Cases

Article 1157 September 7, 1907 G.R. No. L-3489 VICENTE NAVALES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EULOGIA RIAS, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Pantaleon E. del Rosario for appellants. F. Sevilla y Macam for appellee. Torres, J.: On the 18th of November, 1904, Vicente Navales filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso, claiming that the latter should be sentenced to pay him the sum of 1,200 pesos, Philippine currency, as damages, together with costs and such other expenses as the court might consider just and equitable. To this end he alleged that the said defendants, without due cause, ordered the pulling down and destruction of his house erected in Daanbuangan, town of Naga, Island of Cebu, which was 6 meters in height with an area of 8.70 square meters, built of wood with a nipa roof, and worth 1,000 pesos, which amount he expended in its construction. He further alleged that the destruction took place in the month of April, 1904, and that, notwithstanding his efforts, he had not obtained any reimbursement from the defendants, and that by reason of their refusal he had been prejudiced to the extent of 200 pesos, Philippine currency. The defendant, in answer to the foregoing complaint, denied all and each one of the allegations therein contained, and asked that judgment be entered dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. After considering the proofs submitted by both parties and the proceedings upon the trial, the judge, on the 17th of January, 1906, rendered judgment declaring that the decision entered by the justice of the peace of Naga, and the order given by virtue thereof were illegal, as well as the action of the deputy sheriff Luciano Bacayo, that the defendant were thereby liable for the damages caused to the plaintiff, which amounted to 500 pesos, and that the defendants were sentenced to pay the said sum to the plaintiff, with costs. The defendant upon being informed of this decision, asked that it be set aside, and also moved for a new trial on the ground that the decision was not in accordance with the weight of the evidence. The motion was denied, to which exception was taken, and at the request of the interested party, the corresponding bill of exceptions was limited.

The aim of this litigation, therefore, is to obtain payment through a judicial decision, of the damages said to have been caused by the execution of a judgment rendered by the justice of the peace, in an action for ejectment. It is undeniable that, in order to remove from the land of Eulogia Rias, situated within the jurisdiction of the town of Naga, the house which Vicente Navales had constructed thereon, by virtue of the decision of the justice in the action instituted by the said Eulogia Rias against the owner of the house , Vicente Navales, the deputy sheriff who carried the judgment into execution was obliged to destroy the said house and removed it from the land, according to the usual procedure in the action for ejectment. In the order of execution issued to the deputy sheriff, the directive portion of the judgment of the justice of the peace was inserted, and it contained the essential statement that the said judgment, by reason of its not having been appealed from, had become final, and from the contents of the same may be inferred that there had been an action for ejectment between the above-named parties, and that there was no reason why it should not be enforced when it had already become final and acquired the nature of res adjudicata. Section 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: Execution. — If no appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace shall be perfected as herein provided, the justice of the peace shall, at the request of the successful party, issue execution for the enforcement of the judgment, and the expiration of the time limited by law for the perfection of an appeal. Assuming that the order for execution of final judgment was issued in accordance with the law, and in view of the fact that it has not been alleged nor proven that the sheriff when complying with the same had committed trespass or exceeded his functions, it must be presumed according to section 334 (14) of the said Code of Procedure, that the official duty was regularly performed. Therefore, it is not possible to impute liability to the plaintiff who obtained the judgment and the execution thereof, when the same was not disputed nor alleged to be null or illegal, and much less to compel the payment of damages to the person who was defeated in the action and sentenced to be ejected from the land which he improperly occupied with his house. No proof has been submitted that a contract had been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants, or that the latter had committed illegal acts or

omissions or incurred in any kind of fault or negligence, from any of which an obligation might have arisen on the part of the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff. For this reason, the claim for indemnity, on account of acts performed by the sheriff while enforcing a judgment, can not under any consideration be sustained. (Art. 1089, Civil Code.) The illegality of the judgment of the justice of the peace, that of the writ of execution thereunder, or of the acts performed by the sheriff for the enforcement of the judgment, has not been shown. Therefore, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the complaint for damages filed by Vicente Navales against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso is dismissed without special ruling as to costs. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. . G.R. No. 140847 HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI, CEBU CITY vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM FACTS: In 1925, petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, a charitable organization, was created as a body corporate by Act No. 3239. Section 4 of the Act provides that "the personal and real property donated to the Hospicio by its founders or by other persons shall not be sold under any consideration." However, on October 10, 1987, citing Presidential Decree 27, DAR-7 issued an order ordaining that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of 22 tillers as beneficiaries. In 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was enacted. The scope of lands subjected to agrarian reform under RA 6657 has been characterized as overwhelming, even broader in scope than that of PD 27. While the latter (PD 27) applies to all private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn with tenant farmers under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy, RA 6657 generally covers all public and private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. ISSUE: whether a provision in the law prohibiting the sale of the properties donated to the charitable organization that was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of agrarian reform laws as regards said properties. HELD/ RULING: NO. Section 4 is deemed repealed by P.D. No. 27 and the CARL. 1. Neither P.D. No. 27 nor the CARL exempts the lands of the Hospicio or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian reform. Moreover, under both laws, the landowner is entitled to just compensation for the properties taken. 2. Land transfers mandated under P.D. No. 27 cannot be considered a conventional sale under our civil laws. Generally, sale arises out of a contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the first

