Hegemony Core - Gonzaga 2013

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Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 1 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Core
Contents
Hegemony Core ............................................................................................................................................ 1 Latin America ............................................................................................................................................... 8 Uniqueness ................................................................................................................................................ 9 Hegemony Declining Now.................................................................................................................. 10 Hegemony Low Now – Latin America Shifting ................................................................................. 12 Hegemony Low Now – Regional Powers ........................................................................................... 15 Hegemony Low Now – China ............................................................................................................ 17 Hegemony Unsustainable ................................................................................................................... 18 Hegemony Increasing Now ................................................................................................................. 19 Internal Links .......................................................................................................................................... 22 Engagement Increases Influence ......................................................................................................... 23 Security Cooperation Increases Influence........................................................................................... 26 Trade Increases Influence ................................................................................................................... 30 LA Key to US Hegemony ................................................................................................................... 31 Latin American Hegemony Good ........................................................................................................... 38 Stability ............................................................................................................................................... 39 Democracy .......................................................................................................................................... 41 AT – Regionalism Solves Vacuum ..................................................................................................... 43 Latin American Hegemony Bad ............................................................................................................. 44 Hegemony Backfires – Counterbalancing .......................................................................................... 45 AT – US Hegemony Key to Stability ................................................................................................. 48 Hegemony Bad – Democracy ............................................................................................................. 51 AT – US Hegemony Key to Democracy............................................................................................. 53 Latin American Hegemony Bad – Neoliberalism ............................................................................... 55 AT – US Hegemony Benign ............................................................................................................... 56 Regional Groups ..................................................................................................................................... 57 BRICS Rise Now – Latin America ..................................................................................................... 58 Brazil Rise Now .................................................................................................................................. 60 AT – Brazil Rise ................................................................................................................................. 68 Brazil Hegemony Benign .................................................................................................................... 69

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 2 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz China ....................................................................................................................................................... 70 China Rising Now – Influence ............................................................................................................ 71 China Rising Now – Military .............................................................................................................. 74 AT – China Rise.................................................................................................................................. 77 AT – China Rise – Military................................................................................................................. 79 Iran .......................................................................................................................................................... 81 Iran Rising Now – Latin America ....................................................................................................... 82 Iran Rising Now – Cuba...................................................................................................................... 87 Iran Rising Now – Mexico .................................................................................................................. 89 Iran Rising Now – Venezuela ............................................................................................................. 91 Iran Rising Now – Venezuela – Chavez Not Key............................................................................... 95 Iran Rising Now – Brazil .................................................................................................................... 96 Iran Rising Now – Argentina .............................................................................................................. 99 Engagement Checks Iran .................................................................................................................. 101 Iranian Influence Bad – Proliferation................................................................................................ 102 Iranian Influence Bad – Terrorism .................................................................................................... 104 AT – Iran Rise ................................................................................................................................... 106 AT – Iran Rise – Mexico................................................................................................................... 109 AT – Iran Rise – Venezuela .............................................................................................................. 110 AT – Iran Influence Impact ............................................................................................................... 111 Terrorism .............................................................................................................................................. 112 Hezbollah Rise Now – Latin America .............................................................................................. 113 Hezbollah Rise Now – Venezuela .................................................................................................... 114 Hezbollah Influence Bad – Laundry List .......................................................................................... 116 Narco-Terrorism Rise Now – Latin America.................................................................................... 117 Narco-Terrorism Rise – Venezuela................................................................................................... 119 AT – Latin American Terrorism Impact ........................................................................................... 121 Internal Links ............................................................................................................................................ 123 Latin America Relations ....................................................................................................................... 124 Uniqueness – Current Policies Undercut Hegemony ........................................................................ 125 Engagement Increases Credibility .................................................................................................... 127 Relations Increase Credibility ........................................................................................................... 131 AT – Latin America Key .................................................................................................................. 133 AT – Relations Boost Influence ........................................................................................................ 134 Hard Power ........................................................................................................................................... 139 General .............................................................................................................................................. 140

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 3 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Navy .................................................................................................................................................. 143 Air Power .......................................................................................................................................... 146 Readiness .......................................................................................................................................... 147 Soft Power............................................................................................................................................. 149 General Key to Hegemony ................................................................................................................ 150 Outweighs Hard Power ..................................................................................................................... 152 Solves Terrorism ............................................................................................................................... 153 Alt Causes ......................................................................................................................................... 155 Credibility ......................................................................................................................................... 157 Humanitarian..................................................................................................................................... 159 Hard Power Undercuts Soft Power ................................................................................................... 160 Economy ............................................................................................................................................... 161 Key to Hegemony ............................................................................................................................. 162 Economic Hegemony is Key to Military Hegemony ........................................................................ 164 Economic Leverage Key to Exercising Hegemony .......................................................................... 166 Economic Power Key to Soft & Hard Power.................................................................................... 167 Economy Outweighs Military ........................................................................................................... 168 Economy Outweighs Credibility....................................................................................................... 170 Mexico Specific ................................................................................................................................ 171 AT – Economy Key to Hegemony .................................................................................................... 172 Trade ..................................................................................................................................................... 176 Trade Good For Hegemony .............................................................................................................. 177 Proliferation .......................................................................................................................................... 179 Proliferation Undercuts Hegemony .................................................................................................. 180 Internal Link Answers........................................................................................................................... 182 AT – Hegemony Influences Others .................................................................................................. 183 Hegemony Inevitable – Power Consolidation................................................................................... 184 Hegemony Inevitable – Other Countries Want Unipolarity ............................................................. 186 Hegemony Inevitable – Nuclear Deterrence ..................................................................................... 187 Hegemony Inevitable – Multipolarity Fails ...................................................................................... 188 Hegemony Good ....................................................................................................................................... 189 Uniqueness ............................................................................................................................................ 190 Lead Now .......................................................................................................................................... 191 Lead Now – Military ......................................................................................................................... 192 AT – Challengers Now ..................................................................................................................... 193 AT – China Threat Now.................................................................................................................... 194

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 4 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz AT – Hegemony Unsustainable/Cost ................................................................................................ 195 AT – Hegemony Unsustainable ........................................................................................................ 196 AT – Empire Decline ........................................................................................................................ 206 AT – Multipolar Transition ............................................................................................................... 207 Hegemony Good Impacts ..................................................................................................................... 210 Laundry List ...................................................................................................................................... 211 Deters Nuclear Crises........................................................................................................................ 215 Deters Regional Crises ...................................................................................................................... 217 Deters Conflict .................................................................................................................................. 218 Collapse Causes War ........................................................................................................................ 226 Decline Hurts Russia-US Relations .................................................................................................. 232 Decline Causes China War ............................................................................................................... 233 Solves Stability ................................................................................................................................. 234 Solves Terrorism ............................................................................................................................... 241 Solves Proliferation ........................................................................................................................... 244 Cooperation ....................................................................................................................................... 246 Solves Democracy ............................................................................................................................ 247 Human Rights ................................................................................................................................... 248 Solves Climate .................................................................................................................................. 249 Solves Trade...................................................................................................................................... 251 Solves Economy................................................................................................................................ 253 Economy ........................................................................................................................................... 256 AT – Hegemony Bad Args ................................................................................................................... 258 AT – Hegemony Causes Great Power War....................................................................................... 259 AT – Entanglements/Wars ................................................................................................................ 261 AT – Counterbalancing ..................................................................................................................... 263 AT – Soft Balancing ......................................................................................................................... 269 AT – Hard Counterbalancing ............................................................................................................ 274 AT – China Rise................................................................................................................................ 281 AT – Hierarchy Bad .......................................................................................................................... 283 AT – Unipolarity Bad ....................................................................................................................... 284 AT – Hegemony Alternatives ............................................................................................................... 285 AT – Multipolarity Good .................................................................................................................. 286 AT – Bipolarity Solves ..................................................................................................................... 291 AT – Retrenchment Solves/AT – Posen ........................................................................................... 292 AT – Offshore Balancing Solves ...................................................................................................... 294

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 5 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Hegemony Bad.......................................................................................................................................... 298 1NC – Hegemony Bad Case Turn......................................................................................................... 299 Uniqueness ............................................................................................................................................ 303 Transition Now is Key ...................................................................................................................... 304 Uniqueness – Brink ........................................................................................................................... 305 Transition Now ................................................................................................................................. 306 Hegemony Constrained Now ............................................................................................................ 308 Hegemony Low – No Leverage ........................................................................................................ 310 Unsustainable .................................................................................................................................... 312 Unsustainable – Rising Powers ......................................................................................................... 320 Multipolarity Coming Now ............................................................................................................... 324 No Unilateralism Now ...................................................................................................................... 329 Economy Uniqueness............................................................................................................................ 330 Decline Now ..................................................................................................................................... 331 Unsustainable – Debt ........................................................................................................................ 332 Unsustainable – Budget Cuts ............................................................................................................ 333 China Taking Over ............................................................................................................................ 334 AT – China Decline .......................................................................................................................... 336 US Won‘t Play Leadership Role ....................................................................................................... 337 Economy Not Only Factor ................................................................................................................ 338 Hegemony Bad Impacts ........................................................................................................................ 339 Laundry List ...................................................................................................................................... 340 Prolonging Transition Causes War ................................................................................................... 344 Causes Entanglements....................................................................................................................... 347 Causes Conflict ................................................................................................................................. 348 Causes Terrorism .............................................................................................................................. 349 Causes China Conflict....................................................................................................................... 351 Causes Russian-Chinese Alliance ..................................................................................................... 353 Causes Iran Conflict .......................................................................................................................... 355 Causes Middle East Instability.......................................................................................................... 356 Causes Oil Dependence .................................................................................................................... 357 Hurts India-US Relations .................................................................................................................. 359 Causes Proliferation .......................................................................................................................... 360 Hurts Cooperation ............................................................................................................................. 361 Decline Good – Counterbalancing .................................................................................................... 362 Retrenchment Good – On Balance.................................................................................................... 363

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 6 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Hurts the Economy ........................................................................................................................... 364 Retrenchment Good – Economy ....................................................................................................... 367 Hegemony Alternatives ........................................................................................................................ 368 Offshore Balancing Solves................................................................................................................ 369 Retrenchment Solves ........................................................................................................................ 371 Nuclear Deterrence Solves ................................................................................................................ 373 Multipolarity Helps Cooperation ...................................................................................................... 374 Multipolarity Helps Economy ........................................................................................................... 375 AT – Hegemony Good Args ................................................................................................................. 376 AT – Deterrence ................................................................................................................................ 377 AT – Hegemony Solves Conflict ...................................................................................................... 379 AT – Transition Wars ....................................................................................................................... 381 AT – Loss of Alliances Causes Violence.......................................................................................... 385 AT – Cooperation ............................................................................................................................. 386 AT – Offshore Balancing Weakens Deterrence ................................................................................ 388 AT – Withdrawal Causes Economic Decline.................................................................................... 390 AT – Hegemony Key to the Economy .............................................................................................. 392 AT – Military Hegemony Key to the Economy ................................................................................ 395 AT – Military Hegemony Helps the Global Economy ..................................................................... 399 AT – Military Hegemony Helps Jobs ............................................................................................... 400 AT – Hegemony Key to Oil Stability ............................................................................................... 401 AT – Hegemony Benign ................................................................................................................... 402 AT – History Proves US Leadership Good ....................................................................................... 404 AT – China Decline .......................................................................................................................... 407 AT – Military Primacy Key .............................................................................................................. 408 Heg Authors Wrong .......................................................................................................................... 410 Terminal Impacts ...................................................................................................................................... 412 Free Trade ............................................................................................................................................. 413 Free Trade Good Impact ................................................................................................................... 414 Democracy ............................................................................................................................................ 416 Democracy Good Impact .................................................................................................................. 417 AT – Democracy Peace Theory ........................................................................................................ 418 Terrorism .............................................................................................................................................. 419 Terrorism Retaliation Bad Impact..................................................................................................... 420 AT – Nuclear Terrorism Impact........................................................................................................ 422 AT – Loose Nukes ............................................................................................................................ 424

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 7 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz AT – Harder to Attribute................................................................................................................... 426 AT – Deterrence Doesn‘t Apply ....................................................................................................... 430 Proliferation .......................................................................................................................................... 431 Proliferation Bad Impact ................................................................................................................... 432 Russia War ............................................................................................................................................ 435 Russia-US War Bad Impact .............................................................................................................. 436 Asia ....................................................................................................................................................... 437 China War Impact ............................................................................................................................. 438 Asian Instability Bad Impact............................................................................................................. 440 India-US Relations Good Impact ...................................................................................................... 441 India-Pakistan Nuclear War Impacts ................................................................................................ 442 AT – China War ................................................................................................................................ 444 War........................................................................................................................................................ 446 Escalation Likely .............................................................................................................................. 447 Can‘t Solve War ................................................................................................................................ 448 Risk of War Low............................................................................................................................... 449 Risk of Missile Attack Low .............................................................................................................. 450

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 8 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Latin America

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 9 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Uniqueness

