Civil Law Review Digests

016. BARRETO GONZALES vs GONZALES
MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, defendantappellant.
DATE: March 7, 1933
PONENTE: Hull, J.
FACTS:
Plaintiff (Barretto) and defendant (Gonzales) are citizens of the Philippine Islands and residents of the City
of Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and wife
in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time have not
lived together as man and wife.
Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued for several months,
whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children, five
hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of
certain properties to be put in her name.
Shortly after the agreement, Gonzales went to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an absolute
divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927.
On that same date he married another Filipino citizen as well & eventually they had 3 children.
When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support
of Barreto& her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barretto brought an action at the
CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked
sec 9 of Act 2710.
Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would
have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died
intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto&
Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees
of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons.
CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the defendant Barretto. Hence, this appeal by Gonzales.
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ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in said
jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands
would grant a divorce. NO
RULING: The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila is reversed and defendant
absolved from the demands made against him in this action.
RATIO: The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710,
and in various court decisions (such as Goitia v. Campos Rueda, Cousins Hix v. Fluemer, etc)
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this
court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose
to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of
status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law.
At all times their matrimonial domicile has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in
the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence
and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he
had entered in 1919.

While the decisions of this court in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been
expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion,
the Court has not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code.
Article 9 reads:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to
promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.
It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands,
will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of
Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.
Litigants by mutual agreement cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the
personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner
which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, VillamorOstrand, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial and Butte JJ., concur.

018. Van Dorn vs. Romillo (by Pia Benosa)
Alice Reyes Van Dorn vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. (RTC-Pasay) and Richard Upton
October 8, 1985
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Short version: Alice and Richard got a divorce in the US. Richard sued Alice in the Philippines for his
conjugal share in her business. The Court said that he no longer had standing to sue as her husband since
by his own national law he was no longer her husband.
Facts: In 1972, Alice (Filipino) married Richard (American) in Hong Kong. They lived in the Philippines, but
got a divorce in Nevada, USA, in 1982, on the ground of incompatibility. Alice got remarried to Theodore
Van Dorn in Nevada. In 1983, Richard filed a civil case against Alice in the RTC of Pasay City, praying for an
accounting of Alice’s business (the Galleon Shop in Ermita) and a declaration of his right to manage the
said business, which he asserted was their conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss the case for Richard’s
cause of action was barred by the previous judgment in their divorce proceedings, where Richard
acknowledged that they did not have community property as of June 11, 1982. The RTC disagreed, holding
that the Nevada decree had no bearing to the case since the property was located in the Philippines. Alice
certiorari’d the denied MTD.
Issue: Will a divorce obtained by an American citizen in a US court be recognized in Philippine jurisdiction,
where absolute divorces are prohibited, thereby depriving him of standing to sue as the husband of a
Filipino citizen?—Yes.
Ruling: The case was dismissed, Richard is without standing.
Reasoning: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on Richard as an American citizen, such that in the US, he can no
longer sue Alice as her husband. He is somehow invoking the invalidity of the divorce in Philippine
jurisdiction for being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be

recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released Alice from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer Alice’s husband, and is without standing to sue in
this case for entitlement to the exercise of control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of
his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before the said Court.
It is unjust to hold Alice still subject to a wife’s obligations. Neither should Richard continue to be one of
Alice’s heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

019. PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON. LUIS VICTOR and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING
June 30, 1989
Regalado, J.
SV: Pilapil was married to Geiling, a german. Geiling obtained a divorce decree in Germany. After the court
promulgated a divorce decree, Geiling filed a case for adultery in the Philippines. SC ruled that the court is
without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio , since the Geiling, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.
Facts:
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On September 7, 1979, Imelda Pilapil (Filipino) married Erich Geiling (German) before the Registrar
of Births, Marriages and Deaths in Germany. Their only daughter, Isabella Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980
Thereafter, maritcal discord set in, which led them to a separation de facto, and then eventually led
to Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding in Germany.
Pilapil on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Manila RTC.
On Jan. 15, 1986, the Schoneberg Local Court of Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. Custody of the child was granted to Pilapil.
5 months later, Geiling filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that
while they were still married, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia and a Jesus Chua.
Cases were eventually filed with the RTC of Manila.
Pilapil filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking for the case to be set aside and dismissed.
While the cases were under review, the Trial Court proceeded with arraignment. Pilapil filed a
motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction but such was denied. Pilapil entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 27, 1987, Pilapil filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order, seeking to annul the order of the court denying her motion to quash.
The SC issued a TRO enjoining the proceeding with the case. Subsequently the Secretary of Justice
issued a resolution directing the city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against
Pilapil.

Issue: WON the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery (Yes, no jurisdiction)
Ruling: Petition granted
Ratio:Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely
a formal requirement. It is only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the
action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse, it necessarily follows that such initiator
must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of filing of the criminal action.
There does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely
the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
American jurisprudence yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse
no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides
that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultyery
In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Pilapil is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
In the Van Dorn vs. Romillo case, the court explained It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
THEREFORE, Geiling, being no longer the husband of Pilapil, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

020. People v. Ritter
March 5, 1991
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Short Version: Heinrich Ritter inserted something into the vagina of Rosario Baluyot, a street child, which
eventually led to her death due to infection. The RTC convicted him
The SC acquitted Ritter, holding that no qualifying circumstances of rape were proven. However, in
accordance with Art. 29 of the Civil Code, Ritter was still made liable for damages to Baluyot’s family.
Facts: Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian, was convicted of the rape with homicide of Rosario Baluyot.
Ritter brought a boy and a girl with him to his room at MGM Hotel. The 2 children were Jessie
“Egan”Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot, both street children. Jessie testified that Ritter took out pictures of
young boys in various getups and showed him 3 objects “like a Vicks inhaler,” one of which was eventually
left in Rosario’s vagina.
After Ritter carried out sexual acts, including masturbation and insertion of the object in Baluyot’s vagina,
he left the children at the hotel and gave them 200 and 300 pesos, respectively.
Rosario said that the Ritter left something in her vagina. She later said that it had been removed from
inside of her, but she died 7 months later from infection.
After a joint investigation between the Olongapo Police and the NISRA Subic Naval Base Service, Ritter was
arrested at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. Del PilarStrets, as he was a male Caucasian who looked like a
homo-sexual. Jessie Ramirez identified him as the “American” who took him to the hotel. 3 inhalers and
$1,500 were found on his person.
At trial, Ritter’s defense was that there was no way that he was the perpetrator, as the rapist was
described as a black American with a beard, while he was a clean-shaven white Austrian.
He also said that Baluyot was already 13 years old at the time of the incident. Finally, he could not be
charged for homicide because a dildo is not a weapon of death but a thing used for sexual pleasure; the
death was not because of the vibrator, but because of the incompetence of the Surgeon who operated on
Baluyot.
The RTC convicted Ritter of rape with homicide. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:
1
2

WON Ritter’s conviction should be upheld. (No.)
a WON it was proven that Baluyot was under 12 years of age. (No.)
WON he may still be civilly liable. (Yes)

Ratio:
1

The Court found that there was reasonable doubt sufficient to cause an acquittal. To summarize:
a The evidence to prove that Baluyot was less than 12 at the time of the incident was hearsay and
not admissible. Testimonies from her grandparents and father that they thought she was under
12 at the time of the incident, and the death certificate indicating she was 12 years old when
she was admitted, based on Baluyot’s guardian were not admissible for not fulfilling the
requirements of Evidence as to Pedigree, namely that the declarants were still alive when they
gave the information, or that the witnesses were not members of her family.
b Her baptismal certificate created reasonable doubt as to age as well, as to believe it would
mean that she was not yet born when baptized.
c There is no proof as to any other qualifying circumstance for rape.
d Ramirez’ testimony was likewise hearsay.
e It was improbable for a foreign object with active properties to cause serious infection not
immediately after insertion, but only after seven months.
f The testimony of Ramirez stated that “Ginamitsiya ng Negro.” Ritter is not a black.
Thus, there was a reasonable doubt, and Ritter must be acquitted. 1
It is with distressing reluctance that [the SC] had to seemingly set back the efforst of
Government to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means to galvanize a nation to care for its
street children. But there can be no conviction on anything less than reasonable doubt, but…

2

***************CIVLAW TIME****************
Even if there was reasonable doubt that could not uphold a conviction, the Court could not ignore the
acts of Ritter on the Children. The Court was not convinced that he came to the country to look at
historical sights, enrich his intellect, or indulge in legitimate pleasures, but in order to satisfy the
urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was Ritte who picked him and
Baluyot off the streets, masturbated him while he was being masturbated, it is clear that Ritter is a
pedophile.
Pedophilia is a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the state
to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of the youth. Pedophiles,
especially thrill-seeking aliens, have no place in the country.
Here, there is reasonable ground to believe that Ritter committed acts injurious not only to Baluyot
but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. He abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money; he should be expelled.
It does not necessarily follow that Ritter is also free from civil liability. A person while not criminally
liable may still be civilly liable. The reason for the provisions of Art. 29 of the Civil Code, which provides
that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proven doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, is that one of the most serious
flaws of the Civil Code is the old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability.
That rule gave rise to numerous miscarriages of justice. It fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct form one another:
1 One affects the social order, and the other private rights
2 One is for the punishment or correction of the offender, while the other is for the reparation of
damages suffered by an aggrieved party.

1 Many other doctrines regarding evidence were discussed, but not pertinent to this class.

It is just and proper that for the purposes of the imprisonment or fine of the accused, the offense
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But this is not the case for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party.
Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother’s house, and who was forced to
succumb and become a prostitute. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have suffered mental
anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her death. Ritter is not innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution that saved him. However,
there is still proof of unlawful conduct.
He certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus,
considering the circumstances of the case, the Court awarded P30,000 in damages to Baluyot’s heirs.
Petition Granted. Ritter Acquitted. However, he shall pay P30,000 in moral and exemplary
damages to the heirs of Baluyot.

021. ROE vs. WADE
January 22, 1973
Short version: Unmarried pregnant woman wants to abort her baby but can’t in Texas because of the
laws making abortion (not done for health risks to the mother) a crime. She thus assailed the law as being
violative of her rights.
1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of
the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its
interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are
reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
FACTS: Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that Articles 1191-1194 and 1196 of the Texas Penal Code (which make it a crime to
“procure an abortion” or to attempt one, except with respect to “an abortion procured or attempted by
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother) are unconstitutional.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an
abortion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions"; that she was
unable to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to
secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally
vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
MAIN ISSUE: WON the Texas statutes are unconstitutional (YES)
The principal thrust of Roe’s attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be
possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. (Sorry, skipped here the history
of abortion laws) Basically, as in most Bill of Rights cases, what the court does is to weigh the compelling
state interest and the person’s right. Okay?
STATE INTEREST

3 reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 19 th
century and to justify their continued existence.
1
2

It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, does not advance this justification in the present
case.
A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure. When most criminal abortion
laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for a woman. Thus, it has been argued
that a State’s real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman,
that, is to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy.
Modern medical techniques have altered this situation. Appellants and various amici refer to
medical data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first
trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively safe. Mortality rates for women undergoing
early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for
normal childbirth.Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from an
inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has
largely disappeared. Of course, important state interests in the areas of health and medical
standards do remain.
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is
performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient. This interest obviously
extends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the
availability of after-care, and to adequate provision for any complication or emergency that might
arise. The prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal "abortion mills" strengthens, rather than
weakens, the State's interest in regulating the conditions under which abortions are performed.
Moreover, the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy continues. Thus, the State retains a
definite interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a
late stage of pregnancy.

3

The third reason is the State's interest - some phrase it in terms of duty - in protecting prenatal life.
Some of the argument for this justification rests on the theory that a new human life is present from
the moment of conception.
The State's interest and general obligation to protect life then extends, it is argued, to prenatal life.
Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries
within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate
state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at
conception or at some other point prior to live birth.
In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at
least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant
woman alone.
ROE’S RIGHT

The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, the Court
has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, or in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is
apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a

family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors
the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
Sub-issue: Is the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy absolute such that she is entitled to
terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way and for whatever reason she alone chooses?
NO
Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas
protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.
At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation
of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be
absolute.
The right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but this right is not unqualified
and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a "compelling state interest," and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.
Sub-issue: Does the State’s determination to recognize and protect prenatal life from and after
conception constitute a compelling state interest? NO
Texas argued that the fetus is a “person” within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
contains three references to "person." The first, in defining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or
naturalized in the United States." The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal
Protection Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for
Representatives and Senators, Art. I, 2, cl. 2, and 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, 2, cl. 3; in the
Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, 9, cl. 8; in the Electors
provisions, Art. II, 1, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of
President, Art. II, 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave
Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application
only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.
All this, together with our observation that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing
legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does NOT include the unborn.
However, in view of the followin considerations , there is a time in a woman’s pregnancy that
the State has a compelling interest.
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one
accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus. The situation therefore is
inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or
procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and
Meyer were respectively concerned.
It is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of
health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.

Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present
throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from
and after conception.
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at
this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth. This was the
belief of the Stoics. It appears to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish
faith. It may be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community,
insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion
issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family.
Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to
focus either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes
"viable," that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability is
usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.
The Aristotelian theory of "mediate animation," that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite
opposition to this "ensoulment" theory from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life
from the moment of conception. The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church.
In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we
recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined
situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth.
For example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child
was born alive. That rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction. In most States, recovery is said to
be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though
few courts have squarely so held. In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some
States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal
injuries. Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus
consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life.
Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or
other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. Perfection of the interests
involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.
In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the
pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an important and
legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she
be a resident of the State or a non-resident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that
it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These
interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a
point during pregnancy, each becomes "compelling."
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the
"compelling" point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of
the first trimester.
This is so because of the now-established medical fact, that until the end of the first trimester
mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and
after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably

relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in
this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the
licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it
must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of
the facility; and the like.
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this "compelling" point, the
attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State,
that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached,
the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling"
point is at viability.
This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological
justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those
"procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too
broadly. The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those
performed later, and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the
procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.

022. ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO,
respondents
20 July 1961| J. J.B.L. Reyes
Nature: Certiorari from CA
Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know Antonio Geluz for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula
Yambot. In 1950, Villanueva became pregnant by her present husband, Oscar Lazo, before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parents, she had herself aborted by Geluz.
After her marriage with Lazo, she becme pregnant again. Her pregnancy proved inconvenient as she was
then employed in the COMELEC. She thus had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later,
Villanueva again became pregnant and, on 21 February 1955, she again got herself aborted of a 2 month
old fetus by Geluz in his clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila for P50. She was accompanied by
her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter, Lucida. Lazo, was, at that time, in Cagayan, campaigning
for his election to the provincial board. He neither knew of, nor consented to the abortion. Lazo thus filed
an action and award of damages against Geluz which was granted by the TC and CA, awarding the
damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon Art. 2206, CC.
Issue: Does abortion of a fetus entail the award of moral damages to the parents allegedly injured or
prejudiced by the said abortion? NO.
Held: Art. 2206, CC, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the
case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criaturaabortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuenciaes un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado",
Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations. Roughly translates to: Abortive creatures
are not in the category of natural persons and consequently is not born, in the life of the law.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished

by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality.
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro natohabetur)
under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with
the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must
be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or
services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the speshominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well
as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).
However, CA nor TC found any basis for an award of moral damages due to the indifference of Lazo to the
previous abortions of his wife. This clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental hopes and affections.
The lower courts found that Lazo knew of the second abortion, and it was probable that he also knew of
the first. Despite the repetition of the event, he appeared to have not taken steps to investigate and
secure the punishment of Geluz Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to
have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of
record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his
wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and
that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy
member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press
either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of
a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
Dispositive: The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners
for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may
warrant.
023. CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
July 31, 1970
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Appeal
Digest by Dawn Chua
Short Version: Quimiging failed to allege that the baby subject of her claim for support had been born. She
moved to amend the complaint to allege that she had given birth to a baby girl. The lower court did not
allow the amendment since the original complaint averred no cause of action. SC ruled that under Art. 40
of the CC, A conceived child, even if it still hasn’t been born, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it. Therefore, in this case, the unborn child has the right to support from
its progenitor.

Facts:
- Carmen Quimiging filed a claim for support against her neighbor Felix Icao, claiming that she had been
impregnated by him as a result of him having intercourse with her several times through force and
intimidation.
- Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since Quimiging’s complaint did not allege
that the child had been born.
- Thereafter, Quimiging moved to amend the complaint to allege that she had given birth to a baby girl,
but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of
action.
o Also, it opined that Art. 291, CC declaring that support is an obligation of a parents and
illegitimate children does not cover unborn children
- Hence the present appeal.
Issue: WON the complaint for support can be amended to allege that the baby subject of the support has
been born
Reasoning:
- YES
- As provided by Art. 402 of the CC, A conceived child, even if it still hasn’t been born, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it
- Therefore, in this case, the unborn child (court used the phrase “en ventre de sa mere”) has the right
to support from its progenitor (who for the purposes of the MtD admitted paternity)
-

-

Besides, Art. 742 provides that donations may be made to a conceived or unborn child.
Furthermore, Art. 854 also provides that a child-heir who was ignored by the parent in his testament
may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if
such child should be born after the death of the testator
Thus the lower court’s theory that Art. 291, CC declaring that support is an obligation of a parents and
illegitimate children does not cover unborn children violates Art. 40.
Also, the court declared that the proviso in Art. 40 (that the child should be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb) is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child.
A second reason for why the court reversed the lower court’s order is that for a married man to force a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for the damage.
The Court ruled that Quimiging has a cause of action under Art. 21, CC 3, in relation to Art.22194
providing for moral damages.

