Concept of Criminal Law

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CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW
01 Romualdez vs. COMELECG.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
FACTS
C OMELE C Law Dep ar tm en t fi led two s epa ra te in fo rm ations b efore the RTC B a r a u e n , L e y t e
against
spouses
Carlos
S.
Romualdez
and
Erlinda
R.Romualdez
for
k n o w i n g l y m a k i n g f a l s e o r u n t r u t h f u l s t a t e m e n t i n t h e i r application for voter’s
registration relative to their place of residence and non – registration in other areas, which are violations of Sections
10(g) and (j), inrelation to Section 45(j) of RA 8189 or the Voter’s Registration Act, to wit:S E C . 1 0 –
Reg is tr atio n o f Vo ters
.–
xxx
Th e applicatio n sha ll c ontain th efollo win g d ata: x x x (g ) Period s o f res id en ce in th e Philipp in es
an d in th e p l a c e o f r e g i s t r a t i o n ; x x x ( j ) A s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n i s
n o t a registered voter of any precinct;S E C . 4 5 .
E lectio n Off en se
. – T h e f o l l o w i n g s h a l l b e c o n s i d e r e d e l e c t i o n offenses under this Act: x x x (j) Violation of any of the
provisions of this Act.Pending the above case, the spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorariagainst COMELEC,
on the ground, among others, of the unconstitutionality of Sectio n 45 (j) for b eing con tr ar y to the fair
no tice requirem en t Sectio n 14 (1 ) and Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as such penal
provisionis vague on its face.ISSUEW O N S e c t i o n 4 5 ( j ) o f R A 8 1 8 9 i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r
h a v i n g u n c e r t a i n election prohibition.RULINGNo, the Supreme Court held. Using the void for vagueness
doctrine, it the lawi s
said
to
be
facially
invalid
only
if
men
of
common
i n t e l l i g e n c e m u s t necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.As s tru ctured , S ection
4 5 of RA 818 9 ma kes a recital of elec tio n off ensesund er the sam e Ac t. S ec tion 4 5(j) clear ly
sp ecifi es tha t a vio la tio n of a ny o f the p ro visions o f RA 8 18 9 is an election o ff ens e. The la nguage
o f S ection 4 5 ( j ) i s p r e c i s e . T h e c h a l l e n g e d p r o v i s i o n r e n d e r s i t s e l f t o
n o o t h e r interpretation and involves no guesswork.

Title: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council
SCRA Citation: 632 SCRA 146Date Promulgated: October 5, 2010Petitioners: This is a consolidation of 6 petitions,
thus:
GR No. 178552
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. NGOcertiorari and prohibitionAtty. Soliman Santos, Jr.Concerned
citizen,taxpayer, and lawyer
GR No. 178554
KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR citizens
GR No. 178581
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW,LFS, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, Guingona, Jr.,
Lumbera,Constantino, Jr., Sr. Manansan, OSB, Dean Paz, Atty. Lichauco, Ret.Col. Cunanan, Siguion-Reyna, Dr.
Pagaduan-Araullo, Reyes, Ramos,De Jesus, Baua, Casambre
GR No. 178890
SELDA, EMJP, PCPR
GR No. 179157
IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena III, and Tañada
GR. No. 179461
BAYANST, other reg’l chapters and orgs mostly based in Southern
Tagalog
Respondents:
Anti-Terrorism Council, composed of:
Chairperson Eduardo Ermita
Vice-Chair Raul Gonzales
Acting Defense Secretary Alberto Romulo
National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales
DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves
AFP Chief of Staff General Hermogenes Esperon
PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon
PGMA
Support agencies of the Anti-Terrorism Council, namely:
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
NBI
Bureau of Immigration
Office of Civil Defense
Intelligence Service of the AFP

Anti-Money Laundering Center
Philippine Center on Transnational Crime
PNP intelligence and investigative elements
FACTS:

This
case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the Stateand Protect our
People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.

Petitioner-organizations assert
locus standi
on the basis of being
suspected “com
munist fronts
” by the
government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the
“transcendental importance”
doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers
.

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to
“close security
surveillance
by state security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons” and“vehicles with dark windshields,” and
their offices monitored by “men with military build.” They likewise claim
t
hey have been branded as “enemies of the State.”

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,Migrante, HEAD,
and Agham would like the Court to take
judicial notice
of respondents’ alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such
tagging
istantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.

Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of
locus standi
on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.

Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear andpanic
among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulou
s,leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
ISSUES:
1.WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper NO.
2.WON petitioners have locus standi NO.
3.WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging”NO.
4.WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrineNO.
5.WON petitioners can be conferre locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizensNO.
6.WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversNO.
7.WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorismNO.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
December 22, 2012 by Lagangang Butas

Estrada
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
Petitioner:
Joseph
Respondents:
Sandiganbayan
(Third
Ponente: J. Bellosillo

vs.

Division)

Sandiganbayan

and

Ejercito
People

of

the

Estrada
Philippines

FACTS:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659
substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under
the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover, the
legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. The
predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are
committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally” by the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of
plunder is a malum in se.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIM LAW
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Case: KHOSROW MINUCHER v. CA and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. 142396)Date: February 11, 2003Ponente: J. VitugFacts:
Minucher is an Iranian national who came to study in UP in 1974 and was appointed Labor Attache for the Iranian Embasies inTokyo and Manila; he
continued to stay in the Philippines when the Shah of Iran was deposed by Khomeini, he became a refugee of the UN and he headed the Iranian
National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.On the other hand, Scalzo was a special agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. He conducts
surveillance operations onsuspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs shipped to the US and make the actual
arrest.Minucher and one Abbas Torabian was charged for a violation of Act. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the PasigRTC, such criminal
charge was followed by a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents to which Scalzowas a witness for the prosecution. They
were acquitted.Later on, Minucher filed a complaint for damages against Scalzo. It was said that Minucher and Scalzo came to know of eachother thru
Jose Iñigo; they conducted some business i.e. the former sold to the latter some caviar and Persian carpets. Scalzo thenrepresented himself as a special
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, DOJ of US.Minucher expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for him and his Abbas¶s wife. Scalzo told him
that he could help him for a$2,000 fee per visa. After a series of business transactions between the two, when Scalzo came to deliver the visas to
Minucher¶shouse, he told the latter that he would be leaving the Philippines soon and requested him to come out of the house so he can introducehim to
his cousin waiting in the cab. To his surprise, 30-40 armed Filipino soldiers came to arrest him.In his complaint for damages, he said that some of his
properties were missing like Persian carpets, a painting together withhis TV and betamax sets. There was nothing left in his house. He averred that his
arrest as a heroine trafficker was well publicized andthat when we got arrested, he was not given any food or water for 3 days.In his defense, Scalzo
asserted his diplomatic immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that it wasrecognized by the US Government pursuant to the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government itself thruits Executive Department and DFA.The courts ruled in favor of Scalzo
on the ground that as a special agent of the US Drug Enforcement Administration, he wasentitled to diplomatic immunity. Hence, the present recourse of
Minucher.
Issue:
WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to theheads of state, (b) envoys,
ministers or
internuncios
accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to theministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staffof the (diplomatic) mission"
are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staffand thetechnical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff,
excluding the members of theadministrative, technical and service staffof the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention
onDiplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding thatthe same be
restrictively applied.
The main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is thedetermination of whether or not he performs duties of
diplomatic nature.

Scalzo was an Assistant Attaché of the US diplomatic mission. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomaticestablishment who may be in
charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attachesbelonging to certain ministries or departments of the
government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed bytheir respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as
the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science,and customs attaches, or the like
. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in the host country andsubmit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. These
officials are not generally regarded asmembers of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.Vesting a person
with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government.
Thegovernment of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomaticagent. The
State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic titleand "performs duties of
diplomatic nature." Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passportor, from States which do not issue such
passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person todiplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over
twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on anessentially full-time basis. Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most
accurate and descriptive job title to that whichcurrently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the
appropriate functionalcategory.
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong
City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After
fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process
under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case
to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.
(1)

HELD:
NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from
the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect
the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section
45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”.
Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not
allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being
purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on
criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.
(1)

Hence, SC denied the petition.
RETROACTIVITY
People
vs.
Lacson,
G.R.
149453,
October
7,
2003
Petitioner asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying
penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations,
only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive
application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The
respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective application thereof
would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal
cases, thus violating the respondent’s right to due process and equal protection of the law.
ISSUE: What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to the accused , can the time-bar rule be applied retroactively?
HELD:
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the
criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized

in its assailed resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the
orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into
account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time
limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused
and
notice
to
the
offended
parties.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two
years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.

Go vs. Dimagiba
Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for
encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Subqequently,
Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance
of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes, approved on April 3, 1979). He was found
guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the offended party the
amount he owed plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for
the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the
final decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him. The MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and
imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio city a petition
for writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the said court after hearing the case.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

(2) Whether or not SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given retroactive application.

Held:
(1) No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration and
in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC
Order denying these motions. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that
had already become final and executory, an action deplorably amounting to forum shopping.

(2) No. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused.
SC-AC No. 12-2000 cannot be given retroactive application for it is not a law that deletes the penalty of
imprisonment. It is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar
circumstances of the case.
TERRITORIALITY
US V. BULL
15
G.R.
ELLIOTT,

Phil.
No.

L-5270

January

15,

7
1910
J.

Lessons
Laws

Applicable:
Applicable:

Applicability
Art.

of
2

Provision
RPC

FACTS:
• accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port
and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head of cattle and carabaos, without
providing suitable means for securing the animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering.
• animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported
loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding
• neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the
noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and
hold
of
said
vessel,
and
cruelly
wounded,
bruised,
and
killed.

All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section
1
of
Act
No.
55,
which
went
into
effect
January
1,
1901,
provides
that

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the
vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from
the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided
with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time
that
the
animals
are
embarked
to
the
time
of
their
final
debarkation.
• Bull(Norweigan): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands
under
the
laws
thereof
so
it
is
not
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character when the neglect and omission which
constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States
HELD:
The
defendant
was
found
guilty
YES.
• No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or
within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the
headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles
became
applicable.
Note:
when
it
comes
in
our
territory
it
has
the
discretion
to
prosecute
or
not.
If
it
choose
to
prosecute
must
be
justified.

2
well-defined
theories
as
to
extent
of
the
immunities
ordinarily
granted
to
them
1. French theory and practice-matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity
of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel
belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant
vessels
in
foreign
ports
by
one
member
of
the
crew
against
another.
2. The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through
treaty
arrangements
consented
to
waive
a
portion
of
such
jurisdiction.

The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a
reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into
which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their
disembarkation
is
immaterial
so
far
as
jurisdiction
is
concerned.
• The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with
failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios
adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is
translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and circumstances,
we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the
court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the
animals."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. WONG CHENG
March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
G.R. No. L-18924, October 19, 1922

ISLANDS

vs.WONG

CHENG

(alias

WONG

CHUN)

FACTS: Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The
demurrer filed by said appellee alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and
dismissed
the
case.
ISSUE: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed
aboard
merchant
vessels
anchored
in
our
jurisdiction
waters.
HELD: There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the
French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in
the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects
the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the
United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts
of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States (we were still a US territory when this was
decided
in
1922).
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable
by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being
used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding.
Hence
such
a
mere
possession
is
not
considered
a
disturbance
of
the
public
order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach
of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our
territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive
statute.
Remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law.
PEOPLE V. LOOK CHOW
Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573
G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910.
ARELLANO, C. J.
Lesson: Crimes NOT involving a breach of public order committed on board a public vessel is NOT triable by our
courts
Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC, Opium Law
FACTS:
Ø Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico,
via the call ports of Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the inspection and search of the cargo.
o Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon
o larger sack in the hold
o Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep
§ the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were
permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore so it was returned
Ø 2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu:
o unlawful possession of opium
o unlawful sale of opium
Ø Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he
ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
Ø The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the
wharf of Cebu. The court sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular
Government.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.
·
·

HELD: YES. Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000
GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their
ports, does NOT constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered
as an extension of its own nationality
EX: when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is
landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land with respect

to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court
established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People v. Lol-lo & Saraw (1922)
People
G.R.
MALCOLM,

v.

No.

Lol-lo

&

17958

Saraw,
February
J.

43

Phil.

27,

19
1922.

FACTS:
• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other
boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and
Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the
men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro,
a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro
the
2
women
were
able
to
escape.
• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were
arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy
• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas,
without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

Pirates
are
in
law
hostes
humani
generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike
all
other
crimes
has
no
territorial
limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
ISSUE:

W/N

the

provisions

of the

Penal

Code

dealing

with

the

crime

of piracy

are

still

in

force.

HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the
crime
of
piracy
and
is
sentenced
therefor
to
be
hung
until
dead.
YES.
Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines. 
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the  abandonment of persons
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the
penalty
of
cadena
perpetua
or
death
should
be
imposed.
At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately 
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior
strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
DOLO V. CULPA
People v. Ah Chong (1910)
People
G.R.
CARSON,
Lesson:
Laws:

v.
No.
mistake
Article

Ah

Chong

L-5272

of

fact,
1

March

15

definition
RPC,

Phil.
19,
of

Art

488
1910
J.
felony

3

RPC

FACTS:
• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door
of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the
noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room,
I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an
unlawful aggression) which had been placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under
his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual
who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was playing a trick on him

• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to secure bandages to
bind
up
Pascual's
wounds.
• There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which took place in a house
where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

trial
court
held
it
as
simple
homicide
ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he
committed
the
act.
HELD:
trial
court
should
be
reversed,
and
the
defendant
acquitted
of
the
crime
NO.
• GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that
the
actor
may
be
held
criminally
liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code

Article
1
RPC
of
the
Penal
Code
is
as
follows:
Crimes
or
misdemeanors
are
voluntary
acts
and
ommissions
punished
by
law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful
act
committed
be
different
from
that
which
he
had
intended
to
commit.
o
voluntary
act
is
a
free,
intelligent,
and
intentional
act
o
"malice"
signifying
the
intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so
o
“ Actus me incito factus non est meus actus” - an act done by me against my will is not my act
• GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain
acts, and to make their commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent of the doer
• EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of
the
doer
is
clear
and
beyond
question
the
statute
will
not
be
so
construed

ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
• defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing
no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he
would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the
means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.

People vs. Oanis
July 27, 1943 (74 Phil 257)

PARTIES:
Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendants and appellant: Antonio Oanis, Alberto Galanta
FACTS:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo
Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected house then proceeded to the
room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta
simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the victim’s death. The supposedly Balagtas turned
out
to
be
Serepio
Tecson,
an
innocent
man.

ISSUE:

1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their
official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.
HELD:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti excusat” applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and
Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh
perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this
case, only the first requisite is present.
PEOPLE VS PUGAY
GR No. L-74324 November 17, 1988 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee, vs. FERNANDO PUGAY y
BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants Ponente: Medialdea, J.
SHORT VERSION:

Samson and Pugay were charged with the crime of murder. Samson and Pugay, committed the crime with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and superior
strength.
FACTS:
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. Sometime after midnight, Eduardo
Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book.
Later, Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived at the scene seemingly drunk.
The group saw Bayani Miranda and started making fun of him by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on Miranda. Gabion asked Pugay to stop during the
process of pouring the gasoline.
Then Samson set Miranda on fire.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON Pugay and Samson are guilty of the crime murder. (NO)
RATIO:
There was no evidence found that Pugay and Samson planned to kill Miranda. Their meeting was accidental and the
accused were merely making fun of the deceased-victim.
Criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson are counted as individual acts and they are held liable only for the acts
they committed individually.
Pugay should have known that what he was pouring on Miranda was gasoline because of its smell. He failed to
exercise diligence necessary to avoid the consequences of his actions and exposed Miranda to danger and injury.
Pugay is guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
Samson just wanted to set Miranda’s clothes on fire but this doesn’t relieve him of criminal liability (Art. 4).
Samson is guilty of homicide credited with ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong.
Gabion testified that accused were stunned when they noticed Miranda burning.
GARCIA v. CA
G.R. Nos. L-82282-83. November 24, 1988. 167 SCRA 815 GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS: Chemark Electric Motors, Inc.
availed and was granted a credit line by Security Bank and Trust Company. Subsequently, Chemark defaulted on its
payments when they became due and refused to pay despite repeated demands by SBTC. Antonio Garcia, on the
other hand bound himself jointly and severally with Chemark to pay SBTC and like Chemark has failed and refused
to pay his obligations despite demands made upon him by SBTC. The same is true with Dynetics and Matrix; they
bound themselves jointly and severally with Chemark to pay SBTC and has failed and refused to do so. In an action
to enforce the indemnity agreements executed by the above parties with SBTC, the latter prayed for a summary
judgment which was consequently granted. In answer Dynetics, Inc., Matrix Management and Trading Corporation
and Antonio Garcia sought a judicial declaration that they were not liable to Security Bank and Trust Company
under said indemnity agreements they executed in favor of Chemark Electric Motors, Inc. which had been extended
a credit accommodation of about 20, 000, 000.00 Php by SBTC. This was dismissed by the Court of Appeals ordering

Dynetics, Matrix and Garcia to pay SBTC. Hence, the case was elevated to the SC where one of the assigned errors
by the plaintiffs (Dynetics, Matrix and Garcia) to the appellate court's assailed decision is the awards of penalty
charges claiming that such charges are excessive. ISSUES: Whether or not the penalty charges awarded were
excessive and thus must be reduced. HELD: Yes, In the case at bar, the penalty charges are excessive and
unconscionable and so the interest charges are enough punishment for the petitioners' failure to comply with their
obligations. Penalty interests are in the nature of liquidated damages and may be equitably reduced by the courts if
they are iniquitous and unconscionable. Article 1229 of the New Civil Code states that "The judge shall equitably
reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor.
Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable
Manuel vs People of the Philippines
EDUARDO
P.
MANUEL,
petitioner,
G.R.
November

vs.

PEOPLE
No.
29,

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES,

respondent
165842
2005

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Baguio
City,
convicting
the
petitioner
for
the
crime
of
bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the
former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last
visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their
meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s
first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact
already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The
latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek
for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing
him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral
damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled
against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1
day
to
ten
years.
Pecuniary
reward
for
moral
damages
was
affirmed.
Hence,

this

petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s wife cannot
be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive
death
as
provided
for
under
Article
41
of
the
Family
Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
Php200,000.00
as
moral
damages
as
it
has
no
basis
in
fact
and
in
law.
RULINGS:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when
he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance
of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse
reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with

the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus
declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an
innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the
attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and
reasonable.

Criminal Law- People vs. Delim
This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code
"the act of one is the act of all"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim
G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for modesto is an adopted son
of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at
modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that
randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their
evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to
commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its executed.

appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed with
precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in
fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless during
the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three took
advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

Ivler vs. San Pedro G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
Bill of Rights
Ivler vs. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010
FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the
charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari
while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his
arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses,
whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of
our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of
the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by
the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Petition granted.

MALA INSE V. MALA PROHIBITA
US vs. Go Chico (14 Phil 133)
Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Wednesday, February 22, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On or about the 4th day of August, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the
show cases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario, Manila, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon
which were printed the miniature faces of Emilio Aguinaldo and the flag or banner or device used during the late
insurrection in the Phil. Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On
the day previous to the one set forth above, the appellant had purchased the said medallion sold at a public sale
under the authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the appellant was arranging his stock
of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public, and in doing so, he placed the medallions in his showcase
and on one of the windows of his store. The appellant was ignorant of any law against the display of such
medallions and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted. The appellant has two
propositions for his acquittal: first is that before a conviction can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the
accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is directed against the
use of identical banners, devices or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed
rebellion against the United States.
Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws.
Held: The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. The words “used during
the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United
States” mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The
description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an
absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature.
ART.4 CRIM LIAB
PEOPLE vs ILIGANFACTS:
A t a r o u n d 2 i n t h e m o r n i n g E s m e r a l d o Q u i n o n e s a n d h i s c o m p a n i o n s Z a l d y Asis and Felix Lukban
were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio fiesta. On the way they met the accused
Fernando Iligan and his nephew EdmundoAsis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside prompting

Zaldy Asis to boxh i m . Fe l i x q u i c k l y s a i d t h a t t h e y h a d n o d e s i r e t o fi g h t . U p o n s e e i n g h i s n e p h e w
f a l l , Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed.Terrified the trio ran, pursued by the
three accused. They ran for a good while ande v e n p a s s e d t h e h o u s e o f Q u i n o n e s , w h e n t h e y n o t i c e d
that they were no longer beingc h a s e d t h e t h r e e d e c i d e d t o h e a d b a c k t o Q u i n o n e s
h o u s e . O n t h e w a y b a c k t h e t h r e e accused suddenly emerged from the road side, Fernando Iligan
then hacked Quinones Jr.o n t h e f o r e h e a d w i t h h i s b o l o c a u s i n g h i m t o f a l l d o w n . F e l i x
a n d Z a l d y r a n . U p o n returning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted.T h e
p o s t m o r t e m ex a m i n a t i o n r e p o r t a n d t h e d e a t h c e r t i fi c a t e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e victim died of “ shock
and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for the victim’s death given that it was dueto a vehicular accident and not the
hacking.
HELD: YES.
We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. hadf a l l e n f r o m t h e b o l o h a c k i n g
p e r p e t r a t e d b y I l i g a n , h e w a s r u n o v e r b y a v e h i c l e . T h i s fi n d i n g , h o w e v e r , d o e s n o t i n a n y
w a y e xo n e r a t e I l i g a n f r o m l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e d e a t h o f Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC
which states that criminal liability shall b e i n c u r r e d b y a n y p e r s o n c o m m i t t i n g a f e l o n y
a l t h o u g h t h e w r o n g f u l a c t d o n e b e different from that which he intended.T h e e s s e n t i a l
r e q u i s i t e s o f A r t 4 a r e : t h a t a n i n t e n t i o n a l f e l o n y h a s b e e n c o m m i t t e d a n d that the wrong done to
the aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical consequenceof the felony committed by the offender
.
It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional
felonycommitted was the hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it was
c o n s i d e r e d superficial by the physician is immaterial. The location of the wound intended to do awaywith
him.T h e h a c k i n g i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d o n t h e n a t i o n a l h i g h w a y w h e r e
v e h i c l e s p a s s a n y m o m e n t , t h e h a c k i n g b l o w r e c e i v e d b y Q u i n o n e s w e a ke n e d h i m a n d
w a s r u n o v e r b y a v e h i c l e . T h e h a c k i n g b y I l i g a n i s t h u s d e e m e d a s t h e p r ox i m a t e c a u s e o f
t h e v i c t i m ’ s death.Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any qualifying circumstances

M E L B A Q U I N T O V S . D A N T E A N D R E S a n d R A N DY V E R PA C H E C O G . R . N o . 1 5 5 7 9 1 . M a r c h
16, 2005
Fa c t s : A n I n f o r m a t i o n w a s fi l e d w i t h t h e Re g i o n a l Tr i a l C o u r t t h a t t h e a c c u s e d D a n t e A n d r e s
a n d R a n d y v e r Pa c h e c o , c o n s p i r i n g , c o n f e d e r a t i n g , a n d h e l p i n g o n e a n o t h e r , d i d t h e n a n d
t h e r e w i l l f u l l y , u n l a w f u l l y , a n d f e l o n i o u s l y a t t a c k , a s s a u l t , a n d m a u l Wi l s o n Q u i n t o i n s i d e a
c u l v e r t w h e r e t h e t h r e e w e r e fi s h i n g , c a u s i n g Wi l s o n Q u i n t o t o d r o w n a n d d i e . T h e
r e s p o n d e n t s fi l e d a d e m u r e r t o e v i d e n c e w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d o n t h e g r o u n d o f
i n s u ffi c i e n c y o f e v i d e n c e . I t a l s o h e l d t h a t i t c o u l d n o t h o l d t h e r e s p o n d e n t s l i a b l e f o r
d a m a g e s b e c a u s e o f t h e a b s e n c e o f p r e p o n d e r a n t e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e t h e i r l i a b i l i t y f o r Wi l s o n â

s death. The peti tioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civi l aspect
of the case was concerned. The CA ruled that the acquit tal in this case is not merelybased on
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t b u t r a t h e r o n a fi n d i n g t h a t t h e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l e e s d i d n o t c o m m i t t h e
c r i m i n a l a c t s c o m p l a i n e d o f. T h u s , p u r s u a n t t o t h e a b o v e r u l e a n d s e t t l e d j u r i s p r u d e n c e , a n y
c i v i l a c t i o n e x d e l i c t o c a n n o t p r o s p e r. A c q u i t t a l i n a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n b a r s t h e c i v i l a c t i o n
arising theref rom where the judgmentof acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the
c r i m i n a l a c t s i m p u t e d t o t h e m . I s s u e : W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e ex t i n c t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t â

s c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e s w i t h i t t h e e x t i n c t i o n o f t h e i r c i v i l l i a b i l i t y. H e l d : W h e n a c r i m i n a l
a c t i o n i s i n s t i t u t e d , t h e c i v i l a c t i o n f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f c i v i l l i a b i l i t y a r i s i n g f r o m t h e o ff e n s e
c h a r g e d s h a l l b e d e e m e d i n s t i t u t e d w i t h t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i o n u n l e s s t h e o ff e n d e d p a r t y w a i v e s
the civi l act ion, reserv es the right to institute it separately or insti tutes the civi l action prior
t o t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i o n . T h e p r i m e p u r p o s e o f t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i o n i s t o p u n i s h t h e o ff e n d e r i n
o r d e r t o d e t e r h i m a n d o t h e r s f r o m c o m m i t t i n g t h e s a m e o r s i m i l a r o ff e n s e , t o i s o l a t e
h i m f r o m s o c i e t y , t o r e f o r m a n d r e h a b i l i t a t e h i m o r , i n g e n e r a l , t o m a i n t a i n s o c i a l o r d e r. T h e
s o l e p u r p o s e o f t h e c i v i l a c t i o n i s t h e r e s t i t u t i o n , r e p a r a t i o n o r i n d e m n i fi c a t i o n o f t h e p r i v a t e
o ff e n d e d p a r t y f o r t h e d a m a g e o r i n j u r y h e s u s t a i n e d b y r e a s o n o f t h e d e l i c t u a l o r f e l o n i o u s
act of the accused.The extinct ion of the penal action does not carry with it the ext inction of
thecivil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
t h e r e i s a fi n d i n g i n a fi n a l j u d g m e n t i n t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i o n t h a t t h e a c t o r o m i s s i o n f r o m
where the civi l liabilit y may arise does not exist. In thiscase, the peti tioner failed to adduce
proof of any il l-motiv e on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased and as held by
the the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to
prove the facts onwhich the civi l liabi lit y of the respondents rest, i. e. , that the petit ioner
hasa cause of action against the respondents for damages.

rbano vs IACFilomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable

doubtof the crime of homicide.Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield atBarangay Anonanghis palay flooded with water coming from theirrigation
canalthere he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfecutting grass. He asked them who wasresponsible for the opening of the irrigation canaland Javier
admitted that he was the one. Urbanothen got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palayUrbano who hacked him again hitting Javier
onthe left leg with the back portion of said bolo,causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbanotried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced
and prevented him from hackingJavier.Erfes together with Javier went to the policestation of San Fabian to report the incident. Assuggested by Corporal
Torio, Javier was broughtto a physicianUrbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medicalexpenses of Javier.on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to
theNazareth General Hospitalhad lockjaw and was having convulsionscaused by tetanus toxin.In an information dated April 10, 1981, FilomenoUrbano
was charged with the crime of homicidebefore the then Circuit Criminal Court of DagupanCity, Third Judicial District.The appellant filed a motion for
reconsiderationand/or new trialmotion was denied. Hence, this petitionlower courts ruled that Javier's death was thenatural and logical consequence of
Urbano'sunlawful act. Appellate court ruled that The claim of appellantthat there was an efficient cause whichsupervened from the time
the deceased waswounded to the time of his death, which covers aperiod of 23 days, the proximate cause of the victim's death wasthe wound which
got infected with tetanus. Andthe settled rule in this jurisdiction is that anaccused is liable for all the consequences of hisunlawful act. Appellant's
allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligencein going back to work without his wound
beingproperly healed, and lately, that he went to catchfish in dirty irrigation canalsThe SC rulethat Dr. Mario Meneses found notetanus in the injury, and
that Javier got infectedwith tetanus when after two weeks he returned tohis farm and tended his tobacco plants with hisbare hands exposing the wound
to harmfulelements like tetanus germs."that cause, which, in natural and continuoussequence, unbroken by any efficient interveningcause, produces the
injury, and without which theresult would not have occurredThe infection was, therefore, distinct and foreignto the crimeThe rule is that the death of the
victim must bethe
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused
.medical findings, however, lead us to a distinctpossibility that the infection of the wound bytetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the timeof his death And if an independent negligent act or defectivecondition sets into operation the
instances whichresult in injury because of the prior defectivecondition, such subsequent act or condition is theproximate cause." ACQUITTED

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
Intod v. CA
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's
house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at Palangpangan's
bedroom but there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs
• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with
bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability to punish
criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime

o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent
the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds
the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment - attempt to
commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime
People v. Domasian
G.R. No. 95322

