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Criminal law Reviewer 1

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REviewer in Criminal law

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Content

Dear fellow student, hello. This reviewer is sourced from Boado’s book, some stuff from Reyes, Glenn Tuazon’s notes,
Justice Callejo’s lectures and recitations, and case doctrines. Enjoy. And no stamping please!

Fundamental Principles

Criminal law is that branch of public law which defines criminal offenses and prescribes specific
punishments for them.
o Penal law: acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment

All felonies in the RPC are public wrongs, as distinguished from private wrongs, the latter is just a
breach of duty or contract of 2 private parties.
o While the State has the power to prosecute persons for private crimes, the law gives the
victim the privilege of not instituting actions for private crimes (adultery, seduction,
abduction,etc) to protect the latter from shame and humiliation. There must be a complaint
initiated by the offended party.

Rape no longer a private crime. It’s a crime against persons.

Ex post facto law is a penal law which is given retroactive application to the prejudice of the accused.
o Makes an act or omission criminal which when committed was not yet so

Bill of attainder: law/act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial

Characteristics of penal law
o Generality

Refers to the persons covered

Binding on all person who reside or sojourn in the Philippines, whether citizens or not

Ex: those who are covered by treaties and laws of preferential application
(example: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, see discussion on
immunities)
o Territoriality

Refers to the situs of the act or the place where the penal law is applicable

Applicable to all crimes committed within the limits of the Philippine territory

Ex: treaties, laws of preferential application, and Article 2
o Prospectivity

Penal laws have prospective application unless they are favorable to the offender who
is not a habitual delinquent

Covers also penal circulars

Immunities from criminal prosecution by certain individuals
By international comity/law/relations
o Heads of diplomatic missions (Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations):

Ambassadors or nuncios

Envoys, ministers or internuncios

Charges d’ affairs
o Staff of the mission are comprised of:

Diplomatic

Administrative, technical, and administrative staff
o Important: Immunity is granted only to the “diplomatic agents” which are made up of the
heads of the diplomatic missions and the diplomatic staff. (Minucher v CA – test: does he
perform duties of a diplomatic nature?)
o Not subject to local penal laws. Immune from arrest and prosecution for local laws.

But they may be temporarily restrained if they do stuff that threaten public order.
o Varying degrees of immunity depending on the status of the person (based on the
enlightened discussion of the esteemed Justice Puno in Liang v People):

Diplomatic agent: inviolable, not liable to any form of arrest or detention; blanket
immunity

Consular officials: immune for acts performed in the exercise of consular functions;
not liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime

1

Officials of specialized agencies/international officials: immune only for acts
performed by them in their official capacity (functional immunities)

Compared to diplomats, international officials are granted less immunity.
Why? Because the privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of
international officials rest upon different legal foundations.

Diplomatic agents: based on customary international law

International agents: based on treaties, legislation, or both
o In Minucher v CA, Scalzo, the DEA agent, was not considered a diplomatic agent. But, he was
still immune because he was acting within the directive of the United States which placed him
under state immunity from suit, following the doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit
but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.
o The DFA initially determines immunity, but the final determination is still with the Courts.
(although in the WHO case, the Court said it was bound.)
o In the VFA, before the American accused is convicted, he is under the custody of the
Americans. However, once convicted, he will be detained by the Philippine authorities, with
the Americans having visitation rights. Hence, detention in the US embassy after conviction
was held violative of the VFA. (Nicolas v Romulo)
By local legislation
o Transactional immunity (Tanchangco v Sandiganbayan)
o Omnibus Election Code: one who reports to the Comelec any incident of vote buying/selling
and testifies is immune, even if he took part in the crime
o PD 749: immunity granted to those furnishing information regarding bribery, indirect bribery,
corruption
o Parliamentary/Presidential immunity
Is there any law which does not care for immunity? Is there any law which is immune from immunity
statutes?
o Yes. RA 9851, or The Law against Crimes against Humanity/Genocide.
o It says that the law applies equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity.

It, however, makes exceptions.1
What about members of the AFP, who has jurisdiction over them?
o Who are the members and officers of the AFP

Members of the AFP

Those subject to military law

Members of the CAFGU
o GR: Civilian courts have jurisdiction over crimes (RPC, SPL, ordinances) committed by
members of the AFP

EXCEPT: when it comes to service-connected offenses (like conduct unbecoming an
officer, disrespect towards superior officer, etc), courts martial have jurisdiction over
them

EXCEPTION to the EXCEPTION (when can a service oriented crime be tried by
the civilan court?): the president, before arraignment, in the interest of
justice, may refer the crime to a civilian court as long as it is covered by the
RPC or any other SPL2 (Gonzales v Abaya, Navales v Abaya)






1

Section 9. Irrelevance of Official Capacity. - This Act shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a head of state or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Act, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence. However:
(a) Immunities or special procedural rules that may be attached to the official capacity of a person under Philippine law other than the established
constitutional immunity from suit of the Philippine President during his/her tenure, shall not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over such a
person; and
(b) Immunities that may be attached to the official capacity of a person under international law may limit the application of this Act, nut only within
the bounds established under international law.

2

Justice Callejo: Service-oriented offenses are not absorbed by rebellion or coup d’etat
because the former are disciplinary in nature. Hence, erring military men can be tried
separately and independently under the RPC for the same act.

Justice Tinga does not agree with this.
o Justice Tinga: The civilian court is required to make a determination, independent of that of
the court-martial, that the acts charged constitute a service-oriented offense.

Why? The general purpose of RA 7055 is to deprive the court-martial of jurisdiction to
try cases which are properly cognizable before the civilian courts.
How about members of the PNP, which entity of the government has jurisdiction over them?
o The civilian courts since PNP is civilian in character. (And because of RA 6975 3)
Four schools of thought/philosophies:
o Classical/juristic

Basis of criminal liability: human free will – man has the capacity to choose good and
evil

Purpose of penalty: retribution

Determination of penalty: specific and predetermined

Emphasis of the law: on the offense and not on the offender
o Positivist/realistic

Basis of criminal liability: man inherently good, but offender is socially sick;
influenced by society

Purpose of penalty: reformation

Determination of penalty: arrived after an examination of the offender

Emphasis of the law: on the offender and not on the offense

Samples of the influence of the positivist theory to our criminal laws:
o ISL
Modifying Circumstances
Probation
o Habitual delinquency law Extenuating/Absolutory Circumstances
o 3-fold rule 40-year max limit for penalty Pardon Impossible crimes
o Eclectic – combines both
o Utilitarian – primary function of punishment in criminal law is to protect society from potential
and actual wrongdoers
Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law that defines and
punishes it.
o We follow this here, so we don’t have common law crimes.
All laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
Equipoise rule: if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then no
conviction.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – the act cannot be criminal unless the mind is criminal.
o Applies only to intentional felonies. Not to culpable felonies or mala prohibita where good
faith or lack of intent are immaterial.
Sources of criminal law (Perez v NPG Refillers):
o RPC
o SPL
o Municipal ordinances
o Admin regulations/IRRs

Violation of admin regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute

Penalty for violation must be provided by the statute itself

Regulation must be published
o What about decisions of the SC interpreting criminal statutes? Not penal laws per se, merely
interpretative.
o












2

xxx provided, that the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes
or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
3
Section 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts… xxx

3



What happened in Bayan Muna v Romulo (Feb 1, 2011)?
o Bayan Muna was assailing the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement. The Agreement basically
said that persons found in the territory of the other will not be surrendered to any
international tribunal without the consent of the other State. Bayan Muna claim that the
Agreement violated the Rome Statute which created the International Criminal Court which
had jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.
o Issue 1: Was the President GADLEJ for signing it, even if the Rome Statute has not yet been
ratified by the Senate? No.
o Issue 2: Is the Agreement void for being immoral and against recognized principles of IL? No.
o Issue 3: Was the Agreement valid even without concurrence of Senate? Yes. It’s not a treaty.
o The Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance 4 of the Philippines’ national
criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility
and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by
the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide
to try "persons" of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national
criminal justice system. Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring
citizens or over US "persons" committing high crimes in the country and defer to the
secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. As to "persons" of the US whom the
Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country would, in effect, accord discretion to the US to
exercise either its national criminal jurisdiction over the "person" concerned or to give its
consent to the referral of the matter to the ICC for trial. In the same breath, the US must
extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to "persons" of the RP committing
high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction.
o With respect to RA 9851 (Crimes against Humanity), the jurisdiction of the ICC is clearly and
unmistakably complementary to the national jurisdiction of the signatory states.
o Further, the Rome Statute itself rejects the concept of universal jurisdiction over the crimes
enumerated therein as evidenced by it requiring State consent.

Article 1. Time when Act takes effect. — This Code shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen
hundred and thirty-two.
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago,
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against
those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and
securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of
Book Two of this Code.






4

This article gives the exceptions to the territoriality principle of criminal law. Hence, the following acts
can be prosecuted in the country, even if done abroad:
o Offenses committed while on a Philippine ship or airship
o Forgery or counterfeit of any coin or currency note of the Philippines or obligations and
securities issued by the Government of the Philippines
o Connection with the introduction into the country of the obligations and securities mentioned
o Offenses committed by public employees or officers in the exercise of their functions
o Crimes of national security and the law of nations defined in Title One of Book 2
Can there be crimes committed here but can not be prosecuted?
o Yes, those provided in treaties and laws of preferential application.
o See immunity discussion above.
How about terrorism? What does the law say about that?
Should be “affirmation and conformation”

4

Terrorism is the commission of the enumerated acts in the law which sow and create a
condition of widespread and extradordinary fear and panic among the people, in order to
coerce the government to give in to a lawful demand.
o The Human Security Act (RA 9372) says that even if committed abroad, the individual can
still be prosecuted here if:

He commits, conspires or pots to commit terrorism inside the Philippines

Commit said crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippine descent, where
their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor to the commission of the crime

Commit crimes directly against the Philippine government 5
o Also, prosecution under the Human Security Act is a bar to another prosecution under the
RPC or any SPLs
o The provisions of Book 1 of the RPC is also applicable to the Human Security Act.
How about crimes against humanity, genocide?
o In RA 9851, the law provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction in the following cases:

Where the accused is a Filipino

The accused, regardless of citizenship and residence, is present in the Philippines, or

The accused ahs committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.
o See footnote for the options of the Philippine government. 6
o It also says that the RPC have a suppletory application to the Act and that in interpreting the
act, the Philippine courts can be guided by the judicial decisions of international courts and
tribunals, among others. (Sec 15 – Justice Callejo asked this in recit.) 7
Territory of the Philippines: within Philippine archipelago, atmosphere, interior waters, maritime zone
o Territorial sea: 12 nm; Contiguous zone: 24 nm; EEZ: 200 nm
o In the contiguous zone, the State may enforce laws which relate to customs, immigration,
taxes, sanitary laws
o





5

SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to any
contrary provision of any law of preferential application, the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who commit any of the
crimes defined and punished in this Act within the terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the Philippines; (2) to individual
persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of
the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes
within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official capacity; (5) to individual
persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of
Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime; and (6) to individual persons who, although
physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.
6
Section 17. Jurisdiction.- The State shall exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether military or civilian, suspected or accused of a crime defined and
penalized in this Act, regardless of where the crime is committed, provided, any one of the following conditions is met:
(a) The accused is a Filipino citizen;
(b) The accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the Philippines; or
(c) The accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.
In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if
another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities
may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to
the applicable extradition laws and treaties.
No criminal proceedings shall be initiated against foreign nationals suspected or accused of having committed the crimes defined and penalized in this
Act if they have been tried by a competent court outside the Philippines in respect of the same offense and acquitted, or having been convicted,
already served their sentence.
7
Section 15. Applicability of International Law.- In the application and interpretation of this Act, Philippine courts shall be guided by the following
sources:
(a) The 1948 Genocide Convention;
(b) The 1949 Genava Conventions I-IV, their 1977 Additional Protocols I and II and their 2005 Additional Protocol III;
(c) The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, its First Protocol and its 1999 Second
Protocol;
(d) The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;
(e) The rules and principles of customary international law;
(f) The judicial decisions of international courts and tribunals;
(g) Relevant and applicable international human rights instruments;
(h) Other relevant international treaties and conventions ratified or acceded to by the Republic of the Philippines; and
(i) Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and authoritative commentaries on the foregoing sources as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of international law.

5










English rule: territorial State has jurisdiction, except when it merely concerns internal management of
the vessel (ET – English-territory)
French rule: flag of registry has jurisdiction, as long as it does not disturb the peace of the country
(French-flag)
We follow the English rule.
o Hence, when the accused was caught smoking opium in a English vessel in Philippine waters,
the Courts have jurisdiction over him. Drugs disturb the peace of the country.
o What if he did not smoke the opium or sell it, does it still disturb the peace?

Suggested answer from Glenn’s reviewer: In the DDA, mere attempt to transport
marijuana is a crime. If a commercial vessel passes by the territorial sea, the general
rule under UNCLOS is that the ship cannot be boarded. The criminal law of a State
may not be enforced on board the vessel to prosecute indidivuals except if measures
are necessary to suppress illegal traffic of drugs. Hence, if mere passing through the
territorial sea can lead to boarding and prosecution, what more if the ship is docked?
o But the Courts can disregard the rule if they want.

In a CA case (P v Toboto), a person in a Philippine ship in Vietnamese waters got
drunk and shot three people. He was not prosecuted in Vietnam. CA: There is nothing
preventing the Philippines from deviating from English rule. (me: either way, it was
on a Philippine ship, so we had jurisidiction)
Register your ship in the Philippine Maritime Authority.
High seas, free for all. Do what you want. (except be a pirate)
o Is it possible that a crime be committed beyond the territorial sea, but prosecuted here?

Yes, if it is a continuing crime. If it began in the high seas and continued here. (US v
Bull, kalabaws weren’t secured properly. Began in Taiwan, I think, and ended here)
o Does the Philippines have ability to legislate on crimes applying to the high seas?

Yes. PD 532 on piracy.
o In People v Tulin, the pirates boarded a ship within the Philippines and brought the ship to
Singapore waters. Justice Callejo, who was still a young and dashing RTC judge, said the
attack was committed here in our waters, hence the court had jurisdiction. The SC affirmed
him and added that either way, piracy is an exception to the territoriality in criminal law.
o Same was applied in People v Lol-lo where the piracy was committed outside the Philippines.
The purpose of penal laws involving national security is to protect the domestic order and economic
security of the Philippines. Hence, it should extend beyond the territory of the Philippines, to the
perpetrators wherever they may be found. (Dillars v US)

Title One
FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Chapter One
FELONIES
Art. 3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.






Felonies are committed by dolo or culpa.
Deceit when act is performed by deliberate intent.
Fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
In both cases, it is necessary that there is voluntariness.
Dolo

Freedom of action
Intelligence
Intent

Culpa
Freedom of action
Intelligence
Negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, lack of skill

6





In a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of the act/omission punishable by law and the mens
rea (physical act + act of the mind)
o A felony by dolo is a voluntary act. It is a free, voluntary and intentional act; one acts with
intelligence if he can distinguish right from wrong, moral from not, licit fro not
o For felonies by dolo, one is not criminally liable if there is no criminal intent
o Intent refers to the use of a particular means to bring about the desired result. It is
manifested by the overt acts of a person.

GR: criminal intent is presumed (general intent)

EX: if intent an element of the crime (specific criminal intent: intent to kill,
intent to gain), intent cannot be presumed and must be established
o Specific intent is important for the attempted and frustrated stages,
to find out what crime to peg the guy with

It’ll be the difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness.
o But when the crime has been done, specific intent becomes general
intent, which is now presumed. Hence, when someone dies (even
when the wound inflicted is not a mortal wound), the accused is
presumed to have intent to kill. When the thief has possession of the
stolen material, he is presumed to have intent to gain.

Justice Callejo actually said that the intent to kill is
conclusively presumed. (I’m not sure about this generalization
because there are some cases where the victim died yet the
Court said no intent to kill, that’s why only Art 365 was
applied.)

In specific intent felonies (where intent is essential), the prosecution must allege in
the information and prove beyond a reasonable doubt the specific intent. (P v Delim)
o Motive is the moving power of force which impels a person to commit acts.

GR: Immaterial in incurring criminal liability, not an essential element of crime

EX:
o in cases of political crimes, where common crimes are absorbed by
the political crime if it were done in pursuance of the political motive
o when the husband catches the wife making love with a paramour. Not
criminally liable for homicide if motive was to avenge his dishonor. But
if he killed the wife for some other motive, liable.
o For evidentiary issues
In a felony by culpa, culpa is a mode of committing a crime.
o It is the mental attitude which is benig penalized.
o In Art 365 (Reckless Imprudence), culpa is itself the crime punished. The crime is properly
denominated as “reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.”

“Homicide” does not refer to Art 249, but merely indicates that the victim died. There
is no intent to kill.

This was applied in P v Carmen, where the faith healers tried to cure a boy by beating
him up and other folksy stuff. Boy died, but Court said no intent to kill, so just
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
o Can there be a crime of reckless imprudence resulting into frustrated homicide?

Uh, no. frustrated homicide requires intent to kill. This is incompatible with
recklessness, negligence or imprudence. Kalokohan yan.
o Cant here be conspiracy resulting from negligence?

No. Conspiracy is the product of intent. Ay talaga naman.
o Can more than one person be liable for killing the same person, one by dolo and one by
culpa?

Yezzir. Remember P v Pugay. A poured gasoline on mental retardate. B lit him up with
a match. SC: A liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (he should’ve

7



foreseen that someone will light the guy up). B liable for homicide (victim died, so
intent to kill presumed, but he was given a MC here)
o What about mistake in the identity of the victim, does this constitute reckless imprudence?

No. Dolo, the killing was deliberate. Mistake in identity is not culpa. It was an unlawful
act willfully done. (P v Oanis – policeman shot a man sleeping, without ascertaining
first if it was the escapee they were looking for.)
Malum in se, or malum prohibitum, how can we tell?
o Is lack of criminal intent a defense on SPL? Depends if mala in se, or mala prohibitum.
o In answering whether plunder was malum in se or prohibitum, the Court used the following
questions:

Is the crime inherently immoral and wrong?

Are the predicate crimes/felonies mala in se?

Do the penalties imposed follow the nomenclature of the RPC? (Boado doesn’t agree
with this one because of the old DDA which applied RPC penalties to drugs which are
malum prohibitum)

Court answered yes to all 3 questions and thus categorized plunder (under Art
9372) as mala in se.
o A member of the BEI tampers with election results. Mala in se or prohibitum?

In se, even if the crime is defined by SPL. It is inherently immoral and wrong to
tamper with election results.
o Is genocide malum in se?

Yes. It is inherently wrong and immoral.
o How about possession of unlicensed firearms?

Prohibitum.

Interestingly, the intent considered here is the intent to possess the firearm (intent to
perpetrate the act versus intent to commit a crime). Fajardo v People (2011). 8

Hence, transient/temporary possession of an illegal firearm is not a violation of the
law.
o Trust Receipts Law? Prohibitum.
o BP 22? Prohibitum.
o Can one be liable for both a felony and a SPL for one delictual act? Yes. BP22 and Estafa.
Illegal recruitment and estafa.
o Can one be liable for a crime defined by SPL and a felony under a special complex crime?

Yes. Anti-carnapping Law. if the offender kills the driver or occupant to take the car,
guilty of special complex crime of carnapping with murder.
o May a felony by dolo or culpa absorb a crime which is malum prohibitum?

No. A felony by dolo or cupla cannot absorb a malum prohibitum crime. (Loney v
People. But what about illegal firearms?)
o Can there be a conspiracy to commit malum prohibitum?

Yes. In Tigoy v People, the accused were charged with violation of a malum
prohibitum (Forestry Code) because they cut some timber and transported it. Court
applied conspiracy.

8

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not
have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the
first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done
freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is
sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the
part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored
in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is
not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it
is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was
made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting
the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866.

8



The all-knowing Justice does not agree. Art 8 states that conspiracy must be to
commit a felony which is RPC crimes.

Basis of liability
Modifying circumstances
Degree of participation
Stage of accomplishment
Moral turp?
Where can we find them?

In se
Moral trait
Taken into account
Taken into account
Taken into account
Generally involve moral
turpitude
Generally in the RPC

Prohibitum
Offender’s voluntariness
Not considered
Not considered
Only when consummated
Generally no moral turpitude
Generally in SPL

Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.



Who are liable for felonies?
o Those who commit a felony, although the wrongful act done is different from that intended
o Those commit impossible crimes
First paragraph

Boado says applies to both dolo and culpa (since “felony” is used)

But the brilliant Justice Callejo says it applies to only dolo (since “intended” is used). Follow Justice
Callejo, it’s his test.
o Accused was attacked by assailant with a bolo. He managed to wrestle the bolo away from
the assailant but as he yanked it away, it hit his wife. Accused not liable, his act of wrestling
the bolo away was not a felony, it was a legal act. (P v Bindoy)

A person is liable for the natural and logical consequences of his criminal act
o Natural – occurrence in ordinary course of things
o Logical – there must be a reasonable connection between the act done and the consequence

In other words, the act must be the proximate cause of the effect.
o Proximate cause – the cause, which in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred

Accused is deemed to know the consequences of his criminal act. (P v Moldes)
o Neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment are deemed to have been
among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party.

Even if the resulting wrongful act was different from the offender’s intention, he is liable for that
resulting act.

Praeter intentionem – so grave a wrong caused that that intended

Aberratio ictus – mistake in the blow
o Examples:
o Inserting vibrator in anal orifice of victim and victim died because it was rusty. (P v Buyco,
considered complex crime of sexual assault with homicide under RA 8353)
o Accused threw a grenade at person. It killed target and the accused’s wife and SPI 3 childern.
(P v Magalone, complex crime of murder and parricide)
o Accused robbed a store and shoved a pandesal into old lady’s mouth to keep her quiet. Old
lady died. (P v Ofero, robbery with homicide)
o Accused threatened victim with a knife. They were in a boat. Victim got scared and jumped
off. He drowned. Accused guilty since he created a sense of fear in the mind of the victim.
(US v Valdez)9
9

"If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself,
the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result.

9

Accused wanted to rape the victim, so she jumped out of the window and died. Accused guilty
even fro r the death. Rape with homicide. (P v Castromero)
o Accused stabbed the victim so doctor put a drainage on the wound. Victim was in pain and
because of his state of nervousness removed the drainage. Victim died. Accused liable. (P v
Quianzon)
Even if the doctor is negligent, so long as the accused inflicted mortal wounds on the victim, the
negligence of the doctor is not an active intervening force that exculpates the accused.
o But in some cases the doctor’s acts are exculpatory for the accused.

Like when doctor is so drunk that he gave the victim poison, instead of medicine.
Cause and effect between act of the accused and the resulting injury is not altered by:
o Pre-existing conditions of the victim (pathological)
o Predispositions of victim

If victim likes drinking and its part of his culture, and then after being stabbed, the
doctor told him not to drink anymore, but still he drinks, the stabber is liable. (US v
Bayutas)
o Physical condition of the victim

Punching Steve Rogers before he becomes Captain America. And then he dies. His
scrawniness can not be taken against him.
o Incompetence of the doctor
o Refusal of the victim to get medical help
o Infection of the wound

But the infection should not be due to the malicious act of the offended party (US v
delos Santos)
Hence, act is not the proximate cause if:
o There is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the death of the
victim; active force must be foreign to the act of the perpetrator
o Resulting injury or damage is the intentional act of the victim
o Fault of the doctor (not sure, Sir just mentioned it)
So, what applies for culpa?
o Art 365. Offender is liable for whatever damage or injury caused by him.
o Can there be reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide if two people died? May
reckless imprudence result into a complex crime under Art 48?

Yes, because reckless imprudence is a felony under Art 3 and Art 48 talks about
felonies as component crimes.
A person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary consequences of his acts. (Rule 131, Sec 5c)
o











Mistake of Fact

Aberratio Ictus

Factors which affect the intent and criminal liability of the offenders
Definition
Notes
Effect on intent
Effect on liability
Had the facts
Ah Chong.
No criminal intent
No criminal liability
been true to the
Accused must not be
belief of the
negligent in
offender, his act
ascertaining facts.
would have been
justified;
Mistake in the
situation
Mistake in the
A shoots B. He
Intended result
Increases criminal
blow; offender
instead hits C who
falls on another
liability which may
intends the injury
was standing by B.
person, or may be
result to a complex
on one person,
(three persons
in addition to the
crime
but the harm fell
present – actual
injury on the
on another
victim, intended
intended victim
victim, and accused)
Treachery can be
appreciated.

10

Error in personae

Mistake in the
identity of the
victim

A wants to kill B. He
instead kills C, who
was his father and
who he thought was
B.
(two persons
involved – actual &
unintended victim
and accused)

Intended result
falls on another
due to error in the
identity of the
victim

Praeter
intentionem

So grave a wrong
that what was
intended; need for
a great disparity
between the
intended felony
and actual felony
committed
Cause of the
cause is the cause
of the evil caused

A punched B. B died.

Actual crime is
greater than
intended

Proximate cause

Results in crime
although was not
intended

Extenuating if the
resulting crime is
greater than
intended (parricide
when what was
intended was
homicide); no
effect if the
resulting crime is
the same as that
intended
Mitigating under
Art 13

Results in criminal
liability whether
acting with intent
(Art 4) or
negligence (Art
365)

Impossible crimes
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.








