Early Warning System and car

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Abstract:

This research paper will provide a critical review of a Complex Humanitarian Emergency (CHE), including: precursor indicators, sequence of events, and associated outcomes. Specifically, I will consider to what extent, the World Bank‟s, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Early Warning System (EWS), effectively tracked the emergence of Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état. In review, I will develop a three-point, retrospective case study, in evaluation of a warningprevention-response episode, regarding Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état and ensuing political instability. Areas of focus will include: political stability (PS), regulatory quality (RQ), and control of corruption (CC), as it relates to Madagascar‟s deteriorating geo-political and socioeconomic condition. Margins of analysis will include, -2 years pre-coup d'état, and +2 years postcoup d'état. Furthermore, through calculating change over time, I seek to measure the effectiveness of the World Bank‟s EWS, as a pre-emergency versus post-emergency management tool. Explicitly, as it relates to Madagascar‟s WGI scores, I will measure the rate of change of Madagascar‟s governess, by computing change over time, expressed as:  Δ PS3 - PS1 = G  Δ RQ3 - RQ1 = G  Δ CC3 - CC1 = G Thereafter, percent change will be calculated to determine the percent increase or decrease in Madagascar‟s governance, expressed as:  ((y2 – y1) / y1)*100. Subsequently, data should indicate a percent decrease in governess-stability, and a percent increase in governess-instability, over time. As such, by design, are EWS predestined to be reactive versus proactive? In this regard, I will make an argument that, while EWS are a useful diagnostic tool; on balance, EWS operate reactively, versus proactively. It is anticipated that corresponding aggregated WGI data-sets from 2007 to 2011 will support my hypothesis. In conclusion, it is my hope that the utility of my hypothesis will shed light on the valueadded benefit of developing EWS indicators that focus on the process, progression, and sequence of preliminary events leading up to a CHE; thus, enabling EWS to be more active, as a preemergency tool, aimed at enhancing data users, policy-makers, and at-large stakeholders ability to identify specific governance challenges proactively pre-CHE, versus retroactively post-CHE as a diagnostic tool.

Operational Definitions / Key Terms:

(WGI) (Δ) (T) (G) (AU) (OAU) (CHE) (EWS) (PS) (RQ) (Percent Change) (CC) (UN) (UNU/WIDER)

Worldwide Governance Indicators Delta or Change Time Governance African Union Organization of African Unity Complex Humanitarian Emergency Early Warning System Political Stability Regulatory Quality ((y2 – y1) / y1)*100. Control of Corruption United Nations UN University, World Institute for Development & Economics Research

Intro

In today‟s post-modern world, where social constructs and power relations are valued over modernist principles such as, unity and structuralism, the concept of the political has become disenfranchised. Evidence of this point, can be seen in the numerous Complex Humanitarian Emergencies (CHE), around the world. For instance, according to the International Red Cross, the number of persons involved in CHE, “increases annually by ten-million.”1 Specifically, it is estimated that in the 20th Century alone; the scale, range, and geographical distribution of CHE‟s has killed over 1.6 million people. As a result, “the formulation of strategies for prevention of, and effective response to, CHE‟s is

1

Jeni Klugman, Social and Economic Policies to Prevent Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, p. vi

