeding only
for that purpose as it is settled that an unlawful detainer case resolves only the issue
of physical or material possession.[14]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The impugned decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 21, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

3. MADRID V MAPOY
Accion publiciana
SECOND DIVISION

FRANCISCO MADRID· and
EDGARDO BERNARDO,
Petitioners,
- versus SPOUSES BONIFACIO MAPOY and FELICIDAD MARTINEZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 150887
Present:
*CARPIO-MORALES, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
**CARPIO,
***CHICO-NAZARIO,
****LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 14, 2009
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by petitioners Francisco
Madrid and Edgardo Bernardo (petitioners-defendants) to reverse and set aside the
Decision[2] dated July 16, 2001 and Resolution[3] dated November 19, 2001 of the
Former Second Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47691
entitled “Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad Martinez v. Edgardo Bernardo and
Francisco Madrid.”
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, based on the records, are summarized below.
The spouses Bonifacio and Felicidad Mapoy (respondents-plaintiffs) are the
absolute owners of two parcels of land (the properties) known as Lot Nos. 79 and 80
of Block No. 27 of the Rizal Park Subdivision, located at No. 1400 Craig Street corner
Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
130064 and 130065 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The properties have a
combined area of two-hundred seventy (270) square meters.

On April 4, 1988, the respondents-plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the
properties through an accion publiciana filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila[4] against Gregorio Miranda and his family (Mirandas) and two other unnamed
defendants. After the pre-trial conference, the unnamed defendants were identified
as the present petitioners and summons were duly served on them. These
defendants are referred to in this Decision as the petitioners-defendants. The
Mirandas are no longer parties to the present case; they did not appeal the lower
court decision to the CA.
The respondents-plaintiffs alleged that they acquired the properties from the
spouses Procopio and Encarnacion Castelo under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 20, 1978. They merely tolerated the petitioners-defendants’ continued
occupancy and possession until their possession became illegal when demands to
vacate the properties were made. Despite the demands, the petitioners-defendants
continued to occupy and unlawfully withhold possession of the properties from the
respondents-plaintiffs, to their damage and prejudice. Efforts to amicably settle the
case proved futile, leaving the respondents-plaintiffs no recourse but to file a
complaint for ejectment which the lower court dismissed because the respondentsplaintiffs should have filed an accion publiciana. Thus, they filed their complaint for
accion publiciana, praying for recovery of possession of the properties and the
payment of P1,000.00 as monthly rental for the use of the properties from January
1987 until the petitioners-defendants vacate the properties, plus P50,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The Mirandas countered that Gregorio Miranda owned the properties by virtue of an
oral sale made in his favor by the original owner, Vivencio Antonio (Antonio). They
claimed that in 1948, Gregorio Miranda was Antonio’s carpenter, and they had a
verbal contract for Miranda to stay in, develop, fix and guard the properties; in 1972,
Antonio gave the properties to Gregorio Miranda in consideration of his more than
twenty (20) years of loyal service.
Petitioner-defendant Bernardo also asserted ownership over the portion he occupies
based on an oral sale to him by Antonio. He alleged that he became a ward of
Gregorio Miranda in 1965 when he was 10 years old and helped in the development
of the properties; he helped construct a bodega and a house within the properties.
He and Antonio met in 1975, and Antonio promised that the bodega would be given
to him in gratitude for his work.
Petitioner-defendant Madrid, for his part, claimed that he started occupying a portion
of the properties in 1974, and constructed a house on this portion in 1989 with the
permission of Bernardo, the son of Gregorio Miranda.
On the basis of the length of their claimed occupation of the properties, the
petitioners-defendants likewise invoked Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517
(PD 1517), also known as the Urban Land Reform Law, which provides that legitimate
tenants of 10 year or more, who have built their homes on these lands and who have