Impossible crimes won’t apply if another crime had been committed by the acts of the offender
Not a crime, it would have been a crime
Elements:
o Offender performed an act which would be an offense against persons or property
o Act done with criminal intent
o Accomplishment of the act is

Inherently impossible

Means employed were inadequate or ineffectual (Intod v CA)
There is intent, but actually no crime committed
Impossibility may be:
o Legal impossibility

Elements:

motive, desire and expectation was to violate the law

intention to perform the act

actual performance of the act

Consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime

Example: killing a dead person, stealing something that it is yours pala
o Factual or physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act

The factual condition must be unknown to the offender

An extraneous circumstance prevented the consummation of the crime

Example: offender bribes someone who he thinks is Pnoy, it’s not Pnoy, just a look-alike; pointed a gun to victim, but empty pala;

accused fired guns into the empty bedroom of the intended victim, but the
victim was out of town, sipping margaritas in a beach with his homies (Intod
v CA);

11








stealing a check which was subsequently dishonored because of lack of funds
(Jacinto v P – although sir does not agree with this since intent to gain (with
momentary possession) will suffice in theft/robbery)

compare with P v Balmores where the accused made a really really really bad
falsification of a sweepstakes ticket. SC convicted him of falsification. But
Paras dissented and said that the falisification was so bad that it was
inherently inadequate in the means employed. No one in their right mind
would have thought it was a real sweepstakes ticket.
Rape can now be an impossible crime since crime against persons.
Is conspiracy applicable to impossible crimes? No.
Is art 6 applicable to impossible crimes? No.
Justice Regalado: Under Art 59, the imposable penalty for impossible crime is arresto mayor. If I saw
a person on a bed, thought he was my bitter rival and I punched him, and because of my weak arms,
he only sustained slight PI, I would’ve been sentenced to arresto menor.
o But if he turns out that he was already dead, my penalty would be arresto mayor because of
the impossible crime.
o How odd! Just like how salmon swim up the current, and not downward. (Sabaw man.)

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.







If no law punishing act, court should dismiss the case (because of Art 21 and 22)
Art 5 does not apply to crimes defined by SPL because of the use of the words “degree of malice”
o This brings to mind BP 22, in relation to AC 12-2000, as clarified by AC 13-2001:

SC noticed that people are using the courts as collection agencies and are clogging up
the dockets

So the SC issued a circular dissuading people from filing BP 22 and for judges to just
impose fines
For libel, even if imposable penalty is imprisonment or fine, the SC prefers fine over imprisonment.
(Brillante v CA)
If the penalty is too excessive, remedy is executive clemency. But judge should still impose the
penalty. (P v Veneracion)

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those which
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.






Applies only to dolo, since intent is essential for this article
Consummated
o All acts necessary for the felony’s accomplishment and execution are present
o Formal crimes are always consummated because the offender cannot perform all the acts
necessary to consummate the offense without consummating it

Physical injuries, slander
Stages:
o Subjective – accused still has control of his acts

12





o Objective – all the acts of execution are already there
Frustrated
o Offender performs all the acts which would produce the felony as a consequence,

BUT the felony was not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator

If the cause of the frustration is due to the will of the offender, crime is not
frustrated, but could be another crime
o Example: Scott gives Jean poison. Jean drinks it. However, before
Jean dies, Scott feels bad and gives Jean the antidote. Not frustrated
murder, but consummated physical injuries.
o Reached the objective stage of the offense because no further action is required on his part.
o Crimes with no frustrated stage:

Rape

As long as the penis enters/penetrates the labia majoria, already
consummated. (bombardment of the drawbridge doctrine)
o Penis must be erect (P v Brioso)

But touching not enough, the touching must be in relation with the intent to
have carnal knowledge of the woman and there must have been penetration,
however slight. Hence, grazing and mere stroking not enough. 10 (P v
Campuhan)
o If just in the mons pubis – merely attempted, (mere strafing of the
citadel of passion doctrine)

Arson

Corruption of public officers

Adultery

Theft/Robbery

One is liable for consummated robbery if one takes possession of the personal
property of the other, however brief it may be.

Dude goes into lot of the owner, and steals three cows. He is still in the lot
when the owner catches him with the three cows in tow. Consummated theft.

Felonies by omission (no attempted and frustrated)

Falsification of public document (no attempted and frustrated) unless falsification is so
imperfect
Attempted
o Offender commences the commission of an offense directly by overt acts, and
o Does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
o Still in subjective phase
o Elements:

Offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts

Does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony

Offender’s act not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance

Non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance (P v Lizada, penned by the good justice Callejo himself)
o “Directly by overt acts”

Elements:

There must be external acts

Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed

There should be an immediate and necessary connection between the overt acts and
the crime intended to be committed.

10

Touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis
on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis – there must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias
or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

13

It can be the first of a series of acts that would produce the intended crime, as long
as the intended crime is established or known.

In P v Lamahang, the police caught a man entering a house through a hole in
the wall. His body was halfway inside the house. Charged with attempted
robbery. SC: Wrong. Guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling. His act of
making a hole in the wall was not reasonably connected to robbery. You can’t
really tell what he was going to do inside the house, he could’ve raped or
murdered someone.

In P v Lizada, the accused was caught by the brother of the victim without his
shirt on. The accused was on top of the victim, held her hands and was
mashing her breasts and touching her vajayjay. The victim was naked. Acts of
lasciviousness or attempted rape? SC: Attempted rape. By the series of acts
committed by the accused, he had commenced the execution of rape, which,
if for the arrival of the brother, would have produced the rape.

In P v Campuhan, the citadel was merely strafed. Only attempted.

Overt acts are different from preparatory acts.

Overt acts: external acts which if continued will logically result in a felony

Preparatory acts: acts which still require another act so that a felony will
result; not punishable unless the act itself is a crime
o Example of a preparatory act: buying poison, buying a gun,
surveillance of a store which you will rob
“Offender did not perform all the acts of execution”

Still at the subjective phase of the commission of the crime.

Still has full control of acts, and has not completed the needed acts yet.
“Due to cause or accident other than spontaneous desistance.”

Desistance has legal effect only in the attempted stage.

If the person desists on his own, he is not guilty of the attempted crime.

Hence, as long as you desist while still in the subjective phase, you are not
liable for the crime.

The desistance can be for whatever reason (fear, conscience, hunger, needed
to go poop). As long as you desist voluntarily, no liability for the attempted
crime.
o BUT: you can be liable for any other felony already committed.
o Example: Emma aimed gun at Johnny and fired, missed. Emma aimed
again but Johnny pleaded for his life, so Emma felt sorry for him and
desisted from firing. Emma liable for first shot, but not liable for the
second act of aiming.
Take note that in RA 9851, a person is criminally liable for a crime defined and penalized
therin if he/she attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of
circumstances lindependept of the person’s intention. (Sec 8)


o

o

o

Acts of execution
Cause of nonaccomplishment
Phase
Included?
Intent
Homicide/murder

11

Frustrated
All acts have been performed
Cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator
Objective

Wound fatal

Attempted
Not all acts had been done
Cause or accident other than
offender’s spontaneous desistance
Subjective
Necessarily included in the frustrated
stage
Inherent
Wound not fatal

Does the subjective and objective phase apply to crimes against persons (specifically,
homicide/murder)?11
Test should be limited to homicide/murder. Because rape is now a crime against persons and the “nature of the wound” test does not apply to rape.

14

o

o

o

o

No. The august Justice Callejo suggests a different test:

First: Was there intent to kill?

Second: Was the wound serious, less serious, fatal?

If there was intent to kill and wound inflicted was fatal: frustrated

If there was intent to kill and wound inflicted was not mortal/fatal: attempted
o A non-fatal/slight wound can’t possibly produce death.
Why isn’t the subjective/objective phase used? Because even if the accused had lost control
of all his acts (bumaril na siya eh!), the determination is still with the nature of the wound.
(Rivera v People)
There were old rulings before (P v Eduave, P v Borinaga 12) where the test was the belief of
the offender. If he believed that the wound was mortal, frustrated.

No longer the rule. Now, even if the accused believed that he inflicted a mortal
wound, but he did not, it is merely attempted, not frustrated. The nature of the
wound controls, not the belief of the person.
Justice Callejo warns not to be in a hurry in categorizing if mortal/fatal wound or not, wait for
the results. He said this in critique of a case wherein a doctor removed the feeding tube of
the victim. The SC only considered it attempted homicide.

Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable.— Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property





Light felonies – penalty not exceeding arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both
GR: Punishable only when consummated
o EX: crimes against persons or property (all stages)
Only principals and accomplices are liable

Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are
punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some
other person or persons.










There is conspiracy where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.
Must proven beyond reasonable doubt.
o But no need for direct proof. May be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, all o which point to or indicate a joint purpose, a concert of
action and a community of interest.
Art 8 does not define a penalty!
Requirements for conspiracy:
o Singularity of intent, and
o Unity in the execution of the unlawful objective (P v Pagalasan)
There must be criminal intent. No such thing as conspiracy as a product of negligence. No conspiracy
to commit an unintentional act.
Conspiracy does not apply to crimes defined in SPL
o Unless the SPL provides that conspiracy to commit a crime under that law is a crime in itself.

DDA – conspiracy to commit acts like sale, importation, distribution of drugs 13

12

dude stabbed the chair where his victim was sitting. He ended up stabbing the back of the chair, but he thought he dealt the blow and then ran away
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty
prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:
(a) Importation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical;
(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used in any form;
(d) Manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical; and
(e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs.
13

15

o







What if
itself)?


Access Devise Regulations (RA 8484) – conspiracy to commit access devise fraud 14
Anti-terrorism Law (RA 9372)15
no provision in SPL? Can Art 8 still be a mode to commit a crime (not a crime in

In Andan v People, SC held that 2 or more persons who conspire to commit a crime of
BP 22 are liable for such crime, applying Art 8 of the RPC.

In Tigoy v CA, accused were guilty of violating the Forestry Code. SC applied Art 8 to
the accused.

So, apparently, yes, it can be applied as a mode to commit a crime.
There are two concepts of conspiracy:
o Conspiracy as a crime by itself (conspiracy statutes)

Conspiracy to commit treason, conspiracy to commit rebellion (and the SPLs above)

In these two conspiracy crimes, one the traitors/rebels actually commit
treason/rebellion, conspiracy loses its juridical personality and it becomes a
mere mode to commit a crime. (Remember this!)
o Conspiracy as a mode of committing a crime or mode of incurring criminal liability

Pre-arranged conspiracy (there was actual planning), or

Implied conspiracy (implied from the concerted acts of the offenders)
Pre-arranged conspiracy
o The conspiracy that we are all familiar with - there was planning, prior agreement on how to
commit the crime
o GR: as long as he appeared in the scene of the crime, he is liable as co-conspirator

EXCEPT:

if he is a mastermind, he doesn’t have to be in the scene of the crime to be a
co-conspirator (Boado)

if he performs an overt act in performance of the conspiracy, even if it is not
in the scene of the crime per se (Justice Callejo – like the driver of a get-away
car who planned the crime as well, or the man who pressed the button of a
remote control bomb and the bomb exploded a few streets away)
o Unless he is the mastermind, the conspirator must have committed or performed some over
act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.
The overt act may be: (not exclusive list)

Active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself (held the hands of a
guy who was shot),

Moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime (cheering them on), or

By exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators (Mayor lording over his
minions while they chop the head off of some poor fellow)
o Is Art 4, paragraph 1 applicable to conspiracy? (Justice Callejo)

Yes. Each conspirator is responsible for everything fone by his confederates, which
follow incidentally in the execution of the common design, as one of its probable and
natural consequences even though not intended as part of the original design.

Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their act by engaging in
conspiracy.

Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act
differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. (P v
Bisda)

It extends to collateral acts incident to and growing out of the conspiracy.

14

Section 11. Conspiracy to commit access device fraud. – If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any of the offenses listed in Section 9 and
one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as in the case
of the doing of the act, the accomplishment of which is the object of such conspiracy.
15
SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. – Persons who conspire to commit the crime of terrorism shall suffer the
penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the crime of
terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same.

16

Example: Scott and Emma agreed to kidnap Magneto. They pointed a
rubber gun at him. He suffered a heart attack and died. Scott and
Emma are both liable for kidnapping with homicide. (Even if they only
agreed to kidnpap Magneto)
o Example: Kitty and Logan agreed to rob Jean. Jean resisted, so Kitty
shot and killed her. Kitty and Logan both guilty of robbery with
homicide. (Same will apply with robbery with rape)

Why? Well, the resistance of the victim is expected. It’s a necessary
consequence of the crime they agreed upon.
o But the conspirators are not liable for the acts of the other
conspirators which are products of afterthought or extraneous to the
conspiracy. (robbery was finished, then one of the robbers went back
to rape the maid)
Who should be liable for a second unplanned crime committed by one or some of the
perpetrators? (Boado)

Only the actual perpetrator, not the other conspirators.

GR: conspirators’ liability only for the crime agreed upon.

EXCEPT:
o Other crime was committed in their presence and they did not prevent
its commission indicating their approval thereof
o When the other crime is the natural consequence of the crime planned
(Art 4)

homicide resulting from physical injuries inflicted
o Resulting crime was a composite crime because a composite crime or
special complex crime is indivisible

Robbery with homicide, robbery with rape

In these 3 exceptions, although there was a crime committed which is not
part of the plan or prior agreement, all the conspirators are liable therefor. In
other cases, an unplanned crime committed will be the liability only of the one
who committed it.

Remember: Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another
conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which
they intended to commit. (P v Bisda)

Examples:

If one of the robbers prevented the others from committing the extra act of
homicide or rape, then he is only liable for robbery, and not robbery with
rape/homicide. It does not matter if he succeeds in preventing them or not.
(P v de Jesus)

One of the conspirators who committed robbery, after they all escaped, saw a
car and carnapped it. Only he was liable for carnapping. (P v Mapalit)

Agreed to rob victim. After the robbery, one of the conspirators went back to
the house to rape the maid. Only the rapist is liable for the rape. (P v
Angeles)
Conspiracy continues until the object of the conspiracy is attained. It is a continuing event,
unless in the meantime, they abandon the conspiracy or the conspirators are arrested.

For a conspirator to escape liability from the planned crime, he must perform an overt
act to disassociate himself before the crime is actually committed.

Example: trying to prevent the crime, even if unsuccessful.

Example: agreement to commit robbery. One conspirator stabbed the victim
and ran. The accused did not run and was caught. He claimed he was not
guilty since he desisted when did not run. SC held that the mere failure or
refusal to flee after the commission of the crime does not amount to a
disavowal of the conspiracy. There must be an overt act to disassociate
himself from the liability.
o

o

o

17

In other words, for a conspirator to disclaim liability, he must, before the crime
occurs:

Disassociate by an overt act, or

Try to prevent the crime.
o Not necessary for the co-conspirators to perform equally each and every part of the acts
constituting the offense.

As long as the parts played by each of the principals in the conspiracy contribute to
the realization of the common design, they are all liable equally.

The act of one becomes the act of all.
o A co-conspirator may be acquitted while others are convicted.

Conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is committed. The mere act of
conspiring is not by itself punishable.

The acquittal of a conspirator does not absolve the other co-conspirators from
criminal liability.

If the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be
individually responsible for their respective acts.

Remember, mere knowledge, acquiescence or agreement to cooperate is not enough
to constitute one as a conspirator (unless mastermind), absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime, pursuant to the common design and
purpose.

Mere fact that he knew of the criminal design does not ipso facto make him a coconspirator (unless mastermind nga).
Implied conspiracy
o Deduced from the acts of the offenders
o No planning, they acted in concert during the commission of the crime
o The agreement to pursue a common design and united purpose was instantaneous
o GR: accused must have participated in the commission of the crime to be considered a coconspirator

Mere presence or approval of the crime without more will not make the alleged
conspirator liable because there would be no basis for deducing conspiracy as to him
as there is absent criminis particeps (criminal participation)
Three kinds of conspiracy according to Estrada v Sandiganbayan:
o Wheel conspiracy – one person is the hub and his underlings are the spokes

This was used against Jinggoy. SC said that the hub was Erap while the spokes are all
the accused, and the rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the
overall conspiracy (the amassing of wealth). Jinggoy was a spoke.
o Chain conspiracy – involving the distribution of drugs in a way that there is successive
communication and cooperation in the same way as with legit businesses conduct their
business with suppliers, etc
o Enterprise conspiracy – usually seen in organized crime, involves racketeering
Is evident premeditation automatic in conspiracy?
o No. it depends on what kind of conspiracy.

If pre-arranged conspiracy, it can be appreciated. Planned eh.

If implied conspiracy, generally, it cannot be appreciated, absent any proof showing
how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or the time that elapsed when it
was carried out.
How about price or reward?
o Not sure. Original case of P v Tiguman (GR 130144, May 24, 2001) was malabo. See footnote
for decision.16
Boado and the Arias doctrine
o The head of office may be found liable for the acts of his subordinates either due to
conspiracy or by an act of reckless impurdence which allowed the commission of estafa thru












16

As to the circumstance of price or reward, it can only be appreciated against appellant Tiguman since it was he who committed the felonious act for
money. the same evidence on price established conspiracy between the appellants. Consequently the act of one is the act of all.

18

o

o

falsification or malversation through falsification, without such act of negligence the crime
could not have been accomplished. But since negligence cannot co-exist with conspiracy, his
liability shall be thru culpa but that of his subordinates thru dolo, if there is no conspiracy.
When, however, the infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplace by a head
of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of
conspiracy, the head of office must be exculpated.
There has to be some added reason why the head must be compelled to examine each
voucher/paper that comes his way. There are so much to sign and go over, he can’t be
expected to go through all the paperwork.17 (Arias v Sandiganbayan, Arias was acquitted.)

Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. — Grave felonies are those to which the law
attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with
Art. 25 of this Code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are
correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned Art..
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arrest menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos or both; is provided.









Grave felonies
o Capital punishment or afflictive penalties in any of its periods (as long as min, med, max is
within the afflictive penalty, grave!)

PM, dq, RT and RP
Less grave
o Maximum period is correctional, the max period of the penalty must be correctional
o Destierro, suspension, AMayor, PC

Example: penalty imposed by law is AMenor Max to AMayor Min, less grave since max
period of the penalty is within the penalty of Amayor
Light felonies
o Amenor or fine not exceeding P200

Compare with Art 26 where a fine of P200 is correctional. See Art 26 for reconciliation
Use this article to determine:
o Whether a complex crime was committed (Art 48, requires grave or less grave felonies)
o Duration of the subsidiary penalty to be imposed (Art 39, 2) where the subsidiary penalty is
based on the severity of the penalty
o Duration of the detention in case of failure to post the bond to keep the peace (Art 35)
o Whether the crime has prescribed (Art 90)
o Whether the person in authority or his agents have committed delay in the delivery of
detained persons (Art 125)
o The proper penalty for quasi-offenses (Art 365)

How do you categorize reckless imprudence resulting into slight PI?

Light felony since only punishable by public censure. (Riodica v CA)

Offenses not subject to the provisions of the Code
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.



GR: SPLs are not subject to the provisions of the RPC.
o EX: when it uses the nomenclature of the RPC

Like in Child Abuse Act (RA 7610) – when victim is 12 years old, penalty shall
be RP

VAWC – follow RPC in certain cases18

17

There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or
commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting paper that routinely pass
through his hands.
18
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

19

EX to EX: when it specially provides that the RPC will not be supplementary to the
SPL.

Examples:
o DDA – RPC shall not apply to violations of DDA, except in case of
minors19
o Anti-hazing law – mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong not applicable
o Anti-terrorism – conviction under this law is a bar to prosecution of
that person under the RPC or another SPL for the predicate crime 20
supplementary, the following shall apply:
ISL
Art 11 to 15
Conspiracy (at least for BP 22, in Ladonga v P)




When
o
o
o

Justifying Circumstances

Acts of the actor are in accordance with law and hence, he incurs no criminal liability

No civil liability on the actor either
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.






Rule now: Stand ground when in the right. No longer “retreat to the wall.” (US v Domen)
Requisites:
o Unlawful aggression
o Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
o Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself
Unlawful aggression must always be there. Without it, nothing to prevent or repel. No unlawful
aggression? No self-defense.
o Actual and real peril, or at least an imminent threat to one’s:

Life

Limbs

Honor/Chastity

Property

Liberty
o Can’t be simply imagined. Nor should it be a mere threatening or intimidating attitude.
o If there is an agreement to fight, no unlawful aggression, hence no self-defense.

Unless one attacked ahead of time. The one who attacked ahead of time: unlawful
aggression.
o Slapping held to be unlawful aggression. Against honor since the face of a person is akin to
his dignity and honor. (P v Sabio)

If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries shall
have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting
slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as
specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.
19

Section 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the
offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
20

SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall Be a Bar to Another Prosecution Under the Revised Penal Code or Any Special Penal Laws. – When a
person has been prosecuted under a provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged under this Act.

20

When the aggression has ceased to exist, no more necessity for self-defense. The aggression
must continue up to the point where the aggressor is killed.

The right to self-defense begins where the necessity exists, and ends when necessity
ends. It is limited by that necessity. (P v Adlawan)

Like when the aggressor ran away after the attack, accused can no longer run after
him and kill him and then invoke self-defense.

Retaliation is not self-defense. (P v Decena)

Here, the retaliation becomes the unlawful aggression. Hence, the original
aggressor can invoke self-defense (at least partial since there will be sufficient
provocation on his part for initially attacking)

When the attacker was already disarmed, unlawful aggression has ceased. (Gusto v
CA)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed
o Depends upon the circumstances surrounding the aggression, the state of mind of the
aggressor and the available weapon at the defender’s disposal
o Law requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability

Look at sex, size, circumstances, weapons

Hence, when a big, strong, and powerful American negro attacked a Filipino, and the
Filipino shot him 4 times, the SC stated that the Filipino employed reasonable means.
(US v Paras)
o Self-preservation is the paramount consideration
Lack of sufficient provocation
o There can be provocation on the part of the accused, but it should not be suffient
o Sufficient provocation is unjust or improper conduct/act of the offended party, capable of
exciting, inciting or irritating anyone. It must be adequate enough to excite a person to
commit a wrong.
Defense of property rights
o In P v Ignacio, the dissent said that there must be an attack on the person in possession of
property as well, and not just the property for self-defense to be invoked. Follow this.
o The person may use such force as reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful
physical invasion of his property. This does not seem to involve the taking of human life.
o The preservation of human life and limb is of more importance to society than the protection
of property. (State v Green)
o Fencing of a person’s land which will cut him off to the highway is unlawful aggression. (P v
Narvaez)
Can there be self-defense in libel?
o Apparently, yes. (P v Hiong, the person libel may hit back with another libel which, if
adequate, will be justified)
Defense of honor/chastity
o Girl stabbed man who embraced her in a dark alley. Self-defense! (P v dela Cruz)
o Girl stabbed man who touched her thigh in a well-lit church. No self-defense. (P v Jaurige)
Relate with Art 24721
o Art 247 is an absolutory circumstance. The penalty imposed is only destierro, and it’s more
for the protection of the accused more than it is a punishment.
o For instance, the accused arrived and saw his wife in the act of sexual intercourse. The
paramour and the wife ran away. Accused went out. He heard rustling of leaves and saw his
wife putting on her panties. He stabbed his wife. SC: Can’t invoke 247 because at that time,
the wife was already putting on her panties.
o













21

Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.

21

Dissent (follow this): it’s asking too much to actually catch them in the act of actual
sexual congress. What else can you deduce when you see your wife putting on her
panties and her paramour is right there?
o Accused saw his wife making lust with someone else. He told her to leave. But in a rage she
rushed and attacked the husband with a knife. In defense, husband stabbed the wife.

Art 11 should be applied, not Art 247.
o So when should you invoke Art 11, Art 247? Can you invoke both at the same time? (Justice
Calljejo likes asking this raw)

Husband has the right to invoke his honor and defend it, so he can invoke Art 11.

He can also invoke 247 if he discovers his wife and some dude making love.

If you were the husband, invoke 11 over 247.

247 will get you banished, 11 will bring you home scot-free.

Moreover, no civil liability under 11. Not sure about 247.
o Can mistake of fact be invoked under Art 247? (Misled by movement of buttocks, but no
penetration; or woman/spouse forced by another)

Yes. Apply Ah Chong by analogy.
o If the brother-in-law catches his sister-in-law, Art 247 won’t apply.
If self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused. Burden of proof never shifts.
If the accused pleads self-defense, it is not a judicial confession, merely a judicial admission. He does
not penal liability, merely that he killed the victim.
Mistake of fact available in self-defense.
Relate with VAWC, Battered Woman Syndrome
o In Genosa, the BWS was not considered justifying because the elements of self-defense were
not present. VAWC was not yet enacted then. She was granted passion/obfuscation and
diminished will power.
o However, now, women who suffer from BWS are not criminally or civilly liable even if the
elements are not present.22
o Cycle of violence in BWS

Tension-building phase

Acute battering incident

Tranquil, loving, nonviolent phase
o Women suffering from BWS are under the mental impression that their lives are at risk of
harm. Hence, still a defense even if no imminent unlawful aggression.
o Applies only to women.

In the US, even men can avail of it. it’s called “battering and its effects”
o Does not amend Art 11, but simply adds a new element/defense







Defense of Relatives
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and
those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed
in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.





Elements:
o Unlawful aggression
o Reasonable necessity of the means employed
o In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the person defending had no part
therein
Relatives included:
o Spouse

22

SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman
syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense
under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime,
the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

22



o Ascendants/descendants
o Legit, natural or adopted bros or sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same degrees
o Consanguinity within 4th civil degree
What if your spouse has died, will SD still be applicable to your inlaws?
o Yes. relationship by affinity between surviving spouse and kindred of deceased continues
regardless if there is offspring or not.

Defense of Strangers
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Art. are present and that the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.



Elements
o Unlawful aggression
o Reasonable necessity of the means employed
o Person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motives

State of necessity
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another,
provided that the following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.










Elements
o Evil sought to be avoided actually exists
o Injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
o No other practical and less harmful means of preventing it
Civil liability on the person who benefited (Art 101)
If incomplete, see Art 69.
The state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking
the same. (P v Retubado)
The evil should not have been created by the accused or his own negligence.
o For example, you drive recklessly, you swerve to avoid a child, but end up killing someone
else. You are still liable for Art 365.
Invoked in a BP 22 case wherein the accused said that she was forced to issue bouncing checks to
save her mother from the harsh treatment of the hospital she was confined in. SC said the
predicament was brought about by her own failure to pay the hospital bills.