essential requisite of every contract that is the presence of consent. Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the agreement. The absence or vitiation of consent renders the sale either void or voidable. In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicio's property did not arise as a consequence of the Hospicio's consent to the transfer. There was no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand, and the DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to constitute the contract that is to serve ultimately as the basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands. Instead, the obligation to transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27. 3. The twin process of expropriation of lands under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly described in common law jurisdictions as 'sale made under the process of the court, and in the mode prescribed by law, and 'which is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc. Since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as' it is authorized by law. The transfer arises from compulsion of law, and not the desire of any parties. Even if the Hospicio had voluntarily offered to surrender its properties to agrarian reform, the resulting transaction would not be considered as a conventional sale, since the obligation is created not out of the mandate of the parties, but the will of the law. PP vs Paniterce G.R. No. 186382 : April 5, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOMINGO PANITERCE, AccusedAppellant. FACTS: The RTC found Domingo Paniterce y Martinez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness upon his two daughters who were minors. Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision dated March 2, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37, in Criminal Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078, 6079, 6080 and 6081. On 16 September 2008, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Paniterce assailing the DecisionЃa dated August 22, 2008 of the CA. The Court of Appeals gave due course to Paniterce's appeal on September 23, 2008,9cЃa and directed its Judicial Records Division to elevate to the Supreme Court the original records in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001. On 15 April 2009, the SC requiredЃa the parties to file their supplemental briefs, and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to confirm the commitment of Paniterce at the Bureau of Corrections and submit his report thereon within 10 days from notice. On June 16, 2009, Paniterce filed his Supplemental BriefcЃa while the Office of the Solicitor General filed a ManifestationЃa on June 18, 2009 stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief considering that Paniterce did not raise any new issue in his appeal. On July 22, 2009, SC submitted G.R. No. 186382 for resolution. However, Paniterce had died on August 22, 2009 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Paniterce's Death Certificate was attached to the letter submitted by the Assistant Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections to the SC. ISSUE:

Whether or not Paniterce’s death on the pending appeal extinguishes not only his criminal liabilities but also his civil liabilities which were solely arising from or based on rap e and acts of lasciviousness? Held: YES. Paniterce's death on August 22, 2009, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal liabilities for the rape and acts of lasciviousness committed against his daughters, but also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on said crimes. According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas13: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Paniterce's appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crimes charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Paniterce had incurred criminal liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Paniterce's appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes, being civil liabilities ex delicto, were likewise extinguished by his death. Consequently, the appealed Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals - finding Paniterce guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness, sentencing him to imprisonment, and ordering him to indemnify his victims - had become ineffectual. CANDIDA VIRATA, vs. VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents. VIRATA, TOMAS and VIRATA, MANOLITO EVANGELINA VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA,

FERNANDEZ, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Civil Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.
1

The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the employee of Ochoa; that for the death of Arsenio Virata, an action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3162-P of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability; that on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said criminal case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial and presented evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by mere accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. B-134 for damages.
2

NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, petitioners,

Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.

The principal issue is whether or not the heirs of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. The Supreme Court has held that: According to the Code Commission: ‘The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a ‘culpa aquiliana’ or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and ‘culpa extra-contractual’ or quasi-delito has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasidelict or ‘culpa aquiliana’. But said article forestalls a double recovery. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.) Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that upholds ‘the spirit that given life’ rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under

Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is ‘more congruent’ with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress’, to borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to 359, to hold as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to ‘fault covers not only acts ‘not punishable by law’ but also criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or consequently, a separate civil action lies against the in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty and acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the, two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.3 The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation. Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B134, they have only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private respondents. MANUEL M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA; EMERITO M. RAMOS, SUSANA B. RAMOS, EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR., JOSEFA RAMOS DELA RAMA, HORACIO DELA RAMA, ANTONIO B. RAMOS, FILOMENA RAMOS LEDESMA, RODOLFO LEDESMA, VICTORIA RAMOS TANJUATCO, and TEOFILO TANJUATCO, respondents. Rene Diokno for petitioner. F.E. Evangelista & Glecerio T. Orsolino for respondent Central Bank of the Philippines. Feliciano C. Tumale, Pacifico T. Torres and Antonio B. Periquet for respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Josefina G. Salonga for all other respondents.

A sought for ex-parte preliminary injunction against both respondent banks was not given by this Court. Undisputed pertinent facts are: On October 13, 1966 and December 12, 1966, petitioner made a time deposit, for one year with 6% interest, of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with the respondent 3 Overseas Bank of Manila. Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6½% interest, on March 6, 1967, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the 4 same respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. On August 31, 1968, Concepcion Maneja, married to Felixberto M. Serrano, assigned and conveyed to petitioner Manuel M. Serrano, her time deposit of P200,000.00 with respondent 5 Overseas Bank of Manila. Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of the aforementioned time deposits from the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, dating from December 6, 1967 up to March 4, 1968, not a single one of the time deposit certificates was honored by respondent Overseas Bank of 6 Manila. Respondent Central Bank admits that it is charged with the duty of administering the banking system of the Republic and it exercises supervision over all doing business in the Philippines, but denies the petitioner's allegation that the Central Bank has the duty to exercise a most rigid and stringent supervision of banks, implying that respondent Central Bank has to watch every move or activity of all banks, including respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Respondent Central Bank claims that as of March 12, 1965, the Overseas Bank of Manila, while operating, was only on a limited degree of banking operations since the Monetary Board decided in its Resolution No. 322, dated March 12, 1965, to prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila from making new loans and investments in view of its chronic reserve deficiencies against its deposit liabilities. This limited operation of respondent Overseas Bank of Manila continued up 7 to 1968. Respondent Central Bank also denied that it is guarantor of the permanent solvency of any banking institution as claimed by petitioner. It claims that neither the law nor sound banking supervision requires respondent Central Bank to advertise or represent to the public any remedial measures it may impose upon chronic delinquent banks as such action may inevitably result to panic or bank "runs". In the years 1966-1967, there were no findings to 8 declare the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as insolvent. Respondent Central Bank likewise denied that a constructive trust was created in favor of petitioner and his predecessor in interest Concepcion Maneja when their time deposits were made in 1966 and 1967 with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as during that time the