continuously resided thereon for the past ten years, shall not be dispossessed of
their occupied lands and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase these
lands within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices.
THE RTC RULING
On July 21, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 3, rendered its decision,[5] the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendants and all persons
claiming rights thereto to vacate the premises located at the corner of Ma. Clara and
Craig Streets, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by TCT No. 130064 and 130065 and
restore the same to the plaintiffs. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff
the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the sum of P1,000.00 as reasonable
rental for the use and occupation of the premises beginning from the filing of this
complaint until they vacated the premises.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The RTC upheld the respondents-plaintiffs’ right of possession as registered owners
of the properties. It found no merit in the petitioners-defendants’ claims of ownership
via an oral sale given the absence of any public instrument or at least a note or
memorandum supporting their claims. The RTC also found the petitionersdefendants’ invocation of PD 1517 futile, since its Section 6 refers to a legitimate
tenant who has legally occupied the lands by contract; the petitioners-defendants are
mere squatters.
The petitioners-defendants elevated the RTC decision to the CA via an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The Mirandas did not join them, and thus
failed to file a timely appeal. The petitioners-defendants objected to the RTC’s ruling
that the sale or promise of sale should appear in a public instrument, or at least in a
note or memorandum, to be binding and enforceable. They argued that the RTC
failed to consider the respondents-plaintiffs’ bad faith in acquiring the properties
since they knew of the defects in the title of the owner. They further argued that the
CA should have noted Gregorio Miranda’s occupancy since 1948, Bernardo’s since
1966 and Madrid’s since 1973. The petitioners-defendants further submitted that their
continuous residence for more than ten (10) years entitled them to the rights and
privileges granted by PD 1517. They also argued that the RTC should not have
applied the pre-trial order to them, since they had not then been served with
summons and were not present during the pre-trial.
THE CA RULING
The CA dismissed the appeal in its decision[7] of July 16, 2001, affirming as a
consequence the RTC decision of July 21, 1994. The CA held that the certificate of
title in the name of the respondents-plaintiffs serves as evidence of an indefeasible

and incontrovertible title to the properties. The CA found that the petitionersdefendants never submitted any proof of ownership. Also, their reliance on their
alleged continuous occupation is misplaced since petitioner-defendant Bernardo’s
occupation in the concept of owner started only in 1975 when Antonio allegedly gave
him a portion of the properties as a gift, while petitioner-defendant Madrid’s
occupation could not have been in the concept of an owner, as he recognized
Gregorio Miranda as the owner and paid him rents. The CA noted that the petitionersdefendants are not covered by PD 1517 because the law does not apply to occupants
whose possession is by the owner’s mere tolerance. The CA also observed that the
RTC did not err in applying the pre-trial order to the petitioners-defendants because
they derive the right of possession from the principal defendants, the Mirandas, who
were duly represented at the pre-trial; they waived their right to pre-trial by failing to
move that one be held.
The petitioners-defendants moved[8] but failed[9] to secure a reconsideration of the
CA decision; hence, they came to us through the present petition.
THE PETITION and THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
The petitioners-defendants essentially reiterate the issues they raised before the CA,
i.e., that the ruling court failed to consider: (1) the respondents-plaintiffs’ bad faith in
the acquisition of the properties; (2) the occupancy of Gregorio Miranda since 1948,
Bernardo’s since 1966, and Madrid’s since 1973; and, (3) petitioners-defendants’
continuous residence for more than ten (10) years entitling them to the rights and
privileges granted by PD 1517. They also contend that the principle of indefeasibility
of the certificate of title should not apply in this case because fraud attended the
respondents-plaintiffs’ acquisition of title. They again point out that the pre-trial
order should not have been applied to them since they were not present during the
pre-trial conference.
The respondents-plaintiffs counter-argue that the issues raised by the petitionersdefendants are essentially factual in nature and all have been well-considered and
adequately refuted in the challenged CA decision.
OUR RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
a. Accion Publiciana and Ownership
Accion publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion,[10] is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently
of title.[11] It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.[12]

