Criminal Law

Case 1 Magno vs. CA FACTS: Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries. VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities. The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount. As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund. Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the equipment. Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question. HELD: No. To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance. Case 2 United States vs. Ang Tang Ho FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Case 3 People vs. Maceren FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC. ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid? HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power Case 7 People vs. jalosjos FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives HELD: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of theHouse of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attendsessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Case 9 United States vs. Ah Chang FACTS: Because of the many bad elements happening at Fort McKinley, Ah Chong, a cook, locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door of his room. He called out twice, Who is there, but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at the precise moment, he was struck by the chair and believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong was guilty of murder. HELD: Under Article 11 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that to justify the act, there should be: First. Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Ah Chong was not held liable for the death of his roommate. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts conviction of homicide, saying that Ah Chong committed a mistake of fact. He would not have stabbed his roommate had he known the identity of the person who entered the room. If the person who opened the door had really been a robber instead of his roommate, he would not be criminally liable if he had stabbed that person in self-defense. Case 12 Lecaroz vs sandiganbayan FACTS: Francisco, Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, and son Lenlie, KB chair and SB member, Lecaroz were charged with 13 counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. Alleged that Francisco did not recognize appointment of Red as new KB chair in Matalaba and SB member. Alleged that Leslie continued to receive salary even after his term has expired. Convicted by Sandiganbayan ISSUE: WON Lecaroz is criminally liable? HELD: No. Acquitted 1. SB term: 6 yrs. If sectoral/group rep term is coterminus with sectoral term 2. KB term: till last Sunday, November 1985 or until new officers have qualified 3. Lenlie can hold over. ? Law doesn’t say he can or is prevented from doing so. Thus he can stay until succession qualifies ? Duldulao v. ramos: law abhors vacuum in public offices ? Foley v. mcnab: hold over: avoid hiatus in performance of government function ? Barnes v. Holbrook: holdover to prevent public convenience from suffering due to vacancy 4. Red not qualified. Oath administered by Batasang Pambansa member who’s not authorized to do so is invalid 5. lack of criminal intent ? appointment not recognized since there were no authenticated copies of appointment papers ? Francisco sought advice of MILG Secretary Pimentel regarding Red’s papers: Provincial Memo Circular 86-02: No authentication from President can’t assume position; Memo-Circ. 86-17: SB, Splung, Splala: Hold office, be compensated until replaced by president or MILG

? Executive Silence on hold over for 30 yrs not equal to prohibition ? Francisco: well respected. Perhaps he just made erroneous interpretation. Mabutol v Pascual and Cabungcal v. Cordova: misrepresentation is not equal to bad faith, thus not liable ? Falsification: no document statement from offended to narrate facts and facts were not proven wrong or false. ? Conspiracy not proven: should be established separately for crime and must meet same degree of proof ? Strong enough to show community of criminal design ? Blood relation is not equivalent to conspiracy Case 13 People vs. Carmen FACTS: The trial court rendered a decision and the accused-appellants were all foundguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder after having performed acultic healing pray -over which resulted to the death of Randy Luntayao. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. ISSUE: WON accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence resultingin homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. HELD: Yes. Conviction modified to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Killing a person w/ treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it’spresumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. In murderqualified by treachery, it’s required only that there is treachery in the attack, & this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted one who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended ornot. Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption o f criminal intent may arise from the proof of the criminal act. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended. The strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants h a d n o c r i m i n a l i n t e n t t o k i l l t h e b o y. T h e i r l i a b i l i t y a r i s e s from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder .RPC A365, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but w / o m a l i c e , d o i n g o r f a i l i n g t o d o a n a c t f r o m w h i c h m a t e r i a l d a m a g e r e s u l t s b y reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes theplace of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of t h e o f f e n d e r t o t a k e p r e c a u t i o n s d u e t o l a c k o f s k i l l t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t his

Case 14 Guevarra vs Almodovar FACTS: The Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, petitioned the court for a special civil action for certiorari against the Hon. Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the city court of Legaspi. The petitioner, then 11 years old was target shooting with his best friend Teodoro Amine, Jr. and three other children in the backyard in the morning of 29October1984. Unfortunately, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on the left collar bone, w/c then caused his death. ISSUE: Can an 11- year old boy be charged w/ the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence? - Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a determination to do certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment means: the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong - While they (intent and discernment) are products of mental processes w/in a person; intent refers to the desired of one’s act (active) while discernment refers to the moral significance that a person ascribes to an act (passive) - Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted w/ discernment - Discernment is embraced w/in the concept of intelligence w/c is one of the elements of a culpable felony, thus it is important that a minor 9yrs to below 15 yrs of age to have acted w/ discernment to show that he acted w/ intelligence thus being liable for the offense under Art 365 of the R.PC HELD: PETITION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT AND THE TRO EFFECTIVE 17SEPTEMBER1986 IS LIFTED. LET IT BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER COURT FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS. Case 15 PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October 28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to quash was being assailed. ISSUE: Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.