one of the most important challenges facing the international community today.”2 To this end, as it relates to formulating effective strategies in response to CHE‟s, this case study seeks to provide a critical review of a singular episode of a CHE, including: precursor indicators, sequence of events, and associated outcomes. Specifically, I will develop a three-point, retrospective case study in evaluation of a warning-prevention-response episode, regarding Madagascar‟s ongoing humanitarian crisis; including: destruction, damage, and devastation, as result of Malagasy cyclone-whirlwinds, ariddroughts, and political instability; and, while all are linked, post-cyclone recovery and drought relief efforts have been exacerbated due to ensuing Malagasy political instability. Therefore, the substance of my analysis will focus on Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état and related political instability. Areas of focus will include: political stability (PS), regulatory quality (RQ), and control of corruption (CC), as it relates to Madagascar‟s deteriorating geo-political and socio-economic condition. As such, Madagascar‟s government has long been considered weak and decentralized most of its existence. Moreover, a breakdown in Malagasy governance has resulted in numerous CHE on the island country. As a result, Madagascar‟s concept of the political, in regard to governance, turned violent in 2009. Initially, the Malagasy political crisis involved a series of anti-government demonstrations. The demonstrations, aimed at President Marc Ravalomanana, spearheaded by Andry Rajoelina, Mayor of Madagascar‟s capital city, culminated with military involvement, the death of ”1,145 Malagasy citizens,”3 and the illegitimate accession of opposition leader Rajoelina to the Presidency, via military coup d'état. In regard to the above sequence of events, through computational analysis, I aim to measure the effectiveness of the World Bank‟s EWS, as a pre-emergency versus post-emergency management tool. Explicitly, as it relates to Madagascar‟s WGI scores, I will measure Madagascar‟s governess, by calculating rate of change over time to determine, to what extent, the World Bank‟s, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Early Warning System (EWS), effectively tracked the emergence of Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état and ensuing political instability.

2 3

lbid UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, (UNU/ Wider) Complex Humanitarian Emergencies - A Policy Brief p.14

Historiography:

Historically, of all Sub-Saharan African nation-states, none is more unique then Madagascar. Commonly referred to by many ecologists as the “eighth continent,” 4 initially, during the 18th century the island of Madagascar was governed by an assortment of shifting sociopolitical alliances. It was not until the begging of the 19th Century that the island was united, as the Kingdom of Madagascar, under the rule of a series of Malagasy monarchs. Thereafter, upon being conquered by the French, Madagascar was absorbed into the colonial empire, until it regained its independence in 1960. Subsequently, Madagascar has undergone four major periods of constitutional unrest, including two soviet-style republics under Presidents Philibert Tsiranana from (1960–1972), and Admiral Didier Ratsiraka from (1975 -1991); and three western-style democracies under Presidents Albert Zafy from (1993 – 1996), a second presidency under Didier Ratsiraka from (1997 – 2002), and lastly under Marc Ravalomanana from (2002 – 2009). Currently, there is no legitimate sitting president of Madagascar.
Malagasy Governance:

As it relates to governance, the „mini contentment‟ is divided into six autonomous provinces, which are thereafter divided into 22 different regions. According to the CIA, World Fact Book, with over “21 million citizens,”5 the population of the 4th largest Island in the world has grown exponentially, over the past decade at a rate of, “2.9% per/year”; and although, while many countries embrace growth and transition successfully, Madagascar has yet to transition completely from post-French colonialism to contemporary capitalist democracy. As such, governance of the island territory has endured many debilitating, hostile, and persistent political tensions. Moreover, as it relates to political tensions, Madagascar‟s concept of the political, in regard to governance, is embedded in traditions of violence. The World Bank broadly defines governance, “as the set of traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.”6 As such, governance through violence has led to a magnitude of political, social, and civil unrest within the geopolitical framework of the island country. To this end, as it relates to governance, political theorist, Carl Schmitt believed that the “fundamental goal of the political should be to produce „good citizens,‟”7 and that, “the law of a
4 5

Tyson, Peter (2001). The eighth continent: life, death, and discovery in the lost world of Madagascar. Perennial https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ma.html 6 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm#1 7 http://faustianeurope.wordpress.com/2007/09/23/carl-schmitt-aristotle-and-the-political/ paragraph 4

politics should be the framework to show what this good is,”4 including the, protection of citizens and effective wielding of political power. However, Madagascar‟s disenfranchisement of the universal construct of governance has led to patterns of inequality, undermining the original tenets of citizenship. As a result, Madagascar currently ranks in the top ½ of all countries at risk of collapse according to The Failed State Index.
Ex-ante ~ Malagasy CHE Precursor Events & Prevention:

In understanding Madagascar‟s current political crisis, we must first examine the path, in which Madagascar‟s CHE unfolded, including: precursor indicators, prevention and deterrence. As such, was the Malagasy political crisis inevitable? Are coup d'état endemic to post-colonized African nation-states? Should the African Union (AU), Organization of African Unity (OAU), and/or the United Nations (UN) assume more responsibility regarding the post-imperialist paralysis of numerous stillbirth democracies across Africa? In regard to the questions posed above, analysts, scholars, and pundits all consider Rajoelina‟s ascension to Madagascar‟s Presidency illegitimate. Thus, prior to the March 16, 2009 coup d'état of President Ravalomanana, the United Nations University, World Institute for Development & Economics Research (UNU/WIDER), highlighted several precursor indicator, cautionary signals, and warning signs that point to the development of the systemic development Madagascar‟s CHE. For example, UNU/WIDER analysis note that key ex ante factors regarding the structural cause of the Malagasy CHE were rooted in non-traditional indicators, know as horizontal inequalities, such as failed development, economic inequality, and social stagnation; versus vertical factors such as: location, ethnicity, and deteriorating environmental conditions. As such, prior to Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état, President Ravalomanana‟s second term was considered a success by many standards. For instance, at the onset in 2006, Ravalomanana was “credited with improving the country's infrastructure, such as roads, along with making improvements in education and health.”8 However, although these improvements were welcome, a 2006 United Nations Human Development report notes, “85 percent,”9 of Malagasy, “live on less than $2 US dollars a day.”10

8 9

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=62258 http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=62258 10 http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=62258

Accordingly, Ravalomanana‟s would be successor was strategically positioning himself for what would soon manifest as a coup d'état. Rajoelina, the son of a Malagasy colonel did not hold much promise at first. Educationally, according to the CIA World Fact Book, the average Malagasy youth spends approximately, “11 years,”11 in school. As such, Rajoelina would dropout of high school, prior to graduating in search of something more. To earn a living, before to his 20th birthday, the young Rajoelina, “worked as a disc jockey in various clubs and bars around Antananarivo,”12 prior to gaining promise upon launching his own radio station, Viva Radio, in addition to a thriving advertising company. As a result, Rajoelina earned the nickname, TGV - Young Malagasies Determined, which became the eventual slogan for his political movement. As such, amidst a dysfunctional government Rajoelina decided to run for Mayor. Ironically, it would be Ravalomanana‟s appointment of, “President Special Delegation (PDS)”13 to Rajoelina that enabled him to run at such a young age. Surprisingly, Rajoelina won, gaining 63.3% of the vote, and was, “elected mayor on 12 December 2007,”of note, approximately 1 year after Ravalomanana began his second term as Madagascar‟s president. However, Rajoelina‟s jubilee was short lived, as Antananarivo was heavily indebted from previous years of mismanagement and corruption. Thus, political tensions between the two leaders grew from the onset. As such, shortly after Rajoelina‟s election, “the state-run company Jirama cut off water and electricity to the city, citing bad debts as the reason.”14 Additionally, Ravalomanana imposed harsh penalties on Rajoelina‟s Viva TV, shutting down the network on December 13th 2008, citing a recent Viva TV interview with former Malagasy Head of State, President Ratsiraka, was likely to disrupt peace and security across the island. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemned the move by Ravalomanana‟s government, calling it unjust, antidemocratic, and non-conducive to establishing democratic norms. As such, approximately one month later, on January 13th 2009, 2 years after his election, Rajoelina held a series of political demonstrations in Antananarivo, addressing the annoyance, frustration, and displeasure of Ravalomanana's government, accenting the dissident anger many of his policies generated across the Malagasy island.