The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership.[13] However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts
may pass upon the issue to determine who between or among the parties has the
right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue
of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a
bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[14] The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.[15]
In the present case, both the petitioners-defendants and the respondents-plaintiffs
raised the issue of ownership. The petitioners-defendants claim ownership based on
the oral sale to and occupation by Gregorio Miranda, their predecessor-in-interest,
since 1948. On the other hand, the respondents-plaintiffs claim that they are the
owners, and their ownership is evidenced by the TCTs in their names. Under this
legal situation, resolution of these conflicting claims will depend on the weight of the
parties' respective evidence, i.e., whose evidence deserves more weight.
b. Findings of Fact Below – Final and Conclusive
A weighing of evidence necessarily involves the consideration of factual issues – an
exercise that is not appropriate for the Rule 45 petition that the petitionersdefendants filed; under the Rules of Court, the parties may raise only questions of
law under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[16] As a rule, we are
not duty-bound to again analyze and weigh the evidence introduced and considered
in the tribunals below.[17] This is particularly true where the CA has affirmed the trial
court's factual findings, as in the present case. These trial court findings, when
affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and are not open for our review on
appeal.[18]
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA gave more weight to the certificate of
title the respondents-plaintiffs presented, and likewise found that the petitionersdefendants' possession of the properties was merely upon the respondentsplaintiffs’ tolerance. We see no reason to doubt or question the validity of these
findings and thus recognize their finality.
As a matter of law, a Torrens Certificate of Title is evidence of indefeasible title of
property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. The title holder is
entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession,
subject only to limits imposed by law.[19] In the present case, the respondentsplaintiffs are indisputably the holders of a certificate of title against which the
petitioners-defendants’ claim of oral sale cannot prevail. As registered titleholders,
they are entitled to possession of the properties.
c. Claim of Fraud – a Prohibited Collateral Attack

Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and
rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the
title immune from collateral attack.[20] A collateral attack transpires when, in another
action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is
made against the judgment granting the title.[21] This manner of attack is to be
distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an
action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the
judgment had been disposed of.[22] To permit a collateral attack on respondentsplaintiffs’ title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a
Torrens title.[23]
The petitioners-defendants’ attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs’ title, by
claiming that fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an
attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the properties in an
"accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the
validity of the judgment granting the title.[24] This is the attack that possession of a
Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain, much less
accord credit to, the petitioners-defendants’ claim of fraud to impugn the validity of
the respondents-plaintiffs’ title to their property.

d. Claimed Protection under PD 1517
To qualify for protection under PD 1517 and avail of the rights and privileges granted
by the said decree, the claimant must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten
(10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has
resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. The “tenant” covered by PD 1517 is,
as defined under Section 3(f) thereof, "the rightful occupant of land and its
structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely
tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or
deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation."
Stated differently, those whose possession or occupation of land is devoid of any
legal authority or those whose contracts of lease are already terminated, or had
already expired, or whose possession is under litigation are not considered
"tenants" under the decree. Conversely, a legitimate tenant is one who is not a
usurper or an occupant by tolerance.[25]
The petitioners-defendants whose
occupation has been merely by the owner’s tolerance obviously fall outside the
coverage of PD 1517 and cannot seek its protection.
e. The Pre-Trial-based Objection
Without doubt, the petitioners-defendants, having been belatedly served summons
and brought into the case, were entitled to a pre-trial as ordained by Section 2, Rule

18 of the Rules of Court. Unless substantial prejudice is shown, however, the trial
court’s failure to schedule a case for new trial does not render the proceedings
illegal or void ab initio.[26] Where, as in this case, the trial proceeded without any
objection on the part of the petitioners-defendants by their failure to bring the matter
to the attention of the RTC, the petitioners-defendants are deemed to have effectively
forfeited a procedural right granted them under the Rules. Issues raised for the first
time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred
by estoppel.[27] Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[28] To consider the alleged facts and
arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair
play, justice, and due process.
In arriving at this conclusion, we considered, as the CA did, that the petitionersdefendants anchored their right to possess the property on the defenses raised by
the original defendant, Gregorio Miranda, their predecessor-in-interest. While
belatedly summoned, the petitioners-defendants did not raise a substantial matter in
their answer differently from those propounded by Gregorio Miranda; they merely
echoed Miranda’s positions and arguments. Thus, no prejudice could have resulted
to the petitioners-defendants, especially after they entered trial and had the
opportunity to fully ventilate their positions.
f. Attorney’s Fees
As a general rule, the appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned by the
parties. By way of exception, even unassigned errors may be taken up by the court
on appeal if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors.[29]
In the
present case, we note that the award of attorney's fees appears only in the
dispositive portion of the RTC decision without any elaboration, explanation, and
justification. The award stood there all by itself. We view this as a plain legal error by
the RTC that must be rectified.
Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances justifying the grant of
attorney’s fees; in all cases, the award must be reasonable, just and equitable.
Attorney's fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich the winning party at the
expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails in a
suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
[30] The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule. Thus,
findings reflecting the conditions imposed by Article 2208 are necessary to justify an
award; attorney's fees mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision
without any prior justification in the body of the decision is a baseless award that
must be struck down.[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we here DENY the petition for lack of any
reversible error, and consequently AFFIRM the decision of July 16, 2001 of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47691, with the MODIFICATION that the attorney's fees
awarded to respondents-plaintiffs are hereby DELETED.
Costs against the
petitioners-defendants.
SO ORDERED.

4. BEJAR V CALAUAG
All four remedies: FE, UD, AP & AR)
FIRST DIVISION
ALMARIO BEJAR (Deceased), as substituted by his heirs - CARMELITA BEJAR,
ALFREDO BEJAR, GREGORIA B. DANCEL, BRENDA B. MIANO, LOURDES B.
BENDIJO, and SUSANA B. CAMILO,

Petitioners,
-

versus -

MARICEL CALUAG,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 171277
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 15, 2007
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated May 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85430.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
On August 2, 2002, the late Almario Bejar, substituted by his heirs, herein
petitioners, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 12, Manila, a
complaint for illegal detainer and damages against Maricel Caluag, herein
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 173262-CV. The allegations therein are partly
reproduced hereunder:
xxx
4. Plaintiff is the owner of a residential house made of light materials consisting
of wood and galvanized iron roof built on government-owned land located at 777
Coral Street, Tondo, Manila.
5. On December 21, 1981, plaintiff sold one-half (1/2) portion of the said
residential house with an area of twenty-two feet in length and fifteen feet in width to
Fernando Mijares in the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00) Pesos x x x
6. Subsequently, plaintiff became the owner in fee simple of the government
land where his residential house was built including the one-half portion he sold to
Fernando Mijares, located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila, evidenced by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 156220 registered and entered in the Register of Deeds of
Manila on August 30, 1983 x x x
7. On September 2, 1991, Fernando Mijares, sold his residential house to
Maricel Caluag with residence address at 1391 R.A. Reyes St., Tondo, Manila to be
used as a warehouse for her business x x x
8. Plaintiff badly needs the portion of his land occupied by the defendant to
build a residential house for use of his family;
9. On April 9, 2002, plaintiff through counsel sent a formal demand letter to
defendant for the latter to vacate the portion of the property situated at 777 Coral
Street, Tondo, Manila within ten (10) days from receipt of the demand letter x x x
10. Despite formal demand from the plaintiff on April 19, 2002, defendant
failed and refused and still fails and refuses to vacate said portion of the property
owned by the plaintiff located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila to the damage and
prejudice of plaintiff.
xxx
On October 15, 2002, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the issue of ownership.
On February 10, 2003, respondent filed a supplement to her motion to dismiss
alleging that pursuant to the “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Bahay,” Almario Bejar sold to
Fernando Mijares both his house and the entire lot on which it was constructed,
citing paragraph 4 of the “Kasulatan” which reads:
Na alang alang sa halagang LABING ISANG LIBO PISO (P11,000.00) kuartang
Filipino na kasasalukuyang gastahin na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahang loob
kay FERNANDO MIJARES x x x ay aking ipinagbili, ibinigay, isinulit at inilipat ng buo
kong pagaari na kalahating harapan ng bahay ko naipaliwanag sa itaas at ang
pagbibili kong ito ay kasama ang lahat kong karapatan sa lupa kung may karapatan
ako na kinatitirikan ng bahay.[2]
On June 16, 2003, the MeTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 173262CV for want of jurisdiction, holding that the actual issue between the parties is the
enforceability of the subsequent sale by Fernando Mijares to respondent of the
subject property; and that, therefore, jurisdiction properly lies with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 47, Manila, on January 5, 2004, rendered its
Decision reversing the Order of dismissal of the MeTC. The RTC held that the issue
in Civil Case No. 173262-CV is who has better possession of the disputed property.
The RTC then directed the MeTC to hear the case on the merits.
Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 85430.
In its Decision dated May 23, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, in Civil
Case No. 03-107631 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order, dated 16 June 2003, of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 12. Manila in
Civil Case No. 173262-CV, dismissing Almario Bejar’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction is hereby REINSTATED.
Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila for further proceedings pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court held that the allegations of the complaint do not make out a
case for illegal detainer or forcible entry.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision but in its
Resolution dated January 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition.
For our resolution is the issue of whether the MeTC has jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 173262-CV for illegal detainer.
There are four (4) remedies available to one who has been deprived of
possession of real property. These are: (1) an action for unlawful detainer; (2) a suit
for forcible entry; (3) accion publiciana; and (4) accion reinvidicatoria.
In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be determined is
who between the contending parties has better possession of the contested
property.[3] Pursuant to Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts in Cities, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts that exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over these cases.
The proceedings are governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, as amended.
By contrast, an accion publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion,
[4] is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in
order to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title.[5]

