August 26- General Principles of Criminal Liability
A. Definition of Felony- Art. 3
B. Elements of Criminal Liability
1. Physical element (Actus reus)
2. Mental element (Mens rea)
a. Deliberate intent (Dolo)
ii. General and Specific Intent*
iii. Mistake of Fact**
iv. Malum prohibitum- exception to mens rea**
v. Distinguished from motive
b. Constructive intent (Culpa) - Art. 365
ii. Imprudence or lack of skill
iii. Negligence or Lack of Foresight*
c. Transferred Intent - Art. 4 Par. 1
i. Aberration ictus*
ii. Error in personae
iii. Praeter intentionem- Art. 13 Par.3*
4. Resulting harm
C. Liability for incomplete elements
1. Impossible crime- Art. 4 Par. 2**
2. Uncompleted crimes
a. Attempted and frustrated felonies, in general- Arts. 6 and 7*
b. Examples of Specific Felonies
i. Physical Injuries (Art. 236-266), Homicide (Art. 249), Murder (Art. 248) ****
iii. Robbery (Art. 293)*
iv. Illegal Trespass (Arts. 280-281)*
v. Rape (Art. 266-A) *
D. Liability for multiple, complex and continuing crimes - Arts. 9 and 48***
*The omission must be punishable by law
*This omission is not punishable by law
People v. Sylvestre and Atienza (1931) Villa-Real, J. RIA
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza
Summary of Proceedings:
Court of First Instance of Bulacan - both convicted of arson, with Atienza as principal, and
Silvestre as accomplice
Supreme Court - Judgment against Atienza affirmed; against Silvestre, reversed, with only
one half of costs.
On May 16, 1930, a complaint for adultery was filed against defendants Atienza and
Silvestre by Silvestre‟s husband, Domingo Joaquin. The defendants voluntarily signed a
promise that they would discontinue cohabitation, and they would leave the barrio of
Masocol; thus, charges were dismissed.
On November 23, 1930, Silvestre met her son, Nicolas de la Cruz in barrio Santo Nino, and
with the pretext of asking for nipa leaves, went to his house in barrio Masocol, and
remained there. Atienza followed her soon after. On the night of November 25, 1930,
Atienza told de la Cruz and his wife Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because
he was going to burn it, as revenge to the people of Masocol. Atienza was armed with a
pistol, so no one dared say anything to him, not even SIlvestre. de la Cruz and his wife left
to inform the barrio lieutenant, but shortly after they left, Atienza set the house on fire,
forcing them to go back. The fire destroyed about 48 houses.
1. WON the lower court erred in convicting Silvestre as an accomplice - YES
1. An accomplice is one who does not take a direct part in the commission of a wrongful act,
but cooperates in its execution by previous or simultaneous actions. Silvestre‟s silence and
inaction does not reach a certain degree of complicity in the commission of the crime to be
penalized, as there is no evidence that she encouraged or nerved Atienza to burn the
house, nor is there evidence that she morally, or materially cooperated with him.
In contrast, Atienza set fire to the house without knowing if there are people inside the other
houses. So even if the house he set fire to was vacant, he committed the crime of arson as
per Art. 550 (2) of the RPC
Affirmed with reference to Atienza; reversed for Silvestre, with one half of the costs de
*This omission is punishable by law (Art. 19, par 3, RPC)
People v. Talingdan (1978) RIA
Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra
People of the Philippines v. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro
Bides, and Teresa Domogma
Summary of Proceedings:
Court of First Instance of Abra - all accused guilty of murder and sentenced to life
Supreme Court - Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, and Bides sentenced to death, Domogma
sentenced to 5-8 years plus costs.
On June 24, 1967, Bernardo Bagabag was shot in his house in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra.
One of the accused, Teresa Domogma, is Bernardo's supposed wife. She has been having
an affair with her co-accused, Nemesio Talingdan, to the point that Teresa was gone for
more than three weeks with Talingdan. Two days before Bernardo was killed, he and
Teresa had a violent quarrel, and he slapped Teresa several times, prompting her to call the
police. Talingdan, who is a policeman, arrived, and asked Bernardo to come down. When
the latter did not come down, the former warned Bernardo that he will kill him.
The next morning, Corazon, Bernardo and Teresa's daughter, saw Talingdan, Teresa, and
their other co-accused in a hut, and she overheard one of them say 'Could he elude a
bullet'. When Teresa saw Corazon, she shoved her away and told her to tell her father that
they will kill him.
Around sunset the next day, Corazon saw all of the accused 3-4 meters from the batalan,
conversing in subdued tones. They were carrying long guns. A few minutes later, she called
her parents to supper, but they did not come. After eating, she called her parents again, and
when her father came up, she informed him of the people downstairs. Bernardo sat near the
door, and suddenly, he was fired upon from below the stairs of the batalan. The four male
appellants then climbed the stairs, and Tobias fired at Bernardo, seeing he was still alive.
Bides saw Corazon, and warned her not to call for help, or he will kill her. A few minutes
after, Teresa came out of her room, and told Corazon not to say anything to anyone, or she
will be killed.
Teresa, on the other hand, gave an opposite account, saying that she loved her husband
very much, she only knows Talingdan as a policeman, she never left the home for long
periods of time, and her mother-in-law disliked her because she could not get Bernardo's
earnings. Later, when police questioned her, she said that she did not have any suspects in
The other accused said that they were in other places when the crime was committed.
1. WON the appellants are guilty of the crime they are accused of. - Yes and things.
1. The Court fully believes the testimony of Corazon, with the exception of Teresa telling her
that she will kill her father, because of Corazon's failure to relay the message to her father.
