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G.R. No. 131131. June 21, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ABELARDO SALONGA, accused-appellant.
Facts: This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR NO. 18551 which
modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142 in Criminal Case
No. 33127, by increasing the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua. Abelardo
Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the crime of
Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document in an information alleging that on
or before 23 October 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding one
another, and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust
Company (Metrobank), with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of
officers authorized to sign the said check and have the said check deposited in the account of
Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no such
transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a
simulated check described as Check No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear
genuine and authorized, through which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to
gain for themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and
Trust Company in the total amount of P36,480.30. On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its
decision finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification
of Commercial Document.

Issues: Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft?
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper?
Decsion: The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of
accused-appellant in the crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was
the custodian of the blank Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and
encashed. Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of
accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not tally with
the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check was issued without any
transaction. Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of
bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other specimens he
conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing therein was not hers.
Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appearing in the cashiers

check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a letter dated September 15, 1987
to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accused-appellant confirmed the statements in
his extra-judicial confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00. The crime
charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. Since the
value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods and 1 year of each additional PHP 10,000.00
in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the RPC. However, under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than that specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two
degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the
bank officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order to
obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. Falsification of the subject
cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime of qualified theft resulting
in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that, where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering
that qualified Theft is more serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates which
is punished under Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its
minimum period, the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

G.R. No. 143561. June 6, 2001
JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT and
POWER CO., respondents.
FACTS: Jonathan Cariaga v. CA June 6, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes Nature: Petition for
review on certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting Jonathan
Cariaga of qualified theft Facts: Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light &
Power Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were

involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the
matter and catch the perpetrators. In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt.
Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired
Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the pseudonym “Canuto Duran”. ‘Duran’
became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said that his
‘boss’ needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area.
Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to
him. ‘Duran’ was able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his
cousin named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). ‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end
when Sgt. Villasis ‘apprehended’ him on February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in
order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo
and another person came to the police station and confessed to their participation as
“fence” for Jonathan Cariaga. The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo
as witness as the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan
Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a
labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latter’s alleged illegal dismissal.
Issues: Whether or not Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible as evidence; Siton is a
credible witness; guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven
DECISION: the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 1995 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION (1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it
admitted the sworn statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a witness “unable to testify” in
court. In Tan v. CA , the Court has held that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of
witnesses subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was
neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely 4
hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but,
it did not in the present case. (2) Credible. (3) Guilty.

G.R. No. 139603. July 14, 2000
CONCHITA QUINAO, petitioner,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, rep. by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, and FRANCISCO DEL MONTE,respondents.

Facts: Both accused (Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases) and private complainant
Francisco Del Monte are claiming ownership over the land in question. Accusedappellant presented a tax declaration and alleged that the land being claimed by the
complainant is different from the land litigated in Civil Cases No. 3561. Trial Court finds
accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property. Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this case.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land
in question could be held liable of usurpation of her own property?
Decision: Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court
convicting her of the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on
"speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record and in
accordance with the applicable law under Article 312 of Revised Penal Code.

The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's
real property or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession or
usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo
lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof
must show that the real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or
usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained
by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the
property.

In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are
(1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to
another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real
property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the
intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from
this salutary principle.

G.R. No. 140904. October 9, 2000
RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J.
O. NERIT, petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is owned and
operated by the family of private complainant Rosa Cabuso. While she normally bought
jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks to cover the jewelry
she bought in December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance that the
checks would be funded on their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks were
deposited, they were returned with the stamp "Account Closed."

Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10 counts
of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code when she was, in the Information, charged of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the same Code?
Held: The appeal is impressed with merit. Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution
grants the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
This is to enable the accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot
thus be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged
is determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued the
questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fund them
despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations clearly constitute a charge,
not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code. Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the
immediately quoted paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element – false
pretenses or fraudulent acts – the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating
a check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to
fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation of
paragraph 2(a). Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor,
knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori
intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply
with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of dishonor being then an
element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged,
failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder. In the case at bar, as priorly
stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that

petitioner received notice of dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042
for P76,654), of the questioned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks,
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This
leaves it unnecessary to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that
petitioner’s defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se
like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her
bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner offered to pay in installment, to
which the private complainant agreed, the amount covered by the said check, as well as
the others. As reflected above, the prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a
total payment of P338,250, which amount is almost one-third of the total amount of the
ten checks or more than the amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank check. In fine,
the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her acquittal is in order. The
judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.

G.R. No. 149354
January 18, 2008
OLAND V. VELOSO, Petitioner,
v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine, at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle,
Quezon City, is a restaurant owned and operated by the Developers Group of
Companies, Inc. Ramon Sy Hunliong (Ramon) was its president and general manager.
Roland Veloso, petitioner, claiming to be a consultant of then Congressman Antonio V.
Cuenco, was an occasional guest at the restaurant. Before the May 1995 elections,
petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while at the said restaurant having dinner,
had a conversation with Ramon. This led to a friendly bet between petitioner and
Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon
assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both
agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official
results showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the
bet. On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuencos secretary called Eva Anne Nanette
Sto. Domingo (Eva), the restaurants assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for
one table corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser,
informed Eva that he would pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner. However,
when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4)
additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. Hence, Eva had four
additional tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramons account. The Sales
Invoice for the additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00. When the Sales Invoice
was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay, explaining he was a guest of Ramon.
Due to petitioners stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where she should send the
bill. Petitioner instructed her to send it to Congressman Cuencos office as he was
always present there. It turned out, however, that he was no longer reporting at that
office. Hence, the bill was sent to his address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village,
Quezon City, but still, he refused to pay. The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand
letter to petitioner, but to no avail. Consequently, petitioner was charged with estafa
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 31, Quezon City.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of estafa
DECISION: The court DENIED the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA finding petitioner Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Appellant insists
that he is only civilly liable for an unpaid debt. We reviewed the records very closely and
found that petitioner and his guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he
ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It
bears emphasis that the understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the
latter would pay for only one table. We agree with the Solicitor General in his brief for
the People that petitioner employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of
the food ordered and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa
under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 153198