024. De Jesus v. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110/28 November 1933/EN BANC/Appeal from decision of CFI
Antonia L. De Jesus, et al. – plaintiff-appellent
Cesar Syquia – defendant-appellant
Decision by J. Street, Digest by Pip (who feels very sentimental about this case)
Facts: Cesar was the 23-year-old “unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila, and possessed of a
considerable property in his own right.” His brother-in-law Vicente Mendoza owned a barbershop in Tondo

2 Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article. (29a)
3 ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
4 ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:(3) Seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxxxxxxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

where Cesar regularly went to get his hair cut. Antonia was the 22-year-old cashier at the barbershop.
Amorous relations resulted from Cesar and Antonia’s acquaintance, and Antonia gave birth to a baby boy
on 17 June 1931. Cesar constantly visited Antonia at home in the early months of her pregnancy and on
Valentine’s Day of February 1931, on the eve of his departure on a trip to Japan and China, he wrote and
gave to her a note directed to a priest who was expected to christen the baby. In this note he wrote:
Rev. Father: The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it. Cesar Syquia
While he was away Cesar wrote more letters showing paternal interest in the baby and concern for
Antonia’s health. When he returned he employed a doctor friend to attend the birth and saw to the hospital
arrangements. After the baby, Ismael, was born, Cesar took him and Antonia to a house where they lived
together for about a year in regular family style, with all expenses defrayed by Cesar. Over time, however,
Cesar’s ardor abated. When Antonia showed signs of a second pregnancy, Cesar decamped and married
another woman. (Though maybe Antonia should have seen it coming when at the christening he had the
baby named “Ismael Loanco” instead of “Cesar Syquia, Jr.” as they first planned.)
Antonia and her mother Pilar (as representative of Ismael and his younger sister, Pacita) instituted an
action against Cesar in the CFI of Manila to (1) recover P30,000.00 in damages for breach of promise to
marry; (2) compel Cesar to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children; and (3) to pay P500.00 per
month for the maintenance of Ismael, Pacita, and Antonia.
The CFI issued a decree requiring Cesar to recognize Ismael and to pay maintenance for him at the rate
of P50.00 per month. The CFI dismissed the case in all other respects. Both parties appealed.
Issue: Did the note that Cesar wrote before Ismael was born cement the latter’s right, as one enjoying the
uninterrupted status of a natural child, to recognition and support? (Did the note to the priest, along with
the other letters written by Cesar to Antonia, prove an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of
Article 135(1) of the Old Civil Code?) YES.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
Ratio:It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a
bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet
unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition
of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are different.
Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with
the name used.
The Court took a close look at the words of recognition contained in the note. They referred to a baby
then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for
christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of “Ismael Loanco” instead of
“Cesar Syquia, Jr.”, its identity as the child whom Cesar intended to acknowledge was clear from all his
other letters (where he referred to Antonia’s baby as “junior”. Recognition, as described in Article 135(1) of
the Old Civil Code, need not be made out in a single document. 5 In this case, the Court took admissions
from several documents and put them together.
The Court ruled that Ismael was in uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. From his birth,
his father, Cesar, supplied him and his mother a home. The law fixes no period during which a child must
be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; the period in this case was long enough to
evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and
child shortly before this action was started is unimportant.

5“[He may be compelled to recognize his natural child when] an indisputable paper written by him, expressly
acknowledging his paternity, is in existence”

The Court also denied Antonia’s appeal in relation to damages and support for Pacita. Breach of
promise to marry has no standing in civil law, except in the rare cases where the plaintiff tries to recover
money or property advanced upon the faith of such promise. There was no proof that would require Cesar
to recognize Pacita.
Voting:Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.
Dissent, J. Villa-real: The good Justice (and those concurring with him, i.e. C.J. Avancena and J. Imperial)
wanted the decision reversed and the complaint dismissed.
The good Justice basically felt that the letter to the priest and the other letters to Antonia didn’t
constitute a clear acknowledgment. “The writing that is required by said provision must be complete in
itself and by itself, and must contain all the statements that are necessary to constitute a full and clear
acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in order that it may serve as a basis for compelling
him to acknowledge said child should be afterwards deny his paternity. If several writings put together,
each not being complete in itself, should be necessary in order to obtain a full and complete expression of
acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity
would be violated.” Apparently, the “junior” Cesar was talking about in his letters to Antonia could be
anyone, since it wasn’t clear if Antonia was even pregnant at that point.
More importantly, the good Justice believed that the letters Cesar wrote to Antonia while
she was pregnant were inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael enjoyed
the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, “because being of prior date to the
birth of said child they could not be considered as direct acts of Cesar showing possession of
the status of natural child, as no human being can enjoy such possession until he be born with
legal capacity for acquiring civil rights.”

026. LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRAGRANTE
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner, vs.INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased,
respondent.
DATE: April 27, 1948
PONENTE:Hilado, J.
FACTS: On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special
or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate
an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan
and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the
latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the law.
ISSUE: Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality. YES
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in
view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was
applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it
received from the decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person",
as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from
the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial administration of
those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel
of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the
decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death
like his pending application at the commission.

027. Eugenio Sr. vs. Hon. Velez (by Pia Benosa)
Tomas Eugenio Sr. vs. Hon. Alejandro M. Velez (RTC-Cagayan de Oro City), Deputy Sheriff
Johnson Tan, Jr., and Crisanta Vargas-Sanchez, Santos Vargas and Narcisa Vargas-Bentulan
(petitioners in a Habeas Corpus case)
May 17, 1990
Padilla, J.
Short version: The Vargases’ sister died while cohabiting with a cult leader. The cult leader refused to give
up her body, arguing that he was entitled to bury her, as her common law husband. The Court disagreed,
for only the legitimate spouse has such a right, and in default of one, the Civil Code and Family Code
provide that ascendants/descendants, and then brothers and sisters, are the responsible persons.
Facts: Crisanta, Santos and Narcisa (the Vargas siblings) filed a habeas corpus case in September 1988
against Tomas Eugenio, alleging that he took their 25-year old sister Vitaliana from her residence
sometime in 1987, and had since been confining her in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
Unknown to the siblings, Vitaliana had already died on August 28, 1988. The RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, which was unsatisfied. Eugenio (who was nearly 50 at the time) refused to surrender Vitaliana’s
body to the sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of a habeas corpus, and that such
proceeding only applies to cases of illegal confinement/detention of a live person. He filed a Motion to
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Eugenio also claimed he had already obtained a burial permit from the DOH Usec, authorizing Vitaliana’s
burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionaries, Inc. He was the
Supreme President and Founder of this registered religious sect67. Vitaliana supposedly died of heart failure

6 To learn more about this cult, visit pbcm.synthasite.com. “The circumstances before, during
and after the birth of the child who came to be known as Master Tomas D. Eugenio, Sr. - were
filled with miraculous events.The mother, Crescencia, was on her final month of pregnancy when
she heard a voice calling on her from within her bulging stomach. Dumbstruck with awe, she just
listened to the instructions given by her unborn yet talking baby. She was told to recall and
preach this event to the concerned relatives to enlighten them when the child turns seventeen
years old. Unfortunately, out of fear of being ridiculed by her kinsmen she cowed and refused to
heed the instructions given by her child at the appointed age, so both sides of their kinfolk knew
nothing about the pre-natal miracle.When the big day came, another miraculous event occurred.
The attending midwife was awestruck with fear for the child before her whom she helped deliver
was born without the accompanying placenta and umbilical cord! In other words, the baby was
independent of it's mother's nutrients while still inside the womb. It was alive and growing by it's
own power!”

due to toxemia of pregnancy at his house. Eugenio claimed legal custody of her body as her legal spouse.
The RTC directed him to deliver Vitaliana’s body to a funeral parlor for an autopsy.
When the siblings found out about their sister’s death, they alleged that Eugenio was wrongfully interfering
with their duty to bury her, since he was not in any way related to Vitaliana. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of
the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. The RTC agreed with them (applied the order of
support under Art. 294, Civil Code, in default of a surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants) and
denied Eugenio’s MTD but Eugenio filed cases with the SC. While all this was happening, Vitaliana’s body
lay in a coffin displayed at the Greenhills Memorial Home.
Issue: Do burial rights and responsibilities with respect to a deceased person devolve upon her common
law spouse?—NO.
Ruling: RTC Affirmed. Philippine law only recognizes the legitimate spouse as the responsible person. While
certain rights are accorded to common law spouses, this is in relation to the division of community
property only and premised on a lack of impediments for marriage.
Reasoning: (Omitted most of the discussion on habeas corpus proceedings)
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the siblings, amendment of the petition for habeas
corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuitry of
action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances that justify a refusal of permission to
amend. While the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty, the issue of custody remained, and the RTC had to resolve it. (So did
it convert the spec pro into a civil case, or not?)
Eugenio claimed he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used
therein not being preceded by any qualification. Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages;
the spouse must be the legitimate spouse. While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact
that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, in case law, recognition is given to such co-ownerships if the man and
woman living together are not in any way incapacitated to contract marriage. In this case, Eugenio had a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law
relations for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. It makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But
this view cannot be applied to this case. The provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Eugenio
was not Vitaliana’s lawfully-wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.
The Vargases were correctly awarded custody of Vitaliana’s dead body. Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons hereinbelow specified:

7 This religious organization is different from self-proclaimed god Ruben Ecleo’s Philippine
Benevolent Missionaries Association.

xxx xxxxxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial
shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in
possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
NOTE: The TC and SC mostly applied the Civil Code in this case even though the Family Code had already
taken effect at the time of Vitaliana’s death and when the first Habeas Corpus case was filed. (But anyway,
the provisions on support were similar!)

028. JOAQUIN v. NAVARRO
RAMON JOAQUIN v. ANTONIO NAVARRO
May 29, 1953
SV: The Navarro family was killed during the battle of liberation of Manila. The issue was whether the
mother died before the son or vice versa, as this had successional effects. The SC ruled that where there
are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumptions in the Civil
Code and in the Rules of Court do not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Therefore, it was ruled that the son died ahead.
Facts:
During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the following sought refuge on the ground
floor of German Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar (32-33);
daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--).
The building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting the daughters who were hit and fell on
the ground
JN Sr. decided to leave the building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, JN Jr., and
Jr.’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez. As they came out, JN Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and
rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets.
German Club collapsed trapping many people presumably including Angela Joaquin. JN Sr., Adela,
and Francisco sought refuge in an air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days.
On February 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols. JN Sr. and
Adela were hit and killed.
The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd. AJ;
4th. JN, Sr.
The CA found that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th
JN, Sr.

Issue:
(1) WON the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court having repealed Art. 43
of the CC or not is relevant to the case at bar. (No. Neither of the two provisions is applicable)
(2) WON the son/mother died first before the other. (Son died first)
Ratio: It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision
that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential.
Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Francisco Lopez, who survived provided testimony regarding the events. The Supreme court ruled that the
testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep
the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez,
a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this
possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it
was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from the Club.
Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less, and so died
within that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished within those 5
or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.

According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. died,
and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval between JN, Jr.'s death and the
breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds, long
enough to warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when her son expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the building’s collapse, by which AJ could have been
killed. All these causes are speculative. Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams
because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to
fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly, not within the brief space of 5 seconds
between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not
require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the
"particular circumstances from which survivorship can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested
by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is
never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or
conjectures without any sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is deduced from established
facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged
by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to
prevail.

029. Smith Bell v. Natividad
September 17, 1919
Malcolm, J.
Short Version: Smith Bell and Co wanted to register its ship, the Bato, with the Commissioner of
Customs. The Commissioner refused, citing Act 2761, which restricted registration to citizens of the US, the
Philippines, or both.
The SC ruled on the constitutional challenges to that law, on grounds of due process and equal protections
by saying that, while corporations and aliens are both “persons” to whom due process and equal
protection are guaranteed, Act 2761 was a valid exercise of police power.
Facts: Smith, Bell and Co, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands, a
majority of whose stockholders are British, filed an application with the Collector of Customs for the
issuance of a certificate of Philippine Registry covering its vessel, known as the Bato. The collector refused
to issue the certificate, on the ground that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell and Co., were not citizens
either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands.
Hence this petition for issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Issues: WON the Government of the PI, through its legislature and Act 2761, can deny the registry of a
vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders. (Yes.)
In other words, WON Act 1716 is constitutional. (Yes)
Ratio: The prevailing law is Act 2761 of the Philippine Legislature. It amended section 1172 of the
Administrative Code to the effect that only vessels of domestic ownership could be registered. Domestic
ownership means a)citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b)citizens of the US residing in
the PI; (c)any corporation or company composed wholly of the PI or the US, or both.
Section 1176 pertinently provides that no application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be
approved until the collector of customs is satisfied that the vessel is of domestic ownership.
Smith Bell’s claim is that Act 2761 is unconstitutional for denying Smith Bell the equal protection of
the laws, because it in effects prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, on the capricious ground that
one or more of their stockholders is foreign. It is also alleged that it is unconstitutional because it deprives
the corporation of its property without due process, because by passage of law the company was
automatically deprived of all beneficial attributes of ownership in the Bato.

*******************PERSONS TIME**************
The constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection are extended to all persons, including
aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are “persons” within the scope of the guaranties insofar as their
property is concerned. Classification with the end in view of providing diversity of treatment may be made
among corporations but must be based upon some reasonable ground and not merely arbitrary selection.
***************end of discussion on persons. Archaic consti crap follows*****************
However, due process and equal protection were not designed to interfere with the power of the
State, sometimes termed its “police power,” to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education and good order of the people and legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop
its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity.
Here, because the Philippine Islands are composed of “more than three thousand islands.”
Steamship lines are the arteries of commerce. If one be severed, the life-blood of the nation is lost. Time
and again, the PI Government has always taken a firm stand against the presence of undesirable
foreigners. The government has assumed to act for the all-sufficient and primitive reason of the benefit
and protection of its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its dominion. After all, some
evilminded foreigner might very easily take advantage of such lavish hospitality to chart Philippine waters,
to obtain valuable information for unfriendly foreign powers, to stir up insurrection, or to prejudice Filipino
or American commerce. Thus, by analogy, unnaturalized aliens cannot be allowed to kill any wild bird or
animal except in self-defense, and thus, they cannot own shotguns or rifles in Pennsylvania. The First
American Congress of 1789 regulated ships and commerce, and so did the Americans in the Philippines. 8
The Philippine legislature sought to enact an anti-alien shipping act in order to encourage Philippine shipbuilding. It sought safety of these islands from foreign interlopers. Surely, the members of the judiciary are
not expected to live apart from active life, in monastic seclusion amidst dusty tomes and ancient records,
but as keen spectators of passing events and alive to the dictates of the general welfare, can incline the
scales of their decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. Thus,
the law is constitutional.
Petition denied.
031. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JUAN CODINA ARENAS
AND OTHERS, defendants;VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant| 25 July 1911| CJ Arellano
Facts: 15 December 1908: Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and AlipioLocso,
Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and
severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three
months from date, with interest at P1 per month.
5 April 1909: Standard Oil Co. of NY sued the said five debtors for payment with interest from 15 Deember
1908.
12 May 1909: Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default and were so notified, the
latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May, 1909.
28 August 1909: CFI Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to Standard Oil
P3,30576 together with the interest until complete payment has been made.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente Sixto
Villanueva, appeared and alleged that:
1) On 24 July 1909, ViceneSixto Villanueva was delcared insane by CFI Manila;

