Chaffetz - Afghanistan in Turmoil

Afghanistan in Turmoil Author(s): David Chaffetz Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan., 1980), pp. 15-36 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2615717 . Accessed: 28/10/2013 03:38
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AFGHANISTANIN TURMOIL
David Chaffetz
*

100,000 soulsjust belowSovietTurkistan-anobserver couldalready nothelpbeing struck bytheechoesofEastern Europe.The wide,empty streets issuingfrom monumental roundabouts carried the onlytraffic-the slowchugofvintage in heavyovercoats bureaucrats Volga taxicabs bringing and Astrakhan capsfrom their bungalows in thequonset-hut suburbs to the stucco chancelleries in the city. Along these dustystreetsplump,East European matrons stoodbefore tiny fruit stands driving hardbargains with the Afghan vendors. In the centreof the city,in the tiledlapis and turquoise mosqueofImamAli, dervishes keptwatchoverthegraveofSherShah,the Amirwhoplayed Afghan theTsarsand theViceroys ofIndiaoff against one in the Great Game. When asked what theythought another of the Rus nowadays the dervishes . . . may volunteered, 'It's good forthe merchants Godnever letthem enjoy anything'. A visitor in thetimeoftheancienregime to Afghanistan wouldthusnot havebeentooquicktocallthecoupd'etatofApril1978 a major Soviet gainin Central Asia. The SovietUnion had long enjoyeda dominant role in the internal affairs of thatcountry, without havinghad much impacton the 'Thousandand One Nights' lifeof the Afghans. Most old Afghanhands greeted thecoupwith a ready, 'plusca change, plusc'est la meme chose'. But indications soonarosethat theRussians hadencouraged thislatest coupoutof frustration withthe twenty-five-year-old policyof giving aid to Afghanistan andseeing no results. In thiscoupthey havestepped in as never before, using the leverageof financial and technicalassistanceto seek to transform Afghanistan's traditional rural economy into a model .of Soviet-style centralised The government of the leftist development. Khalqi (People's) established in thewakeoftheAprilcoup,showsevery Party, signoftaking sucha programme in fact radical on with socialmeasures. seriously, hastening The speedand violence withwhichthenew government out its has carried has provokedrevoltsin the country'sever-volatile programme border provinces. Moreover, being unableto implement many reforms without heavy reliance on Comecon personnel, theKhalqi government has raised theprofile
* David Chaffetz a member Affairs, is editor-in-chief oftheJournal ofInternational and has contributed at Columbia papersand oftheMiddleEast Institute University, ofNew York. reviews aboutAfghanistan for publication bytheAsia Society 15

IN themid-1970s, visiting theindustrial city ofMazar-i-Sharif-a town of

Thisarticle went toPress theDecember before 1979coupinAfghanistan andthe Soviet intervention inthat country.

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ofitsCommunist supporters to levelswhichundermine thelegitimacy ofthe regime. Can theKhalqisask theAfghans to accepta socialrevolution and at thesametime ask them to giveup SherShah's legacy offierce independence? Ifthatis a choiceto be madein Moscow,rather thanKabul,do theRussians understand whatthey areup against inAfghanistan? The Legacy ofDaoud in Theyhavehadovertwenty-five years tolearn. Extensive Soviet influence Afghanistan first aroseat theinstance ofMohammad Daoud Khan,a cousinof in the thenreigning Zaher Shah, who assumedthe premiership monarch, in hisquestfor 195 3. Spurned bytheUnited States military support, theroyal an agreement prime minister signed with theSoviet Unionwhich wasto make the Afghanarmyentirely dependent on its northern neighbour forarms, and financing. With Soviet encouragement, training, Daoud reversed the in postwartrend towardscapitalistic-albeit monopolistic-development Afghanistan, andembarked thenation on a series ofambitious, Stalinistic fiveUnionnotonly year plans.The effect ofDaoud's policies wastogivetheSoviet a greatstrategic stakein his country, butalso an ideological commitment to making Afghanistan's development work.Afghanistan thusbecamethefirst non-Communist country to seekSoviet development aid in thepostwar period. Many observers viewedthiseventas epochal,regarding President Nasser's fateful switch to theRussiansin 1956 as havingbeen inspired by Daoud's example.' Throughoutthis article it will be argued that the Soviet stake in A country Afghanistan is more than merely geopolitical. of high-2,000 metre-mountains androads, often little better thangoatpaths, Afghanistan is a poorstaging ground for modern war.Whilenomadarmies in thepasthave usedthecountry as a highway for theconquest ofthesubcontinent, thelack, orextreme ofitstechnical infrastructure nowmakes sucha 'highway' fragility, And despite thehighmartial unusable. thehuman reputation oftheAfghans, materiel is poor-halfoftheyoungmendrafted are turned ofthearmy away becauseofphysical disabilities.2 Thus neither norits Afghanistan's highways ninedivisions theSoviets offer muchstrategic advantage. On theother hand, in developing Afghanistan, the Russians aim to create both a modern anda modern Ifthey infrastructure army. wereto succeed, they wouldrealise a viablemilitary boththestrategic advantage ofgaining base,and theequally Soviet in a ofproving significant ideological advantage development capabilities very poorcountry. inAfghanistan fall The Russian ofDaoud stake wasimperilled bytheabrupt in 1963. After ten yearsof Daoud's Sovietgambit the development of the little thepremiership showed Daoud from -ountry improvement. Ousting bya
the Dimension (London:PallMall for TheMilitarv Middle EastPolitics: 1. See,for example, J.C. Hurewitz, Relations, 1969), p. 269. Councilon Foreign Nov.-Dec., 1978, p. 27. Newv Left Review, in Afghanistan', article, 'Revolution 2. See FredHalliday's

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took technocrats a cliqueofAmerican-educated sleight ofhand, constitutional of the nineteenth In a mannerreminiscent charge of the government. to juggleSovietand American begancautiously GreatGame,they century's Five Theirthird bothsuper-powers. to gainmoreaid from in order influence Year Plan (1963-68) relied heavily-to the tune of 30 per cent of financing, ostensibly forthe foreignSovietand American expenditures-on The forthe basic outlays. of the plan, but in reality exchange component of withthesincerity either ofthesuper-powers to impress act failed juggling andtheSoviet States Aid cutbacks byboththeUnited theAfghans' allegiance. to40 percentbelowtheprevious down theplan'sexpenditures Unionbrought at 200 percentaboveit.' beenbudgeted having plan, after withthe to secureaid,together posture ofthisnon-alignment The failure plan, were Daoud's producedby the emasculated economic stagnation a decadein retirement Daoud seizedpower After to power. mandate to return of a President fromhis royal cousin Zaher Shah and declaredhimself of the new supporters Among the enthusiastic RepublicanAfghanistan. who had been schooledin the Soviet werethe juniorarmyofficers regime the 1953 agreement Union-at the rateof about 1,000 annually-under were Khalq and Parcham, twoleftist parties, byDaoud. Afghanistan's signed likewisevisiblein the early days of the new regime.Divided more by in any thetwoparties lacked, andstyle thanbysubstantive issues, personality mass support to contendforpower.4Both lookedto case, the significant of thisshared and Daoud availedhimself however, Moscow forinspiration, thatled observers an alliance ofconvenience 'Moscow connection' to develop a Communist constituted to conclude that the Republicanrevolution rouge'. Le Mondesolemnly calling Daoud, 'le prince takeover-with takeover, thatDaoud's coup was a Communist That earlypresumption, in the materialised WhentheCommunist threat actually to be wrong. proved the fact, to acknowledge April 1978 coup, observerswere reluctant there weresome earlier. Nevertheless, years mistake offive their remembering evenat thetimeof thetwoevents, between who understood therelationship who toldtheAmerican a quiteclairvoyant minister Daoud's coup,including six years Daoud six years, ambassador, Elliotin 1973, 'I giveMohammad soon after withhim'. Meanwhile, decideto dispense before theCommunists Daoud's putsch, the deposed Prime Minister, Mohammed Hashim his 'shock'. dead in his jail cell. Daoud expressed Maiwandwal, was found andthemost technocrats, was thedeanoftheWestward-looking Maiwandwal for did have a schedule IftheSoviets oftheliberals. statesman distinguished timed.5 movecouldnothavebeenbetter ofAfghanistan their control taking look madehis premiership under Daoud's presidency Russianbenevolence
3. Ministry ofPlanning, Five YearPlan,Kabul, 1966. See also,Financial Times,March18, 1969, p. 22, for ofplanning discussion failure during theliberal regime. 4. Haliday, op.cit., p. 25. Halliday usesundisclosed German sources. 5. LouisDupree,'TowardsRepresentative in Afghanistan', Government AUFS Reports, 14, PartII, 1978, p.4.

