Criminal Law Cases

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1477

January 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C.
Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of
the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the
information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over
by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment,
counsel de oficiofor the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court,
notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to
him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental
derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical
experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of
the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital,
Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis,"
at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a
single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this
motivation was determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful
was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only reveal any
conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.

Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio
C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully
aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any
manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto,
the motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an
individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision
he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at
Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt
acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to
abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a
policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even
challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for
a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his
apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship
especially in relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane
but is an individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional
Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion
of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled
that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the
date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the
Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between
the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present
criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in
1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to
Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges
and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his

disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after
the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity"
measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas,
the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by
the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen
prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his
speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained
by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights
granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost
said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an
American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky.
He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to
Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas
(now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the
night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare
for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding
afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "antiparity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote
hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original
Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it
out all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to
my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to
spare, I would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was
the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of
their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were
frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this:
he had deceived the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice
them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations. For these
reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with
the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the good
of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the
consequences of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I

am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my performance of my said
act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.

JULIO C. GUILLEN

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his
nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which
reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de
Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper
bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot
located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the
chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the
grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by
Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing
his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open
space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the
President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to
the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the
platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of
the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the following day as
the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo
Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It
appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was
standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a
barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower
of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but
Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him,
but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion,
placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila
Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that
the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was
acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few
moments previous to the explosion.

The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after
the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform
the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at
the same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and
marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the
other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which
contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who
investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are
satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the
trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly
committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code
in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in
the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows
beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand
grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully
well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and
causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended
victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed
by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of
transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose
was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people
around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the
President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal
to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other word, although it
was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in
killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of
homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious
physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that
he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum
total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with
article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in
order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to
cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it
has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such
gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held
by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People
vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y
habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa
alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se
oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos
en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al
estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia
temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno
al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional
por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y
no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C,
suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de
imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a
tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes
producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del
delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o
sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de
otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del
articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872.
(Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case
before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing
highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies,
namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of
which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the
injured parties.

The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case
of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be
properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner
put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the
qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the
person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand
grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over
acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four
other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the
provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among
others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards
the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his
electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the
nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with
the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the
single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it
necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be
applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporalin its maximum period to
death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it
upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby
do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of
the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial
court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-9426, U.S. v. Marasigan
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
August 15, 1914
G.R. No. L-9426
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO MARASIGAN, defendant-appellant.
Silvester Apacible for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General
Corpus for appellee.
Moreland, J.:
In this case it appears that about 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the
23d of January, 1913, Francisco Mendoza, while engaged in
examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of
Irucan, now called Calayan, in the municipality of Taal, Batangas
Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to approach them.
On arriving near them the accused said to Mendoza: "Why is this
line curved?" [indicating the division line between the lands of the
two.] "Let us make it straight."
Francisco replied saying: "Why do you want to make the line
straight? If you make the line straight, it will put certain logs and
trees on your land.?"

To this the accused replied: "This is false." Saying this he drew his
knife and struck at Mendoza.
On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the left
hand. The accused continued the attack, whereupon Mendoza
seized the accused by the neck and the body and threw him down.
While both were lying upon the ground the accused still sought to
strike Mendoza with his dagger. The latter seized the hand which
held the dagger and attempted to loosen his hold upon it. While
they were thus fighting for the possession of the knife, the wife of
the accused came forward and took the dagger from her husband's
hand, throwing it to one side. She then seized who after various
maneuvers, struck Mendoza a blow which knocked him senseless.
As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the
chest and one in the left hand, the latter being the most serious, the
extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of about P45, but
the middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless.
The story of the affair told by the accused is quite different from that
just related, but the facts as stated were as found by the trial court
and the evidence given fully supports the findings. We have
examined the case carefully and see no reason why it should be
reversed upon the facts. We may say the same as to the law.
The accused asserts that he should have a new trial upon the
ground that if he should be given another opportunity to present
evidence he would be able to show by a physician, Gregorio Limjoco,
that the finger which the court found to have been rendered useless
by the cut already described was not necessarily a useless member,
inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical operation, the
finger could be restored to its normal condition. He also asserts that

he could demonstrate by the physician referred to that it was not
the middle finger that was disabled but the third finger instead.
We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial.
It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the
usefullness of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the
third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was
rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which
finger it was.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original
condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical operation to
relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his
crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must
abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from
Mendoza.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Copyright ©

BRINAS VS. PEOPLE Case Digest
BRINAS VS. PEOPLE
(125 SCRA 687)

Facts: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad
station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter
Emelita Gesmundo. The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon.