8 I don’t know how we got there either.

2) Elisa was appointed as his guardian by the same court;
3) 11 October, she was authorized by the court as guardian, to institute the proper legal proceedings for
the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity, among them that
concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of The Standard Oil;
4) Elisa, as the guardian, was not aware of th proceedings against her husband and was only informed of it
by chance;
5) When Vicente gave the bond which was the subject of the suit, he was permanently insane;
Thus, Elisa petitioned the court to relieve Vicente from compliance with the judgment rendered against him
and to reopen the trial to introduce the evidence on behalf of Vicente with respect to his capacity at the
time of the execution of the bond in question.
The lower court granted the petition and it was found that when Vicente executed the bond in question, he
understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent
that was given by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid and efficacious. As a
result of such findings the court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment
rendered in the case be denied and that the said execution be carried out.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested "with reference to the
defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in support of the
appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a single assignment of error as follows:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the defendant Villanueva,
does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one concerned.
Issue: W/N suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does
not have capacity to act. NO
Ruling: There is yet no evidence to warrant the conclusion that he who suffers from monomania of wealth,
believing himself very wealthy when he is not, is really insane and it is to be presumed, absent a judicial
declaration, that he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind.
The TC decided that although Vicente may have monomania, a person believing himself to be what he is
not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to
bind himself in a contract.
WITNESSES
Dr. Cuervo had visited Vicente eight times during 1902-1903 while Dr. Ocampo, only once.
The witnesses testified that although Vicente had monomania, he can read and understand written
documents and that Vicente was of ordinary intelligence and also literate.
F.B. Ingersoll, the notary that prepared the instrument of bond testified that he explained to Vicente
Villanueva its contents to which he replied that he was willing to sign the instrument and in fact did so. He
obeserved nothing to indicate that Villanueva was insane. He was, rather, composed and spoke in an
ordinary way.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified that while trying in the CFI the case concerning the estate of the
Chinaman Go-Cho-Co, and Mr. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked him
some questions about his property, in order to ascertain whether he was solvent and would be adequate
surety, and that Villanueva testified the same as others had done, and there was no particular disorder or
perturbation of his mental faculties. Hon. Araullo testified that Villanueva answered the questions
concerning the property that he held, stated its value, specified the place where it was situated, his

answers being precisely relevant to the matter treated. All this took place between July and September,
1908.
Araullo, having been asked, on cross-examination, whether Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the date
mentioned, had again been surety in any other case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr.
Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected this new bond, replied
that it was in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he endeavored to
investigate, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva had given any other previous bond, and the discovered
that he had in fact previously given bond in a criminal case, but that, as it had already been cancelled, he
had no objection to accepting the one offered by Mr. Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable,
and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the
moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court,
has not been proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a consideration to
substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it should not be expressed in the contract, it is
presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.)
In the contract of bond the consideration, general, is no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than
the liberality of the benefactor. (Art., 1274, CC) Out of the ordinary, a bond may be given for some other
consideration, according to the agreement and the free stipulation of the parties and may be, as in
onerous and remuneratory contracts, something remunerative stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of
the beneficiary of the bond.
Standard Oil presented a letter by Arenas to Villanueva, telling the latter tht they should meet. It is not
certain if Villanueva was engaged in the business of giving bonds for remuneration, but neither can it be
sustained that the mental disorder dominated the intellect of Villanueva, to the extent of his believing
himself so oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever. There is no
proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that, if
Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds, among them that herein concerned, he was
influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.
There is also no proof that, granting that Villanueva had monomania, that he was dominated by that
malady when he executed the bond.
Even Villanueva's wife, as she attempted to admit him to the Hospicio de San Jose, objected when the
doctors suggested he be placed in the insane ward. She said that "her husband was not exactly insane
enough to be placed among the insane."
Dispostive: Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
032. DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE ESPIRITU,
administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
December 1, 1917
Torres, J.
Appeal by bill of exceptions
Digest by Dawn Chua
Short Version: The Mercados represented themselves to be of legal age when they entered into a contract
of sale over a parcel of land. They now want the contract annulled on the ground that they were minors
and therefore had no legal capacity to enter into the contract. The Court ruled that minority cannot be
invoked as a ground for annulment of a contract when the invoking party represented himself to be of legal
age at the time he entered the contract.
Facts:

-

The Mercados were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis
Espiritu.
Margarita died in 1898, leaving as her paraphernal property a 48 ha. lot in Bulacan. In 1910, Luis
Espiritu managed to fraudulently induce the Mercados to sign a deed of sale of the land.
The Mercados want the courts to declare the deed of sale of a parcel of land null and void because they
were minors at the time they entered into the contract.
Luis’s estate administrator filed a cross complaint alleging that the Mercados had represented
themselves to be of legal age when they sold the land to Luis.
The Mercados claimed that since they reached their majority age, the four years fixed by law for the
annulment of the contract had not yet elapsed. They asked that they be absolved from the cross
complaint.

Issue:WON parties to a contract can bring up their minority as a ground for annulling the contract
Reasoning: NO. The sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they
are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled
033. Young v. Tecson
The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the minor informed the other contracting
party of his minority, does not affect the case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because his
previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing the contract (Young vs. Tecson, 39
Off. Gaz. 953).

036. Rosario L. DE BRAGANZA, et al. vs. Fernando F. DE VILLA ABRILLE (by Pia Benosa)
April 13, 1959
Bengzon, J.
Short version: Villa Abrille lent the Braganza mom and her two boys some money during the war. When the
war was over and he remained unpaid, he sued them, but the boys asserted their minority at the time they
executed a promissory note. The Court exempted them from payment on the ground of minority, noting
that they did not actively misrepresent themselves, but ordered them to make restitution for such portion
of the original obligation (the original amount they received, not the amount they promised to pay in the
PN), that was applied for their support and benefit.
Facts: Rosario and sons received a loan of P70,000 in Japanese war notes from Villa Abrille on Oct. 30,
1944. They executed a promissory note where they obligated themselves to pay him P10,000 “in legal
currency of the P.I. two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International
Echange has been established in the Philippines”, plus 2% per annum. Five years later (1949), no payment
having made, Villa Abrille sued them.
In their defense the De Braganzas claimed they only got P40,000 and asserted that Guillermo and Rodolfo
were minors when they signed the PN (16 and 18, respectively). The CFI and CA ordered them to pay De
Villa Abrillesolidarily.
Issue: Can the De Braganza boys be exempted from paying their debt on the basis of their minority at the
time this was obtained?—Not exactly.
Ruling: They cannot be made to pay the amount indicated in the Promissory Note because they were
minors at the time this was executed. However, they are liable for 2/3 of the original amount of P70,000 in
Japanese war notes, following the principle that the incapacitated person must restitute the other party to
the extent he was benefited by the thing or price received by him. (NCC 1399)
Reasoning: The minority of her children did not release Rosario from responsibility, since it is the children’s
personal defense. However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors
may be responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code9). The CA held the two boys liable since they did not appraise

9 All references to the Civil Code pertain to the Old Civil Code.

Villa Abrille, their creditor, of their incapacity. Thus, if Villa Abrille, in spite of the information relative to
their age, parted with his money, then he should be contended with the consequence of his act. But if the
case was such non-disclosure, the two boys should not later on be permitted to excuse themselves from
the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled.
The SC disagreed. It does not follow as a legal proposition, that the two boys will not be permitted to assert
their minority. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. Citing CJS and AmJur: In order to hold an
infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere
silence when making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an
action of deceit. Mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient.
The De Braganzas committed passive/constructive misrepresentation at the most. There is a view that the
very minority which incapacitates one from contracting should likewise exempt them from the results of
misrepresentation. Thus, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally bound by their signatures in
the PN.
***
It is argued, nevertheless, by Villa Abrille that it was too late to invoke this defense in 1951, when more
than 4 years had elapsed after Rodolfo reached the age of majority. Article 1301 of the Civil Code says that
"an action to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has
reached majority age. The parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however,
that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be held that in October
1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this defense was
interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed from October 1947.
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil
Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors asking for any positive
relief from the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an action for annulment They merely
interposed an excuse from liability.
***
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, even if their written contact is unenforceable because of
minority, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they received.
(Art. 1304—1399 of the New Civil Code) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa
Abrillewere used for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold
that they had profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively
established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent
to P1 of current Philippine money.
As the share of the minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they were ordered to return P1,166.67. Their
promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, cannot be enforced since they were minors incapable of
binding themselves. Their liability was declared without regard of the promissory note, but solely in
pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code. Rosario was to pay 1/3 of the P10,000 agreed upon in the PN.

037. US v. VAQUILAR
THE UNITED STATES v. EVARISTO VAQUILAR
March 13, 1914
Trent, J.
Facts: EvaristoVaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other
persons with a bolo. On appeal, Vaquilar did not deny the crimes but introduced several witnesses who
testified that Vaquilar was insane at the time of the commission of the crime.Eyewitnesses testified that
the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the crimes. They testified that the

appellant was complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The witnesses‘ evidence
for insanity include:
 appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating at the time he was killing his wife
 he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he wouldn‘t have killed his famil
 at the moment of cutting those people, ―he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut anybody
at rando
 sister said, ―…then he pursued me….he must have been crazy because he cut me
Issue: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore
exempt from criminal liability. (No)
Ratio: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane.
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy
of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does.
The appellant‘s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an
unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive
that he is insane. The popular meaning of crazy is not synonymous with the legal terms insane. The
conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person
(not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after the
commission of the crime.
The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of
the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not
exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or
became demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed
that he was in a normal state of mind.
031. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JUAN CODINA ARENAS
AND OTHERS, defendants;VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant| 25 July 1911| CJ Arellano
Facts: 15 December 1908: Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and AlipioLocso,
Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and
severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three
months from date, with interest at P1 per month.
5 April 1909: Standard Oil Co. of NY sued the said five debtors for payment with interest from 15 Deember
1908.
12 May 1909: Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default and were so notified, the
latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May, 1909.
28 August 1909: CFI Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to Standard Oil
P3,30576 together with the interest until complete payment has been made.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente Sixto
Villanueva, appeared and alleged that:
1) On 24 July 1909, ViceneSixto Villanueva was delcared insane by CFI Manila;
2) Elisa was appointed as his guardian by the same court;
3) 11 October, she was authorized by the court as guardian, to institute the proper legal proceedings for
the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity, among them that
concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of The Standard Oil;
4) Elisa, as the guardian, was not aware of th proceedings against her husband and was only informed of it
by chance;

5) When Vicente gave the bond which was the subject of the suit, he was permanently insane;
Thus, Elisa petitioned the court to relieve Vicente from compliance with the judgment rendered against him
and to reopen the trial to introduce the evidence on behalf of Vicente with respect to his capacity at the
time of the execution of the bond in question.
The lower court granted the petition and it was found that when Vicente executed the bond in question, he
understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent
that was given by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid and efficacious. As a
result of such findings the court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment
rendered in the case be denied and that the said execution be carried out.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested "with reference to the
defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in support of the
appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a single assignment of error as follows:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the defendant Villanueva,
does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one concerned.
Issue: W/N suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does
not have capacity to act. NO
Ruling: There is yet no evidence to warrant the conclusion that he who suffers from monomania of wealth,
believing himself very wealthy when he is not, is really insane and it is to be presumed, absent a judicial
declaration, that he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind.
The TC decided that although Vicente may have monomania, a person believing himself to be what he is
not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to
bind himself in a contract.
WITNESSES
Dr. Cuervo had visited Vicente eight times during 1902-1903 while Dr. Ocampo, only once.
The witnesses testified that although Vicente had monomania, he can read and understand written
documents and that Vicente was of ordinary intelligence and also literate.
F.B. Ingersoll, the notary that prepared the instrument of bond testified that he explained to Vicente
Villanueva its contents to which he replied that he was willing to sign the instrument and in fact did so. He
obeserved nothing to indicate that Villanueva was insane. He was, rather, composed and spoke in an
ordinary way.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified that while trying in the CFI the case concerning the estate of the
Chinaman Go-Cho-Co, and Mr. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked him
some questions about his property, in order to ascertain whether he was solvent and would be adequate
surety, and that Villanueva testified the same as others had done, and there was no particular disorder or
perturbation of his mental faculties. Hon. Araullo testified that Villanueva answered the questions
concerning the property that he held, stated its value, specified the place where it was situated, his
answers being precisely relevant to the matter treated. All this took place between July and September,
1908.
Araullo, having been asked, on cross-examination, whether Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the date
mentioned, had again been surety in any other case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr.
Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected this new bond, replied
that it was in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he endeavored to
investigate, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva had given any other previous bond, and the discovered

that he had in fact previously given bond in a criminal case, but that, as it had already been cancelled, he
had no objection to accepting the one offered by Mr. Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable,
and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the
moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court,
has not been proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a consideration to
substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it should not be expressed in the contract, it is
presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.)
In the contract of bond the consideration, general, is no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than
the liberality of the benefactor. (Art., 1274, CC) Out of the ordinary, a bond may be given for some other
consideration, according to the agreement and the free stipulation of the parties and may be, as in
onerous and remuneratory contracts, something remunerative stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of
the beneficiary of the bond.
Standard Oil presented a letter by Arenas to Villanueva, telling the latter tht they should meet. It is not
certain if Villanueva was engaged in the business of giving bonds for remuneration, but neither can it be
sustained that the mental disorder dominated the intellect of Villanueva, to the extent of his believing
himself so oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever. There is no
proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that, if
Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds, among them that herein concerned, he was
influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.
There is also no proof that, granting that Villanueva had monomania, that he was dominated by that
malady when he executed the bond.
Even Villanueva's wife, as she attempted to admit him to the Hospicio de San Jose, objected when the
doctors suggested he be placed in the insane ward. She said that "her husband was not exactly insane
enough to be placed among the insane."
Dispostive: Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
039. People v. Rafanan
November 21, 1991
Feliciano, J.
Short Version: Rafanan was convicted of raping EstelitaRonaya. His defense was insanity in the form of
schizophrenia. The SC rejected his defense and upheld his conviction, ruling that while he was, in fact,
insane, he did not experience a complete destruction of intelligence at the time of the act.
Facts: In 1976, when EstelitaRonaya was 14 years old, she was hired by Ines Rafanan, aka “Baket Ines,”
mother of PolicarpioRafanan, as a househelper at their house in Bgy. San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan.One
night, on March 16, 1976, Ronaya was sent by Baket Ines to help in the store in front of their house, which,
at the time, was manned by Policarpio. When Policarpio asked Ronaya to close the door of the store, he
suddenly pulled her inside the store and said, “Come, let us have sexual intercourse,” to which Ronaya
replied, “I do not like.” Policarpio then held a 1 ½ foot bolo to her throat, and forced himself upon her,
having sexual intercourse. After the filing of a complaint, and trial, the CFI-Pangasinan convicted Rafanan
of rape. Hence this appeal.
Issues:
1
2
Ratio:

WON the inconsistencies in testimony meant that the evidence was hearsay. (No.)
WON Policarpio’s schizophrenia absolved him of criminal liability. (No)

1

2

It was claimed that the testimony was incredible, because on direct Ronaya claimed that she went
home immediately, while on cross she said she went home the next day. However, the
inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not touch upon the manner in
which the crime had been committed and did not thus affect the credibility of Ronaya. In all other
respects, the commission of the crime was not seriously disputed by Rafanan.
****************LET’S GET CRAZY**************
Policarpio’s main defense was that he was suffering schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent
intentions upon Estelita. At the trial court level, the court ordered him confined at the National
Mental Health Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. During this time, four reports
were made by Drs. Simplicio N. Masikip and Arturo E. Nerit, each concluding that he was suffering
from schizophrenia, as symptomized by the ff.:
a Sluggishness in movement, indifferent to interview
b Carelessly attired with disheveled hair, staring vacuously through the window
c Indifference
d Frequently answering “Aywanko, hindikoalam.”
e Claiming to hear voices “parangibon, tinig ng ibon.”
f Constantly saying “Oki naman” to himself.10
g Even when he was released because he had improved, still hearing voices in his head and
talking to himself.

As a result of the reports, the doctors concluded he was not in a condition to stand court trial, until the 4 th
report, where he was cleared for trial. Rafanan’s defense at trial was that he was already schizophrenic 1
to 2 years before he was confined, and was thus already insane at the time of the rape.
This defense was based on Art. 12 of the RPC, which exempts imbeciles and insane persons from criminal
liability, unless the latter acted during a lucid interval.
Insanity as a defense is subject to two standards, as set out in the case of People v. Formigiones, to
wit:
1
2

Test of cognition—complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, and
Test of volition—total deprivation of freedom of the will.

Schizophrenia, formerly dementia praecox, is the most common form of psychosis, symptomized by
disturbance of association, affect and activity. Previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as a
defense saw that theory rejected by the Court. The evidence in these cases tended to show that any
impairment of the mental faculties was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence of the
consciousness of his acts.
At trial, Dr. Jovellano, a psychiatrist who testified that she had examined and treated Rafanan, said
that he was not devoid of consciousness at the time he perpetrated the rape and capable of palnning the
assault. Her testimony negated complete destruction of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
act. Thus, the defense of insanity cannot be sustained.
The law presumes each man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his
affirmative allegation of insanity. An inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moement the act is committed. Rafanan failed to discharge this burden.
The testimonies of the doctors related to general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with
schizophrenia. The defense even failed to present Dr. Masikip, who observed Rafanan during his
confinement.
However, while schizophrenia does not exempt Rafanan, it may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender’s willpower without depriving him
of the consciousness of his acts.