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 10 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Declining Now
US hegemony is decreasing in Latin America, leaving it vulnerable to domestic terrorism – Hezbollah has already been able to smuggle drugs, weapons, and operatives across the US-Mexican border Neumann, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11
(Vanessa, 12/2011, Foreign Policy Research Institute, ―The New Nexus of Narcoterrorism: Hezbollah and Venezuela,‖ http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201112.neumann.narcoterrorism.html, accessed 7/9/13, IC) Yet for all this massive spending on fighting terrorists and insurgents in the Middle East, we are leaving ourselves vulnerable to them here, on a number of fronts. First and foremost, the United States is under territorial threat through its Mexican border. Hezbollah operatives have already been smuggled, along with drugs and weapons, in tunnels dug under the border with the US by Mexican drug cartels. Only a week after my October 5th interview by KT McFarland on Fox, where I specifically warned of a possibility of this resulting in a terrorist attack carried out inside the US with the complicity of South American drug traffickers, the global press revealed a plot by the elite Iranian Quds Force to utilize the Mexican gang Los Zetas to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington in a bombing that would have murdered many Americans on their lunch hour. Second, American assets in Latin America are under threat. Embassies, consulates, corporate headquarters, energy pipelines and American- or Jewish-sponsored community centers and American citizens have already been targeted by terrorist groups all over Latin America for decades: FARC in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru in Peru and Hezbollah in Argentina. Al Qaeda is also rumored to have a strong presence in Brazil. Third, while American soldiers give their lives trying to defeat terrorists and violent insurgents in the Middle East, these same groups are being supported and strengthened increasingly by Latin America, where they receive training, weapons and cash. This makes American military engagement far more costly by any metric: loss of life and financial cost. Indeed over the last decade, Latin America is a region spiraling ever more out of American control. It is a region with which the United States has a growing asymmetry of power: it has more importance to the United States, while the United States is losing influence over Latin America, which remains the largest source of oil, drugs and immigrants, both documented and not. Latinos now account for 15 percent of the US population and nearly 50 percent of recent US population growth, as well as a growing portion of the electorate, as seen in the last presidential elections. The discovery of huge new oil reserves in Brazil and Argentina, that might even challenge Saudi Arabia, and the 2012 presidential elections in Venezuela, make Latin America of increasing strategic importance to the U.S., particularly as the future political landscape of the Middle East becomes ever more uncertain, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in previously secular Arab governments. The growth of transnational gangs and the resurgence of previously waning terrorist organizations pose complicated new challenges, as violence and murder cross the U.S. border, costing American lives and taking a huge toll on U.S. law enforcement. The United States needs to develop a smart policy to deal with these challenges.

US leadership declining now in Latin America – poor leadership in negotiating free trade agreements Boaz, Cato Institute Executive Vice President, 9
(David, CATO Handbook for Policymakers, 2009, page 637-638, CATO Institute, RH)

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During most of the time since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada in 1993, however, the United States showed no such leadership. Instead, Washington promised to create a hemispheric free trade zone, known as the Free Trade Area of the Americas, but made little effort to promote the idea. The result was unfortunate, and a window of opportunity was lost. Latin American countries that were eager to enter into a free trade agreement gradually became disillusioned with years of U.S. inaction, and some turned decidedly against the idea of free trade. Worse, as economist Sebastian Edwards points out, Washington‘s promise of promoting the Free Trade Area of the Americas had the perverse effect of actually halting unilateral trade barrier reductions in Latin America as those countries waited to negotiate reductions as a group with the United States, an expectation that went unfulfilled. Moreover, from the Mexican peso crisis of 1994–95 to the Brazilian currency crisis of 2002, Washington supported massive International Monetary Fund bailouts that encouraged irresponsible behavior by investors and policymakers and surely increased the severity of economic crises in the region.

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Hegemony Low Now – Latin America Shifting
Latin America is moving away from a US dominated, unipolar world – the US‘ hegemony caused balancing Marcella, U.S. Army War College Americas Studies director, 13
(Gabriel, 3/22/13, Journal of International Affairs, ―The transformation of security in Latin America: a cause for common action,‖ http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+transformation+of+security+in+Latin+America%3a+a+cause+for+co mmon...-a0330143508, accessed 7/9/13, IC) Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a transformation of security in Latin America. Latin American countries have been moving toward the concepts of multidimensional security and security of the individual and society, and away from the classical understanding of the security dilemma posed by an external threat to the state. Illegal narcotics, the proliferation of guns, and other transnational threats, combined with undergoverned space and the weak state syndrome, generated an extraordinary crime wave, which gives the region the highest murder rate in the world. Moreover, crime imposes a heavy cost on economic growth and democratic governance. This insecurity crosses international borders, and the institutions of public security--police, military, and judicial systems--are hard pressed to meet the challenge. The privatization of security is a symptom of the problem and a potential source of abuse. The United States shares responsibility for the violence due to U.S. demand for illegal drugs and the fact that it is a supplier of arms to Latin America. At the same time, there is a growing consensus in support of common action, as evidenced by the international coalition that is operating under Operation Martillo--the antinarcotics effort in the Caribbean and Central America. Moreover, a number of Latin American countries contribute to international peace operations. Accordingly, the new strategic consensus among Latin American countries should be a cause for common action. On 21 September 2001, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed resolution that condemned the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in support of the United States. (1) That would be the last collective security action under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947, also known as the Rio Treaty. The assumption in 1947 was that threats would come from outside the Hemisphere. For the next four decades, that threat was international communism. Unlike NATO, the Rio Treaty never developed a robust defense alliance that integrated a political decision-making process for using military force, in part because Latin American countries were relative bystanders in the East-West struggle. Moreover, the enormous asymmetry in military power between the United States and Latin American countries created reluctant partners, based on the fear that this power could be used against them. The more the United States pushed for collective defense, the more Latin America resisted, leveraging the instruments of inter-American security to promote their own security and to balance American power. This studied ambivalence did not prevent the emergence of a strategic consensus for common action against the communist-inspired insurgencies of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

Latin America is rejecting US hegemony Berry, Policy director of the International Relations Center, 5
(Tom, 7/15/5, ―Mission creep in Latin America – US Southern Command‘s New Security Strategy‖, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9472.htm, 7/9/13, AL)

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 13 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The United States is the great power that has come closest to being a global ―hegemon.‖ Like most hegemons, the United States of America began building its hegemonic reach in its ―backyard‖ or what, in the more elevated parlance of foreign policy journals, is known as the ―near abroad.‖ One might expect that U.S. hegemony would be strongest in Latin America and the Caribbean. But U.S. control is disintegrating in its own hemisphere at the very time when the Bush administration has embarked on global crusades to crush anti-U.S. regimes, combat anti-U.S. terrorism, and bolster alliances among free-market democracies around the globe. Pax Americana in the Americas—a declared foreign policy objective since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823—is no longer a sure bet. Throughout the region, grassroots movements, opposition leaders, and governments themselves are rejecting U.S. leadership. There‘s an emerging consensus that U.S. hegemony is not benevolent but rather malevolent. The U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), which defines Latin America and the Caribbean as its Area of Responsibility (AOR), is clearly worried. With a more extensive presence in the region than any other part of the U.S. government, the U.S. military has been the first to identify in any integrated way the rising threats to U.S. hegemony. Rather than questioning the wisdom of current U.S. foreign and military policy, the Pentagon and Southcom have resurrected traditional strategies and launched new initiatives. However, because these responses run counter to the real security needs and national interests of both the United States and the nations within its AOR, these responses serve only to fuel counter-hegemonic forces. Washington is losing control of its backyard. If the U.S. government ―stays the course‖ with its current foreign and military policy, as President Bush has repeatedly asserted is what‘s needed to keep the country strong, the United States is on a collision course with Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S. national security policy has evolved in recent years through a combination of ―mission creep‖ that encompasses expanding definitions of national security, and more overt hegemonic aspirations. Leading strategists and ideologues of the Bush administration believe openly that U.S. global domination is the best and in any case inevitable form of world governance. But at the same time this expanding scope of national security and hegemony confronts a counterhegemonic backlash. There is a new spirit of resistance, reformism, and self-determination in Latin America and the Caribbean.

US influence in Latin America is declining – Latin America is becoming independent of Washington. Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11
(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH) Across the region in recent years, the United States has seen its influence decline. Latin American countries are increasingly looking for solutions among themselves, forming their own regional organizations that exclude the United States and seeking friends and opportunities outside of Washington's orbit. Some U.S. allies are even reconsidering their belief in the primacy of relations with the United States. Much of this has to do with the end of the Cold War, a conflict that turned Latin America into a battleground between U.S. and Soviet proxies. Washington has also made a series of mistakes in the years since then, arrogantly issuing ultimatums that made it even harder to get what it wanted in Latin America. At the same time as U.S. influence has diminished, Latin America's own capabilities have grown. The region has entered into an era of unprecedented economic, political, and diplomatic success. Most visibly, Brazil has emerged as an economic powerhouse, attracting foreign investment with an economy that grew 7.5 percent last year. (Regionwide, average GDP growth last year was 5.6 percent.) Regular free elections and vibrant civil societies are now commonplace in Latin America, and the

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 14 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz region's diplomats are more visible and confident in global forums than ever before. After decades on the receiving end of lectures from Washington and Brussels, Latin American leaders are eager to advertise their recent gains. Santos has been known to tell visiting foreign counterparts that this will be "Latin America's century."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 15 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Low Now – Regional Powers
Regional powers are rising in Latin America as US influence declines – Brazil, Colombia, and multilateral organizations prove. Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11
(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH) LATIN AMERICA'S economic growth and political stability are driving an unprecedented power shift within the region. Countries are reassessing their interests and alliances, and the more confident among them are flexing their muscles. Instead of looking to Washington for guidance, Latin American countries are increasingly working among themselves to conduct diplomacy, pursue shared objectives, and, at times, even spark new rivalries. Brazil's emergence as a serious power is a direct result of the increasing absence of U.S. influence in the region. Sensing an opportunity to gain the regional stature that has long eluded it, the country has begun to act more assertively. But complicating Brazil's power play is the reaction from its fellow Latin American nations. Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian officials, among others, talk privately about their dislike of Brazil's arrogant diplomacy. In some quarters, Brazil's responses to developments such as Chavez's ongoing assault on Venezuela's democracy and even the 2009 coup in Honduras have undermined its credibility as a serious leader. (Brasilia's reluctance to speak out for hemispheric democracy is particularly inexcusable for a government that includes many officials who suffered under the successive military regimes of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.) Many Latin American officials quietly reveal that they are not eager to see Brazil replace the United States as the hemisphere's hegemon. As one diplomat recently put it, "The new imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese." Yet Brazil is learning that leadership means responsibility. Relations with its neighbor Bolivia are a case in point. After the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration was kicked out of Bolivia, Brasilia belatedly realized that Bolivia's cocaine exports--most of which are destined for Brazil, Argentina, or Europe--represented a serious challenge and so stepped up its counternarcotics cooperation with Bolivia. Fortunately, the United States and Brazil are eager to work together on counternarcotics. Bolivia will be a key test of this cooperation--made all the more important by the bitter diplomatic flap that erupted in May 2010 between U.S. President Barack Obama and then Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva over the Iranian nuclear deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey. Colombian leaders are also aware of the shifting balance of power within Latin America . With the recent departure of the inimitable Lula, whose charisma and presence overshadowed the efforts of other Latin American leaders, Santos now believes his government can assume the mantle of regional leadership by adopting a more balanced foreign policy, one less dependent on Washington. Although Santos has no desire to do away with his country's long-standing closeness to the United States, he understands that Colombia's credibility is now more dependent on its ability to cooperate with other regional governments, most important of all, Brazil's. Further evidence of Colombia's diplomatic and strategic maturity can be found in the way it has begun exporting its counterinsurgency and counternarcotics expertise to places as far away as Afghanistan. For almost half a century, the Colombian government has waged a bloody war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. But it has been only in the past several years that the Colombian state, backed by billions of dollars in U.S. assistance, has gained the upper hand. Overwhelmed by this fight until recently, Colombia's security forces now use their hangars and equipment to train pilots from Mexico and Peru and counternarcotics operatives from Afghanistan. As Latin America comes into its own, it is beginning to rely more on its own multilateral bodies. For the past 60 years, the Organization of American States, headquartered in Washington, has

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 16 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz struggled to gain credibility in the region, as critics saw it as a guise for U.S. domination. In recent years, however, it has codified the primacy of democracy in its guiding principles--an important development suggesting that OAS members now consider democracy a shared goal as opposed to a foreign imposition.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 17 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Low Now – China
Hegemony low in Latin America – focus on Middle East detracts Burbach Center for the Studies of The Americas Director et al 13
[Roger, Michael Fox freelancer, Federico Fuentes Bolivian Socialist Alliance director, 3/11/13, ―Latin America‘s Turbulent Transitions‖, http://climateandcapitalism.com/2013/03/11/latin-americas-turbulenttransitions/, accessed 7/5/13, ALT] An opening chapter outlines the international context. ―The old order is breaking down with the decline of the United States as the planet‘s hegemonic power.‖ And while Washington is preoccupied with its wars in the Middle East and South Asia, its grip on Latin America has weakened as an emerging China enters this market in search of raw materials to supply its booming economy. China is now the largest trading partner of Brazil and Chile. Its trade with Latin America as a whole increased eighteen-fold in the first decade of this century, while U.S. exports dropped from 55 percent of the region‘s total to 32 percent.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 18 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Unsustainable
US heg decline inevitable in Latin America – countries are becoming more independent – Bolivia proves. Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11
(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH) Yet over the past decade or so, the United States' willingness and ability to exert control in the region have diminished. This has occurred in part because more important issues, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have forced Latin America down the policymaking food chain. But there is also the indisputable reality that the region itself is now more confident acting on its own. For the most part, this was inevitable, given the end of external and local communist challenges and the shift to an increasingly multilateral world that had room for new powers. Latin America's greater autonomy is both a cause and a result of decreased U.S. influence. The United States' relationship with Bolivia provides one example of Washington's declining power in the region. Believing that it was time to pay back the Americans for their years of backing his political opponents, Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008 and suspended U.S.-funded democracy programs the following year. A decade or so ago, when Bolivia was a faithful client of the United States, it would have been unimaginable for a Bolivian government to even consider such acts, given the diplomatic and financial consequences of provoking Washington's ire. Yet even the ostensibly hard-line George W. Bush administration responded to Morales' repeated diplomatic insults largely with silence. Morales had gone eyeball to eyeball with Washington and lived to tell about it.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 19 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Increasing Now
US influence in Latin America is high— economic and soft power outweigh lack of overarching policies, but continued interest is key. Duddy, former Venezuelan Ambassador, and Mora, Florida University Latin America Center Director, 13
[Patrick and Frank, 5/1/13, The Miami Herald, ―Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?‖, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy, accessed 7/9/13, ALT] Is U.S. influence in Latin America on the wane? It depends how you look at it. As President Obama travels to Mexico and Costa Rica, it‘s likely the pundits will once again underscore what some perceive to be the eroding influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Some will point to the decline in foreign aid or the absence of an overarching policy with an inspiring moniker like ―Alliance for Progress‖ or ―Enterprise Area of the Americas‖ as evidence that the United States is failing to embrace the opportunities of a region that is more important to this country than ever. The reality is a lot more complicated. Forty-two percent of all U.S. exports flow to the Western Hemisphere. In many ways, U.S. engagement in the Americas is more pervasive than ever, even if more diffused. That is in part because the peoples of the Western Hemisphere are not waiting for governments to choreograph their interactions. A more-nuanced assessment inevitably will highlight the complex, multidimensional ties between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. In fact, it may be that we need to change the way we think and talk about the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We also need to resist the temptation to embrace overly reductive yardsticks for judging our standing in the hemisphere. As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of crossnational relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration. Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companies and investors. While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements. An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 20 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture,values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region.