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likefamine. In rapid succession theRussians offered Afghanistan hydroelectric a newroad;irrigation for nitric fertilizer stations; factories; Jelalabad province; inMazar-i-Sharif. and-the jewelofthewhole complex-a natural gasindustry andtheAfghans hadagreed By 197.5theRussians on overseventy projects.6 had its catch-as eventhe Afghans Yet each oftheprojects learned that there is no such thing as a free lunch.The road,forexample, linked Kabul a capacity with vehicles: there with theSoviet for 80-ton wereno such border, in Afghanistan, vehicles or in theSovietUnion,besides Sovietbattle tanks. The Sovietirrigation projectswere tied to fruit-export This agreements. neededboostto Afghan export earnings was souredsomewhat by Russia's as 'lowest classification ofall Afghan was donein the produce quality': sorting SovietUnion by Sovietsorters. The Jaraduq a joint NaturalGas Project, venture and the optimistically betweenSovietMitroprom named Afghan Oil Company, National wascapitalised at 62 5 million rubles, with theSoviets financing two-thirds of that.According 2 billioncubic to the agreement, metres ofgas wereto be exported to theSovietUnioneach yearafter 1976. had a cloud:thepriceofgas was fixed in 1975 and Again,thissilver lining the worldpriceof naturalgas had soared.The remained therelong after Soviets, who had similar thatgas at whatever agreements withIran,bought choseto sellit. The Afghans didnot pricetheIranian National Oil Company havethekind ofclouttheShahanshah enjoyed. Further Soviet penetration of the Afghaneconomyoccurred in more traditional areas.The Afghan Karakolwool market, an exclusively typically London affair, waspartially diverted toLeningrad ithadto compete where with theSoviet Union'sowndomestic Karakol there industry. Profits werecredited directly into the servicing of Afghanistan's debtto the Soviet burgeoning Union.An important 10 percentofthecountry's werethus export earnings tiedintotheSoviet system.7 in Afghanistan But thekeysourceofSovietcontrol of layin thestructure theeconomy. UnderSovietpressure Daoud nationalised themajorindustrial ventures and turned these into unwieldy lynchpins for massive industrialisation.8 was to be a show-case-amodelofSoviet-style Afghanistan in thepoorest development region ofAsia. If theRussians couldnot helpto a country develop and historical on theirown borders withstrong cultural affinities to successful socialist Central aid be shown Asia, where couldSoviet to be effective? thatindustry to the Sovietdoctrine comes first, Adhering in theMiddleEastthat Afghanistan joined must those countries import food to feedthemselves. Withonly4 per centof the arableland givenover to the in a largely andwith production ofcashcrops, 90 percentofthepeopleliving subsistence this on heavy was quixotic, to saythe economy, emphasis industry
6. See KabulTimes,1974-75. Ahmad Shalizi. Minister, with former Interior 7. Basedon discussions to Economic Constraints Money Financeand the Critical Economy: 8. See MaxwellFry,The Afghan Brill,1974), p. 67. (Leiden: Development

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concentrated on produce thegovernment least. In order todevelop agricultural oftherich farms and intensive tractorisation a few, mechanised co-operative victims peasants andnomads found themselves Jelalabad region. The displaced The impinging of exploitation. of what the Sovietslike to call capitalist is a striking agrobusiness-tocall a spade a spade-on the countryside thestate as the inneighbouring Iran,only inthiscasewith repetition ofevents financed Union. capitalist, bytheSoviet dollars by All theseventures costtheSovietUnionmoney-overa billion So signsin 1975 to makea go ofAfghanistan. 1978-but itwas determined brought abouta thatKabul was againtempted to playbothsidesofthefence toward Daoud's regime. reassessment ofSoviet policy on Sovietaid, in 1975 Daoud beganto Concerned overhis dependence Cabinets. policies thatcharacterised thelastroyal resuscitate thefence-sitting alliesin On thedomestic loosefrom his erstwhile front Daoud shookhimself youthful the leftist Parchamand Khalq parties by sending the enthusiastic, ideologues'out to the people'. The AfghanNarodnikiprovedno more in in radicalising successful the masses than theirRussian predecessors in the hostileprovinces while, more Turgenev's day.9 They rusticated cohesion in thecapital. Daoud nowhada free importantly, they losttheir party in his army, hand to move against whomhe purgedin late 1975. leftists declining American aid as a counter-weight Abroad, Daoud sought to replace As a Muslimcountry, as totheSoviets byturning totheMiddleEastoilstates. foraid wellas one oftheworld'spoorer qualified states, Afghanistan readily including the ofaid and lending institutions, from theproliferating numbers andtheOPEC Special Fund. KuwaitFund,theIslamic Bankfor Development, a halfbilliondollarsforhydroelectric GrantsfromSaudi Arabia included whiletheUnited ArabEmirates 8 5 million dollars for a sugar offered works, border againstSovietinfluence, factory. Iran,anxiousto secureits eastern 2 billion in aid,surpassing in pledged offered theSoviets contributions dollars totheAfghan SevenYear Plan(1976-85). " Iran proved to wereequipped The aid from to be morethantheIranians After and morethantheAfghans twoyears, couldhave absorbed. transfer, As with other reached ofthetotal aspects Afghanistan. onlya fraction pledged his parleys withBhuttoand of the Shah's Drang noch Osten-including union-the aid economic Daoud, and his calls foran Iran-Afghan-Pakistan speculate pledgeturnedout to be more smokethan fire.Some observers thatthe Shah's moves provoked, first concernin the Kremlin,and then It is hardto know theregion. counter-moves throughout Communist-inspired how seriouslyconcernedthe Russians were over the Shah's aborted " diplomacy. himwidespread theRussians vis-a-vis Daoud's newposture support brought
9. Dupree, op.cit.,PartI, p. 3; 1976. 10. WashingtonPost,May6, March1979. inBaluchistan', Policy, 11. SeligHarrison, 'Nightmare Foreign