11 12

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ma.html http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/21/madagascar 13 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/21/madagascar 14 Madagascar: sortir du cycle de crises. Rapport Afrique N°156". International Crisis Group. 2010-03-18

To this end, as it relates to precursor events, and to what extent, the World Bank‟s WGI, EWS, effectively tracked the emergence of Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état; the previously mentioned, detailed sequence of events, regarding Malagasy political stability (PS), regulatory quality (RQ), and control of corruption (CC), WGI show that > 2 years prior, Madagascar was considered in the 25th-50th percentile pre coup d'état, versus 0th-10th percentile post-coup d'état, seen below.
Political Stability

Madagascar 0 10 20 30 40 50

2009 2007
Country's Percentile Rank (0-100) 50th-75th Percentile 25th-50th Percentile

90th-100th Percentile 75th-90th Percentile

10th-25th Percentile 0th-10th Percentile

Regulatory Quality

Madagascar 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

2009 2007

90th-100th Percentile 75th-90th Percentile

Country's Percentile Rank (0-100) 50th-75th Percentile 25th-50th Percentile

10th-25th Percentile 0th-10th Percentile

Control of Corruption

Madagascar 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

2009 2007

90th-100th Percentile 75th-90th Percentile

Country's Percentile Rank (0-100) 50th-75th Percentile 25th-50th Percentile

10th-25th Percentile 0th-10th Percentile

In sum, according to the UNU/WIDER, one of the three key factors, as it relates to the sequence of events leading up to the Malagasy CHE and 2009 coup d'état, is evident in the systematic progression of erosion in Malagasy government power, as a result of politicized crises, as seen above in the political demonstrations held Rajoelina. As such, the mismanagement of the above-mentioned sequence of events would lead to Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état, outlined below.
Malagasy CHE Sequence of Events & Management:

UNU/WIDER notes, in regard to the that aforementioned Malagasy CHE that the mismanagement of Malagasy geo-political affairs are consistent with the United Nations Human Development Report‟s (UNDP), broader definition of humanitarian emergency, which encompasses, “death and suffering produced by means other than weapons, such as hunger, epidemics and threats to community identity, including: protracted, low level violence, crises affect the supply of and access to food and basic social services, which often become instruments of power politics.”15 To this end, according to the BBC, on January 26th Rajoelina‟s rally was attended by tens-of-thousands, of fuming Malagasy citizens over the recent series of actions by the Ravalomanana government. Explicitly, Rajoelina, “criticized the effectiveness of Ravalomanana's poverty reduction strategies and accused him of autocratic behavior.”16 Subsequently, lawlessness and insecurity erupted in Antananarivo, after years of pent-up frustrations by Malagasy citizens. Widespread looting, pillaging, and lack of governance is evident in the above graphed EWS, control of corruption and political stability indicators. Moreover, in retaliation of Ravalomanana shutting down of Rajoelina‟s Viva TV, supports of Rajoelina set fire to state owed broadcasting stations, commercial centers, and cars. Dozens lost their lives in the widespread chaos, civil unrest, and ensuing political instability. As a result, according to the Associated Foreign Press (AFP), on January 31st 2009, Rajoelina “announced that he was in charge of the entire Malagasy Republic.”17 Citing that, “the president and the government have not assumed their responsibilities, I therefore proclaim that I will run all national affairs as of today."18 Shortly thereafter, Rajoelina filed an appeal, for President Ravalomanana to officially resign, with the Malagasy parliament. In light of this sequence of events, according to the AFP, on February 3rd 2009, President Ravalomanana dismissed Rajoelina as Mayor. Immediately, Rajoelina, denounced Ravalomanana dismissal, arguing that, “there was „no valid reason,‟ and that he was prepared to face arrest if necessary,”19 warning that the city of Antananarivo would not agree to his illegitimate removal. Following President Ravalomanana‟s, February 3rd dismissal of Mayor Rajoelina, tensions between the two political parties continued to build. As a result, four days later on February 3rd, Madagascar was in a state of a full-blown CHE, when anti-government