US soft power rising – surveys prove Rep. Farr, California Democrat, 13
[Sam, Representative from California, 5/22/13, ―Latin America on the Rise Briefing Series: US Engagement in Latin America‖, http://www.farr.house.gov/index.php/component/content/article/37-2013press-releases/966-latin-america-on-the-rise-briefing-series-us-engagement-in-latin-america, accessed 7/9/13, ALT] In 2009, the image of US leadership in Latin America had a 34% approval rating (Gallup). At the 2009 Summit of the Americas, President Obama stated: ―If our only interaction with many of these [Latin American] countries is drug interdiction, if our only interaction is military, then we may not be developing the connections that can, over time, increase our influence.‖ In 2012, the image of US leadership in Latin America had a 40% approval rating (Gallup). During a 2013 trip to Latin America in early May, President Obama stated in Mexico: ―The relationship between our nations must be defined not by the threats that we face, but by the prosperity and the opportunity that we can create together.‖

US soft power is on the rise in Latin America even if the region is not a priority Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11
(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH) IN HIS first term, U.S. President George W. Bush adopted a heavy-handed, unilateral approach to Latin America, attempting to force governments there to approve the U.S. invasion of Iraq and ensure U.S. soldiers' exemption from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This strategy backfired, and many governments, including traditional U.S. partners such as Chile and Mexico, refused. So in his second term, Bush attempted a more conciliatory approach, for instance, cultivating a personal relationship with the leftist Lula. But it was too little, too late; Chavez and other radicals still played up Bush's reputation as a bully. After Obama took office, however, it became much harder to use the U.S.-bashing strategy. In April 2009, at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, Obama tried to put his imprimatur on Washington's Latin America policy, emphasizing mutual respect and outlining a vision of equal partnerships and joint responsibility. His deferential yet serious style quickly put the most conspiratorial anti-U.S. critics, such as Chavez, Morales, and Ortega, on the defensive--where they have remained ever since.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 21 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The United States' enhanced image should not be dismissed as a mere public relations victory; rather, it is indispensable to restoring Washington's influence in Latin America, since it makes it easier for willing governments to cooperate with Washington on shared priorities without appearing to be subservient to the old hegemon. Obama's approach to the region can be seen as a more concerted continuation of the one Bush adopted in his second term, emphasizing responsibility as a prerequisite for cooperation and leadership--an implicit call for Latin America to solve its own problems. Other than focusing on Mexico's drug violence, the Obama administration has not made Latin America a priority. This may not be so bad: a little breathing room is appropriate, given the region's current stability.

US influence is strong in Latin America Duddy, U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, 13
(Patrick, Frank Mora Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center and Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations in the School of Public and International Affairs at Florida International University, 5/1/13, ―Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?‖, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html, 7/6/13 ,AL) While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements. An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture,values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 22 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

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Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 23 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Engagement Increases Influence
Economic engagement is key to hegemony in Latin America—empirical evidence proves Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13
(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR) Even during the height of U.S. power in the region, it did not act alone, nor did it act in the most cynical of terms. In the cases of intervention--from the days of Dollar Diplomacy to the U.S.supported insurrection in Guatemala in 1954--the United States did so with the support (at times even at the request of) segments of the local populations. Nor were U.S. actions driven only by its own narrow national interests. Policymakers often acted in what they believed to be in the broader interests of development, peace, and prosperity, but for the very citizens of the countries, were rooted in the perceived risks communism posed to human rights and economic freedom. It was in this sense that, despite the litany of abuses (assumed or real), the United States gave cause and breath to real interests and benefits in the region. Those contributions to rights and freedoms and to political and economic stability became particularly true in the waning years of the Cold War and the decades after. In the late 1980s, the United States provided diplomatic and material support to the "No" coalition that opposed the continued rule of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile and that eventually paved the way for Chilean democracy today. The creation of and push for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in 1993, has tied together the economies of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. By providing access to the U.S. market, Mexico has become an exporter of manufactured goods and looks poised to become a global economic leader. In 2000, the United States, in collaboration with the Colombian government, developed Plan Colombia to provide the technical and financial assistance that allowed the one-time beleaguered Colombian state to re-establish security, reduce crime, and regain state control over its territory from armed guerrillas and paramilitaries. And the United States through bilateral assistance and the support of local nongovernmental organizations (NGO) has helped to ensure free and fair elections in countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Peru. Through these efforts, the United States has assisted in ushering in one of the longest periods of democratic rule and expanded political representation in the region's history. While suspicions over U.S. interventions of the past remain a part of the Latin American perspective, leaders like Chavez, Morales, Correa, and the Kirchners (first under President Nestor and today under his wife, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner) have cynically stoked those fears to avoid or distract domestic and international criticism. Too often, scholars and observers have taken these suspicions as the example of the decline in U.S. power or deep-rooted, insoluble anti-Americanism. (10) Yet, as Baker and Cupery demonstrate, the patterns of popular anti-Americanism are in fact not correlated with what authors like McPherson and Sweig assume to be its causes: patterns of intervention, proximity, or economic dominance. Instead, Baker and Cupery demonstrate that positive assessments of the United States are most closely linked with close commercial relations and consumption of U.S. products, irrespective of the other factors often wrongly assumed to shape anti-Americanism. (11)

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Only US-Latin American ties can allow the US to keep exercising hegemony Sanchez, Loyola University, Political Science Director, 12
(Megan Scholar, Loyola University, Latin American Studies Professor, December 12, International Journal of humanities and social science, ―Power and principle: A new US policy for latin america‖, http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_23_December_2012/3.pdf , 7/6/13, AL) Since the turn of the century, however, several Latin American countries have elected presidents who are questioning the so-called Washington consensus. If the United States wishes to remain the region‘s hegemon, it must act quickly to design a new regional policy, akin to Roosevelt‘s Good Neighbour policy or Kennedy‘s Alliance for Progress. Only a more ―ethical‖ policy toward the region will ensure that America can continue to exercise hegemony. By employing the term ―ethical,‖ we are suggesting that the US government will need to ensure that its foreign policy benefits the countries of Latin America, providing such universal values as democracy, peace, and prosperity. A new, ethical policy will not only guarantee vital US interests, but it will also promote the principles that America has rhetorically stood for since its founding—democracy and selfdetermination—and will therefore be welcomed by the leaders and people of the region.

US involvement is key to maintaining influence in Latin America—empirical evidence proves Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13
(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR) The lack of an outside or ideological threat in the hemisphere also granted greater autonomy to governments from U.S. intervention while at the same time reducing their historic concerns over national sovereignty. The result was a series of previously unimaginable advances in international oversight and activism in areas such as human rights, elections, and institutional reform--areas in which only a few decades before governments would have bristled at outside interference. (9) The high point of the hemispheric democratic consensus came with the Organization of American States' (OAS) Resolution 1080 of 1991 in which the thirty-four member governments of the OAS granted the multilateral organization with the unprecedented authority to convene member states when it believed that there had been an interruption of the constitutional process (i.e. a coup) to discuss potential action, including suspension from the OAS and voluntary sanctions by member states. The resolution effectively committed the region to defending the democratic processes of governments. In the years that followed, the collective efforts of the OAS and the United States led to the reversal of coup attempts in Peru, Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay. Later, in an effort to address the growing, elusive threats to democratic rights and institutions from elected officials themselves, the OAS General Assembly approved The Democratic Charter on 11 September 2001. The charter defined democracy as representative democracy and outlined the OAS commitment to defend the checks and balances of demo cratic government, minority rights, and freedom of expression. Unfortunately, the charter did little to establish clear mechanisms to trigger a collective response for when these were at risk, and as a result the promise and hope of the charter has foundered since. However, even by 2001, the democratic consensus had already begun to fray. So too had the region's commitment to establishing an FTAA. The election of President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998, President Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005, President Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2006, and the reelection of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 2006 signaled the emergence of new political currents in the region, brought about in part by the collapse of their traditional party systems. The dramatic and painful

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 25 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001, a country once mistakenly thought to be the darling of the Washington Consensus, only added to the growing rejection in some quarters of the hemispheric consensus toward market reform. Combined with increasing discontent over the persistence of poverty and inequality in the region--in spite of the decade or so of reforms--the 2000s marked a partial and often cynical backlash against the tenets of the consensus and convergence that marked the previous era of market-driven economics and international defense of democracy. The natural corollary to this was renewed public skepticism of the United States and its motives, which had championed these causes. In reality, though, while a proponent of both the Washington Consensus and the efforts toward collective defense of democracy, neither had been unilateral tools of U.S. foreign policy but, rather, represented a broad and genuine consensus at the time.

Major policy needed to sustain hegemony in Latin America Sanchez, Loyola Chicago political science and Latin America Studies professor & Sholar, Loyola Chicago political science professor, 12
[Peter M. and Megan A., December 2012, International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, ―Power and Principle: A New US Policy for Latin America‖, Vol. 2, No. 23, http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_23_December_2012/3.pdf, p. 18, accessed 7/6/13, ALT] Since the turn of the century, however, several Latin American countries have elected presidents who are ¶ questioning the so-called Washington consensus. If the United States wishes to remain the region‘s hegemon, it ¶ must act quickly to design a new regional policy, akin to Roosevelt‘s Good Neighbour policy or Kennedy‘s ¶ Alliance for Progress. Only a more ―ethical‖ policy toward the region will ensure that America can continue to ¶ exercise hegemony. By employing the term ―ethical,‖ we are suggesting that the US government will need to ¶ ensure that its foreign policy benefits the countries of Latin America, providing such universal values as ¶ democracy, peace, and prosperity. A new, ethical policy will not only guarantee vital US interests, but it will also ¶ promote the principles that America has rhetorically stood for since its founding—democracy and selfdetermination—and will therefore be welcomed by the leaders and people of the region.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 26 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Security Cooperation Increases Influence
Security cooperation bolsters US leadership Marcella, U.S. Army War College Americas Studies director, 13
(Gabriel, 3/22/13, Journal of International Affairs, ―The transformation of security in Latin America: a cause for common action,‖ http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+transformation+of+security+in+Latin+America%3a+a+cause+for+co mmon...-a0330143508, accessed 7/9/13, IC) Consensus for collective action is emerging. Colombia has gone the furthest in reducing violence by attacking the sources of violence and asserting greater territorial control. Its experience in democratic state building makes it a model that other countries have been adapting. The task is to simultaneously establish security and rule of law and consolidate the presence and services of the state. (51) Though the work is far from complete, Colombia is more secure and economically dynamic than thirteen years ago. Proud of its accomplishment, it is providing security assistance to others. For example, by 2012, Colombia (52) 1. trained over 11,000 police officers from twenty-one Latin American and African countries, and Afghanistan; 2. trained more than 6,000 Mexican law enforcement personnel, over 500 prosecutors and judicial personnel, and twenty-four Mexican helicopter pilots; 3. provided training programs and exchanges with Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti, Peru, and Paraguay; and 4. were invited by Mexico and Panama to have their national police share lessons learned on the introduction of state services and rule of law into areas where the state is weak. Additionally, the Colombian Army provides an infantry battalion to the UN Multinational Force and Observers mission in Sinai. Besides Colombia, El Salvador sent army battalions in support of the coalition in the second Iraq war. Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic also sent troops in 2003 for one year. OPERATION MARTILLO Thus far, Operation Martillo is the most extensive demonstration of the emerging international civil-military coalition against the scourge of narcotics. It is also a form of burden sharing between countries that produce, transport, and consume illegal narcotics. Multinational law enforcement and military forces detect, monitor, and interdict narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean and Central American areas. Traffickers use sophisticated submarines, which can remain under water for thousands of miles, to carry cocaine across borders. (53) Directed by the Joint Interagency Task Force South, as of 2012, the following countries have participated in Operation Martillo: Belize, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States. It is imperative to note that military personnel support civilian authority in the interdiction operations. The interdictions, boarding, search, seizures, and arrests are conducted by U.S. Coast Guard law-enforcement personnel or partnered with other national drug law enforcement agencies. (54) The map below indicates the impact on reducing the flow of cocaine. (55) [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Lamentably, politics at the moment impede progress. Ecuador and Venezuela, which are transit areas for drugs, dirty money, guns, and precursor chemicals, do not participate in the vital operation. Their nonparticipation is based on political and ideological grounds; they see cooperation with the United States as a bigger threat to their sovereignty than the international criminals who devastate the people of Ecuador and Venezuela. Even Mexico, which historically feared security cooperation with the United

