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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary
of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17,
1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice.
This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that

he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend
to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation
of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9149

September 4, 2013

JULIAN PENILLA, COMPLAINANT,
vs.
ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. for
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for gross misconduct
in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
The antecedent facts follow:
Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn Garin (the
spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted in
their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case for breach of contract against the spouses
where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel.
Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainant’s
payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent advised complainant that he
would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged P30,000 as
attorney’s fees and P10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to
respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before
Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the
hearing, complainant paid another P1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth,
complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent events and transactions
that transpired.
Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that they
have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a favorable
resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later acceded to

respondent’s suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for P950 and delivered it to
respondent’s office.
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the
spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for reconsideration was "needed to
have [the resolution] reversed."2 Respondent then prepared the motion and promised complainant
that he would fix the problem. On February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit.
Respondent then told complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and
presented the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the spouses for the refund
of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional P10,000 to respondent which he asked
for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the complaint, he was told by respondent to
await further notice as to the status of the case. Complainant claims that respondent never gave him
any update thereafter.
Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status of
the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that in one instance he was
able to talk to respondent who told him that the case was not progressing because the spouses
could not be located. In the same meeting, respondent asked complainant to determine the
whereabouts of the spouses. Complainant returned to respondent’s office on January 24, 2005, but
because respondent was not around, complainant left with respondent’s secretary a letter regarding
the possible location of the spouses.
Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his
disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the documents in respondent’s
possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the radio program "Ito ang Batas with Atty.
Aga" to solve his predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Complainant learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on June 6,
20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also found out that the filing fee was only P2,440 and
not P10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same radio program also sent
respondent a letter calling his attention to complainant’s problem. The letter, like all of complainant’s
previous letters, was unheeded.
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of
gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.
Respondent harps a different tale.
In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of
merit. He denied charging complainant P10,000 as filing fees for the estafa case and claimed that he
charged and received only P2,000. He also countered that the payment of P30,000 made by the
complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case. Respondent likewise
denied the following other allegations of complainant: that he assured the success of the case before
the prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor; that
he promised to fix the case; and that he charged P10,000, as he only charged P5,000, as filing fee
for the civil case.

Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to inform
petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the documents of
complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating with complainant was the fact that
complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be attending his daily court
hearings.
The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant and his
counsel attended.5The conference was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006. The parties were
directed to file their verified position papers within 15 days, 6 to which complainant and respondent
complied.7
On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of factual
and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as complainant’s counsel when he filed
the criminal case before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case before
the RTC of Caloocan City. He averred that he should not be blamed for the dismissal of both cases
as his job was to ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It was unethical for him to
guarantee the success of the case and resort to unethical means to win such case for the client. He
continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor a bottle of Carlos Primero I and
that the filing fees he collected totalled P20,000. Respondent argued that it is incredulous that the
total sum of all the fees that he had allegedly collected exceeded P30,000 – the amount being
claimed by complainant from the spouses.
In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months "for negligence within the meaning
of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility," viz:
In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a sore thumb
rendering them difficult to escape notice.
One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract for repair of
the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or omission emanates from a contract, oral or
written, the consequent result is a breach of the contract, hence, properly actionable in a civil suit for
damages. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Prosecutor, the liability of the respondent is
purely civil in nature because the complaint arose from a contract of services and the respondent
(spouses Garin) failed to perform their contractual obligation under the contract.
xxxx
Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after the
dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City where the
actual damages claimed isP36,000.00.
It is also basic that the civil complaint for P36,000.00 should have been filed with the MTC [which]
has jurisdiction over the same. One of the "firsts" that a lawyer ascertains in filing an action is the
proper forum or court with whom the suit or action shall be filed. In June 2002 when the civil
complaint was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such that the
jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already P400,000.00.
xxxx

Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced by the letters
marked as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G" and "H" which were all received by complainant’s secretary,
except for Exhibit "H" which was received by Atty. Asong, not to mention Exhibit "M" which was sent
by "Atty. Aga". These efforts of the complainant were not reciprocated by the respondent with good
faith. Respondent chose to ignore them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet with the
complainant and return the money and documents received by reason of the legal engagement, but
omitted to communicate with him for the purpose of fixing the time and place for the meeting. This
failure suggests a clear disregard of the client’s demand which was done in bad faith on the part of
respondent.10
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-646, adopting
and approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The Resolution 11 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 18 and
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the penalty of suspension be
reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a "Motion to
Admit Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon Leave of Office." 13 Respondent asserted that the
failure to inform complainant of the status of the cases should not be attributed to him alone. He
stressed that complainant had always been informed that he only had time to meet with his clients in
the afternoon at his office in Quezon City. Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his office in
Tandang Sora. He admitted that though he committed lapses which would amount to negligence in
violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they were done unknowingly and without malice or bad faith.
He also stressed that this was his first infraction.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.14 On August 15, 2011, respondent filed a
second Motion for Reconsideration15 which was no longer acted upon due to the transmittal of the
records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011.16
On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the aforementioned Notices of
Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued another
Resolution18 noting the Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and
respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence under Canon
18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we also find
respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein. 19

The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and the following
provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
a)
Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his client;
b)
Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body;
c)
Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from his client;
d)
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him;
e)
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
f)
Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable; and
g)
Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.20
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated
Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to "serve his client with
competence and diligence" when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the
case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the
complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil
case for specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an alternative
prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the Municipal Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over complainant’s claim which amounts to only P36,000. As correctly stated in the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April 15, 1994[,]
vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount of
demand does not exceedP200,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from the effectivity of the Act,
the same shall be adjusted to P400,000.00 (Sec. 34).21
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal
complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been easily
averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. What
aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not
motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The
civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned out to be a
basic jurisdictional error.
That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent
and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He
paid no attention and showed no importance to complainant’s cause despite repeated follow-ups.
Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of
professionalism in dealing with complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be
a helpless attempt to solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a program
in a radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least, get his attention.
Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A client pays his
lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, "[e]very case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to ‘neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.’
He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and
a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning
and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause." 22 Similarly, under Rule 18.04,
a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all other
information relevant thereto. He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly
should there be queries or requests for information from the client.
In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the
cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is too
lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted that he had notice that complainant
had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by
complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to
keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the
client’s request for information.
Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." The legal
profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest
degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough
groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor
bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer’s Oath

and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the entire duration of his
practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic
requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the
pursuit of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is
tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath.
All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the complainant
who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence23 the allegations in the complaint. In the
instant case, complainant was only able to prove respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath.
Complainant failed to substantiate his claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed him to give a bottle of
Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to get a favorable decision. Similarly,
complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent indeed violated Rule 16.01 of Canon
16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required filing fees.
As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath, we find the same to
constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision
of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION that respondent Atty.
Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer’s Oath. This
Court hereby imposes upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision. Respondent is
further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients, and
STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to be disseminated to
all courts throughout the country, to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Quintin P.
Alcid, Jr.’s personal records, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5440

December 10, 2014

SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN PEDRO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is a complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
(complainants) against Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza (respondent). This case involves a determination of
whether respondent violated his duty to hold in trust all moneys and properties of the client; his duty
to account for all funds and property collected or received for or from the client; and his duty to
deliver the funds and property of the client when due or upon demand under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
1

The facts are summarized as follows:
On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the services of respondent to facilitate the
transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to
complainants. Complainants then gave respondent a check for P68,250.00 for the payment of
transfer taxes. They also gave respondent a check for P13,800.00 for respondent’s professional
fee.
2

3

4

Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-ups.