Lawful exercise of right or duty
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.








Elements:
o Acted out of duty or office
o Injury caused is consequence of that duty or right
Judgment and discretion of public officers in the performance of duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively but within reasonable limits. In the absence of clear legal provisions,
they must act in conformity with exercise of sound discretion.
When the victim was a deranged man who was already subdued as he was lying on the ground, and
the policeman walks up to him, and unloads a bullet on the man’s forehead, causing his brains to
splatter all over the wet pavement and on the policeman’s shoe, there is no lawful exercise. There
was no need for such. (P v Pule)
Police can use force to prevent the escape of the victim who snatched their armalite. (Cabanlig v
Sandiganbayan)
o If the victim pointed the gun at the policeman, the policeman can invoke both self-defense
and lawful exercise of duty.

6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

23





Elements:
o Order issued by superior
o Order is for a legal purpose
o Means used to carry out such order is lawful
If the order is illegal but is apparently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the
subordinate is not liable. (Tabuena v Sandiganbayan, Tabuena disbursed money of Marcos) (But
aren’t we all presumed to know the law?)

Exempting Circumstances

While crime is still criminal, the law exempts the actor from liability.
o But not from CIVIL LIABILITY.

Except in accident and insuperable cause which strictly are not criminal.
Justifying
Act legal
No crime, no criminal
No civil liability
Emphasis of the law is on the act

Exempting
Act criminal
There’s a crime and a criminal
Civil liability
Emphasis of the law is on the actor

Insanity/Imbecility
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile
or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order
his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall
not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.








Insanity: complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, deprived of rason, total
deprivation of freedom of will
o Exempt, unless acted during a lucid interval
o Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability
o Must relate to period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is
the subject of the inquiry

If sane when act was done, but insane during trial, he can still be criminally liable
o Distinguish between lack of reason (insanity) and failure to use good judgment due to anger
(passion)
o Burden of proof: accused (because of presumption of sanity)

But if already known that he was insane at that time: prosecution must prove he was
sane at time of commission
o Quantum of proof to overthrow presumption of sanity: beyond reasonable doubt
Imbecile: mental development to that of children between 2-7 years of age
o Always exempt
Two tests to determine complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act:
o Cognition test – deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act (awareness of right
or wrong)

Usually applied here
o Volition test – deprivation of the freedom of will (control over acts)
Not appreciated in P v Valledor, where accused killed people (but didn’t harm others) in a room, and
after said, “I’ve had my revenge.”

Minority

Amended by Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, RA 9344

15 and under: exempt
o they’ll be subject to intervention

over 15 – under 18: exempt unless acted with discernment

24

those who acted with discernment are entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority

they will undergo diversion programs
Exemption does not include exemption from civil liability.
Applied retroactively (May 20, 2006). Hence, minors convicted at that time were ordered released or
their cases were dismissed or they were brought to diversion programs
o 13-year old accused raped 6-year old girl before the law was passed. Once law was passed,
he was ordered released and referred to the local DSWD unit. (Ortega v people)
Applies even to heinous crimes, since the law did not make a distinction.
Reckoning point is the age of the child when the offense was allegedly committed.
What if the act was done while still a minor but the promulgation of the sentence was after he
reached 21?
o He will be sent to an agricultural camp.23 The promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict
with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender
shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. The age of the
child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is
not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still
of tender age. (P v Jacinto, 2011, accused was a minor who, with discernment, raped a 5year old child. He was convicted and sentenced to an agricultural camp for a period of
reclusion perpetua. Sir likes this case)
o Same ruling was applied in the earlier case of Sarcia. There, the accused was 31 when the SC
decision came out. They sent him to an agricultural camp.
If the minor is convicted, can the sentence be suspended?
o Yes. Even if the minor is above 18 he is convicted.

But the maximum age to suspend the sentence is only until 21 years old. 24
2 presumptions under RA 9344:
o presumption of minority
o presumption of no discernment (if 15-18)

applies even in:

conspiracy with adults (P v Estefano)

reckless imprudence (say, a 15 ½ year old boy drives a car and hits someone)
A child under 9 is conclusively presumed to have no discernment. (Jarco Marketing v CA)
o With RA 9344, it’s now 15
What is discernment?
o The mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
o Prove by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during
the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances
must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.
o Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and
shrewdness. (Llave v P, where the minor was deemed with discernment because he was an
o















23

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
24
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various chcumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures
as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

25





honor student and made sure that his rape of another minor was in a secluded area; see also
P v Doquena where the minor was the brightest of his class. Tsk tsk to the smarties!)
o Intelligence, on the other hand, is the power necessary to determine the morality of human
acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.
Offenses not applicable to children:
o Vagrancy and prostitution
o Mendicancy
o Sniffing of rugby
Read codal na lang for stuff on diversion, etc.

Accident
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.










Accident: happens outside the sway of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences
Elements:
o Performance of a lawful act with due care
o Injury to another was by accident
o Without intent or negligence/no fault or no intent
Appreciated in Pomoy v People. Pomoy was a policeman who struggled with the victim who was under
investigation. Gun accidentally went off during the struggle.
The accident must not be foreseeable or else there will be fault or criminal negligence
Accident and negligence are mutually exclusive
o Negligence presupposes some degree of fault or foreseeableness in the fault of the person
No such thing as accidental self-defense. NO SUCH THING. (Tamboong v People)
No civil liability

Irresistible Force
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.





Elements:
o Force must be physical, come from an outside force and accust must act not only without a
will but even against his will
o Actor reduced to a mere instrument, no more freedom
o Duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded fear of death or serious bodily injury
Accused must have had no opportunity to leave or escape or self-defense

Uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.








Elements
o Fear of an evil greater than or at least equal to that which the accused was required to
commit
o Evil was os such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it
Founded on duress or lack of voluntairness on the part of the actor
Same rule with irresistible force, if accused had chance to run away or escape, this EC won’t be
appreciated (P v Morales, where the accused, in a kidnapping case, were a good kilometer from
where the co-accused were. They could’ve just ran away)
Not appreciated when one of two rapists claimed he was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
from the other, but yet he raped the victim while the other was no longer there. (P v Tami)
Civil liability on the principal

Insuperable cause
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable
cause.

26




Applies in felonies by omission (like Art 125 and then holidays pala!)
No civil liability

Anymore?

Yes. Relatives in theft, swindling, malicious mischief.25

Spontaneous desistance in the attempted stage (unless overt act was a crime in itself)

Attempted/frustrated light felonies (except those against persons or property)

Accessories in light felonies

Relatives who are accessories under Art 20

Physical injuries under Art 247 (nahuli yung misis!)

Somnambulism (sleep walkers)

Mistake of fact

Repeal of a penal law

Zombies

Also, those victims of instigation. They are exempt from liability.
Entrapment
Instigation
Mens rea originated from accused who was merely
Evil idea originated from peace officer who induced
trapped by police in flagrante delicto
the accused to commit the act
Not absolutory
Absolutory
Consistent with public policy
Contrary to public policy
Trap for unwary criminals
Trap for unwary innocent
Peace officer not liable
Peace officer is principal by inducement
Mitigating Circumstances

Show the lesser perversity of the offender and thus considered to lower the penalty prescribed for the
offense

Matters of defense which do not have to be alleged in the information

Analogous circumstances are allowed under Art 13

There are other circumstances which also reduce the penalty but are not under Art 13
o These are the extenuating circumstances like concealment of dishonor on the part of the
mother in infanticide

Classifications of mitigating circumstances
o Ordinary

Lowering penalty to the minimum period
o Privileged

Effect of lowering the imposable penalty (divisible or indivisible) by one or more
degrees

Can’t be offset
o Specific

Applies to a specific felony like concealment of dishonor in case of abortion by the
preggy woman herself

Not applicable to Art 365 since it’s culpa, no intent.

Application of MCs and ACs to SPLs will depend on the SPL.
o If it uses the nomenclature of penalties of the RPC, then they will apply.

Unless, they specifically state that they won’t apply.

25

Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime.

27

Ordinary
Can be offset by a generic AC
Lowered to minimum period (except if 2 or more
MCs and no AC, then lower degree by one)
Not considered in single indivisible penalties

Privileged
Can’t be offset
Penalty lowered by one or two degrees
Always considered no matter the penalty imposed

Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt
from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.





Incomplete justification of defense
o Must always have unlawful aggression

Without unlawful aggression, no complete nor incomplete defense
o Becomes a privileged mitigating circumstance if unlawful aggression is present with another
element of self-defense

Only unlawful aggression: ordinary

Unlawful aggression + another element: privileged (see Art 69)
Accident
o Due care and lack of fault are indispensable without which negligence will be present giving
rise to culpable felony
o If lawful act and lack of intention of causing the injury are absent, an intentional act results
taking the case out of the benefit of this mitigating circumstance

Minority/Oldies
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.







RA 9344 did not repeal Art 68. It merely amended it.
If the minor is between 15-18 and acted with discernment, he is still entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance under Art 68 (2).
Minority is always a privileged MC.
Personal to the an accused and can’t be extended to other co-accused.
o 16-year old and 30-year old killed someone. Minority only appreciated to 16-year old.
What about old age?
o Accused was charged with rape. He was 83 years old. Convicted but old age considered as
MC.

Praeter Intentionem
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.








26

Lack of intention to commit so grave as tthat committed
Disparity between intent and consequences
Appreciated when accused had no intent to kill but only to inflict injuries, but the victim died.
Not appreciated:
o
when acts are sufficient to bring the result intended,
o
when the means employed would naturally result to the felony committed,

like when the accused hit the victim in the eyebrow with a LEAD PIPE. SC did not
apply this MC because of the brute force used and the part of the body where the
blow was struck. (Oriente v P)
o
hazing incidents26 under the Anti-Hazing Law (RA 8049), or
o culpa or to crimes not involving intent. Intentionem nga eh.
Usually applied to physical acts
o Accused poured gasoline on a mental retardate, and latter burned to death. (P v Pugay,
accused only meant to burn the clothes of the guy, not the guy himself)
Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

28









o Husband punched wife. Wife broke her ribs and died. (P v Ulep)
But has been applied in malversation.
o Petitioner was a municipal treasurer and the audit team discovered he was short P72k in
funds. After a few months, he returned the money he “borrowed.” SC gave him two MCs:
voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
Intent is determined at the time of the commission of the crime.
o Intent determined by weapons, words, conduct before, during, and after (immediately?) the
incident.
What if 2 persons conspired to commit a felony, and one intended to commit the grave wrong, but the
other did not, what happens?
o Conspirator who did not indeed to commit so grave a wrong as that committed CAN NOT
invoke the MC. (Act of one, act of all!)

But if both of them did not intend to commit so grave a wrong, they both can invoke
the MC.
Can both treachery and praeter intentionem coexist? Can they hold hands and skip?
o Yes. They may coexist. reachery refers to the manner or method used to kill the victim. Lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed refers to the state of mind of the
person. (P v Flores)

Sufficient Provocation
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.









Provocation must:
o Be sufficient
o Be immediate to the commission of the crime (no interval of time elapsed between
provocation and commission of the crime)
o Originate from the offended party
Sufficient provocation is unjust or improper conduct/act of the offended party, capable of exciting,
inciting or irritating anyone. It must be adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong.
(Licayo v P, Oriente v P)
Offended shouted and told the accused to leave. Accused killed him. No MC.
Even if the act of the victim may not constitute unlawful aggression to invoke SD, the same act may
still be invoked by the offended as sufficient provocation on the part of the victim. (Gotis v P)
o Deceased struck accused then ran away like a scared dog. Accused caught up with him and
killed him. Accused actually could have two MCs in his favor: sufficient provocation and
passion/obfuscation. But he can’t be entitled to both, since both are based from the same
facts.
o Same rule applies when same facts give rise to vindication of grave offense and sufficient
provocation. Only entitled to one MC.
Provocation need not be in words, but can also be in action. When the victim entered the accused
person’s property and started gathering crops, this constituted sufficient provocation. (P v Arquiza)

Immediate vindication of grave offense
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the
felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees.








“Immediate” in this case means proximate and allows for a lapse of time
o As long as the offender is still suffereing from the mental agony brought about by the
“offense” to him
“Grave offense” is not the grave offense in Art 9. Here, it might not even be a felony at all. It can be
an assault to one’s honor.
o Includes insult – “You’re just living out of the pockets of your wife!”
Committed against spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or
sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees
Test if the assault is grave depends on:
o Social standing of parties

29








o Time and place and occasion when offense committed
Can not be appreciated if sufficient time had lapsed for the accused to recover his serenity.
o 30 mins? Pwede pa.
o 1 day lapse? No na. (P v Palabrica)
o Hours? Pwede pa. (P v Ignas)

Lesson? All depends on the facts.
Not appreciated when offended party hit the accused with a bamboo stick and the accused killed him.
(Bacabac v P)
Interesting case of P v Diokno. Daughter eloped with a Chinaman. When father found the daughter,
the Chinaman didn’t mind him and went up the stairs to his house. Diokno stabbed the Chinaman.
o Immediate vindication – elopement deemed continuous.
o Passion/obfuscation – because Chinaman didn’t mind him, nabastos, pumatay!

Both were appreciated together because based on different facts.
o Still applicable today? Probably not, but the fact that some families are still conservative
should not be discounted so easily.
What if your spouse has died, will this MC still be applicable to your inlaws?
o Yes. relationship by affinity between surviving spouse and kindred of deceased continues
regardless if there is offspring or not.

Passion and Obfuscation
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.









Must arise from lawful sentiments
o Must not be based on an illegitimate relationship (P v Hicks and P v Salazar)

EXCEPTION in case of P v Bello (1964)

Accused had a common law wife who worked as a hostess/GRO. He told her to stop
her job, she refused. She also refused to stay with Bello because she wanted to
continue her work of dancing scantily clad in front of drunk people. SC held that
passion/obfuscation present, saying, “We can not see how the accused's insistence
that she live with him again, and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, can be
properly qualified as arising from immoral and unworthy passions. Even without
benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison appears morally of a higher level than
gainful promiscuity.”
o Exercise of a lawful right by the offended party cannot be a proper source of
passion/obfuscation.
o As when the offended party came to regain his land. (P v Lopez)
Act which produced the passion/obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time during which the accused might have regained his normal
equanimity
o Lapse of 1 week? No, accused was already expected to recover his equanimity. (P v Ventura
where he found out that his wife had an affair with her amo)
o 3 days? No, same reason. (P v Caber, offended allegedly raped wife of accused 3 days before
the stabbing)
Appreciated in case where the husband killed a witch who cast a spell on the accused’s wife. (P v
Tubadeza, Longbottom v Lestrange)
Treachery cannot exist with passion and obfuscation. In the latter, the accused loses his reason and
self-control. It’s inconsistent with treachery.
Sufficient provocation, immediate vindication, passion/obfuscation cannot be credited separately,
must only appreciate one of them. Unless arising from different factual bases.

Voluntary Surrender, Plea of Guilty
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he
had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution;



Elements:

30








o Surrendered to a person in authority or his agent
o Surrendered before arrest is effected
o Surrendered must be voluntary (spontaneous and unconditional)
GR: doesn’t matter whether there was an arrest warrant or not. As long as he voluntarily surrenders,
MC will be appreciated.
o Except if the arrest is imminent. If that’s the case, voluntary surrender not appreciated.
Not necessary to surrender to authorities where the incident happened. (P v Diva, crime happened in
place A, but surrendered in nearby barrio)
Not appreciated when:
o Surrender was to disclaim liability. (P v Luces)
o Merely to escape the wrath of relatives who wanted to extract revenge (P v Basite, but see
Boado p 140)
o Surrender was to clear their names. (P v Abella, where deaths occurred after a basketball
game)
o No surrender but merely reported that a crime occurred (P v Rogales)
Appreciated when before being charged of malversation, the accused returned the amount before he
was even charged. He was deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. The return of the money must be
spontaneous. (Perez v P)
o Compare to Davalos v P, where the MC was not appreciated because the return of the money
was 7 years later.

Plea of Guilt

Must be:
o In open court
o Spontaneously and unconditionally
o Prior to the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution

Accepted plea to a lesser offense counted as MC (no need to amend information)

Voluntary plea of guilty and voluntary surrender can be both appreciated in one case
Physical defects
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.






Defect must relate to the offense committed
Illness or defect must have moved him to commit the offnse
Not automatic that he should be credited with this MC. Must show that it restricts his means of action,
defense, or communications with fellow beings,
Accused had one hand, but stabbed the victim. No MC.

Illness
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.




If illness deprives the offender of his consciousness of his acts, he will be exempt from liability.
Illnesses considered:
o Psychosis (P v Antonio)
o Schizophrenia

Analogous circumstances
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.





Restitution of malversed funds considered analogous
Voluntary return of a stolen cow
Mere membership in a cultural minority not considered analogous




Mistake in identity MC? No. Neither exempting nor mitigating.
Error in personae MC? No. Neither exempting nor mitigating.

31



Abberatio ictus MC? No. Neither exempting nor mitigating. (P v Genoya, wherein a girl was hit by an
arrow)

Aggravating Circumstances

Unlike mitigating circumstances, the list in Article 14 is exclusive. No analogous circumstances.

Must be alleged in the information.

Different kinds of aggravating circumstances (AC)
o Generic

Apply generally to all crimes

Can be offset by an ordinary mitigating

Increase the penalty to the MAX period

Must be alleged in the information
o Qualifying

Cannot be offset

Changes the nature of the crime and the designation of the offense

Must be alleged in the information

Must be proved beyond reasonable doubt

The penalty does not per se increase, but the nature of the crime is changed (along
with the corresponding penalty)

Hence, from homicide (r.t.) it becomes murder (r.p.)
o Special or specific aggravating

Apply to particular felonies

Found elsewhere than art 14

Do not change the character of the offense charged but guides the court in imposing
the proper penalty

Can’t be offset either
o Inherent circumstance

Element of the felony committed thus no longer considered against the offender in
the determination of the penalty (Art 62)

“abuse of public position” inherent in crime of falsification of document by
public authority, and also in malversation (and other crimes committed by
public officers). Accused must have used his influence or prestige of his office
to commit the crime.

The ones in Article 14 are generally generic, but some are qualifying and even special

No law providing that additional rapes/homicides are considered as aggravating because list is
exclusive

Where of the aggravating circumstances has been used as a qualifying circumstance, the others will
be deemed as generic.
o Hence, treachery qualifies homicide into murder. Evident premeditation becomes a generic
circumstance na lang.

RA 7659 added a new aggravating circumstance of “organized/syndicated group” in Art 62 (1a).
o It’s a special aggravating circumstance because Art 14 (which are generally generic) was not
correspondingly amended.
o An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of 2 or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any
crime (not exclusive to robbery – as long as there is profit, so estafa, kidnapping for ransom,
etc).

Conspiracy is not an aggravating circumstance.

Not applicable to Art 365 since it’s culpa, no intent.
Abuse of official position
Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:
1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.



Test: did the accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime?

32









Public official must use the influence, prestige, and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing
his purpose.
There must be an intimate connection between the offense and office of the accused.
The offender’s being a public officer does not ipso facto make it aggravating. If the public officer could
have committed the crime without the use of public position, it is not aggravating.
o Using one’s service firearm in shooting someone does not fall under this AC.

In P v Villamor, accused used a gun officially issued to him by virtue of office. Court
said he could have shot him even without a gun from the police.
When a policeman keeps quiet while his other police officers were robbing a polio guy and his sister,
the quiet policeman is guilty of abuse of public position. He could have prevented the others from
robbing the victim, but he didn’t. His silence made him liable. (Fortuna v People, a beautiful case.)
Does not apply if inherent in crime.
o Example: Falsification by a public officer of a public document.
Considered special aggravating because of RA 7659, Sec 23. 27 See Art 62 of RPC. Can’t be offset!

Insult to Public Authorities
2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities.












Covers only persons in authority, not agents of persons in authority and other public officers
o One vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order
Elements:
o Public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties
o Not the person against whom the crime is committed
o Offender knows that he is a public authority
If public authority is the victim, then crime is direct assault (AC deemed absorbed).
Barangay captain is a person-in-authority. He was playing cards, then accused shot him. Insult to
public authorities? No. Barangay captain was the victim, and he was not performing his duty at that
time time. He was playing tong-its. (P v. De Mesa)
If crime committed in the presence of an agent of a person in authority, the provision doesn’t apply.
(P v. Siojo, but Boado says the opposite)
If in the presence of a policeman, not aggravating because the policeman is only an agent of a person
in authority. (P v Magbueno)
What if crime committed in the presence of a professor while the latter was teaching?
o Not aggravated. A teacher or professor is only a person in authority for purposes of Art 148
(direct assault) and Art 151 (resistance and disobedience).

EXCEPT under the Dangerous Drugs Act. A teacher of professor is a person in
authority for the purpose of the enforcement of the DDA.

If you smoke weed in the presence of a professor, the professor is a person in a
authority.
What if you’re confined in the National Penitentiary, and you kill each someone? Aggravating. Yes.
Talaga naman! (P v Mendoza, contempt of public authority)

Age, sex, rank, dwelling
3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account
of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not
given provocation.







Common factor: disrespect to the offended
Rationale: need for respect
Need for proof that offender deliberately intended to offend or insult the offended
o There must be deliberate intent to insult or show manifest disregard for the age, rank, sex.
Not merely because the victim is a female or has a rank. (P v. Reyes, killing of spinster case)
Can NOT co-exist with passion or obfuscation where the offended lost his control or reason.

27

1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.

33










AGE, SEX, RANK: considered in crimes against persons, security or honor; but NOT in crimes against
property
o Hence, not applicable to complex crime of robbery with homicide (P v. Cabiles)
Sex: not considered in crimes where being a woman is an element (rape, etc)
o Mere fact that victim is woman does not give rise to the AC of sex. Must be some specific
insult or disrespect shown to her womanhood.
Rank: high social position/standing
o Teacher, judge, consul, general, etc
o Charge should not include rank as an inherent element thereof

So if charge is complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in
authority, AC can’t be appreciated. (If charge only murder, than AC can be
appreciated)
o Accused was conversing with the barangays captain and then suddenly killed him. AC? No.
mere fact that victim was a person with a rank, such as a barangays captain does not
necessarily mean it’s aggravating, absent evidence that the killing was deliberately intended
to disregard or insult or threaten to insult the rank of the victim. (P v Samudio)
o Accused raped a 70-year old woman, his teacher in grade 1. The victim was already retired
when the dude raped her. SC held that the fact that the offended party was already retired
did not diminish the respect due her rank as his former teacher in grade 1. (P v. Nerio)
Age: includes tender age
Dwelling: includes dependencies, staircase, and enclosures under the house.
o Must be a building or structure exclusively used for rest and comfort

Hence, a combination of video store and dwelling is not a “dwelling” for purposes of
this AC (P v. Tano)

Not necessarily owned by the offended.

Home is that which the law seeks to protect or uphold whether the dweller is a lessee,
a boarder or a bed spacer

Held to include:

room in a boarding house (P v Daniel)

room of stay-in laundrywoman in house of amo (P v. Sapinoso, compare with
P v. Punzalan, where no AC appreciated because accused and victim lived
together)

house of a squatter since law does not distinguish validity of title

little rooms separated by curtains (sir’s example of his dorm with his
brothers)
o Appreciated when:

Victim stood in the terrace of his house (P v. Rios)

Victim was stepping on the first rung of the stairs connected to his house

But if he has yet to step, no AC. (P v. Sespene)
o Offended must not have given any provocation (sufficient and immediate)
o Not necessary that the accused actually entered the house. Enough that the victim was
attacked inside his own house. (P v. Villanueva)
o Not appreciated when:

Both the offended and the offender live in the dwelling

EXCEPT in ADULTERY, and the bad spouse did the deed in the conjugal
dwelling (P v. Ibanez)

See case of P. v. Punzalan where the house and the servants’ quarters were
separate but within the same compound. The houseboy went to the house of
the amo and killed him there. SC said no AC because the servants quarters
located in the same compound, hence part of the dwelling of the offended
party. (Sir doesn’t agree with this. Basta separate and distinct places, dapat
separate dwellings.)

Inherent in the crime (trespass, robbery with force upon things, destructive arson)

Does dwelling apply in robbery?

34

Depends. If robbery with homicide or robbery with intimidation of
persons, yes, appreciated. But if robbery with force upon things,
dwelling is inherent.

Inherent also in destructive arson

Offended has given provocation
Can’t be absorbed by treachery. Treachery pertains to manner of commission. Age, sex, rank, refers
to relationship. (P v. Lopez)
o But see P v. Malolot, where accused hacked to death an 11-month old child and the SC
considered age absorbed by treachery. Sir doesn’t agree with this case, but it’s the latter
case, so it shold prevail.
All 4 can be appreciated separately from treachery.
o Accused killed a 3-day old child. SC considered treachery and age of victim separately. (P v
Lora)
o Dwelling and treachery treated separately, appreciated together in the same case. (P v.
Almohera)
o





Abuse of Confidence or obvious ungratefulness
4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.









Requisites:
o Offended had trusted the offender
o Offender abused such trust (P v. Ostia)
o Such abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime
Essential that the confidence is IMMEDIATE and PERSONAl such that it gives the accused some
advantage and makes it easier to commit the crime (P v. Arojado, where accused was the first cousin
of the victim)
o Also applied in P v. Villanueva, where common-law husband (whom the victim called “papa”)
raped the victim.
Inherent in:
o Qualified theft
o Estafa
For obvious ungratefulness, the offended received favors from the victim but still committed the crime
(e.g. kupal)

Palace of Chief Executive/Worship
5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.