CONCEPCION, JR., J.: Petition for mandamus and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, that seeks the establishment of joint and solidary liability to the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos, with interest, against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines and Overseas Bank of Manila and its stockholders, on the alleged failure of the Overseas Bank of Manila to return the time deposits made by petitioner and assigned to him, on the ground that respondent Central Bank failed in its duty to exercise strict supervision over respondent Overseas Bank of Manila 1 to protect depositors and the general public. Petitioner also prays that both respondent banks be ordered to execute the proper and necessary documents to constitute all properties fisted in Annex "7" of the Answer of respondent Central Bank of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-29352, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," into a trust fund in favor of petitioner and all other depositors of respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. It is also prayed that the respondents be prohibited permanently from honoring, implementing, or doing any act predicated upon the validity or efficacy of the deeds of mortgage, assignment. and/or conveyance or transfer of whatever nature of the properties listed in Annex "7" of the Answer 2 of respondent Central Bank in G.R. No. 29352.

latter was not an insolvent bank and its operation as a banking institution was being salvaged 9 by the respondent Central Bank. Respondent Central Bank avers no knowledge of petitioner's claim that the properties given by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as additional collaterals to respondent Central Bank of the Philippines for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans were acquired through the use 10 of depositors' money, including that of the petitioner and Concepcion Maneja. In G.R. No. L-29362, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," a case was filed by the petitioner Ramos, wherein respondent Overseas Bank of Manila sought to prevent respondent Central Bank from closing, declaring the former insolvent, and liquidating its assets. Petitioner Manuel Serrano in this case, filed on September 6, 1968, a motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-29352, on the ground that Serrano had a real and legal interest as depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila in the matter in litigation in that case. Respondent Central Bank in G.R. No. L-29352 opposed petitioner Manuel Serrano's motion to intervene in that case, on the ground that his claim as depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila should properly be ventilated in the Court of First Instance, and if this Court were to allow Serrano to intervene as depositor in G.R. No. L-29352, thousands of other depositors would follow and thus cause an avalanche of cases in this Court. In the resolution dated October 4, 1968, this Court denied Serrano's, motion to intervene. The contents of said motion 11 to intervene are substantially the same as those of the present petition. This Court rendered decision in G.R. No. L-29352 on October 4, 1971, which became final and executory on March 3, 1972, favorable to the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, with the dispositive portion to wit: WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for in the petition are hereby granted and respondent Central Bank's resolution Nos. 1263, 1290 and 1333 (that prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila to participate in clearing, direct the suspension of its operation, and ordering the liquidation of said bank) are hereby annulled and set aside; and said respondent Central Bank of the Philippines is directed to comply with its obligations under the Voting Trust Agreement, and to desist from taking action in violation therefor. Costs 12 against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines. Because of the above decision, petitioner in this case filed a motion for judgment in this case, praying for a decision on the merits, adjudging respondent Central Bank jointly and severally liable with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to the petitioner for the P350,000 time deposit made with the latter bank, with all interests due therein; and declaring all assets assigned or mortgaged by the respondents Overseas Bank of Manila and the Ramos groups in favor of the 13 Central Bank as trust funds for the benefit of petitioner and other depositors.

By the very nature of the claims and causes of action against respondents, they in reality are recovery of time deposits plus interest from respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and recovery of damages against respondent Central Bank for its alleged failure to strictly supervise the acts of the other respondent Bank and protect the interests of its depositors by virtue of the constructive trust created when respondent Central Bank required the other respondent to increase its collaterals for its overdrafts said emergency loans, said collaterals allegedly acquired through the use of depositors money. These claims shoud be ventilated in the Court of First Instance of proper jurisdiction as We already pointed out when this Court denied petitioner's motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-29352. Claims of these nature are not proper in actions for mandamus and prohibition as there is no shown clear abuse of discretion by the Central Bank in its exercise of supervision over the other respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and if there was, petitioner here is not the proper party to raise that question, but rather the Overseas Bank of Manila, as it did in G.R. No. L-29352. Neither is there anything to prohibit in this case, since the questioned acts of the respondent Central Bank (the acts of dissolving and liquidating the Overseas Bank of Manila), which petitioner here intends to use as his basis for claims of damages against respondent Central Bank, had been accomplished a long time ago. Furthermore, both parties overlooked one fundamental principle in the nature of bank deposits when the petitioner claimed that there should be created a constructive trust in his favor when the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila increased its collaterals in favor of respondent Central Bank for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans, since these collaterals were acquired by the use of depositors' money. Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as 14 loans and are to be covered by the law on loans. Current and savings deposit are loans to a bank because it can use the same. The petitioner here in making time deposits that earn interests with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila was in reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a depositor. The respondent Bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Antonio, Abad Santos, JJ., concur. Barredo (Chairman) J., concur in the judgment on the of the concurring opinion of Justice Aquino.