The male accused are guilty of murder qualified by treachery. There was evident
premeditation, and conspiracy.
2. There was nothing inherently unnatural in Corazon's testimony, as she is in a stage when
she is little influenced by the suggestion of others, lying is distasteful to her, and she would
never lose an opportunity to be right in what she affirms. She also has no motive to make-
up her account of her father's shooting.
3. The accused failed to present vital witnesses that they mentioned in their respective
account, such as Mrs. Bayongan, with whom Tobias, Berras and Bides supposedly stayed
during the murder, and Mayor Banawa, with whom Talingdan was supposedly with.
4. Teresa is at the very least an accessory to the crime, because although she did not
directly participate in the conspiracy to kill her husband, her claim that she did not have
suspects in mind constitutes 'concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the
Death sentence for the male accused, and five years of prision correcional to eight years of
prision mayor with accessory penalties for Teresa Domogma.
General and Specific Intent
*Accused do not have specific intent for crimes they are accused with
People v. Puno (1993) Regalado, J. RIA
GR No. 97471
Appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias 'Beloy,' and Enrique Amurao y
Puno, alias 'Enry'
Summary of Proceedings:
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City - Guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a
Supreme Court - Guilty of robbery
On January 13, 1988, Mrs. Ma. Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento was fetched by the accused Puno
from her bakery, because, according to Puno, her usual driver had to attend to an
emergency in Pampanga. On the way to their home in Valle Verde, Enrique Amurao was let
in on a corner of Araneta Avenue and pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento. Puno asked for all
of Sarmiento's money in her bag, which amounted to 7000 Php.
Along the way, the two accused told her that they wanted 100 000 Php more. Sarmiento
agreed, but asked to be dropped off at a gas station in Makati where the money is. While
traversing the North superhighway, Puno asked Sarmiento to issue a check for 100 000
Php. Sarmiento obliged, and wrote three checks.
At one point of the journey, Sarmiento stated that she jumped out of the car and hitchhiked
in a fish vendor's van to Balintawak, where she reported the matter to CAPCOM. Both
accused were arrested the day after, trying to encash one of the checks in Makati, and
charged with kidnapping for ransom. They were found guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway (PD 532) by the QC RTC.
However, according to the accused Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion road and
let Sarmiento step out of the car. He said he needed the money to cure his ulcers.
1. WON the accused committed kidnapping for ransom under article 267 of the RPC - No
2. WON the accused committed a violation of PD 532- No
3. WON the accused committed the offense of simple robbery - Yes
1. The accused did not commit kidnapping for ransom because there is no 'indubitable
proof' that they have motive and specific intent of depriving the complainant of her personal
liberty. Their only motive, as they have admitted, is to extort money from Sarmiento.
2. The accused did not commit highway robbery/brigandage because their robbery was
perpetrated against a predetermined or particular victim. This is in contrast to the definition
of highway robbers/brigandage. To consider such an isolated act to be a highway robbery
would be 'an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.'
Furthermore, the fact that they happened to be traveling on a highway while the robbery is
being committed does not make the simple robbery a highway robbery. The intent of the law
should not be subordinated to its literal interpretation.
3. The accused are guilty of robbery as defined in Art. 293 of the RPC, as they have acted
with conspiracy, as shown by their 'unity of thought and community of purpose.'
They can also be convicted of robbery despite the charge against them being kidnapping for
ransom, because robbery is necessarily included in kidnapping for random. The negation of
the charge of kidnapping for ransom cannot similarly negate the elements of robbery
Accused are convicted of robbery, imposing on each of them 4 yrs. and 2 mos. of prision
correciona to 10 yrs. of prision mayor, in addition to damages paid jointly and severally to
Sarmiento. (7k actual, 20k moral)
Mistake of Fact
U.S. v. Ah Chong (1910) Carson, J. JONI
US (plaintiff-appellee) vs Ah Chong (defendant-appellant)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Summary of Proceedings:
Trial court- charged with assassination and found guilty of simple homicide
August 14 1908, 10pm: defendant was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force
open the door of his room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, “who is there?” Fearing
that the intruder was a robber/thief, he leapt to his feet and called out “if you enter the room,
I will kill you.” At that moment, he was struck by the chair which had been placed against
the door. He seized a kitchen knife from under his pillow (which he kept for personal
protection) and struck out at the intruder who turned out to be his roommate, Pascual.
WON one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of mistake of fact, does an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them
to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide if the actor had known the true state
of facts at the time when he committed the act- NO
There is no criminal liability under such circumstances, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In view of all the facts
as they appeared to the defendant, he acted in good faith, without malice/criminal intent, in
the belief that he was exercising his right of self-defense.
Judgment reversed. Defendant acquitted.
People v. Oanis (1943) Moran, J. JONI
People of the Philippines (plaintiff-appellee) vs Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
Summary of Proceedings:
Court of First Instance- defendants charged with murder of Serapio Tecson and found guilty
of homicide through reckless imprudence
December 24 1938, afternoon: Appellants Corporal Alberto Galanta and Chief of
Police/Provincial Inspector Oanis were instructed to arrest escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house,
appellants went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door,
simultaneously or successively fired at him without first making any reasonable inquiry as to
Issue: WON appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their
official duties and therefore do not incur criminal liability- NO
Appellants cannot claim mistake of fact because they had found no circumstances which
would press them to immediate action. Further, they are not justified in using unnecessary
force when the arrest could be effected otherwise. Where an unlawful fact is willfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim is not reckless imprudence.
Judgment modified. Appellants found guilty of murder (with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery) and mitigating circumstance consisting of the incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in Art. 11, No. 5 of RPC. The appellants had acted in the performance of a duty, but
the injury committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty.
