Criminal Procedure - Digests - Mende

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1. People Vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of
Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of a cash advance in the
amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of
the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two
years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made.
As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent
Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from
receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, submitted an investigation report
to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation
that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could
be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The
Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information
for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, prepared a memorandum
finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating
Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND
MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION and was opposed by The OSP.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dismissed the case against Amante. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who
was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
Held:
Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the
Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May
21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the [15] action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception
contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,

R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in
the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines.
Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the
provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch
occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante,
being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an
offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
2. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and
86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of
Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case
to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not
be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715,
37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs.
Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked
the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution
of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in
Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity
and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against
the surety x x x
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

3. Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R. 143647
Facts:
Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum
scrap wires, accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate
introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric
Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this
information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of
NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum
scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to
comply his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus,
prompting Yu to file an estafa case.
Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty
as charged. Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial
courts’ decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.
Issue:
WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Held:

SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred
in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the
affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was
presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the
amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with
Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that he gave the amount
of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is
located in Parañaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish
that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the
subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in
Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals: However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However,
aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove that any of the
above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. From the
foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime
of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said
city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be
set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges
with the court of competent jurisdiction.

4. People Vs Regalario
Facts:
Menardo Garcia, herein victim, Glenda Osabal and Romano Padillo, all students of Quezon
National High School, were walking in the grounds of the Quezon National High School in
Lucena City after dismissal from classes on their way home. The six accused, joined them.
Menardo Garcia ran towards Don Feliciano Street, chased by the six accused. About 50 meters
away from the corner of Don Feliciano and General Lucban Streets, in front of the former
residence of Ex-Mayor Mario L. Tagarao, the six accused overtook Menardo Garcia and, acting
in unison, they ganged up on him and boxed him. At this point accused Alex Regalario stabbed

Menardo Garcia once with a fan knife locally known as "beinte nueve" and hit him at the left side
of his back. Despite being stabbed, the six accused, still acting in unison, continued boxing
Menardo Garcia until they saw he was down and could no longer stand up. The six accused
then hurriedly left the scene together. Romano Padillo, who was walking side by side with
Menardo Garcia witnessed the attack on Menardo Garcia from 10 meters away. He also left,
fearing for his safety, and proceeded to the house of Menardo Garcia and reported the incident
to his grandmother, Guida Rendon Panganiban. The other accused who pleaded guilty was Alex
Regalario, the one who stabbed the victim.
During their arraignment on October 28, 1986, appellants, with the exception of appellant
Desembrana, entered a plea of not guilty. However, before the prosecution rested its case,
appellants Regalario and Pabillar changed their plea to guilty. Appellant Desembrana was
apprehended only on October 7, 1987 by elements of the Lucena City police for another
offense, and when separately arraigned for the case at bar on November 3, 1987, he pleaded
not guilty.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the appeal be dismissed out-right for being time-barred.
(2) Whether or not trial court err in accepting the plea of guilty of appellants Regalario and
Pabillar when they were re-arraigned but were not apprised clearly and fully of the
nature of the offense charged against them
(3) Whether or not trial court err in not considering the testimonies of Rolando de Chavez,
Augurio Villagracia, Jr., Jose Quiniquito and Alberto Desembrana;
(4) Whether or not trial court err in relying on the testimonies of the two witnesses for the
prosecution, instead of weighing the evidence adduced during the trial in favor of
appellants that there was no conspiracy and the act of boxing and stabbing were
independently committed by appellants Regalario and Pabillar;
(5) Whether or not trial court err in not considering the age of minority of appellants
Regalario and Pabillar at the time of the commission of the crime; and
(6) Whether or not the trial court err in not considering the financial standing of appellant's
parents in the imposition of the award of indemnity, as well as the funeral and other
expenses incidental to the prosecution of the case.
Held:
I.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court very clearly provides:
Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the accused or his attorney.