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 27 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz States, is working closely with Washington via the Merida Initiative to strengthen public security within Mexico. PEACEKEEPING While insecurity increases in the region, a number of Latin American countries are contributing to international security and peace. Brazil has global power aspirations and embarked on a comprehensive modernization of its armed forces (56) Latin American countries have been contributing to international peacekeeping for decades. (57) These countries are motivated by prestige as well as a desire to contribute to international peace and security, support multilateralism (in order to enhance the democratization of global governance), and provide professional development and financial benefits for military personnel. Latin American countries have contributed personnel or battalion-size formations to places as varied as Kashmir, Gaza, Lebanon, Central America, Cyprus, Ecuador, Peru, Croatia, East Timor, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sudan. Perhaps the largest Latin American undertaking is participation in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, with Brazil providing the command and control and contributing logistics. Personnel come from the following countries: (58) Military: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Police: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Uruguay. In addition, Argentina established a regional peacekeeping training center. POLICY IMPLICATIONS The transformation in the security environment calls for common action. The hemispheric community must build on the emerging strategic consensus. Security arrangements and institutions must be modernized and made effective in order to confront the complex web of transnational threats arrayed against the weak state syndrome. One of the geopolitical realities of the Americas is that little can be accomplished without the leadership and support of the United States. Plan Colombia, Operation Martillo, and the Merida Initiative validate this principle. The U.S. Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the analogous Caribbean Basin Security Initiative are the latest evolutions of the lessons learned--notably from the Colombian experience--in strengthening the capacity of states to deal with the onslaught of drugs, violence, and corruption. With a budget of $496 million in U.S. assistance, the five goals of CARSI are to (59) 1. create safe streets; 2. disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband; 3. support the development of strong, capable, and accountable governments; 4. reestablish effective state presence and security; and 5. foster security, the rule of law coordination, and cooperation within and between nations of the region. So far CARSI has had only modest success due to a need to better coordinate and establish priorities within the agencies of the U.S. government, and acquire stronger commitments from Central American governments to be more proactive. The $496 million is seed money that must be augmented by the Central Americans themselves. (60) The central lesson to be learned from American and European support to Colombia is that the host country must mobilize resources in the form of dedicated expertise, money, and sustained programs. The host country must take ownership so that reforms and institution building are legitimately rooted in its cultural and political soil, and the lessons inculcated into the ministries of governance and security, as well as civil society. The international community should provide advice and critical resources on a matched funding basis. To do otherwise invites failure. In addition, the United States should deepen security partnerships with key countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Caribbean and Central American countries that have the political will and who welcome the opportunity to build more capacity within a structure of regional security. The task is made easier by increasing convergence on the concept of multidimensional security. History will show whether this generation of leaders in the Americas will match its splendid sentiments with effective action, and whether it will be able to set aside ideology and narrow nationalism in order to promote peace, economic development, and democracy.

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US is key to successful cooperation – military-to-military relations and funding make the US the best candidate to solve terror Daremblum, Hudson Institute Center for Latin American Studies Director, 5
(Jaime, 11/2/05, Hudson Institute, ―Terrorism in Latin America,‖ http://www.hudson.org/files/documents/terrorism_in_latin_america.pdf, p. 5-6, accessed 7/9/13, IC) Further Steps In many and different ways, the fight against terrorism in Latin America has been yielding substantial results, in no small measure thanks to the resolve shown by some key champions in this struggle –Colombia comes to mind immediately-, and the help provided by the US, all of which has strengthened Inter-American cooperation. But as in all human undertakings there is room for our countries to improve their efforts in the ongoing battle against terrorism, an enemy which cannot be defeated unless we defeat first hunger, poverty and provide better opportunities and, above all, hope to the younger generations of Latin America. Allow me to point out some critical areas that must be addressed if we are to succeed in this difficult task: • It is imperative to foster development and better living conditions. We must do our best to back Latin American efforts for growth and improvement in their living standards. In this regard, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created with bipartisan support, are a powerful and commendable idea. Equally important are CAFTA-DR, the Free Trade Agreements being negotiated with the Andean countries, and the proposal of the U S Trade Representative, Robert Portman -in the context of the Doha Round negotiations- to reduce trade barriers affecting agricultural exports from Latin American countries. • Institutions and government accountability must be strengthened The weakness of key institutions such as the Judiciary is at the root of the most serious cases of instability in Latin American. Institution building is always difficult, and more so after dictatorships have unwoven essential parts of the social fabric. This calls for: o An independent and capable judicial system, essential to encourage growth, fight corruption and ensure respect for human rights. o Property rights must be strengthened because they provide the bedrock for investment, entrepreneurship, and encourage asset leveraging by the poorer strata of society; o Education and health systems are basic to create better opportunities for new and older generations of Latin Americans. o Better Funding must be assured. for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), being provided through the Department of State to Latin American countries in order to improve their capabilities in airport security management, bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism financing. Such funding has been relatively short and most of it is consumed by aid to Colombia. Apart from that nation, funding was $2.5 million for the entire Western Hemisphere in 2002. For 2004, it was $5.3 million, including Colombia. In 2005, an estimated $11.1 million has been budgeted, of which $3.9 million is for Colombia and $0.5 million for the TBA. The 2006 request is $9.7 million, with the same amounts as 2005 for Colombia and the TBA. This is an effort that could and should be strengthened to allow improvements in anti-terrorism capabilities in Latin America. US can foster positive trends in the region. Inter-American cooperation in the fight against terrorism is a very positive and key trend that must be encouraged. Given the good military-tomilitary relations in the fight against terrorism, it is very important to find ways to make the American Service Members Protection Act more flexible, as suggested by Senator Coleman in recent presentations at Hudson and before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, so that foreign military training in Latin America is not hindered by differences over the International Criminal

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 29 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Court. A way has to be found in order to preserve and promote the military cooperation that is and will be needed for the success of counterterrorism efforts in Latin America. • Finally, I believe diplomacy needs to be improved both in the US and Latin America. The US has to become more engaged in the region, and President Bush‘s upcoming visit to the area is a very positive step in this direction. On the other hand, Latin American nations should overcome the traditional mode of flirting with antidemocratic leaders as a way of showing independence from Washington. To face the clear and present dangers, cooperation, not confrontation, is required.

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Trade Increases Influence
Free Trade Agreements boosts US-Latin American Relations Boaz, Cato Institute Executive Vice President, 9
(David, CATO Handbook for Policymakers, 2009, page 642, CATO Institute, RH) Washington should likewise continue to pursue free trade with other Latin American countries that have liberalized their economies and are eager to sign a trade treaty with the United States. Independent of free trade negotiations, the United States should immediately reduce its barriers to Latin America‘s exports, especially textiles and agricultural products. At a time when U.S. credibility is being questioned, such a move would restore some goodwill toward Washington and might help persuade reluctant countries to reduce some of their own trade barriers. At the very least, the United States could then not be blamed for hypocrisy, and the welfare of both the United States and Latin America would improve. Such a unilateral policy of reducing trade barriers, moreover, would not conflict with the goal of negotiating free trade agreements. As Cato Institute scholar Brink Lindsey points out, the United States has regularly signed trade agreements affecting sectors of the U.S. economy that enjoy virtually no protection. For countries that are interested in free trade with the United States, such agreements offer the advantage of ‗‗locking in‘‘ free trade both at home and abroad. Indeed, the certainty provided by free trade treaties is one of their greatest benefits and explains why they tend to result in increases of both trade and investment.

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LA Key to US Hegemony
Latin America key to US heg – trade relations are the security pacts of today Quiliconi, PhD in Politics and IR from USC, 5
(Cintia, 1/1/05, Center for Policy Studies, ―US-Latin American Trade Relations: Path to the Future or Dead End Street,‖ https://cps.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/cps-working-paper-us-latin-americantrade-relations-2005.pdf, p. 24-26, accessed 7/6/13, IC) Brazil‘s engagement with regional integration needs to be understood in strategic and political terms, relating to the construction of sub-regional leadership as a means of mediating the hegemony of the US in the hemispheric and multilateral arenas (Phillips, 2003). The Brazilian indifference to regionalism in the mid-1990s has been replaced by an activism oriented toward strengthening the Brazilian leadership in the region. But at the same time, the reinforcement of Brazilian leadership in the region is seen with benevolent eyes in the US. In this sense, the US needs Brazil‘s cooperation to make progress on critical regional issues such as Venezuela‘s worsening political confrontation and Colombia‘s criminal violence and guerrilla warfare. At the same time, Brazil‘s voice also carries weight on broader international issues such as global trade negotiations and the struggle against AIDS. Lula da Silva has proven, as have most of the new left governments in the region, to be more pragmatic than ideological, a left-wing leader managing to keep support of diverse constituencies domestically and abroad. So far, trade and particularly FTAA negotiations have been the only issues to provoke open friction between the US and Brazil. They have been able to cooperate on difficult issues such as Venezuela and Colombia and have managed to swallow harsh rhetoric and avoid public quarrels on other issues, such as Cuba and the Iraq war (Hakim, 2004). The FTAA ambitious plan described by President Bush as a ―vital link for prosperity,‖ is mired in disputes that have led to widespread skepticism and opposition about its chances of materializing from not only governmental sources but also civil society movements. With large countries in South America such as Brazil and Argentina firmly opposed to the initiative, the US has clearly redirected its efforts in the last two years from the FTAA to bilateral negotiations with a handful of smaller countries in Central America and the Andean region. However, looking farther South, the Andean nations of Bolivia and Ecuador, hit by violent tumult have little chance to sign a trade agreement anytime soon. Even Peru and Colombia, both having good relations with the US, are experiencing opposition in bilateral negotiations with the US, hesitating because of concerns that their farming sectors may be negatively affected by subsidized American imports. After more than four years of talks, the Bush administration‘s grand initiative in the hemisphere, the FTAA, and the many bilateral negotiations that they have proposed under the competitive liberalization strategy, have signed only Mexico and Chile as full partners. The free trade agenda is becoming a serious problem in Latin America. CAFTA countries are facing resistance to pass the USCAFTA agreement through their Congresses, and negotiations with Andean countries are still shallow and not free of domestic resistance. Prospects were much more positive when President Bush was elected in his first term. Latin America was then declared a priority, and the administration began drumming up support for a tariff-free $3.4 trillion trade bloc stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, comprising 823 million people. ―Democratic freedoms cannot flourish unless our hemisphere also builds a prosperity whose benefits are widely shared. Open trade is an essential foundation for that prosperity and that possibility,‖ President Bush told the Organization of American States in April 2001. The 9/11 attacks have caused a redirection of US priorities abroad in which the scope of engagement with Latin America has shrunk on almost every front except trade policy (Hakim, 2003). But increasingly, Latin American governments and particularly civil society view free trade with the US with suspicion. At the same time, after the failure of the Washington consensus policies the region shifted to left-wing governments and has