10 Which, judging from the fact he’s from Pangasinan, and thus Ilocano, is probably not what he
was actually saying.

Decision affirmed.
Gabe.
041. CABAGUE VS. AUXILLO
FELIPE CABAGUE & GERONIMO CABAGUE VS. MATIAS AUXILLO & SOCORRO AUXILLO
November 26, 1952
Bengzon, J.
Short Version: Plaintiff sued the defendants to recover damages resulting from defendants' refusal to
carry out the previously agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo. The Supreme Court allowed the
action against Socorro to prosper for such damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their
mutual matrimonial promises.
Facts:
1. Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued the defendant Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to
recover damages resulting from defendants' refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage
between Socorro and Geronimo. The complaint alleged:
a. that defendants promised such marriage to plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve the
defendants' house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride;
b. that relying upon such promises plaintiffs made the improvement and spent P700; and
c. that without cause defendants refused to honor their pledged word.
2. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint. It was appealed presently to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the present action may prosper in court? (YES)
Ruling:
This expediente will be returned to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.
Ratio: Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such damages as may have resulted from
her failure to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises.
 The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really involves
two kinds of agreement.
o One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in consideration of the
marriage of Socorro and Geronimo.
 However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement
in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this
action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to marry".
 Neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to
marry."
o Another, the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry".
 For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages.
This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible.
 From Case Footnote: This is different from the situation in Atienza vs. Castillo
wherein the groom litigated against his bride and her parents for breach of
matrimonial promise. SC held in that case that the promise could not be proved
orally because the bridegroom was suing to enforce a contract "between his
parents and those of the bride."
042. DOMALAGAN V. BOLIFER
February 8, 1916
Johnson, J. (digest by Oyie Javelosa)
Short Version: Plaintiff Domalagan brought an action against defendant Bolifer for the recovery of an
amount paid pursuant to an agreement made in consideration of the marriage of their children. Defendant
countered that the action must fail because the agreement was not reduced to writing. Court held that the
agreement was not rendered invalid by the parties’ failure to reduce it to writing, and that the defendant’s
failure to object to proof of the same amounted to a waiver.
Facts:

-

In November 1909, plaintiff-appellee Jorge Domalagan (father of Cipriano) entered into a contract with
defendant-appellant Carlos Bolifer (father of Bonifacia) whereby the former would pay respondent PhP
500.00 upon Cipriano’s and Bonifacia’s marriage.
- Plaintiff fulfilled his obligation by paying PhP 500.00 and an additional PhP 16.00 as a token to
defendant
- However, in August 1910, Bonifacia was married to one Laureano Sisi
- Plaintiff then demanded the return of the total sum of PhP 516.00 + interests, damages. Thus, the
instant action was instituted.
- CFI: in favor of petitioner; ordered respondent to pay PhP 516 + 6% interest
- Hence, this appeal.
o Defendant argues that per Section 335 (3) of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action, the plaintiff
could not recover the amount in question because the agreement upon which the action was
based was not reduced to writing.
o Said section renders an “agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a
mutual promise to marry” unenforceable, unless the same be in writing and subscribed by the
party charged. Further, evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or
secondary evidence of its contents.
Issues: WoN the failure of the parties to reduce their agreement to writing is fatal to the action.
Ruling: NO. Failure to reduce an agreement made in consideration of marriage is not fatal to its
enforcement.
Reasoning: Section 335 does not render oral contracts invalid, as a contract may be perfectly valid even
though it is not clothed with the necessary form. It merely prevents parties to a valid oral contract from
proving it, if proper objection is made. In other words, it merely provides the method by which the
contracts identified therein can be proved. However, in the instant case, evidence relating to the
agreement was admitted without the slightest objection on the part of the defendant. Such failure to
except to evidence violative of the rule amounts to a waiver, and the contract shall be just as binding upon
the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
Judgment affirmed.
043. HERMOSISIMA VS. CA
September 30, 1960
Concepcion
SHORT VERSION: Soledad Cagigas and Francisco Hermosisima used to go around together. One night, they
had sexual intercourse which led to Soledad being pregnant. Soledad claims that when she told Francisco
about the pregnancy, Francisco promised to marry her. But Francisco married another woman. Soledad
filed a complaint asking for damages for breach of promise to marry. TC and CA awarded damages,
considered Soledad’s case as seduction. SC reversed, Philippines does not have express provisions
punishing breach of promise to marry and also Soledad’s case cannot be considered seduction because
she willingly gave in to Francisco.
FACTS : Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu who later became a
life insurance underwriter and Francisco Hermosisima was an apprentice pilot. Hermosisima was 10 years
younger than Soledad. They used to go around together and regard themselves as engaged.
One evening after watching a movie, they had a sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V Escano.
Sometime after Soledad advised Francisco that she was pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry her.
Soledad gave birth to Chris Hermosisima. But days after Chris was born, Francisco married (another
woman) Romanita Perez.
Soledad, together with Chris, filed a complaint for moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry.
Francisco admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support Chris but denied ever
having promised to marry Soledad.
TC declared Chris as the natural daughter of Francisco and ordered support. The court also granted the
plea for moral damages (5,000)
CA affirmed TC. Increased moral damages to 7,000.
ISSUE whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry
RULING: NO
REASONING: Articles 43 and 44 of the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to
marry. But these articles were never in force in the Philippines. As a matter of fact, the Philippine Supreme

Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise".
The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem
it best, however, to change the law thereon. Hence, the proposed Civil Code had provisions on breach of
promise to marry. But this was eliminated by Congress for the reason that: “…The history of breach of
promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to
abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men… the creation of such causes of action at a time when
so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a
step in the wrong direction”
In the case at bar, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly,
untenable. CA based its award on Article 2219 paragraph 3 of NCC but that provision strongly indicates
that the seduction therein contemplated is the crime punished by the RPC. But, in the case at bar, we find
ourselves unable to say that Francisco is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately
10 years younger than the Soledad — who around 36 years old – and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
Francisco, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, Soledad
"surrendered herself" to Francisco because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

044. WASSMER v. VELEZ </3
G.R. No. L-20089
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
DATE: Dec. 26, 1964
PONENTE: Bengzon, J.
SHORT VERSION: Facts: Francisco and Beatriz decided to get married. Two days before their marriage
Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day
before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her “nothing changed rest assured returning soon”.
Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.
Held: The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded
under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of
said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner
FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his brideto-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today. Please do not
ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE. PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Beatriz adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner. Judgment was rendered ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
Francisco filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it out. But the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to
appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving
at an amicable settlement."
Francisco failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for
two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element.
The court granted two weeks, but still Francisco failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed
the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
The court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to the SC. He
alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated
that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
In support of Francisco’s MR, he asserts that the judgment rendered was contrary to law because "there is
no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.
WON a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong. NO
In Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay , the Court held that "mere breach
of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
However, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
It is noted that on August 23, 1954 Beatriz and Francisco applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received.
And then, with but two days before the wedding, Francisco left.
WON Francisco is liable for damages. YES
This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.
WON Francisco is liable formoral and exemplary damages. YES, BUT Court lowered the amount
to P15k.
No question was raised as to award of actual damages. Francisco wants to have the moral and exemplary
damages eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
As to exemplary damages, Francisco contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because
under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
The argument is devoid of merit as under the circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in
a "wanton x x reckless [and] oppressive manner."
- P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
Ruling: The lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.a
045. SPOUSES FRANCISCO ESTREMOS and ESTRELLA ESTREMOS, ET AL., plaintiffs and
appellees, v. SPOUSES GONZALO EPHAN and RESURECCION VALENZONA, ET AL., defendants
and appellants.
December 23, 1986
[CA Decision]
Appeal from CFI of Davao del Sur
Bartolome, J.
Digest by Dawn Chua
Short Version: Virgilio got Erlinda pregnant. He was forced by his parents and Erlinda’s parents to marry
her in order to hide her shame. He ran away before the date of the wedding. Erlinda’s parents are now
suing Virgilio’s parents for damages. Court ruled that this case was different from the Wassmer v. Velez
case mainly because Virgilio was forced to enter into the marriage, while in the former case both the
contracting parties entered into the agreement willingly. They opined that Erlinda should also suffer the
consequences of her libertarian conduct and that Virgilio should not be forced to enter into the marriage as
that would only make him an embittered husband and an inept father.
Facts: Virgilio Ephan (a student of Harvardian University lol) and Erlinda Estremos were college
sweethearts. They engaged in consensual sex several times, resulting in Erlinda getting pregnant.
- When the parents of both parties found out, they arranged for them to get married. Virgilio didn’t want
to go through with it but his father insisted. So Erlinda, her mother Estrella , Virgilio, and his father
Gonzalo, went to the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a marriage license.
Later on, however, Virgilio disappeared, but first coursing a letter through a pedicab driver explaining
his actions. Some juicy bits:
o “now is not the right moment for me to marry… I want to marry when I am already prepared…”
o “… I can already work if I want to work but do not have yet money for capital in a small
business, this is one thing that stop me from getting married.”
o “… I would not like to ask money from my parents after I get married, and every person has a
different principle and this is my principle.”
o They had planned to get the baby aborted by a “Hilot” but since Erlinda was already 4 months
on the way, he did not continue because he “did not want to add more to [his] sins.”
- Erlinda’s parents are now suing Virgilio’s parents for damages. They had already bought Erlinda a
wedding gown and sandals, and prepared some animals for slaughter.
- The CFI ruled in favor of the Sps. Ephan, awarding them P20,000 in moral damages P10,000 in
exemplary damages, P1,000 in attorney’s fees, and P400 in wedding reparations.
- Hence present appeal.
Issue: WON a runaway groom who was forced by his parents into marriage can be sued for damages.
Reasoning: NO.
- General rule is that breach of a promise to marry is an actionable wrong. The only exception is found in
the case of Wassmer v. Velez where preparations were already made for the wedding (like the wedding
gown was already bought, dresses for the entourage had already been made, the matrimonial bed was
bought, bridal showers and gifts received, etc.). The Court held in the Wassmer case that “to formally
set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized…is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs
for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21…” Moral and
exemplary damages were awarded.
- The Court differentiated the present case from Wassmer in that the parents of both contracting parties
connived Virgilio into marrying Erlinda. In Wassmer, the contracting parties themselves entered into the
agreement to marry.
- The Court then opined that Erlinda should suffer for her libertarian conduct. She entered into it with
“eyes (and legs lol) wide open and with mutual passion.” Virgilio shouldn’t suffer alone. If Virgilio felt
that he was not prepared for marriage in the first place then he should not go through with it. It will
only make him a bitter husband and consequently an inept father, which do not make for a good family
life.

046. TANJANCO v. CA
APOLONIO TANJANCOvs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS
December 17, 1966
Aquino, J.
Short version: Apolonio wooed Araceli Santos, professed love and marriage. Araceli got pregnant Araceli
got pregnant, and sued for damages under Art. 21. Court ruled that for this to apply, there must seduction
with deceit or enticement, not merely sexual intercourse of breach of promise to marry. Here, there was
consent and mutuality since they were having sexual relations for a year.
FACTS: Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos and professed his love for her. A year after, he promised
marriage and so Araceli consented to have carnal knowledge of him. They continued their sexual
relationship for a year, and Araceli conceived a child. Due to her pregnancy, to avoid embarrassment and
social humiliation, she resigned as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., and became unable to support herself
and her baby. Apolonio refused to marry plaintiff as promised, and so Araceli brought an action for moral
damages and recognition of the child.
The CFI dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Araceli appealed to the CA, which
held that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition and support of the child as yet unborn, but
decreed that a cause of action based on Article 21 of the Civil Code was present.
Apolonio appealed to the SC, arguing that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not recognized in
this jurisdiction.
Issue: WON a cause of action against Apolonio existed- NO. (not from breach of promise to marry NOR
Art.21)
Held: A cause of action under Art.21 under these circumstances only appplies to a minor who has been
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, which in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach
of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman
must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer.
Here, they were both of legal age, and they both professed their love for each other. They went out on
frequent dates, became very close and intimate to each other. They had repeated acts of intercourse,
which is incompatible with the idea of seduction. T here voluntariness and mutual passionThere is no case
is under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of
First Instance is affirmed. No costs. (Without prejudice to actions corresponding to rights of child against
Apolonio)

048. PAÑGANIBAN vs. BORROMEO
Jose Panganiban vs. Elias Borromeo
September 9, 1933
Malcolm, J.
FACTS: Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala, husband and wife, subscribed a contract before notary public
Elias Borromeo. The contract had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Atty.
Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document and had, at least, some knowledge of its contents,
although he may not have been fully informed because of a difference in dialect.
The contract in substance purported to formulate an agreement between the husband the wife which
permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in an adulterous relationship
with another one, without opposition from either of them.
ISSUES:

1
2

WON the contract is judicially recognizable (NO, as it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose)
WON Atty. Borromeo may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public (YES)

REASONING
1 The contract of the spouses was executed at a time when the Spanish Penal Code was in force.
Conceding, however, that the more liberal provisions of the Revised Penal Code should be given
application, it is herein provided that the consent or pardon given by the offended party constitutes
a bar to prosecution for adultery or concubinage. In this instance, if the spouses should retain their
present frame of mind, no prosecution of either one by the other could be expected.
Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of the Legislature to legalize adultery and
concubinage. They still remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be instituted if
the offended party consent to the act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of future contingency
and is not matter for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. The contract contains
provisions contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable.
2 To the office of notary public there is not attached such importance under present conditions as
under the Spanish administration. Even so, the notary public exercise duties calling for carefulness
and faithfulness. It is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify, and
to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to
the practice of law, and such, in the commingling of his duties as notary and lawyer, must be held
responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary
public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court even to the extent
of disbarment.
DISPOSITIVE Discipline of Atty. Borromeo confined to severe censure in view of 3 mitigating circumstances
(1) he may not have realized the full purport of the document (2) no falsification of facts was attempted
and (3) his commission as a notary public has been revoked.
049. In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant| 21 June 1940| J. Laurel
Nature: Administrative case initiated upon the complaint of the Sol-Gen against Roque Santiago, charging
him with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.
Facts: Ernesto Baniquit, then living separately from his wife, Soledad Colares for 9 consecutive years, was
bent on contracting a second marriage. He sought the legal advice of Santiago, who was then a practicing
lawyer and notary public in Occidental Negros. 29 May 1939: Santiago assured Baniquit that he could
secure a separation from his wife and remarry. He asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same
day. Right then and there, Santiago prepared a document (Exh. A) stipulating, among other things, that the
contracting parties, who are husband and wife and authorized to marry again, at the same time
renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying.
After execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, Santiago asked the spouses to shake
hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and subsequent
marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it Santiago stood up and,
pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be
valid."
Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with
Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum
of P50, but since there was no proof that this was done, the Court just considered the service rendered as
free of charge.
Issue: WON Santiago is guilty of malpractice for executing Exh. A, and making the parties believe that the
same was legitimate and that their marriage bonds were severed, allowing them to remarry. YES.
Ruling: Santiago did not deny preparation of Exh. A. He put up the defense that he had the idea that seven
years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage and for
that reason prepared Exh A. However, immediately after executing the document, realized that he had
made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939,
came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.
The act of Santiago is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. His
advice constitutes malpractice, justifying his disbarment from the practie of law. The admission of a lawyer
to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred

is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness
or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of
a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared
terminated. However, the Court considered the fact that Santiago realized his mistake and endeavored to
correct it thus, he was merely suspended instead of disbarred.
Dispositive: The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
050. SELANOVA vs. MENDOZA
May 19, 1975
AQUINO, J
Mica Maurinne M. Adao
SUMMARY: Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for having prepared, ratified
and notarized a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the spouses with the
condition of waiving their respective right to prosecute any acts of infidelity. Judge admitted the fact but
argued that he relied on Art 191(4) of the Civil Code which he claims to allow for extrajudicial liquidation of
conjugal partnership. SC ruled that the agreement was VOID for being contrary to Art 221 of the New Civil
Code. Judge Mendoza was just severely censured because the court considered the fact that he was
admitted to the bar in 1948 and, consequently, he did not study the new Civil Code in the law school,
FACTS: Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross ignorance of
the law for having prepared and ratified a document dated November 21, 1972, extrajudicially liquidating
the conjugal partnership of the him and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that
either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each
had filed against the other and that they waived their "right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of
infidelity" either one would commit against the other. The agreement was acknowledged before him as
"City Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio”
Respondent Judge Mendoza alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife may
agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval"
(Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code).
The case was not referred to a Judge of the Court of First Instance for investigation because actually no
factual issues necessitate a hearing and presentation of evidence. Respondent Judge admitted that he was
responsible for the execution of the questioned document, an extrajudicial "Liquidation of Conjugal
Properties", which he caused complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, to sign.
ISSUE: Is the agreement extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the spouses with the
condition of waiving their respective right to prosecute any acts of infidelity valid?
RULING: No. It is void.
RATIO: The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the Art 221 of the Civil Code:
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;
Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void (Quintana vs. Lerma,; De Luna vs. Linatoc, De La
Rosa vs. Barruga).
On the other hand, disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who authenticated agreements for
the personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse was permitted to commit acts of infidelity.
In the instant case, respondent Judge, due to his unawareness of the legal prohibition against contracts for
the personal separation of husband and wife and for the extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal
partnership, prepared the said void agreement which was acknowledged before him as "City Judge and
Notary Public Ex-Officio". (Because he was admitted to the bar in 1948 and, consequently, he did not study
the new Civil Code in the law school, he might not have been cognizant of its aforecited article 221).
Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good faith and honest desire to terminate the
marital conflict between the complainant and his wife, we are of the opinion that a drastic penalty should