Malum Prohibitum-Exception to Mens Rea
Padilla v. Dizon (1988) Per Curiam JM
Alexander Padilla vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon
The respondent judge‟s decision to acquit the defendant in the case of “People vs. Lo Chi
Fai” where the defendant was accused of smuggling foreign currency out of the country is
the issue in this complaint. After rendering his decision, this administrative complaint was
then filed against him, accusing the judge of rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due
to, at the very least, gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. The facts of “Lo
Chi Fai” are as follows. Lo Chi Fai, a tourist, was caught by a customs guard at the Manila
International Airport carrying various foreign currencies and foreign instruments, 380 pieces,
that together totalled US$ 355,349.57. This is in violation of Sec. 6 of Circular No. 960 of the
Central Bank, which provides:
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or
transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through other persons, through the mails or through
international carriers except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under existing international
agreements or Central Bank regulations.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding
such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of establishing the amount of foreign exchange brought
in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
At the time of defendant‟s apprehension, he only had two currency declarations which were
far below what was needed to account for the rest of his foreign currency. At the trial he put
forth a fanciful story about how he had been collecting investments from various business
partners to establish a business in the Philippines, but they had recently decided that with
the unrest going on in the country owing to the recent transition in administration, investing
in the Philippines was unwise, and so they had decided to pull out their funds.
1. Is mens rea or malice required in offenses that are punished by special laws, and thus
are mala prohibita? NO
2. Did the respondent commit his erroneous ruling in good faith? NO
1. In crimes that are punished by special laws and are mala prohibita, mens rea, also known
as malice or deliberate intent, is not necessary for conviction. The mere act of violation of
the special law is enough to convict the violator. Good faith is not a viable defense against
crimes mala prohibita.
2. The problem with Lo Chi Fai‟s story is that the SC felt it was too full of holes and was far
from plausible, and they proceeded to expose its various inconsistencies and incredulous
portions. And yet the respondent judge bought it “hook, line, and sinker,” in the words of the
SC. Beyond this however, the insistence of the respondent to require proof of mens rea
shows his lack of knowledge regarding crimes mala prohibita, which he as a judge should
have been fully aware of. He in fact even gave back the sum of $3000 to Lo Chi Fai despite
it not being required anywhere in law. And so the SC wrote: “These and other
circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as
to render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of
the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith."
His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound
and fair administration of justice.”
The respondent judge was ordered DISMISSED from the service.
Magno v. CA (1992) Paras, J.JONI
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI to review decision of Court of Appeals
Magno (petitioner) vs. Court of Appeals (respondent)
Summary of Proceedings:
Regional Trial Court of QC- accused petitioner found guilty of four counts of violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
Court of Appeals- affirmed in toto RTC‟s decision
-Lacking funds to purchase equipment to put up his car repair shop, petitioner Oriel Magno
approached Corazon Teng, VP of Mancor Industries (Mancor) which was a distributor of his
needed car repair service equipment.
- Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance) and
advised its VP, Joey Gomez, that Mancor could supply the necessary pieces of equipment if
LS Finance could provide petitioner with credit facilities.
- Petitioner entered into an agreement with LS finance whereby (a) petitioner has to put up
a warranty deposit (Php29, 790) which shall be refunded to the lessee upon the satisfactory
completion of the entire period of lease (b) LS finance would pay the corresponding rent
with the option to buy the same
- Prior to entering the agreement, petitioner requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to
look for a third party who could lend him the warranty deposit. Unknown to petitioner, it was
Teng who advanced the deposit in question on the condition that the same would be paid
as a short term loan with interest.
- Petitioner issued six postdated checks as payment for the loan (on the warranty deposit).
2 checks were cleared while 4 were held momentarily by Teng on the request that they
were not covered with sufficient funds.
- Petitioner subsequently could not pay LS Finance for its monthly rentals and it was then
he became aware that it was Teng who advanced the warranty deposit.
- Teng was approached by petitioner who promised to pay but the payment never came and
she deposited the checks which were returned for the reason „account closed‟
1. WON petitioner is guilty of violating the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22)- NO
2. WON post-dated checks were issued “to apply on account or for value” as required by
Sec. 1 of BP Blg. 22- NO
1. The warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner since the “cash out”
made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner. The “warranty deposit” remained with LS
Finance and was not withdrawn by petitioner as it was not his own account.
2. The four checks were issued to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the
receipt of an actual “account or credit for value”. The charged violation‟s requisite of
knowledge on the part of the maker of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is absent in
the case since petitioner disclosed that he did not have the funds to pay for the warranty
Appealed decision is reversed. Accused-petitioner acquitted.
Note: Mere act of issuing a worthless check is a special offense punishable by the Anti-
Bouncing Checks Law and is Malum Prohibitum. In cases of Mala Prohibita, the only inquiry
is whether or not the law had been violated and proof of criminal intent is not necessary for
the conviction of the accused. The acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.
Negligence or Lack of Foresight
People v. Pugay (1988) Medialdea, J. JM
Petition for Review of Decision in RTC
On or about May 19, 1982, the accused, Pugay and Samson, set fire to the deceased,
Miranda, a retardate, at a town fiesta fair in Rosario, Cavite. Gabion, who was sitting in the
Ferris Wheel and reading a comic, witnessed the events and his testimony is the main
source of the antecedent facts. After midnight, Pugay and his companions including
Samson, arrived at the fair and upon seeing Miranda, who was a friend of Pugay‟s,
proceeded to engage in poking fun at him and generally horsing around. At some point,
Pugay then grabbed a can of gasoline from under the Ferris Wheel, and poured it on
Miranda, while Gabion told him to desist. Samson then set Miranda on fire, turning him into
a human torch, and he died as a result. Pugay insists that he did not know that the
container was full of gasoline, thinking that it instead contained water.