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from moderates, as well as conservative Muslimclergy, who had strongly, theincreasingly in thecountry. evenviolently, opposed visible Soviet presence Consciousof thisreligious support, Daoud repaired strained relations with and madea widely MuslimPakistan, publicised journey to SaudiArabia,via These movesweretoo palpable a reversal Islamabad. forthe leftists, slowly their recovering from 1975 setback. The Khalq andParcham, regrouped and recovered from their forced rustication, cemented their leadership differences in a brutal andjoinedin stepping up activity against theregime, which resulted andarmy in thecapital. crackdown on students officers Pay-rises for thearmy and subsidised pricesfor the civil servants-which cost the government a year-didnotwinDaoud broad 3 billion rupees support infaceof20 percent inflation. Slipping intoa siegementality, Daoud authorised theassassination of exileeven sevenprominent leftist whilesending personalities, intodiplomatic The purge andfinal in its moderates. of1978, morefar-reaching sympathetic intent thanthatof 1975, gave the Khalq and the Parchamthe choiceof liquidation orrevolution. theSoviets wereat thesereversals How disturbed ofpolicy bytheir protege is impossible to Daoud, and how muchparttheyplayedin his overthrow, know.But the scale on whichtheyhave backedDaoud's leftist successors with volumes. Comecon countries speaks Immediately twenty-five agreements an unusualburst weresigned ofdiplomacy on thepart ofa bythenewregime; in itsowncapital. secure Whilestreet-fighting went on in government scarcely and East television forBulgarian Kabul, the government begancontracting withan additional 22 million Germanprinting dollars equipment, together the SovietUnion to exploit natural visit from gas. FidelCastropaid a brief after therevolution, thatit to assurethenewgovernment shortly presumably is possible to run a small countryentirely on Soviet aid for years. and other Warsaw from Poland'sHenryk Congratulatory telegrams Jablonski Pactheadsofstate, in.12 flooded The Khalqi regime Observers whohadbeenquickto call Daoud's regime in 1973 Communist werenowwilling to givethenewgovernment thebenefit Said a ofthedoubt. USAID official, 'I think former in the level of rhetoric they're just raising order to be heard abovetherhetoric Daoud used'. The Western Presspointed out the American connections of boththe new President, Nur Mohammad Taraki-a former translator at the Americanembassy-and the Prime a Columbia Minister, Hafizollah Amin, alumnus. An Afghan, now livingin exile, cautioned againstattaching a strong to either of the Afghan leaders.'I used to have lunch ideological colouring withTarakiand Aminevery dayfortwoyears.Taraki,he is a weak,kindly sortofman. That's whytheymadehimpresident. Amin is But Hafizollah a goodspeaker. He's after thepower.' very sharp,
andMay 1978. intheKabulTimesduring articles various April example, 12. See,for

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It is hardtoknow themotives andgoalsofthenewregime at themoment it TarakiandAmin,both that members oftheKhalq seized power. Somesuggest and their moved toa prearranged Party, according planin consolidating power their affiliation withMoscow.According to thisview,theKhalq proclaiming leaders(1) joined with the Parchamin a tacticalalliance;(2) overthrew inKabulwhiledisguising theextent of Daoud's regime; (3) consolidated power the July1978 (4) executed theirideological commitment to Communism; sympathetic to theirrivals;and (5) purgeoftheParchamand armyofficers withMoscow in thelastmonths of 1978. institutionalised their relationship Tarakiand Aminwereforced intothehandsoftheRussians Others holdthat violenceof the opposition againstthem.In this view, by the unexpected areas successive to assumedirection oftherural attempts bythenew regime in in remote Nuristan province and afterwards provoked localresistance, first PaktiaandHerat.Thus Tarakiwas forced to seekSoviet backing, culminating in the defence pactof December1978 withthe SovietUnion, in orderto theregime thegrowth secure ofrural insurgency. militarily against the mayhave beenbefore comingto power, Whatever Khalq aspirations in thewakeofthecoup,and thegrowth courseofevents ofSovietinfluence, theregime a posture showa logicoftheir own.At first assumed ofconciliation. 'all progressives' and Whether invited sincerely or not,thenew government 'all victims toparticipate inthecountry's development. ofDaoud's repression' in prison opponents of Daoud remained Nevertheless, severalpro-Western and misgivings withthe changeof regimes about the possibleCommunist in Kabul. However, orientation of the new government began to surface the Hafizollah Amin, rejected Afghanistan's well-spoken PrimeMinister, labelfortwogoodreasons. In thefirst Marxist-Leninist place,theAmerican proved unwilling to invokethe automatic Department of Statehad hitherto aid to Communist clause in the foreign assistanceact (which prohibits While the UnitedStates Communist. countries) by callingTaraki's regime it enjoyed in Kabul, Tarakiand thuspreserved whatever leverage diplomatic the Aminsalvaged American aid programme. Secondly, the15 million dollar labelwouldhavefurther thefundamentalist Marxist-Leninist alienated Afghan For whoequatethematerial ofcommunism withatheism. clergy, philosophy theirbenefit, itself proclaimed socialist-a political then,theKhalqi regime hue common theMuslimMiddleEast to be acceptable to enough throughout themenofreligion. Taraki's in theWestern The argument, Press,as to whether wagedlargely One maywell doubt was Communist or not soon becameacademic. regime the 'scientific whether socialism' of Marx was fullyunderstood by the in the Marxist thatmatter, self-proclaimed regimes Khalqis-or, for bymany fell victim to thenew Third neither norprivate capital World: private property Taraki's familiar Yet in a manner to other Communist dictatorships regime. regime began to narrowits base of power and grasp for centralised, bureaucratic overthemasses. control

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facingthe new regimewas to assertits problems One of the greatest that make rural districts in theisolated ofthepeople legitimacy overthemasses Members ofthegoverning ofthepopulation. elitehavelittle up 90 per,cent thepeople, and their them runfrom thedisdain attitudes toward contact with condescension oftheyoung by the oldereliteto thefashionable entertained with fear, proud, rural people reciprocate leftists. The tribal,intensely attachment way of life, and a chauvinistic to theirtraditional suspicion, nearly to Islam.In their view,theKabulieliteis very as attachment expressed a troika of in the countryside, presence The government kafir, unbelieving. andtaxcollector familiar Tsarist is onlyan from Russia, schoolteacher soldier, emblem Real authority is sharedwiththe local ofKabul's control. outward as middlemen notables, tribalchiefsand villageheadmen,who function ill-will ofthegoverning eliteand between Kabul and thepeople.The mutual ofthe association tempered bythehistorical therural masses was traditionally 1 dynasty with the local notables-fromwhich class it had emerged. the dynasty and itslegacyofrurallegitimacy, theKhalqi regime Extirpating ofthe'toiling masses'so dear theconfidence needed a wayofwinning to find ideals.Instead themin the mostpalpable ways.In to their theythreatened imprisoned power they immediately on seizing Nuristan, for example, remote himwitha Kabuli thepopular local notable-andreplaced sub-governor-a ofthe theritual performance radical interfered with Thisyoung party member. in their theNuristanis fears Muslimfasting thatthenew confirming month, and oftribal strongholds provinces, to Islam.In theeastern regime was hostile andsoldiers the to 'liberate' sentteachers thegovernment religious sentiment, their khansand clerics. quitea Subsequently, tribal massesfrom 'oppressive' byresentful werereported to havebeenkilled few ideologues ofthese youthful tribesmen. in confronting therealism oftheKhalqigovernment One can onlyquestion The lack of realism the heremaystemfrom sentiment so crudely. popular but it also the ruling and the ruledof Afghanistan, historical gulfbetween to ruling cliqueseeking Soviet-styled thealienation ofan increasingly reflects maintain through force. power whichbythe to theruralopposition The Khalqi government didrespond the endemic theEast. Recognising summer of 1978 had become throughout the opposition to the of the local notables necessity of at least neutralising in invited tribal khansand village chiefs to meetings thegovernment regime, that Kabul theprovincial increasingly vocalfears to quiettheir capitals, trying In deference party had 'goneCommunist'. to thesensibilities ofthenotables, began whiletheKabul press 'comrade', calling one another members stopped a 'recitation from the to report eventas havingincluded every government socialandeconomic reforms, plansfor HolyKoran'. As to thegovernment's Ali Keshtmand, that'We have Sultan gaveassurances thePlanning Minister, 4 butputthrough what wasplanned'. donenothing yet
(Paris,1974). inMikeBarry, ofthis 13. Bestdiscussion Afghanistan 14. MEED, June 30, 1978, p.6.