not be imposed on him. But he deserves a severe censure for his mistake in preparing and notarizing the
aforementioned immoral and illegal agreement. Such severe reprimand should not be an obstacle to his
enjoyment of retirement privileges, assuming that there are no causes for depriving him of such benefits.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is severely censured.
Mentioned Jurisprudence
Panganiban vs. Borromeo: a lawyer was severely censured for having notarized a document containing
"an agreement between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a
concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either
one of them". The Court noted that while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, "they still remain
crimes" and a contract legalizing their commission is "contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a
consequence not judicially recognizable".
Biton vs. Momongon: Severe censure was administered to a notary of Cebu City who
document entitled "Legal Separation", executed by husband and wife, wherein they agreed
separated mutually and voluntarily, that they renounced their rights and obligations, and
authorized each other to remarry, renouncing any action to which they might be entitled
promising not to be a witness against the other. Those covenants are contrary to law, morals
customs and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family

ratified a
that they
that they
and each
and good

In re Santiago: The lawyer prepared for a married couple (who had been separated for nine years) a
document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia, that they authorized each other to marry again, at the same
time renouncing whatever right of action one might have against the other. When the husband inquired if
there would be no trouble, the lawyer pointed to his diploma which was hanging on the wall and said: "I
would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid." The husband remarried. The respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for one year for having been ignorant of the law or being careless in
giving legal advice
Balinon vs. De Leon: Attorney Celestino M. de Leon prepared an affidavit wherein he declared that he
was married to Vertudes Marquez, from whom he had been separated, their conjugal partnership having
been dissolved, and that he was consorting with Regina S. Balinon his "new found life-partner," to whom
he would "remain loyal and faithful" "as a lawful and devoted loving husband for the rest of" his life "at all
costs". Attorney Justo T. Velayo notarized that affidavit. This Court reprimanded Velayo and suspended De
Leon from the practice of law for three years.
051. Lichauco-De Leon v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 80965/6 June 1990/First Division/Petition for review on certiorari
Sylvia Lichauco-De Leon – petitioner
Court of Appeals, Macaria De Leon and Jose Vicente De Leon
Decision by J. Medialdea, Digest by Pip
Short Version: Jose and Sylvia were married for a short while before she left him and moved to the US.
She then commenced divorce proceedings there but they couldn’t prosper because Jose was in the
Philippines and had no property in the US. Later on, Sylvia entered into an agreement with Jose’s mother,
Macaria, where they agreed that, in consideration for the termination of relations between Jose and Sylvia,
Macaria would pay certain sums of money and transfer several properties.
Jose and Sylvia then filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal property. After it was granted, Jose
appealed with Macaria intervening. Macaria argued that since the cause of the letter-agreement was the
termination of marital relations, the agreement was null and void. The Court agreed with Macaria and
applied Article 52 of the Civil Code, which pertinently provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.
Facts: Sylvia and Jose were married in October 1969 before the municipal mayor of Binangonan, Rizal.
Their daughter Susana was born almost two years later. In October 1972, a de facto separation between
the spouses occurred due to “irreconcilable marital differences” and Sylvia left the conjugal home. In
March 1973 she went the United States where she obtained American citizenship.

In November 1973, Sylvia filed a petition for dissolution of marriage with the Superior Court of
California (County of San Francisco) against Jose. In these divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed claims for
support and distribution of properties. However, since Jose was then a Philippine resident and did not have
assets in the United States, Sylvia held the divorce proceedings in abeyance and concentrated her efforts
to obtain some sort of property settlement with Jose in the Philippines. 11
In March 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a letter-agreement with her mother-in-law, Macaria (on
her own behalf and as Jose’s representative). 12 In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of
relations between Sylvia and Jose, Macaria agreed to deliver title several properties 13 and respect the sole
custody of Sylvia over Susana. For her part, Sylvia agreed to judicial separation of property in accordance
with Philippine law and to do whatever necessary to obtain this. She also agreed to amend her petition for
divorce to fit the letter-agreement and to permit Susana to spend two to three months with her father. The
contract was agreed to be applicable both in the Philippines and in the US, and an actionable document,
the use of which the parties waived their rights to object to in the event a legal issue arose relating to its
validity.
Macaria immediately paid the money Sylvia was asking for in the agreement. Two weeks later, Sylvia and
Jose filed a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership before the CFI of
Rizal. After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an order in February 1980 approving the petition.
A month later, Sylvia moved for the execution of the order. Jose moved for reconsideration of the order,
alleging that Sylvia made a verbal reformation of the petition, since there was no such agreement for the
payment of P4,500.00 monthly support beginning the alleged date of separation in April 1973. He claimed
to have received no notice that Sylvia would attempt verbal reformation of the agreement contained in the
petition.
Macaria’s motion for leave to intervene was granted because she was the owner of the properties
involved in this case. She then filed a complaint-in-intervention assailing the validity and legality of the
letter-agreement which had for its purpose the termination of marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose.
Before any hearing could be had, the judicial reorganization took place and the case was transferred to the
RTC of Pasig.
In December 1983, the RTC of Pasig rendered judgment in favor of Macaria. The RTC declared the letteragreement to be null and void and ordered Sylvia to return the money Macaria had already paid, plus legal
interest from the date of the complaint, attorney’s fees, costs, and an additional P100,000.00. The RTC
affirmed the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of Jose and Sylvia as well as the division of properties
and assets provided in the petition, except insofar as the adjudication to Sylvia of properties belonging to
Macaria. Jose was still ordered to pay monthly support.
Sylvia appealed to the CA, insisting that the cause of the letter-agreement was not the termination of
marital relations with Jose but merely the termination of property relations. The CA affirmed the decision in
toto. Sylvia repeated her argument before the Supreme Court but added that if there was unlawful
consideration in the contract, it was also on Macaria’s part and (applying the in pari delicto rule), Macaria
could not recover from Sylvia.
Issues:
(1) Was the cause of the letter-agreement the termination of marital relations? YES.
(2) Was Macaria prevented from recovering the amounts she paid to Sylvia because they were in pari
delicto? NO.
Ruling: Petition denied.

11 Support and distribution of properties when you live in another country and he doesn’t own
property where you live? She should fire her lawyer.
12 I wondered why it would have to be Macaria, but it seems the old lady was loaded. The letter
addressed her as “Dona” and she lived in Forbes.
13 Again, loaded! The properties Sylvia was asking for? A condominium suite in Ortigas, an
apartment in Wack Wack, two Ayala lots in Alabang, a house in Wexford, San Francisco,
P100,000.00, $35,000.00, and monthly support for Susana.

Ratio:
(1) The relevant portion of the letter agreement reads as follows—
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned
and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:
xxx
As found by the trial court, on page two of the letter-agreement, the parties contemplated not only
to agree to a judicial separation of property, but likewise to continue with divorce
proceedings. Clearly, “termination of relations” did not just refer to property relations but
marital relations in its entirety.
Furthermore, while there are inherent benefits to a termination of conjugal property relationship
between spouses, in this case there was no consideration for Macaria to get involved if this case only dealt
with termination of conjugal property relationship. On the other hand, if the case involved termination of
marital relations entirely, Macaria had consideration to enter into the letter-agreement, i.e. “to secure
freedom for her son”, ensure that Sylvia pardoned Jose for adultery and concubinage, and finally to “buy
peace from Sylvia Lichauco for myself and for the whole family…for the peaceful and amicable termination
of marital relationship between my son and Sylvia.”
Finally, the letter-agreement also provided that “It is the stated objective of this agreement that said
divorce proceedings in the United States will continue.”
Since the letter-agreement was for the purpose of terminating marital relations, the Court
declared it null and void. As basis, the Court cited Article 1306 and Article 1409 of the Civil Code. 14 In
this case, the letter-agreement was contrary to law, i.e. Article 52 of the Civil Code, which
provides that “marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations.” The letteragreement was also contrary to Filipino morals and public policy.
Even if the letter-agreement referred only to the termination of property relations, the agreement was
nevertheless void because it contravened Article 221 of the Civil Code, which provides that certain
contracts shall be void: (a) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; and (b) Every
extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife.
(2) The trial court ordered the return of Macaria’s money because it found that she had been forced and
intimidated by Sylvia into signing the letter-agreement. The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that
Sylvia’s constant nagging and threats to file lawsuits did not constitute the kind of intimidation that could
vitiate consent. In the first place, it was not Sylvia’s constant nagging and threats that moved Macaria to
sign the contract—such conditions were but incidents of the consideration of the agreement, i.e. the
termination of marital relations.
Both Sylvia and Macaria acted in violation of law (i.e. Article 52 of the Civil Code). However,
the in pari delicto rule, which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and
leaves them where they are, did not apply in this case. Rather, what applied was the exception
to the rule provided in Article 1414 of the Civil Code:

14Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void and inexistent
from the beginning.
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.

When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by
one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been
caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest will thus be served,
allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property.
The letter-agreement was repudiated before the purpose (i.e. termination of marital relations) could be
accomplished. The Court ruled that to adhere to the in pari delicto rule in this case would be to put a
premium on circumvention of the laws. Justice would be served by allowing Macaria to be placed in the
position in which she was before the transaction was entered into.
Voting: Narvasa, Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.
052. Pugeda v. Trias
FABIAN PUGEDA, Pugeda-appellee, vs.RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her
husband Angel Sanchez, CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera, GABRIEL TRIAS,
minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem,
Rafael Trias, TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon
Portugal, defendants-appellants.
Date: March 31, 1962
Ponente: Labrador
Digested by: Mandee
The case in a nutshell: Maria Ferrer was married twice: first to Mariano Trias, then to Fabian Pugeda,
whom she was married to until her death. She had children with both husbands. After she died, Pugeda
sought the partition of certain properties which he claimed he and Ferrer had acquired during their
message using conjugal funds. He claimed that after Ferrer’s death, he and her children from both
marriages became co-owners of such properties, managing them in trust. He asked for ½ thereof as his
share. The Trias children denied his claim, questioning the existence of his marriage to Ferrer. The CFI ruled
against them. On appeal, the SC affirmed. The evidence submitted shows conclusively that Pugeda was in
fact married to Ferrer, said marriage subsisting until her death. Pugeda presented as his witnesses the
justice of the peace who officiated their wedding as well as others who testified that he and Ferrer lived as
husband and wife after the wedding. He also submitted the birth and baptismal certificates of his first child
with Ferrer, which named her and him as the parents. Lastly, a document entitled “Project of Partition”
signed by both the Trias and Pugeda children which referred to Ferrer’s “second marriage” to Pugeda. All
the evidence submitted was competent to prove the marriage. Generally, no proof other than a certificate
of record in the civil registrar shall be admitted to prove the existence of a marriage. But if such books
have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, the marriage may be
proved by evidence of any kind.
Facts:
1 The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias, are the
children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband, the deceased Mariano Trias, while the
defendants Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda are Maria’s children with her second husband, Fabian Pugeda.
2 Ferrer and Pugeda were married in January 1916.
3 Ferrer died on February 11, 1934. Sometime after, Pugeda filed an action against the Trias and Pugeda
children in the CFI of Cavite for the partition of certain properties, which he claimed he and Ferrer had
acquired during their marriage using conjugal funds, with ½ thereof going to him as his share.
a The properties included varying interests in 5 lots 15 in the San Francisco de Malabon estate in
General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn (camarin) of strong materials, a store
of strong materials, and sets of household furniture.
b Pugeda alleged that upon Ferrer’s death in 1934, he and the Trias and Pugeda children became
co-owners of the properties, with the children managing the properties in trust as co-owners.
4 The Trias children denied Pugeda’s claim to the properties, or that said properties had been
administered by them in trust as co-owners.

15 Interest in each lot: 71% in Lot No. 273, 82% in Lot No. 2650, 77% in Lot No. 2652, 77% in Lot No. 2080, 64% in Lot No. 2718, and
76% in Lot No. 2764.

a

5

6
7

8

By way of special and affirmative defense, they alleged that they had inherited the properties
from their deceased father (Mariano Trias) and mother, and had been in possession and full
enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly, and adversely
under a claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that Pugeda is estopped from
claiming or asserting any rights or participation in the said properties.
b They also denied, for lack of knowledge and belief, Pugeda’s claim that he was married to Ferrer
up to her death in 1934.
c They filed a counterclaim against Pugeda for the sum of Php40,000, this amount being what was
contributed by them in support of the candidacies of Pugeda when running for the office of
provincial governor of Cavite.
d They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and Php5,000 in cash
amounting in value to the total sum of Php50,000, and another counterclaim for Php100,000,
which is the value of 4 big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which Pugeda had
appropriated for his own use.
The Pugeda children joined in their father’s claim that the properties were joint properties of him and
the Trias children.
a They also alleged that the properties had gone to the management and control of the Trias
children, who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof.
b As cross-claim against the Trias children, they alleged that they are each entitled to 1/8 of the
properties in Pugeda’s complaint, as well as a share of 1/8 each in 2 more lots in the San
Francisco de Malabon estate, a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite, and 60 heads of cattle.
Pugeda denied the Trias children’s counterclaim.
The Trias children answered the Pugeda children’s cross-claim by denying the allegations contained in
the answer of the Pugeda children, and further alleged that the cross-claim is improper as the same
should be the subject of probate proceedings.
a They alleged that the Pugeda children estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any
further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
The CFI ruled against the Trias children, so they appealed to the SC.

Issue: Were Pugeda and Ferrer married? YES. (Note: the case discussed other issues, but I only included
the one relevant to the topic in the syllabus.)
Held: FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed, and the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division
of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified
in the sense that all of her properties be divided among her eight children at the rate of one-eight per
child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
Ratio:
1) The evidence submitted shows conclusively that Pugeda was in fact married to Ferrer, said marriage
subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the latter.
a. Pugeda and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that on the afternoon of January 5, 1916,
Pugeda and Ferrer went to the office of Ricafrente, who was then Justice of the Peace, to ask the
latter to marry them.
i. Accordingly, Ricafrente celebrated the marriage in the presence of 2 witnesses. After the
ceremony, Ricafrente asked the parties to sign 2 copies of a marriage contract, after
which he delivered 1 copy to Pugeda and Ferrer and another to the President of the
Sanitary Division, who was then the keeper of the records of the civil register.
ii. Pugeda and his witnesses explained that no celebration of the marriage was held in spite
of his and Ferrer’s prominence, because he was then busy campaigning for the office of
Member of the Provincial Board, while Ferrer was already pregnant.
b. The Trias children denied the existence of the marriage by introducing a photostatic copy of the
record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January 1916, which
showed no record of the alleged marriage.
i. However, this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace, that perhaps the
person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in the registry.
c. Pugeda also submitted the ff.:
i. He introduced other witnesses who testified that after getting married, he lived in
Ferrer’s house.

ii. He submitted evidence to show that his and Ferrer’s first child was baptized on August
26, 1917, with Ferrer’s sister-in-law acting as sponsor. The baptismal certificate stated
that the baptized child was the child of Pugeda and Ferrer.
iii. He submitted the birth certificate of his and Ferrer’s first child, which states that his
father was Pugeda and his mother was Ferrer.
d. The Trias children did not deny that after the marriage, Pugeda cohabited with Ferrer, publicly
and openly, as husband and wife, for 18 years (1916-1934).
e. A document entitled “Project of Partition,” signed by the Trias and Pugeda children, contains the
following significant statement or admission:
WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of
the said deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and
Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first
marriage with Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo and Virginia,
both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer, are the children of her second
marriage with Fabian Pugeda..
f.

The SC agreed with the CFI’s finding that the evidence submitted was competent to prove the
marriage.
i. Art. 53 of the Civil Code provides the general rule for proving the existence of a
marriage:
ii.
Art. 53. — As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof
other than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be
admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have
disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases
the marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind.
1. Failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does
not invalidate a marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof all requisites for its
validity were present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not
being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon)
2. Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The
person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an
eyewitness to the fact of marriage. (C.J.S.)

053. Pedro V. Vilar vs. Gaudencio V. Paraiso (by Pia Benosa)
March 14, 1955
Bautista-Angelo, J.
Short version: Paraiso was elected Mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, but his opponent Vilar contested this, since
Paraiso was an ecclesiastic prohibited from running for a seat by the Revised Administrative Code. The
Court agreed that Paraiso still held his position as a minister of the UCCP at the time of election, since he
did not register/record his resignation and its acceptance at the Bureau of Public Libraries.
Facts: Vilar and Paraiso ran against each other for the mayoralty seat of Rizal, Nueva Ecija in November
1951. Paraiso won by 41 votes. Vilar instituted a quo warranto case against Paraiso, alleging the latter’s
ineligibility to hold office for being a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, which is
prohibited by Sec. 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. Paraiso raised the defense that he had already
resigned sometime in August 1951, and that this was accepted by his church’s cabinet, and that in any
case, Vilar could not just take his place should he be found ineligible.
The trial court found Paraiso to be ineligible for being an ecclesiastic, but Vilar was not proclaimed as the
mayor.