1. Was there premeditation and forethought as well as conspiracy on the part of the
accused-appellants, which would constitute murder as opposed to homicide? NO
2. Was there treachery on the part of the accused-appellants? NO
1. The accused were held to have acted separately and thus are responsible only for their
individual acts, hence the varying degrees of punishment accorded each one. Thus there
was no conspiracy on their part. There was no premeditation as well regarding the death of
the deceased, as it all seems to have been a spontaneous meeting which led to an
interaction that was originally mere fun and games and horsing around, and there was no
prior animosity between any of the parties which might have been cause for a planned
attack. Homicide is the proper sentence for the crime at bar.
2. No, because “for the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and
the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.” The facts do not support the claim that treachery was
involved in this crime.
Decision affirmed with the modifications listed below.
Pugay‟s sentence reduced from the range of 12 years (prision mayor) to 20 years (reclusion
temporal), to the range of 4 months (arresto mayor) to 4 years and 2 months (prision
correcional), for the crime of homicide by reckless imprudence as defined in Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. From U.S. vs. Maleza:
“A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for
such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through
culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.”
Samson‟s sentence reduced from reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) to 8 years (prision
mayor) to 14 years (reclusion temporal) for the crime of homicide, with the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave an act (praeter intentionem).
People v Guillen MIGGY
Julio Guillen (defendant-appellant) was arrested for having thrown 2 hand grenades, which
caused the death of Simeon Varela and serious injuries of 4 other men, during the meeting
held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. The said meeting was
attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, and other prominent people in government,
among others. According to Guillen, he did it voluntarily in order to kill the President whom
he finds disappointing for his alleged failure to fulfill the promises made during the
presidential elections campaign.
WON the act is considered to be (1) homicide through reckless imprudence or (2) murder
and multiple frustrated murder
Murder and multiple frustrated murder. In throwing hand grenade at the President with the
intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Moreover, Guillen was aware
that by throwing the grenade, he would endanger not only the President but also those
people around him, a decision he thought was justifiable since these people were
associated with the President, leading further credence to the fact that the act was voluntary
and done with malice.
Praeter intentionem - Art. 13 Par. 3
People v. Albuquerque (1933) Avancena, C.J. JM
Appeal of Judgment of Homicide
The accused-appellant is a 55-year-old widower, who is partially paralyzed and lacks
control of his right arm and limps with his left leg. He has nine children, most of whom live
with one of his daughters, Maria, as well as himself. Pilar, a daughter of his who lives with
Maria, had had intimate relations with the deceased, and bore a child by him. When the
appellant found out about this, he urged the deceased to marry his daughter and support
her and their child. Of note is that the deceased had already agreed to give a monthly
amount of money for the child but had so far failed to carry it out. One day, the accused
decided to visit the deceased at his place of work and confront him regarding the situation
with Pilar and the child. Upon the deceased‟s refusal of the accused‟s proposal that the
former marry Pilar, the latter whipped out his penknife and stabbed the former at the base of
the neck. The accused however maintains that it was not his intention to kill the deceased,
as he only intended to cut his face and leave a scar, something he had threatened to do in
his letters to the deceased. He holds that killing the deceased would have served him no
purpose as he had in fact wanted him to marry his daughter and look after their child
together. The reason given for the error in the blow stricken is the lack of control in the
accused‟s arm owing to his paralysis.
1. WON the accused acted in self-defense. NO
1. As the appellant was the one who first brandished a weapon, the penknife, and
proceeded to attack, he cannot claim self-defense. However, praeter intentionem may be
used as a mitigating circumstance owing to lack of intent to kill.
Decision affirmed, with modifications due to the three mitigating circumstances present,
which are 1) lack of intention to cause so grave an injury (praeter intentionem), 2) the
appellant‟s voluntary surrender to the authorities, and 3) acting under the influence of
passion and obfuscation, as well as there being no aggravating circumstance. Penalty thus
modified from eight years and one day (prision mayor), to indeterminate penalty of 1 year
(prision correcional) to 8 years and 1 day (prision mayor), with same costs.
Bataclan v. Medina (1957) Montemayor, J. JM
Appeal from lower court to CA, but endorsed by CA to SC because of the value involved in
Shortly after midnight on Sept. 13, 1952, bus no. 30 of Medina Transportation owned by
Medina, the owner defendant in the case, and driven by Saylon, its regular chauffeur, was
transporting the deceased, Bataclan, along with 17 other passengers including the driver
and the conductor, from Amadeo, Cavite to Pasay City. At around 2 in the morning, a front
tire burst and the bus zigzagged into a ditch in the area of Imus, Cavite. While the rest of
the passengers managed to escape, 4 passengers, Bataclan included, were trapped inside
and could not get out. Thirty minutes later, upon cries of help from the passengers, 10 men
arrived from the nearby neighborhood, bringing with them a lit torch. Upon approaching the
bus, the bus burst into flame, for apparently gasoline had leaked out when the bus had
turned turtle, and soaked the bus and the area around it. The 4 passengers trapped inside
were burned to death. It was later established that the bus was speeding at the time the tire
burst, and besides this that the tires were old and the driver had previously been instructed
to replace them but had failed to do so. The lower court only awarded damages against the
defendant based on the physical injuries sustained by Bataclan before the bus caught fire,
in the belief that the proximate cause of death was not the overturning of the bus but rather
the fire that burned the bus.
