Constitutional Law Review Case Digests Set 1[1]

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1. Araullo vs. Aquino, GR 209287, July 1, 2014

Facts:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth
of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting
for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government
project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefore will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be re-allotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a
few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF
(Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain
Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President
to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issue:
1. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
3. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
4. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
5. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

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Ruling:
Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
1. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in
Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
2. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s
no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
3. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to
make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within
their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But
under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they
are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when
there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP,
there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the
fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the
middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
Whether or not the sourcing of un-programmed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
4. No. Un-programmed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this
case, no such certification was secured before un-programmed funds were used.
Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
5. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely
helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can

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no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received
especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so
found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in
good faith.

2. Belgica et al. vs. Ochoa et al., GR 208566, November 19, 2013
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature
(“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the
Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act
of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the
Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by
the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund
and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund
under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The
Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by
PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through
which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source
later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of
government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several
citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations
Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the
government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate
using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores
of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20
dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the
Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering
the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the
Arroyo administration.
As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million
from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].”
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual
and justiciable controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to
judicial review

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3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation
of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on…
1.) …separation of powers
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
3.) …checks and balances
4.) …accountability
5.) …political dynasties
6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar
as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power
* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual
and justiciable controversy
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also,
the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the
challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended

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by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed lineitem budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful
purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not
the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had
already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the
Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot
and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court
in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of
the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, nondelegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local
autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved –
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of
public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly
presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public
interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s
flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of
the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s
own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the
findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. If only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely
due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There
is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein
in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of
the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be
guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the
recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is,
by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues
underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most
opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

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2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to
judicial review
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a
legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the
political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an
exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested
the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have
come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,
assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the
existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of
public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given
that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of
controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation
of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous
case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between
the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes
of
action. This
required
identity
is
not
attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article
and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is
essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on
the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers
problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority
to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each
other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intrarelation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of
fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses

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herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason
against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full
resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings
(such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling
in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any
controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these
cases, stare decisis would not apply.

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on…
1.) …separation of powers
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
3.) …checks and balances
4.) …accountability
5.) …political dynasties
6.) …local autonomy

…separation of powers
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special
Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have
also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special
Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4,
paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in
“the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in
violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this
end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out
that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority
of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper
phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.

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…non-delegability of legislative power
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as
held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,
involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given
a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from
such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators
have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
…checks and balances
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as
a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could,
after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA
is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/postenactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget
within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point
out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of
all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes
of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state
auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently
auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line
by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing
agency.”
…accountability
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.”
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

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However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority
and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate
himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on
a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity
between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the
domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
…political dynasties
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does
not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no
standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would
be able to propagate political dynasties.
…local autonomy
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of
PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highlyurbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a farflung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the
former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which
are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within
its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section
8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle

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of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include
– or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited;
second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has
used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend
the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The
first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the
same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“.
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure
development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe
the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too
broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of
PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

3. People vs. Andan, GR 116439, March 3, 1997
Re.: Extrajudicial Confessions to Mayor and Media Admissible
Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The offense
was committed on February 19, 1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne
Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing.
On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her
way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his
wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her
distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then
punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time,
Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was
adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she
moved, prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer

11
moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered.
The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries."
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio
Trinidad to form an investigation team. The investigation pointed to the appellant.
Appellant's nearby house was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police
team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and
brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with evidence,
appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout.
Larin and Dizon were likewise brought there by the police. The following day a physical
examination conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on
the neck, chest and back.
By that time, people and media representatives were already at the police headquarters
awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant approached him and whispered that they talk privately. The mayor led him to
the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the
door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. Since
no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the
presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife
and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon
whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also
said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he
read almost everyday. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked
the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide.
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said
date he was at his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son
went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant claimed
that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he
raped and killed Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.
The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found guilty of
the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly.
Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
W/N the appellant’s confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of the
constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him.
Ruling:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession
before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational
supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to
any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No
police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked
with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state
as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was
correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were
made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in
evidence.

12
The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide.
4. People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by
Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced
Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job
Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the
package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a
suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this
to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI
agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A
case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a
quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy
was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence
against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling:
NO. The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that
Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of
business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged was AFFIRMED.

5. Estrada vs. Desierto, GR 146710, March 2, 2001
with Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 146738, March 2, 2001

FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and subsequent to the
event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo were elected as president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada
administration began when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his
exposé that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money.
After this expose, a lot of different groups and many personalities had asked for the resignation
of the petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP),
Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For.