15

UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, (UNU/ Wider) Complex Humanitarian Emergencies A Policy Brief p.12 16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7851275.stm 17 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/01/200913117515731782.html 18 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/01/200913117515731782.html 19 http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jSsw9Mt5_TWeAwuwVr5S24GMvwIg

demonstrators stormed the Malagasy presidential palace. Ensuing violence resulted in the Malagasy military opening fire, “killing 170 demonstrators,”20 and injuring hundreds more. In sum, the above-mentioned sequence of events marked the final straw, in a long list of forerunner episodes, regarding the emergence, prevention, and management of Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état. As such, according to the UNU/WIDER, the emergence, management, and control of Madagascar‟s CHE illustrates, “an underlying vulnerability to conflict.”21 In relation to this point, UNU/WIDER notes that, “persistent economic and political differences among groups” serves as a precursor to actual conflict; and that, “the root causes of CHE‟s revolve around unequal access.”22 UNU/WIDER defines unequal access as: social, economic, and/or political disparities among a group of citizens, in a defined territory, region, or society; versus traditional indicators of inequality, which measure disparities among individuals. Thus, in this regard, as it relates to the structural context in which the World Bank‟s WGI EWS effectively managed the timing, scope, and magnitude of Madagascar‟s CHE, in relation to measuring disparities among a group, versus disparities among individuals, underscores the value-added benefit of aggregated indicators. As such, WGI indicator‟s, “are based on a large number of data sources, capturing the views and experiences of survey respondents, experts in the public and private sectors, as well as various NGOs,” 23 that reflect views, opinions, and judgments of experts, as well as, a broader number of de facto indicators, captured by the views, opinions, and judgments of various types of respondents based upon category and criteria outlined below:
Category Types of Conflict Criteria (e.g.) Intra-communal conflicts Ethnic Conflicts Inter-State Conflicts Local, National Level Sub-Regional, Continental Governmental/ military level Academic/ NGO Level Conflict Actors, Conflict Mediators Security Forces, Politicians, Desk Officers, Administrators Civil Society Actors, Academia, Research Institutes, Media International Organizations, Donors Private Sector, Interest Groups

Geographical Coverage Institutional Level Composition of Stakeholders involved

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http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83838 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CEBBiHbdKi4J:reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resourc es/3186F057B642B6B9C1256C22002B564Ecomplex.pdf+United+Nations+University+World+Institute+for+Development+Economics+Research+%28UNU/WID ER%29&hl=en&gl=us 22 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CEBBiHbdKi4J:reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resourc es/3186F057B642B6B9C1256C22002B564Ecomplex.pdf+United+Nations+University+World+Institute+for+Development+Economics+Research+%28UNU/WID ER%29&hl=en&gl=us 23 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm#2

Hence, the significance of both, “broad public scrutiny, as well as, scholarly peer reviewed of governance indicators,”24 add to the depth and breadth of WGI, EWS aggregated markers. Evidence of point can be seen in the rate change, over time, of Madagascar‟s WGI score percentile ranking, from 2007 to 2009, expressed as: [Δ PS3 (42.8) - PS1 (23.6)] = G (19.2), [Δ RQ3 (48.5) – RQ1 (34.8)] = G (13.7), and [Δ CC3 (55.1) - CC1 (50.5)] = G (5) respectively, revealing Madagascar‟s underlying vulnerability to conflict shown below in data table 1.
Madagascar Control of Corruption 12 11 Regulatory Quality 11 12 Political Stability 8 8 SOURCE YEAR 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 PERCENTILE RANK (0-100) 50.5 55.1 34.8 48.5 23.6 42.8 GOVERNANCE SCORCE -0.25 -0.11 -0.47 -0.19 -0.67 -0.01 STANDARD ERROR 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.22