The petitioner prayed that the Central Bank be ordered to pay his time deposits of P350,000, plus interests, which he could not recover from the distressed Overseas Bank of Manila, and to declare all the assets assigned or mortgaged by that bank and the Ramos group to the Central Bank as trust properties for the benefit of the petitioner and other depositors. The petitioner has no causes of action agianst the Central Bank to obtain those reliefs. They cannot be granted in petitioner's instant original actions in this Court for mandamus and prohibition. It is not the Central Bank's ministerial duty to pay petitioner's time deposits or to hold the mortgaged properties in trust for the depositors of the Overseas Bank of Manila. The petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition, a remedy usually available against any tribunal, board, corporation or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. Since the Overseas Bank of Manila was found to be insolvent and the Superintendent of Banks was ordered to take over its assets preparatory to its liquidation under section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 (p. 197, Rollo, Manifestation of September 19, 1973), petitioner's remedy is to file his claim in the liquidating proceeding (Central Bank vs. Morfe, L-38427, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 114; Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75). LIGAYA S. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE GERIATRICS FOUNDATION, INC., respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: Petitioner Ligaya S. Santos seeks reversal of the decision dated June 23, 1998, of the Court of Appeals, and its resolution dated September 15, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46629, ordering petitioner to vacate and surrender possession of the contested premises (on Lions Road, Villegas St., Ermita, Manila) to private respondent Philippine Geriatrics Foundation, Inc. (PGFI), and to pay rentals and the costs of suit. The CA set aside the decision dated September 16, 1997 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, in Civil Case No. 97-82946, which affirmed the decision dated February 26, 1997 of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 12, in Civil Case No. 150316. The factual antecedents of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals,[1] are as follows: In 1969, private respondent PGFI occupied the ground floor of the Geriatrics Center on Lions Road, Mayor Antonio J. Villegas Street, Ermita, Manila, upon the invitation of the president of the Philippine Federation of Medical Practitioners. In 1971, PGFI built a gymnasium adjacent to said building. This was later on converted into a canteen and leased to one Victor Jimenez. Jimenez later on vacated the space after he failed to pay rentals therefor. In 1989, petitioner occupied the canteen by virtue of a letter-contract[2] executed between her and Vicente Pulido, president of PGFI.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring: The petitioner prayed that the Central Bank be ordered to pay his time deposits of P350,000, plus interests, which he could not recover from the distressed Overseas Bank of Manila, and to declare all the assets assigned or mortgaged by that bank and the Ramos group to the Central Bank as trust properties for the benefit of the petitioner and other depositors. The petitioner has no causes of action agianst the Central Bank to obtain those reliefs. They cannot be granted in petitioner's instant original actions in this Court for mandamus and prohibition. It is not the Central Bank's ministerial duty to pay petitioner's time deposits or to hold the mortgaged properties in trust for the depositors of the Overseas Bank of Manila. The petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition, a remedy usually available against any tribunal, board, corporation or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. Since the Overseas Bank of Manila was found to be insolvent and the Superintendent of Banks was ordered to take over its assets preparatory to its liquidation under section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 (p. 197, Rollo, Manifestation of September 19, 1973), petitioner's remedy is to file his claim in the liquidating proceeding (Central Bank vs. Morfe, L-38427, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 114; Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75).

Separate Opinions AQUINO, J., concurring:

Meanwhile, the City Mayor of Manila requested PGFI to vacate its office at the Geriatrics Center. It agreed and planned to transfer to the canteen beside the Geriatrics Center. On December 27, 1993,[3] PGFI asked petitioner to vacate said space in a letter advising the latter of the termination of the lease contract. However, petitioner refused to vacate. In the meantime, the city government of Manila forcibly ejected PGFI from the Geriatrics Center on January 7, 1995. On October 11, 1995,[4] PGFI through counsel, sent another demand letter to petitioner asking her to pay rentals in arrears and to vacate the canteen space within ten days of receipt of the letter. Still, petitioner refused. Thereafter, PGFI filed an ejectment case against petitioner with a prayer for the payment of rentals in arrears for the period September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995 totaling P36,750.00. The parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether or not petitioner may be ejected from the premises on the ground of non-payment of rentals.[5] The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the complaint on the ground that PGFI failed to establish the existence of a lease contract between the parties.[6] PGFI claimed that the contract had been lost when it was forcibly ejected from the Geriatrics Center.[7] The contract was a letter-offer signed by petitioner and addressed to PGFI, stating petitioner’s intention to lease PGFI’s canteen under certain terms and conditions. It was later on signed by Pulido as PGFI president, indicating its conformity with the terms thereof.[8] To prove the existence of the contract, PGFI presented affidavits of its trustees and officers[9] and presented to the trial court an unsigned photocopy[10] of the same. However, the trial court refused to admit the photocopy as secondary evidence. Consequently, in a decision dated February 26, 1997,[11] the MeTC ruled that there is no evidence that would warrant ejectment of petitioner from the subject premises. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the decision of the MeTC. PGFI filed a motion for reconsideration on October 6, 1997 and a motion to treat said motion as a motion for new trial on October 27, 1997, on the ground of newly discovered evidence. [12] A few days earlier, on October 11, 1997,[13] PGFI found its copy of the lease contract signed by petitioner and Pulido, as well as by its other trustees. PGFI presented said contract to the RTC, which rejected it as “forgotten evidence”.[14] PGFI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the RTC. According to the CA, the unsigned copy of the lease contract that was presented before the trial court qualified as secondary evidence under Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA noted that PGFI was able to prove the existence and due execution of the lease contract through the affidavits of its witnesses. Finally, the contents of the contract itself were proven through the unsigned copy held by PGFI. There is, thus, a valid lease contract executed between the parties, contrary to the ruling of the trial court. The CA ruled that petitioner’s failure to abide by the terms stated in the contract, particularly the payment of rentals, warranted her eviction from the premises. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court which dismissed plaintiff’s complaint is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered ordering the defendant Ligaya Santos, a.k.a. Ligaya Salvador, to vacate the premises in question subject of the complaint and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff; and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P24,500.00 as unpaid rentals from September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995 at the rate of P1,000.00 a month as provided in the letter-contract and the further sum of P1,000.00 a month from October, 1995 until she vacates the premises as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy thereof, and to pay the costs of suit. Costs against respondent. SO ORDERED.”[15] Hence, this petition for review wherein petitioner alleges that the CA erred: I. …IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE FACT OF THE EXECUTION OF THE LETTER-CONTRACT OF LEASE. II. …WHEN IT ADMITTED AS NEWLY FOUND EVIDENCE THE ALLEGEDLY SIGNED LETTER-CONTRACT OF LEASE EVEN THOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL. III. …IN ITS DECISION, DATED JUNE 23, 1998, SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WHICH DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF.[16] Petitioner stresses that no lease contract had been executed between her and PGFI. She points out that the contents of the copy of the alleged contract must correspond exactly with the contents of the original. However, without the parties’ signatures, the copy presented by PGFI cannot be legally considered as a copy of the original contract. Even the affidavits of PGFI’s witnesses are insufficient, according to petitioner, since none of those witnesses had the opportunity to compare the copy with the original. She claims that the copy did not even exist during the time of the execution of the alleged original contract, nor was it copied a short time thereafter, since the copy was merely “reconstructed” by PGFI president Pulido during the trial of the ejectment case. Petitioner cites in support of this assertion the statement of the CA that Pulido “correctly recalled” the contents of the contract when he presented an unsigned copy thereof during trial.[17] Petitioner contends that the original copy of the contract can no longer be considered in evidence since it was not formally offered during trial, having been found only after the trial was terminated. Moreover, petitioner argues that the CA could no longer reverse the ruling of the RTC since it had already attained finality. According to her, when PGFI filed before the RTC a motion to treat its motion for reconsideration as one for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it effectively