5

Several letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of title. However,
respondent still failed to produce the title.
6

Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay. Respondent refused to return the
amount complainants gave for the transfer taxes. Complainants were then issued a certificate to file
action. They also sent a letter demanding the refund of the money intended for the transfer
taxes. Respondent still did not return the money.
7

8

9

10

On May 8, 2000, respondent sent another letter to complainants. He promised to settle the transfer
of the land title. However, respondent reneged on this promise. Complainants were then forced to
obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company to secure the transfer
of the title to the property in their names.
11

12

13

Respondent contested the allegations of complainants. According to him, it was complainants who
caused the three-year delay in the transfer of title to complainants’ names. Complainants were not

able to furnish respondent several important documents: (a) original copy of the deed of extrajudicial
petition; (b) affidavit of publication with the clippings of the published item in a newspaper of general
circulation; and (c) a barangay certificate from the barangay where the property is located as
required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
14

In addition, respondent argued that complainants paid him the measly sum of P13,800.00 despite all
the work he did for them, including facilitating the sale of the property. These involved "being-pulled
from the office four or five times to discuss . . . the details of the transaction [with the sellers]; going
twice to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna[,] Branch 24, to expedite the . . . issuance of a
[n]ew owner’s duplicate copy of the title; going twice to the office of the Register of Deeds for
Calamba, Laguna to make verification and submit the court [o]rder; [and facilitating the] preparation
and notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale."
15

Respondent also claimed that retention of the money is justified owing to his receivables from
complainants for the services he rendered in various cases:
1) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas, for
Forcible Entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Santa
Rosa, Laguna. This case was dismissed by the Honorable Court for alleged lack of
jurisdiction, the issue of possession being intertwined with that of ownership;
2) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas for Accion
Publiciana docketed as Civil Case No. B-5386 raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna[,] Branch 25;
3) In Civil Case No. B-4503 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
et al., for nullity of title, [r]econveyance with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction directed specifically to herein complainant. This case was assigned to the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna[.] Respondent, for and in behalf of herein
complainant, submitted an [a]nswer and [o]pposition to the prayer for issuance of the
injunction, which was favorably acted upon. Consequently[,] the case was dismissed by the
Court[;]
4) In Civil Case No. B-688 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
et al., for [r]e-partition and [r]econveyance, which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24[;] [and]
5) Likewise, respondent represented herein complainant in [an] ESTAFA case they [filed]
against Greg Ramos and Benjamin Corsino, which case, as per reliable source, was
discontinued by complainant after the civil aspect of the same was amicably
settled. Respondent further alleged that complainants challenged him to prove his worth as
a lawyer by doing away with the requirements and expediting the cancellation of the
Marcaidas’ title.
16

17

The present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. The parties were then called to a mandatory conference
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. They were required to submit their position
papers. Respondent did not submit his position paper.
18

19

20

21

On July 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, submitted his findings
and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated Canon 16,
Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
22

23

The Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to respondent were encashed
despite respondent’s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the name of
complainants. Complainants had to obtain a loan to facilitate the transfer of title in their names.
24

25

Moreover, respondent admitted his liability in his letters to complainants. Complainant Nicasio San
Pedro’s affidavit of desistance is immaterial.
26

27

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disciplinary action of "censure and warning,"
hence:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the disciplinary
sanction of CENSURE and WARNING be given the respondent with the admonition that he be
extremely careful of his acts to forego severe penalty in the future.
28

In the Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It held:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent’s
violation of Canon 16, [Rule] 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
he failed to effect the transfer of property despite encashment of the two checks, Atty. Isagani A.
Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered to
Returnthe amount of Sixty Eight Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (P68,250.00) Pesos to complainants
within thirty days from receipt of notice. (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring in the original)
29

On November 14, 2008, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration. The IBP Board of
Governors denied respondent’s motion in the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22,
2013:
30

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which
had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399
dated August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED. (Emphasis and italics in the original)
31

On December 11, 2013, this court resolved to note the following: (a) Notice of Resolution No. XVIII2008-399 dated August 14, 2008 of the IBP Board of Governors; (b) Notice of Resolution No. XX2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of Governors;and (c) IBP’s letter dated October 7,
2013 transmitting the documents pertaining to the case.
32