Only in the third circumstance (public authorities engaged in the discharge) is performance of
function necessary.
If done in the palace of the President, in his presence, or in a place dedicated to religious worship,
performance of function not necessary.
Must show that offender sought the above places for the commission of the crime (lack of respect!)
o That’s why it wasn’t appreciated in P. v. Jaurige, where the young lass stabbed the dude’s
neck in church after he placed his hand precariously on her thigh

Night time, uninhabited place, by a band
6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such
circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense,
it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.



If all three are present, are these separate ACs or only one?
o GR: Only one.

EXCEPT: when the three can be distinctly perceived and can subsist independently of
each other, revealing greater perversity. (P v. Librando)

35

Night time (Nocturnity)

Becomes an AC only (requisites)
o when sought by the offender,
o taken advantage by him to facilitate the commission of the crime,
o ensured his immunity from capture, and
o place where the crime was committed was not illuminated

Objective test: did it facilitate the commission of the crime?

Subjective test: was it purposely sought out by the accused to afford impunity?
o Yes to either question will suffice to appreciate night time.

Nighttime: sunset to sunrise
o Crime must have been committed exclusively at nighttime

There must be evidence that night time was sought for, or the nocturnity facilitated the commission of
the offense. (P v. Dela Cruz)

Absorbed in treachery if it is part of the treacherous means to insure execution of crime
Uninhabited Place (Despoblado)

Test: whether or not in the place of the commission of the offense, there was reasonable possibility of
the victim receiving some help

It is not the distance, but the possibility or impossibility of immediate aid to be obtained. (P v. Ostia,
P v. Cabiles)
o The more important consideration is if the commission of the crime makes it possible for the
victim to receive aid.

If the distance is not so great, but you have to climb a hill to reach the house to
render aid, despobado is considered.

Casual encounter at night in an uninhabited bukid? Not AC. The prosecution must show that the
remoteness of the place was chosen by the accused to facilitate the crime, or conceal it.
Band

Consists of:
o Four or more persons
o Armed malefactors (at least four must be armed)
o Shall have acted together in the commission of an offense

“Armed”: any weapon which by reason of its intrinsic nature or purpose is capable of inflicting serious
injuries (bolo, club, guns, grenades, cupcake.)

Must prove that 4 or more persons had weapons.
o If proven that only 2 had weapons, not AC (P v. Oco)
o Weird case: P v Estante – 4 accused. 1 acquitted. 1 jumped bail. But SC still considered band
as AC.

Justices Aquino and Abad Santos said NO AC. 4 – 2 = 2.

Art 14: generic aggravating
o Generic aggravating in robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, PY resulting in
insanity, impotency, blindness. (Art 294)

But remember Art 226-B: Rape committed by 2 or more persons, offender is sentenced to RP (to
death).

Art 295, with relation to 2,3,4 of Art 294: qualifying circumstance 28

Destructive arson by 2 or more people (Art 320, amended by PD 1744): qualifying circumstance 29
28

Art. 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. — If
the offenses mentioned in subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall have been committed in an uninhabited place or by a
band, or by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passenger's compartments in a train or, in any manner,
taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the
use of a firearm, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties.
In the same cases, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the leader of the band.
29
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is
perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the
building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.

36



When conspiracy is proved, band can be appreciated. It is not absorbed by conspiracy, since the latter
is only a means to commit a crime.

Calamity or misfortune
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or
other calamity or misfortune.







Does not refer to acts of men
Refers to the occasion of the crime, not the means (which is Par 12)
Rationale: instead of helping, you took advantage pa!
Accused must take advantage of the calamity to ensure success of the crime. (People v Arpa 27 SCRA
1037)
Dude who burned down his own house and others considered guilty of arson with AC of on occasion
of conflagration. (?) (People v Sing)

Aid of armed men
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.










Elements:
o Armed men took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly,
o Accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed
Not appreciated when:
o all the accused acted under the same plan and for the same purpose.

If so, they are all principals in the commission of the crime.
o principal was not aided
o not taken advantage of.
The armed men are accomplices who take part in a minor capacity, directly or indirectly.
o Minimal participation as compared to accomplices.
There should not be any conspiracy nor should the armed men be principals. (People v Berayon)
Absorbed by band
Aggravating in kidnapping. Men also means “women.” (People v. Licop)
Band

Liability

All principals

Number
Specificity
Nature

4 or more
Crime not specified
Generic

Organized Crime
Syndicate (Art 62)
All principals
2 or more
Crime for GAIN
Special aggravating
Can’t be offset

Aid of Armed Men
Armed men are
accomplices
2 or more
Crime not specified
Generic

Habituality
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or
greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.



Different forms of habitiluality
o Recidivist is one who

At the time of his trial for one crime

Shall have been previously convicted

By final judgment,

Of another crime embraced in the same title of the Code

Hence, there’s a need for two convictions (first by final judgment, and must
take place prior to the second convication)

37

What if 3 separate informations, but only one judgment, recidivist?
No. No prior judgment in that case. (People v Rivera)
No requirement that it be consummated. Can be attempted or frustrated. Law
does not distinguish.
Generic aggravating circumstance
No time limit either.
What if pardoned for first crime?
o Recidivist still. Effects still remain.

But if amnesty?

Not recidivist, since amnesty extinguishes entire
crime. (Monsanto v Factoran)
What if judgment is suspended because of RA 9344, and then accused
commits another crime under the same title, recidivist? No. Decision not
promulgated, hence no final judgment.
Accused committed robbery on December 23. He then committed theft on
December 30. He was convicted for theft. After, he was charged for robbery.
Recividist? No. Second crime must be committed after the first conviction. (P
v. Baldera)
o









o

Antecedent
Offense
Penalty

Reiteracion

Offender has previously served sentence

First offense must have been punished with an equal or greater penalty, or

He has committed two or more crimes previously to which the law attaches a lighter
penalty (penalty imposed by law, not penalty which judge eventually metes out)

Does not require that the offenses be covered under the same title of the Code

Generic aggravating circumstance

Reiteracion is concerned with the penalty imposed by law, and not the nature
of the crime
Recidivism
Previous conviction by final judgment
Under the same Title of the Code
No requirement as to penalty imposed in the
prior conviction

o

Habitual delinquency

Within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction,

Of the crimes of falsification, robbery, estafa, theft, serious or less serious physical
injuries (FRETSeL)

Found guilty of said crimes a third time or oftener.

Special aggravating circumstance for which an additional penalty is imposed
which escalates with increase in the number of convictions (Art 62)
o Boado says in effect a crime by itself because it has its own penalty.

Need for 3 convictions. Third conviction must be committed within 10 years
from the second conviction.

An offender can be a recidivist and habitual delinquent at the same time.
(RET are all under the same title; so with SeL)

Convictions
Crimes covered
Prescription

Reitreacion
Service of sentence
Need not be under the same
Title
Prior crime must have been
penalized with an equal or
greater penalty or 2 or more
crimes with lighter penalty

Recidivism
Two are enough
Must be both under the
same Title of the Code
None as no time limit given

Habitual Delinquency
Three are required
FRETSeL
Prescribes if the 10-year

38

by law between the 1st and
2nd convictions
Nature
Penalty

Generic, can be offset
Increase is to the max
period

o

limit between the second
and third convictions are
exceeded
Special, can not be offset
Entails additional penalty
which increases with the
number of convictions

Quasi-redivisim (Art 160)

Offender has been previously convicted by final judgment

Before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same,

He commits a felony.

Special aggravating, can not be offset

Penalizes the convict with the max period for the new felony committed.

Recidivism inherent in quasi-recidivism.

Accused is serving sentence for homicide. Then kills someone in prison. He’ll
get the max period for his second homicide.

Price, Promise, Reward (yeay!)
11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise.











Equally affects the offeror (principal by inducement) and the acceptor (principal by direct
participation). (People v. Alincastre, Mayor Gordon case)
Those who did not benefit from the PPR will not have his penalty increased because this AC is
personal to the giver and the receiver.
Inducement must be the primary consideration in the commission of the crime for it to be
aggravating.
Need not be money. Services pwede!
Mere promise will suffice, as long as it induced!
Dude tells accused to kill X for P5. Accused kills B. (Error in personae) What happens?
o Offeror no AC, acceptor AC.
o Person different from intended! (People v. dela Serna)
Dude gives money after the crime. No promise before crime. No AC. (US v Flores)
Qualifies homicide to Mordor, em, murder.

Inundation, Fire, etc
12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or
international damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving
great waste and ruin.






When is it arson, murder, or both? (People v. Malngan)
o If intent to burn the building and death is a result, just arson. Resulting homicide is absorbed.
o If intent to kill and fire resorted to as means to kill, murder only.
o If intent to kill (and he has done so) then fire used to cover up the killing, then two distinct
crimes, homicide/murder and arson.
o No such thing as complex crime of arson with multiple homicide.
Intent PIVOTAL.
See discussion of Comadre case in the special penal laws part.

Evident premeditation
13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation.



Elements:
o Time when the offender determined to commit the crime
o An overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination
o Sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act (People v. Annibong)

39














Connotes adherence to a plant to commit a crime
Essence: execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection of the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive a calm
judgment.
o Must show when the plan to execute the crime was hatched or what time elapsed before it
was carried out

How much times must elapse?

Law does not give formula. Case to case basis. (P v Rodas)
Not appreciated when:
o Inherent part of the crime (since already considered by the law – Art 62)

Generally, inherent in specific intent felony.
o Why? These crimes are not really decided at the sput of the moment.
Iisipin mo yan eh!

Kidnapping

Robbery

Estafa (intent to gain)

Piracy in Philippine waters
o Attack was made in the heat of anger, or in a chance encounter
Is there evident premeditation when he wanted to kill President Roxas, threw a grenade but he ended
up killing someone else? (Error in personae) No, because he did not intend to kill the other guy. (P v.
Guillen)
o But if one decided to kill a class of persons (like any Ilocano) or anybody he encounters, and
he does, then this AC applies.
If in addition to the crime of robbery, the accused intended to kill a person (robbery with homicide),
evident premeditation is aggravating.
o But if he had no plan to kill a person, but ends up killing a person in the house who put up
some form of resistance, no evident premeditation. (P v Curachia)
Hiding things for one’s escape under a tree does not prove evident premeditation in the crime of
murder and kidnapping because of the possibility that the things could have been used for something
other than the murder or kidnapping. (P v. Baldogo, where Court said that they could have just hid
the stuff to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. It did not prove that they coolly thought of
murdering and kidnapping the victims.)
Proof of conspiracy does not imply the existence of evident premeditation.
o Evident premeditation can be presumed only where conspiracy is directly established (prearranged), not where, conspiracy is merely implied (instant).

If two or more persons conspire to commit a crime, and they decide to commit it,
there may be evident premeditation if the conspiracy allowed the conspirators to
ponder upon and reflect on their decision to commit a felony.

Craft, Fraud, Disguise
14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.








Craft: cunning or intellectual trickery or chicanery resorted to by the accused to carry out his evil
design
o Assuming position of authority to gain entry in a house
Fraud: deceit, manifested by insidious words or machinations
Disguise: resorted to conceal one’s identity
o If disguise sucked and offender was still recognized, cannot be aggravating
These cannot be AC if did not facilitate the commission of the crime, or not take advantage of by the
offender in the course of the assault
If they were used to insure the commission of the crime against persons without risk to offender,
absorbed by treachery (usually absorbed by treachery)
o But can be appreciated separately if based on different facts.

40

For example, guy pretends to hire a jeep because he wants to rob it. Jeepney driver
gets loko. While on the jeep, accused kills accused by hitting him behind the head. SC
considered craft in the plan in the robbery scheme. Treachery in the killing of the
driver. (P v San Pedro, 1980).
Posing as customers of a restaurant, and the robbing it = craft. (P v. Empacis)
Aggravating in robbery with homicide.
o Inducing a buyer of cows to a visit a pen of cows, and then killing him = craft. Intellectual
trickery. (P v. Labaguen)





Abuse of superior strength or means taken to weaken the defense
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.









Abuse of superior strength: where offenders intentionally employ excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the victim.
o Must be a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor. Consider the
relative strength versus the victim.
o Superiority in number does not necessarily mean this AC will be appreciated

Must still be proved that the attackers cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage from superiority of strength

There must be proof of deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength (P v
Alarcon [three guys raped a girl], but SC here did not consider the AC because was
not alleged in the information of the two other accused)
Not appreciated when:
o Assault characterized with passion or obfuscation
o Made during a quarrel
o When the attack was made on the victim alternately and not simultaneously
o Inherent in crime (parricide, rape by force)

Generally accepted that the husband is physically stronger than the wife (P v Galapia,
where horny husband couldn’t get some from his estranged wife, so he killed her.)
An attack made by an armed man upon a woman, who died as a result, is murder because his sex
and weapon gave him superiority of strength. (P v Olivio, where an Igorot woman was killed)
Absorbs band
Absorbed by treachery (P v. Demo, P v. Suyum [2 people killed a guy with a bolo G.R. No. 137518,
2002])
o If an AC is absorbed by another, then it loses its juridical existence.

Treachery
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.






Conditions:
o Employment of means, manner, method or execution that would ensure the safety of the
offender from any defense or retaliation of the offended party, and
o The means, manner, and form were consciously and deliberately chosen.

Shown through prior conduct, motive/relationship of the parties, or nature of the
killing (dissent in People v. Antonio)
The attack must be intended to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to the offender
from a defense that the other party might offer.
Essence: swiftness and the unexpectedness of the attack
o However, the suddenness of the attack must be preconceived by the accused, unexpected by
the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter.
o Mere suddenness does not by itself suggest treachery. (P v. Antonio, when accused suddenly
shot victim after a game of pusoy-dos)

41

That’s why chance encounters, impulse killings, or those preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by treachery
May treachery be considered in carnapping with killing of a person? Before, no. (P v. Lovitania,
because it’s a crime against property).
o Now, yes. Because of P v. Escote (hold-up in bus, holduppers shot passenger-policeman with
his own gun).

In this case, J Callejo, using Spanish decisions, said that treachery is not an element
of robbery with homicide. It is neither inherent in the said crime, and thus should be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. The law looks at the constituent
crime of homicide which is a crime against persons, and not at the constituent crime
of robbery which is a crime against property. Reason? When robbery is coupled with
crimes against persons, the crime is not only an assault of the property, but also of
the victims themselves.

It is not qualifying because crime of robbery with homicide is a unique crime. There is
no robbery with murder. Homicide is used as a generic term, even if the second
component is actually murder.
o This was reiterated in P v. Ancheta (GR 143935), where the six accused robbed palay and
then murdered the victims using guns and a grenade. (generic!)
Can treachery be considered as qualifying in rape with homicide (to make it rape with murder)?
o No. Homicide used in generic sense. Treachery only considered as generic aggravating. No
such crime as rape with murder.
Examples:
o Killing a guy who was drunk and sleeping. (P v. Vallespin)
o The accused shooting the major as the former hid in his house as the latter proceeded to
effect a warrant of arrest on him. (P v. Garcia)
o Victim hogtied before he was stabbed with icepicks (P v. Ong, mahjong case, ala Chinese
mafia movie, yu don’t want pay me mah maney, ay kill u)
o Attacking an unconscious victim
o Victim a child of tender age
May treachery be considered if the wrongful act done be different from that intended by the offender?
o Yes. Treachery is present even if the victim killed is different than the one intended to be
killed. (P v. Castillo, where the victim was killed because he was wearing the target’s shirt.
Compare with P v. Hilario, where the court said that evident premeditation can not be
appreciated)
Does it have to be consummated to appreciate treachery?
o No. treachery doesn’t depend on success. It can be considered even if not consummated.
Sufficient that it tends to this end. (People v. Abendan)
No treachery if attack is an impulse, or due to passion, or when accused did not do any preparations
Treachery may be appreciated even when the victim is warned of the danger to his person, for what
is decisive is that the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate
The retaliation, if ever, must come from the victim, not from anyone else
In a continuous aggression, treachery must be shown present at the inception of the attack, not in
some subsequent stage of the attack.
o Treachery must be present and preceded the commencement of the act which caused the
injury complained of
o After the commencement of such an attack, and before its termination, an accused person
may have employed means or methods which were of a treacherous character, and yet such
would not constitute treachery.

One continuous attack cannot be broken up into parts and made to constitute
separate, distinct attacks so that that treachery may be injected therein

Seen in P v. Dela Cruz, where a commotion occured before the stabbing.
Treachery may not be assumed from the mere fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of
the deceased. Treachery must be proven, and cannot be presumed.
GR: Frontal attack, no treachery.




















42

EX: when attack is sudden and made in such a manner that insures its execution free from
danger and without risk to oneself on account of what the victim might make to defend
himself (P v. Base, where barangay captain was suddenly shot in the head after opening the
door of his residence to the accused)
Generic only for crimes other than killing.
o Special aggravating in serious physical injuries because it increases the penalty.
o Generic in less serious physical injuries.
o Generic in parricide and infanticide. (?)
o Special qualifying in serious physical injuries. (higher degree given!)
o Primordial qualifying circumstance: qualifies homicide into murder.
o Special in the sense that applies only to crimes against persons.
Treachery absorbs:
o Nighttime
o Superior strength (P v Go-od, where victim was ganged up by accused while looking for his
goat)
o Evident premeditation.
o Superior strength
o Craft
o Band

But can they be considered separately?

Yes! If based on different factual settings.

For example, accused took victim at night, walked all night in the mountains,
then tied victim to the tree in morning, and then killed him. Consider night
time and treachery separately. (People v Bernidad)
Treachery inherent in murder by poisoning.
o







Ignominy
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of
the act.








Moral attribute, adds disgrace to the material injury caused by the crime
Relates to moral suffering (whereas cruelty refers to physical suffering)
Circumstance pertaining to a moral order which adds disgrace to the material injury caused to the
offended party; makes crime more humiliating
Victim must still be alive (P v. Fuertes, where accused sliced off flesh of the victim after the death.
But should have been discussed in cruelty. But either way, won’t be appreciated, patay na eh)
o Same ruling in P v. Cachola, where victim’s privates were severed off after he was shot.
Examples:
o Lighting a cigarette on the pubic area of an 8-year old victim (P v. Valla)
o Raping doggy-style (People v Saylan, and in the sick twisted case of P v Siao)

Rape before father or spouse (this has been amended by RA 8353, which made it a
special qualifying circumstance, see discussion below)

Forcing victim to exhibit herself in her full nakedness before the rape

Raping a preggy victim (this has also been amended by RA 8353, which made it a
special qualifying circumstance)

Tying a banana fiber around his junk before raping the victim (enumerated in P v.
Bacule, where sodomy, to appreciate ignominy, was not proven by the prosecution)
o Note: Glenn’s notes state that Art 266-A has changed the rulings of the doggy-style cases
from rape to sexual assault. However, sexual assault talks of inserting one’s penis into
another’s mouth or anal orifice. In the two doggy-style cases, the penis was inserted into the
vagina of the victims. Hence, it should still be covered under rape, not sexual assault.

Unlawful entry/breaking of wall
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.

43

19. That as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.





Qualifies theft into robbery
Inherent in trespass and robbery with force upon things
Par 18 will not apply when ingress is made by breaking; it will go under Par 19.

Aid of minors/use of motor vehicles
20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of motor
vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438).




Use of
o
Use of
o

minor: minor is under 15 years old
Conspiracy with minor? Minor exempt, adult punished with AC.
motor vehicles: motor vehicles facilitated the commission of the crime
Using a get-away car in a bank robbery: no, because crime already committed

Cruelty
21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for its commissions.









Must be done while victim was alive and the offender delighted in the suffering of the victim
o Offender enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually causing him
unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act
Test: whether accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong
not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed
at his person or corpse (P v. Sitchon, where bad common-law dad beat to death his 2-year old son for
spreading his poo around the floor. The Court did not consider cruelty because no proof that commonlaw dad enjoyed the beating)
Multiple wounds not per se cruelty
Chopping off head of victim – cruelty
In robbery with homicide, can the extra (2nd or 3rd) killing be counted as an aggravating circumstance
analogous to cruelty? (Keep in mind that there’s no such thing as robbery with multiple
homicide/rape)
o P v. Abdul (1999), robbery which resulted to 2 dead and 3 mortally wounded, Court said yes,
extra killings should be appreciated as an AC, to avoid the anomalous situation where from
the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be on the same
level as robbery with multiple killings.
o P v. Regala (2000), robbery occasioned with 2 rapes, Court said no. Enumeration of Art 14
exclusive. Additional rapes absorbed by robbery with rape. Remedy to the anomalous
situation lies with legislature. [en banc decision!]
o P v. De Jesus (2004), robbery with 2 dead (hold-up cases, tapos P5000 lang nakuha), no,
additional killing not an aggravating circumstance.

Weird case: accused robbed victim, raped her and then killed her. Court convicted him
of robbery with homicide, and counted the rape as ignominy. WRONG. Should not
prevail over P. v Regala. It was only a division ruling.

Special Laws Relating to Aggravating Circumstances
Dangerous Drugs Act
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an Offender Under the
Influence of Dangerous Drugs. – Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive
finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of
a crime by an offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be
applicable.






Qualifying aggravating.
Used in P v. Belgar, rape of mental 12-year old mental retardate
Not used in P v. Sitchon, because prosecution used drugs under intoxication. It was not considered.
Teacher considered a person-in-authority under DDA

Illegal/Unlawful Possession of Firearms and Explosives

44

Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or
instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. — The penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall
be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other
firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion
or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the
crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible
officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or
persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow
any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of
their residence in the course of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm
outside his residence without legal authority therefor."
Sec. 2. Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 3. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of explosives. — The penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in,
acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not
limited to 'pillbox,' 'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary devices capable of
producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person.
"When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use
of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices, which results in the death of
any person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible
officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the explosives owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity, to be used by any person or
persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs."



What happens?
Unlicensed Firearms
Special AC
Absorbed
Not AC, not even separate
offense
For unlicensed explosives, becomes a special AC only when:
o Used to commit ANY crime (RPC or SPL), and

Homicide or murder
Political crimes
Used in other crime


45

Someone dies.

What if no one dies?

Mickey Note: This was the ruling before RA 9516. Now, RA 9516 has removed
any mentioned of explosives being absorbed by political crimes or being
aggravating only when death arises.
Intent to possess firearm essential (P. v Dela Rosa)
o Temporary possession not covered.
o So if you grabbed the gun from an assailant to protect yourself, you’re not guilty of illegal
possession.
In P v. Comadre, the Court said that 8294 amended Art 14 (12) by adding the use of unlicensed
explosives as an aggravating circumstance.
o Dissent: Absurd. If illegally possessed, only aggravating. But if legally possessed, qualified to
murder.

Use of an unlicensed explosives is aggravating, because it says any crime in the RPC.
So that should include murder, it shouldn’t be qualifying.
Take note that if unlicensed firearm is used to commit murder or homicide, it is merely an
aggravating circumstance.
o The murder or homicide must be consummated. If crime merely attempted or frustrated, this
AC does not apply.
o Take note of the phrase “that no other crime was committed.” This means that if an
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime (not murder or homicide since it
has its own paragraph), there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms.

Hence, if the crime was direct assault and multiple attempted homicide, the accused
can no longer be charged with the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms,
even if its penalty is heavier than direct assault. (P v Ladjaalam)

Nor can use of an unlicensed firearm be used as an AC against him (since it only
pertains to murder and homicide). But the use of arms can be used against him 
homicide with use of weapon. (P v Ladjaalam)

Moreover, an accused may evade conviction for illegal possession by using such
weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight
physical injuries. Remedy is with Congress.
o Note that the person must first be convicted for that other crime, before this anomaly in the
law can be used by the accused.
o “Murder or homicide” includes parricide or infanticide. (P v. Mendoza, where husband shot
wife. But can be argued that the broad interpretation is wrong. Interpretation of doubts must
be always for the accused.)
It is a special AC, not merely generic. Can’t be offset.(P v. de Leon, P. v Palaganas)
What if robbery with homicide? The use of illegal firearms is not an AC. Only considered if murder or
homicide. That’s it. (P v. Sabadao)
o But in People v. Abdul (2000), the SC 1st division affirmed the RTC ruling which considered it
as an AC. This is wrong.
o In People v. Domacyong (2003), the SC ruled that that the AC of illegal possession can be
considered in robbery with homicide. This is wrong. (The Court was right though for
acquitting them of the separate charge of illegal possession)
Security agency has license to possess firearm, guard does not. Guard uses gun to commit murder.
AC? Yes, guard has no license to possess that firearm, only the employer. (Catalina v Decano,
“Pursuant to Section 1 in relation to Section 5, the firearm used in an unauthorized manner shall be
considered an aggravating circumstance. We are in agreement that even if the firearm used was
properly licensed to the security agency, its unauthorized use by the appellant aggravated his
offense.”)
o Compare to Cuenca v People (1970), where security guard was charged for illegal possession.
He did not know that agency did not have the proper license. He was acquitted.
Does the firearm have to be presented during trial?
o














46

No! The corpus delicti is the possession of the firearm. Not the firearm. You just have to prove
possession without license. You can do this through a certification from the PNP that accused
did not have a license.
Are paltiks covered? Yes.
You have a license, but no permit to bring it out of your house, and then you bring it out. What
happens? Liable ka boy. (Pastrano v CA)
Accused in possession of two guns, one high-powered and the other low-powered. Can he be charged
for 2 crimes? Yes! Different penalty for high-powered and low-powered eh!
o What if he has 3 high-powered guns, can he be charge for 3 crimes? No, just 1 crime. Since it
only has one penalty!
Gun ban during election, right? Accused brings out his unlicensed firearm. Solve.
o Not AC (not murder or homicide) and not even considered separate (used in other crime eh!)
o Guilty of violating the gun ban.
o







Anti-Rape Law
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim;
When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement or penal
institution;
When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or relatives within the
third civil degree of consanguinity;
When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally known
to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime;
When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV) Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease
is transmitted to the victim;
When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of para-military units thereof or
the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took
advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime;
When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime; and
When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of crime.
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prison mayor.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed , the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua.
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.