Issue: Was Paraiso an ecclesiastic at the time of the elections, and as such ineligible for the mayoralty
seat?
Ruling: Paraiso was considered not to have resigned as a minister at the time of the elections. The Court
believed that his claim of resignation was a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition against
ecclesiastics running for office, since such resignation was not done in due form. However, Vilar cannot just
be proclaimed the new mayor, simply because he did not obtain the plurality of votes.
Reasoning: The Court gave much weight to Vilar’s evidence, that: Paraiso was ordained as minister of the
Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the
Bureau of Public Libraries; that from 1944-50 he was the minister of his town of Rizal, periodically renewing
his license to solemnize marriages, as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that
he transferred to the UCCP in 1950 and in April 1951 he applied for and was issued a new license to
solemnize new marriages (til 1952) under the new church. Vilar faulted Paraiso for not cancelling the same
license. He claimed that Paraiso was still publicly known as a UCCP minister, and that the latter failed to
attach to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as a minister.
The Court agreed with Vilar. Indeed, if Paraiso really and sincerely intended to resign, he should have done
so in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.
The purpose of registration is two-fold:
- to inform the public of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions
- to inform the public informed of any change in the minister’s religious status.
Arts. 92-96 of the NCC make the registration requirement mandatory and especially important with respect
to the authority of a solemnizing officer to solemnize a marriage. Paraiso cannot just claim that it should
have been his church which should have done the registration for him, since the NCC holds the interested
party responsible for this task. In light of his failure to register, the Court was not inclined to give much
weight to the documents he presented, purporting to show his resignation and its acceptance.
The Court also viewed the minutes of the meeting, as recorded by one Jose Agpalo, as having been
prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and solemnity that should characterize the religious
activities of a well established religious order. Ultimately, it seemed as if the resignation was only really
effected at a later date to cure the defect in Paraiso’s candidacy.

ARANES v. OCCIANO
MERCEDITA ARANAS v. JUDGE SALVADOR OCCIANO
April 11, 2002
Puno, J.
SV: Aranes and Orobia were married without a valid marriage license as they had promised the judge to
submit the license after the ceremony. Judge Occiano was reprimanded for his acts of solemnizing a
marriage outside of his territory and for solemnizing a marriage without a valid marriage license. The
marriage of Aranes and Orobia is therefore void.
Facts:Mercedita Aranes married Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000. When the later passed away,
Mercedita was unable deprived of receiving the pension of Orobia and her right to inherit were not
recognized as it turned out that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license.
Merceditas filed a case against the solemnizing Judge Occiano for gross ignorance of the law. She prays
that sanctions be imposed against the judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
allegedly caused her so much hardship, embarrassment and sufferings.
On comment to the charges, the Judge explained:
He was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties
on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he
acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions
for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if

he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke.
After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties
that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge
that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite
the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the
petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
Mercedita later filed an affidavit of desistance, explaining that the judge only solemnized their marriage
because of her prodding and reassurances, and that she had filed the case out of rage.
Records of the case show that the couple had filed for a marriage license but failed to claim it. It also
appears that the Civil Registrar General issued a certification that they had no record of the marriage of
the couple.
Issues: WON the judge should be reprimanded for his act of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. (Yes)
Held: Judge is guilty. Fined P5,000.
Ratio: Judges are given the authority to solemnize marriages confined to their territorial jurisdiction, per
BP129.
Navarro vs. Domagtoy – Judge of MTC Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte solemnized a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa. He was suspended for 6 months for solemnizing a marriage outside of his jurisdiction
which constitutes ignorance of the law.Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. In this
case, Judge Occiano was limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage in Nabua, Camarines Sur is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
A Marriage License is a requisite to a valid marriage.
People vs. Lara - a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority
to solemnize a marriage.
Judge Occiano cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance. A withdrawal of the complain does
not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.

Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez (2001)
C.J. Davide
By P.R. Manalo
Short Version: Administrative case. Petitioner Herminia Borja-Manzano charged respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez with gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judge solemnized the marriage of petitioner’s
husband to another woman who was also married to another man. Petitioner contended that the marriage
was bigamous. Respondent judge countered that the marriage was solemnized in accordance with article
34 of the Family Code (exempting couples who have lived together for at least 5 years as husband and
wife without impediment to marry each other from obtaining a marriage license) because petitioner’s
husband and his new wife had been living together for 7 years. HELD—Article 34 only exempts certain
persons from obtaining a marriage license, and not from other requirements such as capacity to marry.
Petitioner’s husband and his new wife do not have capacity to marry each other. Respondent judge is
grossly ignorant of the law.
Facts: Petitioner Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano (married May 21,
1966). Much later, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge Sanchez (March 22, 1993). According to petitioner, when respondent judge solemnized the marriage,
he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated
that both contracting parties were “separated.”
Respondent judge claimed that he did not know that David Manzano was legally married. According to him,
all that he knew was that David and Luzviminda had been living together as husband and wife for 7 years
already without the benefit of marriage (per their joint affidavit).

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and be fined with 2,000 pesos.
Then respondent judge filed a manifestation for the dismissal of the complaint. His manifestation was
accompanied by the affidavits of David and Luzviminda stating that they were previously married, but that
since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families
and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. According to respondent judge, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in accordance with art. 34, FC on the basis of the said affidavits.
Issue: Whether on the basis of art. 34, FC, the parties concerned (David and Luzviminda, who have legal
impediment to marry each other) may be married.
Held: No, because not all of the requirements for the application of art. 34 are present in this case.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply (art. 36), the following requisites
must concur: (1) the man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage; (2) the parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; (3) the
parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; (4) the parties must execute an affidavit
stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry
each other]; and (5) the solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Note here that in their affidavits, David and Luzviminda admitted that they had prior existing marriages
and in their marriage contract, it was indicated that they were both “separated.” Respondent Judge knew
or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage.
The fact that David and Luzviminda had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at
bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not
serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.
The recommendation of the OCA is adopted and modified. Penalty increased to 20,000 pesos.

056. NINAL V. BADAYOG
March 14, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J. (digest by Oyie Javelosa)
Short version: Petitioners sought to have the second marriage of their deceased father declared null and
void on account of the absence of a valid marriage license. Respondent second-wife argued that they were
exempt from such requirement for having cohabited as husband and wife for five years prior to their

marriage. Court ruled that they were not exempt from the requirement because the deceased still had a
subsisting marriage during such period.
Facts:
- Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Herein petitioners are their five (5) children.
- Pepito shot Teodulfa, leading to her death on April 24, 1985.
- 1 year and 8 months later, on Decemeber 1986, Pepito married respondent Norma Baldayog.
o The marriage was without a marriage license.
o Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from the marriage license requirement.
- On February 1997, Pepito died.
- Petitioners (children from the first marriage) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between Pepito and Norma (the second marriage)
o The case was filed on the assumption that the validity of the marriage would affect their
successional rights.
o Norma: MTD, on the ground that petitioners re not among the persons who could file an action
for annulment of marriage under FC, Art. 47
- RTC: petition dismissed. It ruled that petitioners should have filed the action before Pepito’s death,
applying by analogy FC, Art. 47 (rules on who may file actions for the annulment of voidable
marriages).
- Hence, this petition.
Issues: WoN the nature of Pepito and Norma’s cohabitation warrants an exemption from the marriage
license requirement;
Ruling: NO. They are not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Reasoning:
- General rule: Under the Civil Code (which is the applicable law for both marriages), a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.
o This requirement is a demonstration of the State’s involvement in every marriage.
o It allows the public to be notified that two persons are about to be married, allowing anyone
who has knowledge of any impediment to the union to report it to the Local Civil Registrar.
- Exception: One of the exceptions to this requirement is in the case of a marriage between a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five (5) years before the marriage.
o Rationale: avoid exposing the parties to humiliation and shame that comes with the publishing
of their names as applicants for a marriage license, thereby exposing their cohabitation outside
a valid marriage. Otherwise, many would be discouraged from legitimizing their status.
o It requires:
 Cohabitation as “husband and wife,” where the only missing factor is marriage;
 Cohabitation of at least 5 years immediately before the marriage;
 Exclusivity – no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years; and
 Continuity – cohabitation that is unbroken
- In this case, Pepito and Norma have not cohabited as husband and wife for a period of 5 years before
the marriage and are therefore not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
o At the time of their marriage, only twenty (20) months have elapsed since the death of Teodulfa
(first wife). Pepito thus had a subsisting marriage at the time he started cohabiting with Norma,
and such cohabitation was not in the nature of a perfect union which only lacked marriage.
- For lack of a valid marriage license, the marriage between Pepito and Norma is VOID AB INITIO.
Sub-issue: WoN petitioners have standing to file a petition to declare Pepito’s marriage void after his
death.
Sub-ruling/reasoning: YES
- Petitioners have the personality to declare the marriage void even after Pepito’s death.
- The CFI erred in applying FC, Art. 47 by analogy because annulment (which is the subject matter of
said provision) is not similar to the declaration of nullity of void marriages.
o Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party; an action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible. Being void ab initio, they are considered as never to have taken place,
are not subject to ratification, and have no legal effects (except those declared by law

-

concerning the properties of alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership, and their effect on
children born to void marriages.)
o Void marriages may be assailed by any proper interested party.
Further, the Court ruled that other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a void marriage an absolute nullity.
o Other purposes: heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, criminal cases.

058. DOMINGA FIEL, plaintiff and appellee, v. JULIO BANAWA, ET AL., defendants and
appellants
March 26, 1979
Appeal from a judgment of the CFi
Gutierrez, H.E., J.
This is a CA Case
Digest by Dawn Chua
Short Version: Natalio, a widower with no children cohabited with Fiel, who was legally married to another.
When Natalio died, Fiel signed a partition agreement where she would get 1/3 of their common properties,
while Natalio’s nephews and brothers would get 2/3. She comes to court requesting the annulment of the
partition agreement. The Court ruled that the property relations governing such relationships as that of Fiel
and Natalio are those of co-ownership. Also, donations made by Natalio to Fiel are void.
Facts:
- Fiel lived in a common law relationship with Natalio Banawa for 25 years. Natalio was a widower with
no children when he started cohabiting with Fiel, while Fiel was still legally married to another with one
child.
- During the course of their cohabitation, they made the following property-related transactions:
o They set up a sari-sari store
o They acquired several properties
o Natalio donated some lots to Fiel
- When Natalio died (victim of a robbery), Fiel signed a partition agreement of their common properties
offered by Natalio’s nephew. 1/3 of the properties was to go to Fiel, while 2/3 would go to Natalio’s
brothers and nephews.
- She later on filed a claim for the annulment of a partition of the properties allegedly owned in common
by them, on the ground that she was not in the right state of mind when she signed the partition
agreement.
- The lower court ordered the division of the properties owned in common by Natalio and Fiel.
Issues:
1 What is the nature of the property relations between a childless widower and his common-law wife who
is legally married to another?
2 Are the donations made by Natalio to Fiel valid?
Reasoning:
1 Co-ownership
- Philippine law does not recognize “common law marriages” but it cannot be denied that there are such
relationships where a man and a woman represent themselves to be husband and wife and are known
to be so within the community. These are termed as common-law relationships, erroneous as the use of
the term may be.
- The applicable provision in the Civil Code to this kind of relationship is Art. 144, which states:
o Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. (n)
- The Court made the pronouncement in this case that there is no definite and unequivocal rule that this
article applies only to common-law relationships where there is no impediment to a valid marriage.
(Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. v. Teodoro)
- The special circumstances in this case which calls for the application of Art.144 is that Natalio was a
widower with no children when he started to accumulate the properties with Fiel. There was no legal

2
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conjugal partnership and no children with whom his share of the earnings would accrue. The
defendants in this case are only brothers and nephews.
There is also no dispute that the properties were the product of the efforts of both Natalio and Fiel.
Based on legal and equitable considerations, the rules provided in Art. 144 are applicable.
Fiel should thus receive ½ of the fruits and earnings of the common properties.
NO. The properties should be included in the properties owned in common by Natalio and Fiel because
he could not validly make a donation to her while they were living together.
Art. 780 of the Civil Code expressly prohibits donations made between parties guilty of adultery or
concubinage. There need not be a final conviction on this matter, but rather only a preponderance of
evidence to prove its existence.
Furthermore, following the ruling in Buenaventura v. Bautista and Matabuena v. Cervantes, the same
prohibitions governing donations between spouses should also govern those in common-law
relationships for reasons of public policy.

059. PEOPLE v. ARTURO MENDOZA
September 28, 1954
Aquino, J.
Short version: Mendoza married Jovita. While this marriage was subsisting, he married Olga. Jovita died
and Arturo married another woman, Carmencita. Arturo was sued for bigamy for the third marriage. SC
acquitted Arturo based on his defense that since his 1st marriage had already been extinguished by
Jovita’s death and the 2nd marriage was void for being contracted while the 2st was subsisting, the 3 rd is
not bigamous.
FACTS: On August 5, 1936- Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina.
On May 14, 1941- during the subsistence of the 1st marriage, he married to Olga Lema in Manila.
Jovita de Asis died. Subsequently, on August 19, 1949, he married another Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba.
This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution and conviction for bigamy.
Mendoza contends that he should be acquitted since his 2 nd marriage with Olga is null and void, having
been contracted during his 1st marriage, and the 3rd marriage cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy
because it took place after the death of the 1 st wife. The SolGen argues that there has to be a previous
judicial annulment of the 2nd marriage as bigamous to be free from criminal prosecution.
Issue: WON a judicial decree is needed to consider the 2nd marriage void- NO.
Held: it is admitted that the 2nd marriage with Olga was during the 1 st marriage with Jovita. Section 29 of
the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time of the 2nd marriage in 1941, provides:
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee
being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until
declared null and void by a competent court.
This plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annulable marriages. There is no pretense that the 2nd marriage was contracted in the belief that
the 1st spouse, has been absent or considered as dead, so as to render it valid until declared null and void
by a competent court (b).
DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with

costs de officio so ordered.

060. People v. Aragon
February 28, 1958
Labrador, J.
Short Version:Aragon contracted marriage 3 times. He married Gorrea, then married Faicol. Gorrea then
died. He then married Maglasang after Gorrea’s death. He was thus convicted of bigamy.
The SC held that there was no bigamy because there was bigamy. Because the 2 nd marriage was entered
into while the 1st marriage was subsisting, it was bigamous and thus void ab initio. As Gorrea had already
died by the time the 3rd marriage was celebrated, it was valid.
Facts: Proceso Aragon contracted marriage on September 28, 1925, under the name Proceso Rosima with
Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While that marriage was subsisting, he
contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934 in the Sta. Teresita Church of Iloilo
City. Aragon and Faicol then established residence in Iloilo. Aragon, as a traveling salesman, shuttled back
and forth between Iloilo and Cebu, and between Faicol and Gorrea, respectively.
Gorrea died in 1939, leading Aragon to bring Faicol to Cebu. However, Aragon and Faicol did not live a
happy marital life, with Maria suffering physical maltreatment at Proceso’s hands. When Faicol was sent to
Iloilo to have her eyes treated in 1953, Aragon took the chance to marry Jesusa Maglasang.
CFI convicted Aragon of bigamy, holding that Aragon could not contract marriage with Maglasang without
the dissolution of his marriage to Faicol. Hence this appeal.
Issues: WON Aragon’s marriage to Maglasang was bigamous, and therefore void ab initio. (No.)
Ratio:A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and
void from its performance. Thus, the second marriage to Faicol, entered into while Gorrea was still alive,
was void from the beginning. Penal laws must be construed in favor of the accused.
Thus, the institution of the complaint by Faicol, the second wife, whose marriage was not renewed
upon death of the first wife, cannot prosper. The last marriage was a valid one.
Judgment Reversed. Aragon acquitted.
Reyes, A.J, dissenting
WTH guys. It is not for the spouses to judge whether a marriage is void or not. And ruling like the majority
did would frustrate the legislative intent of the law punishing bigamy.
061. TOLENTINO vs. PARAS
Serafia Tolentino vs. Ho. Edgardo Paras, Maria Clemente and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan
May 30, 1983
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS: Amado Toelntino married Maria Clemente at Paombong, Bulacan on November 1, 1948 while his
marriage with Serafia Tolentino celebrated on July 31, 1943 was still subsisting.
Serafia charged Amado with Bigamy in CFI Bulacan which, upon Amado’s plea of guilty, sentenced him to
suffer the corresponding penalty.
After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with Maria Clemente
until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry ‘Name of Surviving Spouse – Maria
Clemente.”
Serafia sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in Amado’s death certificate from Maria
Clemente to Serafia Tolentino. Her petition for correction of entry was dismissed for lack of the proper
requisites under the law.
Serafia filed a case against Maria Clemente and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her
ddeclaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of Amado’s death certificate. CFI dismissed