July 11, 2006

CRISANTA B. BONIFACIO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: Private complainant Ofelia Santos was a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell
agent of jewelry. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner Crisanta Bonifacio was introduced
to her. She expressed interest to see the pieces of jewelry Santos was selling. On
March 21, 1996, petitioner received several pieces of jewelry from Santos. She signed a
document acknowledging receipt of the jewelry and agreeing to sell these items on
commission basis. She also promised to remit the proceeds of the sale or return the
unsold items to Santos within 15 days. Petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the
sale within the given period. She, however, returned some of the unsold items at a later
date. The value of the pieces unaccounted for amounted to P154,000. On March 28,
1996, petitioner asked Santos for new sets of jewelry to sell under the same terms and
conditions. Again, on due date, petitioner failed to account. This time, the value of the
unpaid and unreturned items amounted to P91,500. On April 3, 1996, petitioner once
more accepted several pieces of jewelry and signed an acknowledgment receipt under
the same terms and conditions. On due date, petitioner again failed to pay. The pieces
of jewelry left unpaid and unreturned amounted to P38,500. In a letter dated July 25,
1996, Santos demanded from petitioner the payment of the total amount of P244,500.
Petitioner gave her two checks amounting to P30,000 as partial payment. The checks,
however, bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds and being drawn against a
closed account, respectively.
ISSUE: Whether the CA’s decision of rendering judgement of petitioner being guilty of
Estafa is correct
DECISION: The petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The essence of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b), RPC
is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the
owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing
of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it is the agent's duty
to return the jewelry on demand of the owner. The demand for the return of the thing
delivered in trust and the failure of the accused-agent to account for it are circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. Here, petitioner admitted that she received the pieces of
jewelry on commission. She likewise admitted that she failed to return the items or their
value on Santos' demand. On the other hand, the testimony of her lone witness, Lilia
Pascual, failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence that she misappropriated the items
or their corresponding value. She also never appeared in the trial court to refute the
charge against her. Hence, the trial and appellate courts' conclusion of guilt by
misappropriation was a logical consequence of the established facts.

G.R. No. 133036. January 22, 2003
JOY LEE RECUERDO, petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she
issued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by
the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a
complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she
contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not B.P. 22 is unconstitutional?
Decision: A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for
encashment, has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of
B.P. 22, which is explicit that “any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently
dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment. B.P. 22 does not appear to
concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial
intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being
virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made. It
is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee
bank’s representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of
insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did in this case, only
complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged. She is
competent and qualified witness to testify that she deposited the checks to her account
in a bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the checks returned unpaid
with a notation ‘drawn against insufficient funds’ stamped or written on the dorsal side of
the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to
the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or
make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.

G.R. No. 150910

February 6, 2006

BIENVENIDO GONZALUDO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the Bacolod
City Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita Manlangit in Bacolod
City. Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulysses’s mother at the latter’s house at
Bacolod City. Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City. Meanwhile, his wife Anita
secured a teaching job in Catubig, Samar prompting her to leave Bacolod City and live
in Samar.

After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned to Bacolod City.
And, in December of 1978, he was able to buy for P1,500.00 a small house located
near that of his mother at Purok 5, Mansungay, Bacolod City. Then, in 1985, Ulysses
took one Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress and brought her into the house. In time,
improvements were made on the house and the house was transformed into a 2-storey
structure. After Ulysses’s demise in January of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie Gelogo
offered to sell the 2-storey house for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner Bienvenido
Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben Gonzaludo, who lives just nearby. Since the house was being
sold for a cheap price, petitioner convinced the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba
Canlas, to whom he is related by affinity, to buy the same. Herein, petitioner introduced
the Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo. In the Deed of Sale, Rosemarie Gelogo signed as
Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful owner of the 2-storey
house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gregg Canlas acquired all of Rosemarie’s
rights and interest on the subject house.

Later, upon complaint of Ulysses’s widow Anita Manlangit, an Information dated
May 31, 1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City charging
Rosemarie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba
Canlas and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document. The
trial court acquitted the Canlas spouses but convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
The appellate affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

Issue: Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article
315, Revised Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime of Estafa is not
present?

Decision: The petition is partly impressed with merit. For an accused to be convicted of
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the elements of
the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. There is no
question that the first, second and fourth elements are present: there was false or
fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo when she used the fictitious
surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false pretense was made prior to or

simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and private complainant Anita
Manlangit’s right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the very least prejudiced
when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases. It is petitioner’s thesis, however, that there is
here an absence of the third element contending that private complainant Anita
Manlangit, who was the offended party in this case, was never induced to part with any
money or property by means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the false pretense
or fraudulent representation by Rosemarie. The Court find merit in petitioner’s
submission. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that
the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of
defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the
offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the present case.

