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Dela Cruz vs. Moya G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838 Facts: On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an order mission to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the said mission, they caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They left the place but brought with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfighting, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their way to the Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President on January 16, 1981, vesting in court – martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in the performance of their duty. Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Held: In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 published in the Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD. 1822-A were promulgated after the filling of the complaint however, General Order 59 was enacted before the commission of the crime. The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are inapplicable to the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore, the petition was GRANTED. People vs. Chupeco G.R. No. L- 19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640 Facts: On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of the SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of Agricultural and Industrial Bank located in Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance Corp. herein complainant with principal office in Manila. Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with intent to defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to quash the information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the case Held: An essential element common to the two acts punishable by Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or repledged should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal of repledging. In the instant case, evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank
are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile. On the evidence presented, there is no showing that properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo Pinile). With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of First Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment or stipulation. People v. Eduarte Gr. 88232 February 26, 1990 FACTS: • The evidence of prosecution establishes that Fredeswindo Eduarte, suspecting that his wife was having an illicit affair with another man, got a scissor. Upon seeing his intention, Roberto (Fredeswindo’s brother -in-law) tried to pacify him. However, instead of being appeased, Fredeswindo thrusted the scissor to Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto drove his jeep to seek the help of policemen. On the way back, he saw Fredeswindo lying flat on the road so he stopped and alighted to help. Just when Roberto was in the act of extending assistance, Florentino Eduarte, Fredeswindo’s brother, shot him, which caused his death. Not long after, the police authorities arrived and the place and looked for Florentino, but failed to locate him. • On the other hand, the defense, in its counter-statement of facts, relates that when Fredeswindo confronted his wife, Roberto butted in and berated him which resulted to an exchange of words leading to altercation. Fredeswindo defended himself by grasping a scissor from his back and thrusting it against his assailant. When Roberto’s wife saw this, she sought the help of Roberto’s three brothers and they ganged up on Fredeswindo. Julie Eduarte, Fredewindo’s brother, saw this and thereafter sought the help of their other brother, Florentino Eduarte. When Florentino arrived at the place of incident, he saw Roberto clubbing his brother who was lying, face downward and his shirt soaked with blood. • The accused-appellant maintains that he is innocent of the crime as charged invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives. Instead of making an assignment of errors, the accused-appellant states that the trial court was confronted with two conflicting versions, one asserting that Roberto Trinidad was shot while assisting Fredeswindo Eduarte and the other stating that Roberto was shot while clubbing Fredeswindo. In both cases, the appellant states that defense of relative should be appreciated. ISSUE: Whether the defense of relatives under Article II, subparagraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code can be invoked by the accused-appellant in his favour. RULE: Article II, subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: 2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstances are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. The first and second requisites are unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. Hence, it was incumbent upon the accused-appellant to prove the existence of the three essential requisites of the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein. APPLICATION: The accused-appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto Trinidad considering that the scenario he saw after he was summoned from his place of work by his other brother Julie was that of his allegedly assaulted brother Fredeswindo sprawled on the ground and bathed in his own blood with Roberto Trinidad clubbing Fredeswindo. It was when Roberto was about to deliver the final blow to Fredeswindo that the accused-appellant claimed he shot Roberto in defense of his brother. Thus, according to the accused-appellant, the second requisite is also present considering that the use of a gun at that pressing moment was reasonable and necessary to prevent or repel the aforestated unlawful aggression. As regards the third requisite, the accusedappellant contends that there is no debate as to its presence since the accused-appellant was clearly not a part of the melee in question.