RA 8353 is found in Art 266-B of the RPC. Crime of simple rape becomes qualified, becomes RP to
death.
Did RA 8353 amend Art 14?
o In sense, RA 8353 amended Art 14.
o In 266-B, the use of a deadly weapon to commit rape is a special qualifying circumstance. It
is not anymore an AC under Art 14, but is under 266-B.

47

Alternative Circumstances
Art. 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as
aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions
attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and
education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party in
the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity
in the same degrees of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the
offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the
plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.





Always generic
Denominated as AC or MC, as the case may be
Relationship
o Exclusively: (SADBRoSA)

Spouse

Ascendant

Descendant

Legit, natural or adopted Brother or Sistah

Relative by affinity in the same degrees

Stepparents and stepchildren included by analogy
o But the step spouse and the parent of the child must be legally
married.

Do they always have to be married for relationship to be
considered aggravating?

No. See 266-B, where even the common-law spouse
is included. However, this is considered a special
qualifying circumstance.

Uncles and nieces: NO.

No other relatives by consanguinity included. (hence first cousins not
included)
o GR: in crimes against chastity, relationship AGGRAVATING, whether the offender is a higher
or a lower degree relative of the offended party.

What about rape, since it’s now crime against persons?

Since Art 15 does not say when relationship is an AC and when it’s an MC,
and rape was punishable by death, relationship should not be deemed an AC.
In case of doubt, you must favor the accused, hence, it should not be
considered an AC. (discussion academic since no more death penalty and
because of 266-B)
o But see Art 266-B which now makes relationship in rape cases a
special qualifying circumstance.

However, for civil liability, consider it as an AC.
o GR: in crimes against persons, relationship AGGRAVATING.

In sexual assault, relationship aggravating. (People v Abello, 2009)

But see People v Velarde (36 Phil 991), where dude struck his brother in law. Court
considered it mitigating since it was for a laudible purpose. (exceptional case!)
o In crimes against property, it depends.

If robbery with homicide, aggravating. (P v. Larosa)

If theft, estafa, malicious mischief, exempting because of Art 332.
o In Child Abuse cases, relationship AGGRAVATING, because of Sec 31 (c) of RA 7610. 30

30

The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent guardian, stepparent or collateral
relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its license
has expired or has been revoked

48

When does relationship become exempting?

Art 20 (accessories exempted)

Art 247 (legally married spouse catching spouse having sex with another)

Art 332 (theft, swindling, or malicious mischief by relatives, see codal)

Sec 6, RA 9372 (relatives who are accessories in the Human Securities Act except
those who profited)31

What about if theft with falsification? ABANGAN!
o When should relationship not be considered?

If inherent in the crime. Like parricide.
Intoxication
o To be mitigating:

Actually intoxicated/drunk (self-control diminished), and

Not a habitual drinker and did not take the alcoholic drink with the intention to
reinforce his resolve to commit the crime
o To be aggravating:

Habitual drunk

Drank to strengthen resolve
o What about in VAWC (Art 9262), can you use intoxication as a defense?

Hell no.32 But can you use it as mitigating? Dandandan!
Degree of instruction or education
o If crime is basically wrong, like parricide, robbery or rape, it is immaterial whether the
offender is schooled or not. It’s not mitigating.

But see People v Limaco (83 Phil 85) where dude butchered his kids and he only
finished grade 1. Court considered mitigating.

Also People v. Ramos where robbers killed a 96 year old man. Court considered lack
of education mitigating. Both are unusual cases.
o It is not illiteracy alone but the lack of intelligence of the offender that is considered.
o The high degree of learning should be taken in relation to the crime committed whether his
education puts him into a better position than the ordinary offenders.

Like estafa or malversation committed by a lawyer should be considered aggravating.

Slander by a medical student? AC according to P. v. Roque (40 OG 1710). Don’t know
how the crime committed put him in a better position to commit the slander though.

High degree of instruction was considered AC when a judge was smoking
opium. Again, don’t know how that put him in a better position. (P v. Gabud,
old case!)

But if a lawyer punches an annoying person, high degree of learning should not be
considered aggravating. Walang kinalaman eh.
o High degree of learning should also not be considered aggravating for abortion practiced by a
physician or midwife, since their skills are already inherent in that crime.
o GR: Low degree of learning may be mitigating, never aggravating.
o GR: High degree of learning may be aggravating, never mitigating.
o





Title Two
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
31

Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having participated
therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of
the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their
spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single
exception of accessories falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a).
32
SECTION 27. Prohibited Defense. – Being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-altering substance shall not be a
defense under this Act.

49

Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals 2. Accomplices.



For light felonies, accessories are not liable because the light felonies are punished with arresto
menor. Accessories are given the penalty two degrees lower than the principals. There is nothing two
degrees below arresto menor.

Special stuff for special students

First off, may a private corporation, partnership or association or other juridical entity be criminally
liable?
o Yes, if the law provides a penalty for the corporation. Or even if the crime is committed by a
corporation, but prescribes a penalty on the officers or directors or employees. The state is
not prevented from penalizing a corporation for violation of a penal law, even if the crime is
committed by its agents. (P. v Chow Duri and Ching v Sec of Justice)
o Principle applied in the Trust Receipts Law, and the Labor Code (where the license of one
found to be an illegal recruiter can be revoked).
o Also applied in the Dangerous Drugs Act (Sec 30). Officers liable. 33

What about in the Anti-Hazing Law (RA 8049), what are the rules?
o Principals:

Those who actually participated in the hazing

Parent of a frat/sorority member who owned the place where the hazing occurred,
knew of it but still did not do anything to stop it

Officers, former officers, alumni who planned it, even if they weren’t there

Frat/sorority advisor who was present but didn’t stop it

Anyone there who did not prevent it
o Accessory

Owner of the place where the hazing occurred and who knew of the hazing and did
not stop it

School authorities who actually knew and consented to it

Is there command-responsibility in Philippine Law?
o GR: No.

EXCEPT: in the Genocide Law (RA 9851), the superiors are liable for the acts of their
subordinates.34 Keep in mind that this only applies to RA 9851.

Also in the Anti-Torture Act. See Sec 13.

In the Anti-Torture Act of 2009, senior officers who give orders to their minions to torture people are
liable as principals.35
33

Section 30. Criminal Liability of Officers of Partnerships, Corporations, Associations or Other Juridical Entities. – In case any violation of this
Act is committed by a partnership, corporation, association or any juridical entity, the partner, president, director, manager, trustee, estate
administrator, or officer who consents to or knowingly tolerates such violation shall be held criminally liable as a co-principal.
The penalty provided for the offense under this Act shall be imposed upon the partner, president, director, manager, trustee, estate administrator, or
officer who knowingly authorizes, tolerates or consents to the use of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment or other facility, as an instrument in the
importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of dangerous drugs, or chemical
diversion, if such vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment or other instrument is owned by or under the control or supervision of the partnership,
corporation, association or juridical entity to which they are affiliated.
34
Section 10. Responsibility of Superiors. - In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility for crimes defined and penalized under this Act, a
superior shall be criminally responsible as a principal for such crimes committed by subordinates under his/her effective command and control, or
effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control over such subordinates, where:
(a) That superior either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the subordinates were committing or about to
commit such crimes;
(b) That superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his/her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
35

Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually participated Or induced another in the commission of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal

50

Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished.



Direct participation (PDP)
o Those who materially execute the crime
o Those who carried out the plan and directly participated in the execution of the crime
o Usually, there’s consiparcy.

But can there be PDP without conspiracy?

Yes! Two guys, who don’t know each other, get pissed at some dude at a bar.
They shot him at the same time. Nagkataon lang. Both are liable as PDP. (P. v.
Figueroa)

What about the mastermind, does he have to commit an overt act in the execution of
the planned conspiracy?

No. enough to be held as co-principal through conspiracy, as long as there is
involvement in the planning and commission.

What do you mean by an overt act, or an act which materially executes the crime?

Active participation (dude shot the other guy),

Moral assistance to the other conspirators (other dudes cheered him on).
Also, moral support or exercising moral ascendancy.
o But keep in mind that mere presence doesn’t make him PDP unless he
gave moral assistance or exercised moral ascendancy. (P. v. Flores)

Can someone not be in the scene of the crime and still be a principal?

Opowz koyah/ateh.

The general rule is that the PDP must be at the place of the commission of the
crime. However, the law does not require that PDP is there in the scene of the
crime (locus ciminis).

For as long as the conspirators perform specific acts that were coordinated
pursuant to the conspiracy, they are all principals. Even if their acts are
performed in different places.

Masterminds are principals even if they’re not actually there. Look-outs who
are conspirators are also principals are also principals even if they just stand
outside the scene of the crime.

Must conspirator know every single detail of the crime?

No. As long as he knows his role. (P. v. Masagnay)

Three guys killed a victim by all stabbing him. Is it a complex crime?

No. Only one crime of homicide. Number of crimes committed is not
dependent on the number of conspirators, but on number of victims. (P. v.
Verayon)

Rape committed by 2 or more persons, what happens?

Qualifying circumstance. If husband rapes the victim, while sick wife holds the
victim’s arms, husband PDP, wife PIC. (P. v. Hofilenia)

Is it possible that 2 persons are conspirators but are liable for different crimes? i.e.
same over act, but different liabilities.

Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who issued an order to any lower ranking personnel to commit
torture for whatever purpose shall be held equally liable as principals.
The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior public official of the PNP and other law enforcement
agencies shall be held liable as a principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment for any act or
omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof
by his/her subordinates. If he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that acts of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others
within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during or immediately
after its commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment but failed to prevent or investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to negligence shall also be liable as principals.

51



o



Direct
o
o

o

o

o

o

o

Yes.
o

Private individual liable for delivery of prisoner, while escapee liable
for evasion of sentence.
o Husband and friend killed wife. Husband parricide. Friend homicide.

Can a private person be liable for malversation?

Yes. By conspiring with a public official.

Review of conspiracy doctrines for complex crimes.

GR: in robbery with homicide, when persons conspire to commit robbery, they
expect that it can be attended by violence.
o EX: one desisted before the homicide was committed. (P. v. Napalit).
Hence, it’s possible that one is liable for robbery only, while the others
are liable for robbery with homicide.

Same rule with robbery with rape. All are liable for robbery with rape, even
those who didn’t put their peepees in the victim’s vajayjays. (P v Verseles, P v
Punsalan)
o EX: those who endeavored to prevent the rape by overt acts will not
be liable for the rape, just robbery.

Mere silence is not enough, nor is running away.

But totally different when they robbed, went on their merry
way, but horny robber went back to rape the victim. Only
horny robber guilty of robbery with rape. (gulo ng crim
putek.)
May one be a PDP on the basis of a presumption?

Yes. One caught in possession of recently stolen property is presumed to be author of
the theft or robbery.
Inducement (PDI)
Difference between PDP and PDI: in the former, the PDP does an overt act. In PDI, the PDI
induces, doesn’t really do the overt act.
Two ways of becoming a PDI:

By directly forcing another to commit a crime

Though irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear

By directly inducing another to commit a crime

By giving a price, offering a reward or promise

By using words of command
Requisites:

Inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the
crime, and

Inducement be the determining cause of the commission othe crime by the material
execution.
As to the first requisite, the PDI must intend that his inducement should be obeyed. Mere
careless comment made by one who does not possess dominance or moral ascendancy over
the offender will not make the former a PDI. The one who made the careless comment is not
even criminally liable. Masama bang magcomment?
It is essential that the inducement must be the sole cause that the crime was committed.

A offered B P50 to kill C. B accepted it, but in truth, he had been wanting to kill C
ever since. B killed C. B was not paid. Is A a PDI?

No. A’s offer was not the determining cause. B had two motives – money and
revenge. Inducement must be the sole cause. (P. v. Laohas)

If PDP does it for his own reason, PDI not liable.
What if the PDP is not paid by the PDI after the inducement? What if PDI reneged on his
promise?

Doesn’t matter, as long as he was induced in the first place.
Remember price, reward or promise? It’s a qualifying circumstance in murder. It’s imputed
both on the PDI and the PDP.

52

The use or words must have actually moved the hands of the PDP, such that the PDP has no
other recourse but to obey the command. PDI must have moral dominance over the PDP.

Moral ascendancy, however, is not enough. (P v. Dumanacas 320 SCRA 600).
o Does PDI have to be in the scene of the crime to be liable?

No. they are liable even if they did not appear in the scene. The reason they induce
people to do their dirty work is so that they don’t have to be there in the first place.
o Can the PDP be exempt, while the PDI/PIC still held liable?

Yes! Under Article 332. (P v Po, PDP exempt, PIC liable.)

Also when a guy lies about this details to a clerk to get his residence permit. Clerk is
not liable because he was in good faith, but liar liable as a PDI.

Also when the PDP can make use of exempting circumstances. (bad dude induces 8year old kid to do some crime.)
o How does error in personae affect the PDI?

A induced B to kill C. B killed D by mistake.

A not PDI in the killing of D. B is PDP for death of D.

Crime committed must be the crime A induced B to do.
o How does Art 4 affect the PDI?

A told B to punch C in the back. C dies.

A is PDI in the death of C. Article 4 applies.
o Can love be used to induce?

Yes. A has a paramour B, who loved C. A told D to kill B with the promise that if he
does, “ako ay sa iyo na, buong buo.” D killed B. A is PDI. (P v Ramos, 91 Phil 678).36

What if A does not give herself buong buo to D?
Indispensable cooperation (PIC)
o Difference from PDP: PIC’s act is different from the overt act of the PDP
o Direct participation in the criminal design by another act which the crime could not have been
committed.
o The PIC need not be a party in the planning stage of a conspiracy for he may become a
principal at the moment of the execution of the crime with the other principals, if his act was
indispensable to the crime.

Hence, even if he wasn’t there while the others were planning, if his act showed that
it was indispensable to the criminal design of the PDPs, he will be liable as a PDI.
o Does the PIC have to be in the scene of the crime?

No.

A, who lives in the US, gives B poison to kill C. B used the poison to kill C here in the
Philippines. A is PIC. B is PDP.
o Can a PIC commit a crime different from the PDP?

Yes. Malversation through falsification of public documents committed by a public
offier in conspiracy with a private individual. Private individual may be liable for
malversation. (P v. Sandaydiego).

Husband gives poison to friend to kill wife. Friend homicide. Husband parricide.
o Can the PDP be liable by dolo, yet the PIC by culpa?

Yes. (Andan v People, People v Samson, People v Magsuci)

A made check payable to “X.” A went to the drawee bank, talked to employee B, and
convinced B that she was “X.” B allowed without verifying the identity. A got to encash
the check.

A liable for dolo. B by culpa. A would not have been able to achieve his
criminal scheme were it not for B’s negligence.

A convinced B to give him a check worth P500. B gave it to him, telling him that he
didn’t have any money it that account. A said, “ako bahala sa iyo pre.” A negotiated
the check to C for P1m. Both are liable for estafa. A as PDP. B as PIC, even if he was
only negligent.
o



36

"Ahas na kung ahas, mali na rin kung mali. Pero sinunod ko lang ang puso ko. Mali ba un?" - Angelu de Leon, Wala Na Bang Pag-ibig? (1997)
@PinoyMovieQuotes

53

Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.













An accomplice is one who:
o Not being a principal
o Cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts
o Role in perpetration of the crime is of a minor character
To be an accomplice:
o Offender should take part in the execution of the crime by previous or simultaneous acts, and
o Intends to take part in the commission of the crime
Conspiracy not needed for he is not a principal but he supplies material or moral aid to the principal in
an efficacious way
o If there’s conspiracy, he becomes a principal
His cooperation is not indispensable to the commission of the crime
o His prior or simultaneous acts not indispensable for commission of crime, not over acts for
commission
An accomplice agrees to contribute or to assist. His acts must have a relation to the crime of the
principal.
o A killed B. C was the lookout. But while B was being stabbed by A, C stole from B. What’s the
liability of C?

Accomplice to the murder of B.

Principal of the robbery of B.
o A and B agreed to rob C. B killed C. Liabilities?

A – robbery with homicide.

B – robbery with homicide.
When does the accomplice acquire knowledge of the commission of the crime by the PDP?
o Accomplices come to know of the criminal resolution of the principals after the latter have
reached a decision to commit a crime. The accomplice does not decide the commission of a
crime. The accomplice just agrees after the criminal resolution is accomplished, he does not
conspire. But if the accomplice commits an act of execution, he becomes a PDP.

As to…
Inducement

Cooperation
When acts are committed
Conspiracy




Principals
Without such inducement,
crime would not be
committed

Accomplices
Inducement or utterance is
not indispensable; with or
without such, the crime
would still be committed
(since principal already
determined to commit the
crime)
Indispensable
Minor
Both act before or during the commission of the crime
Decide that the crime should Merely concur it in and
be committed
cooperate in the
accomplishment
Authors of the crime
Mere instruments who
perform acts not essential to
the perpetration

Mere knowledge and participation therefore do not suffice to make one a conspirator, for such are
elements also of an accomplice, especially if even without his participation (like a look-out), the crime
could have been accomplished.
However, where the acts of the accused show that he shared in the community of purpose with the
principals and their acts collectively demonstrate the existence of a common design, conspiracy
becomes evident and all will be liable as principals.

54











Principals and accomplices both know and agree with the criminal design. They have that in common.
o Difference lies in the fact that conspirators know the criminal intention because they
themselves have decided to commit the crime; accomplices just come to know about it after.
May one be charged and convicted as accomplice/accessory even before the principal is charged or
convicted? Should the PDP first be convicted before the accomplice/accessory be charged or
convicted?
o As long as the commission of the crime is proven beyond reasonable doubt, determination of
criminal responsibility of accessory/accomplice may be determined independently of and
separately from liability of PDP. (P v. Rafael)

But if the case is dismissed against the PDP, the case against the
accessory/accomplice must also be dismissed because the liability of the
accomplice/accessory is subordinate to that of the PDP. The accomplice/accessory is
like a shadow that follows the PDP and not the other way around. (PCGG v Desierto)

BUT if the PDP is exempted from the crime, it does not follow that the
accomplice/accessory is exempted, or that the case against the
accomplice/accessory should be dismissed as well.

AND dismissal of the case against the accomplice/accessory does not result to
the dismissal of the case against the PDP.
o PDP acquitted because crime was not committed at all. What happens to
accomplice/accessory?

They can’t be charged. Crime was not committed.
o PDP is dead. Can accomplice/accessory still be charged?

Yes, they can still be prosecuted.
In PD 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law), anyone who aids or abets piracy or robbery
in the highway is considered an accomplice, not an accessory.37
In Human Securities Act (RA 9372), an accomplice basically follows the same definition of the RPC. 38
In the Genocide Law (RA 9851), an accomplice is one who facilitates the commission of the crime. 39
In the Anti-Torture Act (RA 9745), there is no definition of an accomplice. (So I guess follow the RPC
definition? Since suppletory?)
Are there accomplices in bigamy?
o A, a married man, marries B who knew of A’s subsisting marriage.

One case (P v. Arcilla) said A is a PDP, while B is an accomplice.

Another case (P v. Nepomuceno) said A is a PDP, while B is a PIC.

Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and
without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty
of some other crime.



Accessories are those who:

37

Section 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery/brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any
manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of
the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal
offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
38
Section 5. Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof,
cooperates in the execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty
of from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
39
Section 8 (b) A person shall be criminally liable as accomplice for facilitating the commission of a crime defined and penalized in this Act if he/she
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission.

55

Have knowledge of the commission of the crime
Without having participated therein
Take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:

Profiting or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the crime

Concealing the body of the crime or effects or the instruments thereof to prevent its
discovery

Harboring, concealing or assisting the escape of the principal (see two kinds below)

By a public officer who acts with abuse of public functions, he is liable
whatever crime may have been committed by the offender

By a private individual and only when the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, attempt on the life of the Chief Exec, murder, parricide or is known to
be habitually guilty of some other crime
o So a private individual will only be liable as an accessory for harboring
the escape of the offender for those crimes enumerated. Compare this
to the public officer who is guilty for whatever crime.
o Take note that in the second instance, the principal must have been
adjudged guilty.
Profiting or assisting the offender to profit
o Intent to gain not enough, there must have been some gain or material benefit.
o A person who received any property from another and used it, knowing the property was
stolen, is guilty as an accessory by profiting.
o If the crime is robbery/theft and one bought, sold, possessed, or profited from the goods
stolen, what is he guilty of?

Principal for crime of fencing. 40 (SPL)

Accessory to the principals in the crime of robbery or theft.

Prosecution has option of choosing what to charge.
o One who receives part of the ransom/loot from kidnapper/robbery with homicide is an
accessory to the crime of kidnapping/robbery with homicide.
Concealing the body of the crime/effects/instruments thereof to prevent its discovery
o Body of the crime/corpus delicti is the substance of the crime. The fact that a crime has
actually been committed. Made up of 2 things:

Existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, (criminal
event) and

Existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. (criminal
responsibility)
Harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal
o See notes above
o The offender to be assisted must be the principal. No assisting of an accomplice.
o Accused policemen witnessed the killing of the victim by co-accused. Policeman failed to
arrest culprit and even told co-accused not to tell the other policeman. Was policeman an
accessory? Damn right he was, under 3rd paragraph. It was his duty to arrest culprit and not
to conceal commission of crime by silence or misleading authorities that accused was really
culprit. By his acts, he abused his public position. (P v. Antonio, July 2000)
o Policeman helps Leviste (serving time for murder) escape. Liabilities?

Policeman principal for infidelity.

Leviste principal for evasion of sentence.

Is the policeman accessory to murder or evasion?

Justice Callejo: evasion!
o But isn’t the policeman a PDP or PIC? Leviste couldn’t have escaped
were it not for the actions of the policeman. (ewan.)
o
o
o







40

Elements of Fencing: robbery or theft committed, accused does not participate in the robbery or theft, accused acquires proceeds of robbery or theft,
has actual knowledge or should have known subject is from robbery or theft, intent to acquire.

56



Participation
Knowledge
Acts

Liability
Penalty

Boado: those who assist the principal to escape maybe prosecuted under PD
1829 on obstruction of justice not as accessory but as a principal, provided
that a separate information shall be prepared for the crime of obstruction.
Accomplice
Before or during the
commission of the offense
Knows the criminal design of
the principal
Provides material or moral
aid in an efficacious way but
not in a manner
indispensable to the offense
No exemption
1 degree lower than
principal’s

Accessory
Subsequent to the
commission of the offense
Knows the commission of
the offense
Acts in the 3 ways in Art 19

Exempted under Art 20 and
for light felonies (Art 16)
2 degrees lower than
principals’

Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories
shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees,
with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article.













Who are exempt? (SADBroSA)
o Spouse
o Ascendant
o Descendant
o Legitimate, natural, and adopted bros and sis
o Relatives by affinity within the same degrees
Why? Natural affection for the offender.
Exempt for acts in art 19 EXCEPT if they profit or assist the offender to profit (because no longer
natural affection, but because of greed).
A killed B, told sister C to hide body of B. A and C buried B. SC: Sister exempt. Got to preserve the
cleanliness of one’s name. it compels one to conceal crimes by relatives.
o Justice Callejo: I don’t agree with that shiznit.
What if policeman furnishes means for his brother to escape with abuse of public position? Is the
policeman exempt?
o Pacheco: Yes, ties of blood constitute a more powerful incentive than call of duty (modern
warfare).
o Law does not distinguish between private individuals and public officers either.
o Justice Callejo: I agree with that shiznit.
Does the pari delicto rule apply in criminal cases?
o No. if two people agree to fight, and one gets beaten up. He can sue the other for physical
injuries.
Does estoppel apply?
o No. Estoppel does not apply against the State.

Penalties
Title Three
PENALTIES
Chapter One
PENALTIES IN GENERAL

57

Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by
law prior to its commission.







Only penalties prescribed by law prior to its commission can be imposed on the offender.
No imprisonment at the discretion of the court. There must be limits imposed by law.
In BP22 and libel, the SC issued admin orders giving preference to fine over imprisonment. This
doesn’t mean that the SC abolished imprisonment.
The favorable judgment by the appellate court on an accused will be applied to his co-accused if it is
favorable and applicable to the latter.
Court can impose either fine or imprisonment. But it can never imposed “fine and/or imprisonment.”
Accused can’t choose how he wants to serve his sentence.

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.










RA 9346 which prevents the imposition of the death penalty could be apply retroactively because it
favors the accused.
o Even if no more death penalty, the classification of heinous crimes still remains because of the
possibility that it will once again be revived. Moreover, civil liability is still dependent on the
nature of heinous crimes. (P v Bon)
o Even if the offender is a habitual delinquent, RA 9346 will still benefit him. Congress intended
it to benefit even the habitual delinquent.
This article applies equally to the RPC and to SPLs.
o See Juvenile Justice Act (RA 9344) which was applied retroactively to kids who were below 18
at the commission of the crime
o Sir also mentioned VAWC (RA 9262), I don’t know why.
Court can apply even if not invoked by the accused.
What is the effect of an absolute repeal of penal laws?
o Extinguishes liability of accused, EXCEPT

Saving clause in the repealing statute

When repealing statute re-enacts the former statute and punishes the act previously
penalized under the old law
What if implied repeal or repeal by re-enactment?
o The first law will govern if the accused is a habitual delinquent or the favorable second law
prohibits retroactivity.
o While the second law will govern if favorable to the offender who is not a habitual delinquent
or the law is silent as to its retroactivity.

Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. — A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish
criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest
of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.




Amended by RA 8353
See Art 89

Art. 24. Measures of prevention or safety which are nor considered penalties. — The following shall not be
considered as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their detention by reason of insanity
or imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital.
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80 and for the purposes
specified therein. (repealed! See Art 9344)
3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings.
4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary powers,
superior officials may impose upon their subordinates.
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in penal form.