abandoned its motion for reconsideration and its supplemental motion for reconsideration. When the RTC denied PGFI’s latter motion, there was nothing left for the RTC to consider, not even the previous motion for reconsideration. Without said motion for reconsideration, the RTC decision became final, according to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner claims that PGFI can no longer question the merits of the decision of the trial court, but only the propriety of the order of the RTC that denied PGFI’s motion to treat its motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial. On the other hand, private respondent PGFI contends that the loss of the original contract was due to its eviction from the Geriatrics Center, which petitioner does not dispute. It argues that the unsigned copy of the letter-contract qualifies as secondary evidence under Rule 130, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court. PGFI points out that as required by the Rules, it sufficiently proved the existence and due execution of the original, as well as its contents, through the affidavits of its trustees who were signatories to the original contract.[18] It further points out that even one who was not a party to a contract may attest to its existence and due execution. [19] PGFI contends that the original contract should no longer be an issue since secondary evidence had already been presented proving its existence and execution. However, the original serves to confirm what was proven through the unsigned copy. PGFI further argues that there is a conclusive presumption that a tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.[20] We first address the procedural question raised by petitioner. We do not share petitioner’s view that PGFI in effect abandoned its motion for reconsideration before the RTC when it moved to treat such motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial; [21] that when the latter motion was denied, there was nothing else for the court to consider and so the RTC decision became final. Nothing in the Rules of Court supports this contention. A decision becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal therefrom, without an appeal [22] or motion for reconsideration or new trial having been filed. [23] The filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial suspends the running of the period to appeal.[24] PGFI filed its motions in the RTC within the period to appeal.[25] Likewise, its petition for review before the CA was filed within the period of extension granted by the CA.[26] Thus, the RTC decision never became final, contrary to petitioner’s claim. We now proceed to discuss the merits of this case. The parties anchor their respective arguments on the admissibility, or non-admissibility in the case of petitioner, of the unsigned copy of the alleged letter-contract of lease executed between petitioner and PGFI. Admittedly, the original copy of the contract was not presented during trial, so PGFI as plaintiff therein resorted to presentation of secondary evidence. It presented the disputed unsigned copy of the contract as well as affidavits of persons who saw the contract and signed thereon representing PGFI.

The Rules of Court provides, in case the original of the document is lost: SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. -- When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (Rule 130, Rules of Court). Before the contents of an original document may be proved by secondary evidence, there must first be satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.[27] Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence. [28] In the present case, the existence and due execution of the lease contract had been established by the affidavits of trustees of PGFI who were signatories thereto.[29] The loss of said contract was likewise established by the affidavit of Vicente Pulido, who attested to the fact that he kept the original and a duplicate copy[30] of the contract at the PGFI office at the Geriatrics Center. These copies were lost in the chaos that ensued when PGFI was forcibly evicted from its office. Without a place to immediately move to, its files and records were left for sometime[31] on the street where they were susceptible to theft. Secondary evidence, then, may be admitted to prove the contents of the contract. The contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the recollection of witnesses, [32] in the order stated. There is testimonial evidence on record to prove the contents of the lost lease contract. The affidavits of the witnesses for PGFI contain a recital of the offer of petitioner to occupy the subject premises for a specified amount payable every month, and the conformity to these terms by the trustees of PGFI who signed thereon.[33] Thus, even dispensing with the unsigned copy that was presented at the trial of this case, there is still evidence of the contents of the contract in the form of testimonial evidence. Petitioner’s emphasis on the admissibility of the unsigned copy of the contract is misplaced. The contents of the lost original copy may not only be proved by a copy thereof but also by the testimony of witnesses.[34]At best, the original copy of the contract that was later found merely affirms what had already been established by secondary evidence. When the original copy of the contract[35] was found, PGFI attempted to present it before the trial court by moving for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. On this point, we note that petitioner did not offer any objection as to the genuineness of the original contract or her signature thereon.[36] She objected only insofar as claiming that PGFI could no longer present the document since it was not offered in evidence during the trial of this case. We take this as an indication that, indeed, there is nothing questionable about the original contract insofar as its genuineness is concerned.