CONCLUSION: We find no merit in the claim that the shooting of Roberto was done in defense of a relative. For this justifying circumstance to prosper, the evidence adduced must be persuasive. Although it is true that the accused-appellant took no part in the provocation that led to the killing incident, his testimony that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto was self-serving and uncorroborated. Hence, for lack of a clear unlawful aggression on the part of the victim Roberto and of the reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused-appellant, the justifying circumstance of defense of relative cannot be availed of. Accused-appellant Florentino Eduarte is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
MATERIAL FACTS: • The evidence of prosecution establishes that Fredeswindo Eduarte, suspecting that his wife was having an illicit affair with another man, got a scissor. Upon seeing his intention, Roberto (Fredeswindo ’s brother-in-law) tried to pacify him. However, instead of being appeased, Fredeswindo thrusted the scissor to Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto drove his jeep to seek the help of policemen. On the way back, he saw Fredeswindo lying flat on the road so he stopped and alighted to help. Just when Roberto was in the act of extending assistance, Florentino Eduarte, Fredeswindo’s brother, shot him, which caused his death. Not long after, the police authorities arrived and the place and looked for Florentino, but failed to locate him. • On the other hand, the defense, in its counter-statement of facts, relates that when Fredeswindo confronted his wife, Roberto butted in and berated him which resulted to an exchange of words leading to altercation. Fredeswindo defended himself by grasping a scissor from his back and thrusting it against his assailant. When Roberto’s wife saw this, she sought the help of Roberto’s three brothers and they ganged up on Fredeswindo. Julie Eduarte, Fredewindo’s brother, saw this and thereaft er sought the help of their other brother, Florentino Eduarte. When Florentino arrived at the place of incident, he saw Roberto clubbing his brother who was lying, face downward and his shirt soaked with blood. • The accused-appellant maintains that he is innocent of the crime as charged invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives. Instead of making an assignment of errors, the accused-appellant states that the trial court was confronted with two conflicting versions, one asserting that Roberto Trinidad was shot while assisting Fredeswindo Eduarte and the other stating that Roberto was shot while clubbing Fredeswindo. In both cases, the appellant states that defense of relative should be appreciated. ISSUE: Whether the defense of relatives under Article II, sub paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code can be invoked by the accused-appellant in his favor. RULE: •
Article II, subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: 2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstances are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. • The first and second requisites are unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. Hence, it was incumbent upon the accused-appellant to prove the existence of the three essential requisites of the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein. APPLICATION: • The accused-appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto Trinidad considering that the scenario he saw after he was summoned from his place of work by his other brother Julie was that of his allegedly assaulted brother Fredeswindo sprawled on the ground and bathed in his own blood with Roberto Trinidad clubbing Fredeswindo. It was when Roberto was about to deliver the final blow to Fredeswindo that the accused-appellant claimed he shot Roberto in defense of his brother. Thus, according to the accusedappellant, the second requisite is also present considering that the use of a gun at that pressing moment was reasonable and necessary to prevent or repel the aforestated unlawful aggression. As regards the third requisite,
the accused-appellant contends that there is no debate as to its presence since the accused-appellant was clearly not a part of the melee in question. CONCLUSION: • We find no merit in the claim that the shooting of Roberto was done in defense of a relative. For this justifying circumstance to prosper, the evidence adduced must be persuasive. Although it is true that the accusedappellant took no part in the provocation that led to the killing incident, his testimony that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto was self-serving and uncorroborated. Hence, for lack of a clear unlawful aggression on the part of the victim Roberto and of the reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused-appellant, the justifying circumstance of defense of relative cannot be availed of. Accused-appellant Florentino Eduarte is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
Buaya vs. Polo G.R. No. 75079
January 26, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of the transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila. How ever, an audit of Buaya’s account showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but the same was denied by respondent judge Polo. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner Buaya HELD: The allegations in the complaint or information determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases. §14(a) of Rule 110 provides that the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements took place. The subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is without merit. Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction since the respondent’s principal place of business is i n Manila and Buaya’s failure to remit the premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in manila. Besides, estafa is a continuing offense which may be prosecuted at any place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. Petition is DISMISSED.
CRESPO vs MOGUL GR No. L-53373 June 30, 1987 FACTS: Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estaga against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to deter arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the office of provincial Fiscal.
CARDINAL PRINCIPLE: Criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal. He may or he may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the discretion and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation, that the fiscal determines the existence of a Prima Facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court of compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information.