As earlier observed, the records of this case show that the judgment of conviction was
promulgated in open court on January 17, 1991. Fourteen days thereafter, or on January 31,
1991, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration and a copy of the order denying the same
was received by appellants' counsel on February 22, 1991. When appellants filed their notice of
appeal on March 4, 1991, ten days had elapsed since the receipt of the notice of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration.
As hereinbefore noted, the appeal must be perfected within fifteen days from the
promulgation of the judgment, but said period is interrupted from the time a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed and starts to run again from receipt of the notice denying said
motion. Accordingly, from receipt of such denial order, appellant has only the remaining period
within which to perfect his appeal. In the case at bar, fourteen days had elapsed before the filing
of appellants' motion for reconsideration, hence they had only one day from February 22, 1991
to file a notice of appeal. Consequently, the trial court was correct in rejecting appellants' notice
of appeal since it was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Ordinarily, therefore, the appeal herein could have been dismissed outright for being
time-barred. The records, however, do not show that either the public or private prosecutor
moved for the dismissal of said appeal or objected to the aforesaid order of the trial court
directing the elevation of the records of the case to this Court, obviously for appellate review. It
was only after appellants had filed their brief that appellee, in its brief, raised the issue of the
belated appeal and, inferentially, the lack of appellate jurisdiction of this Court in this case.
However, the principle of estoppel by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction has been adopted and
repeatedly applied by this Court, notably in Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., and in several
cases which followed thereafter, including criminal cases.
In view of the gravity of the offense and the penalty involved, we feel that we should also
follow the same judicial path and, in the oft-invoked broader interests of substantial justice, grant
to appellants in this case the benefit of judicial review.
II.
The trial court did not err in accepting the plea of guilty of appellants Regalario and
Pabillar when they were re-arraigned. As reflected in its order dated February 23, 1988, both
appellants were assisted by their counsel and it was only after a series of questions to both of
them that said court, after being convinced that the plea of guilty was made intelligently and
voluntarily, accepted the change of plea, but nevertheless required the prosecution to present its
evidence. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, appellants never questioned the
correctness of that order and of the declarations therein, until they filed their brief.
Also, during the trial of the case, counsel for both appellants never raised the issue of
improvident plea of guilt, as appellants Regalario and Pabillar even presented witnesses to
prove their minority during the commission of the crime.
III

We have carefully reviewed and evaluated the evidence in this case and we agree with
the aforequoted findings of the lower court and its conclusion that the culpability of appellants
and the existence of a conspiracy among them was sufficiently established by the prosecution.
It has been our consistent ruling, founded on reason, logic and experience, that the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimonies is accorded great respect on
appeal. We have repeatedly pointed out and with rational bases, that appellate courts will
generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial courts since the latter are in a better position
to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. That
doctrine applies in this case as the exceptive circumstance thereto does not obtain here.
IV.
From the foregoing circumstances, it cannot but be inferred that a conspiratorial
undertaking animated the acts of appellants. In a number of cases, the Court has ruled that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy if it shows a concerted plan, scheme or
design to further a common objective. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but
may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during and right after the
assault on the victim which indicate their common intention to commit the crime. To prove
conspiracy, the prosecution need not establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail
in the execution of the crime or that they were actually together at all stages of the conspiracy.
V.
We do not agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court. The mitigating
circumstance of minority, being favorable to both appellants, all doubts should be resolved in
their favor.
Also, it has been ruled that "(i)n regard to the doubt as to whether the accused is over or
under 18 years of age, and in the absence of proof that on the day he committed the crime he
was 18 years old, he must perforce be considered as still under that age. . . . ." In a more recent
case, the mitigating circumstance of minority was appreciated by the Court despite the fact that
the only evidence presented by the accused in said case was his own testimony regarding his
age while he was on the witness stand narrating what happened two years earlier.
VI.
In rendering its judgment of conviction, the trial court also ordered appellants to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Menardo Garcia the amount of P23,381.00 as funeral
expenses and expenses incident to the prosecution of the case. We accept the ruling of the
lower court on this score since such damages were duly proven by the prosecution. However,
the death indemnity awarded by the court a quo should be increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing case law.

Decision:
Judgment of trial court affirmed with modification.

5. Zaldivia v Reyes
Facts:
A complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office constituting an offense in violation of a city
ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3
months later. The defendant’s counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file
the complaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his
office already interrupts the prescription period.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a
violation against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.

Held:
The mere filing of complaint to the fiscal’s office does not interrupt the running of
prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed
within a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive
period is interrupted.

**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which
states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

6. Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87
Facts:
Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol causing him
physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the
accident a complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office against the petitioner. She was
charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury."
After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner
of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in damage to property with slight physical
injuries" with arresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner
made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court’s decision. In its motion for

reconsideration, petitioner now assails that the court erred in giving its penalty on
complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both being light offenses over which the
RTC has no jurisdiction and it can’t impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes.
Reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction.
Issues:
a. Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct.
b. Whether or not reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and reckless
imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries are light felonies.
c. Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC.
d. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on
appeal.
e. Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.
f. Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed.

Held:
a. On penalty imposed
a. The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is
public censure (being the penalty next lower in degree toarresto menor – see the
exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies).
b. The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property amounting to 8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in minimum
and medium periods.
b. Classification of each felony involved
a. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony.
Public censure is classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it
belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower
to arresto menor.
b. Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a
correctional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and
not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
c. Rule on complex crime

a. Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot
constitute a complex crime because reckless imprudence resulting to slight
physical injuries is not either a grave or less grave felony. Therefore each felony
should be filed as a separate complaint subject to distinct penalties.
d. Right to assail duplicity of information
a. Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to object against
it before the trial, the court may convict the accuse to as many offenses as
charged and impose a penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the
objection before the trial therefore the right to object has been waived.
e. Jurisdiction
a. Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine
imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence
resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to damage
to property is within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the
CA was set aside.