90th-100th Percentile 75th-90th Percentile

50th-75th Percentile 25th-50th Percentile

10th-25th Percentile 0th-10th Percentile

In sum, as it relates to precursor incidents, and to what extent, the World Bank‟s WGI, EWS, effectively tracked the emergence of, and management of Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état; the previously mentioned, detailed sequence of events, regarding Malagasy political stability (PS), regulatory quality (RQ), and control of corruption (CC), shows that, on average, Madagascar‟s governance ranking decreased 12.6 percentile points from 2007 to 2009.
Ex- Post ~ Malagasy CHE Outcomes & Reconstruction:

As it relates to ex post Malagasy CHE outcomes, including: stakeholders, response efforts, associated effects, due to on-going deterring political conditions leading up to Madagascar‟s 2009 coup d'état, on February 21st 2009, President Ravalomanana sought to schedule a series of talks with Rajoelina in an attempt to resolve the ongoing political turmoil, but progress was stifled by previous accusations, deep resentment, and profound political differences in governance. As such, the failed talks resulted in further violence, from February 28th thru March 6th, during a Ravalomanana government crackdown on backers of Rajoelina opposition supporters. Subsequently, amidst increasing violence and political instability, munity among Malagasy legionnaires occurred on March 8th, when soldiers proclaimed, “they will defy government orders to repress civilians.”25 This event marks a pivotal shift in the Ravalomanana‟s governance, as dissension between the head-of-state and head of the military lead to the unraveling of Ravalomanana‟s narrow hold on the office of presidency.

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The Worldwide Governance Indicators Methodology and Analytical Issues, by Daniel Kaufmann Aart Kraay Massimo Mastruzzi, Working Paper 2010 p. 19 25 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/03/2009316202014374161.html

Subsequently, Madagascar's army chief General Edmond Rasolofomahandry declared a 72-hour ultimatum, for Ravalomanana and Rajoelina to end their feud and resolve political differences, or face intervention of behalf of the military. Due to his comments, contradicting the current sitting administrations stance, general Rasolofomahandry was removed from his post as army chief, and replaced by Andre Andriarijaona. Thereafter, from March 13th to March 16th, the following sequence of five key events are central to the spiraling out of control of Ravalomanana‟s thin hold of the Malagasy presidency. First, Rajoelina soldiers claim to have, “deployed tanks in Antananarivo to intercept mercenaries.”26 Second, Ravalomanana denies opposition claims that he has lost control, support, and power over the government. Third, as a result of Ravalomanana loosing his hold on the government, he offers to hold a referendum in order to resolve the ongoing standoff between opposition supporters and his government. Fourth, Rajoelina calls on security personal to detain, question, and arrest Ravalomanana amidst claims, “of misspending government funds.”27 Fifth, Malagasy soldiers seize the Madagascan presidential palace compound and chief financial depository in the capital city of Antananarivo; and although, President Ravalomanana vows to “fight to the death,“28 appealing to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU), and UN for help, it was too-little-too-late, as military support had shifted to back Rajoelina. Finally, the preceding three months of protests, political tension, and violence ended on March 17, 2009, when President Ravalomanana stepped down, signing authority over to the Malagasy military, which in turn, bestowed the office of presidency onto opposition leader Rajoelina. Thereafter, according to the U.S. Department of State, Rajoelina, “declared himself President of the High Transitional Authority,” vowing to hold presidential referendum by October 2010. As of today, 7 months later Rajoelina has failed to keep his promise. In sum, as it relates to ex post Malagasy CHE outcomes, including: stakeholders, response efforts, and associated after-effects, regarding management of on-going deterring political conditions, and reconstruction efforts, following Madagascar's 2009 coup d'état, data is not yet available. As such, statistics, figures, and records regarding World Bank, WGI data is presented on a two-year time lag. However, a brief prognosis regarding post-Malagasy CHE, outcomes and prognosis can be based on the 2009 Madagascar Flash Appeal filed with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The report notes that the AU, SADC, EU, and “donors like the US and Norway quickly ceased non-humanitarian aid.”29 As such, resulting implications of the cease in