In a clash of views between the Judge who did not investigate and the Fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should normally prevail. The action of fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval to the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief of State Prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the Fiscal.
Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., respondents Facts: The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of estafa though falsification of public documents before the RTC of Manila. Allegedly, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Self-adjucation of a parcel of land when she knew that there were other surviving heirs. The offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action. Hence, it was tried together with the criminal case. The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the court ordered the return of the parcel of land to the surviving heirs. Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed with the CA. This was also dismissed by the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issues: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, involving a property in Bulacan. Decision: Case Remanded. There are 3 important requisites which must be present before the court can acquire criminal
jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdiction before the subject matter, the territory where the offense was committed, and over the person of the accused. In this case, the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa though falsification of public document. The court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The court also has acquire jurisdiction over the accused because whe voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority. Art. 100 of the RPC provides that “every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Art. 104 of the same Code provides that “civil liability xxx includes restitution.” In this case, the civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal action since the offended party did not reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was acquitted, this did not dissolve the civil aspect of the case. Cuyos vs. Garcia G.R. No. L-46934
April 15, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to proeperty through reckless imprudence before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment and the judge set the case for trial, but before it could commence, petitioner filed a Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos claimed that there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court and contended that the damages suffered by the Volkswagen he hit amounted to P18,000.00. He argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to three times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00=P54,000.00). Under §87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the Trial. The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case for trial. Cuyos’ verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case against Cuyos HELD: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General that the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case. The case at bar involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365, par.2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty imposable upon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. At the time the complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both People vs. Magallanes G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995 FACTS: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police Inspector Abeto’s cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis,
civilian agents: Fernandez, Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other accused secretly buried the victims in a makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a fee of P500.00 each. The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused, but the reception of evidence was suspended because of the motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the transmittal of the recors to the Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied. The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited himself. The cases were then reraffled to Branch 49 of tne Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of the case. People vs. Mariano Facts: The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing Mariano of estafa. Mariano was the Liaison Officer of Mayor Nolasco and is authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of the municipality. The property received were electric cables and cable powers amounting to P4,797.35 which he had a duty to deliver to the Mayor. However he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the items. Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information claiming that the court had no jurisdiction. He claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was indicted by the Military Commission under a charge of malversation and found guilty. He claimed that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco has already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over him. Respondent judge granted the motion to quash stating that since the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court, the case for estafa has already been heard and decided. Issue: Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over estafa and committed by a civilian Held: there is no concurrent jurisdiction
Ratio: The question of jurisdiction of respondent CFI is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1948 in Section 44 (f) provides the CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months or fine of more than 200 pesos. Estafa falls under the original jurisdiction of CFI. Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. At the time the criminal case was filed on Dec 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court is the Judiciary Act of 1948. General Order No. 49 dated Oct 4, 1974, redefines the jurisdiction of military tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa and malversation are not enumerated therein. Therefore, the Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. We do not have here a situation involving two tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that whoever takes cognizance first acquires jurisdiction exclusive of the other. The Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the crime of estafa against Mariano hence there is no concurrent jurisdiction to speak of. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts REPUBLIC vs. SUNGA June 20, 1988 FACTS: An information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. A hearing was set but was postponed since Rafael Anadilla was not yet arrested by the authorities. The court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set a new trial date. However, 4 months before the trial date, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads: “Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio. Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect. The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled. In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order. SO ORDERED. “ The order was based on an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE which was executed and notarized by the victim and mentioned that: a. he was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the case b. he had forgiven the accused c. his material witnesses could not be located, and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The provincial fiscal moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but was also denied. Hence the petition and issue of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. RATIO: The court cites a similar case Crespo v. Mogul in its when it answered that the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The rule is that once a complaint is filed, the disposition of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. The fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the court when the case has been submitted to it as his jurisdiction ends in the direction and control of the prosecution of the case. Only the court can decide what the best direction is for the case, as it is within its exclusive jurisdiction. In this case, almost 10 years have elapsed since the date of the filing of the information, hence it was not unusual that the victim could not find his witnesses, the testimonies of whom are needed to convict the accused. The fiscal still believed that he could convict the accused without thee testimonies in his MR! Although the Crespo doctrine holds that it is the courts duty to judge whether a case should be dismissed, any move of the offended part to dismiss the case, even without objection of the accused, should first be submitted to the fiscal. It is only after the fiscal’s hearing that the court should exercise its duty to continue or dismiss the case. Petition dismissed.