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At the same timeas Taraki and Amin backedofffrom theirheadlong the two Khalq leadersmoveddecisively collisionwithpopularsentiment, their In July, Cabinet with against rivals within Parcham leftist front. members affiliations werefirst posted abroad to diplomatic posts, thenfired. Showtrials The demotion werearranged those Parchamis slowto leavethecountry. of for theDeputyPrimeMinister, twowell-known pro-Soviet personalities, Babrak Karmaland the DefenceMinister, GeneralAbdul Qadir, led observers to drift speculatethat the Khalqi's regimewould rapidly away fromSoviet influence. Subsequent events were toprove otherwise. Karmalhad advocated a gradualist reform ofthecountry-for all his vocal he had recognised fortheRussians, therealism in Daoud's support inherent programme ofcautious reforms. Amin,on theother hand,urgesrapid social at whatever reforms cost.WiththepurgeofKarmaland also Keshtmandwhose sanguinereassurances had about the direction of the government proved useful in thegovernment earlier in thesummer-theKhalqi regime toembark prepared on an ambitious scheme ofreforms. Ifcarried to completion thesereforms wouldrevolutionise Afghan society. arenewinconception, Noneofthereforms having beendrafted under previous and republican But theearlier royalist ministers. generation ofreformers had beendaunted by the difficulties confronting them.Anxiouslestrapidsocial reforms shouldalienate theirpower-base of tribesmen, religious and figures landowners, thepre-revolutionary governments had always movedslowly on basicreforms, muchto thefrustration oftheyoung leftists. Now speedis the order ofthe day.Land reform in July1978, Proclamation VI, promulgated cancels all debts,returns all mortgages and freesall sharecroppers from financial in thelastdecade.Ruralmoney obligations contracted have lenders been jailed,whilenewspapers have announced thatlargelandowners have given'gifts' ofthousands of jeribsoflandtotherevolution. We maywellwonder whatis thereality behind all this.Ruralcredit, as in many poorer countries, is usurious becauseit reflects thescarcity in ofcapital the country. Withoutany alternative source of credit(the Agricultural Development Bankstill a figment being largely ofKabul's imagination), what willthefarmers dofor credit thelocalmoney-lending hasbeen nowthat system in the crushed? Dislocations causedbylanddisputes and claimsadjustments wake of reform are to be handledby a 'Land Arbitration Board' in every provincial sub-capital. Thereare overa hundred in the of thesesub-capitals and cadastral trained country-without any without records, any personnel, theadministrative a massive without infrastructure to control transfer ofland. The activities of the boardsin the threeprovinces wheretheyhave been established-all nearbigtowns-seemto be limited to collecting testimonies from recently landed peasants arewith therevolution. abouthowhappy they The zeal ofthegovernment's seemsat best action on behalf ofthepeasants
15. Kabul Times, June1978; Anis(Persian andPushtu, Kabul),July 15, Aug. 26, 1978.

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rely ofrural credit on whichsmallfarmers thesystem misplaced. Destroying shortages a year plantings thisyearandthreatens hence. for seedhas curtailed in 1980. The of500,000 tonsofwheat predict a short-fall Already observers as '6 As ill-conceived only100,000 tons. Soviet UnionandIndiahavepledged VI maybe a formula for Proclamation in theMiddleEast,this anylandreform disaster. In this arid, of much significance. necessarily Nor is the land reform is thesourceof country, landis 'dirtcheap' and accessto water mountainous of and tribalchiefsregulate the distribution wealth.Powerful landowners If the pattern. ifself-serving, according to a time-honoured, irrigated waters thekhansand thewaterlords-as meansto stepin and supplant government in thecountryside. boards water arecalled-they wouldhaveto establish they they Asia, though takeover ofCentral didjust thatin their The Bolsheviks Can the the and the had Oxus Afghan Jaxartes. to control tworivers, only board for thethousands establish a water cadres regime with itslackoftrained theagricultural landofthemillions thatnourish ofsmall ofseasonalrivulets a deadletter. remains Ifthey do not,thelandreform farmers? theformation ofrural In another thegovernment announced utopian move, Whileother staff. countries developing with government-salaried co-operatives their before implementing have studied theproblems of co-operatives might in Augustof 1978, fourmonths co-operatives plans,Kabul openedits first The waiting under impatient. after therevolution. days Daoud hadmadethem theKhalqiregime undermined whatever legitimacy rapidly Theseactivities rural areas.The to therestive itsconciliatory gestures from mayhavegained buteven susceptible to rhetoric, highly as being Afghans maybe characterised in Afghanistan actionsspeak louder than words.Whether'communist', aimedto 'anti-Islamic' or 'trulyIslamic',the Khalqi regime 'progressive', and the countryside extendits bureaucratic control over the countryside, in hailed thesuccessofthelandreforms aimedto resist. WhiletheKabulpress and Kabul-that is, the major urban areas-no official Herat, Jelalabad beganto came from the ruralareas. On the otherhand,reports reportage and ofKabul airofparty workers surface ofmassacres by tribesmen telling in the eastern provincesof Nuristan, strikesagainst rural insurgents andKonar. Nangrahar thesummer of1978 led the through In Nuristan, successive provocations rescuetheir from jail thesub-provincial old governor capital, localsto attack and take on a regiment of regular armytroopssentto punishthem.In a theNuristanis threw backthegovernment, enough capturing surprise upset, men in the district-that to equip all military-age armsand ammunition is, " therevolt became official. tenandseventy-and agedbetween in Julyand Nuristan Planes bombed Kabul tookthe uprising seriously.
16. Dawn (Karachi), Dec. 5, 1978. 17. Detailsbasedon conference at Asia Society (New York)chaired byDr Chris Brunner; notable speakers area. were KhalilNuristani, Dr Richard Strand, whohadrecently comefrom therebel

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therebel moved in to isolate ofa division August1978, whiletheequivalent the againstthe Nuristanis, province. Stirring up ancienttribalemnities rivaltribesmen promising to thefight, irregulars also committed government The werebeaten. likedto theNuristanis once they they coulddo whatthey them. or holywar,against a 'Jihad', evenproclaimed government progressive ended when snowfall until mid-winter, ragedfrommid-summer Fighting andhigh passes defiles The Nuristanis toholdthenarrow managed operations. overtheKabulisby andcelebrated this stalemate that leadintotheir provinces, themselves independent. declaring its ties regime consolidate of 1978 saw theAfghan The lasttwomonths with Moscow. Whetherplanned,or whetherinducedby the revoltin withthoseoftheKhalqs made ofSovietattitudes thecongruence Nuristan, since domestically inevitable: the coursetheypursued such a consolidation toMoscow. them buttomovecloser no option hadleft coming topower to Moscow to meetin joint Cabinettravelled the Afghan In November in the countryside peasantswere Meanwhile, sessionwith the Politburo. forvoluntary labourin road construction (King Zaher Shah had organised acclamation). in 1968 amidliberal abolished corveelabourby the peasants took andcivilservants students, soldiers peasants, ofworkers, Demonstrations schoolsand factories barracks, capitals, and ministries, placein theprovincial was designated Taraki'sbirthplace werecloseddownto encourage attendance. 'son ofa poorshepherd' a national whytheself-proclaimed shrine (although a substantial farmstead is lessthan clear). should tobe from prove the During Taraki's visitto Moscow, he took partin commemorating of the Great October Revolution,making the obligatory anniversary to Lenin's tomb and givinga singularspeech over Afghan pilgrimage Sovietaid to Afghanistan, twenty years ofinconclusive Defending television. aid. unconditional Taraki had this to say: 'The Soviet Union extended that no to thetoilers theaidwasso beneficial somewerenotpleased, Although withthe SovietUnion, one could object'. He wenton to praiserelations on December 5, that his listenersfor the announcement, preparing pact.8 The first and the SovietUnion had signeda defence Afghanistan to seek Sovietaid, back in 1953, now joined Cuba, Angola and country inhaving a mutual defence Moscow. pactwith Ethiopia to the regime This pact came just in time,as the level of opposition that ofan epidemic. wasnowapproaching theeastern provinces throughout The counter-revolution had in resisting authority government The success of the Nuristanis a general in all theperipheral provinces themoodtoward uprising encouraged Kabul.The tribes a sullen from that hadtraditionally maintained independence declared Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, of the Sarhadd, opposite in thefirst theKhalqiregime months of1979. The chiefs themselves against
18. Anis,Nov. 25, 1978.