Court Ruling on Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription:
I.

Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the violation
was against the RPC.

II.

Filing of a complaint in the fiscal’s office involving a felony under the RPC is sufficient to
interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under the fiscal’s office
involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance) does not interrupt the
running of prescription. Act 3326 is the governing law on prescriptions of crimes
punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon
judicial proceeding.

7. Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various
sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his
business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili
and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored,
either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal
demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on
26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During
the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However,
Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since
petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he
was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against
Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and
pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found
probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed
a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was
filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his
signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for
lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J.
Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act
No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing
of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion
for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal
Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9
August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view
of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In
the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently
without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law
which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in
accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not
Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"
and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace
for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However,

from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24
August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine
(9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had
already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer
setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue
their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of
his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ(2)
Crime:violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)
Lower Court Decision:dismissed the charges against Tongson
Court of Appeals Decision:dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.’s (petitioner’s) petition for certiorari
and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Supreme Court Decision:GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is alsoANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
Factsw
  In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton amounting to P1,979,459.
  In 1993, Cawili with his ‘business associate’ Tongson issued 3 checks as payment
 Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
  During preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed that he was not Cawili’s business
associate.
 On Dec. 6 1995 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against
Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
 Petitioner then appeal before DOJ and in 1997 DOJ found that it was indeed possible for
Tongson to co-signed the checks. It then directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned





signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State
Prosecutor’s resolution. ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P.
Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Moreover, ACPSampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the
matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not
the investigating prosecutor.

Issues
1. Whether or not the rule on prescription as provided for in Act No. 3326 applies to
offenses under B.P. 22
Ruling
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology
in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,”[39] and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.[40]
***************
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.[55] A clear example would be this case,
wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year
prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on
the dismissal of the charges againstTongson. He went through the proper channels, within the
prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office
of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution,
an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner’s
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24
August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ’s flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner ’s filing of his complaint–
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively

interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the
information against the petitioner.
8. CRESPO vs MOGUL
FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estaga against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When
the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to deter arraignment on the ground
that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of
the office of provincial Fiscal.

CARDINAL PRINCIPLE:
Criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the Fiscal. He may or he may not file the complaint or information, follow or
not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his
opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the discretion and control of the fiscal is to
prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.
It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation, that the fiscal determines the
existence of a Prima Facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not
prudent or even permissible for a Court of compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally
initiated by him on an information.
In a clash of views between the Judge who did not investigate and the Fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should normally
prevail.
The action of fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval to the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief of State Prosecutor as the
case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to
affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the Fiscal.

MARIO FL. CRESPO vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL(2)
FACTS:


On April 18, 1977 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl.
Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice. In an order, the presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the
motion.



A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the accused in the CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining
the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case
until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.



The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against the accused. But the respondent judge denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated
for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
RATIO: YES.






It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. And it is
through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may
grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in
spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at
its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People
of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the
prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to



appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to
the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

9. Dimatulac v Villon
FACTS:
SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol,
Pampanga. A complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David,
Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari,
Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir
Yumul, a certain “Danny,” and a certain “Koyang/Arding.”
Judge David conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause, issued
warrants for the arrest of the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat and Yambao were arrested;
while only Yambao submitted his counter affidavit.
After the prelim investigation, the judge found reasonable ground to believe that Murder has
been committed and the accused are probably the perpetrators thereof. He recommended the
issuance of warrants of arrests and provided no bail
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. It is not clear
from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private
respondents.
 The offense committed was only homicide (NOT murder) and all Yabuts were in
conspiracy with one another. The 2 requisites of murder qualified by treachery
were absent. She also recommended bail of 20k each. (note: the Yabuts were
not under the custody of the law)
Before the information for Homicide was filed, the heirs of Dimatulac filed an appeal on the
resolution of Ass. Prov. Pros. Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) alleging
mainly that Alfonso-Flores erred in lowering the crime from Murder as originally filed to Homicide
despite the glaring presence of treachery, evident premeditation, etc. (Take note of Rule 70-

NPS Rules on Appeal in Syllabus1)




Notice of the appeal was furnished to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Alfonso-Flores ignored this and proceeded to file the information for Homicide
which the Prov. Prosecutor (Manarang) approved and certified
Private prosecutor (counsel for private complainants) filed a motion to defer
proceedings (i.e. arraignment) before the RTC in view of his client’s pending
appeal with the SOJ
YABUTs opposed motion to defer proceedings/arraignment arguing that the
pendency of the appeal before the SOJ was not a ground to defer arraignment
and they had a right to a speedy trial [invoked the case of Crespo v. Mogul.