HELD: Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or

extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. Case 16 People vs Simon FACTS: Accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of RA no. 6425 under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, atbarangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM)poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to a laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana. On December 4, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. ISSUE: Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case? HELD: Yes. Drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would puthim within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusionperpetua to death. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, andshould be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused Case 18 Rosa lim vs. people FACTS: Rosa Lim bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300,000 from thestore of Maria Antonia Seguan, by issuing a check payable to ³cash´ drawnagainst MetroBank. The next day, Lim again purchased jewelry valued atP241,668 by issuing another check payable to cash likewise drawn againstMetroBank. Seguan deposited the checks with her bank. The checks werereturned with a notice of dishonor as Lim¶s accounts in said bank werealready closed. Upon demand, Lim promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did. Rosa Lim was charge for twocounts of violation of BP 22, where she was found guilty, and sentenced to 1year imprisonment with fine (P200,000). ISSUE: Whether Lim has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds whenissuing the checks. HELD: The elements of BP22 are (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value, (2) the knowledge of the maker,drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds inor credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon itspresentment, and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the draweebank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason hadnot the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.Lim never denied issuing the check. Section 2 of BP 22 creates apresumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists whenthe first and third elements are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustaina conviction.It must be noted that similar to the Vaca case, the Court deleted the prisonsentences imposed upon Lim, holding that the two fines imposed for each of the violation (P200,000 each ) are appropriate and sufficient. Subsidiaryimprisonment not exceeding 6 months is provided in case of insolvency ornon-payment of the fines as decreed.

Case 19 DELA TORRE vs. COMELEC FACTS: Rolando P. Dela Torre seeks the nullification of two resolutions issued by COMELEC allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case for disqualification filed against him. The first resolution dated May 6, 1995 declared the Dela Torre disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna for the reason that under Section 40(a) of the LGC a person who has been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence are disqualified to run for any elective position. COMELEC held that by established evidence Dela Torre was found guilty by the MTC for violation of P.D. 1612 (Anti-fencing Law) in June 1, 1990. Dela Torre appealed the said conviction with the RTC which however, affirmed MTC’s decision. Said conviction became final on January 18, 1991. The second resolution dated August 28, 1995, denied Dela Torre’s MR. In said motion, Dele Torre claimed that Section 40 (a) of the LGC does not apply to his case because MTC granted his probation petition which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing there from. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude? 2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)'s applicability? HELD: I. Crime of Fencing involves moral turpitude? Not every criminal act, involves moral turpitude. The Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in the case of Zari v. Flores. However the guidelines set forth proved short of providing a clear-cut solutionin another case where they said that there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It is then ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statue. Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P.D. 1612 the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on "Human Relations" and "Solutio Indebiti All told, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude. II. Grant of Probation affects Section 40(a) of LGC Dela Torre’s conviction of fencing which we have declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case

ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. Case DIMISSED and the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 6, 1995 and August 28, 1995 are AFFIRMED in toto. Case 20 Zari vs Flores FACTS: Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended thedismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, ongrounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant amounting toundue interest in cases pending before Branch VI and gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the CityJudges. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service. HELD: In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, therespondent stated that I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative,criminal or police record . This claim is not true because the respondent had been convicted of libel inCriminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is a ground for serious disciplinary action.That in his accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 which was subscribed and sworn to, the respondentadmits having acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries andothers who are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, becausesuch persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully established inthe practice of law.The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others as reflected in his letter toJudge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City which containsdefamatory and uncalled for language.es virtual law libraryThe handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Courtof Quezon City, presided by the complainant, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence in thedisposition of the cases mentioned therein.Respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in thenational and local governments, as well as, in any government instrumentality or agency includinggovernment owned or controlled corporations. Case 22 People vs. quijada Case where a dance was held in a basketball court and Quijada kept on pestering Iroy’s sister and Quijada killed the brother. • He was convicted of two separate offenses of murder and illegal use of firearm aggravated with illegal use of firearm. •The unequivocal intent of the second par of s e c t i o n 1 . o f P D 1 8 6 6 i s t o r e s p e c t a n d preserve homicide or murder as a distincto f f e n s e p e n a l i z e d u n d e r t h e R P C a n d t o increasae the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in killinga person. •Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the RPC in such a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the