1. What is the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan and the other trapped passengers?
1. The SC cites this passage from American jurisprudence, which states: “that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
It was only a natural consequence that in that rural area the people living there would use a
torch as a source of light and would innocently approach the overturned bus to see how
they could help. The leaking of the gasoline is also a natural result of the overturning of the
bus. And so the overturning of the bus, which is due to the negligence of the driver as
demonstrated by his speeding and lack of care for the vehicle‟s roadworthy condition with
regard to the state of the tires, is still the proximate cause of the deaths of the trapped
passengers. In fact, the bus bursting into flame can also be attributed to the negligence of
the carrier through its agents, the driver and the conductor, to whom it did not occur that
gasoline may very well have leaked out of the bus, and so could have warned those bearing
the torch not to get too close.
Affirmed with modifications to the RTC decision from 1000 to 6000 pesos in damages, and
from 600 to 800 pesos in attorney‟s fees.
Intod v. CA MIGGY
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner Sulpicio Intod, together with other men, wanted to kill Bernardina Palangpangan
due to a land dispute between them. At about 10 o clock in the evening of the same day, he
and his men arrived at Palangpangan‟s house, went to the location of the bedroom, and
fired at said room. It turned out that Palangpangan was not there at the time.
The RTC convicted him of attempted murder and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
WON the crime is attempted murder or an impossible crime
Impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category; the factual
situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended
crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
PETITION GRANTED; Decision of CA MODIFIED. Having in mind the social danger and
degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months ofarresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law,
and to pay the costs.
People v. Saladino JR
Appeal to the decision of court of first instance
In the night of June 23, 1948 Corporal Saladino and Private Alejo were sleeping in a house
in Paoay, Ilocos Norte together with three policemen of the municipality. They're on patrol
duty to apprehend those who fired upon their dwelling on a previous night. They were
awakened by cries for help by Felix Pasion saying he was robbed by Luis Bernabe at
around midnight. The next morning Saladino and Alejo together with the policemen went to
Luis Bernabe's house. They brought the latter to Pasion's house for questioning. Bernabe
denied the accusation. Saladino repeatedly boxed and kicked Bernabe in different parts of
his body but he continued to deny. Saladino hit Bernabe with a piece of wood and the
former called Alejo to take his turn. Alejo reluctantly hit Bernabe four times and left.
Saladino continued to question and beat Bernabe. Saladino then tied Bernabe's wrists
together and made him hang on the ceiling. He continued to hit Bernabe. One of the
policemen told Saladino to stop and just bring Bernabe to their HQ to continue their
investigation. Saladino refused and continued beating Bernabe. Bernabe was untied and
was made to sit on a chair. He continued to deny so Saladino kicked the chair causing the
former to fall on the floor. Saladino kicked Bernabe until the latter remained motionless on
the floor. The former stepped on the latter's throat and chest to show that the latter was
faking death. Bernabe was left alone for 15 minutes but he didn't move nor breathe. An old
man checked Bernabe's pulse and said that the latter was dead. Saladino ordered Alejo to
shoot Bernabe's dead body and just say that he ran away. Alejo complied and shot the
body four times.
WON Alejo has criminal liability.
WON there was due process given to Bernabe.
WON there was conspiracy between Saladino and Alejo.
Bernabe died as a consequence of Saladino's violent mauling. The latter must be declared
guilty of assassination. Alejo did not appear to have conspired with Saladino and is not
liable for the death of Bernabe but Alejo is guilty as accessory after the fact because by
following the orders of Saladino, the former tried to conceal the crime.
Saladino was convicted of the murder of Bernabe and given the penalty that will be in
accordance with the law. Alejo was declared an accessory after the fact and given a penalty
of imprisonment not less than 3 years of prision correctional nor more than 6 years and 2
months of prision mayor.
Attempted and frustrated felonies in general- Arts.6 and 7
U.S. v. Eduave MIGGY
Protasio Eduave struck a girl toward a vital part of the body; thinking that he had killed the
girl, he threw the body into the bushes
WON the crime is murder or homicide , and whether it is attempted or frustrated
Article 3, Penal Code (Article 6 Revised Penal Code): A felony is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a
consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The crime was frustrated murder. The defendant performed all of the acts which should
have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime
cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the
crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing
all of the acts which should produce the crime.
Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing
through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the
intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender.
MODIFIED. AFFIRMED WITH COSTS (thirteen years of cadena temporal)
Physical Injuries (Art.263-266), Homicide (Art.249), Murder (Art.248)
People v. Borinaga JR
Appeal to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the conviction of Borinaga
for his crime of frustrated murder
Prior to March 4, 1929, an American by the name of Harry H. Mooney, a resident of the
municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with one Juan Lawaan for the construction of a
fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction of the corral.
On the morning of March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop
and tried to collect from him the whole amount fixed by the contract even if only about two-
thirds of the fish corral had been finished. Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon at
that time. Lawaan warned him that if he did not pay, something would happen to him.
Lawaan left with his men, and Mooney returned to his shop. On the evening of the same
day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua Najarro. He had taken
a seat on a chair in front of Perpetua, his back being to the window. Perpetua saw Basilio
Borinaga from the window strike with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the
knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the
chair as a result of the force of the blow, but was not injured. Borinaga ran away towards
the market place. Before this occurred, it should be stated that Borinaga had been heard to
tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an American brute." After the attack,
Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the back of Mooney but only the back of
the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the first
attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so because Mooney and
Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him
away. Again the same night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed his mark
and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight. The point of the knife was
subsequently, on examination of the chair, found embedded in it.