While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in
this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to
sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas
spouses who were the ones who parted with their money when they bought the house.
However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged
damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita
Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita
Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for
estafa. With all the more reason must this be for herein petitioner. The lack of criminal
liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve petitioner from criminal liability
arising from the charge of falsification of public document under the same Information
charging the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document.

It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses
included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of
evidence to hold the accused of the other charge is legally feasible. As correctly found
by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making
untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie
to be the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor"
instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas
spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie
committed the crime of falsification of public document. Likewise, proof beyond
reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie
and petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house

in this case. Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification
of Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Document.

G.R. No. 150439. July 29, 2005
AMELITA DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
That on or about and during the period comprised from the month
ofDecember 1994 to January 1995, inclusive, or thereabouts in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the Great Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village, Inc., and Hock
Wan Restaurant Corporation, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
being then the payroll clerk of said Corporations, existing domestic corporations
primarily engaged in the restaurant business, with principal places of business at
798 Ongpin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and 489 Nueva St., Binondo, Manila,
respectively, and by virtue of her position as such, received from said

corporations in trust, during the said period a total sum of P471,166.11
representing the excess amount paid to the employees of said corporations as
salaries under the obligation of accounting and turning over the said excess to
said corporations, but she did not do so in violation of the trust relationship
existing between her and said corporations, which amount, once in her
possession, far from complying with her obligation aforesaid, went into hiding and
failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to return the same whereby
misappropriating, misapplying and converting the said amount to her personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said corporation represented
by their common personnel manager Manuel M. Matammu in the total amount of
P471,166.11 Philippine Currency.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST PETITIONER IS
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT HER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE AS CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION;
WHETHER OR NOT FORMAL DEMAND IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE IN THE
CRIME OF ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
Decision: The court premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
31 May 2001 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The questioned decision is hereby
REVERSED. Accused-petitioner Amelita dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the crime of
estafa defined under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code on the
ground of reasonable doubt. The cash bond for the accused-petitioners provisional
liberty is ordered returned to her, subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. Ominously, such bait, though hearsay evidence, was acknowledged hook,
line and sinker by the court a quo, and worse, affirmed by the appellate court. Not even
one iota of documentary or object evidence was presented that would give a semblance
of correctness to the actions of the said courts.
In sum, from the totality of evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with
propriety and due respect for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent
evidence on which to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the requisite
degree of moral certainty. Only the checks and acknowledged payroll slips were
presented to show the culpability of the accused-petitioner, and, sadly, said
documentary evidence were the only basis for the theory that there was an overcomputation of the payrolls. What the trial court used to convict the accused-petitioner
are documents that had no direct relation to her. It would have been different had the
accused-petitioners computations been used as the basis for comparing the

acknowledged payroll slips. That way, it would be clearly shown that she had overcomputed the salaries due the employees to enable her to misappropriate said excess.
In other words, the trial court failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused-petitioner over-computed the payroll and pocketed the excess money. The
Court finds the testimonies and documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there
may be inherent weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast
suspicion on accused-petitioner. The principle has been dinned into the ears of the
bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
While the Court is not inclined to hold that the evidence is conclusive that she is not
guilty, neither is it convinced that she is so, based on the circumstances of this case.
The Court is, thus, under a long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of
herein accused-petitioner. Undeniably, the convergence of the circumstances vis-vis the evidence established by the prosecution, especially the tenuous testimonies of
the witnesses, must ineluctably result in a favorable verdict for the defense.

G.R. No. 134120. January 17, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. LEA SAGAN JULIANO, appellant.
FACTS: The accused purchased 190 sacks of milled rice from JCT Agro-Development
Corporation and in payment she issued a check for a value of P89,000, knowing at the
time of issue that she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said
check. When presented for encashment, it was dishonored by the bank for reason of
insufficiency of funds. On the following month the accused issued another check that
was again dishonored by the drawee bank for the same reason, to the damage and
prejudice of JCT Agro-Development Corporation. The trial court found her guilty of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) and Estafa.
Appellant appealed her conviction for estafa to the Court of Appeals, but still found her

guilty, with intent to defraud and by means of false pretense, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, committed the offenses.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution able to prove beyond reasonable doubt to convict the
appellant for estafa?
Decision: The Court set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and acquitted
Lea Sagan Juliano for the crime of estafa. The accused could not be found guilty of
estafa in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed
deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act. Nevertheless, appellant’s civil
liability to JCT remains, in the amount of P89,000, which is the value of the sack of rice
she purchased.

G.R. Nos. 146641-43. November 18, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RICA G. CUYUGAN, accused-appellant.
FACT: That on or about the 18 th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused, Rica G. Cuyugan, defrauded and deceived private Complainant Norma
Abagat in the following manner to wit: that said accused with intent to defraud
and well knowing that her account with the bank was already closed, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, make out and issue to private
Complainant the several checks. in the total amount of P396,000.00
simultaneous with the receipt by the accused of cash money from private
Complainant also in the total amount of P396,000.00 but which checks when
presented to the drawee bank on their maturity dates were promptly dishonored
for reasons of Account Closed and notwithstanding demands made on her,