13

Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make the “supreme self-sacrifice”. Respondent
also resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services and also asked
petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and then
Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to
the impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one
for the ages. It was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by
the vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop allegedly
containing evidence showing that the petitioner had a secret bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde” containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people going
to the streets and the public prosecutors withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of
Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and declared “on behalf of your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our
support to this government.” PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson together with some
Cabinet members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for the peaceful
transition of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14th president of the
Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following
Press Statement:
“20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity
and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

14

On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05SC. The said resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the
oath taking that happened on January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the
new president of the Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 “expressing the full
support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.” It also approved Resolution No. 176
“expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of
the nation’s goals under the Constitution.”
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On
February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona. On the same day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated. Several cases were filed against
the petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales
on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by
the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture,
graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for
government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on
November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28,
2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080;
and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for
plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan,
Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22,
the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of
his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR
No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case
Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted.” Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” Acting on
GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents “to
comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001.” On February
13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing
of the respondents’ comments “on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.”
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for “Gag Order” on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
146738, the Court resolved:
“(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring
the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement
justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of
being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits
of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and

15

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office
against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news
reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner
Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will
make the cases at bar moot and academic.”

ISSUES:
I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.

DECISION:
I No. The case is legal not political.
II No. He is not a president on leave.
III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not
entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution
IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of
the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
RATIO/REASON:
1. I. Whether or not the case involves a political question
Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political question. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
became a President through the People power revolution. Her legitimacy as president was also
accepted by other nations. Thus, they conclude that the following shall serve as political thicket
which the Court cannot enter.
The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been defined by our Court as “those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.”
Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration should be treated similarly with
the Aquino administration. Respondents propose that the situation of the Arroyo and Aquino
administrations are similar. However, the Court finds otherwise. The Court has made substantial
distinctions which are the following:
Aquino
Arroyo
Government was a result of a successful
Government was a result of a peaceful
revolution
revolution
In the Freedom constitution, it was stated that Arroyo took the oath of the 1987 Constitution.
the Aquino government was instilled directly by She is discharging the authority of the president
the people in defiance of the 1973 Constitution under the 1987 constitution.
as amended.

16

It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by
people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop. But this would not apply as the Court finds substantial difference between
the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It would show that there are differences between the 2 governments set
up by EDSA I and II. This was further explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA
Revolutions.
EDSA I
Extra-constitutional. Hence, “Xxx IN
DEFIANCE OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION,
AS AMENDED”—cannot be subject of judicial
review
exercise of the people power of revolution
which overthrew the whole government

Political question

EDSA II
Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath of the
respondent as President includes the protection
and upholding of the 1987 Constitution.—
resignation of the President makes it subject to
judicial review
exercise of people power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the President
Legal Question

In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.

1. II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President
Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent
to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no required form
of resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or written. It is true that respondent never wrote
a letter of resignation before he left Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court would
use the totality test or the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. The Court knows the amount of
stress that the petitioner had suffered. With just a blink of an eye, he lost the support of the
legislative when then Manny Villar and other Representatives had defected. AFP Chief of Staff
General Angelo Reyes had already gone to EDSA. PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson
and other cabinet secretaries had withdrawn as well. By looking into the Angara diaries, it was
pointed out that the petitioner had suggested a snap election at May on which he would not be a
candidate. Proposing a snap election in which he is not a candidate means that he had intent to
resign. When the proposal for a dignified exit or resignation was proposed, petitioner did not
disagree but listened closely. This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the
reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace
period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The negotiations that had happened were about a peaceful transfer of power. It was already
implied that petitioner would resign. The negotiations concentrated on the following: (1) the
transition period of five days after the petitioner’s resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of
the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the
name of the petitioner. Also taken from the Angara diaries, The President says. “Pagod na
pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the
red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will go.” The
quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear evidence that he has resigned.
The second round of negotiations were about the consolidating of the clauses which were
proposed by both sides. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the
petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at
that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
period.

17

When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner and ready to be faxed by
Angara, the negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to Angara saying that the SC
would allow respondent to have her oath taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a
last statement.
The statement reads: ‘At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal
minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of
unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shrink from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!’”
By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the following: (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving
the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him
to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called
on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency.
Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of absence. This is evidenced by a
letter which reads as follows:
“Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting
this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of
law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”
The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter during the week long crisis. It
would be very easy for him to say before he left Malacanang that he was temporarily unable to
govern, thus, he is leaving Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious
letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press
release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation
must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands
scant legal significance.
Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is RA 3019 which states:
“Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal
or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”