are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile. On the evidence presented, there is no showing that properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo Pinile). With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of First Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment or stipulation. People v. Eduarte Gr. 88232 February 26, 1990 FACTS: • The evidence of prosecution establishes that Fredeswindo Eduarte, suspecting that his wife was having an illicit affair with another man, got a scissor. Upon seeing his intention, Roberto (Fredeswindo’s brother -in-law) tried to pacify him. However, instead of being appeased, Fredeswindo thrusted the scissor to Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto drove his jeep to seek the help of policemen. On the way back, he saw Fredeswindo lying flat on the road so he stopped and alighted to help. Just when Roberto was in the act of extending assistance, Florentino Eduarte, Fredeswindo’s brother, shot him, which caused his death. Not long after, the police authorities arrived and the place and looked for Florentino, but failed to locate him. • On the other hand, the defense, in its counter-statement of facts, relates that when Fredeswindo confronted his wife, Roberto butted in and berated him which resulted to an exchange of words leading to altercation. Fredeswindo defended himself by grasping a scissor from his back and thrusting it against his assailant. When Roberto’s wife saw this, she sought the help of Roberto’s three brothers and they ganged up on Fredeswindo. Julie Eduarte, Fredewindo’s brother, saw this and thereafter sought the help of their other brother, Florentino Eduarte. When Florentino arrived at the place of incident, he saw Roberto clubbing his brother who was lying, face downward and his shirt soaked with blood. • The accused-appellant maintains that he is innocent of the crime as charged invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives. Instead of making an assignment of errors, the accused-appellant states that the trial court was confronted with two conflicting versions, one asserting that Roberto Trinidad was shot while assisting Fredeswindo Eduarte and the other stating that Roberto was shot while clubbing Fredeswindo. In both cases, the appellant states that defense of relative should be appreciated. ISSUE: Whether the defense of relatives under Article II, subparagraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code can be invoked by the accused-appellant in his favour. RULE: Article II, subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: 2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstances are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. The first and second requisites are unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. Hence, it was incumbent upon the accused-appellant to prove the existence of the three essential requisites of the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein. APPLICATION: The accused-appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto Trinidad considering that the scenario he saw after he was summoned from his place of work by his other brother Julie was that of his allegedly assaulted brother Fredeswindo sprawled on the ground and bathed in his own blood with Roberto Trinidad clubbing Fredeswindo. It was when Roberto was about to deliver the final blow to Fredeswindo that the accused-appellant claimed he shot Roberto in defense of his brother. Thus, according to the accused-appellant, the second requisite is also present considering that the use of a gun at that pressing moment was reasonable and necessary to prevent or repel the aforestated unlawful aggression. As regards the third requisite, the accusedappellant contends that there is no debate as to its presence since the accused-appellant was clearly not a part of the melee in question.