accused failed and refused and still fails to redeem or make good the said
checks face value thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the private
Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of P396,000.00. That on or about the
12th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded and
deceived private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following manner to wit: that
the accused with intent to defraud and well-knowing that her account with the
bank has no sufficient funds, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out and
issue to the private Complainant Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No.
03A058532P postdated June 10, 1994 in the amount of P150,000.00
simultaneous with, for and in consideration of cash money from private
Complainant in the total amount of P150,000.00 but which check when presented
to the drawee bank on maturity date was promptly dishonored for reason of
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) and notwithstanding demands on her,
accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem or make good
the said check or its value, to the damage and prejudice of the private
Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of P150,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the crime of estafa
DECISION: The judgment dated December 20, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 117, finding appellant RICA G. CUYUGAN, liable for three
counts of estafa is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED, for
lack of sufficient evidence to prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt.However, she
is ordered to pay private complainants the balance of her obligation The
transaction between appellant and the Abagat spouses, in our view, was one for
a loan of money to be used by appellant in her business and she issued checks
to guarantee the payment of the loan. As such, she has the obligation to make
good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But such obligation is civil in
character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised
Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee
of repayment. We find appellants allegation, that the Abagat spouses entered
into a joint venture agreement with her for the supply of materials with the AFP, is
self-serving. But we also note that the trial court convicted appellant on a general
allegation that all the elements of estafa under Article 315, 2 (d) of the Revised
Penal Code had been proved by the prosecution without making any reference to
or giving any proof of the actual fraud that appellant allegedly committed to make
her liable for estafa. It is elementary that where an allegation in the information is
an essential element of the crime, the same must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt to sustain a conviction. In this case, the prosecution did not establish

specifically and conclusively the fraud alleged as an element of the offenses
charged.

G.R. Nos. 124443-46. June 6, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. NIMFA REMULLO, accused-appellant.
FACTS: That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, falsely representing herself to have the
capacity and power to contract, enlist and recruit workers for job/placement abroad, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise
employment job placement abroad to the complainants, ROSARIO CADACIO,
JENELYN QUINSAAT and HONORINA MEJIA, without first securing the required
license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, thus committing
illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of [Article 38(2) in relation to Article 39 (b) of

the Labor Code]. That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993 in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of false pretenses and
fraudulent representation made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, with intent to defraud the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT to the effect that she
would send her abroad for the purpose of employment and would need certain amount
for the expenses in the processing of papers thereof, which representations the
accused well knew was (sic) false and fraudulent and was only made by her to induce
said complainant to give and pay, as in fact the latter gave and paid to her the amount
of P15,000.00 which the accused once in possession of the said amount, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate and convert to her own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT
in the aforementioned amount of P15,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty for large scale illegal recruitment
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 132, is hereby AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 95-653, for illegal
recruitment in large scale, appellant NIMFA REMULLO is found guilty and sentenced to
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000; and in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654, 95655 and 95-656 for estafa, she is declared guilty sentenced in each case to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one
(1) one day of prision mayor, and to pay by way of restitution P15,000 to each of the
private complainants, Jenelyn Quinsaat, Rosario Cadacio and Honorina Mejia, together
with the costs. Anent appellants conviction for estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654 to
95-656, we find no error committed by the trial court. Their conviction and sentence are
fully supported by the evidence on record. For charges of estafa to prosper, the
following elements must be present: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. In this case,
appellant clearly defrauded private complainants by deceiving them into believing that
she had the power and authority to send them on jobs abroad. By virtue of appellants
false representations, private complainants each parted with their hard-earned money.
Each complainant paid P15,000 as recruitment fee to appellant, who then appropriated
the money for her own use and benefit, but failed utterly to provide overseas job
placements to the complainants. In a classic rigmarole, complainants were provided
defective visas, brought to the airport with their passports and tickets, only to be
offloaded that day, but with promises to be booked in a plane flight on another day. The
recruits wait in vain for weeks, months, even years, only to realize they were gypped, as
no jobs await them abroad. No clearer cases of estafa could be imagined than those for
which appellant should be held criminally responsible.

G.R. No. 162822

August 25, 2005

JAIME GUINHAWA, Petitioner
v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new
motor vehicles, including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor
Sales. His office and display room for cars were located along Panganiban Avenue,
Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales manager. On March 17, 1995,
Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van and from the Union
Motors Corporation (UMC) in Paco, Manila. Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove
the van from Manila to Naga City. However, while the van was traveling along the
highway in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack. The van went

out of control, traversed the highway onto the opposite lane, and was ditched into the
canal parallel to the highway. The van was damaged, and the left front tire had to be
replaced. Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund of
their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the
confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had
bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in Daet.
Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint from the DTI. On February 14,
1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Naga City.
ISSUE: Whether or not under the Information, the petitioner was charged of other
deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
DECISION: The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Considering the surrounding circumstances of
the case, the petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment. The petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
It bears stressing that Azotea and the petitioner had every opportunity to reveal to the
private complainant that the van was defective. They resolved to maintain their silence,
to the prejudice of the private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had
no special knowledge of parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding
circumstances, she relied on her belief that the van was brand new. In fine, she was the
innocent victim of the petitioners fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment. The
petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent omission on his general manager,
Azotea. The two are equally liable for their collective fraudulent silence. Case law has it
that wherever the doing of a certain act or the transaction of a given affair, or the
performance of certain business is confided to an agent, the authority to so act will, in
accordance with a general rule often referred to, carry with it by implication the authority
to do all of the collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main
act or business authorized.