RTC judge denied motion to defer arraignment.RTC Judge set the arraignment. Private
prosecutor moved to inhibit the judge, and filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the judge from
proceeding with the arraignment. RTC Judge voluntarily inhibited himself and then the case
wastransferred to herein respondent Judge Villion.
Petitioners filed manifestation informing Judge Villlon him of the cases pending before the SOJ
and the prohibition case before the CA. Judge ignored this and set the arraignment. Yabuts
entered their plea of not guilty. Petitioners moved to set aside arraignment but to no avail. SOJ
Guingona FINALLY came up with a resolution of the appeal. He directed the Provincial
Prosec. To amend the info against the accused from homicide to murder. But he wrote to
Provincial Prosec. Again and SET ASIDE his order to amend the info from homicide to murder,
considering the appeal was moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused but Mallari
must be included.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, denied.
CA also dismissed the petition.
Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus to reverse the
order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment
of private respondents; order that no further action be taken by any court in criminal case until
this petition resolved; and order Sec. of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the
information from homicide to murder.
ISSUES
1. WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime charged from
Murder to Homicide [YES]
2. WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused and denying
motion to set aside arraignment [YES]
3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information from
Homicide to Murder [YES]
1

HELD:
Petition GRANTED. The orders denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding/Arraignment
and denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
arraignment of private respondents is likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the
order of SOJ is SET ASIDE and his initial order REINSTATED. The Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to file with the RTC the amended information for
Murder.
Issue #1: WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime
charged from Murder to Homicide [YES]
There was No Basis for the Reinvestigation or downgrading of the Offense from
Murder to Homicide.
Warrants of arrest were issued against the Yabuts but they were never arrested/or
surrendered and never brought into the custody of the law. How can the Ass. Prov
Prosec. Conduct a reinvestigation then lower the crime from murder to Homicide? (Note
that they re-appeared after crime was downgraded).
She should have also waited for the resolution of the Sec of Justice, but instead
entertained the motion for reinvestigation, accepted counter-affidavits and recommended
bail. REMEMBER! They were never brought into the custody of the law.
Petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ under Section 4 of Rule 112of the
Rules of Court and DOJ Order No. 223 S. 1993 recognizes the right of both offended
parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions inpreliminary investigations or
reinvestigations. The sec. speaks of “dismissing criminal complaint”petitioners herein
were not barred from appealingfrom the resolution holding that only homicide was
committed,considering that their complaint was for murder. By holdingthat only homicide
was committed, the Provincial Prosecutor'sOffice of Pampanga effectively "dismissed"
the complaint formurder.
Appeal to the Sec. of Justice should not be dismissed motu propio on account of
the Yabut’s arraignment.
The bar on Sec 4does not apply! The cases of Crespo v Mogul forecloses the power of
authorityof the SOJ to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminalcases despite an
information already having been filed in court.The SOJ is only enjoined to refrain, as far
as practicable, fromentertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
theprosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. There was clear and
indecent haste on the part of the public prosec. In the filing of the information for
homicide depriving the State and offended parties of due processs.
Issue #2: WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused
and denying motion to set aside arraignment [YES]

Judge Villon set arraignment of the accused almost immediately upon receiving the
records of the case from theformer RTC Judge. He should have gone over the case and
noticed the multiple motions, manifestations and uttervehemence of the petitioners to
hear their cause. The judge had COMPLETE control over the case and any disposition
rested on his discretion + was not bound to await the DOJ resolution on appeal.
But he committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of theYABUTs on
the assailed information for homicide denying due process.
Actions:nullifying without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings,
the denial of the motion toreconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and
their
plea of not guilty
Issue #3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information
from Homicide to Murder [YES]
DOJ relinquished its power of control andsupervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and
the Asst. Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrenderedto the latter's
inappropriate conduct even hostile attitude,which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct
prejudicial tothe best interest of the service.
The DOJ could have joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment and, in the
exercise of itsdisciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could havedirected the
public prosecutors concerned to show cause whyno disciplinary action should be taken
against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
10. Elcano vs. Hill

Facts:
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the
occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a minor and is already legally married. Reginald is still living and
gets subsistence with his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts
were not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistakes.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the present civil action for damages is already barred by the acquittal of
Reginald.

(2) Whether or not Atty. Marvin Hill has a vicarious liability being the father of a minor child who
committed a delict.

Held:

No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delicts, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil
cases, preponderance of evidence is sufficient. The concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts
which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
Also, Art 2177 CC provides that “Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. However, plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (ART
327CC), and under Art 397, emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor, such
emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although married, was living with his father and
still dependent from the latter. ART 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald.

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