26 27

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/03/2009316202014374161.html http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/03/2009316202014374161.html 28 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/03/2009316202014374161.html 29 http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83838

aid are projected to be calamitous, resulting in a compounded fusion of CHE‟s. For instance, in FY 2008, pre-coup d'état Madagascar received $86.2 million dollars in US assistance, “of which approximately 85 percent was non-emergency,”30 funding. In regard to this point, prior to the 2009 coup d'état, official development aid (ODA) to Madagascar‟s public sector totaled, “$600 million and represented 75 percent of the government's investment budget."31 However, as a consequence of the political crisis, “$200 million in ODA has already been frozen, including all direct budget support to the government.” 32 To this end, as of April 2009, one month after the coup d'état the Malagasy government ran out of funds to pay civil servants. Thus, the delay, interruption, and suspension of government programs joined with the truncated capacity of Rajoelina‟s government, as a result of the abrupt change in governance; in addition to suspension of aid, not to mention recent environmental calamities has crippled the capacity of the Rajoelina‟s government to, “meet the basic needs of the population.”33 Finally, it can be assumed that World Bank WGI, EWS data for 2010-2011 will show a continued trend in Madagascar's decline in governance across all indicators. Projections are shown below based on WGI aggregated data from 2007 – 2009.
Projected Trend's in Madagascar's Goverance

60 50
Percentile Rank

40 30 20 10 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 Projected
10th-25th Percentile 0th-10th Percentile

Political Stability Regulatory Quality Control of Corruption

90th-100th Percentile 75th-90th Percentile

50th-75th Percentile 25th-50th Percentile

As such, policy recommendation within the existing framework of strained relations between international donors and the Rajoelina government must be solved, on account of the 1.4

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http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/03/120850.htm http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83838 32 http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83838 33 http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83838

million citizens of Madagascar's main city of Antananarivo, who need humanitarian assistance. In addition to the 410,000 Malagasy who need food assistance, not to mention the anticipated, “delay in harvest by three months, reducing the crop by an estimated 30 - 40%,”34 leaving an additional food shortage, and broadening the cost-recovery of the Madagascar's CHE. As such, policy recommendations for mitigating the aforementioned projected prognosis are outlined in the next section below.
Recommendations/ Conclusion:

As it relates to recommendations regarding the destruction, damage, and devastation resulting from the abovementioned totality of Malagasy CHE episodes, including: cyclonewhirlwinds, arid-droughts, and political instability; while all are linked, post-cyclone recovery and drought relief efforts have been exacerbated, due to ensuing Malagasy political instability. Moreover, the compound impact of concurrent crises has affected stakeholders, patrons, and the Malagasy government‟s capacity to respond alike. As such, given the volatility, fluidity, and uncertainty of the unfolding Malagasy crisis, the full impact of the 2009 coup d'état is unclear. However, the immediate necessity of addressing recovery basics for individuals, families, and communities affected, is not. To this end, account of the ensuing political instability, and abovementioned sequence of events highlights the significant measures that must be taken now. As such, it is my recommendation that a three-fold strategic response plan be implemented focusing on food, security, and reconciliation. First, as it relates to strategic priorities regarding security, humanitarian response efforts must be focused on the urban centers where the total population is at a greater risk of violence. As such, according to the UN‟s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009 Madagascan Flash Appeals Report “the establishment of safety nets and other social protection measures,”35 must be taken in relation to urban vulnerability and political violence. Furthermore, in regard to the abovementioned security recommendation, official Flash Appeal data indicates that political unrest, “resulted in 1,145 casualties, including 430 severely injured cases and 185 fatalities countrywide.”36 To this end, due to the sheer numbers the AU, UN, and SADC should strongly consider sending peacekeeping forces. pre-emergency versus post-emergency, as seen in numerous examples, over the years, throughout the continent of African. Lastly, in relation to this point Madagascar‟s 2009 Flash Appeal forewarns that, “instability is likely to continue, and if the level of violence observed in the last two months is maintained partners estimate that up to 1,000 casualties,” could result in additional episodes of
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http://reliefweb.int/node/303661 Madagascar, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Madagascar Flash Appeal 2009, Report – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p 18 36 Madagascar, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Madagascar Flash Appeal 2009, Report – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p 12