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 32 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz become increasingly wary of the US‘s economic prescriptions as growth flagged and promises of prosperity vanished. The reasons for caution are numerous, from the potent anti-globalization movement that has swept South America, to practical concerns in many Latin American countries about what opening their markets to the US, the world‘s largest economy, would mean for their industries. Ideology has also played a role, with Washington‘s leading antagonist in the region, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, calling the Bush administration‘s free trade agenda ―the medicine of death‖ more than just a backlash against market reforms and the perceived trade agenda of the US, Chávez has become a key element in the regional opposition to the US financing subversive movements in Latin America such as the MAS4 (Movement Towards Socialism) in Bolivia and the communist narcoguerrillas in Colombia. In recent months, two governments that the US had hoped would sign free trade deals have collapsed in the wake of protests with a strong anti-globalization component. In April 2005, Ecuador‘s president, Lucio Gutiérrez, who had close economic relations with the US, was forced out of power amidst riots and violent social protests. Then, in June 2005, in the middle of widespread social protests, Bolivia‘s Congress accepted President Carlos Mesa‘s resignation and subsequently appointed a new president, Eduardo Rodríguez, who faces the threat of more protests. In this scenario it is impossible to think that Bolivia can start talks to sign a FTA with the US. However, American officials have not given up, stating that most countries in the region should expect even more benefits by signing trade deals with the US. The American focus, for the time being, is to secure a trade pact with CAFTA-DR, in order to set the stage for talks with other countries. The ratification of the US-CAFTA agreement is the key to continue momentum in the US move to sign bilateral FTAs in the region. Nonetheless, the American talks with the nations of the Andean countries, which started in May 2004, are meeting obstacles. In Colombia, the agriculture sector has lobbied against a free trade deal, claiming that stopping tariffs on American imports while the US maintains subsidies to its farmers would destroy Colombian agriculture. In Bolivia, the authorities worry about small but healthy industries like the country‘s pharmaceutical sector. A free trade deal would extend patent protections on old American products, in effect phasing out the generic brands. The impact would not be immediate, but in the long term could result in the closing of these companies. The interconnection between governments and civil society in the Americas is nowadays more sophisticated, showing that the trade regime has become a complex, multi-layered arena where social forces and contending political projects compete, a far cry from the simple manifestation of an uncontested hegemonic project for market-driven integration as initially mapped out by the US. In this scenario, the prospect of finishing a comprehensive, far-reaching agreement at the FTAA is very unlikely. Nowadays, a two level (hemispheric and bilateral) trade liberalization strategy is guiding the hemispheric trade agenda. In this scenario, the FTAA would probably just imply certain superficial commitments in all the topics under negotiation, meanwhile bilateral trade negotiations led by the US are blossoming and becoming the key to deepening liberalization commitments with Latin American countries. Anti-Americanism in Latin America was first related to security issues but after the failure of the Washington consensus policies the root of this sentiment mainly originates from economic issues. Nonetheless, if we take into account that economic policy became much more explicitly linked to security policy (Higgott, 2004), it is not that anti-Americanism has changed its target, only that security issues are intertwined with economic issues and the US is exerting soft power through economic relations with security aims. Since 9/11, security has become a top priority, and the US has been criticized for growing distant and detached from the Latin American region, yet anti-Americanism has resurfaced in the spheres of trade and economics, confirming the entrenchment between security and economic issues. Hemispheric and bilateral US Free Trade Agreement proposals are closely connected to this country‘s global hegemony strategy. These new bilateral trade agreements proposed by the US are intertwined with the follow-up of the dissemination of the neo-liberal agenda. However, it is important to highlight that beyond the expansion of the neo-liberal agenda, the US interests in the region are related to security and democracy agendas. In this sense, the FTAA negotiations and the proliferation of bilateral agreements proposed by the US embed security-related strategies into broader trade and economic issues.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 33 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Trade liberalization has become mixed with other causes, including the conflation of markets and political freedom under US leadership (Tussie, 2005). In essence, this was the universal projection of the American dream—a vision of economic plenty in the context of political freedom as expressed some decades later in the notion of a ―free world‖. Often a menace or an enemy was necessary to garner consensus on further liberalization. The spirit was re-embodied in the Trade Act of 2002: ―The expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the US. Trade is critical to economic growth and strength of the US and its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships promote security and prosperity. Trade Arrangements today serve the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold War, binding nations together through a series of rights and obligations. Leadership by the US in international trade fosters open markets, democracy and peace throughout the world.‖ (US Trade Act of 2002: Title XXI). As the US extends its power and influence abroad, the challenges multiply. What should be apparent is that as developmental values regain legitimacy, the trade arena has become a site of resistance where the weak or under-represented seek windows of opportunity to reshape rules and reduce pressure for policies they wish to evade or for which they want offsetting concessions. These challenges are not necessarily a general rejection of future cooperation at all times. As they grow in strength and stature, emerging players are investing in becoming technically empowered to resist, confront and shape a number of outcomes. Dealing with the US is less an exercise of helplessness than an exercise of accommodation where state and non-state players interact and feed off each other in a process whereby even though not organic, values become shared, rules gradually codified and all players are able to reinvent themselves.

Expanding markets, drug trade, and immigration all mean that Latin America is a strategic region for the US, and increasing global presence makes it key to global hegemony Carlsen, IRC Americas program of the International Relations Center director, and Barry, IRC‘s policy director, 6
(Laura, Tom, 2/10/06, Americas Program, ―U.S. Hegemony Or Global Good Neighbor Policy,‖ http://www.countercurrents.org/sa-carlsen100206.htm, accessed 7/6/13, IC) Over the past few years we have faced two major challenges in conceiving of a new foreign policy in Latin America. The first is the relative lack of attention to the region, by both the U.S. government and public. The second is the increasing friction between the current U.S. administration's strategies for global U.S. hegemony and Latin American elected governments and grassroots trends toward greater independence and new models. The following policy review of U.S.-Latin American relations examines the salient new developments in Latin America and the Caribbean and U.S. policy in the region. It concludes with general guidelines for a more coherent and constructive U.S. Latin American policy in the region, along the lines of the ―Global Good Neighbor Ethic for U.S. Foreign Policy.‖ I. Why Latin America Matters Over the past five years, the United States had paid relatively little attention to Latin America. Since September 11, policymakers, media, and the U.S. public have kept the focus on the Middle East and Muslim countries. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, foreign policy, while gaining greater public attention, has become nearly synonymous with the debate over the occupation of that country and the deteriorating conditions for peace in the Middle East. The United States still retains a special sense of hegemony over its ―near abroad‖ or backyard. But in an age of the global war on terror, global economic integration, and global communication, geographical proximity has reduced relevance in prioritizing international relations. As the only remaining superpower

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 34 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, Washington has come to regard the entire globe as its natural domain. One result of this global reach is that less importance is attached to relations with Latin America than to nations with more strategic resources, especially oil, more profitable investment locations, geopolitical importance, and those that offer expanding consumer markets. The problem for Latin America is that the lack of coherent policymaking has led to stopgap and piecemeal policies, far more reactive than pro-active. These policies, while generally falling under the erroneous framework of the National Security Doctrine, are not based on a comprehensive and careful analysis of the region; nor do they take into account the needs of the countries themselves. Moreover, between the distinct policy areas—counternarcotics operations, development aid, anti-terrorism, immigration restriction, trade liberalization—they frequently contradict each other and fail to consider broader policy objectives in the region. Historically, the reasons for Latin America 's relevance to U.S. interests—as defined by the governing elite—have changed. Latin America and the Caribbean were traditionally linked to the United States by geography. In the early 19 th century the U.S. government instituted the Monroe Doctrine to ensure that the Western Hemisphere would remain outside the dominance of colonial powers and mercantilists. In this way it asserted both its interest and its hegemony over the region. The purpose was not only to pull the new nations of the hemisphere into its sphere of influence but also to keep other countries out. This served both security interests and economic objectives. The Cold War dictated a new set of objectives oriented toward eliminating what were defined as communist threats. But since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the ―global war on terrorism,‖ Latin America has taken a back seat in U.S. foreign policy in relation to other parts of the world. The former rationales of proximity, defeating communism, and maintaining regional hegemony have fallen away to new, more complex forms of involvement. For many who have analyzed or experienced firsthand the U.S. policies that fomented civil wars, supported military dictators, or helped overthrow elected governments, neglect may seem a positive development in U.S.-Latin American relations. But the United States continues to exercise strong hegemonic ties in the region, whether through its expanding military presence, NAFTA-style trade agreements, or the dictates of U.S.-dominated international financial institutions. Latin America is still a crucial area for the United States. Moreover, recent political trends have placed it squarely in the center of major debates on the future of U.S. foreign policy and the course of globalization. Latin American nations have called into question the U.S. government's efforts to militarize international relations under a counterterrorism agenda that does not reflect the reality of the region and have increasingly protested the neoliberal model. At this juncture, to base alternative U.S. policy in the region on a negative agenda—what the U.S. should not do in Latin America—would be short-sighted, and ultimately would be only a defensive position. Although regional attention has been spotty, conservatives developed a long-term and cohesive foreign policy agenda centered on U.S. global hegemony over a decade ago. To counter that agenda of military presence, intervention, corporate privileges, and deepening rifts between the rich and the poor, we too must develop a more comprehensive agenda. What's clear is that in today's globalized world, the United States and Latin America remain inextricably linked—and in some ways even more so. The large U.S. market, expanding Latin American markets for U.S. goods, the international drug trade, immigration—all underline the strategic relationship that exists between the two regions. It is also clear that many countries in Latin America are taking bold steps toward addressing some of the worst inequities of corporate-led globalization and their colonial heritage. A U.S. foreign policy that supports, rather than counters, these initiatives and that resolutely respects the right to self-determination could bring our nations into a shared community of values based on sustainable development, inclusive democracy and peace. II. Continental Drift: Trends in Latin America

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 35 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Despite the more dramatic developments in other parts of the world, Latin America has drawn world attention on an increasing number of occasions. This time it has not been due to major crises, such as the economic crashes that rocked the continent with Mexico 's peso devaluation in 1995 or the implosion of the Argentine economy in 2001. Instead, the region has made headlines for its new and unexpected political leadership that in some cases extends to the global stage.

Latin America is key – it‘s the US traditional backyard, has a booming economy, specifically Brazil, and is of interest by China, a potential hegemonic rival – means any shift in power represents a global shift Brand, University of Mainz Department of Political Science Post-Doc Researcher, et al. 12
(Alexander, McEwen-Fial, Susan, University of Mainz Department of Political Science Lecturer, Muno, Wolfgang, University of Erfurt Visiting Professor of Political Science, Hoffman, Andrea Ribeiro, University of Erfurt Willy Brandt School of Public Policy Lecturer, 4/12, University of Mainz, ―BRICs and U.S. Hegemony: Theoretical Reflections on Shifting Power Patterns and Empirical Evidence from Latin America,‖ http://international.politics.uni-mainz.de/files/2012/10/mpiep04.pdf, p. 2-3, accessed 7/6/13, IC) In our paper we want to assess the validity of such claims by looking at current developments in Latin America. In general, a regional focus as such has its merits beyond the question what makes Latin America a rather unique case given a peculiar constellation of factors (see below): In specifying a ―target region‖ of political and other strategies, it allows for a more differentiated account of how gradually shifting power patterns or potentials indeed translate into political consequences ―on the ground‖. In our case, a regional focus is to elucidate the factual political implications of a shift in capabilities and patterns of actions among states and between their respective societies. Moreover, shifting patterns of regional hegemony might (as has historically been the case) be indicative of global power shifts. This is because global hegemony – sketched here in a first attempt as the propensity of a state to shape the fate of others on a global scale1 – at least with regard to the case of U.S. hegemony clearly had a regional base to start with a/o to rely upon (e.g. Layne 2006).2 Latin America as a region in itself is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it is seen as the ―traditional backyard‖ of the regional hegemon, the U.S. (e.g. Livingston 2009). Therefore, it could be assumed that any perceived challenges would be tackled in some way or another by the United States thus leading to some form of hegemonic rivalry. Second, the region is home to one of the BRIC-states, namely Brazil, which is increasingly being discussed as a regional powerhouse with not only the potential to act as such but also the aspirations to do so (e.g. Varas 2008). And third, it has recently been deemed of heightened strategic importance by another BRIC-country situated outside the region, namely China. Although the authors might disagree about the implications for such activism regarding the status of China as a regional hegemonic contender – in terms of its calculus as well as its perception in the eyes of key U.S. policymakers (e.g. Paz 2006; Cala 2011) – it should be clear that the alleged (coming or already existing) hegemonic rivalry between the U.S. and China on a global scale serves as a backdrop to such thoughts. In this regard, it is not by chance that both diagnoses often go in tandem: the ―rise of China‖ is seen as part of the ―U.S. decline‖. 3 In that sense, if the ascendancy of the BRICs is to be interpreted as the rise of contenders to U.S. hegemony, developments in Latin America should give us a grasp on the emerging form of contestation as well as efforts on behalf of the United States to manage such attempts. The second section outlines a more differentiated concept of hegemony. Such an account allows us to infer political intentionalities as well as politically relevant implications of changing patterns of action among a set of actors. This is not to say that a more traditional reading of, let us say, military capabilities,

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 36 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz trade volumes, monetary reserves and financial flows is of no use. But a rather simple talk about shifting trends in figures and relative shares within some sectors is either misleading (Strange 1988) or just ―not enough‖ (e.g. Nye 2011: esp. 153-204) if one is to assess political consequences in terms of power shifts or alterations in the patterns of influence. In other words, to speak about quantifiable trends might constitute an important aspect of any assessment of hegemony and hegemonic rivalry, but obviously omits key facets as well.