the case stating that (1) correction of the entry in the office of the local civil registrar is not the proper
remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship, (2) court has not acquired proper jurisdiction
because no publication was made, (3) the subject matter of the case has been aptly discussed in the
earlier special proceedings for correction of entry which was already dismissed for lack of proper requisites
under the law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Serafia’s complaint against Maria Clemente in CFI Bulacan is the proper remedy (YES)
2. Whether Serafia is the lawful surviving spouse of Amado (YES)
REASONING
1. Although Serafia’s ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful
surviving spouse of Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death
certificate. The suit is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere
summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it.
Maria Clemente, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the
petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication
required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for
no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.
2. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted of Bigamy, that sentence furnished the
necessary proof of the marital status of Serafia and Amado. There is no better proof of the marriage
than Amado’s admission of the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted
with Maria Clemente during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no
force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. It can be
safely concluded then, without need of further proof nor remand to CFI, that Maria Clemente is not the
surviving spouse of Amado, but Serafia. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local
Civil Registrar may be validly made.
DISPOSITIVE Serafia is declared as Amado’s surviving spouse. Let the correction be made in the latter’s
death certificate.
062. LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner vs.THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents| 19 August
1986| J. Paras
Facts: Karl Wiegel and Lilia Wiegel were married on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian
Church Branch in Makati.
An action was filed before the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Caloocan City wherein Karl
Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion, celebrated on 25 June 1972 at Our Lady of Lourded Church in QC.
While admitting the existence of the said prior subsisting marriage, Lilia claimed that the same was null
and void since the couple was allegedly forced to enter the marriage.
Sempio-Diy, as presiding judge, ruled against the presentation of evidence by Lilia because the existence
of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage were already agreed upon in the pre-trial.
Issue: Assuming that the first marriage was entered into wherein the consent of the parties was obtained
through force, was said prior marriage void or merely voidable?
Ruling: There is no need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85,
Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when
she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to
respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court

a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage
of Lilia and Karl would be regarded VOID under the law.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained
of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
063. DONATO vs LUNA (CFI Judge)
April 15, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:
Mica Maurinne M. Adao
SUMMARY: In Jan 1979, Abayan (2nd wife) filed a bigamy case against Donato. In Sept 1979, she also
filed a case for annulment on the ground of deceit (concealment of 1st marriage). Donato filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of his
second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or
decided before the criminal case can proceed. CFI Judge Luna denied the motion. SC affirmed. It is not a
prejudicial question.
Landicho vs. Relova : What can possibly be a prejudicial question in such case is when the defendant in the
bigamy is the one who files the annulment of the second marriage on the ground of duress, force or
intimidation. (own words)
FACTS: On January 23, 1979, Paz B. Abayan filed a complaint for bigamy against Leonilo C. Donato with
the CFI of Manila.
On September 28, 1979, before the Donato's arraignment, Abayan filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted
on September 26, 1978. It was based on the ground that Abayan consented to entering into the marriage,
which was Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that he was already married to a
certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since
it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence
were employed by Abayan to obtain his consent to the marriage. (However, it was noted that the marriage
license requirement was dispensed with in their case pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code for living
together as husband and wife for a period of 5 yrs before their marriage)
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the criminal case, Donato filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of said case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed
by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the
criminal case can proceed. CFI Judge Luna denied said motion. MR was likewise denied. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before CFI of Manila should be suspended in
view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on
the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
RULING: NO
RATIO: A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually comes
into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in a criminal case.

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the ruling
upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was Donato's second wife, Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment
of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Landicho vs. Relova : The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the
accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown
that the petitioner's consent to such (second) marriage must be the one that was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. If it pertains to the
first marriage, judicial declaration of annulment is necessary for it to be a defense in a case for bigamy.
Donato has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the
use of threats, force and intimidation.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to
the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was
obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent
marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the
criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had
been living with Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belied.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
064. Terre v. Terre
A.M. No. 2349/3 July 1992/EN BANC
Dorothy B. Terre – complainant
Atty. Jordan Terre – respondent
Per Curiam, Digest by Pip
Short Version: Jordan married Dorothy after he convinced her that her first marriage to her first cousin
was null and void ab initio, and that a judicial declaration of nullity was unnecessary. Jordan then bolted
while Dorothy was pregnant with his child and married another woman, this time because he believed that
his marriage to Dorothy was void ab initio because she was already married when they got hitched. The
Court disbarred Jordan, finding his character to be deeply flawed and rendering him unfit to be a member
of the Bar. The Court also reiterated the prevailing doctrine that that for purposes of determining whether
a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential.
Facts: In 1981, Dorothy charged Jordan with “grossly immoral conduct” consisting of a second marriage
and living with another woman while his marriage to Dorothy was still subsisting. The Court required Jordan
to answer the complaint, but Jordan successfully evaded five attempts to serve him a copy of the Court’s
Resolution and the complaint by moving from place to place. This dragged on for over three years, after
which the Court resolved to suspend Jordan from the practice of law until after he appeared and filed his
answer.
Jordan finally filed his answer in 1985 and averred that he had contracted marriage with Dorothy in
June 1977 upon her representation that she was single. Sometime after, Jordan learned that Dorothy had
already married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla in 1968. When confronted, Dorothy drove Jordan out of
their conjugal residence and mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito, as well as the fact
that the child she was carrying (i.e. Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla. Since Jordan believed in good

faith that his marriage to Dorothy was null and void ab initio, he married Helina Malicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan.
In Dorothy’s reply, she denied that Jason was the child of Merlito and insisted he was Jordan’s, as
evidenced by his birth certificate and physical resemblance to Jordan. Although she had given birth to
Jason at the PAFGH as a registered dependent of Merlito, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to
avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus, which happened to be in a difficult breach position. She claimed
that at this point she had already been abandoned by Jordan and was penniless.
The complaint was referred to the OSG for investigation, but in the hearing in July 1986 only Dorothy
appeared and presented her evidence ex parte. In the second hearing a month later, where clarificatory
questions were put to Dorothy, Jordan still did not appear. A third hearing was set in October 1986 and
Jordan was notified that if he did not present his evidence the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution. When Jordan still did not appear, the investigating solicitor submitted the case for resolution.
Dorothy went on to submit her memorandum.
The OSG reported that when Dorothy and Jordan first met she was married to Merlito but Jordan was
aware of her marital status and still courted her. When they both moved to Manila to pursue their
education, Jordan persisted in courting her and explained that her marriage to Merlito was void ab initio
since she and Merlito were first cousins. Convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice
from her mother and former in-laws, she agreed to marry Jordan. Jordan wrote her down as “single” in the
marriage license despite her objection, insisting that since her marriage was void ab initio there was no
need to get a court to declare it as such. After four years or so, Jordan simply disappeared and it was only
later that Dorothy found out he had married again. She filed a cases for abandonment of minor, bigamy,
and this administrative case.
Issue: Was it necessary to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity for both Dorothy’s marriage to Merlito and
Jordan’s marriage to Dorothy? YES.
Ruling: Jordan DISBARRED.
Ratio: First the Court noted the established facts: (1) Dorothy and Jordan married in 1977; (2) Jordan
married Helina in 1981; and (3) When Jordan married Helina, his marriage to Dorothy was still subsisting
because no judicial declaration of nullity was obtained in relation to his first marriage.
The Court found Jordan’s defense—that he believed in good faith that his marriage to Dorothy was void
ab initio and that no judicial declaration of nullity was necessary—to be spurious. He did not even rebut the
evidence which underscored his bad faith. The defense was the same argument he used to inveigle
Dorothy into believing her prior marriage to Merlito was incestuous and void ab initio, and that she was
free to contract a second marriage to Jordan without need of any action in court.
Jordan, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that his argument ran counter to prevailing case
law, which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. Even if the Court believed that Jordan was simply mistaken and in good faith, using his own
argument—that Dorothy’s first marriage was void ab initio—then his marriage to Dorothy was valid and his
second marriage was bigamous and criminal in character.
The Court concluded from Jordan’s actions that his moral character was deeply flawed. He convinced
Dorothy that she could marry him, finished law school in part due to Dorothy’s support, then left her
pregnant and penniless, without the wherewithal for delivering his child safely in a hospital. He displayed
“not only his unfitness to remain a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose
and responsibility of his gender, because marriage is a basic social institution.” His actions constituted
“grossly immoral conduct” under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording sufficient basis for
his disbarment.
Voting: C.J. Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
065. Jones v. Hortiguela
Date: March 6, 1937

Ponente: Concepcion
Digested by: Mandee
The case in a nutshell: In 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur Jones. On January 10, 1918, Arthur
went abroad and was never heard from again. In 1919, proceedings were instituted to have Arthur
judicially declared an absentee. On October 25, 1919, the CFI issued an order declaring Arthur an
absentee, provided that said judicial declaration would not take effect until 6 months after its publication.
Publication was made, and on April 23, 1921, the CFI issued another order for the taking effect of the
declaration of absence. On May 6, 1927, Marciana married Felix Hortiguela. Marciana died intestate, and
Felix was appointed judicial administrator of her estate. He and Angelita Jones, Marciana’s daughter from
her first marriage to Arthur, were declared Marciana’s only heirs. But Angelita alleged that she was
Marciana’s only heir, as there had never been a valid marriage between her mother and Felix. The CFI
ruled in Felix’s favor. The SC affirmed. The absence of Arthur should be counted from January 10, 1918 (the
date on which the last news concerning him was received). From said date to May 6, 1927 (the date of the
celebration of Marciana’s marriage to Felix), more than 9 years elapsed. According to section 334, No. 24,
of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in 7 years is presumed to be dead. Said marriage
is, therefore, valid and lawful. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The law (section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68)
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage; the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living; and the former spouse
is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Facts:
1) In December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban Catholic church of San
Nicolas, Province of Cebu.
2) On January 10, 1918, Arthur secured a passport to go abroad, and was never heard from again.
3) In October 1919, at Marciana’s instance, proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Maasin, Leyte, to
have Arthur judicially declared an absentee.
4) On October 25, 1919, the CFI issued an order declaring Arthur an absentee from the Philippine Islands
pursuant to the provisions of Article 186 of the (old) Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial
declaration of absence would not take effect until 6 months after its publication in the Official Gazette
and in the newspaper El Ideal.
5) The court order was published in the Official Gazette in December 1919, and January, February, March,
April, May, and June, 1920.
6) On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence,
publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in El Ideal.
7) On May 6, 1927, Marciana married Felix Hortiguela before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte,
and they signed the certificate of marriage.
8) Escaño died intestate. Felix was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate.
9) In an order, Felix and Angelita Jones, Marciana’s daughter by her first marriage, were declared
Marciana’s only heirs.
10) Felix, as administrator, filed a motion with the conformity of Angelita’s guardian (she was a minor),
praying that his fees, as such, be fixed at Php10,000. The court granted the motion.
11) Later, Felix, administrator, presented an inventory of the properties left by Marciana, a final account of
his administration, and a project of partition of the intestate estate, wherein he adjudicated to himself a
part of the estate as payment for his share of the conjugal properties and his usufructuary right as
widower, and the remaining part to Angelita.
12) The project of partition and final account were approved, and the properties were turned over to the
respective grantees by virtue thereof.
13) Later, Angelita, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion in the CFI of Cebu, alleging that she
was Marciana’s only heir, as there had never been a valid marriage between her mother and Felix. Had
such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void.
a. Even granting that the marriage were valid, she argued that Felix was still not entitled to a
share in usufruct of 1/3 of the inheritance, because of many errors and inaccuracies in the
intestate proceedings which impaired her rights.
i. She had been a minor during the intestate proceedings, and during the hearing she had
not been assisted by counsel but was instead represented by Felix’s attorney.
ii. The fee of Php10,000 charged by Felix as administrator was highly unreasonable and
unconscionable.
b. She prayed that:

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.

Proceedings be reopened;
Her husband be appointed special administrator without bond;
Marciana’s alleged marriage to Felix be declared null and void;
The partition of the properties made by Felix be declared null and void;
She be declared the only universal heir of Felix;
In case there was a valid marriage between Felix and Marciana, Felix be declared not
entitled to the widower’s usufruct;
vii. The errors in the administrator's account be corrected;
viii. Felix be granted a remuneration of only Php4 a day; and
ix. New partition of the properties be made.
14) The CFI ruled against Angelita.
a. It denied her the motion to appoint a new administrator and to set aside the order declaring the
heirs of Marciana.
b. It held it unwarranted to declare that the properties of the intestate estate are paraphernal
properties of Marciana, but reserving to the parties the right to discuss which of said properties
are paraphernal and which are conjugal.
c. It set aside the orders granting to Felix administrator’s fees in the sum of Php10,000, and
approving the project of partition and the final account.
d. It ordered the presentation of another project of partition and final account.
Issue: Was Felix’s marriage to Marciana valid and lawful? YES. (Note: other issues were discussed but only
the one relevant to the topic in the syllabus was included)
Held: For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so
far as it set aside the order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June
26, 1933, approving the final account and the project of portion, and in so far as said order of March 14,
1935, required the presentation of a new project of partition; denied the appointment of Angelita Jones
husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932, relative to declaration of heirs; and holds it
unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the properties of this intestate estate are paraphernal
properties of the deceased Marciana Escaño reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are
paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. So ordered.
Ratio:
1) Felix’s marriage to Marciana was valid and lawful.
a. The absence of Arthur, Marciana’s first husband, should be counted from January 10, 1918 (the
date on which the last news concerning him was received). From said date to May 6, 1927 (the
date of the celebration of Marciana’s marriage to Felix), more than 9 years elapsed. Said
marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
i. According to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from
in 7 years is presumed to be dead.
ii. Angelita contended that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been
made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921 (after publication
in the Official Gazette and El Ideal). From the latter date to May 6, 1927, only 6 years and
14 days elapsed. Thus, in accordance with Section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders,
No. 68, Marciana’s marriage to Felix is null and void. But the SC disagreed.
iii. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires that:
1. The former spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage;
2. The spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living;
3. The former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2,
General orders, No. 68).
iv. The absence of Arthur should be counted from January 10, 1918. From said date to May
6, 1927, more than 9 years elapsed. Thus, the marriage is valid.
b. The failure to record Felix and Marciana’s marriage in the marriage register of the municipality
of Malitbog did not affect the efficacy and validity thereof.

i. For some unknown reason NOT attributable to the fault or negligence of Felix or
Marciana, their marriage did not appear recorded in the marriage register of the
municipality of Malitbog.
ii. Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides that the person solemnizing
the marriage must transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, and
failure to transmit such certificate “shall be fined not less than twenty-five and not more
than fifty dollars.” But the provision does not say that failure to transmit such certificate
to the municipal secretary annuls the marriage.
iii. Failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not
invalidate a marriage, as long as it appears that in the celebration thereof all requisites
for its validity were present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not
being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon)
c. Marciana believed Arthur to be dead when she contracted her second marriage. Angelita herself
was of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married Felix,
treated Felix as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her mother.
She certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead.
066. In Re Szatraw (by Pia Benosa)
Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw. CONSUELO SORS, petitioner-appellant.
August 31, 1948
Padilla, J.
***OG citation is wrong. This case was decided by the SC.
Short version: Consuelo’s Polish husband left the conjugal abode with their child, never to return again.
Seven years later, Consuelo filed a case for declaration of her husband’s death. The Court disallowed the
action for not being invoked in relation to another case that requires a determination of a person’s death. It
emphasized that the 7-year presumption is already established by law, and need not be confirmed in a
judicial declaration.
Facts: Consuelo married Nicolai, a Polish citizen, in Manila, in November 1936. Sometime in 1940, Nicolai
left the house with their son, Alexis, claiming that he was calling on some friends, but they never returned.
She later learned from his friends that Nicolai had departed for Shanghai with Alexis, but other Polish
citizens who had just returned from Shanghai told Consuelo that the two had not been seen there.
Consuelo filed the petition seven years after their disappearance, praying that her husband be declared
dead and her parental authority over Alexis be preserved should he be later found alive.
The trial court dismissed the action since it is not for the settlement of the absentee’s estate, nor does the
rule of evidence on presumption of death create a right upon which a judicial decree may be predicated.
Issue: Can Consuelo pursue this case independent of an action that requires the final determination of
Nicolai’s death? (The court thus considered Consuelo’s action as one of a declaration of presumptive
death, since she based her right of action on the rule of evidence on the presumption of death based on a
7-year absence.)
Ruling: The proceeding for declaration of presumptive death is superfluous. The procedure cannot be
invoked unless in relation to another case requiring the settlement of the matter of a person’s death.
Reasoning: The rule of evidence on presumption of death may arise and be invoked and made in a case,
either in an action or a special proceeding, which is tried by competent authority. But this cannot be
invoked independently of such an action/special proceeding. Here there is no right to be enforced nor a
prayer for final determination of a right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact. Consuelo
does not even ask the court to declare Nicolai dead, but just to presume him dead. Any such declaration
would not improve her situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only,
and is still disputable.
A case is necessary for the court must decide finally a controversy, or determine finally some rights or
status, or establish finally a particular fact. After such a decision, the matter will be considered res
judicata. It is for this reason that a judicial declaration of presumptive death, because of having been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot ever

reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death will be needed and have to be made in
another proceeding. Thus a proceeding for declaration of presumptive death is superfluous.
The Court emphasized that the law protects against actions like these because it could be a means of
circumventing the laws on marriage. The married couple could simply collude and later remarry. What
cannot be obtained directly under the provisions of the Divorce Law cannot be indirectly secured under the
Rules of Court!