CHE‟s. This forewarning, serves as a precursor to the release of the World Banks 2010-2011 WGI, EWS, data results. Secondly, as it relates to strategic priorities regarding food, hunger, and malnutrition, the UN defines food-insecurity as a long lasting reoccurring crisis of being unable to produce, provide, or acquire nutrition. As such, the World Food Program (WFP), found that, “35%, equivalent to 780,000”37 Malagasy citizens suffer from various levels of food insecurity; and out of the 780,000, 66% of Malagasy citizens, “equivalent to 512,000”38 were severely food-insecure. To this end, it is my recommendations that steps must be taken to provide the time-critical delivery of nourishment. In support if this recommendation, according to Madagascar‟s 2009 Flash Appeal, nourishment is considered an essential, „early recovery‟39 strategic priority element that helps to reduce and stabilize the likelihood of ongoing or compounded CHE‟s, as a result of starvation, disease, and malnourishment. Thirdly, as it relates to strategic priorities regarding reconciliation efforts, internal and external stakeholders must take tactical approaches. As it relates to internal stakeholders, it must be remembered that Ravalomanana stepped down, signing authority over to the Malagasy military, which in turn, bestowed the office of presidency onto opposition leader Rajoelina. Therefore, Rajoelina should be recognized as Madagascar‟s current sitting president, internally and externally on account of Ravalomanana stepping down. However, it is also my opinion that Rajoelina must gain the support, confidence, and respect of the international community by following through with his promises. While it is problematic that Rajoelina promised to hold elections by October 2010, and as of today, 7 months later Rajoelina has failed to do so, I believe the international community will sympathize with his leadership on account of compounded CHE, namely cyclones Eric and Fanele affecting a total 58,493 Malagasy citizens across the island. Lastly, as it relates to internal reconciliation efforts, the systemic infighting amongst Malagasy military personal, and political fighting among opposition and former President Ravalomanana supporters is not a fare assessment of current President Rajoelina‟s governance, as episodic incident reports, based upon Rajoelina‟s inheritance of an already failing state-system, intra-communal and intra-state conflicts at the local, sub-regional, and continental level involving multiple actors including: government military, academic, and NGO stakeholders is a far cry from bad governance. Moreover, incident reports are not early warning reports, whereas situation reports can be useful in conflict early warning. However, due to the UN, AU, and SADC failing

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Madagascar, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Madagascar Flash Appeal 2009, Report – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p 9 38 Madagascar, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Madagascar Flash Appeal 2009, Report – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p 9 39 Madagascar, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Madagascar Flash Appeal 2009, Report – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p 1

to recognize Rajoelina‟s ascension, as commander and chief, formal EW channels and networks organized, funded, and operated by the UN, AU, and SADC have been pulled, leaving future forecasting efforts contingent upon historical observations and baselines. The bottom line is that future forecasts reflect that which is probabilistic rather than deterministic, and therefore the probability that a certain level of instability will occur in Madagascar for an extended period of time must be dealt with proactively rather then reactively by setting thresholds and projecting forward based upon current trends, and meeting deviations & anomalies with equal and opposite force to ensure thresholds and set confidence levels can be maintained. In sum, the value-added benefit of developing EWS indicators that focus on the process, progression, and preliminary events leading up to a CHE; thus, enabling EWS to be more proactive as a pre-emergency tool, aimed at enhancing data users, policy-makers, and at-large stakeholders ability to identify specific governance challenges proactively pre-CHE, versus retroactively post-CHE as a diagnostic tool are need.

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