They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about 2pm. Upon approaching Barrio
Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down and the conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente Brinas,
shouted “Lusacan, Lusacan!”

The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with one hand and holding her
baggage with the other. When they were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old
woman and the child stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by an
oncoming train, causing their instant death.

A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver, Hermogenes Buencamino, the
assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the

lower court acquitted Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA affirmed the
decision.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the accused-appellant was negligent?

Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the conclusion drawn
from the findings.

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses
that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of
the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some
passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus
comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train
resumes its run before they are able to disembark; there is no way to stop it as a bus may be
stopped. The appellant was negligent because his announcement was premature and erroneous, for
it took a full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. The premature
announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said
announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train
jerked and picked up speed. The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and
erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30309 November 25, 1983
CLEMENTE BRIÑAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Mariano R. Abad for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, Branch
1, which found the accused Clemente Briñas guilty of the crime of DOUBLE HOMICIDE THRU
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE prior the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo.
The information charged the accused-appellant. and others as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 1957, in the Municipality of Tiaong, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the said accused Victor Milan, Clemente

Briñas and Hermogenes Buencamino, being then persons in charge of passenger Train No. 522-6 of
the Manila Railroad Company, then running from Tagkawayan to San Pablo City, as engine driver,
conductor and assistant conductor, respectively, wilfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same
in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to existing laws, regulations and
ordinances, that although there were passengers on board the passenger coach, they failed to
provide lamps or lights therein, and failed to take the necessary precautions for the safety of
passengers and to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, that when said passenger Train No. 522-6 was passing
the railroad tracks in the Municipality of Tiaong, Quezon, two of its passengers, Martina Bool, an old
woman, and Emelita Gesmundo, a child about three years of age, fell from the passenger coach of
the said train, as a result of which, they were over run, causing their instantaneous death. "
The facts established by the prosecution and accepted by the respondent court as basis for the
decision are summarized as follows:
The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito
Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old
mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio
Lusacan, Tiaong, same province. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old
woman and her granddaughter among the passengers. At Hondagua the train's complement were
relieved, with Victor Millan taking over as engineman, Clemente Briñas as conductor, and
Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong at
about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train slowed down and the conductor shouted 'Lusacan',
'Lusacan'. Thereupon, the old woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of
Tiaong, carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and
Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. As a result the old woman and the
child stumbled and they were seen no more. It took three minutes more before the train stopped at
the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the passengers who disembarked
thereat .
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Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were found along
the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag. Repairing to the scene to investigate, they
found the lifeless body of a female child, about 2 feet from the railroad tracks,
sprawled to the ground with her belly down, the hand resting on the forehead, and
with the back portion of the head crushed. The investigators also found the corpse of
an old woman about 2 feet away from the railroad tracks with the head and both legs
severed and the left hand missing. The head was located farther west between the
rails. An arm was found midway from the body of the child to the body of the old
woman. Blood, pieces of scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the scene.
Later, the bodies were Identified as those of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo.
Among the personal effects found on Martina was a train ticket (Exhibits "B").
On January 7, 1957, the bodies of the deceased were autopsied by Dr. Pastor Huertas, the
Municipal Health Officer of Tiaong. Dr. Huertas testified on the cause of death of the victims as
follows:
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FISCAL YNGENTE:
Q What could have caused the death of those women?
A Shock.

Q What could have caused that shock?
A Traumatic injury.
Q What could have caused traumatic injury?
A The running over by the wheel of the train.
Q With those injuries, has a person a chance to survive?
A No chance to survive.
Q What would you say death would come?
A Instantaneous.
Q How about the girl, the young girl about four years old, what could
have caused the death?
A Shock too.
Q What could have caused the shock?
A Compound fracture of the skull and going out of the brain.
Q What could have caused the fracture of the skull and the going out
of the brain?
A That is the impact against a steel object. (TSN., pp. 81-82, July 1,
1959)
The Court of First Instance of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for double
homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, the court finds the defendant Clemente Briñas guilty beyond doubt of
the crime of double homicide thru reckless imprudence, defined and punished under
Article 305 in connection with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences
him to suffer six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo in the amounts of P6,000
and P3,000, respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs.
For lack of sufficient evidence against the defendant Hermogenes Buencamino and
on the ground of reasonable doubt in the case of defendant Victor Millan the court
hereby acquits them of the crime charged in the information and their bail bonds
declared cancelled.
As to the responsibility of the Manila Railroad Company in this case, this will be the
subject of court determination in another proceeding.

