Contention Against Maintainability of SLP
Content
In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia Vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai AIR 2004 SC 1815 (para
33) When no law confers a statutory right to appeal on a party, Article 136 cannot be called
in aid to spell out such a right. The Supreme Court would not under Article 136 constitute
itself into a tribunal or court just settling disputes and reduce itself to a mere court of error.
The power under Article 136 is an extraordinary power to be exercised in rare and
exceptional cases and on well known principles.
The Supreme Court in Pritam Singh vs The State 1950 AIR 169 held that the SC will not
grant special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution unless it is shown that
exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been
done and the case in question presents features of sufficient
gravity to warrant a
review of the decision appealed against.
In Narpat Singh Vs. Jaipur Development Authority (2002) 4 SCC 666, this Court observed as
under :
"The exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Art.136 of the Constitution on the Supreme Court
is discretionary. It does not confer a right to appeal on a party to litigation; it only confers a
discretionary power of widest amplitude on the Supreme Court to be exercised for satisfying
the demands of justice. On one hand, it is an exceptional power to be exercised sparingly,
with caution and care and to remedy extraordinary situations or situations occasioning gross
failure of justice.”
Article 136 provides for a mode which allows furtherance of justice or correction of grave
injustice. Justice as such could be classified as a nonrivalrous resource. What it suffers from
is the ‘tragedy of commons’. Filing of rivalrous SLP’s is comparable to the overexploitation
of the resource (of justice) resulting in lower efficiency.
The Supreme Court in case of Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills vs. CIT AIR 1955 SC 65 held
that the Court has on several occasions remarked that it was the high court that was
intended to be the final court of appeal and Article 136 was just a provision to ensure that
substantial justice is done.
In P.S.R. Sadhanatam vs. Arunachalam AIR 1980 SC 856 Justice Krishna Iyer substantiated
the reasoning for limiting the scope of SLP’s. He said, “the wider the discretionary power, the
more sparing its exercise. A number of times this Court as stressed that though parties
promiscuously ‘provoke’ this jurisdiction, the Court parsimoniously invokes the power. It is
true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process of the Court, especially at the
expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and ordinarily
meddlesome bystanders should not be granted a ‘visa’.
There is no material whatsoever to show that the prosecution has deliberately roped in the
accused persons. There is no malafide or malice like the fact situation which are projected in
the case of Hardeep Singh (supra). Thus, the view expressed by the learned trial Judge is
absolutely indefensible and the affirmance thereof by the High Court is wholly unsustainable.
33) When no law confers a statutory right to appeal on a party, Article 136 cannot be called
in aid to spell out such a right. The Supreme Court would not under Article 136 constitute
itself into a tribunal or court just settling disputes and reduce itself to a mere court of error.
The power under Article 136 is an extraordinary power to be exercised in rare and
exceptional cases and on well known principles.
The Supreme Court in Pritam Singh vs The State 1950 AIR 169 held that the SC will not
grant special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution unless it is shown that
exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been
done and the case in question presents features of sufficient
gravity to warrant a
review of the decision appealed against.
In Narpat Singh Vs. Jaipur Development Authority (2002) 4 SCC 666, this Court observed as
under :
"The exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Art.136 of the Constitution on the Supreme Court
is discretionary. It does not confer a right to appeal on a party to litigation; it only confers a
discretionary power of widest amplitude on the Supreme Court to be exercised for satisfying
the demands of justice. On one hand, it is an exceptional power to be exercised sparingly,
with caution and care and to remedy extraordinary situations or situations occasioning gross
failure of justice.”
Article 136 provides for a mode which allows furtherance of justice or correction of grave
injustice. Justice as such could be classified as a nonrivalrous resource. What it suffers from
is the ‘tragedy of commons’. Filing of rivalrous SLP’s is comparable to the overexploitation
of the resource (of justice) resulting in lower efficiency.
The Supreme Court in case of Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills vs. CIT AIR 1955 SC 65 held
that the Court has on several occasions remarked that it was the high court that was
intended to be the final court of appeal and Article 136 was just a provision to ensure that
substantial justice is done.
In P.S.R. Sadhanatam vs. Arunachalam AIR 1980 SC 856 Justice Krishna Iyer substantiated
the reasoning for limiting the scope of SLP’s. He said, “the wider the discretionary power, the
more sparing its exercise. A number of times this Court as stressed that though parties
promiscuously ‘provoke’ this jurisdiction, the Court parsimoniously invokes the power. It is
true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process of the Court, especially at the
expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and ordinarily
meddlesome bystanders should not be granted a ‘visa’.
There is no material whatsoever to show that the prosecution has deliberately roped in the
accused persons. There is no malafide or malice like the fact situation which are projected in
the case of Hardeep Singh (supra). Thus, the view expressed by the learned trial Judge is
absolutely indefensible and the affirmance thereof by the High Court is wholly unsustainable.