US global heg hinges on its economy – Latin America‘s booming economies, geographical proximity, and strong trade ties makes it a key partner Bitar, Inter-American Dialogue non-resident Senior Fellow, 11
(Sergio, 9/11, Inter-American Dialogue, ―Latin America and the United States: Looking Towards 2020,‖ http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/LAtheUS2020.pdf, p. 2-3, accessed 7/6/13, IC) Over the last decade, the United States has had to adjust to the relative decline of its global power. Its future influence will be subject to greater economic limitations. Latin America, meanwhile, with the exception of a few countries, has emerged from a decade of good governance in a stronger position. The region generally enters the next decade in favorable circumstances for continued development. In speeches in the three countries he visited, President Obama recognized the emergence of a new multipolar world. As in Egypt and India and at the 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, he proposed new alliances for the pursuit of global governance and, as a result, new partnerships among countries. Speaking in Santiago to the entire region, Obama used the word partner or partnership 24 times and repeated a phrase he had said in Trinidad: ―There are no senior partners and there are no junior partners, there are only equal partners.‖ Obama‘s vision clearly differs from that of his predecessor. While President George W. Bush employed similar terminology, he carried out a markedly unilateral and militaristic policy based on the premise of a hegemonic power, which was divorced from the current reality. The data supporting this new reality are eloquent. The United States has accumulated an unprecedented debt that will limit its ability to wield global influence for many years, particularly in the coming decade. The recent financial crisis deeply shook the US economy and the international financial system, raising questions about the capacity of the United States to properly regulate its banking and financial sectors. The US military is over-extended, fighting wars on three fronts at the same time, and seems uncertain about how to deal with Chinese expansion. Against this backdrop, the US administration appears to be advancing a new vision, one that maintains that the country will continue to be the leading power—but its power relative to others will decline. This vision recognizes that military muscle alone is not enough to maintain order, spread US values, and advance strategic interests. Instead, it reaffirms that the basis for renewed US power lies in the strengthening of a competitive economy, which is the only way to sustain its global influence. For such a concept to take hold greater austerity in the US domestic economy will be required and new alliances to regain influence will need to be pursued. That thinking was reflected in President Obama‘s State of the Union address in January 2011. Meanwhile, emerging economies keep upsetting the balance of economic power. In a February 2011 talk at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, Indian economist A. Virmani projected that the size of China‘s economy (measured by per-capita income, adjusted for purchasing power, and multiplied by the population) would overtake that of the United States by 2020, while India and Brazil would surpass Japan and France, respectively, by 2015, and Russia would surpass Germany shortly after 2020. China keeps growing at a pace that shows no signs of slowing. Its saving rate is more than 40 percent, the world‘s highest. Its consumption level in recent years has been less than 40 percent of GDP, while Europe‘s is 60 percent and the United States‘ exceeds 70 percent.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 37 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Its domestic market has a tremendous potential for growth, fueled by the rapid expansion of the middle class. The domestic market and strong public spending enable China to protect itself from the vagaries of external demand and keep growth rates up. That middle class will keep driving demand for commodities and food, along with new goods and services. China‘s economy is nimble and competitive. In this decade, it risks a slowdown only if growing pressure for a political opening and more freedom and participation prove unmanageable for the ruling Communist Party. India, likewise, is seeing continued growth that will make it a stronger influence in global and hemispheric affairs. In this context, it is plausible that in coming years Latin America will continue to move towards Asia. After all, Asia‘s share of new global demand will be greater than those of the advanced economies, and the region will also offer new export markets and investments in Latin America. The two giants—China and India—will join Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and Turkey in posting growth rates that exceed those of the developed nations and therefore accounting for a larger share of world GDP. The world that is taking shape will be multipolar and more interconnected and interdependent than ever before. The United States will be its largest shareholder, though a minority one—and it will have to come to terms with these new circumstances.1 Latin America, for its part, faces a new window of opportunity that it should take advantage of. It is well positioned for a forward push to pursue substantive reforms in the coming decade. The United States cannot underestimate the importance of a region whose current population of 500 million is expected to reach 600 million by 2020. National differences aside, Latin America‘s democracies have spread and will continue to deepen. The progress achieved should be viewed in light of the changes underway in the Middle East. For the most part, Latin America has little risk of armed conflict among countries. Its key challenge is to defeat the violence and organized crime that threatens democratic institutions, especially in northern Central America. Latin American economies have grown and diversified. In recent years their governments‘ macroeconomic management has been more responsible and effective than that of the developed countries. Most nations have made significant strides in reducing poverty, although serious inequalities remain. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on March 18, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized just how important Latin America has become for the United States. More than 40 percent of US exports go to the region; the United States sells more to Chile and Colombia than to Russia; and Brazil is a global power with a growing economy and deepening democracy that will play a greater role in the energy field. Clinton underlined that geography was an important factor to maintain and improve the close link between the United States and Mexico and Central America, to work jointly with new initiatives to address serious crime and drug issues.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 38 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Latin American Hegemony Good

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 39 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Stability
Loss of American hegemony in Latin America will lead to regional violence and instability Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13
(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR) The United States' reduced ability to unilaterally get what it wants in the hemisphere is already shaping Latin American countries' calculations of domestic and foreign policies and the formation of multilateral alliances. The last ten years have witnessed the emergence of regional and multilateral powers seeking to assert regional diplomatic power, if not to specifically reduce the role of the United States in intra-regional diplomacy. The most obvious and pointed example is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) formed by former President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, which includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela among others in a bloc vowed to oppose a now-defunct plan to establish a hemisphere-wide free-trade agreement. At the same time, as its economy rebounded quickly and strongly from the 2007 global financial crisis until 2012, Brazil has sought a greater regional and even global role, exerting its new found diplomatic and economic muscle, often as an alternative to U.S .influence in matters as diverse as the threat of political upheaval in Venezuela to the UN drive to sanction Iran for its nuclear ambitions. Yet, there may likely be a down side to the retrenchment of U.S. leadership and prerogative in the region. While there are multiple tragic examples of U.S. intervention and a long history of abuse by U.S. power that have thwarted the political and economic development of countries such as Guatemala or Haiti, U.S. leadership and power have also brought benefits. For example, governments have long relied on U.S. leadership to champion specific causes, at times "passing the buck" to have U.S. support serve as a foil for a general principle or policy that they support but do not want to lead publicly. Similarly, recent cases of U.S. technical assistance and cooperation helped focus national attention and energy on addressing violence and crime in countries like Colombia and Mexico. Moreover, countries in the region have long benefited from the security provided by being in the U.S. diplomatic and military sphere of influence. This security has helped states struggling with violence and instability and contributed to intra-regional peace. Will a shift in U.S. power weaken these hemispheric public goods?

US power has lead policies, checked violence, and secured the region Sabatini, was the Latin America and the Caribbean at the National Endowment for Democracy Director, 13
(Christopher, Spring-Summer 13, Questia, ―Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony?‖, http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-330143504/will-latin-america-miss-u-s-hegemony#articleDetails, 7/6/13, AL) Yet, there may likely be a down side to the retrenchment of U.S. leadership and prerogative in the region. While there are multiple tragic examples of U.S. intervention and a long history of abuse by U.S. power that have thwarted the political and economic development of countries such as Guatemala or Haiti, U.S. leadership and power have also brought benefits. For example, governments have long relied on U.S. leadership to champion specific causes, at times "passing the buck" to have U.S.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 40 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz support serve as a foil for a general principle or policy that they support but do not want to lead publicly. Similarly, recent cases of U.S. technical assistance and cooperation helped focus national attention and energy on addressing violence and crime in countries like Colombia and Mexico. Moreover, countries in the region have long benefited from the security provided by being in the U.S. diplomatic and military sphere of influence. This security has helped states struggling with violence and instability and contributed to intra-regional peace. Will a shift in U.S. power weaken these hemispheric public goods?

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Democracy
Loss of US hegemony in Latin America leads to authoritarian and socialist expansion. Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11
(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH) WITH THE end of U.S. hegemony in Latin America, the region's authoritarians--Venezuela's Chavez, Cuba's Fidel and Raul Castro, and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega--have taken the opportunity to expand their own influence. Chavez, the Castro brothers, and Ortega form part of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a band of leftist governments led by Venezuela. Contending that Latin America remains shackled by the imperial United States and its lackeys at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, members of this group remain committed to a nonaligned diplomacy and seek friendships with the governments of such countries as Iran, Russia, and, to some extent, China. With the United States less involved in the region, the ALBA bloc will continue to play its cherished role as diplomatic spoiler and its members will face far fewer constraints on how radically they transform their societies. Take Bolivia, whose military recently declared itself "socialist, anti-imperialist, and anticapitalist." This declaration is no surprise, given that the Bolivian government has gone to great lengths to reduce U.S. influence in the country, especially in the armed forces. Cuban and Venezuelan military advisers have replaced U.S. ones. The consequences of such a shift within Bolivia's military will not be known for a while, but it is unlikely to be good for Bolivia's fledgling democracy. Thus far, the Chavez-led spoilers have been enabled by their more democratic counterparts. Although the democratic leaders enjoy the benefits of elections, a free press, and other signs of democratic vigor in their own countries, they are unwilling to confront other governments that undermine such rights. Many of the otherwise impressive leftist democratic governments in the region, such as those of former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet and Lula, have been wary of raising the subject, especially regarding Cuba and Venezuela. These leaders and others like them have been reluctant to speak out because they still share some sort of revolutionary solidarity with Chavez and the Castros and they remain overly sensitive to concerns about violating another nation's sovereignty.

US hegemony in Latin America has historically been beneficial—human rights Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13
(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR) Here, we turn to the last two provocative sources of soft power: moral leadership and aspirational leadership. While the United States may have cloaked national interests in the rhetoric of shared principles, there have been times--such as those discussed earlier--when its actions have helped to ensure positive political change and the reinforcement of human rights norms and standards in the region. The call of a common history, of democratic independence, and of a shared commitment to government by the people, while hard to quantify, remains powerful. Even those who have established themselves as opposed to U.S. influence and democracy, such as Presidents Chavez and Morales, defined their movements and governments as expressions of democratic participation and inclusion in the region. And as the United States advances its own processes of democratic inclusion--in areas of race,

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 42 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz gender, or sexual orientation--its efforts remain an inspiration and source of support for citizens in these countries. U.S. leadership on issues of civil rights, gender equality, and more recently lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights have helped to give voice to once-discriminated groups and have pressured governments directly and indirectly into addressing those concerns. Similarly, the aspirational aspect of U.S. power remains strong. Whether it is the desire to immigrate to seek work or to pursue higher education in the United States, the ineffable allure of the "colossus of the north" remains important. And, as personal ties between the United States and Latin America grow--through immigration, culture, education, and integration--so too will the importance of people's sense of personal and cultural connection to the United States.

Loss of American hegemony in Latin America leads to collapses of both democracy and defense of human rights—action must be taken soon Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13
(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR) Inarguably, Latin American countries have developed more scope for independent diplomatic activity in the last decade. Certain countries challenge U.S. interests and the democratic and market-oriented consensus of the post-Cold War era. The question is the cost this will have for the overall region and for the region's citizens over the long term. One such area is human rights. President Chavez pulled Venezuela out of the esteemed InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and Presidents Correa (of Ecuador) and Morales have sought to reduce the independence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights--two regional human rights bodies nominally under the OAS. In its fifty plus years of history, the inter-American system of human rights has protected citizens and defended human rights against unelected tyrants and unaccountable elected governments. Unfortunately, much of the region remained silent as countries have tried to gut these institutions. At the same time, the much-lauded advances in electoral standards that ushered in the longest history of democracy in the region and led to greater levels of political and social inclusion are at risk of being rolled back. In countries like the Dominican Republic in 1994 and Peru in 2000, after sitting presidents attempted to deny citizens their right to vote to choose their leaders, the United States helped to catalyze the regional coalitions that ultimately ensured that those citizens' demands and rights were recognized. The standards that the United States supported and U.S. leadership are now being eroded, as governments like Venezuela and Ecuador are refusing to invite electoral missions. Today, in a direct challenge to this history and to the legacy of the United States, UNASUR has announced its intention to form a body to observe elections, pushing aside many of the multilateral organizations and NGOs that have been doing it for decades. But without the technical capacity or the clear international normative or legal framework for conducting the complex task of pre-election monitoring and election-day observation, the effectiveness of UNASUR in protecting the right to vote and free and fair elections remains to be seen.

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AT – Regionalism Solves Vacuum
Subregional groups are not ready to take over hegemonic responsibility Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13
(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR) Diplomatically, the region has become more contentious for the United States, but a greater willingness to challenge U.S. positions on drug policy or question the wisdom of its Cuba policy should not be mistaken for broad-based opposition to the United States. These are legitimate points of debate--as was seen at the 2012 SOA in Cartagena, Colombia. They may require more diplomatic footwork but they are discussions largely among allies. At the same time, the emergence of the new subregional groupings such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) that pointedly exclude the United States, manifest a desire for the region to resolve intra-regional issues--including security and human rights-independently of the United States. But are they up to the task? While ALBA remains a thorn in the side of the United States, even before the death of Chavez, the Bolivarian Republic's petroleum-fueled vote buying had already started to weaken--especially as countries confronted their own internal challenges. And while UNASUR and CELAC are ambitious diplomatic initiatives, both remain for now just a roving series of presidential summits, with no institutional or normative basis or infrastructure

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 44 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Latin American Hegemony Bad

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 45 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Backfires – Counterbalancing
American imperialism leads Latin American countries to ally with US enemiesRussia, China, Iran. Burbach, Center for the Studies of The Americas Director et al. 13
[Roger, Michael Fox freelancer, Federico Fuentes Bolivian Socialist Alliance director, 3/11/13, ―Latin America‘s Turbulent Transitions‖, http://climateandcapitalism.com/2013/03/11/latin-americas-turbulenttransitions/, accessed 7/5/13, ALT] Anti-imperialism. In addition to regional integration, many Latin American governments look to multilateralism to counter domination and threats from the U.S. and other imperialist powers. They favour trade and diplomacy with all countries, but especially those such as Russia, China or Iran targeted by Washington because they defy Israel or threaten competition over access to oil and other vital resources. Even Brazil, which has long acted as a ―sub-hegemon, or sidekick to the United States in the region,‖ has, since the election of the PT government, begun ―to carve out a new independent foreign policy,‖ the authors write. It has not just worked to expand the new continental trade and diplomatic alliances but it has played a pivotal role in standing up to U.S. hegemony — for instance, by opposing Washington‘s blockade of Cuba, and sheltering deposed Honduran president Zelaya for weeks in its embassy in Tegucigalpa. And it stood behind Bolivia when that country‘s eastern agrobusiness elites launched an attempt in 2008 to overturn the Morales government.