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theMohmand, metin ajirga ofthelargest tribes, Afridi, Waziri, andYusofzai, ' These chiefs (council) to co-ordinate their activities. werejoinedbyrefugees from Kabul,representing dissidents ofall colours: royalists, republicans, highranking army officers, andevenapolitical technocrats anxious tooverthrow the A notable in thetribes Khalqiregime. presence is thatofAfghanistan's most distinguished religious leaders, fleeing whatis widely viewed as a bloody purge withtheancienregime influential ofAfghanistan's connected clergy. Closely bykintiesandpolitical alliance, these pirs, orsaints, arehighly regarded bythe Thepirs, tribal distrusted people. Theyarethusdoubly bytheKhalqiregime. like the tribesmen, are Sunni Muslims,the official sect of the countryShia also exist.Responding although to Taraki's proclamation of a Jibad againstthe 'Made-in-London Muslims' (a reference to the cosmopolitan a Jibadagainst Tarakiand education ofmany ofthese pirs),thepirscalledfor 2u thesupport backed themselves up with oftheSarhaddi tribesmen. in The tribal jirga calledfora direct assaulton Kabul."' Prudent counsels thejirga reminded the chiefs underthe of the experience of the Nuristanis In the mountains, had terroristic air-strikes. such bombing government's Others tribal massed for itwouldbe devastating. effects; against levies, assault, noted thedefence agreement between Kabul andMoscow,andpointed outthe largenumbers ofSovietmilitary advisers in the base at Jelalabad, just a few kilometres down the road. Up to the present, therefore, despiteroutine designation of such-and-such a day as 'D-Day', guerrilla warfare ofvarying intensity hasbeentherule. Manyregions ofthecountry havesettled downintoa Hobbesian 'stateof wherea nature',liketherugged Hazarajatin thecentre of theHindukush, local governor issuedrifles to his retainers and declared war on the distant himself He has not, like his Nuristani declared government. counterparts, independent from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the behaviour of theselocal CivilWarthanofthe rebels is more reminiscent ofthewarlords oftheChinese IslamicRevolution of Iran. The fragile mosaicof social more co-ordinated in Afghanistan The rebel bands are groups underscores thissegmenting effect. like the Hazaras; by linguistic and cultural isolatedby theirmountains, likethe identity, liketheNuristanis; orbybitter memories ofpolitical rivalries, It shouldnot be PathankhansofPakistan's North-West Frontier Province. rivalsof the thatthe Khalqis are all GhilzaiPathans,long-time forgotten and manyofthepresent theformer DurraniPathans, including royalfamily rebel clans. The unity oftherebels basednearthePakistani border hangsprecariously a maintain constant on the efforts of traditional to go-betweens dialogue betweenthe suspicious, jealous leadersof the revolt.Recentreports of a unification of severalfactions into a NationalFront(ANLF) may be more
19. Dawn,May 12, 1979. 20. Anis,Apri.122,1979. withZia Khan 21. New York Times,April19, 1979, article by Robert Trumbtill based on interview Nassry. I interviewed Nassry as wellas SaidAhmadGailani, courtesy New York Post.

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ifthefollowing apparent than real, is anyindication. anecdote A partisan ofthe Gailani-led IslamicPartyof Pakistan, Jamiat-i-Islami said of the ANLF's leader, Sibghatullah Mujadidi,'his father was a great man,buttheson is not up to hisstuff'. Mujadidi replied to theaffront, 'Who is thisGailani?He is a nobody. We knowwhat he is'. A thirdspokesman of the ANLF said of Engineer Gulbedin Hikmatyar's, Hizb-i-Islami movement, 'thatTajik has no morechanceofruling Afghanistan thana Negrohas ofbecoming American President' . 22 Despitethefragility ofthecoalition oftheseveral rebelgroups, fighting in the North-West Frontier Provincehas becomemore and more in earnest throughout 1979. The Pakistani-based rebels, feelingthe squeeze of Islamabad's pressure tostopguerrilla activity in therefugee areas,havefought to gain bases within Kabul has responded tenaciously Afghan territory. by launching air-strikes against therebels usingnapalm. Indirect confirmation of thenumber ofairattacks launched byKabulis given byPakistan's complaints thatnearlya hundred overflights into Pakistani in airspacehave resulted Pakistani villagesbeingbombed. Fleeingthe bombing in Afghanistan, the in theNorth-West number ofrefugees Frontier Province has swelled to over Whiletherebelgroups in Afghanistan and call for struggle fora toe-hold immediate assaulton Kabul,a long-run perspective on their campaign offers a prospect neither so grim as they nor as presently face, yetone so optimistic a theirspokesmen It is true that the rebels muster cannot direct suggest. assaulton the capital, giventhe sheerfire-power of the government troops armed with theheaviest On theother model Soviet gun-boat helicopters. hand, a longwarofattrition their sidesteps opponents' superior fire-power, making an issueoftherelative ofthetwosides.The Khalqis'conscript staying power has beenwracked army bymutinies sincethe fighting started. Wholeunits havereportedly their for elitesecurity defected, alongwith equipment. Except halfthe armyis tieddown-the fighting unitsin the capital-where nearly a is questionable. Thereis evidence, determination ofthetroops that however, longwarofattrition might be acceptable to therebels. The mainbusiness of the tribes,besidesherding, is smuggling. The factthat official AfghanPakistani trade is conducted under hascreated restrictive currency agreements a black market forall sortsof consumer goods soughtin both countries. Nomad smuggling -servesthat market,reachinga greatervolume as control wanes. Since the outbreak of fighting, has government smuggling flourished. The tribesmen themeans thewar.At the have,therefore, topursue sametime, customs ofthegovernment's revenues one half receipts, generally in normal the for havefallen times, dismally, undermining Khalqis' capacity prolonged conflict.23 The tribalrebelshave strongdisincentives to end the conflict on the
uddin Rabbani ofJamiat-i-Islami. with Burhan June 22, 1979, p. 38; interview 22. Impact International, 23. Dawn,July 6,1979.

300,000.