Having thus shown that a lease agreement exists between the parties, we come to the question of whether or not petitioner may be ejected from the subject premises for non-compliance with the terms of the agreement. Under the contract, petitioner obligated herself to pay a monthly rental, denominated as donation per PGFI policy, to PGFI in the amount of P1,000.00 a month. The lease period was two years.[37] PGFI issued receipts,[38] whose existence and issuance petitioner admitted,[39] for petitioner’s monthly payments which was eventually increased from P1,000.00 to P1,500.00. The agreement expired in December 1991. In December 1993, petitioner admittedly stopped paying PGFI, [40] while still occupying the subject premises. We agree with the CA that after December 1991, with petitioner still in the premises, the lease was impliedly renewed on a month-to-month basis, per Article 1670, in relation to Article 1687, of the Civil Code.[41] Article 1670 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived. (Emphasis supplied.) On the other hand, Article 1687 states: Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. xxx (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner’s obligation to pay rentals did not cease with the termination of the original agreement. When she failed to remit the required amounts after December 1993, the time when she stopped paying, PGFI was justified in instituting ejectment proceedings against her. Thus, under Article 1673 of the Civil Code: Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes: (1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has expired; (2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated; (3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;

xxx Petitioner clearly violated the provisions of the lease when she stopped making payments to PGFI. Hence, we find no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of respondent appellate court. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision dated June 23, 1998, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46629 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. October 31, 1964 G.R. No. L-18719 PILAR JOAQUIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX ANICETO, ET AL., defendants-appellee. Arturo B. Atienza & F. B. del Rosario for plaintiff appellants. D. A. Karganilla for defendants-appellees. Regala, J.:

This case comes to Us for review directly from the Court of First Instance of Manila. The facts are not in dispute. They are as follows: While Pilar Joaquin was on the sidewalk of Aviles Street, Manila, on April 27, 1960, a taxicab driven by Felix Aniceto and owned by Ruperto Rodelas bumped her As a result, she suffered physical injuries. Aniceto was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Municipal Court (now the City Court) of Manila. He was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. However, no ruling was made on his civil liability to the offended party in view of the latter's reservation to file a separate civil action for damages for the injuries suffered by her. Aniceto appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of First Instance of Manila. While the criminal case was thus pending appeal, Pilar Joaquin, the injured party, filed this case for damages in the Court of First Instance of Manila, in accordance with the reservation which she had earlier made. Felix Aniceto and Ruperto Rodelas, driver and owner, respectively, of the taxicab were made party defendants.

At the trial of this case, the plaintiff blocked all attempts of Rodelas to prove that, as employer, he had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, on the ground that such a defense is not available in a civil action brought under the Penal Code to recover the subsidiary civil liability arising from the crime. The lower court sustained plaintiff's objection. However, it dismissed the case on the ground that in the absence of a final judgment of conviction against the driver in the criminal case, any action to enforce the employer's subsidiary civil liability would be premature. Such liability, the trial court added, may only be enforced on proof of the insolvency of the employee. Hence, this appeal. The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against the employee is still pending? To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasi-delict.1According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crimes. With respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code provides: Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. (Emphasis supplied) The Revised Penal Code provides in turn that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable"2and that in default of the persons criminally liable, employers, teachers persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry shall be civilly liable for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge of their duties.3 As this Court held in City of Manila v. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil. 586: ... The Penal Code authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its applicability providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be present: (1) That an employee has committed a crime in the

discharge of his duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964]) Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable. Now, it is no reason to bring such action against the employer on the ground that in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, Article 33 of the Civil Code authorizes a civil action that is "entirely separate, and distinct from the criminal action," (Carangdang v. Santiago, 51 O.G. 2878; Reyes v. De la Rosa, 52 O.G. 6548; Dyogi v. Yatco, G. R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957). Can Article 33 above cited be made applicable to an employer in a civil action for subsidiary liability? The answer to this question is undoubtedly in the negative 4b2Zlpp. What this article 33 authorizes is an action against the employee on his primary civil liability. It cannot apply to an action against the employer to enforce his subsidiary civil liability as stated above, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. Any action brought against him before the conviction of his employee is premature. In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice, between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. (See Barredo v. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Parker v. Panlilio, et al., 91 Phil. 1) If he chooses an action for quasi-delict, he may hold an employer liable for the negligent act of the employee subject, however, to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. (Art. 2180, Civil Code) On the other hand, should he choose to prosecute his action under Article 100 of the Penal Code, he can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon prior conviction of the employee. While a separate and independent civil action for damages may be brought against the employee under Article 33 of the Civil Code, no such action may be filed against the employer on the latter's subsidiary civil liability because such liability is governed not by the Civil Code but by the Penal Code, under which conviction of the employee is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. If the court trying the employee's liability adjudges the employee liable, but the court trying the criminal action acquits the employee, the subsequent insolvency of the employee cannot make the employer subsidiary

liable to the offended party or to the latter's heirs. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur aQp3w. At bench are appeals by certiorari[1] from the Decision[2] of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan; (1) finding Demetrio T. Comendador[3] (Mayor Comendador) and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.[4] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) dismissing the cases against accused Alberto S. Angeles;[5] (3) ordering the defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. to pay the plaintiffs now respondents Visitacion C. Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C. Bombasi damages; and (4) dismissing the cases against the spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza[6] and Benita and Isagani Coronado.[7] The factual antecedents of the case are: On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion's late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the respondent's mother for a period of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20 years.[8] The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights. Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984.[9] From then on up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor's permits.[10] Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion's request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways,[11] Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of