067. REPUBLIC v. CA & MOLINA
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL MOLINA
February 13, 1997
Panganiban, J.
SV: Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married. However, Roridel filed for nullity of marriage claiming that
Reynaldo was psychologically incapacitated. Court ruled that Reynaldo was not psychologically
incapacitated but was not suffering psychological defects which gave him a difficulty in the performance of
his marital obligations. This thus not warrant an annulment of marriage.
Facts: Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila.
Andre Molina was born thereafter. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility” as a husband and a father as he spent more time with his friends and squandered his
money. He depended on his parents for finances. He was relieved of his job leaving Roridel as the sole
breadwinner of the family. Their relationship was estranged soon after and Roridel left her job and went to
live with her parents in Baguio. Reynaldo left Roridel and their son and had since then abandoned them.
Reynaldo in his answer alleged that Roridel had strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage, Roridel refused to perform her marital duties such as cooking meals, and
Roridel’s failure to run the household and handle their finances was the cause of their broken relationship.
Evidence of Roridel submitted in trial were her own testimony, that of her friends, as well as that of a social
worker, a psychiatrist.
RTC declared the marriage void. CA denied the appeal.
Issue: WON Reynaldo was suffering from psychological incapacity rendering their marriage void (No)
Held: Petition granted.
Ratio:Reynaldo was not psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
Santos v. CA – psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental incapacity. The
intendment of the law was to confine the meaning to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence and c)
incurability.
In this case, there in no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is incapacity. It
appears to be more of a difficulty if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable difference and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
The case fails all three tests. There was no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be held in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
Root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be psychological, not physical.

Such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
The manifestations of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment or prior.
Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
Such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code
Decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our
law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state

068. CHOA v. CHOA
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
DATE: Nov. 26, 2002
SHORT VERSION
Facts: Alfonso filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latter’s
psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him
behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
He also testified that Leni was immature, carefree, and lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.
He presented Dr. Gauzon, who testified that Alfonso and Leni had incompatible personalities.
Held: As to the cases filed against Alfonso, the Court said that it is the height of absurdity and inequity to
condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because Leni filed
cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of
the cases against him.
Alfonso’s testimony basically complains about three aspects of petitioner’s personality; namely, her
alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an “intention of procreative
sexuality.” None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes “psychological incapacity.”
Dr. Gauzon on the other hand utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
FACTS: Leni (Petitioner) and Alfonso (respondent) were married on March 15, 1981. They had 2 kids,
Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.
On October 27, 1993, Alfonso filed before RTC Negros Occidental a Complaint for the annulment of his
marriage. Afterwards he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
his wife’s alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he
submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits. Instead of offering any objection to it, Leni filed a Motion to Dismiss
(Demurrer to Evidence). The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. Leni elevated the case to the
CA via Petition for Certiorari.
CA - The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if
an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom.
ISSUES AND RATIO:
1. WON certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence. YES

In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, it was declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due
time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
But, the exception to this rule is when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of
an interlocutory order.
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.
2. WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Leni’s Demurrer to
Evidence. YES  WON the evidence against Leni is sufficient to support a finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage. NO
a. WON the filing of charges against Alfonso is proof of Leni’s psychological incapacity. NO
Alfonso claims that Leni’s filing of a series of charges against him is proof of the latter’s psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
- These include complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage, and deportation.
- According to Alfonso, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife
wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that
this “is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband
as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.”
SC disagrees. The documents presented during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence
presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that
the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also
grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
b. WON the testimony of Alfonso, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary
offerings, sufficient to prove the alleged psychological incapacity. NO.
Alfonso’s Testimony:
Q
Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by ‘psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.’ What do you mean by that?
A
Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want
it aborted by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of
procreative sexuality.
xxx
She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to
hire an attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not
bother to let the children see a doctor.
xxx
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she won’t talk to me when I
call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time
when I am busy with some other things. So, I think that is all.
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioner’s
personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an
“intention of procreative sexuality.” None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes “psychological
incapacity.”
The Court cited Santos v. CA wherein it explained that “psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.” There the Court said:
“It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase

‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances x x x
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological
incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.”
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina, it was ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“difficulty,” a “refusal” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
Alfonso’s allegation that petitioner “lacked the intention of procreative sexuality” is easily belied by the
fact that two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the
alleged “defect” was already existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by
respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The pertinent portions of Dr. Gauzon’s testimony:
Q: And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the
husband and the wife in the present case have a personality which is normal. That is your
conclusion?
A: They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q: And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder,
bordering on abnormality?
A: Yes.
Q: But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?
A: Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to
handle marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q: Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?
A: Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot
be harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital
problem, it could have been solved.
Q: Or the situation could have been remedied?
A: Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom,
Dick and Harry could handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities
which they were incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they will not mix, they will be
always quarreling with each other. They should not have got married.
Q: You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess
the necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
A: Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an “incompatibility,” a “defect” that could possibly
be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated
to him by Alfonso. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever

claim to have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement “If what Alfonso Choa
said about his wife Leni is true, x x x.”
He said in his testimony that he even requested Alfonso if it was possible for him to interview Leni. Alfonso
said he doesn’t know. Dr. Gauzon further said that he is willing to conduct the same personal interview and
written psychological examination on Leni for a fee, and that he may be able to make them reconcile.
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been
relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information
fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioner’s character, not
only through the descriptions given by Alfonso, but also through the former’s at least fifteen hours of study
of the voluminous transcript of records of this case. Even if it took him a whole day or a whole week to
examine the records of this case, his assessment of petitioner’s psychological state is sorely insufficient
and methodologically flawed.
BUT the Court noted the ruling that a medical examination is NOT a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity
adequately. Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on the alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Kathleen
069. Barcelona v. CA and Bengzon (2003)
J. Carpio
By P.R. Manalo
Short Version: Petition for review. Petitioner Diana Barcelona is married to private respondent Tadeo
Bengzon. During their marriage, it appeared that Diana was unable to fulfill the essential marital
obligations of the marriage (coming from a rich family, she would be out of the house every day, play
tennis, etc.) so Tadeo filed an action to declare their marriage void ab initio under art. 36, FC. The action
was withdrawn. Another action was filed by Tadeo. Diana moved to dismiss the second petition for failure
to state a cause of action and forum shopping. RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed. HELD—Tadeo’s petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under art. 36 states a cause of action as the ultimate facts were
alleged. There is no forum shopping because no litis pendentia or res judicata.
Facts:
1. Private respondent Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition to have his marriage with petitioner Diana Barcelona
declared void. This first petition was withdrawn. Later, he filed a second petition.
2. To the second petition, Diana filed a motion to have it dismissed on grounds of failure to state a cause of
action and forum shopping.
3. Diana’s motion was denied. The trial judge reasoned that (a) when the ground for dismissal is the
complaint’s failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition
itself. The allegations of the petition show that Diana has violated Tadeo’s right, thus giving rise to a cause
of action; and (b) there was no forum shopping because there was no pending case.
4. On certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, the CA agreed with the trial court and dismissed Diana’s
petition.
5. Hence this petition, where petitioner argues among other things that, relying on Santos v. CA and
Republic v. CA and Molina: (a) Tadeo’s second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause
of the alleged psychological incapacity; (b) the second petition also fails to state that the alleged
psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable;
(c) the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the her
(Diana) disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and (d) the second petition did not even
state the marital obligations which Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.

Issue: Whether Tadeo’s petition sufficiently stated a cause of action for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Diana under art. 36, FC.
Held: Yes, because the petition specifically alleged the complete facts showing that Diana was
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.
Tadeo’s petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition alleged that Tadeo and Diana were legally married; and that Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
The petition of Tadeo alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
“5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent
(Diana), coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the
house. She would go to her sister’s house or would play tennis the whole day.
“6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness
of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
“7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on
the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave
their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from
petitioner’s marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another
room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondent’s desire, but no amount of plea and
explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
“8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent’s pregnancy, the
petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in
Greenhills.
“9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the
respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondent’s favor through
an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact between
the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.
“10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex “C” and taken as an
integral part hereof.
“11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up
to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological
examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
“12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent
is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.”
Clearly, Tadeo’s second petition states the ultimate facts on which he (Tadeo) bases his claim in
accordance. Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence which establish the material elements.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (“new Rules”). Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d)
of the new Rules provides:
“SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages –

“What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
“The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative
of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert
opinion need not be alleged.”
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect
of the new Rules providing that “expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is
also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of
neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological
incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human
body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological
disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their
outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are
the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Tadeo’s second petition complies with
this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of Tadeo, the correlative
obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right.
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits
all the factual averments in the complaint. Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition,
the trial court could render judgment over the case.
The petition is denied and the judgment, affirmed.
070. REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO
May 20, 2004
Corona, J. (digest by Oyie Javelosa)
Short version: Respondent sought to have her marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity due to her husband’s abandonment of the family and alleged inability to observe essential
marital obligations. Court ruled that mere failure to meet one’s duty and responsibility as a married person
was not enough in order to prove psychological incapacity; such behavior must be due to a psychological
illness proven following the guidelines set in the Molina case.
Facts:
- Respondent Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month, and respondent gave birth to their
child.
- In January 1988, they were married. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan with the
promise to return by Christmas.
- Toshio sent money to respondent for two months after his departure, but subsequently stopped giving
financial support. Respondent’s letters to him were unanswered, and it was discovered that he visited
the Philippines without informing her and their child.
- Respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Toshio on the ground of
psychological capacity.
- RTC: marriage NULL and VOID.
o Toshio failed to fulfil his obligations as husband and father. He remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference was taken to be a clear
manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child – a behavior traced to
mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.
- Petitioner Republic, through OSG, appealed to the CA:
- CA: decision affirmed.

Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform martial obligations, and to “observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”
o The case cannot be equated with Republic v. CA, and Santos v. CA because those cases
contemplated Filipino spouses; this one deals with a mixed marriage.
Hence, this appeal.
o

-

Issues:
- WoN abandonment of and insensitivity to the needs of one’s family constitutes psychological incapacity
- WoN the guidelines in Molina and Santos apply to mixed marriages
Ruling: NO. Abandonment of and insensitivity to one’s family does not constitute psychological incapacity;
YES, the guidelines in Molina and Santos apply to mixed marriages.
Reasoning:
- The case of Republic v. CA and Molina lays down a number of guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36: xxx (refer to Molina digest)
- In the instant case, Toshio’s psychological incapacity to assume martial responsibilities was not
adequately proven.
o While his abandonment of his family is doubtlessly irresponsible, it was not alleged nor proven
to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Apart from the acts of abandonment, no other
evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
o It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person. He must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness – one
that incapacitates him from accepting and complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
- Court noted that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation, and that there was no showing
that the case was not just an instance of abandonment in that context.
- Further, the guidelines set by Molina and Santos apply in this case. In proving psychological incapacity,
there is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Medical and clinical rules to
determine such were formulated on the basis of human behavior in general. Thus, they should apply to
any person regardless of nationality
072. TENEBRO vs. CA
February 18, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Mica Maurinne M. Adao
SUMMARY: In 1990, Tenebro married Ancajas. In 1991, Tenebro left Ancajas and told her he was
previously married to Villareyes in 1986. In 1993, Tenebro contracted of yet another marriage with Villegas.
When Ancjas learned this, she filed a case for bigamy against Tenebro. RTC found Tenebro guilty. CA
affirmed. Tenebro appealed to the SC claiming that (1) the first marriage did not exist, and that (2) the
declaration of nullity of the 2nd marriage on the ground of Art 36 retroacts to the date of its celebration,
hence there is no second marriage and bigamy was not committed. SC ruled that the existence of the first
marriage was duly proven. Also, The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.Tenebro and Ancajas
lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was
going to cohabit with Villareyes.On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to Tenebro. Villareyes confirmed such fact, Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.

Tenebro denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify
from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but
there was no record of said marriage.
RTC found Tenebro guilty of bigamy. CA affirmed.
Tenebro appealed to the SC presenting a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his
first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. Hence,
he argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.
RELEVANT ISSUE: What is the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy 16?
RULING: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal
laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RATIO: FIRST DEFENSE: the first marriage did not exist.
[IRRELEVANT: EVIDENTIARY ISSUES] The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer
in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. The Court ruled that the
certificate issued by NSO and Civil Registry of Manila merely attest that the respective issuing offices have
no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the
invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. The documents presented by the defense
cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to
establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. The marriage contract presented by
the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any
record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
marriage.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first
and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
SECOND DEFENSE: the declaration of nullity of second marriage on the ground of art 36 retroacts to the
date of its celebration, hence there is no second marriage and bigamy was not committed.
A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner Tenebro’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, his marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence

16Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:(1) that the offender
has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for
bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of
the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate
disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. All the
essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by Tenebro and Ancajas. Both
were over 18 yyears of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two
witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is
that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
073. 062. LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner vs.THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents| 19
August 1986| J. Paras
Facts: Karl Wiegel and Lilia Wiegel were married on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian
Church Branch in Makati.
An action was filed before the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Caloocan City wherein Karl
Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion, celebrated on 25 June 1972 at Our Lady of Lourded Church in QC.
While admitting the existence of the said prior subsisting marriage, Lilia claimed that the same was null
and void since the couple was allegedly forced to enter the marriage.
Sempio-Diy, as presiding judge, ruled against the presentation of evidence by Lilia because the existence
of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage were already agreed upon in the pre-trial.
Issue: Assuming that the first marriage was entered into wherein the consent of the parties was obtained
through force, was said prior marriage void or merely voidable?
Ruling: There is no need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85,
Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when

she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to
respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court
a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage
of Lilia and Karl would be regarded VOID under the law.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained
of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

075. Jocson v. Robles
Feb. 10, 1968
Reyes JBL, J.
Short Version: Jocson filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Robles on the ground of bigamy.
Robles’ answer was that he had been forced into marrying Jocson. Robles filed a petition for summary
judgment, while Robles filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Neither was granted.
The SC held that the case could not continue, because the methods sought by both parties amounted to
an attempt to annul the marriage via stipulation of fact or confession of judgment, neither of which is
permissible under the Civil Code.
Facts: Gloria Jocson alleged that Ricardo Robles contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who
charged Robles with bigamy. This led Jocson to likewise file an action for annulment of her marriage to
Robles.
Robles’ defense was that Jocson’s parents compelled him through force, threats and intimidation to marry
her, notwithstanding her knowledge that he was already married. He alleged that such threats subsisted
until January 1963, when he was finally able to escape.
He thus filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that no genuine issue of fact involved.
Jocson filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in response. Motions denied. The court held that the
evidentiary requirement to establish the facts before the motion for summary judgment could be filed had
not been met. The court also found that there had been collusion between the parties. MR denied. Hence
this appeal.
Issues:
1. (procedural)WON the notice of appeal was properly taken. (No, Robles failed to attach such data as will
show that the appeal was perfected on time. There was thus no proof that he had made the appeal
within the reglementary period)
2. (on the merits)WON the case could be resolved via a summary judgment. (No)
Ratio: Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree
of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed
to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not allowed by the Civil Code.
Petition dismissed.

076. TOLENTINO vs. VILLANUEVA
Romulo Tolentino vs. Helen Villanueva, Hon. Corazon Juliano Agrava, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court
March 15, 1974
Makasiar, J.
FACTS: Romulo Tolentino and Helen Villanueva were married on September 28, 1959.
On April 26, 1962, Romulo filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen, alleging that his consent was
obtained through fraud because:

immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that Helen was pregnant despite the
fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony;



they did not live as husband and wife as immediate after the marriage, Helen left his house and her
whereabouts remained unknown to him until January 1963 when he discovered she was residing in
Cebu.

Despite the fact that she was served with summons, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading and was
subsequently declared in default. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, Judge
Agrava referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt
thereof, and, in the event of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent
fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed Romulo to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint
and such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and guidance.
Romulo, through counsel, submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to Romulo's counsel requiring
him to bring Romulo with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case
on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M. Romulo’s counsel wrote to inform Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could
not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, Romulo prayed that the date be set for the reception of
his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse
of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
On November 6, 1962, Judge Agrava denied the motion unless Romulo submits himself for interrogation by
the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, Judge Agrava dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that Romulo is
not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON Judge Agrava was correct in dismissing Romulo’s annulment suit on the ground that he was
not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the city fiscal (YES)
REASONING: Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus,
Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for
the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the
complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of
Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised Rules, with "legal separation" being substituted for "divorce", obviously
because the present Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of
marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the
spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these
social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence.

The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract
between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to
direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of
the marital bonds.
DSIPOSITIVE July 29, 1963 order is affirmed.