WON the facts constitute frustrated murder or attempted murder within
the meaning of article 3 of the Penal Code
The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. The aggressor
stated his purpose, which was to kill, and apologized to his friends for not accomplishing
that purpose. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed treacherously toward vital
organs of the victim. The means used were entirely suitable for accomplishment. The crime
should, therefore, be qualified as murder because of the presence of the circumstance of
treachery. The essential condition of a frustrated crime is that the actor perform all the acts
of execution and attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work
of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason
of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from
further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.
Borinaga was declared guilty of frustrated murder and was sentenced to fourteen years,
eight months, and one day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with the accessory
penalties and the costs.
It is the preventing of death by causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, after
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence had
been performed, that constitutes frustrated felony, according to the law, and not the
preventing of the performance of all the acts of execution which constitute the
felony, as in the present case. The interference of the frame of the back of the chair
which prevented the defendant-appellant from wounding Mooney in the back with a
deadly knife, made his acts constitute an attempt to commit murder; for he had
commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, and did not perform
all the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of a cause or accident
other than his own voluntary desistance.
People v. Kalalo JR
Appeal to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas for the sentence given to
the two accounts of murder and one account of frustrated murder
Prior to October 1, 1932, the date of the commission of the three crimes alleged in the three
informations which gave rise to the three cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo and Isabela Holgado, the latter being the sister of Arcadio Holgado and a
cousin Marcelino Panaligan, had a litigation over a parcel of land. On September 28, 1931,
and again on December 8th of the same year, Marcelo Kalalo filed a complaint against the
said woman in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. His first complaint was dismissed on
December 7, 1931, and his second complaint was likewise dismissed on February 5, 1932.
Marcelo Kalalo cultivated the land in question during the agricultural years 1931 and 1932,
but when harvest time came Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted. On October
1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, decided to order the aforesaid
land plowed. Arcadio Holgado and some laborers went to the said land early that day, but
Marcelo Kalalo, who had been informed thereof, proceeded to the place accompanied by
his brothers Felipe and Juan Kalalo, his brother-in-law Gregorio Ramos and by Alejandro
Garcia, who were later followed by Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, mother and aunt,
respectively, of the first three. The first five were all armed with bolos. Once they arrived,
they ordered those who were plowing the land to stop. Isabela Holgado, Maria Gutierrez
and Hilarion Holgado arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Marcelino Panaligan,
cousin of said Isabela and Arcadio, arrived. Marcelino Panaligan ordered Arcadio and the
other laborers to again hitch their respective carabaos to continue the work already began.
At this juncture, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio, while the appellants
Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, in turn, approached Marcelino Panaligan.
At a remark from Fausta Abrenica, mother of the Kalalos, about as follows, "what is
detaining you?" they all simultaneously struck with their bolos, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo
slashing Arcadio Holgado, while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio
Ramos slashed Marcelino Panaligan. Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan died
instantly from the wounds received by them. After Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino
Panaligan had fallen to the ground dead, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo took from its holster
on the belt of Panaligans' body, the revolver which the deceased carried, and fired four
shots at Hilarion Holgado who was then fleeing from the scene in order to save his own life.
WON the sentences of the Court of First Instance are in accordance with law.
For case nos. 6858 and 6859: An abuse of superior power constitutes to murder. The
deceased were armed with a bolo and a revolver resulting to a balance of power between
the two parties. The gun can be considered as effective as three bolos. Due to the
circumstances given, there could be no abuse of superior power.
For case no. 6860: There was intent to kill Hilarion Holgado because Marcelo Kalalo tried to
shoot the former four times but failed by causes independent from his will. This constituted
to an attempted homicide.
In case No. 6858, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellants is homicide and
they hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal
each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Marcelino Panaligan in the sum of
P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings of both instances;
and by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of the said penalty of reclusion
temporal is hereby fixed at nine years.
In case No. 6859, the court likewise finds that the crime committed by the appellants is
homicide, and they are hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Arcadio Holgado in
the sum of P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of both instances; and in
conformity with the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of the penalty of reclusion
temporal herein imposed upon them is hereby fixed at nine years.
In case No. 6860, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellant Marcelo Kalalo
is attempted homicide, and he is hereby sentenced to two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional, it being understood that by virtue of the provisions of said Act No.
4103, the minimum of this penalty is six months, and he is furthermore sentenced to pay the
costs of the appeal in this case.
People v. Trinidad JR
*Not enough proof of intent to kill for homicide
Mondragon v. People (1966) Zaldivar, J. RIA
Petition for review by certiorari
Isidoro Mondragon v. The People of the Philippines
Summary of Proceedings:
Court of First Instance of Iloilo - Guilty of attempted homicide
Court of Appeals - affirmed
Supreme Court - modified to less serious physical injuries
On July 11, 1954, complainant Serapio Nacionales was opening the dike of his ricefield in
Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, when petitioner Mondragon told him, 'Don't you dare open the
dike.' Nacionales told Mondragon that he needed to open the dike because he had to plant
the next morning, but Mondragon tried to hit him. When Nacionales dodged the blow,
Mondragon drew his bolo and hit Nacionales in several parts of his body. The complainant
hacked Mondragon with his bolo in self-defense, after which, Mondragon backed down.
The complainant had a medical exam the following day, and the government medical officer
certified that his wounds would heal in less than 30 days.
During his trial, Mondragon admitted that he would do everything to stop Nacionales from
opening the dike. From this admission, the Court of Appeals held the Court of First
Instance's conviction of attempted homicide.