Nagcarlan. The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15 October 1993. On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter[12] from Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish her store within five (5) days from notice. Attached to the letter were copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156[13] dated 30 August 1993 and a Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Marianito Sasondoncillo of Laguna. The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that: NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize Hon. Demetrio T. Comendador to enforce and order the Coronado's to demolish the building constructed on the space previously rented to them in order to give way for the construction of a new municipal market building. RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project if the Coronado's continuously resists the order. On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to Mayor Comendador saying that: (1) the lease contract was still existing and legally binding; (2) she was willing to vacate the store as long as same place and area would be given to her in the new public market; and (3) in case her proposals are not acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for the latter to just file an unlawful detainer case against her pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156. Pertinent portions of the letter read: x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the Municipal Council and the opinion rendered by the Laguna Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, it is my considered view, however, arrived at after consultation with my legal counsel, that our existing lease contract is still legally binding and in full force and effect. Lest I appear to be defiant, let me reiterate to you and the council that we are willing to vacate the said building provided that a new contract is executed granting to us the same space or lot and the same area. I believe that our proposal is most reasonable and fair under the circumstance. If you are not amenable to the said proposal, I concur with the position taken by the Council for you to file the appropriate action

in court for unlawful detainer to enable our court to finally thresh out our differences.[14] On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser sent a letter to Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the public market she was occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be filed against her. On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. The significant portion of the Resolution reads: Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang IPINASIYA: Ang pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang anumang istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na pagbabangon ng pamilihang bayan.[15] On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a letter[16] to Visitacion informing her of the impending demolition of her store the next day. Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a reply letter[17] to Asilo, alleging that there is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a court order and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further replied that if the demolition will take place, appropriate administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in the demolition. On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work. Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed civil engineer, estimated the cost of the demolished property as amounting to P437,900.00 [18] On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case[19]for damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and Alberto S. Angeles. The complaint was soon after amended to include the Spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as formal

defendants because they were then the occupants of the contested area. The spouses prayed for the following disposition:

1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant Municipality and defendant Municipal Mayor from leasing the premises subject of lease Annex "A" hereof, part of which is now occupied by PNP Outpost and by the Municipal Collectors' Office, and the equivalent adjacent area thereof, and to cause the removal of said stalls; 2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to occupy the equivalent corner area of the leased areas being now assigned to other persons by defendants Municipality and/or by defendant Municipal Mayor, and to allow plaintiffs to construct their stalls thereon; 3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after trial; 4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following (a) P437,900.00 for loss of building/store and other items therein; (b) P200,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c) P200,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P30,.00 for attorney's fees and P700.00 for every attendance of counsel in court. 5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs as justice and equity may warrant in the premises.[20]

Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint[21] against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February 1996, an Information[22] against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles was filed, which reads: That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public

officers, accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being then the Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being then the Municipal Administrator and accused Alberto S. Angeles being then the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, all of the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with each other, and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause the demolition of a public market stall leased by the municipal government in favor of one Visitacion Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable ground therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the latter in the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY (P437,900.00). Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas of "Not Guilty." On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94)[23] with Criminal Case No. 23267 pending before the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, which pertinently reads: Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.[24] During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on 16 November 1997. Accordingly, the counsel of Angeles filed a motion to drop accused Angeles. On 22 September 1999, the Third Division of Sandiganbayan issued an Order[25]DISMISSING the case against Angeles. The germane portion of the Order reads:

In view of the submission of the death certificate of accused/defendant Alberto S. Angeles, and there being no objection on the part of the Public Prosecutor, cases against deceased accused/defendant Angeles only, are hereby DISMISSED. The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September 2002. As a result, the counsel of the late Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan informing the court of the fact of Mayor Comendador's death. On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2 months imprisonment as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as maximum. The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 dismissing the cases against the accused Alberto S. Angeles, who died on November 16, 1997 is hereby reiterated. In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual damages for the destruction of the store; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the cost of the suit. The prayer for exemplary damages is denied as the court found no aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. In view of this court's finding that the defendant spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza are lawful occupants of the subject market stalls from which they cannot be validly ejected without just cause, the complaint against them is dismissed. The complaint against defendant spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado is likewise dismissed, it appearing that they are similarly situated as the spouses Coroza. Meanwhile, plaintiff Visitacion Bombasi is given the option to accept market space being given to her by the municipality, subject to her payment of the appropriate rental and permit fees.

The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same having become moot and academic. The compulsory counterclaim of defendant Comendador is likewise denied for lack of merit.[26] Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27]of the Decision alleging that there was only an error of judgment when he complied with and implemented the order of his superior, Mayor Comendador. He likewise alleged that there is no liability when a public officer commits in good faith an error of judgment. The Sandiganbayan, on its Resolution[28] dated 21 July 2003 denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that good faith cannot be argued to support his cause in the face of the court's finding that bad faith attended the commission of the offense charged. The Court further explained that the invocation of compliance with an order of a superior is of no moment for the "demolition [order] cannot be described as having the semblance of legality inasmuch as it was issued without the authority and therefore the same was patently illegal."[29] The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration[30] on 12 May 2003 alleging that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan on its Resolution[31] granted the Motion insofar as the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil action. Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.[32] Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," the public officer must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence. He also contended that he and his co-accused acted in good faith in the demolition of the market and, thereby, no liability was incurred. On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the death of Mayor Comendador prior to the promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor Comendador's criminal liability but also his civil liability. She also asserted good faith on the part of the accused public officials when they performed the demolition of the market stall. Lastly, she contended that assuming arguendo that there was indeed liability on the part of the accused public officials, the actual amount of damages being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no basis and was not duly substantiated.