There are two distinctions between the summary ejectment suits (unlawful detainer
and forcible entry) and accion publiciana. The first lies in the period within which
each one can be instituted. Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry must be
filed within one year from the date possession is lost, while an accion publiciana may
be filed only after the expiration of that period but within the period prescribed in the
statute of limitations. The second distinction involves jurisdiction. An accion
publiciana may only be filed with the RTC, while a complaint for unlawful detainer or
forcible entry may only be filed with the first level courts earlier mentioned.
An accion reinvidicatoria, unlike the three remedies previously discussed,
involves not only possession, but ownership of the property. The plaintiff in this
action sets up title in him and prays that he be declared the owner and be given
possession thereof.[6] Otherwise put, the plaintiff alleges ownership of real property
and prays for recovery of such ownership. Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, two
things must be alleged and proven in an accion reinvidicatoria: (1) the identity of the
property and (2) plaintiff’s title to it. Sole and exclusive jurisdiction over cases for
accion reinvidicatoria is vested in the RTC.
We are guided by the elementary principle that what determines the nature of
an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.[7]
To make out a suit for illegal detainer or forcible entry, the complaint must contain
two mandatory allegations: (1) prior physical possession of the property by the
plaintiff; and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.[8] This latter requirement implies that the
possession of the disputed property by the intruder has been unlawful from the very
start. Then, the action must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry
to the property or, in cases where stealth was employed, from the date the plaintiff
learned about it.[9]
An examination of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case
No. 173262CV does not show that Almario Bejar was deprived of his possession of the property
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Here, the case is for unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly alleges that
Almario Bejar sold one-half portion of his house to Fernando Mijares; that the latter,
in turn, sold the same portion of the house to respondent; that eventually, Almario
Bejar became the owner in fee simple of the entire lot where his house was built; that
he needs the portion of the lot occupied by respondent for the construction of a
house for the use of his family; and that despite demand, respondent failed and still
fails to vacate the premises. From the records, it appears that Almario Bejar filed his
complaint within one year from the date of his last demand upon respondent to
vacate the contested portion of the land.

A suit for unlawful detainer will prosper if the complaint sufficiently alleges that there
is a withholding of possession or refusal to vacate the property by a defendant.[10]
The cause of action arises from the expiration or termination of the defendant’s right
to continue possession which is upon plaintiff’s demand to vacate the premises. The
complaint for unlawful detainer must then be instituted within one year from the date
of the last demand.[11] All these incidents are present in the instant case.
Considering that the allegations in Almario Bejar’s complaint in Civil Case No.
173262-CV show that it is one for illegal detainer, hence, it is the MeTC, Branch 12,
Manila which has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 173262-CV.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals. The RTC Decision is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case
be remanded to the MeTC, Branch 12, Manila, for further proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.