G.R. No. 182061

March 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
v FERDINAND T. BALUNTONG, Appellant.
FAC TS: Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon,
causing the complete destruction of the saidhouse and the death of
Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical
injuries on JoshuaSavarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which,
nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator. The Trial Court found accused guilty be yond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated
murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The Court

of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but in light of the
passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced the sentence from death to reclusion
perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the courts correct in charging the accused the
complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder?
Decision: The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE ,
and a NEW one is rendered findingappellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D.
No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion p er p etua
with no eligibility for parole and other civil damages modified. The assailed
CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered as follows:
Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple
Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. Appellant is ORDERED to pay the
damages and other expenses. How Felicitas acquired such knowledge was not probed
into, however, despite the fact that she was cross-examined thereon. Absent any
concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant
cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true
with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant
wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the
neighboring house, Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She
merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons.While the above-quoted
Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, appellant
may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under
Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the
act. As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the
occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere
consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense
proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

G.R. No. 182460

March 9, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee.
v JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon
the latter stab wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason
of causes independent of the will; that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered to
said Alicia Q. Manlupig which prevented her death, all to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party. Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He stated that while
he was having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get a glass of

water. He followed her and gave her water. He noticed Felicidad light a gas lamp. He
then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He got into a heated argument with
Herminio. The latter struck him in the head. He immediately went inside the house to
get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo, went back outside and hit Herminio. The latter
ran away and appellant chased him. Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the
actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the
knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and lost consciousness because, apparently, he
was struck by something in the back. Appellant denied setting the house on fire. On 30
May 2006, decision was rendered by the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated homicide,
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Arson and frustrated homicide
DECISION: The appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant imputes ill-motive on the part
of Herminio. This Court does not discount the fact that there was a fight between
appellant and Herminio which preceded the occurrence of the fire. However, it cannot
be presumed that Herminio will automatically give a false testimony against
appellant. His testimony, having withstood cross-examination, has passed the scrutiny
of the lower courts and was held to be credible. The lower courts found appellant liable
under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of
arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and
Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based on the
kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the
damage caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both
public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons. On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings,
government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves
and other industrial establishments.

G. R. No. 170470

September 26, 2006

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES , Appellee,
v EDN A M ALNG AN y M AYO, Appellant.
FACTS: From the personal account of Rem igio Bernardo, the Barangay
Chairman in the area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab
driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on Januar y 2,
2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant
EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., wit h her head
turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer
at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have
boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as
Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed
that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she
changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan
Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare. Thirt y minutes

later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later
discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid.
Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon
hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire
District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire. W hen
Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received
a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that
shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the
housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman
(the same housemaid) who was acting strangely and suspiciously on
Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the
other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the wom an who was
later identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively
identified the wom an as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna
Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods
apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation.
At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa,
Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accusedappellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon
inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant
EDNAs bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay
Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angr y residents
outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire
because she had not been paid her salar y for about a year and that she
wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a
broomstick in going home. Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over
to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her
to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further
investigated and then detained.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a complex crime of arson and homicide
Decision: The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005, in
CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction
of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The
sentence to be imposed and the amount of damages to be awarded,
however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 1613, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA. In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated ± whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:(a) if

the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or
on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson , and the resulting homicide is
absorbed;(b) if, on the other hand, the m ain objective is to kill a particular person who
may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such
goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a
particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as
a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed homicide/ murder and arson.

G.R. No. 122110. September 26, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FERIGEL OLIVA, accused-appellant.

FACTS: August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino
Manguba (hereinafter referred to as "Avelino") and his family were sleeping in their
house in San Jose, Claveria, Cagayan. Avelino went out of the house to urinate. He saw
Ferigel set the roof of their house on fire with a lighted match. Awakened by the loud
barking of dogs, Avelino's wife sensed danger and peeped through a hole in their
wall. She also saw Ferigel burn the roof of their house. She shouted, "Perry is burning
our house!" and called out to the neighbors for help. While the fire razed Avelino's
house, Ferigel and three others, Dominador Oliva, Marcos Paderan and Arnel Domingo
watched at a distance of about five (5) meters. One of the neighbors, Benjamin
Estrellon (hereinafter referred to as "Benjamin") went to the nearby river and fetched
water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was shot by Ferigel at
close range. Benjamin tried to run, but he slumped and fell to the ground. The gunshot
wound caused Benjamin's death. Avelino, his wife, and Benjamin's son, Noel, witnessed

the shooting since they were only about five (5) to six (6) meters away from Ferigel
when the incident occurred. The place was brightly lit by the burning roof and visibility
was not a problem. On August 24, 1993, a post-mortem report was made on Benjamin's
cadaver, revealing the following: "II POSTMORTEM FINDINGS: "Cadaver is in a state
of rigor mortis and with postmortem lividity at back."Gunshot wound of entrance 0.9 cm.
at left lateral mid-scapular area going medially and anterosuperiorily, 10 cms. deep
without exit.""III. CAUSE OF DEATH "Internal Hemorrhage due to gunshot wound at
back."
ISSUE: Whether or not that the testimonies should be taken into consideration, same
with alibi and defense
DECISION: We find no reversible error and affirm the conviction.
Whether or not Benjamin was shot while he was on the street or when he was in the
act of pouring water on the burning roof is irrelevant to the crime. We agree with the
Solicitor General that Benjamin could have been on the street while pouring water on
the burning roof. The two testimonies were not inconsistent. Also whether or not
Benjamin immediately fell or tried to run away after he was shot is not important. The
fact is that he was shot; any act of his after he was shot would not change the shooting,
which at that point was fait accompli. Equally insignificant is whether the gun used was
a long firearm or a short firearm. Identification of the weapon only becomes critical when
there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant. In this case, the trial court did not doubt
the identity, and neither would we. There are 2 elements of arson: (1) that there is
intentional burning; (2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecution for felonies and offense.
Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime. It refers to the fact that a crime has
actually been committed. Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime that
may be proved by the testimonies of the witnesses. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is
satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally
caused. The uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be
enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. Here, corpus delicti of the
arson and murder was duly proven beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 126351