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has theKhalqiregime governments, MiddleEastern Khalqis'terns.Likemost with Together ofAfghanistan. industry thepastoral plansfor'rationalising' in Heratandsetup a a livestock Bankithas opened slaughterhouse theWorld provinces. groupforthe nomadsof neighbouring fieldserviceveterinary itsimplementation Daoud's regime, under theplanwas conceived (Although as thegovernment The planenvisages under thenewgovernment.) has begun withthegovernment ofthenomads'livestock, price, at a fixed thesolebuyer, ifany, havebeenfew, it. So farthere formarketing theresponsibility having free market, thenomads oftheir The concept oftheplanis to deprive takers. Iran, impose trade with meat-hungry cut off the lucrativesmuggling administration and governmental service taxes,imposemilitary government Free terms. settlethemon the government's on tribal life,and eventually it an adaptation useful however state, in a socialist is notpossible pastoralism Following nicheofmostofAfghanistan. ecological to themarginal represents the hopesto settle leadin abolishing theKhalqiregime theSoviet pastoralism, from many ofwhomarerefugees in thenextfive The nomads, years. nomads of capable in the1930s, arefully Asianpastoralists ofCentral Stalin's genocide mood. ofthegovernment's understanding theimplications are boundto and socialexistence, thenomads for their economic Fighting in theJihadto date performance be more tenaciousthan theirlacklustre that regimes ofresistance against is a significant history Behind them suggests. Amani issues. When the reformist them on bread-and-butter threatened service on the military in the1920s tried taxesand regular to impose regime the downon Kabul and ousted thegrandfathers ofthesemenswooped tribes, revolt of 1949, when in theJelalabad Theirfathers participated reformers. and to cancel its reforms by attacking the government the tribesforced In 1963 when Pakistanclosed its the armybase in Jelalabad. destroying thestranded policy, in response to Daoud's Pakhtunistan to thetribes borders ended Daoud's thecoupd'etatwhich andineffect provoked rebelled tribesmen inpower. first decade betweentwo and three The tribesof the Sarhaddnumbersomewhere is Iftheinflated number ofthe'official' population Afghan million pastoralists. bythe team-suppressed to thebestguessoftheSUNY demographic reduced this nomadicgroup 17 millionto 11 million, Afghangovernment-from that these Add to thisthefact a substantial ofthepopulation. accounts for part wherethe thebestarmed-in a country are therichest, thebestorganised, andthe arsenal-andthemost acute, politically adult maleis a walking average can be well and itsSovietbackers thegovernment facing scale oftheproblem from ofAfghanistan tribes havebeenthekingmakers The Sarhadd appreciated. Theyhavebeenthepolitical loreand tradition. a logicthat tribal goesbeyond thefirst unified orelsetheAchilles heel,from muscle ofevery regime, Afghan And they know it.One in 1747 toDaoud's lasttenure as president. monarchy a difficult life. Wazirichief it thisway: 'We livein themountains, expressed with Khan.We beattheBritish for Abdurrahman Butwe conquered Nuristan

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in ourhand.We overthrew and stones theKing,and sticks BacchaSaqao for we made him get rid of Hashem Khan, his uncle. For we are the true theKhalqi Facedwith a rebellion ofa quarter ofthepopulation, thebestthat of600,000 together regime cando is holdthefort-Kabul, with itspopulation with' the othermajor urbancentres, Kandahar,Herat, and the industrial in this Kondoz corridor, comprising an additional 434,000. Significantly, Turki-the latter areaalongtheSoviet border, thenewregime has recognised common Turkicpopulation-as language ofthehitherto culturally repressed fromthe Soviet the official language.U-ndoubtedly, seepageof prosperity and thefact north is ethnic thattheindustrial Union,plusa generous policy, moreamenable to Soviet-style thantherestofthecountry, planning policies willhelpsolidify adjacent to theregime's holdon this region. But theterritory theSoviet border should hardly be a problem for thegovernment.25 in theMiddle The fact is thattheexperience oftribal rebellions elsewhere theycan be. In East suggests how tenacious and unamenable to settlement years against the Iraq,for example, theKurdsmanaged to holdoutfor fifteen Soviet Baghdad government despite the leftist Baghdadis' considerable in theSudan theEquatorial keptup a civilwar backing. Likewise provinces inKhartoum overtwenty The fact both that against thegovernment for years. a more endedwith capitulation of those conflicts by the rebelsdisguises andKhartoum BothBaghdad sudden about-faces significant point. experienced in the courseof the wars,withthe hard-liner, pro-Moscow cliquesdeposed from power andconciliatory regimes installed in their places.In bothcasesthe and theinevitable Russians, seeing which waythewind was blowing, accepted helped bring aboutthecompromise. Ofcourse, an 800is notKurdistan or SouthSudan.It shares Afghanistan mile-long borderwith the Soviet Union, which makes the Sovietsboth in Kabul. their friends concerned aboutand quitecapableofaiding extremely andIraq or Sudanwhich But there are other differences between Afghanistan in Iraq or the Sudan was a crucial, are in the mojahedin's Neither favour. in theconflict, havethe dominant nordidthey partofthepopulation engaged was in their The Kurdish insurrection ideological support ofreligion struggle. identified by manyKurds as a personal power-play on the partof Molla Sudanwerelaid at Barzani.The secessionist tendencies Mustafa ofSouthern there African Butin Afghanistan thedoorofimperialist plots against integrity. is no suchambiguity abouttheissuesatstake. Trouble forthewiderregion from thestart, when The civilwarin Afghanistan developed a wider aspect airstrikes inside the theNuristani from insurgents sought refuge government
intheauthor's 24. Letter possession. 25. Basedon discussion with EdenNaby(Harvard).

Afghans'.24

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tookup residence with region. The refugees Pakistani border, in theChitral traced thus theofficial ofpassport control. kinsmen, muting problem tenuously within Pakistan swelledto the number of refugees As the uprising spread, a considerable strainon the of 1978-79, imposing 75,000 by the winter diplomatic problem forthe area,and causinga tricky resources oftheborder Pakistani government. runsa merely nominal andtheAfghan city ofJelalabad Between Peshawar ofnomadson theannual theDurandline,crossed yearly bymillions border, paved road.The border attheKhyber passis a single migrations. Bisecting this ofIslamabad andKabuleveninthebestoftimes extend no further jurisdictions andPakistan's oftheSarhadd North-West Frontier thanthisroad.The tribes without regardforthe nicetiesof international Provincerule themselves, havepitched camp.The domain thattherefugees diplomacy, anditis in their posesIslamabad refugees in this limbo ofsovereignty presence ofthese Afghan Ifit tries territory, it must a ticklish to administer itsown nominal problem. which the cautiousmilitary inevitably clash with the tribes-something of General Zia-ul-Haqseeksto avoid.If,on the otherhand,it government in thetribal area,it opens and therefugees ignores theactivities ofthetribes thatit is abetting oftheSoviet UnionandAfghanistan itself up to thecharges hasavoided A 'handsoff' Islamabad either extreme. counter-revolution. policy freedom to campsallowsthe rebelleadersdiscretionary vis-a-vis the refugee is ill-defined at best, Pakistan Sincetheborder pursue their political objectives. initsassertion On the can be selective ofjurisdiction overtherebels'activities. the rebelsleavesthe refugees' otherhand,thislaissezfaire policytowards on local charity and on scarcely humanproblems up in the air, dependent adequate emergencymeasures taken at low-levelsof the Provincial in not givinggrounds forany Pakistanhas been scrupulous government. humanitarian morethanthebareminimum Sovietallegations thatit provide assistance. with its complexpolicyconstraints.2 Pakistan'scautionis consistent Islamabad's departure from the foreign policy, General Zia's newnon-aligned in Karachi, Central theRussians'hugesteelmillproject Treaty Organisation, The dangerof are all factors. whichenterintothe Pakistanis' calculations. itself to thePakistani sceneis political transmitting Afghanistan's polarisation The Communist ofPakistan theKhalqi openly supports another factor. Party has joined and echoesMoscowandKabul's accusations thatPakistan regime In Peshawar, where in an 'imperialist' 'progressive Afghanistan'. plotagainst armed Abdul-Ghaffar Khanis powerful, theparty ofCommunist-sympathising and thePakistani leftists havetaken rebelgroups clashesbetween theIslamic The on the Leftis onlypartof Pakistan'sworries. place. But polarisation while has urgedthegovernment to do morefortherefugees, Jamiat-i-Islami
The attitudes oftheleft andright 26. Basedon discussions Pakistani officials off-record. ofPakistan can with in Muslim Students Association in New York-splitovertheissueof be observed in thedivision that has arisen in Afghanistan. whom tosupport