Hegemony leads to the collapse of the American Empire Cunningham, expert in International Affairs and Masters in Agricultural Chemistry, 13
(Finian, 4/13/13, Press TV, ―Iran deals deathblow to US global hegemony‖, http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/04/12/297864/iran-key-to-us-global-defeat/, 7/7/13, AL) North Korea may present an immediate challenge to Washington‘s hegemonic ambitions. However, as we shall see, Iran presents a much greater and potentially fatal challenge to the American global empire. It is documented record, thanks to writers and thinkers like William Blum and Noam Chomsky, that the US has been involved in more than 60 wars and many more proxy conflicts, subterfuges and coups over the nearly seven decades since the Second World War. No other nation on earth comes close to this American track record of belligerence and threat to world security. No other nation has so much blood on its hands. Americans like to think of their country as first in the world for freedom, humanitarian principles, technology and economic prowess. The truth is more brutal and prosaic. The US is first in the world for war-mongering and raining death and destruction down on others. If the US is not perpetrating war directly, as in the genocide of Vietnam, then it is waging violence through surrogates, such as past South American dictatorships and death squads or its Middle Eastern proxy military machine, Israel. That bellicose tendency seems to have accelerated since the demise of the Soviet Union more than two decades ago. No sooner had the Soviet Union imploded than the US led the First Persian Gulf War on Iraq in 1991. That was then swiftly followed by a bloody intervention in Somalia under the deceptively charming title Operation Restore Hope.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 46 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Since then we have seen the US become embroiled in more and more wars - sometimes under the guise of ―coalitions of the willing‖, the United Nations or NATO. A variety of pretexts have also been invoked: war on drugs, war on terror, Axis of Evil, responsibility to protect, the world‘s policeman, upholding global peace and security, preventing weapons of mass destruction. But always, these wars are Washington-led affairs. And always the pretexts are mere pretty window-dressing for Washington‘s brutish strategic interests. Now it seems we have reached a phase of history where the world is witnessing a state of permanent war prosecuted by the US and its underlings: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq (again), Libya, Pakistan, Somalia (again), Mali and Syria, to mention a few. These theaters of criminal US military operations join a list of ongoing covert wars against Palestine, Cuba, Iran and North Korea. Fortunately, a twist of fate brought about by the Bolivarian Revolution of the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez has ensured that much of South America - the primary US so-called sphere of influence remains off-limits to Washington‘s depredations, at least for now. The question is: why has the US such an inordinate propensity for war? The answer is: power. The global capitalist economy mandates a fatal power struggle for the control of natural resources. To maintain its unique historic position of commanding capitalist profits and privilege, the US corporate elite - the executive of the world capitalist system - must have hegemony over the world‘s natural resources. The cold logic of this propensity was articulated clearly by US state planner George F Kennan in 1948: ―We should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.‖ In other words, Kennan was candidly admitting what US political leaders often dissimulate with fake rhetoric; that the US ruling elite has no interest in defending democracy, human rights or international law. The purpose is control of economic power, in accord with capitalist laws of motion. Kennan, who was one of the main architects of US foreign policy in the post-Second World War era, also noted with candidness and prescience: ―Were the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the ocean, the American military-industrial establishment would have to go on, substantially unchanged, until some other adversary could be invented. Anything else would be an unacceptable shock to the American economy.‖ Thus we see how after the ―evil empire‖ of the Soviet Union collapsed the US has been flailing to contrive a replacement ―enemy‖ and pretext for its essential militarism. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent ―war on terror‖ has fulfilled this purpose to a degree, even though it is replete with contradictions that belie its fraudulence, such as the support given to Al Qaeda terrorist elements currently to overthrow the government of Syria. The present threat of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula is not really about North Korea or the US-backed South Korean state. As in 1945, Korea was the site of the US flexing its military muscle towards its perceived main global rivals - Russia and China. As the SecondWorld War drew to a close, the advances made by Communist Russia and China in the Pacific against imperialist Japan were a cause for deep concern in Washington with its eyes on the post-war global carve-up. That is why the US took the unprecedented step of dropping atomic bombs on Japan. It was the most far-reaching demonstration of raw power by the US to its rivals. Russian and Chinese advances on the Korean Peninsula against the Japanese, which were welcomed by the Korean population, were halted dead in their tracks by the twin nuclear holocausts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The partition of Korea in 1945 at the behest of Washington was also part of the post-war demarcation for global influence and staking out control of resources. The American-instigated Korean War (1950-53) and the subsequent decades of tensions between the North and South states afforded Washington a permanent military presence in the Pacific. Rhetoric about ―defending our allies‖ reiterated again this week by US defense secretary Chuck Hagel is but a cynical chimera for the real purpose and rationale for Washington‘s presence in Korea -

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 47 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz strategic control of Russia and China for hegemony over natural resources, markets, transport, logistics, and ultimately capitalist profit. Tragically, North and South Korea are still caught in the cross-hairs of Washington‘s geopolitical war with Russia and China. That is what makes the present tensions on the Peninsula so dangerous. The US could gamble that a devastating strike on North Korea is the best way at this historical juncture for it to send another brutal message to its global rivals. Unfortunately, North Korea‘s nuclear capability and truculent attitude - amplified by the Western mainstream media - could serve as a superficial political cover for Washington to again take the military option. Iran, however, presents a greater and more problematic challenge to US global hegemony. The US in 2013 is a very different animal from what it was in 1945. Now it resembles more a lumbering giant. Gone is its former economic prowess and its arteries are sclerotic with its internal social decay and malaise. Crucially, too, the lumbering American giant has squandered any moral strength it may have had in the eyes of the world. Its veil of morality and democratic principle may have appeared credible in 1945, but that cover has been torn asunder by the countless wars and nefarious intrigues over the ensuing decades to reveal a pathological warmonger. The American military power is still, of course, a highly dangerous force. But it is now more like a bulging muscle hanging on an otherwise emaciated corpse. Iran presents this lumbering, dying power with a fatal challenge. For a start, Iran does not have nuclear weapons or ambitions and it has repeatedly stated this, thereby gaining much-reciprocated good will from the international community, including the public of North America and Europe. The US or its surrogates cannot therefore credibly justify a military strike on Iran, as it might do against North Korea, without risking a tsunami of political backlash. Secondly, Iran exerts a controlling influence over the vital drug that keeps the American economic system alive - the world‘s supply of oil and gas. Any war with Iran, if the US were so foolish to embark on it, would result in a deathblow to the waning American and global economy. A third reason why Iran presents a mortal challenge to US global hegemony is that the Islamic Republic is a formidable military power. Its 80 million-strong people are committed to antiimperialism and any strike from the US or its allies would result in a region-wide war that would pull down the very pillars of Western geopolitical architecture, including the collapse of the Israeli state and the overthrow of the House of Saud and the other the Persian Gulf oil dictatorships. US planners know this and that is why they will not dare to confront Iran head-on. But that leaves the US empire with a fatal dilemma. Its congenital belligerence arising from in its capitalist DNA, puts the US ruling elite on a locked-in stalemate with Iran. The longer that stalemate persists, the more the US global power will drain from its corpse. The American empire, as many others have before, could therefore founder on the rocks of the ancient Persian empire. However, the story will not end there. The attainment of world peace, justice and sustainability does not only necessitate the collapse of American hegemony. We need to overthrow the underlying capitalist economic system that gives rise to such destructive hegemonic powers. Iran represents a deathblow to the American empire, but the people of the world will need to build on the ruins.

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AT – US Hegemony Key to Stability
Latin America is more independent now – economics, stability, and aid programs prove they can solve their own problems, means no need for US action Crandall, Davidson University Political Science Associate Professor, 11
(Russell, May/June 2011, The Post-American Hemisphere, Foreign Affairs, Volume: 90 Issue: 3, Academic Search Complete. Accessed 7-6-13. RH) In recent years, however, Latin America's growth has begun to translate into more prosperous and developed societies. In countries as disparate as Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, the benefits of democracy and open markets are now finally beginning to trickle down to a citizenry that had lost faith in elected governments. This socioeconomic prosperity, in turn, is legitimizing the democratic system--a sort of virtuous cycle in a region more accustomed to vicious ones. Despite what the fiery rhetoric of leaders such as Chavez might indicate, in today's climate, Latin Americans want results, not blame. Armed revolution is now dead in the region that was once its cradle. In its stead, the region now has a new brand of leaders who have taken office through the ballot box and have striven to provide education, security, and opportunities for their constituents. Human capital and economic competitiveness, not rote anticapitalist slogans, are what occupy the thoughts of these politicians. They point proudly to the fact that 40 million Latin Americans were lifted out of poverty between 2002 and 2008, a feat accomplished largely through innovative and homegrown social programs. It has long been said that when the United States catches a cold, Latin America catches the flu. This has certainly been true in the economic realm, where jitters in the U.S. economy could quickly undermine Latin America's chronically weak financial and fiscal fundamentals. But during the recent global economic crisis, Latin America remained relatively unscathed. At the time, many predicted that Latin American governments--especially leftist ones suspected of being more predisposed to fiscal profligacy--would turn to the seductive tonic of populism. But leftist governments in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, to name a few, responded to the crisis with prudence. They refused to abandon market-friendly policies such as flexible exchange rates, independent central banks, and fiscal restraint. Some countries, such as Brazil and Peru, even continued to grow at almost China-like rates. In the past, when Latin America was in economic trouble, outsiders prescribed bitter medicine, such as severe fiscal austerity measures. In the last several years, however, the region has shown that it can address its own problems, even exporting its solutions globally. There is no greater example of the region's autonomy in economic policymaking than Brazil's Bolsa Família or Mexico's Oportunidades, conditional cash-transfer programs that give money to poor families if they meet certain requirements, such as enrolling their children in school. As the World Bank has noted, Bolsa Família targets the 12 million Brazilians who desperately need the assistance; most of the money is used to buy food, school supplies, and clothes for children. The program is also credited with helping reduce Brazil's notoriously high income inequality. The Brazilian and Mexican efforts have been widely emulated outside the region, including in the United States. Another example is Chile's creation of a rainy-day fund, filled with national savings from the country's copper production. This $12.8 billion account gave Chile a level of policy flexibility during the recent global economic downturn that the United States and many other industrial economies could only envy. As Latin America's achievements suggest, the region is growing up fast.

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US hegemony in Latin America impedes on economic independence and national sovereignty. Burbach Center for the Studies of The Americas Director et al 13
[Roger, Michael Fox freelancer, Federico Fuentes Bolivian Socialist Alliance director, 3/11/13, ―Latin America‘s Turbulent Transitions‖, http://climateandcapitalism.com/2013/03/11/latin-americas-turbulenttransitions/, accessed 7/5/13, ALT] Although these shifting patterns do not free Latin America from economic dependency on resource exports, they do give its governments more leverage to diversify economic alliances and strategies, develop an independent foreign policy and ward off some of the worst effects of the global economic crisis. It might be added — although the authors don‘t say this — that Beijing generally tends to be much more respectful than Washington of the national sovereignty of its trading partners. Its commercial relations, loans and other development assistance come with fewer strings attached. In recent years, Latin American governments have been able to develop a number of mutually beneficial regional economic and political agreements (MERCOSUR, UNASUR and ALBA, to cite only those), while rejecting Washington‘s attempt to foist a continental free-trade agreement, the FTAA, on the region.

Latin America is against US hegemony – even counternarcotic operations are seen as hegemonic in nature and elicited backlash Cárdenas, Brookings Institute Director and Senior Fellow, and Casas-Zamora, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow, 09
(Mauricio, Kevin, 9/15/09, Brookings Institute, ―Between Hypocrisy and Narcoterrorism in Latin America,‖ http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/09/15-colombia-cardenas, accessed 7/9/13, IC) The recent spat over the use of Colombian military bases by the U.S. armed forces poses crucial questions about the future of U.S.-Latin America relations. The agreement between the United States and Colombia will give the U.S. military access to seven existing facilities in order to carry out counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations. This would allow the United States to retain a presence on South American soil after the closure of its military base in Manta, Ecuador. Predictably, the agreement‘s announcement has met the wrath of Venezuela‘s President, Hugo Chávez, who has even threatened to sever diplomatic links with Colombia. Less predictably, however, it has been received with uneasiness by other South American governments, notably Brazil . Brazilian President Lula prominently brought it up in a recent conversation with President Obama. In the meantime, President Uribe, of Colombia, felt compelled to do a whirlwind tour of South American capitals to allay regional fears, an unusual diplomatic gesture with mixed results. There are lessons that the United States would do well to extract from this debate. Counternarcotics policies are the first motive invoked by both the United States and Colombia for the agreement. However, as the situation in Mexico and Central America shows, this is not just a bilateral issue. The Latin American countries are justifiably anxious about the dire implications of the U.S.‘ "War on Drugs" for the region. Numerous organizations and individuals, including the Brookings Institution‘s Partnership for the Americas Commission and the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, have called for a change in the current strategy which emphasizes forced eradication of illicit crops. Hence, if the United States is to have operational capacities in Latin America for its counternarcotics efforts, it should at least call for a proper dialogue between producing, consuming and transshipment countries. It is high time to have a meaningful hemispheric conversation to deal

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 50 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz with a problem whose solution lays not just in the jungles of Colombia, but also on the streets of Washington, Los Angeles and Chicago. A second lesson is as much about form as it is about substance. This agreement was abruptly announced and seems not to have been preceded by the diplomatic groundwork to prevent the chilly reaction it elicited from trustworthy U.S. allies, such as Chile and Brazil. By all appearances, they were caught by surprise. If a respectful partnership with Latin America is to be shaped, as announced by President Obama at the Summit of the Americas, U.S. diplomacy must do much better than this. In particular it has to show some awareness of the sensitivities of an emerging power, like Brazil, that sees itself playing a key role in the security of South America. Yet, Brazil and the rest of South America must understand a few things too. Brazil ought to realize that with power comes responsibility. If its security interests are to be taken seriously, not just by the U.S. but also by its South American neighbors, Brazil ought to step up significantly its security cooperation with the rest of the region, and support the Colombian government in its legitimate struggle against the FARC, a terrorist organization. Under Brazil‘s complacent gaze, the recent South American Union‘s Summit in Argentina failed to condemn FARC or admonish the countries that have been supportive of it. For Brazil to become a regional leader it needs to start playing a more decisive role. By the same token, the rest of the region must understand that it cannot have it both ways. It may regard the struggle with FARC as a purely Colombian problem on whose solution is not willing to assist, in which case the Colombian government can form whatever security alliances it sees fit. Alternatively, it can regard it as an international problem, on whose solution unequivocal regional cooperation and support are to be committed. In the latter case, and only in it, the rest of the region would deserve to be informed and consulted on security matters by Colombia. Given that the security fallout of the FARC‘s presence has been traced as far as some Central American countries, not to speak of Venezuela and Ecuador, it is clear that the Colombian government has a fair claim to robust international support in its struggle. A new partnership between the United States and Latin America, including on security matters, will need significant adjustments in the mind frame of both parties if it is to succeed. The insensitivity, hypocrisy and sense of entitlement shown by key actors in the current row about the Colombian bases are not promising signs.