Not imposed after trial but mere preventive measures

58




Paragraph 2 has been repealed by the Juvenile Justice Act. Not a penalty but a measure to enhance
the person of a minor.
Other relevant special laws:
o PNP Act (RA 6975) – preventive suspension of policemen during criminal trials (Sec 41 and
47)
o Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) – suspension of public official after filing of a
valid information
o Plunder Act (RA 7080) - suspension of public official after filing of a valid information
o VAWC (RA 9262) – offended party entitled to protection orders, or accused must file a bond
to keep the peace

Chapter Two
CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES
Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed. — The penalties which may be imposed according to this Code,
and their different classes, are those included in the following:
Scale
Principal Penalties
Capital punishment:
Death.
Afflictive penalties:
Reclusion perpetua, Reclusion temporal, Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, Perpetual or
temporary special disqualification, Prision mayor.
Correctional penalties:
Prision correccional, Arresto mayor, Suspension, Destierro.
Light penalties:
Arresto menor, Public censure.
Penalties common to the three preceding classes:
Fine, and Bond to keep the peace.
Accessory Penalties
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling. Civil
interdiction, Indemnification, Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,
Payment of costs.







General characteristics of penalties in the RPC:
o Graduated according to ceverity
o Divided into periods (except RP)
o Classified into principal or accessory
o Deemed imposed for consummated crimes
o Imposed against the principal offenders
o Max imposable for the particular crime to which they are respectively prescribed
o Understood to be a degree for purposes of lowering the penalty under the ISL, privileged
mitigating, and for applying Art 50-57
Death penalty
o Can no longer be imposed, but RA 9346 did not abolish it since the Constitution allows it to be
imposed in heinous crimes
Reclusion perpetua
o Court should use proper RPC nomenclature
o Indivisible penalty (RP, Perpetual absolute or special DQ, public censure)

Not affected by mitigating or aggravating circumstances

Impose penalty in its entirety, even if there is special aggravating or two mitigating, it
will not be affected

But if PRIVILEGED mitigating, it may be reduced by 1 or 2 degrees
o After imprisonment of 30 years, eligible for pardon.

Court may not impose “30 years of RP”, they should just impose RP. There 30 years
doesn’t refer to the duration of RP, but to the eligibility of parole and for purposes of
computing the 3-fold rule.

59

Different from life imprisonment

Except in PD 818 Syndicated Estafa: max of 30 years, with accessory penalties
provided by RP for 30 years
Life Imprisonment
Reclusion Perpetua
SPL
RPC
No fixed duration (through lifetime of convict)
Fixed duration (20 years, 1 day to 40 years)
No accessory penalties
With accessory penalties
o In P v Canales, court imposed 40 years of RP, with accessory penalties of death and cannot be
pardoned until after 40 years. How come?

Under Art 309, theft is punishable by RT. But for qualified theft, penalty is 2 degress
higher, which is death.

But under Art 74, if the next higher penalty is death, then it becomes RP, with
accessory penalty of death. This is also the reason why he can’t be pardoned before
40 years, instead of the usual 30 years.

Dual personality of disqualification and suspension
o It can be a principal penalty

Temporary DQ – 6 years, 1 day to 12 years

Suspension – 6 months, 1 day to 6 years
o It can also be an accessory penalty

Follow the period of the principal penalty.

Court can not extend the DQ or suspension if it merely follows the principal penalty,
can’t extend beyond principal penalty.

Suspension
o All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence, cannot practice
their profession or engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention.

Bond to keep the peace is a principal penalty yet there is no crime in Book II which imposes it. No
occasion to mete this penalty on a convict.
o Compare with bond for good behavior (Art 248 for grave and light threats only). Failure to
post bond for good behavior means destierro for accused. Failure to post bond to keep the
peace means detention for accused.

What are some instances when a lesser offense absorbs the graver offense?
o Rebellion (RT) absorbs murder (RP)
o Forcible abduction (RT) absorbs illegal detention of a woman (RP)
o Slavery involving kidnapping of a person (PM) absorbs kidnapping (RP)
o

Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. — A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an
alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional
penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than
200 pesos.







Read in conjunction with Art 38 (order of payment of pecuniary liabilities)
Fine is not given to the complainant, it is given to the State. Fine is for vindication!
Accused can use his cash bail bond to pay his fine, if he is convicted. Law does not prohibit him from
using his cash bail bond to pay his fine. It is only meant to ensure his attendance during the process.
Fine is not a substitute for imprisonment. It’s completely independent.
What if exactly P200, how do you reconcile Art 9 and Art 26?
o Art 9 should prevail when the issue is prescription of crime. It’s considered a light felony and
prescribes in 2 months.
o But Art 26 should prevail when the issue is prescription of penalty. It’s considered
correctional, and prescribes in 10 years.

Chapter Three
DURATION AND EFFECTS OF PENALTIES
Section One. — Duration of Penalties

60

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned
after undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other
serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.
Reclusion temporal. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty
years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and
temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal
penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. — The duration of the penalties of prision correccional,
suspension and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six
months.
Arresto menor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. — The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as
the court may determine.
Art. 28. Computation of penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the
temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have
become final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty
shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the
enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on
which the defendant commences to serve his sentence.




How do you compute the penalty if the accused is not in jail during trial?
o If absent during trial, time from arrest
What if he was in prison?
o From finality of date of conviction. If he appeals, he has to wait until the finality of conviction.

Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders who have
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if
the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment. (As amended by Republic Act 6127, June 17, 1970).
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the
possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not
yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof
or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the
accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment. (As amended by E.O. No. 214, July 10, 1988).






Preventive imprisonment is not a penalty. It usually occurs if the accused is unable to post bond, or
the crime charged is not bailable.
If accused is preventively detained during trial, he can get full credit for the time he spent there if he
voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicts.
o He can’t get full credit if:

He’s a recidivist or a habitual delinquent (P v Gana)

He fails to surrender voluntarily upon being summoned for the execution of the
sentence.

In these cases, he’ll only be credited 4/5 of the time spent.
If he’s served the max time, file a petition for habeas corpus.

61






Preventive imprisonment applies to destierro.
If the convict is sentenced to life imprisonment, rp or death, he is still entitled to benefit from this
provision.
What if the accused is detained, then sentenced to imprisonment and fine, and he has already served
his sentence but has not yet paid the fine, may he be released? No. He has to pay the fine first.
See Juvenile Justice Act, Sec 41 – Any form of physical restraint imposed on a child in conflict with
the law including his community service or commitment to a rehab center shall be considered as
preventive imprisonment.
o If the minor juvy is imprisoned pending trial, he shall be credited with the service of the
sentence with the full time in which the child was preventively imprisoned.
o If the child has served the full time, director can determine if child still has to stay in rehab.

Section Two. — Effects of the penalties
according to their respective nature
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if
conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2
and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the
following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected; 2. The disqualification for
holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to
the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature
of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such
office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification.
Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the right of
suffrage. — The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or
right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the
period of his suspension.
Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of
marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any
act or any conveyance inter vivos.




Convict can prepare a will since it’s not a donation inter vivos
Read codal na lang.

Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. — It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to
keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit
the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount
determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of
the court to guarantee said undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond.
Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained for a period which shall
in no case exceed six months, is he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall
not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony.

62

Art. 37. Cost; What are included. — Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial
proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in
force, or amounts not subject to schedule.
Art. 38. Pecuniary liabilities; Order of payment. — In case the property of the offender should not be
sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:
1. The reparation of the damage caused. 2. Indemnification of consequential damages. 3. The fine. 4. The
cost of the proceedings.






Order for pecuniary liability: reparation, indemnification, fine, costs.
First to the offended (reparation and indemnification), and then to the government (fine and costs)
If guilty of several offenses, follow the chronological order of the dates of final judgment rendered
against the convict, beginning with the first final judgment.
Fine is actually a pecuniary penalty, according to Art 25.

Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the
paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate
of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under
confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for
more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six
months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed
fifteen days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such
penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall
continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall
not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA
5465, April 21, 1969).













Subsidiary imprisonment can only be imposed if the accused is penalized with a fine (either fine only,
or fine and imprisonment) and because of insolvency, he cannot pay it.
Since it is a penalty, Court must EXPRESSLY state that subsidiary imprisonment shall be served in
case of insolvency.
o It is not an accessory penalty that follows the principal penalty as a matter of course.
He can’t be ordered to serve subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay pecuniary liability
(reparations), but he can serve for pecuniary penalty (fine).
Subsidiary penalty not proper in the following cases:
o Principal penalty imposed is more than PC (6 years and 1 day or more)
o Principal penalty is other than prison sentence which is not of fixed duration
o Subsidiary penalty is not expressly stated in the sentence
o Sentence imposed does not include fine
o Convict has the means to pay the fine
Follow the actual penalty meted out in determining whether subsidiary imprisonment can be applied.
Not the penalty prescribed by law.
Can the accused, who has money, choose not to pay the fine and go to jail instead? No. He has no
choice but to pay the fine.
o But see P v Subido where the court allowed him to choose. Justice Callejo doesn’t agree with
that.
Subsidiary imprisonment also applies to SPL, like BP 22 or possession of illegal firearms.
Supposing the accused is charged with 2 or more offenses and there was just 1 decision which
convicted him of all the charges. How do we determine the 6-year limit?
o The 6-year period shall be based on the total duration of the penalties imposed by court
(after joint trial) based on the 3-fold rule under Art 70. Hence, if the total of the penalties

63

exceed 6 years, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed, even if the penalty for each of
the crimes is less than 6 years.
Section Three. — Penalties in which other accessory penalties
are inherent
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period
of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender
shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.



When the penalty imposed is RP as a penalty next higher in degree, the accessory penalty shall be
that under Art 40 but the offender shall not be given the benefit of the provision of Art 27 until 40
years have elapsed, otherwise, there could be no difference at all between RP when imposed as
apenalty next higher in degree and when it is imposed as a penalty fixed by law. (P v Bago)

Art. 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of
temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage
which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with
it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in the article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of
the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. — Every penalty imposed
for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government,
unless they be property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject
of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.








Only the trial court who convicted the accused may order the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime
and the instruments or tools used in the crime.
o But before the court may do so, the tools/instruments must be presented to the court as
evidence. Otherwise, the court has no jd to order the forfeiture or destruction of such. (P v
Singson)
o In case of bribery, the money used may be forfeited in favor of the state.
The tool/instrument must belong to the accused himself. If it belongs to someone else and he has no
involvement in the crime, there can be no such declaration. (P v. Elona)
Applicable also to SPL.
The court may order destruction nonetheless if the items are contraband.
Dangerous Drugs Act, Sec 20 – those subject of the crime, including proceeds derived from drug
trafficking and even money and assets acquired in violation of the DDA, can be ordered forfeited in
favor of the government, unless belonging to the third persons without involvement of the crime.
o EXCEPTION to the third person rule – if the items are beyond lawful commerce, still forfeited
o Proceeds of sale or disposition of the property forfeited must be used to pay the expenses
incurred in the proceedings including cost of the proceedings

Chapter Four

64

APPLICATION OF PENALTIES
Section One. — Rules for the application of penalties
to the persons criminally liable and for the graduation of the same.
Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law for the
commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to
the consummated felony.
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. — The death penalty shall be imposed in all
cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:
1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.
2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme court, all the members thereof are not
unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of
said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the
Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said court,
unless some member or members thereof shall have been disqualified from taking part in the
consideration of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices
shall be required.



RA 9346 has proscribed the imposition of the death penalty and in its steal shall be RP or life
imprisonment as the case may be without any right of the offender to avail of the benefit of parole
under Act 4103, the ISL.

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.









There are two kinds of complex crimes under Art 48
o Compound crimes, or delito compuesto: when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies
o Complex crime proper, or delito complejo: when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other
Art 48 is actually for the benefit of the offender under the pro reo principle.
o Since even if two crimes are committed, the law only punished the offender for one, although
it is in the maximum. In the eyes of the law, the two crimes stem from one criminal intent –
this is less perverse in the crimes of the law compared to punishing him for two crimes. This
applies to both compound crimes and complex crime proper.
o The reason for the single penalty is that the basis of the felony is the singularity of the act.
Only one information must be filed charging the complex felony.
o If you want to charge someone with forcible abduction with rape, you have to allege the
elements of both forcible abduction and rape.
Compound crimes (delito compuesto)
o Committed when a single act results to two or more grave or less grave felonies

Either two or more grave felonies

Two or more less grave felonies

One or more grave and one or more less grave

If a light felony likewise resulted, the light felony shall be treated as a separate
offense. A separate information must be filed for them.
o Take note of the word ‘felonies.’ This precludes application to ordinances and SPLs.

The felonies resulting from the single act must be felonies in the RPC.

If punishable under the RPC and an SPL (or an ordinance), Art 48 will not apply. The
offender may be charged and convicted for both crimes, separately without double
jeopardy.

Estafa and illegal recruitment

Estafa and BP 22

Rape and sexual assault (SPL) (P v Abay)

65

Accused inserted his fingers, and then his penis to victim’s vagina.
NOT complex crime. One count rape, one count sexual assault. Not a
complex crime. (P v Nequia)
Can be either dolo or culpa

Person was convicted for reckless imprudence resulting into homicide and destruction
of property (P v de los Santos)

Reckless imprudence is a felony, so Art 48 will apply to it.
Examples:

Man threw a grenade, killed two people. Complex crime of double murder. (P v
Comadre)

Man threw a pillbox, killed some people, injured others. Complex crime of murder
with attempted murder. (P v. dela Rosa)

Can it be two different crimes, and still complex? Yes. Man threw a grenade,
killed his father and his father’s friend. Complex crime of parricide with
murder.
Does it have to be consummated? No. Man threw hand grenade to a group of people. Some
died, some didn’t. Complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder and
double attempted murder. (P v Magalona)
What if only one victim, will Art 48 apply? Yes. Governor was performing duties and was killed
by accused. Complex crime of direct assault with homicide.
Supposing one wants to kill another with treachery, but there abberatio ictus or error in
personae, can the crime committed by the accused be a complex crime?

Yes. Homicide with attempted homicide.

Dude stabbed victim with a bolo, the bolo hit both the victim and the person behind
him. Complex rime of murder and serious physical injuries. (P v Patrolla)

Accused forcibly inserted his penis into the vagina of the woman. She sustained less
serious physical injuries in her vagina. Complex crime of rape with less serious
physical injuries. (P v. Andaya)
What if there was no intent to kill, but two people died because of the acts of the accused,
will Art 48 apply?

Yes. Art 48 applies even to praeter intentionem.

Example: dude stabbed wife who was 7 months pregnant. Both wife and baby died.
Complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. (P v Paycana, Jr)
BUT remember: NO COMPLEX CRIME of ARSON with MURDER (P v Malngan, look at intent)
What is the test to determine whether Art 48 will apply – single criminal act or single criminal
intent/impulse?

Law is clear: SINGLE ACT.

The SC, however, has applied the single impulse test in some cases, as in the
following:
o Stealing of 13 cows (P v Tulos)
o Taking two roosters on one occasion (P v de Leon, convicted of just
one theft)
o Raped niece at 10 am, 11 am, 12 pm at same grassy area. (P v
Obrique. This is a unique case)
For cases of RAPE, SC has used the single act test.

Hence, when accused inserted private organ and raped the victim, and then inserted
his finger twice into the vagina at the same place and same occasion. SC said no
complex crime. Accused guilty of one count of rape and two counts of sexual assault,
even if same place and same occasiln. (P v Intong)

Hence, when the accused inserted his penis into the vagina of the victim and made
several push and pull movements but without removing his organ until he reached
orgams, the accused is guilty of only one count of rape. (P v Avaron wherein the
prosecutor argued that there should be as many crimes of rape as to the number of
pushes and pulls) [don’t remove it!]
o

o

o

o

o
o

o

o
o

o

66



o

o

o

One count of rape = putting it in. if you take it out, then put it back in, how
many counts of rape?

Accused raped his niece once a day, inserting his finger once a day, for 16 consecutive
days in different locations. SC held as many crimes of rape and sexual assault equal
to how many times he inserted his organ and finger.

No single criminal intent because each time he committed the crime was on
different days, he was animated by separate criminal intents on each
occasion. (P v. Sollano)

Accused raped his daughter every day for a week against the wishes of his wife. SC
held 7 counts of rape. (P v Gorbida)

Accused raped victim 5 times in the same place and on the same night. Convicted of
5 counts of rape. (P v Escoton)
For cases of KIDNAPPING, SC has used the single act test.

Even if the persons were kidnapped on the same occasion and place, there was as
many crimes of kidnapping as there were persons. (P v Laranaga)

Hence, if accused kidnaps 5 kids, he is liable for 5 counts of kidnapping. Not a
complex crime.

Kidnapping with murder, kidnapping with rape, kidnapping with homicide –
these are all special complex crimes, and not complex crimes under Art 48.
Even if the homicide or rape was a mere afterthought, this would still be the
name of the crime.
o For example, kidnapped victim was raped. How many special complex
crimes? As many as the number of persons kidnapped and raped. (P v
Rimurin [?])
o Strange case: 7 persons kidnapped and two died. SC DIVISION said
only 1 crime of kidnapping with homicide. (Justice Calljo does not
agree with this, naturally.)

Same rule for kidnapping for ransom. Even if it is in the same situs, the
number of crimes of kidnapping will depend on the number of persons
kidnapped.
What test will you apply to BP 22?

Single act. Can’t apply criminal intent test because it’s mala prohibita and a SPL.
Hence, number of bouncing checks equals number of violations of BP 22.
For cases of FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS, SC has used the single act test.

There as many crimes as the vouchers falsified. (P v Gonzales)

Accused falsified three money orders separately. Each constitutes separate crimes. (P
v Villanueva)

Accused falsified the roll of attorneys by including 3 names. Each constitutes separate
crimes. (P v Segovia)

Important case: relatives died leaving 3 parcels of land. Accused executed three
separate deeds of sale on the same day, making it appear that the relatives-vendors
were still alive at time of sale. Convicted of 3 charges of falsification because 3
documents falsified. (Lastrilla v Granda)

Accused did it by antedating, forging and making it appear that the relatives
were still alive. In other words, he falsified each document in 3 modes. Is he
guilty of 3 counts of falsification per document? NO. Only one crime of
falsification of public document even if there were multiple modes.

Accused committed estafa by withdrawing from account. Number of counts of estafa
= number of withdrawals. Not continuing. Moment that withdrawal was made, the
crime was committed. Accused did not intend to commit just one crime. (Gamboa v
CA)

In Ilagan v CA, the accused swindled both the lot buyers and the corporation he was
working for.

As far as the lot buyers were concerned, there were as many crimes of estafa
as the number of times the accused fraudulently collected from the victims.

67



o

o

o

As far as the corporation is concerned, it depends on the obligation to
account. If he is obliged to account everyday and he fails to do so, there are
as many crimes of estafa as the number of days he failed to account. If he is
obliged to account every month, he is guilty for every month he fails to
account.

There are as many crimes of estafa through forgery as there are acts.
For cases of LIBEL, SC has used the single act test.

One count of libel doesn’t depend on persons damaged, but on the number of
publications.

Even if two or more persons were subject to libel, if there was only one publication,
there is only one crime of libel. (P v Aquino)
For crimes against persons, the court has applied both, but the correct test is the single act
test.

When the constabulary officers killed around 50 Maranaws with guns, the Court
convicted them all under the complex crime of multiple murder, using the single
impulse test. But the Court only did this because it was impossible to determine who
killed who. (P v Lawas)

When there were several killings inside Bilibid prison, the Court held the accused
guilty for multiple murder with multiple frustrated/attempted murder, applying the
single impulse test (P v Pingcalin)

J Makasiar dissented, saying it should be single act.

On MR, the Court reneged, followed J Makasiar.

In P v Pineda, wherein the accused shot once and killed two people with one bullet,
the SC finally said that Art 48 talks of a single act. Do not apply the single impulse
test.

Hence, when with one thrust of a knife, two people get hurt, Art 48 will apply.

So with the use of one bomb and lots get injured, Art 48 will apply.
For automatic weapons, what is the rule?

According to Boado and Reyes, in view of the special characteristic or mechanism of
automatic machine guns, there are as many offenses as the numbers of victims of the
bullets fired. So, single act of pulling trigger, but lots of bullets fired, Art 48 won’t
apply, separate crimes for each victim.

This was also the case of P v Pacificador, Dalmacio [2002, division], et al,
where the victims were killed after a series of gunshots (armalites fired
successively). The accused were guilty of as many crimes as how many
people were injured.

According to Justice Callejo, the single act of pulling the trigger, even if lots of bullets
are fired, will place it under Art 48.

See P v Sanidad [2003 en banc]. In that case, the accused ambushed a
jeepney with their armalites and other guns. The accused showed a single
criminal impulse when he said “oh my gosh, we were not able to kill all of
them.” 85 empty armalite shells were recovered in the scene of the crime.
The court applied Art 48 for two reasons. First, it was impossible to determine
who killed the victim. And there was a single criminal impulse which showed a
conspiracy to kill, hence, it was seen as a single act. 41

Justice Callejo also cited the cases of Manghoy and Mision, but I can’t find it.

41

We fully agree with the lower court that the instant case comes within the purview of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of
complex crimes, provides that when “a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.” In a complex crime, although two or more
crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender.
Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in firing separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to
determine who among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire at each and
every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon
Tugadi’s group as a whole. Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: “My gosh, we were not able to kill all of them.”
Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single
act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense

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For cases of malversation

If there are different kinds of property malversed in one occasion, there’s only one
crime

Accused malversed money and personal property in one occasion

If on different occasions, then different counts of malversation
Complex crimes proper (delito complejo)
o These are felonies where one offense is necessary to commit another, the two crimes
comprise one complex crime
o The first crime must be a necessary means to commit the other

The first is committed to insure and facilitate the commission of the next crime

The first is necessary but not indispensable (because if indispensable, element na
siya)

Hence, the following are not complex crimes:
o A crime to conceal another because such is not to commit but to
conceal the other crime
o A crime which is an element of the other for in that case, the former
shall be absorbed by the latter (like trespassing which is an element
of robbery)
o A crime which has the same element as the other crime committed

Estafa and falisfication of private documents have the same
element of damage. One damage cannot give rise to two
crimes. Hence, there is no complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of private documents.

But in falsification of public, official or commercial
documents does not have the element of damage.
Hence, you can have a complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public, official, or commercial
documents.
o Where the intent is really to commit the second crime but the first act
although also a crime is incidental to the commission of the second
crime. (Taking away a woman to rape here. The taking is merely
incidental. No complex crime of abduction with rape but only simple
rape)
o Special complex crimes
o Is it possible that one crime is dolo and the other is culpa?

Yes. accused cashed check on behalf of an impostor. The employee of the bank did
not bother to check since they were friends. The employee’s failure to ascertain the
identity of payee was falsification by culpa. It was the means to commit estafa.
Hence, estafa, through falsification by culpa. (Samson v CA)

Is there falsification through culpa of private documents? No, because as stated
earlier, damage is already an element of falsification of private documents, hence you
can’t have a complex crime.
o More on forcible abduction with rape vs simple rape:

If the intent was to rape, and the victim was brought to a place to rape her, no
complex crime. Only rape. Abduction is absorbed by rape. (P v Almanzor)

Victim was abducted and brought to a grassy area near her house. She was
raped. Abduction was absorbed. (P v Mojerada)

Victim brought 600m from her house where she was raped. Abduction still
absorbed by rape. (P v Godinez)

But when is it not absorbed?!

Abducted to place 100m from her house. Court said forcible abduction with
rape. (P v Abarquez)

Main determinant is the specific intention of the offender, and not the distance.

What if there was abduction (which was necessary to commit the rape) and then
there were three rapes done after?
o



69



o

The moment the first rape was committed, then forcible abduction with rape
was consummated. The second and third rapes were separate crimes. Hence,
one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and then two separate
simple crimes of rape. (P v Garcia, P v Caraang)

But isn’t abduction a continuing crime? Dandan!

If accused abducted two women at the same time, and then raped both, how’s that?

He’s guilty of two counts of forcible abduction with rape.

It depends on the number of women he abducted.

Compare with kidnapping with rape which is a special complex crime (not a complex
crime under Art 48). (P v Laranaga)

Can there be forcible abduction with acts of lasciviousness?

Before, no. Now, yes. (Justice Callejo)

Boado breaks it down:

Intent to rape: simple rape. Taking incidental.

Intent to take woman against her will with lewd designs: forcible abduction
with rape (information must allege lewd designs)
o If multiple rapes, complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, then
other rapes file separately.

Intent was to kidnap for ransom, but after rape was committed as an
afterthought: special complex crime of kidnapping with rape
Give examples of crimes that look complex, but are not complex under Art 48:

Usurpation of private property with violence

Art 48 won’t apply because the law provides a penalty for it already.

Malicious procurement of search warrant through perjury

Art 48 won’t apply because Art 129 already provides a penalty for it.

Trespass to dwelling with murder

Art 48 won’t apply because trespass already absorbed

Political crimes with common crimes

Art 48, you ain’t gonna be bringin yo shiznat to these crimes. Common crimes
are absorbed in political crimes. (P v Hernandez)

Even SPLs are absorbed in political crimes.

Important to know the motive to determine if absorbed or not.

May torture by persons-in-authority be absorbed?

NEVER. Always a separate crime.

It can’t absorb other crimes either.42

Art 48 won’t apply.

Robbery with homicide/rape/intentional mutilation, kidnapping with
murder/rape/homicide (special complex crimes)

Kidnapping and torture

Torture considered special aggravating (torture here done by kidnappers, not
by persons-in-authority, so Anti-Torture Law won’t apply)

Stuff under 266-B

They have their own penalties

For rape with homicide, if 2 people raped victim, but only one killed her, both
will still be liable for rape with homicide (even if only one killed the victim)

Special complex crimes under the Anti-Torture Act

Torture with homicide

Torture with rape

Torture with mutilation

Torture with sexual abuse

42

Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or felony
committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated as a separate and independent
criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to any other criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws.