commission of homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished. •T h e w o r d s o f t h e s u b j e c t p r o v i s i o n a r e palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, a s c r i m e s m a l a i n s e u n d e r t h e R P C i s obliterated as such and reduced as a merea g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e i n i l l e g a l p o s s e s s i o n o f f i r e a r m w h e n e v e r t h e unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person. •T h e o n l y p u r p o s e o f t h e p r o v i s i o n i s t o increase the penalty prescribed in 1St par of s e c 1 — r e c l u s i o n t e m p o r a l i n i t s m a x t o reclusion perpetua to death Case 23 People vs Ringor jr FACTS: Appellant Ringor and his two companions entered a restaurant where the accused worked. After seating themselves, the group ordered a bottle of gin. Appellant approached one of the tables where Florida, the restaurant’s cook was drinking beer. Without any warning, appellant pulled Florida’s hair and poked a knife on the latter’s throat. Florida stood up and pleaded with appellant not to harm him Appellant relented and released his grip on Florida. Thereafter, he left the restaurant together with his companions. However, a few minutes later he was back Appellant brandished a gun and menacingly entered the restaurant. Not encountering any resistance, he thus proceeded to the kitchen where Florida worked. Stealthily approaching Florida from behind, appellant fired six successive shots at Florida who fell down. Ringor left thereafter. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. HELD: On the matter of the aggravating circumstance of “use of unlicensed firearm” in the commission of murder or homicide, the trial court erred in appreciating the same to qualify to death the penalty for the murder committed by accused-appellant. It should be noted that at the time accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the unlicensed character of a firearm used in taking the life of another was not yet an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Sentenced to reclusion perpetua instead. case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao Case 24 People vs Ferrer FACTS: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the AntiSubversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court.

Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prison mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without thebenefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished? Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The member of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCEOF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

Case 27 Urbano v. IAC FACTS: On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death HELD: A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

Case 30 People vs Acuram FACTS: The appellant shot the victim who later died. After charges were filed and his commanding officer was told of the incident, he was ordered not to leave camp, where he surrendered. ISSUE: Whether the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender HELD: The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case, it was appellant’s commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one’s superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao Case 31 Intod vs. CA FACTS: Intod and company were tasked to kill Palang-pangan due to land dispute. They fired at her room. However, she was in another city then thus they hit no one. ISSUE: WON he is liable for attempted murder? HELD: No. Only impossible crime. In the Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime—an act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate would constitute a felony against person or family. Its purpose is to punish criminal tendencies. There must either be (1) legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where: (1) The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) There is no intention to perform the physical act; (3) There is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor or beyond control prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

Case 32 People vs veneracion FACTS: On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The respondent judge refused to act. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law. HELD: The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws. Case 33 People vs. Oanis FACTS: Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get hi dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, they wenti n t o a r o o m a n d o n s e e i n g a m a n s l e e p i n g w i t h h i s b a c k t o w a r d t h e d o o r , simultaneously fired at him with their revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal. HELD: Both accused are guilty of murder. Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the accusedwould not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping. In apprehendingeven the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It isonly when the fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of law who aretrying to capture him that killing him would be justified. Case 34 People vs Lamahang FACTS: Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall of a store o f cheap goods in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was unfastening anotherwhen a patrolling police caught him. Owners of the store were sleeping inside storeas it was early dawn. Convicted of attempt of robbery ISSUE: WON crime is attempted robbery? HELD: No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should have logical relation to ap a r t i c u l a r a n d c o n c r e t e o f f e n s e w h i c h w o u l d l e a d d i r e c t l y t o c o n s u m m a t i o n . Necessary to establish unavoidable connection & logical & natural relation of cause and effect. Important t o show clear intent t o c o m m i t c r i m e . I n c a s e a t b a r , w e c a n only infer that his intent was to enter by force, other inferences are not justified by f a c t s . G r o i z a r d : i n f e r o n l y f r o m n a t u r e o f a c t s e x e c u t e d . Acts susceptible of double interpretation can’t furnish ground for themselves. M i n d s h o u l d n o t d i r e c t l y i n f e r intent. Spain SC: necessary that objectives established or acts themselves obviously disclose criminal objective.