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indirectly intriguing for military aid to theIslamicrebels. The Jamiat-i-Islami is an important backer ofGeneral Zia's military government, having played an instrumental rolein bringing downAli Bhutto'sgovernment in 1977. The mouthpiece ofmilitant Islamic sentiment in thisideologically Islamic country, its poweris growing, and it may step into the lead when GeneralZia's government steps out.Itsinsistence that thegovernment actin support ofthe in Afghanistan Islamicrebels couldturnintoa destabilising domestic issue, Islamabad's tocopewith thecrisis. further limiting ability Perhapsthe gravest constraint on Pakistan'sfreedom of action is the attitude of the UnitedStates.The killing of the Americanambassador to Kabul,AdolphDubbs,on February 14, 1979, promptly cooledWashington's previously correct relations withAfghanistan. Suspecting official Afghan, as wellas Soviet,complicity in the tragedy, and Washington protested sharply off 11 million aid toAfghanistan. The ambassadorial shaved dollars ofplanned a former remains UnderSecretary ofState,Harold vacant. position Recently at thegrowing in American violence Saunders, expressed official displeasure Afghanistan and theSoviet rolein it. Yet theDepartment ofStateis quickto is notinquestion. outthat itscontinued oftheKhalqiregime point recognition has had no contact withany of the rebelgroupsin Officially, Washington Pakistan. Waryofbecoming involved in anything remotely resembling foreign in a country the SovietUnion,the UnitedStateshas intervention abutting the Soviet role in Afghanistan. restrained itselfto criticising As to the a in support oftherebels, that America is engaged action possibility in covert in advance thatthe CIA had to inform seniorpolicymakernotedrecently 'Ifthe covert activities. seventeen committees before congressional committing 'I think allknow itbynow'. CIA werethere', he concluded, we would about Even if the UnitedStateswere interested in exerting on the influence Afghanproblem,throughits old ally Pakistan,both policy and legal constraints intrude. On theonehand, America is wary ofrelying on theshaky to let the dustsettleon a military government of GeneralZia, preferring solutionof Pakistan'sthree-decade searchfor politicalinstitutions before ofan existing On theother, withPakistan's out in support coming regime. in excess of the limits announced intention to developnuclearcapabilities theUnited States has beenboundbylaw to endall military allowed bytreaty, in Washington aid. Conflict has arisen policy circles between thoseconcerned withAmerican forantitieswithSouthAsia and thoseresponsible security will make it almost proliferation policies.But the factof the law itself to resume with Pakistan. for America itsclosemilitary impossible relationship Pakistan in theAfghan the is unable tointervene decisively crisis, and,inturn, to influence the region'sactors. UnitedStateslacksthe leverage necessary assumed a position ofnon-interference. Bothcountries have,therefore, Rumours ofIranian Not so Afghanistan's to thewest." neighbour support forthe counter-revolution flyhardand fastin the wake of talksbetween of theAyatollah and members of theAfghan Islamicgroups representatives

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of thesetalkswas to secure The avowedpurpose Khomeini'sentourage.27 in Pakistan. in Iranto jointherebel forces workers stranded Afghan transit for Iraninto from Afghans crossed March1979 several thousand In fact, during an uprising there thegovernment. off against ofHerat,sparking theprovince town therevolt to an ofHeratbrought medieval against thequaint Air strikes In a reverse as 8,000 refugees as many movement, casualties. endwithheavy Iran. fled Heratfor ofTayyabad, thefrontier towns intheregion, torecent travellers According activity. of Afghanrefugee Torbat-eHeydariand Jam displaya flurry treated the oftheIslamicRevolution initially thelocal committees Although betweenthe various co-operation Afghansas Sovietagentsprovocateurs, Iranian intervention shape.Therehas beenno direct has taken Islamic groups forthe in the fighting, Sovietand Khalqi allegations to thateffect, despite theIslamic in theprovince self. is a shadow ofitsformer Iranian army Rather, areorganising relief therefugees, totherebels, and for selling arms committees arefull of newspapers through thebazaarsofMashhad.Iranian raising money to the rebellion, while leafletsand radio broadcasts storiessympathetic IranandspilloverintoAfghanistan. theKhalqisflood attacking to Qom A delegation ofAfghan bothShiiand Sunni,has ventured clerics, Iranian The mostprominent of counterparts. causewiththeir to takeup their in Qom and has taken up residence Sheikh MohseniofKandahar, theShiites, therebels.His hosts, the for to raisemoney leadsthelocalbazaarcommittee Iranian whichdominates politics, agreeon fewthings, collegeof Ayatollahs in Kabul. When are united in condemnation regime butthey ofthepresent continue Tarakithefate oftheShahifhe should Khomeini promised Ayatollah a 'maniac'bycalling Khomeini responded Islam',theAfghans to 'oppress whenTaraki's the Iranianpressexpressed its satisfaction and subsequently, in Kabul, a purgeagainstthe local Shiite deathwas reported. Meanwhile, families many provided Kabul's ShiiteQizilbash has beenreported. minority to the ancien re'gime.Now these have joined the Khalqis' other officers and 'deathto in prison, wallgraffitti while enemies read,'deathtoKhomeini', theShiites'. in thewholeaffair giventhefluid The roleoftheIranians is mostelusive, in thewakeoftheShah's downfall. state ofthat country's politics Historically, The in Afghanistan. Iranhas always a secure, ifnotdominant position sought trade-and-aid Shah'splanstoreplace theSoviet Unionas Afghanistan's biggest thatthepresent Thereis no reasonto think thisprecedent. partner followed in Afghanistan to advantage, Iranian willnottry to turnthetroubles regime ifonly 'IslamicRepublic', offuture tiesto an Iranian holding out theprospect and are security stability forthcoming. Moscow The view from of whether Moscowsharesthedoctrinaire inflexibility It is to be wondered
in Etelaa/,TehranJournal, Iran Times,published between Juneand September 27. See variousarticles see Mardom viewoftheAfghan conflict (Tehran)in thesamemonths. 1979. Fora leftist, pro-Khalqi