18

During the amendments, another section was inserted which states that:
During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
“Sec. 15. Termination of office — No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending
an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any
offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution
under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.”
The original senate bill was rejected because of the 2nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless,
another similar bill was passed. Section 15 then became section 13. There is another reason why
petitioner’s contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when
petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were
OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases
have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was
immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the
Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not
suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. The Court holds otherwise. The
impeachment proceeding may be arguable. However, even if the impeachment proceeding is
administrative, it cannot be considered pending because the process had already broke down.
There was also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the impeachment case. In fact, the
proceeding was postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was no impeachment case pending when he
resigned.
1. III. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President
This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was addressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and
then Senate President Pimentel. Petitioner’s contention is that he is a president on leave and that
the respondent is an acting president. This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner’s stance
that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
“SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without
need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session
within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his

19

office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."
After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is
very clear that the inability of the petitioner as president is not temporary. The question is
whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. The Court says that they cannot, for such is an example
of a political question, in which the matter has solely been left to the legislative,
1. IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. If yes, what is the extent of
the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit,
whether criminal or civil. The “immunity” the petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.
The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive may not be personally mulcted
in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official
duties. He is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he
cannot be said to have exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act.
What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when
he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used
discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to
act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his
authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was
one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is
not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ
over its determination.
The Court rejects the petitioner’s argument that before he could be prosecuted, he should be first
convicted of impeachment proceedings. The impeachment proceeding was already aborted
because of the walking out of the prosecutors. This was then formalized by a Senate resolution
(Resolution #83) which declared the proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in the
Constitutional Convention, when an impeachment proceeding have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, proper civil and criminal cases may be filed against him.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity
of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.
It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts
and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity from civil damages only covers
“official acts”.
1. V. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined to prejudicial
publicity
Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting an
investigation of the cases filed against him for he has already developed a bias against the
petitioner. He submits that it is a violation of due process. There are two (2) principal legal and
philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with the
presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach
is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive
publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. During cases like such, the test of actual
prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The

20

Court rules that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.
According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The
petitioner alleges that there were news reports which said that the Ombudsman had already
prejudged the cases against him. The Court rules that the evidence presented is insufficient. The
Court also cannot adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating prosecutors
should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman
resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable
cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper
court.
6. Angara vs. Electoral Commission, GR L-45081, July 15, 1936
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct. 17, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of
the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office
on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the
victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of
protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l
Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing
of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to
dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The
Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards
the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore
has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by
the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

7. Imbong et al. vs. Ochoa et al., GR 204819, April 8, 2014
FACTS:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth
control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed
views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media.
From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to
mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a
deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,

21
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword
that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen
petitions
and
2
petitions-in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life
of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products,
and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and
service,
although
it
is
against
their
religious
beliefs
and
convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education
in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they
argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion
and
the
right
to
free
speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due
process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to
decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."
It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct
their
affairs
in
accordance
with
their
own
discretion
and
judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray
for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or
controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation
took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.

ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy;
2)
Whether
the
RH
law
is
unconstitutional.
HELD:
1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and
that
the
same
is
ripe
for
judicial
determination.

22
REMEDIAL

LAW:

actual

case

or

controversy

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is
replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites,
viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (
d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case
or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the
questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one
has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any
of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is
contended
that
judicial
review
of
the
RH
Law
is
premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other;
that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would
be
upon
a
hypothetical
state
of
facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a
result
of
the
act.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same
is
ripe
for
judicial
determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be
heard
on
the
matter
NOW.

REMEDIAL LAW: facial challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure.
The Court is not persuaded.

23

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning
not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right
to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights
of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are
externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike
its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist
no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
REMEDIAL LAW: locus standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective
petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot
prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the
government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.

REMEDIAL LAW: transcendental importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest."

24

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no
direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an
"as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed,
thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by
the operation of a law or any other government act.
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also
to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all,
the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health,
the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these
and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused
deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life of
either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
REMEDIAL LAW: declaratory relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its
true intent- to act as a population control measure.
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and
methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared
towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of

25
births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as
well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and
provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.
Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention
and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided
for in the Magna Carta for Women."
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
2)
POLITICAL LAW: right to life
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. Even if
not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It
precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act
To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the
ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the
need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve
long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and
health and the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing.
Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines"
and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has
always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the
"principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection
expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
POLITICAL LAW: when life begins
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the
individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

26
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular
phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it
is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have
conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization.
They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life
begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are
those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: plain and legal meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v.
Judicial Bar Council:
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -from the words of a statute there should be
no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception"
which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins
at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of
developing into a being like its parents.
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of
the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and
maturation under normal conditions.
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: intent of the framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From
their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."