February 18, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAUL ACOSTA Y LAYGO, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a
resident of Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used
to be a good friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private

complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the
fire, Montesclaros, in the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his livein partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture,
and appliances. Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said complainant and
located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City.
It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant. At about 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of prosecution witness Mona Aquino called
the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was
carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her house and approached
appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he
would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. Owing to the fearsome
answer of appellant to witness Aquino’s query, she returned immediately to her house. A
few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of broken bottles and the
throwing of chair inside the house of complainant. When she peeped through her
kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainant’s house, which was unoccupied at
that time. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with
cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by appellant’s wife who arrived at the place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.
DECISION: In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following
circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair
and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private
complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we
agree with the trial court in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following
circumstances duly proved and on record: First, appellant had the motive to commit the
arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible for the prosecution
to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged,
nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a
sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses. Appellant had every
reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros
and his grandmother. Second, appellant’s intent to commit the arson was established by
his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private
complainant’s) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino
testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant
carrying a gas stove and knife.

G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of
marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on

ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance
of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of
the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their
marriage is a prejudicial question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological
incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.
DECISION: The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two
conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue
determines whether or not the criminal action will proceed. In the present case, the
accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof
of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts.
So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists
for all intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks
being prosecuted for concubinage.

G.R. No. 96715 November 19, 1991
RUBY VERA-NERI, petitioner,
vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo in the
City of Baguio. On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of
Mrs. Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at
around 11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at
Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the
Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at
the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the door for Arroyo who entered, he went
down to and knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her
companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the
master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About fortyfive minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come
down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision.
Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that
a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri,
and that her husband had later on traded marriage with another woman with whom he is
presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the
criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto.
Decision: The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only
in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code
relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involve any
illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now seeking 171 | P a g e
Background image of page 171 to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that
the complaining husband, by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them
were to live separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about
a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the
adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore, not authorized
by law to institute the criminal proceedings.

G.R. No. 157718

April 26, 2005

ALVIN AMPLOYO y EBALADA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , Respondent.

Facts: Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and
playing the breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her
consent. Amployo contends that the element of lewd design was not established since:
(1) the incident happened at 7am, in a street near the school with people around; (2) the
breast of an 8 year old is still very much underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h
intentionally touched her breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly whim. He also argues
that the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 RPC and not child
abuse under RA 7610 as the elements thereof had not been proved.
Issues: Whether or not lewd design was established; Amployo violated RA 7610.
DECISION: *Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious
conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse
under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.The first element is lewd design.
The term ‘lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;[12] it is
characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is
entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of
which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention,i.e., by conduct that can
only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is
inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a
precise definition.
Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge in his version of the story as
he has conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd
design. It would have been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was
merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very
same petitioner did the very same act to the very same victim in the past.
*The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioner’s act of purposely touching Kristine
Joy’s breasts (sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,[24] Section
5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for
profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion
or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As
to the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only
eight years old at the time of the incident in question.

G.R. No. 130709. March 6, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MARIANITO MONTERON y PANTORAS, accused-appellant.

FACTS: On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann Martenez was
walking home from Wangan National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was
walking on a secluded portion of the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot.
She turned to see where the stone came from, she was hit again on the mouth. She fell
down unconscious.[2] When Mary Ann came to, she found herself lying on the grass
naked. Accused-appellant was lying on top of her, also naked. She struggled but
accused-appellant, who was stronger, restrained her.[3] He placed his penis on top of
her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She frantically grabbed his erect penis and
pushed it away from her. This caused accused-appellant to stand up in pain. Mary Ann
ran towards the road while putting on her clothes. Mary Anns cousin, Arnel Arat,
witnessed the whole incident as he was then walking to Wangan Agricultural School. He
met Mary Ann while the latter was running away and brought her home. When they got
home, Mary Ann told her uncle what happened. Her uncle, in turn, told her mother. That
afternoon, upon complaint of Mary Ann, the Calinan Police Precinct arrested accusedappellant. The following morning, Mary Ann was brought to the City Health Office of
Davao City where she was examined by Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma. The latter found that
Mary Anns hymen was intact and had no laceration, but her labia minora was coaptated
and her labia majora was gaping.[4] On March 12, 1996, accused-appellant was
formally charged with rape. At his arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.[5] After trial, the lower court convicted him of the crime of rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.
DECISION: The decision is is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Marianito Monteron y
Pantoras is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape and is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Mary Ann Martenez,
the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as moral damages. Accusedappellant also contends that it was unlikely for him to strip naked and commit rape in
broad daylight. In this connection, suffice it to say that lust is no respecter of time and
place. It is known to happen in the most unlikely places such as parks, along roadsides,
within school premises or even occupied rooms. Rape has also been committed on a
passageway and at noontime.
While accused-appellant is guilty of rape, the same was committed only in its
attempted stage. Mary Ann clearly testified that accused-appellant only placed his penis
on top of her vagina. In fact, she was able to grab it and push it away from her, causing
accused-appellant to stand up. The pain she felt may have been caused by accused-

appellants attempts to insert his organ into hers. However, the fact remains, based on
Mary Anns own narrative, that accused-appellants penis was merely on top of her
vagina and has not actually entered the same.Accused-appellant has commenced the
commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing himself and the
victim and lying on top of her, but he did not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In the case at bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance which
prevented the insertion of accused-appellants penis in her vagina.

