cases

BAR MATTER [October 02, 2001]

NO.

850

months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.chan robles virtual law library SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. - Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely: (a) Compliance group 1. - Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1. . (b) Compliance group 2. - Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2. . (c) Compliance group 3. - Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3. Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement. SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program. – Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission. The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group. (a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance. . (b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number. RULE 4 COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS SECTION 1. Guidelines. – CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyer’s participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents required therefor:

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE) RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CONTINUING OF THE

Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules for proper implementation: RULE PURPOSE 1

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. – Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.chan robles virtual law library RULE 2 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. - Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules. SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. – Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours: (a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units. (b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit units. (c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units. . (d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units. . (e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units. . (f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units. . (g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units. RULE COMPLIANCE PERIOD 3

PROGRAMS/ACTIV CREDIT UNITS ITY

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES 1. PARTICIPANT/ ATTENDEE 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF OF ATTENDANCE WITH ATTENDANCE NUMBER OF HOURS PHOTOCOPY PLAQUE SPONSOR’S CERTIFICATION OF OR

1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR RESOURCE THE SUBJECT SPEAKER PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD 1.3 PANELIST/REACT OR COMMENTATOR/ MODERATOR/

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. - The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36)

½ OF CU FOR CERTIFICATION FROM THE SUBJECT SPONSORING PER ORGANIZATION COMPLIANCE PERIOD

COORDINATOR/ FACILITATOR 2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW 2.1 LAW BOOK OF FULL CU FOR PUBLISHED BOOK NOT LESS THAN THE SUBJECT 100 PAGES PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD 2.2 BOOK EDITOR ½ OF THE CU PUBLISHED BOOK OF WITH PROOF AS AUTHORSHIP EDITOR CATEGORY 2.3 RESEARCH PAPER INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ CREATIVE PROJECT 2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT LEAST TEN (10) PAGES ½ OF CU FOR THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD DULY CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER

½ OF CU FOR PUBLISHED ARTICLE THE SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.5 LEGAL 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED NEWSLETTER/ NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL LAW JOURNAL EDITOR 2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ BAR REVIEW LECTURE LAW TEACHING/ FULL CU FOR CERTIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT LAW DEAN OR BAR PER REVIEW DIRECTOR COMPLIANCE PERIOD

(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments; . (b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; . (c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education; . (d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice; . (e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General; . (f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel; . (g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions; . (h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman; . (i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions; . (j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;chan robles virtual law library . (k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and . (l) Governors and Mayors. SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt: (a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public. . (b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors. SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement - A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee. SEC. 4. Change of status. - The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group. SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. - Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents. RULE 8 STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. - Subject to the implementing regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education. SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. - All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards:chan robles virtual law library (a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.

RULE CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

5

SECTION 1. Classes of credit units. -Credit units are either participatory or non-participatory. SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. - Participatory credit units may be claimed for: (a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion. . (b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.chan robles virtual law library . (c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class. SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. - Nonparticipatory credit units may be claimed per compliance period for: (a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the member's practice or employment. . (b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter. RULE 6 COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. - Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals. RULE EXEMPTIONS 7

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:

. (b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy. . (c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience. . (d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is offered. . (e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and other distractions. RULE9 ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. - Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee. SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. - Any person or group may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall: (a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee; . (b) Contain all information requested in the form; . (c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee. SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. - All approved accredited providers shall agree to the following: (a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official record of attendance only if the member's signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the member's name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE. . (b) The provider shall certify that: (1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of _______ hours of which _____ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity; . (2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE. (c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the activity. . (d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBPBoard for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules. . (e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form. . (f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.chan robles virtual law library . (g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.

SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. - The accreditation of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period. SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. - The accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause. RULE 10 FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER SECTION 1. Payment of fees. - Application for approval of an education activity or accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees. RULE 11 GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES SECTION 1. Compliance card. - Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after the end of the member's compliance period. SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. - Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3© of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5. RULE12 NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. - The following shall constitute non-compliance: (a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period; . (b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption; . (c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;chan robles virtual law library . (d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice; . (e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period; . (f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements. SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. - Members failing to comply will receive a NonCompliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters: IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.chan robles virtual law library RULE13 CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. - A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee. SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. - A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a factfinding arm of the MCLE Committee. SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. - Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member. . RULE14 REINSTATEMENT . SECTION 1. Process. - The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the period of noncompliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. - The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee. RULE 15 COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SECTION 1. Composition. - The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors. The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court. SEC. 2. Duty of committee. - The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court. chan robles virtual law library SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. - Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions. SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. - The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual

budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.chan robles virtual law library This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001

BAR MATTERNO. 1922

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila Sirs/Mesdames: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008. "Bar Matter No. 1922 - Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. - The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Commitee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program. The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts of quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records. The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation." Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave. Very (Signed) MA. Clerk of Court LUISA truly D. yours, VILLARAMA

[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004] NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent.

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer “by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.” In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children – namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old – both of whom are in complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before

the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, “James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.” Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent. Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent. In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order. In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others. In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning. On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals’ resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued. At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney’s oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’ Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country. After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals. In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states: CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling complainant, a “sly manipulator of truth” as well as a “vindictive congenital prevaricator”, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.

herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith. On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents’ motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read: “We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same. Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge. Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee” The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993. On further appeal to this Court, petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21, 1993. Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994. Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner’s motion was initially granted on August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued. Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers’ freedom of religion and worship; and that private respondents’ title is being questioned in another case. On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled, thus: "This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. x x x x Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the

[G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998] ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.

This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in this second petition for review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now write finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City: “x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.” The facts: The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondentspouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void. Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs." The aforesaid decision was affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5, 1992. The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued. Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by

execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court). Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant petition has already become moot and academic as the property in question was already turned over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.) The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused in their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals. The petition must fail. It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end. Petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the case between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled: “Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge. “Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee.” The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here. Further, petitioner’s contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be resolved before the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable. Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. C9297 which will render the execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil Case No. C11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final resolution of the case.

We do not agree. The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioner’s title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents’ title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment. Finally, petitioner’s fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated: "The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy because they can still go after the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in possession of the subject property, due to defendantpetitioners' arguments that the same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiffrespondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots." In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit: "The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can have access to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be made." Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows: "Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of land within the said memorial park." From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has been properly addressed. Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the “Sheriff’s Return,” dated March 31, 1995, with the attached “Turn Over Premises” indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property.

A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice. We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al., we ruled: "As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts."