Constitutional Criminal Procedure Case Briefs
Content
Bram v. United States
U.S. Supreme Court (1897)
Issue: Is a confession made pursuant to a strip search and police questioning voluntarily made?
Facts: A murder occurred on a ship and when the ship came into port, one of the customs officials
suspected that Bram (defendant) was responsible. The official had Bram strip-searched to find evidence of
the crime and Bram was questioned. His statements were taken as a confession to the murder. At Bram’s
trial, the official testified to what Bram said during this questioning.
Rule: To be admissible at trial, a confession must be voluntary and may not be coerced by fear, no matter
how slightly the emotion is implanted.
Holding: No. Where a suspect confesses pursuant to a strip-search and questioning, the state has exerted
some influence over the suspect. In such situations there is doubt regarding the voluntariness of the
confession and the court must decide in favor of the accused. Therefore, the trial court erred when it
permitted the official to testify to Bram’s statements at trial.
Justice Brewer (dissenting): The trial court properly allowed the official to testify at trial because his
testimony and the record support the finding that there were no threats or inducements made to Bram.
Therefore, there is nothing supporting the finding that Bram’s confession was not freely and voluntarily
made.
Miranda v. Arizona
U.S. Supreme Court (1966)
Issue: Is an individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination violated when he is subject to
custodial police interrogation and he has not been specifically informed of his constitutional rights?
Facts: This case combines four cases. In each case, the defendants, pursuant to police interrogation, made
self-incriminating statements which were introduced at trial. Each defendant was found guilty. Miranda
(defendant) was convicted of kidnapping and rape. He was taken into the police station for questioning
and was interrogated by two officers. Miranda was never informed of his right to have counsel present.
After two hours, Miranda confessed to the crimes and signed a written statement.
Procedural:
Over Miranda’s objections, the trial court allowed the officers to testify to Miranda’s oral
confession and the written statement was introduced into evidence.
The state supreme court affirmed the conviction, holding that Miranda’s constitutional rights were
not violated because he never specifically requested counsel.
Rule: When an individual is taken into custody and is subject to questioning, the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination requires that the individual be apprised of his constitutional rights.
Holding: Yes. Where an individual is subject to custodial police interrogation, the Fifth Amendment
demands that he be specifically informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an
attorney present he must be told that anything he says may be used against him at trial and that if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him. The history of the right against self-incrimination
makes it clear that this right applies not only at trial, but any time a suspect is in police custody. However,
a look to common police tactics and police instruction manuals reveals a custodial interrogation system
aimed at obtaining confessions through coercive means. Most significantly, interrogations generally
transpire incommunicado, with the suspect intentionally isolated from all outside support, and placed in
unfamiliar and uncomfortable surroundings. Police are encouraged to continue questioning a suspect until
he confesses and to use trickery and false promises if necessary. The purpose of such police tactics is to
put the suspect in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment. Therefore, while
not physically coercive, these tactics create an intimidating atmosphere that amounts to coercion and a
violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. As a result, to ensure that a confession
is fully voluntary, the Fifth Amendment requires that a suspect be specifically informed of his right
against self-incrimination and the consequences of waiving this right. In addition, a suspect must be
informed of his right to have an attorney present. This rights applies even if a suspect cannot afford an
attorney and therefore, suspects must also be informed that an attorney will be provided for them even if
they indigent. Denial of counsel is a further violation of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination because an attorney’s presence can ensure that the police do not improperly coerce the
suspect to talk, and can ensure the accuracy of the suspect’s statement. While a suspect may waive his
Fifth Amendment right, the waiver must be knowing and intelligent. However, if a suspect requests an
attorney, the police must refrain from questioning him until his attorney is present. Similarly, if the
suspect invokes his right to remain silent, the police must cease their questioning. This holding applies to
confessions, as well as all other “admissions,” and applies to both incriminating statements, as well as
those he intends as his defense. In this case, Miranda was not apprised of his rights and therefore his
confession was coerced in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Accordingly,
the judgment is revered.
Justice Harlan (dissenting): The Court’s ruling redefines “voluntariness” in a way that is inconsistent
with history and precedent. While interrogation may be unpleasant, the constitution does not prohibit
government intrusion where probable cause or a warrant is present. The holding therefore impairs and
frustrates law-enforcement
Justice White (dissenting): The Court’s conclusion that spontaneous statements remain admissible while
those made in response to police questioning are coerced, defies commonsense. Furthermore, the Court’s
holding is irrational. There is no evidence that all confessions made during in-custody interrogations are
coerced. Even assuming such a proposition is supported in fact, nothing supports the Court’s second
criteria that a suspect be informed of his right to counsel, since there is no evidence that having an
attorney present makes an interrogation any less coercive for the accused. In addition, how can the
prosecution prove that a suspect’s waiver to have counsel present was not itself a coerced answer?
U.S. Supreme Court (1897)
Issue: Is a confession made pursuant to a strip search and police questioning voluntarily made?
Facts: A murder occurred on a ship and when the ship came into port, one of the customs officials
suspected that Bram (defendant) was responsible. The official had Bram strip-searched to find evidence of
the crime and Bram was questioned. His statements were taken as a confession to the murder. At Bram’s
trial, the official testified to what Bram said during this questioning.
Rule: To be admissible at trial, a confession must be voluntary and may not be coerced by fear, no matter
how slightly the emotion is implanted.
Holding: No. Where a suspect confesses pursuant to a strip-search and questioning, the state has exerted
some influence over the suspect. In such situations there is doubt regarding the voluntariness of the
confession and the court must decide in favor of the accused. Therefore, the trial court erred when it
permitted the official to testify to Bram’s statements at trial.
Justice Brewer (dissenting): The trial court properly allowed the official to testify at trial because his
testimony and the record support the finding that there were no threats or inducements made to Bram.
Therefore, there is nothing supporting the finding that Bram’s confession was not freely and voluntarily
made.
Miranda v. Arizona
U.S. Supreme Court (1966)
Issue: Is an individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination violated when he is subject to
custodial police interrogation and he has not been specifically informed of his constitutional rights?
Facts: This case combines four cases. In each case, the defendants, pursuant to police interrogation, made
self-incriminating statements which were introduced at trial. Each defendant was found guilty. Miranda
(defendant) was convicted of kidnapping and rape. He was taken into the police station for questioning
and was interrogated by two officers. Miranda was never informed of his right to have counsel present.
After two hours, Miranda confessed to the crimes and signed a written statement.
Procedural:
Over Miranda’s objections, the trial court allowed the officers to testify to Miranda’s oral
confession and the written statement was introduced into evidence.
The state supreme court affirmed the conviction, holding that Miranda’s constitutional rights were
not violated because he never specifically requested counsel.
Rule: When an individual is taken into custody and is subject to questioning, the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination requires that the individual be apprised of his constitutional rights.
Holding: Yes. Where an individual is subject to custodial police interrogation, the Fifth Amendment
demands that he be specifically informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an
attorney present he must be told that anything he says may be used against him at trial and that if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him. The history of the right against self-incrimination
makes it clear that this right applies not only at trial, but any time a suspect is in police custody. However,
a look to common police tactics and police instruction manuals reveals a custodial interrogation system
aimed at obtaining confessions through coercive means. Most significantly, interrogations generally
transpire incommunicado, with the suspect intentionally isolated from all outside support, and placed in
unfamiliar and uncomfortable surroundings. Police are encouraged to continue questioning a suspect until
he confesses and to use trickery and false promises if necessary. The purpose of such police tactics is to
put the suspect in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment. Therefore, while
not physically coercive, these tactics create an intimidating atmosphere that amounts to coercion and a
violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. As a result, to ensure that a confession
is fully voluntary, the Fifth Amendment requires that a suspect be specifically informed of his right
against self-incrimination and the consequences of waiving this right. In addition, a suspect must be
informed of his right to have an attorney present. This rights applies even if a suspect cannot afford an
attorney and therefore, suspects must also be informed that an attorney will be provided for them even if
they indigent. Denial of counsel is a further violation of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination because an attorney’s presence can ensure that the police do not improperly coerce the
suspect to talk, and can ensure the accuracy of the suspect’s statement. While a suspect may waive his
Fifth Amendment right, the waiver must be knowing and intelligent. However, if a suspect requests an
attorney, the police must refrain from questioning him until his attorney is present. Similarly, if the
suspect invokes his right to remain silent, the police must cease their questioning. This holding applies to
confessions, as well as all other “admissions,” and applies to both incriminating statements, as well as
those he intends as his defense. In this case, Miranda was not apprised of his rights and therefore his
confession was coerced in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Accordingly,
the judgment is revered.
Justice Harlan (dissenting): The Court’s ruling redefines “voluntariness” in a way that is inconsistent
with history and precedent. While interrogation may be unpleasant, the constitution does not prohibit
government intrusion where probable cause or a warrant is present. The holding therefore impairs and
frustrates law-enforcement
Justice White (dissenting): The Court’s conclusion that spontaneous statements remain admissible while
those made in response to police questioning are coerced, defies commonsense. Furthermore, the Court’s
holding is irrational. There is no evidence that all confessions made during in-custody interrogations are
coerced. Even assuming such a proposition is supported in fact, nothing supports the Court’s second
criteria that a suspect be informed of his right to counsel, since there is no evidence that having an
attorney present makes an interrogation any less coercive for the accused. In addition, how can the
prosecution prove that a suspect’s waiver to have counsel present was not itself a coerced answer?