In the manifestation and motion dated October 25,2013, respondent requested for a formal hearing,
reasoning that he "wants to exercise his right to confront his accusers [to] cross[-]examine them and
that of their witness." The manifestation and motion was denied by this court in the resolution dated
September 22, 2014.
33

34

The main issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his clients.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this court resolves to adopt
and approve the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
It has been said that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high
standards oflegal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and
values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."
35

An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this
section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a
lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees,

registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how
the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately
return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by the client. (Emphasis supplied)
36

Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to complainants’
name. He continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his duty. However, after three
(3) years and several demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the task given to
him and even refused to return the money. Complainants’ alleged failure to provide the necessary
documents to effect the transfer does not justify his violation of his duty under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
1âwphi1

Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has the
following elements:
An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1)
lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3)
unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general lien for the
balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds
of the client which may come into the attorney’s possession in the course of his employment.
37

Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present evidence as
to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of cases he worked on for complainants
remains unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot
validly retain their client’s funds or properties.
38

Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien, he
cannot appropriate for himself his client's funds without the proper accounting and notice to the
client. The rule is that when there is "a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount
claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees .... "
39

We also note that despite complainant Nicasio San Pedro's affidavit of desistance dated March 14,
2008, both complainants signed their comment to respondent's motion for reconsideration and
prayed that the motion be dismissed for lack of merit.
40

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months. He is also ordered to RETURN to complainants the amount of P68,250.00 with 6%
legal interest from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment. Respondent is further
DIRECTED to submit to this court proof of payment of the amount within 10 days from payment. Let
a copy of this resolution be entered in respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza's personal record with
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

ENILLA
vs.
ATTY. ALCID, JR.A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013FACTS:
Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Garinfor the
repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses defaultedin
their obligation. hus, !omplainant de!ided to file a !ase for brea!h of !ontra!t
againstthe spouses where he engaged the servi!es of respondent as !ounsel. he
respondent advised !omplainant that he would file a !riminal !ase for estafa against
said spouses. "espondent !harged P#$,$$$ as attorney%s fees and P&$,$$$as filing
fees. "espondent then filed the !omplaint for estafa before the 'ffi!e of the
CityProse!utor of (ue)on City. *fter the hearing, !omplainant paid another P&,$$$
torespondent as appearan!e fee.*sst. City Prose!utor +ortuno later issued a
resolution dismissing theestafa !ase against the spouses. 'n +ebruary &, -$$-, the
motion for re!onsiderationfiled by the respondent was denied for la!k of merit.
"espondent presented the option of filing a !ivil !ase for spe!ifi! performan!e against
the spouses for the refund of themoney plus damages. Complainant paid an
additional P&$,$$$ to respondent whi!h heasked for the payment of filing fees.
Complainant !laims that respondent never gave himany update thereafter.
+ollowing the advi!e he gathered from other lawyers, !omplainantwent to the 'ffi!e
of the Clerk of Court of the Caloo!an City etropolitan rial Courtand "egional rial
Court /"C0. Complainant learned that a !ivil !ase for Spe!ifi!Performan!e and
Damages was filed on June 1, -$$- but was dismissed on June &#,-$$-. 2e also found
out that the filing fee was only P-,33$ and not P&$,$$$ as earlier stated by
respondent.'n January 4, -$$1, !omplainant filed before the 5ntegrated 6ar of
thePhilippines7Commission on 6ar Dis!ipline /56P7C6D0 the instant administrative !
ase praying that respondent be found guilty of gross mis!ondu!t for violating the
8awyer%s'ath and the Code of Professional "esponsibility, and for appropriate
administrativesan!tions to be imposed.5n its "eport and "e!ommendation dated
September &-, -$$, the 56P7C6D re!ommended the suspension of respondent from
the pra!ti!e of law for si9 months:for negligen!e within the meaning of Canon &
and transgression of "ule &.$3 of theCode of Professional "esponsibility:.'n De!
ember &&, -$$, the 56P 6oard of Governors issued "esolution ;o. <V5557-$$7131,
adopting and approving the re!ommendation of the 56P7C6D.
ISSE