G.R. No. 113265. March 5, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MANUEL PEREZ y MAGPANTAY, accused-appellant.

FACTS: At about 6:00 A.M. on May 31, 1990, Manuel Perez woke up Jennifer who
lying asleep on the cemented floor of the house. The door and the windows of the
house were closed. Manuel Perez ordered Jennifer to remain lying down on the
cemented floor and began undressing Jennifer. Manuel then kissed the cheeks of
Jennifer. He proceeded to kiss and touch the breasts of Jennifer as well as the upper
part of Jennifers body. Manuel, who was dressed in short pants, did not remove the
same but he unzipped the zipper of his short pants. He pulled the legs of Jennifer apart
and placed himself on top of the body of Jennifer. He then inserted his private part
inside the private part of Jennifer. All this time Jennifer protested and complained of
pain but was unable to resist because Manuel threatened to kill her. After satisfying his
lust, Manuel again threatened Jennifer not to tell anybody about what happened to her.
Jennifer left the house after the incident and proceeded to the nearby house of her aunt,
Othelia Marco, who was then out of the house. Jennifer glanced at the clock in Othelias
house and found out that it was 6:00 A.M. in the morning of May 31, 1990. Jennifer
remained outside the house until Manuel called her later on to clean the bleedings.
It was not until June 3, 1990 that Jennifer disclosed her harrowing experience to a
certain Malou (Marilou Castellano), a kumadre of her mother, who was then staying with
them. Malou promised to help her. She brought her to the Navotas Police Station in
order to report the rape incident. The Navotas police, however, told them to report the
matter to the Malabon Police Station. Malou and Jennifer then proceeded there, but
they were advised that the matter fell under the jurisdiction of the Kalookan City police
force. Malou and the victim, however, did not proceed to the Kalookan City police force
as it was already late in the evening.
The next day, Jennifer reported the incident to her aunts, Othelia Marco and Myrna
Casapao. They then accompanied Jennifer and Malou to the Kalookan City police
station, where Jennifer filed a complaint for rape against appellant. After the police
investigation, Jennifer was advised to go to the then-Philippine Constabulary (PC)
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a physical examination. However, it
was only on June 13, 1990, that Jennifer submitted herself to a physical examination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape
DECISION: The decision is finding appellant Manuel Perez y Magpantay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that appellant is also ordered to pay
the victim, Jennifer Dimaano y Casapao. Having examined the entire record, we find
that the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution proves beyond doubt all
the elements of rape. Private complainant testified as to how appellant had carnal
knowledge of her. The carnal knowledge took place under circumstances of violence

and intimidation. Her testimony is supported by the results of the medico-legal
examination conducted upon her at the police crime laboratory. Moreover, she positively
pointed to appellant in open court as the person responsible for her defilement. Against
said positive identification, appellants puerile defense of denial will not hold water, for he
does not even deny that he was with the offended party at the time of the commission of
the crime. Moreover, his attempts to cast ill motive on private complainant or her family
for fabricating the charge of rape against him have no evidentiary weight. It would be
most unnatural for a young and immature girl to fabricate a story of rape by her mothers
common-law spouse; allow a medical examination of her genitalia; and subject herself
to a public trial and possible ridicule, all because her maternal relatives want her mother
to separate from her common-law spouse. Perforce, appellants conviction must stand.

G.R. Nos. 135667-70

March 1, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO, accused-appellant.
FACTS: TO TIE A CHILD of tender years spread-eagled to her bed to abuse her in
the privacy of her home is despicable enough; to encroach on her innocence
unashamedly in front of her younger brother is to descend to the deepest recesses of
depravity. Thus the incorrigible lothario transgressed all norms of decency, morality and
rectitude when he molested his nine (9)-year old victim in the presence of her six (6)year old brother and severed all strands of gratefulness to her parents who gave him
food, shelter and livelihood for four (4) years. Messeah is the daughter of Jose Noli
Dumaoal, a seaman. His household was composed of his wife Julie, and their three (3)
children, Reggie, Messeah and Metheor. The accused Jessie Ventura Collado, son of
Jose Nolis cousin Benjamin, was living with them since 1989. While waiting for an
opportunity to become a seaman himself like his uncle Jose, Jessie served as the family

driver. Aside from driving Julie, Jessie would also drive the school service vehicle
operated by the Dumaoal spouses. Since Jose was almost always at sea and having no
househelp, their children were oftentimes left in the care of Jessie. But, instead of taking
care of them as their surrogate father, he took advantage of Messeah by sexually
molesting her at home, and worse, even in the presence of her younger brother. There
were four unfortunate occasions that constituted the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape
DECISION: The court finding accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO
guilty of Statutory Rape and three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in is MODIFIED.
Messeahs failure to reveal the sexual abuses to her mother does not taint her
credibility. Her silence was impelled by both fear for her life and shame for the
degradation that had befallen her. It is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to
be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her life. Silence is not an odd
behavior of a rape victim. In fact, the burden of keeping such a secret took its toll on her
health. Jose Noli testified that when he arrived for a vacation in August 1993, he noticed
that his children looked blank and pale, especially Messeah who looked thin,
complained of dizziness and headaches and sometimes threw up. He and his wife had
brought Messeah to several doctors, before one finally diagnosed Messeah as suffering
from nervous breakdown and psychological trauma.
The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially
when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Jessie's alibi that he was driving
the family car on the disputed occasions cannot stand up to his positive identification as
the perpetrator of the crime by both Messeah and Metheor. Neither can we believe
Jessie's allegation that Julie only wanted him out of their house because she favored
her own relative over him. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the
humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not
motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for her child's
defilement. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that a rape victim and her family would
publicly disclose the incident and thus sully their honor and reputation in the community
unless the charge is true. In fact, if Julie only wanted Jessie out of her house, then why
would the Dumaoal family file the complaints against him only on 13 April 1994, when it
is clear that he had already left the household as early as 22 October 1993. Neither
does this explain why the Dumaoal spouses felt compelled to change residences in
such a short period of time. As Jose Noli testified, they made the move even before All
Saints Day, which shows that they left their familiar surroundings and uprooted their
family all within ten (10) days just so they could ensure Messeahs safety.