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the heirs of
the deceased victims filed with the same court, a separate civil action for damages against the
Manila Railroad Company entitled "Civil Case No. 5978, Manaleyo Gesmundo, et al., v. Manila
Railroad Company". The separate civil action was filed for the recovery of P30,350.00 from the
Manila Railroad Company as damages resulting from the accident.
The accused-appellant alleges that the Court of Appeals made the following errors in its decision:
I

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THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERAPPELLANT UNDER THE FACTS AS FOUND BY SAID COURT; and
II

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THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INCLUDING THE PAYMENT
OF DEATH INDEMNITY BY THE PETITIONER- APPELLANT, WITH SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY, AFTER THE HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED HAVE ALREADY COMMENCED A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES AGAINST THE RAILROAD COMPANY ARISING FROM THE SAME
MISHAP.
We see no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the conclusion drawn from
those findings.
It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-appellant was
assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted
"Lusacan, Lusacan", they stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the
train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled
and they were seen no more.
In finding petitioner-appellant negligent, respondent Court

têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx
The appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full three
minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. In making the
erroneous and premature announcement, appellant was negligent. He ought to have
known that train passengers invariably prepare to alight upon notice from the
conductor that the destination was reached and that the train was about to stop.
Upon the facts, it was the appellant's negligent act which led the victims to the door.
Said acts virtually exposed the victims to peril, for had not the appellant mistakenly
made the announcement, the victims would be safely ensconced in their seats when
the train jerked while picking up speed, Although it might be argued that the negligent
act of the appellant was not the immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to,
the injury, for the train jerked before the victims stumbled, yet in legal contemplation
appellant's negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury. As this Court held in
Tucker v. Milan, CA G.R. No. 7059-R, June 3, 1953: 'The proximate cause of the
injury is not necessarily the immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the

injury. It is only when the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is to
be charged with the disaster. So long as there is a natural, direct and continuous
sequence between the negligent act the injury (sic) that it can reasonably be said
that but for the act the injury could not have occurred, such negligent act is the
proximate cause of the injury, and whoever is responsible therefore is liable for
damages resulting therefrom. One who negligently creates a dangerous condition
cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although
the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible intervenes
to precipitate the loss.
xxx xxx xxx
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses
that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of
the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some
passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus
comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train
resumes its run before they are able to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus may be
stopped.
It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a
full three minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of Appeals correctly observed, "the appellant's
announcement was premature and erroneous.
That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact that immediately after
the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full speed. Petitioner-appellant failed to show
any reason why the train suddenly resumed its regular speed. The announcement was made while
the train was still in Barrio Lagalag.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of
petitioner' appelant Briñas. This announcement prompted the victims to stand and proceed to the
nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their
respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature
and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and
natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.
Petitioner-appellant also argues that it was negligence per se for Martina Bool to go to the door of
the coach while the train was still in motion and that it was this negligence that was the proximate
cause of their deaths.
We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent court that the negligence
of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the
proximate cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the
victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that after the heirs of Martina
Bool and Emelita Gesmundo had actually commenced the separate civil action for damages in the
same trial court during the pendency of the criminal action, the said court had no more power to
include any civil liability in its judgment of conviction.
The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is culpa contractual, not
an act or omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellant's arguments and from the title

of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant
Briñas Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct sources of
obligation.
The petitioner-appellant argues that since the information did not allege the existence of any kind of
damages whatsoever coupled by the fact that no private prosecutors appeared and the prosecution
witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of damages, the trial court erred in awarding death
indemnity in its judgment of conviction.
A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal action for double
homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file an independent civil action
but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company.
The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the separate civil action
against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death indemnity in the judgment of conviction
against the petitioner-appellant.
It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items
of damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss
of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
and interests are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed slim of P12,000.00
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death. This indemnity arising from the fact of
death due to a crime is fixed whereas the others are still subject to the determination of the court
based on the evidence presented. The fact that the witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of
damages is of no moment because the death indemnity fixed for death is separate and distinct from
the other forms of indemnity for damages.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award for death indemnity is
increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool instead of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for the
death of Emelita Gesmundo instead of P3,000.00, but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency imposed by the lower court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

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Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera; Plana and Relova, JJ., concur.

M A G A L L O N A V. E R M I TA ( C A S E D I G E S T )
August 24, 2014

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of
the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158,
codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in
1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046
reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the
UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one
baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence
undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our
claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a
codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522
is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic
starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of
the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and
sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms
operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both
passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal
states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can
invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA
3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the
itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over
KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll
breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.