70


Torture against kids
Plunder

Art 48 won’t apply. Other crimes are merely predicate crimes. Only one crime
is committed.
o Will Art 332 (exempting relatives from certain crimes) still lie in complex crimes?

No. If the accused swindles her brother-in-law by falsifying a public document, she
can be guilty of estafa through falsification of a public document. The exemption will
not lie. If constitutive of a complex crime, Art 332 will no longer apply. Hence the
relative will be liable of estafa through falsification of a public document.

Break muna.

Okay, besides complex crimes and compound crimes, what are the other kinds of plurality of crimes
where a single penalty is imposed? (Take note that these aren’t covered by Art 48, but only bear a
semblance to complex crimes, hence commentators usually discuss them together)
o Composite crimes or special complex crimes
o Continued crime or delito continuado
o Continuing crimes or transitory crimes

NOTE: Justice Callejo did not distinguish between continued crimes and continuing
crimes, he lumped them together as delito continuado. Boado, however, distinguished
between the two. The distinction it seems is academic, the effect being the same –
that only one crime is considered committed.

Composite crimes
o those which in the eyes of the law are treated as single indivisible offenses although in reality
are made up of more than one crime.
Composite
Complex
Combo of offenses is fixed by law
Combo is not specified but generalized
Penalty is specific
Not specific, but for the most serious offense in the
max period
Even if there are more than one count of the
If more than one count of the crime forming part of
component crime (like several rapes), still just one
the complex crime, the first shall be complexed,
composite crime to be charged
while the other counts are treated as separate
crimes (forcible abduction with rape, with
subsequent rapes charged separately)
If light felony accompanies the commission of the
Light felonies are not absorbed, they have to be
composite offence, such is absorbed
filed separately

Continued crimes (delito continuado)
o Impelled by a single criminal impulse but commited by a series of overt acts at about the
same time in about the same place and all the overt acts violate one and the same provision
of law
o Apparently, this is where the single criminal impulse test applies
o Single larceny rule: taking of several things belonging to the same or different owners at the
same time and place constitutes but one larceny.
o Applied in:

Theft of 13 cows at same place and time

Theft of 6 roosters belonging to 2 different owners from the same coop and at the
same time

Mallari v People. Mallari wanted to borrow P300k, but the lender only wanted to give
him P150k. he mortgaged two lots to secure the debt, went to the aunt to borrow
instead, and mortgaged the same two lots. The titles were falsified. (Not sure about
the facts, just copied from Glenn). There was delito continuado even if there were two
transactions because there was a single criminal resolution leading to a single crime
of estafa throught falsification of public document.
o Does NOT apply to formal/instantaneous crimes. Adultery is not a delito continuado. Each
sexual act is an offense. It is consummated and exhausted (like the accuseds) at the time of
carnal union.

Continuing Crime


71

o
o
o

o

One where any of the elements of the offense was committed in different localities such that
the accused may be indicted in any of those localities
Only considered as one crime.
May also refer to any offense which is continuing in time

Rebellion

Squatting

Violation of BP 22

Abduction, kidnapping, illegal detention
Applicable to SPL? Yes. See Santiago v Garchitorena, where Court said that Miriam’s signing
the order to allow 32 aliens to stay was a continuing crime. She was charged only once.

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that
intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to
commit, the following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense
which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which
the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by
the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a
higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the
frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.






Applies to error in personae only.
o If intended crime was homicide but due to error in personae, parricide was committed, the
lower penalty for homicide will be imposed. Same if vice versa. It’s an extenuating
circumstance.
Doesn’t apply to pareter inentionem (covered by Art 13).
Doesn’t apply to abberatio ictus (covered by Art 48)

Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a
frustrated felony.
Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempt to commit a felony.
Art. 52. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated crime. — The penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the
commission of a consummated felony.
Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. — The
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed
upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.
Art. 54. Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree
than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission
of a frustrated felony.
Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime. — The penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the
commission of a frustrated felony.
Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime. — The penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the
accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.
Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime. — The penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the

72

attempt to commit a felony.
Art. 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories. — Those accessories falling within the
terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall
suffer the additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty
of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave
felony.
Art. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the
aims sought are impossible. — When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the
acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that
the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by
such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the
social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of
arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.
Art. 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. — The provisions contained in Articles 50 to
57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the
penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.

How to apply, in degrees Consummated
Frustrated
Attempted
Principal
As provide by law
-1
-2
Accomplice
-1
-2
-3
Accessory
-2
-3
-4

Sample: simple rape, penalty is reclusion perpetua.
o If accomplice and consummated, -1, hence reclusion temporal.
o If accomplice and attempted, -3, prison correccional.

For Art 59 (impossible crimes), it does not apply if the intended crime is a light felony.

So death penalty cannot be imposed anymore, right? If the penalty prescribed by law is death, where
do we start counting from, death or rp?
o In People v Bon (2003), court counted from RP.
o HOWEVER, in P v Sarcia (2009) and P v Jacinto (2011), both cases were for qualified rape by
a minor on a minor, in appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (Art 68)
court counted from DEATH. 43

So start counting from DEATH. Sarcia was en banc. Jacinto was by division.
Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to
the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as
principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall
be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees
shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
Article 71 of this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more
divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the
maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the
medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper
divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated
scale.
4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different
divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately
following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty
prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned
respective graduated scale.
43

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accusedappellant is reclusion perpetua.

73

5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four
preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those
guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and
accessories.




Just read the codal for the rules. Sir didn’t really discuss this anyway.
Read with Art 71.

Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. —
Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the
purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which
are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into
account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
1 (a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position,
the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed it the offense was committed by any person who belongs
to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of 2 or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for puposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a
degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from
his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such
circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to
accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge
of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime
of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the
offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of
ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical
injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.









This article gives the rules on when not to consider stuff as aggravating:
o If element of the crime (included by the law in defining the crime and prescribing its penalty)
o Inherent in the crime
Additional rule: those which are caused by the moral attributes of the offender or his relations with
the offended or any other personal causes will only affect the offender having such attribute.
o Passion and obfuscation will only apply to the one who was actually enraged; so with
relationship
Take note that this article made the following SPECIAL aggravating circumstances:
o Abuse of public position
o Committed by organized/syndicated crime group

CAN NOT BE OFFSET by generic mitigating
If policeman uses his gun to murder someone, the use of his gun is a special aggravating
circumstance under the Illegal Firearms Law, but can his abuse of position be appreciated as well?

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

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In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court
shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the
purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.




Inoperative because of RA 9346.
Now, only RP is indivisible.
o Cannot be affected by generic mitigating circumstances.
o However, it can be affected by privileged mitigating circumstances (like Art 68, 69).

Privileged mitigating always considered whether divisible or indivisible penalty.

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of
three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76
and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether
there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty
prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the
penalty in its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the
penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset
those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present,
the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose
a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the
number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of
the evil produced by the crime.









Rules when penalty is divisible:
o No aggravating and no mitigating – medium
o Mitigating only – minimum
o Aggravating only – maximum
o Some of both – offset, then apply the above rules
o Two or more mitigating with no aggravating – lower the penalty one degree but always in the
proper period
If there are a lot of aggravating but no mitigating, can the courts increase the penalty to one greater
than that prescribed by law? NO.
If after offsetting (meaning there was aggravating and mitigating), there are 2 mitigating left, can the
penalty be lowered by one degree? NO. as long as there was aggravating, can’t lower penalty by
degree.
If there are four mitigating circumstances, you use two to lower the penalty by one degree. The
remaining two are used to find the period. You can’t use the remaining two to lower the penalty by
another degree.
o Imposed by law: RT. 4 mitigating.

Lower to PM. Then use the 2 remaining mitigating to find the period. So PM minimum.
Art 64 is important in the ISL because the modifying circumstances are first considered in the
determination of the maximum penalty in the ISL. (sir won’t ask to compute ISL)

75

Art 64 is not considered in the determination of the minimum penalty in the ISL. The
minimum penalty in the ISL must be within the whole range of the penalty next lower in
degree.
If the accused is sentenced to RP and has two generic mitigating circumstances (and no AC), penalty
can NOT be lowered by one degree since it’s an indivisible penalty. (Only a privileged mitigating can
give a penalty lower for an indivisible penalty)
This article doesn’t apply to Art 365 because modifying circumstances don’t apply to quasi-offfenses.
o




Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In cases in which the
penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in
the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and
forming one period of each of the three portions.



This is applied when the law prescribes a penalty not composed of three periods (like robbery in an
uninhabited place whose penalty is PC in medium to maximum.)
o Just divide the period given by 3 to get the min, med and max.

Art. 66. Imposition of fines. — In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.












Study with Art 75.
The LAW can prescribe the following:
o Fine only
o Fine AND imprisonment
o Fine OR imprisonment
The court can’t give the accused a penalty of fine OR imprisonment. The court has to make a choice,
it can’t leave to the accused the choice on what penalty he wants to serve.
If the law states “fine of P50k to 150k”, the court can choose between those bounds.
If the law states “fine of P15k”, that’s it, court must impose the definite fine.
If the law states “fine not less than P15k”, court must be judicious. They can’t just fine the accused
for P1m.
Increase or reduction in the degree of the fine. (See Art 75)
Fine cannot be used as substitute penalty to imprisonment. Penalty of fine is independent from
penalty of imprisonment.
If the accused drew and issued a check but it bounced, and during trial he pays the value of the
check, should he still be convicted for a fine? Yes. Penalty of the fine goes to the State, not the
offended party.

Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth circumstance of
Article 12 are present.— When all the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this
Code to exempt from criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty
of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.



Lack of requisites in performance of lawful act – AM max to PC minimum (if grave), AM min to med (if
less grave)

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor
under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of
Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of
the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.




Paragraph 1 implied repealed by Juvenile Justice Act.
o As long as below 15 or 18 (without discernment), criminally exempt.
Paragraph 2 modified.

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If between 15-18 and acted with discernment, criminally liable.

If child is determined to be criminally liable and the diversion program is not
consented to, the case shall proved. The child shall enjoy the privileged mitigating
circumstance under Art 68 but shall nevertheless be entitled to suspension of
sentence whether or not he is no longer a minor.
As long as child was under 18 when he did the crime, suspension of sentence will apply.
o Suspension can apply until he’s 21 (discretion of court). 44

After the suspension, child may serve his sentence in agricultural camps or other
training facilities.45

After the suspension, he can also be granted probation. 46
Remember: even if minor criminally exempt, he is still civilly liable.
Even if minor is charged with a heinous crime, he is still entitled to suspension of conviction. RA 9344
does not distinguish. (P v Garcia)
What if SPL which does not follow nomenclature of RPC? Minor not entitled to privileged MC.
o Like life imprisonment in illegal recruitment. Can’t be lowered by 1 or 2 degrees.
Recommendation of social worked not binding on the court. (P v Candelario)
o








Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal
liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions
be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.









Art 69 applies when the majority of requisites for justifying and exempting circumstances are
present.
Art 69 makes it privileged mitigating because the penalty is lowered by one or two degrees.
o Hence, incomplete self-defense (for example) can’t be offset by any aggravating
circumstances.
Remember, however, that for incomplete self-defense to be privileged mitigating, there must be
unlawful aggression for Art 69 to apply.
o Unlawful aggression in self-defense is a condition sine qua non to justify the act.
What if not majority of requisites, like isa lang? Ordinary mitigating only. Lower to minimum period.
Example: guilty of homicide, RT. But incomplete self-defense, plus two generic mitigating
circumstances.
o Lower by two degrees (don’t know why 2, but basta lowered degree) to PC.
o Then since there are 2 generic mitigating, lower by another degree (Art 64) to AM. (People v
Narvaez)

Art. 70. Successive service of sentence. — When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall
serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall
be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may
be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the
penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the
44

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
45
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
46
SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the law,
and upon application at any time, place the child on probation in lieu of service of his/her sentence taking into account the best interest of the child.
For this purpose, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby amended accordingly

77

penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale:
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10 Temporal absolute disqualification.
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or
calling, and
12. Public censure.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum
total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be
computed at thirty years. (As amended).













When a convict is given multiple sentences, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties permits simultaneous service of sentence.
Otherwise, the penalties shall be served successively in the order of severity as prescribed above.
o You can’t serve 3 reclusion perpetuas simultaneously. Hence they should be served
successively, starting from the most severe, if penalties of different degrees of severity are
imposed.
Limitations on the service of sentence:
o 3-fold rule: maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than 3-fold of the
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.

i.e. the maximum penalty is three times the most severe or the total of the penalties
imposed, whichever is lower.
o Such max period shall not exceed 40 years. Whatever is lower between the total penalties
and 3x the most sever, it shall not be more than 40 years.
How to compute:
o Step 1: get the most severe penalty meted out as listed in Art 70
o Step 2: Multiply the duration of that by 3
o Step 3: Add the duration of all the different sentences
o Step 4: Compare the results of 2 and 3
o Step 5: Accused to serve the lesser period, unless it is in excess of 40 years in which case the
culprit shall serve only 40 years.
Do not include subsidiary imprisonment penalty in the computation of the 40 years because
subsidiary liability is uncertain if it will even happen. (Director v Bagtas)
If the penalty is complex, the three-fold penalty is three times the indeterminate sentence also. (see
boado for example)
If ISL is imposed, use the max period in computing because the max period is the most severe.
What are the penalties that can be served simultaneously with penalty of imprisonment?
o Perpetual absolute DQ
o Perpetual special DQ
o Temporary absolute DQ
o Temporary special DQ
o Suspension
o Public censure
o Fine
o Bond to keep the peace
o Civil interdiction
o Confiscation and payment of costs

78











Destierro can NOT be served simultaneously with imprisonment.
The imputation of the 30-year duration to reclusion perpetua in this article is only to
o serve as a basis for determining the convict’s eligibility for pardon or
o for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.
The judge should NOT refrain from imposing the correct penalties even if these would exceed the
limitation of penalties in this article.
o This article deals with SERVICE of sentence, not with imposition.
o The court should impose the correct penalties even if these will amount to more than the
lifetime of the prisoner.
o Why? Because when the convict is pardoned, he should still serve the other sentences meted
on him.
Accused is convicted for 10 counts of rape, all RP. How long should he remain in jail? 40 years.
o What sentence should accuse serve first? Parepareho lang naman eh. Justice Callejo: Follow
order of docket numbers. Article 70 doesn’t strictly apply. (P v Conte)
The second sentence should only commence after the 1 st. Successive nga eh.
Does Art 70 apply to SPL?

Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribed a penalty lower or higher by one or
more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in
graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given
penalty.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Destierro,
8. Arresto menor,
9. Public censure,
10. Fine.
SCALE NO. 2
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
2. Temporal absolute disqualification
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or
calling,
4. Public censure,
5. Fine.



Note that in Art 71, the penalty next lower than arresto mayor is destierro, not arresto menor. But
in Art 70, destierro follows arresto menor in the degree of severity. Why?
o Arresto mayor is imprisonment or complete deprivation of liberty. Destierro means
banishment for a specified length of time. They must not be judged by the duration of each of
these penalties, but by degree of deprivation of liberty involved. Destierro is considered
lighter than arresto mayor.

Art. 72. Preference in the payment of the civil liabilities. — The civil liabilities of a person found guilty of
two or more offenses shall be satisfied by following the chronological order of the dates of the judgments
rendered against him, beginning with the first in order of time.
Section Three. — Provisions common in the last two preceding sections
Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory penalties. — Whenever the courts shall
impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of
Articles 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also

79

imposed upon the convict.



The accessory penalties are automatically imposed because of this article, even if not indicated in the
decision.
o Compare this with subsidiary imprisonment, which must be in the decision for it to be
imposed.

Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. — In cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty higher than another given penalty, without specially designating the name of the former, if such
higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be
considered as the next higher penalty. (REPEALED)
Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees. — Whenever it may be
necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or
reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without
however, changing the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard of fines that do not consist of a fixed amount, but are made
proportional.







This deals with the reduction of fines when the felony is attempted or frustrated or when imposed
upon the accessory or the accomplice.
For each degree, ¼ of the max amount is taken.
In no case shall the penalty computed be lower than the minimum prescribed by law.
o Fine by law is 200-600.
o Example, it has to be reduced by two degrees. (So get ¼ of 600, then subtract it twice from
600, that’ll be your penalty.)
o You’ll end up with 200-300, that’s the range of the fine.
Sir said he won’t ask this.

Art. 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. — The legal period of duration of divisible penalties
shall be considered as divided into three parts, forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the
maximum in the manner shown in the following table:
TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH OF THEIR
PERIODS
Penalties
Reclusion
Temporal

Full Period
12 years and 1
day to 20 years

Minimum
12 years and 1
day to 14 years
and 8 months

Prision mayor,
absolute
disqualification
and special
temporary
disqualification

6 years and 1
day to 12 years.

6 years and 1
day to 8 years.

Prision
correccional,
suspension and
destierro

6 months and 1
day to 6 years.

Arresto mayor

1 month and 1
day to 6
months.
From 1 to 30
days.

Arresto menor



Medium
14 years, 8
months, 1 day
to 17 years and
4 months
8 years and 1
day to 10 years.

Max
17 years, 4
months and 1
day to 20 years

6 months and 1
day to 2 years
and 4 months.

2 years, 4
months and 1
day to 4 years
and 2 months.

4 years, 2
months and 1
day to 6 years.

1 to 2 months.

2 months and 1
day to 4
months.
11 to 20 days.

4 months and 1
day to 6
months.
21 to 30 days.

1 to 10 days.

10 years and 1
day to 12 years.

If you forget the periods, just follow the steps:
o Step 1: get the duration of each period
o Step 2: divide that by 3
o Step 3: add the quotient to the beginning of each period starting with the minimum

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Art. 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties. — In cases in which the
law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of
them shall be the minimum the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided for in this Code, the
periods shall be distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules.



For example, law says penalty is RT, PM, and PC. RT will be max, PM medium, PC minimum.

Chapter Five
EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES
Section One. — General Provisions
Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. — No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a
final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other
circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.
In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the
institutions in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the
work to be performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations
of the convicts among themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.
The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least
into different departments and also for the correction and reform of the convicts.





No penalty to be executed except by virtue of final judgment
If the person is acquitted, he can’t be subjected to public censure (P v. Abellera)
If the judge sentence accused to 25 years of RP, he can not be compelled to serve sentence because
no such thing as 25 years of RP. Remedy is writ of habeas corpus.

Art. 79. Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity. — When a convict
shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said
sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second
paragraph of circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases.
If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall
have prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while
the convict is serving his sentence.



If the convict becomes insane or an imbecile: suspend service of sentence and send to hospital for treatment
But civil liability shall still be enforced in spite of insanity and imbecility.
o
Guardian can be appointed to administer the property, so civil liability can be imposed.
Art 80 – repealed.

Section Two. — Execution of principal penalties.
Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. — The death sentence shall be executed with
reference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution.
The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as
possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under sentence during electrocution as well as during the
proceedings prior to the execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution.
Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit. — The court shall
designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be
communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after
the expiration of at least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval
between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such
assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the
religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of
his family or persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property,
or of the care of his descendants.

81

Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. — The death sentence shall not be inflicted
upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor
upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40.
Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same. — The execution shall take place in the
penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests
assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the
physician and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director of
Prisons may authorize.
Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial. — Unless claimed by his
family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the
execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the
purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of
the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at
government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the family of the
culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death
be held with pomp.
Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor. —
The penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto
mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the
Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future.



Consti policy: no excessive fines or cruel or inhuman punishment shall be imposed.

Art. 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places
designated in the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and
not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.





Memorize this.
Destierro is a correctional penalty (6 months – 6 years)
Violation of destierro will give rise to evasion of sentence (Art 156-159).

Art. 88. Arresto menor. — The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the
house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides
in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem
satisfactory to it.

Extinction of Criminal Liability
Title Four
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Chapter One
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by
the sentence.

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Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. — A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish
criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest
of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.









Crim liability is extinguished by:
o Death of convict (pecuniary liability extinguished if death occurs before final judgment)
o Service of sentence
o Absolute pardon
o Amnesty
o Prescription of crime
o Prescription of penalty
o Marriage of the offended woman under 266-C and 344
o Express repeal of penal law
Death of convict extinguishes criminal liability at any stage of the proceeding. Nobody will be there to
serve the penalty.
o But to extinguish civil liability, death must be before final judgment.
o The civil liability extinguished by death before final judgment includes duty to restitute the
proceeds of the crime. (P v Bayotas)

Whether asserted in a criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability exdelicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while is his conviction is on appeal.
o But if civil liability predicated on a source other than the delict, then it survives. It can be
executed against the estate. (de Guzman v People)

Final judgment – judgment beyond recall.
Service of sentence
o Period during which convict was not inside prison walls cannot be regarded as service of
sentence. Service of sentence must be in a penal institution.
Pardon
o Does not look back, looks to the future and is not retrospective

Civil liability NOT extingiushed
o Pardon by offended party does not extinguish criminal liability.

EX: Art 266-C (valid marriage between offender and victim in rape), and Art 344
(seduction, acts of lasciviousness, adultery, concubinage, abduction)

Art 266-C: VALID marriage between offender and offended party in rape or
sexual assault will extinguish
o criminal liability and
o even the penalty already imposed.

So even if the convict is already serving sentence, marriage
with the victim will extinguish his criminal liability.
o If there are 3 accused: PDP, PIC, and an accomplice, will the marriage
between the victim and the PDP extinguish the liability of the other
accused?

Yes. This was the intent of the Senate when they removed the
original proviso stating that the co-principal, etc are not
benefited, as manifested by Senator Enrile’s statement in SB
950.
o Marriage must be valid. If void, no extinguishment of crim liability.
(Upon declaration of the court that it was void, does the accused go
back to prison?)
o In rape cases, is the pardon of the parents of the victim without the
concurrence of the minor victim herself effective?

Boado says no. Offended minor must also give her express
pardon.

Art 344: Offended party may pardon before institution of criminal case (filing
of complaint)

83




o

Can the President pardon even if it’s a private crime? Yes.
What is the effect of an affidavit of desistance? Simply an additional ground to
buttress the accused’s defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in
acquittal.
Pardon by the President

Private act of the President and must be proved by the accused

Must be done after final judgment

Does not extend to cases of impeachment

Absolute pardon by the President restores all civil rights, EXCEPT

Right to suffrage

Right to hold public office
o These two rights must be specifically granted by the pardon of the
President

Pardon by
General rule
When
Civil liability



Effect
Congress
When given
To whom given
Nature




President
Any crime
After final judgment
Doesn’t extinguish civil
liability

Amnesty
o Act of grace, relieves the offender not only from suffering the penalty but obliterates the
effects of the conviction as if the act were not criminal
o Usually given to political offenders
o Looks backward, abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, as if no offense ever
happened
o Public act, must be concurred to by the Congress
o Ramos issued a proclamation granting amnesty to Honasan, Kapunan, etc. Does the amnest
cover other members of the AFP (“any person who may have been involved in the rebellion?”)

Yes. But the amnesty does not include any crime not covered by the proclamation
itself. The latter msut specify the crimes to which amnesty is extended.

Application



Offended Party
Can’t pardon, except in Art
266-C and Art 344
Before institution of criminal
action
GR: doesn’t extinguish but
can be waived by offended
party

Amnesty
Generally to political crimes
and offenders
Obliterates the effects of
conviction as if the act were
not criminal
Concurrence required
Even before conviction
Class of persons
Public act of the President,
courts can take judicial
notice

Pardon
Generally to ordinary crimes
and offenders
Relieves the offender of
penalty but the effects of
conviction stay
Concurrence not needed
After final conviction
Specific individual
Private act of the President,
no judicial notice

Suppose an accused made perjurious statements in petition for naturalization, and it’s discovered. He
withdraws the petition for naturalization. Does this extinguish liability?
o No. crime already committed. Application is the only one extinguished. (Chua v People)
Take note of BP 22: there’s an amnesty period of 5 days from notice of dishonor for the issuer to pay.
If he pays within this period, he has no liability.
What if accused returns property in malversation?

84

Not extinguished. It can be mitigating if done before the institution of the criminal complaint
(analogous to voluntary surrender) (Sajop v People)
Public officer charged with Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), but returns money. What
happens?
o Crim liability remains. But civil liability extinguished.
o



Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal
shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the
application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by
RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966).
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.















When a crime has prescribed, the State loses its right to prosecute.
If the penalty imposed on the convict is a compound one, the basis for prescription is the highest
penalty.
Destierro is correctional, so it prescribes in 10 years.
Consider the following to determine if a crime has prescribed:
o Period of the offense charged
o Period when it begins to run
o Period when it is interrupted
When does the period begin to run?
o Upon discovery of the crime by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents

How do you “discover” a crime? By learning of the corpus delicti, even if you don’t
know who did it. (Domingo v Sandiganbayan)

For a continuing crime, when does it start? Prescription period runs after the
occurrence of the last act.

See the Ad Hoc Commission v Ombudsman Desierto, where the court said that the
crimes could not have been discovered because of the unique situation of the Marcos
era.
When is the period interrupted?
o Upon filing of the complaint for filing of preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or
Ombudsman.
When does it resume again?
o When the proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or
o When the proceedings terminate for any reason not imputable to the accused
o Duration of the resumed period should be the unexpended portion only for to give the period
a fresh start every time it is interrupted is prejudicial to the offender.
When does it not run?
o When the offender is absent from the Philippines
Supposing a real estate document is executed (like a REM, deed of sale) and it is falsified. When does
the period run?
o For documents required to be filed with the Register of Deeds, the period begins to run upon
filing with the RD. Why? Because PD 1529 says that filing with the RD is constructive notice to
all persons. (P v Reyes)

Can the period start earlier?