1. WON the petitioner should be convicted with less serious physical injuries, instead of
attempted homicide. - YES
1. The intention of the petitioner to kill was not conclusively shown, as intent to kill must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Firstly, it was not manifest in the fight between
the petitioner and the complainant, as the petitioner backed away when the complainant
struck him with a bolo.
Secondly, his statement that 'he will do everything' to stop Nacionales from opening the dike
was made almost five years after the incident. Such statement should be considered as an
opinion at most, in addition to the fact that the phrase 'will do everything' has a broad
Lastly, intent to kill duly established, as the injuries inflicted by the petitioner were not
necessarily fatal; in fact, they could be healed in less than 30 days.
Mondragon is convicted with the crime of less serious physical injuries, with the penalty of 3
mos. and 15 days of arresto mayor, with costs.
U.S.v. Adiao ONG
No. 13785 October 8, 1918
United States, plaintiff and appellee v Tomas Adiao, defendant and appellant
Petition for review of Certiorari
Summary of Proceedings:
Municipal Court of Manila- charged with theft but convicted of frustrated theft
Court of First Instance of Manila (V. del Rosario J.)- reaffirmed the decision on frustrated
Tomas Adiao, customs inspector, abstracted a leather belt, valued at 80 cents, from the
baggage of the Japanese named T. Murakami. He then hid the stolen belt in his desk in the
Custom House which was later found out by other employees. He was then charged with
theft in the Municipal Court however he was only convicted of the lesser crime of frustrated
theft. He later on appealed to the Court of First Instance which upheld the conviction. His
penalties were fine of P100.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
shoulder the costs.
1. Was the crime properly classified as frustrated theft or consummated theft?
1. Consummated theft- offender accomplished all acts of execution necessary for
completion of crime. The fact that defendant was under observation and was unable to get
the belt out of the Custom house is irrelevant. All the elements of the crime were
Decision: Reversed and defendant sentenced to 3 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and
ordered to pay all costs.
People v. Dino RAYMOND
People v. Dio RAYMOND
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Hernando Dio, accused-appellant
Summary of Proceedings:
The trial court convicted Dio of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and
sentenced him to the death penalty.
Supreme Court - Modified judgement to guilty of attempted robbery with homicide and he is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Crispulo
Alega in the amount of P30,000 and to pay one-half the costs.
Crispulo Alega, civil engineer, met his girlfriend, Remedios Maniti, at Pasay City Public
Market. There, respondent Dio and Danilo Tobias conspired with one another to rob
Crispulo Alega of his Seiko brand watch. When Mr. Alega resisted, Tobias stabbed him in
the left side of his chest eventually killing him. The Seiko watch was still attached to the
The killing of Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely incidental to and an offshoot of
the plan to carry out the robbery, which however was not consummated because of the
resistance offered by the deceased.
There would be no reason for death penalty as there was no attendant aggravating
Modified judgement to guilty of attempted robbery with homicide and he is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of
reclusion temporal as maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Crispulo Alega in
the amount of P30,000 and to pay one-half the costs.
Illlegal trespass Arts. 280-281
People v. Lamahang INIGO
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Aurelio Lamahang,
defendant and appellant.
Appeal from a judgement of the court of first instance of Iloilo
Summary of Proceedings
Court of First Instance of Iloilo- Lamahang guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him
to suffer 2 years and 4 months prison correccional and additional penalty of 10 years and
one day of prison mayor for being an habitual delingquent
Supreme Court-Sentenced appealed from is revoked and the accused is held guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force
Early dawn of March 2, 1955 policeman Jose Tomambing caught the accused in the act of
making an opening with an iron rod the wall of a store of cheap goods. The accused had
only been able to break one board and unfastening another from the wall well the
policeman showed up and arrested him.
The lower court erred in convicting accused of attempted robbery
In the case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence
in another person‟s dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must
be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession for the purpose of gain
some personal property.
In the case at bar, there is nothing that proves that robbery may be reasonably inferred.
Case does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling under article
280 of the Revised penal Code. Wherefore, the sentence appealed is revoked and accused
is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force with aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. 3 months and 1 day arresto mayor with the accessory
People v. Orita (1990) RAYMOND
Summary of Proceedings:
Regional Trial Court - Convicted of Frustrated Rape.
On March 20, 1983, complainant Cristina S. Abayan went home to her boarding house at
1:30 AM. Defendant Orita, a Philippine Constabulary soldier, surprised her and held a knife
to her neck. He took her to a room and with said deadly weapon still present, attempted to
rape her. There was partial penetration of the vagina but the hymen was still intact. Abayan
was able to escape and made a run for it to the nearest municipality office where policemen
1. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused of frustrated rape?
There is no such thing as frustrated rape. The moment he has had carnal knowledge of the
women, it is consummated rape. Penetration need not be perfect for there to be rape.
“Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements
of the offense have been accomplished.Nothing more is left to be done by the offender,
because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
Orita is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and must indemnify the victim to the amount of P30,000.
Liability for multiple, complex and continuing crimes-Arts. 9 and 48
People v. Hernandez ONG
Nos. L-6025-26 July 18, 1956
Motion for bail pending appeal of judgement of Court of First Instance of Manila (Montesa,
People of Philippines , plaintiff and appelle v Amado V. Hernandez et al., defendant and
Summary of Proceedings:
Petition for bail- denied by lower court (not specified?)
Around March 15, 1945, the accused conspired, confederated and cooperated with each
other as well as 31 other defendants on the crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons
and robberies. The accused were officers, members or affiliated with the Congress of Labor
Organization, formerly known as Committee on Labor Organization, an institution of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. Their work also were tied to the Huks (HMB) who have
risen publicly with the purpose of removing from territory from the Philippines from the
government. They initiate armed raids, sorties and ambushes against police, army and
civilian targets. The court viewed such activities (murder, arson, planned destruction of
property, pillage, looting, etc.) as necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion.