27
From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized
that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from
the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution
intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine
when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that
the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. From the
discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed
an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance,
and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman
that life begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and conception are two
distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that
the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only
after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it is a living human being complete with
DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by
those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity
not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
POLITICAL LAW: the right to health
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section
15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the
health of the people, viz:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research,
responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.

28
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard
or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless
the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.
It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception
and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo -under R.A. No. 5921 and
R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are
dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician -be maintained.
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good
law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician.
With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider
the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives
that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all
possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are
assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be
held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to
the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which
drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that
food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently,
the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature.
Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional
yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence
of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by
using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been
tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to
determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and
non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the
inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in
fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
POLITICAL LAW: freedom of religion and the right to free speech
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up
of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has

29
shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious,
cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all -the religious people of different sects and the
non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever
they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting
our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973
and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions
such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government
institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.
The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6
ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question
its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate
against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on
the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs,
even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over
another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its
generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God
which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to
protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the
following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs
among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and
the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is
prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious
beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices.
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the

30
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute.
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can
be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where
the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
POLITICAL LAW: legislative acts and the free exercise clause
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use
of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with
"faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only
in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious
freedom.
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their
beliefs should be respected.
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise
clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom
to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is
compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans
the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product,
method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On
the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate
and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means. Other than the assertion that the act of referring
would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is
the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve
its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns
of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive
health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person
who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as
the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that
the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A. No. 4
729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and
R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs
of women in relation to health services and programs.

31
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs m exchange for blind conformity.
POLITICAL LAW: exception; life threatening cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the
law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive
health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception
must be made in life threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference,
considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service,
resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
POLITICAL LAW: academic freedom
The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973
Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition
of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of
society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of
developing the youth and their important role in nation building.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health
education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it
becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV,
Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.
POLITICAL LAW: due process
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not
only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other
parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other
parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods,
includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
POLITICAL LAW: equal protection

32
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target
of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in
the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and
definition of terms of the law.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that
an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law
to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must
not leave out or "under include" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification.
POLITICAL LAW: involuntary servitude
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can
hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care
service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government,
the accreditation of medical practitioners with Phil Health being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is
not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of

33
the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the
public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.
A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and
non-government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other
than non-accreditation with Phil Health, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also
enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where
and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering
of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does
not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized
that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs
and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bono or
otherwise.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that
the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our
only guidepost is the Constitution.
While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the
Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it.
To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws
are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and
theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an
abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural right has
been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the
Court is not duty bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both
the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the
most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It
does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out,
however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious
freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group
cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society
leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and
open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each
other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that
what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country.
Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the
unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain

34
as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago, are
now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling
with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These
countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use
coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors)
to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court
declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
moderm methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bono reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation;
and
8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily"
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354
which have been herein declared as constitutional.

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8. Lambino et al. vs. COMELEC, GR 174153, October 25, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plesicite
that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the
petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by Art. 17 of the
Constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying sections 1-7 and
sections 1-4 of Art. 7 and by adding Art. 18. The proposed changes will shift the present
bicameral-presidential form of government to unicameral-parliamentary. COMELEC
denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked
Santiago vs. COMELEC ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative
petitions.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative.
2. WON this court should revisit its ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the constitution.
3. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.
RULING:
According to the SC, the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people's initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. NO. the initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the constitution on
direct proposal by the people. The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative
signer must be informed a the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.
2. The initiative violates Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives. The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision". It is intended that the third mode of changing the constitution
as stated in Sec. 2, Art. XVII refers only to proposals for amendments. Merging legislativve
and executive is a radical change.
3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary. Even assuming that RA 6735 is
valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec. 2, Art. 17 to be
a valid initiative, there a is a need first to comply with the constitution before complying
with RA 6735.
PETITION DISMISSED.

9. People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 807
FACTS:
The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation
of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of
Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto –
published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have

36
violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults
the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can
be applied in the case at bar?
RULING:
NO. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was
enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court
explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish
to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically
abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is
about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is
considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore,
respondent was acquitted.

10. Garcia vs. Drilon et al., GR 179267, June 25, 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would
be an “exercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of
an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes
a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
2. WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

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3. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
4. WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
5. WON the CA seriously erred in declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Ruling:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction
to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be
raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not
limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate
extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO ex parte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that
by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum
of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a
mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of
any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and
administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.