March 1, 1993

Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable: Art. 4
FACTS:
• March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso Ferreras, his classmate, along Roque street in the
poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by Pablito Domasian who requested his assistance in getting his
father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to
Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became
apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced
him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his
father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from
where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed
to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente. As Enrico was crying
and being firmly held, Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver became suspicious and asked Domasian about his
relationship with the boy who told him they were brothers. Their physical differences and the wide gap between
their ages made Grate doubt so he immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers
alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing
that they were being pursued, Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in
a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him.
• At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be
killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital,
he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination
• March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note demanding P1 million otherwise
Enrico will be killed. . Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar so he referred it to the NBI for
examination and it turned out to be Dr. Samson Tan’s signature.
• Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon
o Domasian’s alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and later
went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses
o Dr. Tan’s alibi: he was in Manila
• Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.
• RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all
accessory penalties
• Appealed

ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping kidnapping with serious illegal detention
HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
• Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but
also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
• Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime
which he says is not punishable.
• Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he

intended.
• Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already
been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of
its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of the ransom note would
have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too
would not have been possible under the new Constitution.
• On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through physical volition of one or
all, proceeding severally or collectively. These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the
attainment of the common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life.
• The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan approached him 6 days before the
incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan
did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.
Art.6 stages of felony
a.

Subjective and objective phase of felony

D2013 | Criminal Law 1 | Prof. I. M. Gutierrez III
|Art. 6. Stages of commissionUS vs. Eduave
Facts: The accused rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind with a sharp bolo, producing a frightfulgash in the lumbar region
and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all ofthe muscles and tissues there.The accused was incensed
at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the localofficials with having raped her a
nd with being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother‘s querido and was
living with her as such at the time the crime here charged was committedIssues: WON the crime murder or homicide if the girl had been killed,
WON the stage of commission is attempted orfrustratedHeld: The crime committed was MURDER; The attack was made treacherously.
Qualified by the circumstance ofalevosia (Sp. treachery, a-le-vo-SI-a), the accused making a sudden attack upon his victim partly from the rear
anddealing her a terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo. The stage of commission is FRUSTRATED; Notattempted murder because
defendant PERFORMED ALL OF THE ACTS which should have resulted in theconsummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts.Adapt
Art. 6: RapePeople vs. Orita
Facts:
Victim: Cristina Abaya, 19 years old, freshman at St. Joseph‘s College in Borongan, Eastern Samar
At around 1:30 am, after attending a party, Abayan came home to her boarding house. As she knocked at the door,Orita suddenly held her and
poked a knife at her neck. She pleaded for him to let her go but instead of doing so, Oritadragged her upstairs with him while he had his left arm
wrapped around her neck and his right hand holding andpoking the balisong at the victim. At the second floor, he commanded Christina to look
for a room. Upon finding aroom, Orita held her against the wall while he undressed himself. He then ordered her to undress. As she took off
hershirt, he pulled off her bra, pants and panty, and ordered her to lie on the floor. He then mounted her and, pointing thebalisong at her neck,
ordered he to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. In this position, only a portion of hispenis entered her, so he ordered Abayan to go on top
of him. With him lying on his back and Abayan mounting him,still, he did not achieve full penetration and only part of his penis was inserted in
the vagina. At this instance, Abayangot the opportunity to escape Orita because he had both his hands and the knife on the floor.Abayan, still
naked, was chased from room to room with Orita climbing over the partitions. Abayan, frantic andscared, jumped out of a window and darted for
the municipal building and was finally found by Pat. Donceras andother policemen. Due to darkness though, the failed to apprehend Orita.In the
medico legal, Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude had the following findings: circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck, linearabrasions below left breas, multiple
pinpoint marks at the back, abrasions on both kness, erythemetous areas notedsurrounding vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact; no laceration
fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enterand with difficulty; vaginal cavity tight, no discharges notedIssue: Whether or not rape is
consummatedHeld: Rape was consummated. Perfect penetration is not essential. For the consummation of rape, any penetration ofthe female
organ by the male organ is sufficient to qualify as having carnal knowledge.In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim, he actually attains his purposeand from that moment, the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.

People v. Campuhan
G.R. No. 129433

March 30, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Attempted rape
Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks
for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr.,
brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be
frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw
Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants
were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several
times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who
she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus
prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their
compound, to chase the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the
barangay officials who detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when
she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death
• Thus, subject to automatic review
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor
medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
• People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated
• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
• Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary
is yet as underdeveloped
• Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus
showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim
• the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by
the child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs
close together and that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy"
about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko,
aray ko!
• no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and
the victim

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