Liability of the accused public officials under Republic Act No. 3019 Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides: In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[33] We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador as here represented by his widow Victoria Bueta. We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable that the first two requisites of the criminal offense were present at the time of the commission of the complained acts and that, as to the remaining elements, there is sufficient amount of evidence to establish that there was an undue injury suffered on the part of the Spouses Bombasi and that the public officials concerned acted with evident bad faith when they performed the demolition of the market stall. Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence.[34]

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.[35] It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor Comendador as accused below did not deny that there was indeed damage caused the Spouses Bombasi on account of the demolition. We affirm the finding that: xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff's store was carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiff's store. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.[36] [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[37] It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad faith in performing the demolition. First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents' structure is a public nuisance. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se.[38] Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and surroundings.[39] In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office.[40] To quote: An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial establishment) cited above and found out the following:

1. 2. 3. 4.

It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached. It is located within the market site. The building has not been affected by the recent fire. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being exposed to fire.[41]

Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor law,[42] the present Local Government Code[43] does not expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance.[44] And even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the accused public officials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision. Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as represented by the then Mayor Comendador, was placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business permits[45] in favor of the Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431 of the New Civil Code provides that, throughestoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The representation made by the municipality that the Spouses Bombasi had the right to continuously operate its store binds the municipality. It is utterly unjust for the Municipality to receive the benefits of the store operation and later on claim the illegality of the business. The bad faith of the petitioners completes the elements of the criminal offense of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The same bad faith serves as the source of the civil liability of Asilo, Angeles, and Mayor Comendador. It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16 November 1997, a motion to drop him as an accused was filed by his counsel with no objection on the part of the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan acted favorably on the motion and issued an Order dismissing all the cases filed against Angeles. On the other hand, when Mayor Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against him which resulted in the filing of a motion for reconsideration by Mayor Comendador's counsel, the prosecution opposed the Motion specifying the ground that the civil liability did not arise from delict, hence, survived the death of the accused. The Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the prosecution which disposition was not appealed.

We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case extinguished their criminal liabilities. We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil liability of Mayor Comendador survived his death; and that of Angeles could have likewise survived had it not been for the fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil liability was not questioned and lapsed into finality. We laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas:[46] Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) b) c) d) Acts or omissions e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours) Law Contracts Quasi-contracts law; and

civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.[48] The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human Relations, were cited by the prosecution to substantiate its argument that the civil action based therein is an independent one, thus, will stand despite the death of the accused during the pendency of the case. On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, in support of its argument that the civil action was dependent upon the criminal action, thus, was extinguished upon the death of the accused. The law provides that: Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized. (Emphasis ours) We agree with the prosecution. Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation, the law on human relations.[49] The pertinent articles follow: Art. 31 of the Civil Code states: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

punished

by

Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action[47] and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the

And, Art. 32(6) states: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; x x x x

xxxx The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right to private property of the Spouses Bombasi. The accused public officials should have accorded the spouses the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order. This Court in a number of decisions[51] held that even if there is already a writ of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested property.[52] The pertinent provisions are the following: Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - When the property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a special order of demolition.[53] This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has successfully been litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no case was even filed by the municipality. The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.[54] Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. As held in Aberca v. Ver: It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision [Art. 32 of the New Civil Code] is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. x x x.[50] Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law on human relations. First, the complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor Comendador's violation of plaintiff's right to due process. Thus: x x x x

In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the individual natural defendants did not only act with grave abuse of authority but usurped a power which belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations were done with malice or in bad faith and constitute an invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of law.

violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria who specified in her petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner in the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it although their consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged." We must, however, correct the amount of damages awarded to the Spouses Bombasi. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.[55] In this case, the Court finds that the only evidence presented to prove the actual damages incurred was the itemized list of damaged and lost items[56] prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to estimate the costs. As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation v. People of the Philippines,[57] x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works.Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the "sum of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment." The appellate court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 in its threepage decision. Thus, the appellate court merely declared: With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely demolish the apartment in question considering the

nature of the damages sustained as a result of the accident. Consequently, appellants continue, the award of P150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.

Further, in one case,[58] this Court held that the amount claimed by the respondent-claimant's witness as to the actual amount of damages "should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence." The Court further said that whatever claim the respondent witness would allege must be appreciated in consideration of his particular selfinterest.[59] There must still be a need for the examination of the documentary evidence presented by the claimants to support its claim with regard to the actual amount of damages. The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an exhibit[60] partakes of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the person who issued them was not presented as a witness.[61] Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.[62] Further, exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the actual damages claimed, this Court grants temperate damages for P200,000.00 in view of the loss suffered by the Spouses Bombasi. Temperate damages are awarded in accordance with Art. 2224 of the New Civil Code when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. The amount of temperate or moderated damages is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that the temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.[63] Without a doubt, the Spouses Bombasi suffered some form of pecuniary loss in the impairment of their store. Based on the record of the case,[64] the demolished store was housed on a two-story building located at the market's commercial area and its concrete walls remained strong and not affected by the fire. However, due to the failure of the Spouses Bombasi to prove the exact amount of damage in accordance with the Rules of Evidence,[65] this court finds that P200,000.00 is the amount just and reasonable under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda. De Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for temperate damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.