CONCLUSION: We find no merit in the claim that the shooting of Roberto was done in defense of a relative. For this justifying circumstance to prosper, the evidence adduced must be persuasive. Although it is true that the accused-appellant took no part in the provocation that led to the killing incident, his testimony that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto was self-serving and uncorroborated. Hence, for lack of a clear unlawful aggression on the part of the victim Roberto and of the reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused-appellant, the justifying circumstance of defense of relative cannot be availed of. Accused-appellant Florentino Eduarte is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
MATERIAL FACTS: • The evidence of prosecution establishes that Fredeswindo Eduarte, suspecting that his wife was having an illicit affair with another man, got a scissor. Upon seeing his intention, Roberto (Fredeswindo ’s brother-in-law) tried to pacify him. However, instead of being appeased, Fredeswindo thrusted the scissor to Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto drove his jeep to seek the help of policemen. On the way back, he saw Fredeswindo lying flat on the road so he stopped and alighted to help. Just when Roberto was in the act of extending assistance, Florentino Eduarte, Fredeswindo’s brother, shot him, which caused his death. Not long after, the police authorities arrived and the place and looked for Florentino, but failed to locate him. • On the other hand, the defense, in its counter-statement of facts, relates that when Fredeswindo confronted his wife, Roberto butted in and berated him which resulted to an exchange of words leading to altercation. Fredeswindo defended himself by grasping a scissor from his back and thrusting it against his assailant. When Roberto’s wife saw this, she sought the help of Roberto’s three brothers and they ganged up on Fredeswindo. Julie Eduarte, Fredewindo’s brother, saw this and thereaft er sought the help of their other brother, Florentino Eduarte. When Florentino arrived at the place of incident, he saw Roberto clubbing his brother who was lying, face downward and his shirt soaked with blood. • The accused-appellant maintains that he is innocent of the crime as charged invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives. Instead of making an assignment of errors, the accused-appellant states that the trial court was confronted with two conflicting versions, one asserting that Roberto Trinidad was shot while assisting Fredeswindo Eduarte and the other stating that Roberto was shot while clubbing Fredeswindo. In both cases, the appellant states that defense of relative should be appreciated. ISSUE: Whether the defense of relatives under Article II, sub paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code can be invoked by the accused-appellant in his favor. RULE: •
Article II, subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: 2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstances are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. • The first and second requisites are unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. Hence, it was incumbent upon the accused-appellant to prove the existence of the three essential requisites of the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein. APPLICATION: • The accused-appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto Trinidad considering that the scenario he saw after he was summoned from his place of work by his other brother Julie was that of his allegedly assaulted brother Fredeswindo sprawled on the ground and bathed in his own blood with Roberto Trinidad clubbing Fredeswindo. It was when Roberto was about to deliver the final blow to Fredeswindo that the accused-appellant claimed he shot Roberto in defense of his brother. Thus, according to the accusedappellant, the second requisite is also present considering that the use of a gun at that pressing moment was reasonable and necessary to prevent or repel the aforestated unlawful aggression. As regards the third requisite,
the accused-appellant contends that there is no debate as to its presence since the accused-appellant was clearly not a part of the melee in question. CONCLUSION: • We find no merit in the claim that the shooting of Roberto was done in defense of a relative. For this justifying circumstance to prosper, the evidence adduced must be persuasive. Although it is true that the accusedappellant took no part in the provocation that led to the killing incident, his testimony that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto was self-serving and uncorroborated. Hence, for lack of a clear unlawful aggression on the part of the victim Roberto and of the reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused-appellant, the justifying circumstance of defense of relative cannot be availed of. Accused-appellant Florentino Eduarte is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
Buaya vs. Polo G.R. No. 75079
January 26, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of the transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila. How ever, an audit of Buaya’s account showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but the same was denied by respondent judge Polo. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner Buaya HELD: The allegations in the complaint or information determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases. §14(a) of Rule 110 provides that the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements took place. The subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is without merit. Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction since the respondent’s principal place of business is i n Manila and Buaya’s failure to remit the premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in manila. Besides, estafa is a continuing offense which may be prosecuted at any place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. Petition is DISMISSED.
CRESPO vs MOGUL GR No. L-53373 June 30, 1987 FACTS: Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estaga against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to deter arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the office of provincial Fiscal.
CARDINAL PRINCIPLE: Criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal. He may or he may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the discretion and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation, that the fiscal determines the existence of a Prima Facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court of compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information.
In a clash of views between the Judge who did not investigate and the Fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should normally prevail. The action of fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval to the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief of State Prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the Fiscal.
Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., respondents Facts: The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of estafa though falsification of public documents before the RTC of Manila. Allegedly, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Self-adjucation of a parcel of land when she knew that there were other surviving heirs. The offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action. Hence, it was tried together with the criminal case. The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the court ordered the return of the parcel of land to the surviving heirs. Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed with the CA. This was also dismissed by the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issues: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, involving a property in Bulacan. Decision: Case Remanded. There are 3 important requisites which must be present before the court can acquire criminal
jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdiction before the subject matter, the territory where the offense was committed, and over the person of the accused. In this case, the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa though falsification of public document. The court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The court also has acquire jurisdiction over the accused because whe voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority. Art. 100 of the RPC provides that “every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Art. 104 of the same Code provides that “civil liability xxx includes restitution.” In this case, the civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal action since the offended party did not reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was acquitted, this did not dissolve the civil aspect of the case. Cuyos vs. Garcia G.R. No. L-46934
April 15, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to proeperty through reckless imprudence before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment and the judge set the case for trial, but before it could commence, petitioner filed a Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos claimed that there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court and contended that the damages suffered by the Volkswagen he hit amounted to P18,000.00. He argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to three times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00=P54,000.00). Under §87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the Trial. The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case for trial. Cuyos’ verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case against Cuyos HELD: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General that the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case. The case at bar involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365, par.2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty imposable upon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. At the time the complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both People vs. Magallanes G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995 FACTS: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police Inspector Abeto’s cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis,
civilian agents: Fernandez, Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other accused secretly buried the victims in a makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a fee of P500.00 each. The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused, but the reception of evidence was suspended because of the motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the transmittal of the recors to the Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied. The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited himself. The cases were then reraffled to Branch 49 of tne Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of the case. People vs. Mariano Facts: The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing Mariano of estafa. Mariano was the Liaison Officer of Mayor Nolasco and is authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of the municipality. The property received were electric cables and cable powers amounting to P4,797.35 which he had a duty to deliver to the Mayor. However he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the items. Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information claiming that the court had no jurisdiction. He claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was indicted by the Military Commission under a charge of malversation and found guilty. He claimed that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco has already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over him. Respondent judge granted the motion to quash stating that since the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court, the case for estafa has already been heard and decided. Issue: Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over estafa and committed by a civilian Held: there is no concurrent jurisdiction
Ratio: The question of jurisdiction of respondent CFI is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1948 in Section 44 (f) provides the CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months or fine of more than 200 pesos. Estafa falls under the original jurisdiction of CFI. Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. At the time the criminal case was filed on Dec 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court is the Judiciary Act of 1948. General Order No. 49 dated Oct 4, 1974, redefines the jurisdiction of military tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa and malversation are not enumerated therein. Therefore, the Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. We do not have here a situation involving two tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that whoever takes cognizance first acquires jurisdiction exclusive of the other. The Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the crime of estafa against Mariano hence there is no concurrent jurisdiction to speak of. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts REPUBLIC vs. SUNGA June 20, 1988 FACTS: An information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. A hearing was set but was postponed since Rafael Anadilla was not yet arrested by the authorities. The court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set a new trial date. However, 4 months before the trial date, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads: “Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio. Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect. The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled. In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order. SO ORDERED. “ The order was based on an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE which was executed and notarized by the victim and mentioned that: a. he was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the case b. he had forgiven the accused c. his material witnesses could not be located, and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The provincial fiscal moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but was also denied. Hence the petition and issue of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. RATIO: The court cites a similar case Crespo v. Mogul in its when it answered that the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The rule is that once a complaint is filed, the disposition of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. The fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the court when the case has been submitted to it as his jurisdiction ends in the direction and control of the prosecution of the case. Only the court can decide what the best direction is for the case, as it is within its exclusive jurisdiction. In this case, almost 10 years have elapsed since the date of the filing of the information, hence it was not unusual that the victim could not find his witnesses, the testimonies of whom are needed to convict the accused. The fiscal still believed that he could convict the accused without thee testimonies in his MR! Although the Crespo doctrine holds that it is the courts duty to judge whether a case should be dismissed, any move of the offended part to dismiss the case, even without objection of the accused, should first be submitted to the fiscal. It is only after the fiscal’s hearing that the court should exercise its duty to continue or dismiss the case. Petition dismissed.