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itsproteges in Kabul. After thirty yearsofactiveSovietparticipation in the internal development ofAfghanistan, onewouldthink that theRussians would haveforeseen many oftheproblems nowfacing theKhalqiregime. In question too is the extentof unconditional support which theywill extendto an indigenous Communist party, suchas theKhalq. It is notat all clearhow the Russians viewtheoptions oftheKhalqisnow,or howfar they willgo in trying to extricate them from their difficulties. But therecord ofSovietinvolvement in Afghanistan doesnotpromise encouraging flexibility on Russia'spartin a resolution oftheconflict. It is easyfor a super-power toforget that itsbacking maybe thekissofdeath in a xenophobic toa policy ora leader country. It is easyfor citizens ofa superto stroll power downthestreets ofa Third-World capital and be comforted by thesight familiar ofso many piecesofmaterial culture. The Russians inKabul see theVolgacar;theAmericans in Tehransawpizzaparlours. To this extent, theSoviet Unionis no moremyopic aboutAfghanistan thansuper-powers are generally. Yet Sovietmyopia is morespecific, and has morespecific causes.To begin the faultsof Americanaid policiesin Afghanistan, most with,whatever a better Americans activethere cameawaywith graspoftherural realities of the countryside than thatenjoyedby high-level members of the Afghan rural The Russians, in contrast, had no large-scale government. programmes. The differing fociof the two countries' academicand cultural tiesare also While the Russianscultivated trainedthe significant. Pushto literature, Pushtunmilitary littleattention to the Pushtun elite,but gave relatively and tribal nomads-or any ofthe country's manyotherethnic groups-the often United States scholars toinvestigate tribal andethnic sentmany cultures, in conjunction withruraldevelopment It is perhapsnot so programmes. that Americans arerather better informed aboutthelives surprising, therefore, thanare the and tribesmen of Afghanistan's 10 million farmers herdsmen, thelatter Russians: knowthedetribalised, neighbouring do, however, military and civilPushtun eliteofAfghanistan-though thesepeopleare onlya small andunrepresentative sample oftheir countrymen. in Afghanistan run deeper But the SovietUnion's perceptual difficulties in Central Asia. thanthis, andgo backtothehistorical ofCommunism genesis Asia in the1920s, The Bolsheviks carried outa lightning conquest ofCentral in andbuilding an oasisofSoviet-style thelocalelite, subjugating development all in an environment andculturally linked themidst ofthesteppe, historically The verysuccessof theSovietRevolution in Central Asia to Afghanistan. a perceptual withpresent fortheir successors in dealing creates problem day Afghanistan. a country of extreme In Central found Asia theBolsheviks of latifundia, The the peasantsand the oftenabsentee landlords. class division between was as extensive as it was despotic. powerof the central government By a fewautocratic took overthe state toppling khans,the Bolsheviks simply

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and rechristened administration thesystem 'socialist'.Expropriation ofwater rights and grazing rights was moregradually executed, though not without muchbloodshed andan exodus ofrefugees toAfghanistan. A Soviet anthropologist warned the Bolsheviksabout the different to be found in thekingdom conditions belowtheOxus. In Monich'sLetter fromTurkistan (1927) we read, 'Landlords greater thanthese(owners of 100 acres)can be counted on As one leavesTurkistan, one's fingers. thedomain ofsmalllandholders increases. Yet nowhere does the peasantry experience such horrors as it is economically . . . feudal where independent landlords moderate the bandit treatment ofthepeasants bytheofficials'. The social role of the khansof Afghanistan todayin mostof the country remains as Monichdescribes it,whiletherapaciousness ofthelocal officials increasesas each coup shortensthe tenureand security of the petty bureaucrats. Wherethecentral government interferes in rurallife, thetribal khan is the best protection againsttyranny. Where government is nonthe tribalkhan assures against anarchy.Far frombeing the existent, 'parasitic', 'feudal'classthat theBolsheviks encountered in Central Asia fifty are vitalto the social survival yearsago, the khansof Afghanistan of their people. It is Moscow's insensitivity to this,its confidence in bureaucracy and centralisation as the solution to the problems of development and political that ittothechallenge inAfghanistan. integration mayblind itfaces This is notto saythat theRussians haveno roomto manoeuvre. Tactically theyhave a freehand over the Khalqis, as demonstrated by theiropen withmembers consultation oftheancienregime, theformer including King inabsentia ZahirShah(condemned todeath andthe bytheKhalqgovernment) GrandVizier,Nur AhmanEtemadi to havebeenexecuted (now reported by havebeenwidely theKhalqinKabul).28 Suchmoves as an attempt interpreted bytheSoviet Unionto expand thebaseoftheregime. But no newfaces have comeforward to co-operate withtheRussians, ofleaders have as a generation ' " At rather thaninvolvement with theSoviet Union. chosenapolitical apathy thesame time, Russianfeelers theformer Vizier towards kingand theroyal theirnarrow them.The underscore of the problems understanding facing Shah dialogue with thenewsoftheSoviet-Zaher rebelsin Peshawar greeted In exile forseven years,alienatedand isolatedfromAfghan incredulity. towardsthe future of politics,the former King is almostas indifferent him.But theRussians, as therebels andtheKhalqisare towards Afghanistan cannot on their comeup with Pushtun-elite relying contacts, anyalternatives. The Khalqis, havegrown commitment to for their ofSoviet part, suspicious thattheSoviets will their revolution. Some Khalqishave expressed concern
28. New YorkTimes, September 17, 1979. inAsiaweek. Studies Analysis Sept.3, 29. See analysis byP. R. CharioftheNew Delhi Institute ofDefense 1979.

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doinganything moreforthe Khalqi wait to see how the chipsfallbefore ofdollars ofaid regime. Theyclaim,forexample, thatmanyof themillions iftheKhalq pledged by theSovietUnion to Kabul have yetto materialise: But it may thestory willrestwiththeRussians. shouldfalter, goes,thefault whichis tying up not be the external opposition to theKhalq government aidso much the in theKhalqparty, from which Soviet as theinternal struggles have favoured the SovietUnionmustremain aloof.Thoughit mayinitially Parchamparty, withits closertiesto Moscow,the SovietUnion gracefully and theemergence oftheAmin-Taraki accepted thepurgeoftheParchamis in several ministerial changes which duoin thesummer of1978. It acquiesced Amin,anditmadeno overt movewhen advanced thepower ofthestrong-man theousted Tarakiwas killed. The Russians lacka power base in Afghanistan and therapidly Were outside thepurged Parchamis contracting Khalq Party. there wouldbe little mutual trust they to shift support backto theParchamis, leftist relationship. Therefore, without and credibility foranySoviet-Afghan the to supporting the Khalqi government, committing themselves firmly it. Soviet Unioncando little actively toreplace are unhappy withtheKhalq, and yet It is widely agreed thattheRussians the SovietUnion maybe preparing witha military massively to intervene it it maybe no contradiction to saythattheRussians force. mayfind Indeed, a regime their support. Strategically necessary tosecure they do notcompletely The civil war in have inflexible parameters. policies in Afghanistan here,in Afghanistan causes specialconcern to thembecauseit is precisely oftheSovietUnionlookontothe Afghanistan, thattheMuslimnationalities a policyof stabilisation Muslimworld.The Russianshave long pursued on their the southern attempts to extend frontiers, interrupted byStalin'spostwar seaward. As discussed andAlexandre frontiers Wimbush Bennigsen byEnders in theSovietUnion30 the Communism in their recent work, Muslim National andreligious in Turkey, Soviets havebeenreluctant to stir conflicts up ethnic with Iran and Afghanistan, repercussions. Particularly forfearof domestic to thetea-kettle ofKabul theRussianshave alwaysbeen aliveto the regard threatthat the kingdomshould prove ungovernable. Now, with more in the 'NorthernTier' of Turkey,Iran and and instability confusion thanin anyyearsince1946-the heyday ofCommunist activity Afghanistan Russians arefaced with ofa broadly intheregion-the theprospect anti-Soviet, CentralAsia. Hence theirneed fora Pan-Islamic movement threatening ofthesituation. stabilisation in Le Monde, pictures theRussians'devantun AndreFontaine, writing massivement dans la guerrecivile ... soit choix delicat,soit intervenir . . .'. For a super-power, the a son sortle regime tresimpopulaire abandoner fortherecan be no simpleanswerto any policy choiceis alwaysdelicate, theRussians downduring thewinter dilemma. As thefighting winds months,
30. Chicago, London: Chicago University Press,1979.

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36

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

forAmin, support foran will probably trya littleof everything-support may alternative, massive intervention, selective compromise. In theendthey determined succeed in preserving theirpositionin Afghanistan through maykeep intervention andforced communalisation ofthecountryside. Or they an island in a sea of theKhalqiregime justbarely afloat, ofMarxist ideologues hostile peasants. The tragedy ofthesmallcountry, confronted with thesuperpower, is that this'delicate choice'must be madeinMoscow,notinKabul.

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