Moreover, we agree with the Solicitor General that the only reason why the
Dumaoal spouses agreed to let Jessie go home to the province instead of filing charges
against him was because they were "torn between seeking justice for their daughter and
preserving her and the familys reputation. There was also the Christian desire to forgive
and give a blood kin a new chance at life knowing the gravity of the penalty that would
be meted out to him. To interpret their actuation any other way would be most unfair to
parents who are equally suffering with what befell their only daughter.

G.R. No. 123164. February 18, 2000
NICANOR DULLA, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home
crying, with bruises on her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her

uncle, herein petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, "Inaano
ako ng uncle ko," while doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to
demonstrate what had been done to her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis
to her. The matter was reported to Barangay Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the
child, the latter’s guardian, and three barangay tanods, went to the house of petitioner to
confront him. As petitioner’s father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and his
party, Lumaban sought assistance from the nearby Western Police District (WPD)
Station No. 7. It appears; however, that petitioner took advantage of the situation and
ran away. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape,
whereupon trial ensued. In her testimony in court, Andrea said that petitioner fondled
her organ and showed her his penis. She said that when petitioner did a pumping
motion, she had no panties on and that she was lying down. Petitioner was also lying
down, according to her. The medical report on Andrea prepared by Dr. Maximo Reyes,
who examined the child on February 3, 1993, showed that hymen of the victim is still
intact.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He said that
Andrea was coached by her guardian. He likewise denied that he escaped from
Lumaban and his men on February 2, 1993, and said that he only went away to avoid
any trouble that time. The trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness
hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether Andrea is a competent witness.
RULING:
The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. Under Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, only children who, on
account of immaturity, are incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses.
In People v. Mendoza, the Court held:
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating
truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.The requirements then of a child’s
competency as a witness are the following:(a) Capacity of observation,(b) Capacity
of recollection(c) Capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of
sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is settled that the trial court is called
upon to make such determination.
In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months old at the time she
testified. Despite her young age, however, she was able to respond to the questions put
to her. She answered "yes" and "no" to questions and, when unable to articulate what
was done to her by petitioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. During her
interrogation, she showed an understanding of what was being asked. She was

consistent in her answers to the questions asked by the prosecutor, the defense
counsel, and even by the judge.

G.R. No. 126096. July 26, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. AMADO SANDRIAS JAVIER, accused-appellant.

Facts:Julia Ratunil Javier, a 16-year old girl, was raped three times by her father,
Amado Sandrias Javier, one on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November, 1994
and December, 1994, which resulted to Julia’s pregnancy.

Three complaints were filed. The trial court found Amado guilty of the crime of
incestuous rape in the first complaint and sentenced to death. Upon failure of the
prosecution to prove the use of force by Amado in the second and third complaints, he
was just convicted of qualified seduction.

Issue:
Whether or not the conviction for qualified seduction is proper in the
complaint for the crime of rape?
Decision:
No. Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by
accused, the latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the
complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may be
convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of force by the
accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise would be violating
the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified
seduction under the same information (People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144 [1976]).
Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies
have one common element which is carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly
vary in all other respects (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).

G.R. Nos. 110974-81. June 17, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. DANTE MANANSALA Y MANALANSANG, accused-appellant.

Facts:
Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her
father, a 44-year old “taho” vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991. On
direct examination, Jennifer testified that she was raped eight times in the “taho” factory
in Tondo, the workplace of her father. On cross examination, however, Jennifer changed
her statement that the first rape incident was committed in the “taho” factory in Tondo
but the rest of the seven rape incidents were committed in Tarlac. She also mentioned
that her father gave her money every time they had sexual intercourse. The trial court
found Rodante Manansala guilty of having raped his daughter in Manila but dismissed
those committed in Tarlac on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly,
the crime of qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the victim’s
statement?
Decision: No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified
seduction. The inconsistencies on victim’s testimony for evidence cannot be dismissed
as trivial. Trial courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be able to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the
conviction of the accused. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. As SC has
said: Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are
categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking
retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being
interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge
without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection.
Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every
woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the
abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim
goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The prosecution’s evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and
contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1,
1991, the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November
2 and stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone
through a harrowing experience at the hands of her father but the following day and for
thirteen more days after that she stayed with him. It is true the medico-legal examination

conducted on November 17, 1991 showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she
had had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her
father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not rape but, quite possibly qualified
seduction, considering the age of complainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is
especially true because she said she had been given money by her father everytime
they had an intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that it
was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected to sexual
torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What is clear from
complainant’s testimony is that although accused-appellant had had sexual intercourse
with her, it was not done by force or intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible
because of accused-appellant’s moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accusedappellant was not living with them, having separated from complainant’s mother in
1986.
Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was
committed “by means of force, violence and intimidation,” accused-appellant cannot
possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the constitutional rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. That
charge does not include qualified seduction. Neither can qualified seduction include
rape.

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