Bail is allowed to be granted to petitioners provided the penalty of their crimes is not capital
punishment. In this case however, the penalty is dependent on the crime to be classified to
which the end penalty would either be prision mayor or capital punishment.
1. Should the crime be classified as simple rebellion in which all other acts such as murder,
arson etc. be lumped together as ingredients of rebellion or should it be a complex crime
with factors including murder, arson etc.?
2. Does rebellion with components of murder, arson etc. classify as complex crime or
simple crime?- No
1. Court ruled that murder, arson etc. are necessary ingredients to initiate rebellion thus
classification of simple rebellion due to past jurisprudence where offenders have been
classified to commit crime of simple rebellion despite killing individuals.
2. Murder and all the other crimes committed are classified as components and necessary
to institute a rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC. Article 135 lists down 5
classes of acts that constitute only one offense which are subject to one penalty only
(prision mayor and fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos).
3. Rebellion is classified as a political crime and actions done under the motive of rebellion
such as murder and arson by Hernandez et al. was political in nature in order to further their
rebellion. The decisive factor is the intent. Common crimes can be committed to achieve a
political purpose, making them political crimes.
4. Bail cannot be denied because lower court sentenced Hernandez to life imprisonment
and not capital punishment so he has right to seek bail. Appeal by opposition to motion do
not reveal satisfactorily and concrete positive act of accused showing that his provincial
release during pendency of appeal would jeopardize the security of the State.
Decision: Bail petition granted at the sum of P30,000.00
-Granting of bail is discretionary and security of state is at state
-Murder, arson etc. is not necessary or indispensible to consummate rebellion. Art 134
states that rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against government for
the purpose or purposes enumerated in the article.
-Idea that one crime absorbing a more serious one with a more serious penalty does not
appeal to reasonable and logical mind (murder carries penalty up to capital punishment
while rebellion‟s penalty is only prision mayor and fine).
-Muder and arson etc. were chosen by the petitioners as mode of rebellion and not
necessary to commit rebellion.
- concur with J. Montemayor that complex crime of rebellion with murder exists under law
- concur with J. Padilla that bail is discretionary and can be waived in the interest of the
security of the state
Enrile v. Salazar INIGO
Petition for Habaes Corpus filed by Enrile alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional
On Feb 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the Nat'l Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the strength of a
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City. The warrant had issued an
information signed by a panel of prosecutors charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco & Erlinda
Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan with the cirme of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from Nov 29 to Dec 10,
1990. Petition for Habaes Corpus filed by Enrile alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional
ISSUE: Whether a complex crime is present in this case
No. There is no complex crime on rebellion with murder, arson, robbery, or other common crimes.
Such common offenses are absorbed or inherent in the crime of rebellion. Hernandez doctrine
prohibits complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as
a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
Juan Enrile, spouses Panlilio must be charged with simple rebellion only; hence, said petitioners are
entitled to bail before final conviction
People v. Ducay INIGO
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Aurelio Lamahang, defendant and
Appeal from a judgement of the court of first instance of Iloilo
Summary of Proceedings
Court of First Instance of Iloilo- Lamahang guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer
2 years and 4 months prision correccional and additional penalty of 10 years and one day of prision
mayor for being an habitual delinquent
Supreme Court-Sentenced appealed from is revoked and the accused is held guilty of attempted
trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force
Early dawn of March 2, 1955 policeman Jose Tomambing caught the accused in the act of making an
opening with an iron rod the wall of a store of cheap goods. The accused had only been able to break
one board and unfastening another from the wall well the policeman showed up and arrested him.
The lower court was erred in convicting accused of attempted robbery
In the case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence in
another person’s dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown
that the offender clearly intended to take possession for the purpose of gain some personal property.
In the case at bar, there is nothing that proves that robbery may be reasonably inferred.
Case does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling under article 280 of
the Revised penal Code. Wherefore, the sentence appealed is revoked and accused is guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force with aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 3 months and 1 day arresto mayor with the accessory penalties
People of the Philippines vs. Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay, accused. Santos Ducay,
Appeal from the judgement of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
Summary of Proceedings:
Regional Trial Court- Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay charged with the complex crime of double
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Finding Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but
acquitting Edgardo on ground of reasonable doubt.
Lina Labos testified that about 5am, of October 12, 1986, she was sleeping in the sala with her
husband Manuel when she was awakened by the pounding of the door on first floor. Santos Ducay
and Edgard Ducay appeared in the sala. Santos was carrying a long firearm while Edgardo had a
caliber .45 pistol. The two started firing at Manuel and then shot Pacita labos her mother in law
causing the death of both.
The accused also shot her, Ma. Cristina and Edwin Labos, her brother-in-law. She was hit in the
stomach and gall bladder while Ma. Cristina was hit in the right leg, left thigh, and abdomen. She
was able to identify the 2 accused who are former neighbors.
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused given the presented arguments
The Court never doubts the participation of Santos Ducay not only on the basis of the positive
identification made by surviving victims, Lina and Edwin Labos, the motive Santos Ducay had to
avenge the assault done on him by Manuel Labos, but also because his positive identification sweeps
aside altogether his defense — that of alibi — a very weak defense in the light of the overwhelming
evidence against him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code the challenged judgment of Branch 172 of the Regional
Trial court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 7792-V-6 is AFFIRMED subject to
the modifications herein indicated. Convicted for 2 counts of murder and 3 counts of frustrated