85









Yes. If the falsification is discovered before filing with the RD. (P v.
Pacifacador)
Does this apply to marriages for bigamy? Since The marriage certificate is registered with the civil
registrar anyway.
o No. The prescriptive period should begin to run from when the offended party, State or its
agents, acquired actual knowledge of the second marriage. There is no counterpart provision
in the Civil Register Act which states that filing with the civ register is constructive notice.
Moreover, bigamous marriages are usually done in a concealed manner. Hence, the period will
only begin to run upon discovery of the bigamous marriage.
For SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, ACT 3326 will apply.47
o But there are some SPLs which provide for their own prescription rules.

Omnibus Election Code – 5 years

Genocide Law (RA 9851) – never prescribes 48

Human Security Act (RA 9372) – RPC to apply suppletorily (RPC prescription will
apply)
o In Act 3326, what does “proceedings” mean?

It includes judicial proceedings, and

It also includes executive proceedings. This means investigation by the executive
department.

Hence, when a criminal complaint is filed in SEC for the investigation of a
crime, the period is interrupted. (SEC V Interport, wherein the Court said that
the investigation of the SEC for a crime under the Revised Securities Act
interrupted the period. See footnote on exact words of SC. 49)

Hence, in a complaint under the Intellectual Property Law, the prescription
period is interrupted when the complaint is filed with the DOJ for preliminary
investigation.

See also Panaguiton v DOJ (2008) which said the same thing.
For cases under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the prescriptive period is interrupted when the
information is filed in the MTC (no preliminary investigation eh.)

Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as
follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which
prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. — The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with
47

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)
after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but
less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason,
which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
48
Section 11. Non-prescription. - The crimes defined and penalized under this Act, their prosecution, and the execution of sentences imposed on their
account, shall not be subject to any prescription.
49
“Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused. In criminal cases, this is
accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a
finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the
SEC in 1995, soon after it discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted the prescription period. Given the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, such
investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period.”

86

which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of
the period of prescription.







Loss of the State of the right to make the convict serve his sentence by the lapse of time.
When does it start?
o When the culprit evades the service of his sentence
When is it interrupted?
o Convict gives himself up
o He’s captured
o Goes to a country which has no extradition treaty

If it has an extradition treaty, but does not cover the said crime, period is interrupted
o Commits another crime (other than evasion of sentence) before the expiration of the period
of prescription
o Acceptance of conditional pardon (Pontillas)
Applicable to destierro

Prescription of Crime
Loss of right to proscute
Prosecution has yet to begin
Convict may not have been under custody
Begins when corpus delicti discovered

Prescription of Penalty
Loss of right to enforce the penalty
Trial on the merits already concluded
Convict already was in custody
Begins when crime of evasion of service of
sentence is done

Chapter Two
PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.



Causes
o
o
o
o
o
o

of partial extinction:
Conditional pardon
Commutation
Good conduct allowances
Parole under the ISL
Probation
Partial repeal of a penal law

Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. — Any person who has been granted
conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein
otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the
pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be applied to him.







Must be given after final judgment and must be accepted by accused
Does not extinguish civil liability
If one violates his conditional pardon, two things can happen:
o President orders his rearrest and incarceration (no need for judicial determination of guilt),
and
o Prosecuted under 159 of the RPC
Suppose dude was given conditional pardon. Condition, he shouldn’t kill no more. He kills an
annoying person. What are his liabilities?
o Article 159
o Homicide

Not complex crime! Different crimes!

Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. — The commutation of the original sentence for another of a
different length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.

87

Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall
entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each
month of good behavior;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight
days for each month of good behavior;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen
days for each month of good behavior.
Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. — A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be
granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances
mentioned in Article 58 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe to in said article.
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant
allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.







Good conduct allowance given when:
o There was an occurrence of a disorder/calamity which the prisoner did not participate
o Convict escapes
o He gives himself up 48 hours after proclamation that no more calamity
He gets 1/5 deduction of his service!
He must escape and then return. If he doesn’t escape, just stays put in the prison, he doesn’t get any
good conduct allowance. Lesson: escape, but return.
If he escapes for good, but gets captured, or doesn’t return within 2 days, he will get 1/5 addition to
the remaining sentence which shouldn’t be more than 6 months.

Indeterminate Sentence Law
ACT NO. 4103
(As Amended by Act No. 4225 and Republic Act No. 4203 [June 19, 1965])
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR ALL PERSONS CONVICTED OF
CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same.
.
Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted
of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are
habitual delinquents; to those who have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who
having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to
those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by
final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof.









The venerable Justice won’t ask us to compute.
The ISL is for the benefit of the convict, and to increase his economic contribution. It stems from the
positivist theory.
It looks at the convict as private individual and a member of society as a whole.
The state is interest in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.
Court must determine the max of the indeterminate penalty first, and then the minimum.
o With the minimum the court has unlimited discretion within the range of the minimum of the
penalty one degree lower than the penalty imposed by law.
The following can NOT avail of the benefits of the ISL:

88

Based on Penalties

Convicted and punished with death, LI, RP (for purposes of ISL: LI and RP are
synonymous)

Maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year

Non-prison sentences of fine, destierro, disqualification, etc
o Based on Offenses

Convicted of treason, misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage, piracy
o Based on Offenders

Habitual delinquents

Those who escaped from confinement or evaded sentence

Committed crimes while on parole

Violated conditional pardon

Those already sentenced upon passage of Act
If the court imposes a penalty of fine (if alternative between imprisonment and fine), the ISL does
not apply because it applies only to penalty of imprisonment with divisible penalty.
There are some laws which expressly provide that the convict is not entitled to the benefits of the ISL
and parole (like the anti-terrorism law)
Offenders who commit crimes while on parole are disqualified from the ISL.
When the penalty is originally exempt from the ISL and after the lowering due to privileged mitigating
circumstances it becomes within the law, the law should apply. What controls is the penalty imposed,
not what is imposable.
If crime is a complex one, to determine the penalty next lower in degree, the full range of the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense must be the starting point, not merely the imposable penalty. The
reason is the complex nature of the offense.
When can a court impose a straight penalty?
o When both the minimum and maximum durations of imprisonment are less than 1 year. In
one case, the maximum was 4 months and a day. The court can impose a straight penalty of
60 days.
o








Parole50

When the person serves the minimum of the ISL, he may apply for parole. He will be allowed to leave
the penal institution under certain conditions.

Parole lasts for a certain period of time.
50

Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence to look into the physical, mental and moral record of the prisoners who shall be
eligible to parole and to determine the proper time of release of such prisoners. Whenever any prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty
imposed on him, and it shall appear to the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, from the reports of the prisoner's work and conduct which may be
received in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed, and from the study and investigation made by the Board itself, that such prisoner is
fitted by his training for release, that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that such release will not be incompatible with the welfare of society, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence may, in its discretion, and in accordance
with the rules and regulations adopted hereunder, authorize the release of such prisoner on parole, upon such terms and conditions as are herein
prescribed and as may be prescribed by the Board. The said Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall also examine the records and status of prisoners
who shall have been convicted of any offense other than those named in Section 2 hereof, and have been sentenced for more than one year by final
judgment prior to the date on which this Act shall take effect, and shall make recommendation in all such cases to the Governor-General with regard
to the parole of such prisoners as they shall deem qualified for parole as herein provided, after they shall have served a period of imprisonment not
less than the minimum period for which they might have been sentenced under this Act for the same offense.
Sec. 6. Every prisoner released from confinement on parole by virtue of this Act shall, at such times and in such manner as may be required by the
conditions of his parole, as may be designated by the said Board for such purpose, report personally to such government officials or other parole
officers hereafter appointed by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence for a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum
sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence as herein provided. The officials so designated
shall keep such records and make such reports and perform such other duties hereunder as may be required by said Board. The limits of residence of
such paroled prisoner during his parole may be fixed and from time to time changed by the said Board in its discretion. If during the period of
surveillance such paroled prisoner shall show himself to be a law-abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippine Islands, the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue a final certificate of release in his favor, which shall entitle him to final release and discharge
Sec. 7. The Board shall file with the court which passed judgment on the case, and with the Chief of Constabulary, a certified copy of each order of
conditional or final release and discharge issued in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding two sections.
Sec. 8. Whenever any prisoner released on parole by virtue of this Act shall, during the period of surveillance, violate any of the conditions of his
parole, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue an order for his re-arrest which may be served in any part of the Philippine Islands by any
police officer. In such case the prisoner so re-arrested shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was
originally committed to prison, unless the Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the said prisoner

89



If he complies with the conditions of the parole, the Board of Pardons and Parole will give out final
release and discharge.

Parole
Minimum sentence must be served
Granted by law

Pardon
Service not required for grant
By Pres

Probation Law
Section 1. Title and Scope of the Decree. — This Decree shall be known as the Probation Law of 1976. It
shall apply to all offenders except those entitled to the benefits under the provisions of Presidential
Decree numbered Six Hundred and three and similar laws.
Sec. 2. Purpose. — This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized
treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he
were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses
Sec. 3. Meaning of Terms. — As used in this Decree, the following shall, unless the context otherwise
requires, be construed thus:
(a) "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released
subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer.
(b) "Probationer" means a person placed on probation.
(c) "Probation Officer" means one who investigates for the court a referral for probation or supervises a
probationer or both.
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the
execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal
has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waver of
the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Sec. 5. Post-sentence Investigation. — No person shall be placed on probation except upon prior
investigation by the probation officer and a determination by the court that the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public as well as that of the defendant will be served thereby.
Sec. 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. — In determining whether an offender may be
placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents,
environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community
resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that:
(a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his
commitment to an institution; or
(b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or
(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became
applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
Sec. 10. Conditions of Probation. — Every probation order issued by the court shall contain conditions
requiring that the probationer shall:
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may
be specified in the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer.
The court may also require the probationer to:
(a) cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) meet his family responsibilities;

90

(c) devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without the prior written
approval of the probation officer;
(d) undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and treatment and enter and remain in a
specified institution, when required for that purpose;
(e) pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
(f) attend or reside in a facility established for instruction, recreation or residence of persons on
probation;
(g) refrain from visiting houses of ill-repute;
(h) abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess;
(i) permit the probation officer or an authorized social worker to visit his home and place of work;
(j) reside at premises approved by it and not to change his residence without its prior written approval; or
(k) satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of
his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience.
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. — A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at which
time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to
comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he
shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.
Sec. 14. Period of Probation. —
(a) The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year
shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period shall not exceed six years.
(b) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, the period of probation shall not be less than nor to be more than twice the total
number of days of subsidiary imprisonment as computed at the rate established, in Article thirty-nine of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Sec. 15. Arrest of Probationer; Subsequent Disposition. — At any time during probation, the court may
issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation. The
probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for a hearing,
which may be informal and summary, of the violation charged. The defendant may be admitted to bail
pending such hearing. In such a case, the provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with a
crime shall be applicable to probationers arrested under this provision. If the violation is established, the
court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall
order the probationer to serve the sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation
or modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.
Sec. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report
and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer
upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is
deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspend as a
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order.








Probation is a mere privilege, not a right.
REMEMBER: if you file an appeal, you lose probation. If you file for probation, you cannot appeal.
o Appeal and probation are mutually exclusive.

Except under RA 9344, which allows probation even if you appeal.
If you apply for probation, judgment is suspended, the accessory penalty included.
o But the civil liability is NOT suspended.

Even when the probation is granted, a writ of execution for the civil liability can still
be enforced. Civil liability is not extinguished by a grant of probation.
Following are disqualified from applying for probation:
o Sentenced to a max term of more than 6 years imprisonment
o Convicted of subversion or any crime against national security or the public order
o Previously convicted by fj of offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and
1 day and/or fine of not less than P200
o Once been on probation (you can do probation once)
o Convicted of drug pushing (DDA)
o Convicted of terrorism (Anti-Terrorism Act)
o Already serving sentence upon the effectivity of the law
o Those who already perfected appeals

91














6 years lang, right? What if he was sentenced for 3 crimes tried jointly, each having less than a 6
year penalty, but if you add them, the penalties exceed 6 years.
o Accused still entitled to probation. Consider the penalty for each crime, not the aggregate.
(Pablo Francisco v CA)
What if on appeal, the CA reduces the penalty?
o Can’t apply for probation. You already appealed. Even if purpose of appeal is to reduce the
penalty, the moment one appeals, you lose probation.
o If you file for probation, judgment is deemed final.
o If you file for appeal, it forecloses application to probation.

You can’t have your red velvet cake and eat it too.
o The “appeal” here is the appeal from the trial court to the CA. (P v Evangelista)
What if you withdrew the appeal within 15 days, pwede pa ba? Pwede! Should be a perfected appeal.
(Llamado v CA)
If the application for probation is sufficient in form, the convict may be allowed to post bail.
o But the court cannot extend beyond the period beyond the period to study the application.
Court can give conditions for the probation. (Mandatory conditions are to present himself to probation
officer and report to prob officer once a month)
o Condition was to submit a program for payment of the civil liability. Accused didn’t pay and
his probation was revoked. He claimed he was being imprisoned for nonpayment of debt. SC:
Mali ka boy. Imprisoned for not complying with condition, not for nonpayment. (Salgado v
CA)
o But a condition which prohibits a teacher from teaching again is wrong. Court must think of
the accused. (Baclayon v Mutia)
If the court approves/denies the application, is it appealable? No. it’s an order. So, go for Rule 65.
Can court grant shorter periods of probation?
o Yes. but they cannot extend it.
o Imprisonment of not more than one year, probation shall not exceed two years.
o More than one year, probation period shall not exceed 6 years.
o Fine only (with subsidiary imprisonment), probation shall be twice the number of days of
subsidiary imprisonment.
Mere expiry of probation period does NOT automatically terminate probation. (Bala v Martinez)
o Court must still determine if accused complied with the conditions of the probation. Need for
a final discharge from the court.
o Once discharged, ok na! he can’t be compelled to do the conditions or go back to jail.
Moreover, he recovers whatever he lost due to his accessory penalties.

Sentence
Penalty
Disposition
Violation
Appeal
Availability
Nature

Probation
Must not be more than 6 years
Imprisonment or fine
Sentence is suspended
Entire sentence shall be served
Forecloses privilege of probation
Only once
Mere privilege, must be applied for by
the convict

ISL
Max must be more than 1 year
Imprisonment only
Minimum to be served
Unexpired portion only to be served
No effect on the operation of the law
Everytime as long as the offender is not dq’d
Mandatory, need not be applied for by the
convict

Civil Liability
Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY
Chapter One
PERSON CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.

92

















Civil liability can be incurred whether the act is punishable by law or not (since it can be based on
felonies or quasi-delicts/torts)
The moment the criminal action is instituted, the civil action is instituted along with it.
o Remember torts principles and independent civil actions.
Possible that there’s a crime but no civil liability, like in victimless crimes.
o But if the state is the one aggrieved, the state can recover civil liability. (Malversation)
Also possible that there’s no crime, but there’s still civil liability. (Art 332 – swindling relatives)
What if the accused is acquitted? 51
o If based on the ground that accused was not the author of the act/omission complained of:
no civil liability based on delict
o If based on reasonable doubt: civil liability still possible by a preponderance of evidence
If SPL, is there civil liabilities?
o Yes. there must be evidence that a party including the government sustained substantial
injury so that the accused may be civilly liable.

BP 22

Anti-Fencing (PD 1612) – Sec 3(a) includes accessory penalty of RPC (hence, civil
liability under Art 104 [restitution]) 52

VAWC (RA 9262) – accused liable to battered woman.
If crime is absorbed by another crime, can there be civil liability in the absorbed crime?
o Yes. For example, you murder someone in furtherance of rebellion. You will still be civilly
liable for the murder, even if it lost its juridical existence. Liable for civil indemnity and moral
damages. (P v Hernandez)
o Also when homicide is absorbed by arson. Still liable for civil indemnity and moral damages
for the homicide. (P v Malngan)
If a check bounces, accused can be liable for BP22 and estafa. Will the accused pay the value of the
check twice, or just once?
o Although there are two crimes, there is only one check. Thus, there should only be one
payment of the payment. (Rodriguez v Pomferada)
If there is a complex crime (2 crimes), can there be more than 1 civil liability?
o Yes. Number of civil liabilities for as many victims.

Dude shot one bullet, killed two people. Civilly liable to both victims.
If two crimes (one SPL and one RPC), can there be more than 1 civil liability?
o No. See BP22/estafa example.
o Same when estafa and illegal recruitment, just one civil liability.

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established
in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile
or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of
age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own
property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has
been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
51

Civil Code Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
52

a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of
such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed
reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.

93

liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.





If justifying circumstance, no civil liability
o EXCEPT Art 11, Par 4 (person who avoided a greater evil or injury): primary liability is on the
one who benefited from such avoidance. If there were several benefited, they will all bear the
liability proportionately.
If exempting circumstance
o Insane person, imbecile, or under 18 with no discernment 53 (Art 12, Par 1-3): primary liability
on the person who has control or authority over them, unless he is without fault or negligence

If no fault or negligence, then property of minor or insane (except property exempt
from liability)
o Acting because of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear (Art 12, Par 5-6): primary liability
on the person employing the force or causing the fear

Secondary liability is on the person doing the act, save for their property exempt from
execution
o Doing a lawful act, failure to do an act because of some lawful insuperable cause (Art 12, Par
4 and 7): no civil liability!

The great Justice Regalado says these are actually justifying circumstances and
should’ve been under Art 11.

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. — In
default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.







Elements under Par 1:
o Innkeeper, tavernkeeper or proprietor of establishment or his employee committed a violation
of municipal ordinance or some general or special police regulation
o Crime committed in such tavern, inn, establishment
o Person criminally liable is insolvent

All three present? Then keepers/props civilly liable.
Elements under Par 2:
o Guests notified in advance the innkeeper or the person representing him of the deposit of
their goods within the inn or house
o Guests followed the directions of the innkeeper or his representative with respect to the care
of and vigilance over such goods
o Such goods were taken by robbery with force upon things or theft committed within the inn or
house

All three present? Innkeeper subsidiarily liable.
No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons.
o EXCEPT when committed by the innkeeper’s employees.

53

RA 9344: The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.

94

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.















Is the adopter civilly liable for the damage caused by the adopted minor? Yes.
Requirements for subsidiary civil liability of the employer:
o EE-ER Relationship
o ER engaged in some kind of industry

“engaged in some kind of industry”: capital and labor are habitually employed for the
purpose of gain/profit
o EE guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties (not necessarily any offense he commits while in the discharge of such duties)
o EE is insolvent as shown by the non-satisfaction of the execution against him
o Conviction attained finality
No need for court to pronounce subsidiary liability of the employee. It is deemed written into the
judgments of the cases.
Can the ER challenge the sheriff’s return which showed non-satisfaction? Yes! He must do it upon
submission of the sheriff’s return.
Is teacher liable for student’s acts? Only when engaged in industry. (Compare with 2180 which talks
of quasi-delicts)
Visiting doctor left gauze in stomach of patient. Patient died. Are hospitals liable for
consulting/visiting doctors? (Ramos v CA/Pro Services v Agana)
o Yes, because of:

Control in hiring and firing of these consultants/doctors

Performance of duties within hospital premises.

Consultants’ acts subject to review by hospital

Hospital controlled staff of consultants.
o Moreover, private corporation who owned the hospital was subsidiarily liable under corporate
responsibility.
Important doctrines from the Philippine Rabbit Bus case:
o Filing of criminal action necessarily includes subsidiary liability of employer. He may not be a
party but in effect, he is bound by the judgment. ER may assist in the defense of his
employee, but he may not actually participate in the criminal case.
o The judgment binds the ER.

Except if there’s collusion between the offended and the erring EE.
o Extent of liability of ER: only in terms of civil liability (he can’t be jailed) and the amount of
the civil liability. His civil liability can’t be separated from his EE.
If the employee is acquitted based on reasonable doubt, is there civil liability for the employer?
o Yes. Only time when no civil liability is when the court says that he did not actually commit
the acts on which the charge is based on.
Regardless as to who the actual owner of the car is, the registered owner is the operator of the same
with respect to the public or 3rd persons.
o Registered owner liable, but can recover from the actual owner. (transpo cases)

Chapter Two
WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
Art. 104. What is included in civil liability. — The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and
103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Art. 105. Restitution; How made. — The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible,
with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who has

95

acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may be liable to
him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person in the
manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.
Art. 106. Reparation; How made. — The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into
consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured
party, and reparation shall be made accordingly.
Art. 107. Indemnification; What is included. — Indemnification for consequential damages shall include
not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by
reason of the crime.












Civil liability includes:
o Restitution (return of the thing itself)
o If restitution not possible, reparation of the damage caused
o Indemnification for consequential damages (based on Civil Code)
Restitution
o Includes return of ransom in kidnapping with ransom
o What if a third person acquired property subject of crime?

Can still recover the item from that person

But the buyer in good faith is entitled to reimbursement from thief or criminal

If stolen property cannot be returned anymore, the value of the thing taken will do

What is basis for the value? Value at the time of the commission of the crime.

In illegal recruitment, money paid by the applicant must be returned (P v Billaber)

With 12% interest from the time of filing of the case until amount has been
paid.

In BP 22, 6% from filing of information until finality of decision, then get the whole
amount then 12% until amount was paid (Palana v P)
Damages
o Actual, moral, exemplary, temperate, nominal
o In crimes and quasi-delicts, liable for all natural and probable consequences of act or
omission54
o May be increased or decreased depending on aggravating or mitigating circumstances 55
o Also includes lost profits, not only value lost 56
Civil indemnity
o As long as the crime results to death, civil indemnity will be awarded
o Also been granted in rape
Actual damages
o Must be proved
Moral damages
o Because of physical suffering, besmirched repuration, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings
o Recovered in:

Crimes leading to physical injuries (includes DEATH)

Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries (includes DEATH)

Seduction, abduction, rape (even attempted rape), lascivious acts

Parents may also recover moral damages

Adultery, concubinage

54

Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendan
55

Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
56

Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain

96












Illegal/arbitrary detention/arrests

Illegal search

Libel, slander, defamation

Malicious prosecution

Others are based on civil code na
o If raped three times, there must be a separate award for each crime. Can’t be lumped
together.
o In the cases enumerated, no need to allege emotional suffering in the information. Given na
yon.

However, there are some cases which say that heirs must prove that they suffered
emotional pain, etc.

But basta ikaw yung victim, you can get moral damages.
Exemplary damages
o Imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
o To serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings and vindication
o No need for proof of actual loss
o Distinct and separate from penalty of fine.
o When a crime has one or more ACs, exemplary damages may be imposed (Civ Code, 2230)
o What if the AC was not alleged in the information (hence, can’t be used against accused for
his penalty), but proved during trial, can exemplary damages still be imposed?

Yes. even if not alleged in the complaint or information, as long as proven.
o “Aggravating” should be applied in its generic sense, includes specific, qualifying, general, etc.

Hence, even if treachery is qualifying in Art 248, it can still be treated as aggravating
for imposing exemplary damages.

Same with kidnapping with ransom (demand for ransom is qualifying),
exemplary may still be imposed.

Also, relationship may be a basis for granting exemplary damages even if it is an
inherent element of the crime. (parricide)
o Does set-off apply in terms of exemplary damages? No. As long as there’s an AC, exemplary
may be imposed.
o Can exemplary damages be awarded in arson? Yes. It’s an anti-social act. To correct the
behavior.
o Two separate crimes of rape, but same victim, how many exemplary?

As many as the number of crimes committed, even if the victim was the same.
o In reckless imprudence, exemplary damages may be imposed if shown to have had gross
negligence.
Temperate damages
o More than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of
the case, be provided with certainty
o Must be reasonable
o For example, the heirs of a deceased in homicide, murder, parricide are entitled to actual
damages.

But if they can’t prove actual damages, the court may give temperate damages.
Attorney’s fees
o Must be reasonable
o Discretionary upon the court
Interest
o 12% from date of final judgment
Even with RA 9346, the classification of crimes as heinous (death) and quasi-heinous (RP) still
remains. It is important in determining the civil indemnity and moral damages of the crime.
o Heinous:

97


Indemnity: P75k

Moral damages: P50k
o Quasi-heinous:

Indemnity: P50k

Moral damages: P50k

Crime
Indemnity
Rape with homicide
100k
Qualified rape
75k
Simple rape
50k

Moral Damages
50k
50k
50k

Sexual assault
(fingered)
Attempted rape
Acts of lasciviousness
(for each count)
Murder
Parricide

30k

30k

30K
None

25k
5k

75k
50k

75k
50k

Homicide
Frustrated homicide
Attempted homicide

50k
None, no one died
None

Robbery with homicide

75k (if death) 50k (if
RP)
75k

50k
30k
30k (one case 10k,
depends talaga!)
75k (death) 50k (RP)

Forcible abduction with
rape (for each count)

50k

Kidnapping with rape
Kidnapping with
homicide
Kidnapped was 8 years
old (Kidnap for ransom)
Qualified carnapping
RA 7610

75k
75k

75k
75k

50k

200k

75k
20k

50k
15k

Zombie apocalypse

0k

0k

Others

If a child is born out of
the rape, also liable for
support (except if
woman is already
married.)
This exception is
dissented to by the
omniscient Justice
Regalado. He claims that
the offender must still
pay, provided that the
paternity is established.
But the offender cannot
be obliged to
acknowledge offspring in
adultery and
concubinage when the
offended party is
married and paternity
cannot be determined.

10k exemplary
2k exemplary

Shouldn’t there be
exemplary here?

If multiple rape, extra
P50k indemnity and 50k
moral damages, per
extra rape

100k exemplary
(because of ransom)
Not sure, just got this
from J. Callejo
Eow powz.

98

Art. 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for consequential
damages and actions to demand the same; Upon whom it devolves . — The obligation to make restoration
or reparation for damages and indemnification for consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the
person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the
person injured.
Art. 109. Share of each person civilly liable. — If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony,
the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond.
Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony; Preference
in payment. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices,
and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among
themselves for their quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.
The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next, against that of
the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories.
Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom
payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective
shares.
Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. — Any person who has participated gratuitously
in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of
such participation.

99

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