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Hegemony Bad – Democracy
Sustaining US hegemony in Latin America requires suppressing democracy Shariati, Kansas City Kansas Community College Sociology Professor, 8
[Mehdi S, 11/25/08, ―Latin America's march of democracy as a challenge to hegemon: The struggle against the containment of democracy‖, http://www.payvand.com/news/08/nov/1252.html, acessed 7/9/13, ALT] A New Dawn in Latin America has begun. Enormous challenges and opportunities confront the region in the Face of a crushing and vengeful neo-liberalism of global capitalism and all of its supportive economic, military and political institutions. This paper examines those challenges and opportunities particularly as they are related to the possible loss of U.S. hegemony and the attempts at containing democratic aspirations and strategies in Latin America. Contemporary challenges faced by Latin countries are no less determining than what they were confronted with in the decades following their independence. From the rise of Bolivarian ethos to the struggles for liberation and autonomy waged by guerrilla leaders such as Che, Castro and the Sandinista of Nicaragua to democratically elected Socialists such as Arbenz of Guatemala, Allende of Chile, to the contemporary democratically elected governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and the quasi-populist De Silva of Brazil, the struggle remains not just a political and an economic one, but rather an existential one. The Latin people for most of their history have struggled for democracy and had they been free of imperialistic interventions aided by domestic comprador, they would have achieved much more in the social, economic and political arena. This has been a very long and sordid history. Any attempt at liberation and autonomy has been forcefully confronted and decapitated. Peron was discredited, Che was murdered, the Cuban revolution has been effectively contained within its shores, Arbenz was overthrown and murdered, so was democratically elected President of Chile, Salvatore Allende, the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega was overthrown through a bloody Contra group carved out of the body of Sandinista revolutionaries and aided by some of the Latin governments (Argentina, Honduras, and El Salvador among others involved in the "dirty war"), various organs of the United States governments, Christian Fundamentalist, World Anti-Communist League and Omega 7 (Armony, 1977). Since independence, Latin America as a region had experienced over 160 coups, and during the same period their powerful neighbor to the north often presenting itself as a benevolent imperial protector of its backyard by intervening when its interests warranted. In the words of former United States Senator George P. McLean, it is an "imperialism of science, peace, and justice (Congressional Records, 1927, cited in Smith 1981:66). United States has maintained its hegemonic control through regional treaties, agreements and support of the elite dominated regimes nourished through social, economic and military means. Today those countries which have opted for democratic socialism or are struggling against globalization, and neo-liberalism are engaged in a desperate struggle to sustain themselves in the face of a very destructive and dangerous form of terrorism -monetary terrorism. Drawing on historical parallel may not be as significant in conveying much about the future, but historical experiences ought not to be readily discarded, particularly if the motives and reasons for the past experiences are as valid today as they were then. There may be a lesson if anyone cares to learn. What do the learned Latin Americans think of the Monroe Doctrine, Clark Memorandum, The Platt Amendment, Roosevelt Corolary, The Panama Canal (1), Venezuela, the Big Stick Policy, the Good Neighbor Policy, Mexico, the Rio Treaty, The Alliance for Progress, Kennedy Round, Dominican Republic, Che Guevera , The "Banana Republic", The School of the Americas, Arbenz, Allende, Contras, El Salvador, Haiti, Caribbean Basin initiative, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), The Summit of the Americas, Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA),and Free Trade Areas of the

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 52 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Americas (FTAA)? In the mind of the Latin American masses, there is no ambiguity with regards to the cultural disdain towards them. In their view the technologically advanced, militarily strong, and economically imperial North has always had a fear of true democracy and the people consciousness about their condition as prelude to revolution. They do recite the struggles of their forefathers and the consequences of those struggles and in the end speculate as to what went wrong and how not to repeat the mistakes that brought them defeat. Social scientists theorize about them, theologians reoriented eschatological tenor, philosophers debated ontological concerns and the Latin masses for the most part (except for some segment of the Church) remained outside of the discourse. Today, Latin America has entered a new phase of existence and is attempting to forge a new identity. They are proving that they do understand and that realization is being communicated through democratic process and alliances. What do North Americans by and large think of the history of United States/ Latin America relations and/or the contemporary issues regarding that relationship? Is there sufficient number of people with the knowledge and concerns for their country's relationship with Latin America to warrant such question? And to what extent can one conclude that the United States foreign policy is governed by the democratic process if the answer to the first question is "very few"? How many of them can identify countries to the south of Mexico and how many of them bother to ask pertinent questions? Much is done in the name of the American people and yet we are constantly reminded that not many of them know or care to know about the very regions their political, economic and social elites are operating either in the form of war or exploitation. How many of them understand that under the despotic regime of global capitalism, all of the developing countries are forced to compete for foreign investments, effectively relinquishing their control over their economies to the agents of global finance. And that accumulation is the modus operandi, the alpha and the omega of the dynamics of global capitalism. Accumulation on a global scale does not allow prosperity for the majority including North American masses. It endorses and breeds dispossession. It effectively lowers wages and reduces or eliminates social services as part of the crushing austerity measures administered by one of its powerful agents-the IMF. Accumulation and privatization are symbiotic processes in the global capitalist system. Long term hegemonic plans are designed to reinvent themselves in each specific historical period. Accordingly, the socio-economic and political control in each specific period demands specific means. But what remain constant is the common practice of privatizing the gains and socializing the cost associated with global capitalist transactions from free trade to all aspects of globalization. Thus, it is imperative that imperialism both in its external dimension and its internal dimension (social imperialism) is successful.

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AT – US Hegemony Key to Democracy
The US will oppress Latin America in the name of hegemony Marshall, Project manager for The People‘s Book Project, 11
(Andrew Gavin, 12/14/11, ―The American Empire in Latin America: ―Democracy‖ is a threat to ―National Security‖, http://thepeoplesbookproject.com/2011/12/14/the-american-empire-in-latin-americademocracy-is-a-threat-to-national-security/, 7/7/13, AL) Thus, the NSC-144 document listed a number of ―Objectives‖ for the United States to undertake in this highly threatening situation where the poor masses of an entire continent no longer wanted to be subjected to the ruthless domination of a tiny domestic and foreign minority. These ‗objectives‘ included: ―Hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policies, particularly in the UN and other international organizations,‖ which, in other words, means towing the line with the United States in regards to American foreign policy around the world; ―An orderly political and economic development in Latin America so that the states in the area will be more effective members of the hemisphere system and increasingly important participants in the economic and political affairs of the free world,‖ which can be roughly translated as supporting the development of a Western-oriented middle class which would support the elites and keep the lower classes – the masses – at bay; ―The safeguarding of the hemisphere… against external aggression through the development of indigenous military forces and local bases necessary for hemisphere defense,‖ which implies allowing America to establish military bases throughout the continent – naturally for ―defensive‖ purposes – in offensively defending America‘s resources (which happen to be in other countries), as well as establishing local military proxies through which America can exert regional hegemony. Further objectives included: ―The reduction and elimination of the menace of internal Communist or other anti-U.S. subversion,‖ which equates to purging and liquidating the countries of dissenters, a patently fascistic policy objective; ―Adequate production in Latin America of, and access by the United States to, raw materials essential to U.S. security,‖ which means that American corporations get unhindered access to exploit the region‘s resources; and ―The ultimate standardization of Latin American military organization, training, doctrine and equipment along U.S. lines,‖ which implies making every country‘s military structure and apparatus of internal repression dependent upon U.S. support, and thus, it would ensure a structure of dependency between domestic elites and the American Empire , as the domestic elites would need the military and police apparatus to repress the ―masses‖ whom they rule over and exploit. Therefore, America would need to essentially subsidize Latin America‘s systems and structures of repression.[3]

US hegemony deprives Latin America of progress School of the Americas Watch, 5
(School of the Americas Watch, 7/1/5, ―Mission Creep? In Latin America? US Southern Command‘s New Security Strategy‖, http://www.soaw.org/category-table/2514, 7/7/13, AL) Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 the United States has regarded the Western Hemisphere as its own domain. The intent of this foreign policy doctrine was to prevent foreign powers—European colonizers, mercantilists, and financiers in the 1800s—from exercising influence that challenged the U.S. stake in Latin America and the Caribbean. The policy undermined economic development and political progress in the region for over a century. However, the precepts of the Monroe Doctrine have ensured that the Western Hemisphere remains a region that harbors no military threats to U.S. national security, albeit at great cost.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 54 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz This is no small accomplishment. At least part of America‘s superpower status today stems from its own geographical security—its isolation from other great powers, the absence of weapons of mass destruction in the ―near abroad,‖ and its effective hegemony over its own hemisphere. But this hegemony has come with a high price, predictably for the subjects of the hegemon. Even a quick glance at the political and economic conditions of some the United States‘ closest neighbors— Haiti, the border cities of Mexico, Central American nations— belies the benefits of U.S. ―benevolent hegemony.‖ In these countries, clearly geographical and political proximity to the world‘s greatest power failed to yield even a minimal standard of progress. In the name of security—both U.S. national security and the security of nations within U.S. hegemonic reach—the United States has repeatedly obstructed political and economic progress in Latin America and the Caribbean. Nearly two centuries of U.S. hemispheric hegemony has left a bloodstained legacy—one marked by a tragic history of gunboat diplomacy, military occupations, counterinsurgency campaigns, economic exploitation by companies like United Fruit and Anaconda, and support for dictators and military regimes. If regional stagnation, instability, and growing contradictions between the United States and Latin America are the result of years of hegemony, then it is past time to find a new approach. In the search for less ideological and more effective security policies, it is worth recalling U.S. policies that offered more positive elements for a new model of constructive hemispheric relations. One such model was Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s, and more recently certain aspects of constructive engagement by the Clinton administration.2

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 55 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Latin American Hegemony Bad – Neoliberalism
US hegemony leads to suppression of regional growth, development. Shariati, Kansas City Kansas Community College Sociology Professor, 8
[Mehdi S, 11/25/08, ―Latin America's march of democracy as a challenge to hegemon: The struggle against the containment of democracy‖, http://www.payvand.com/news/08/nov/1252.html, acessed 7/9/13, ALT] What frightens the Washington block is the formation and reproduction of a philosophy that puts people before profit. In the context of home grown regional integration the preoccupation with high profit margins cease to exist. By the very definition, regional integration strategies would eliminate intraregional competition and expensive solicitation for foreign investment from the imperialist zones. Indeed economic democracy is possible only when deregulation (regulation favoring big business) is replaced with long term regional planning at the national level and in conjunction and association with long term regional planning predicated on cooperation rather than competition. Within the context of regional common market in which each member is an equal player, elimination of tariff and other barriers are appropriate. In this context an arrangement by which all members decide all the rules and they all play by the same set of rules, then development and growth (as measured by all the indices of social inclusion) are possible and both the gains and if need be all losses are socialized. It is within a vibrant regional association that in addition to economic integration, a political as well as military (defensive) integration is possible. The task of establishing a regional economic power house in Latin America ought to be much easier than any other geographic region. For one, there are very strong cultural ties (though diverse in ethnic and racial identities) between the countries of the region and second the impulse of building a common market much stronger since they have collectively experienced outside intervention and still feel very vulnerable. The struggle to create a common market of truly independent members operating on the basis of a charter which puts human dignity, social development, economic democracy, and political accountability, has been, is and will be challenged by the powerful politico-military establishment that serves the transnationals.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 56 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – US Hegemony Benign
US uses hegemony for its own interests Inter Press Service, 12
(8/11/12, Inter Press Service, ―New Threats, Same old US Hegemony‖, http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/10/new-threats-same-old-u-s-hegemony/, 7/9/13, AL) PUNTA DEL ESTE, Uruguay , Oct 11 2012 (IPS) - Although it admits that it cannot be a long-term solution, Washington insists on strengthening the armed forces in Latin America, to confront ―new threats,‖ including citizen insecurity. But activists argue that it is only another means of maintaining control over the region. The new U.S. military strategy is all too familiar to many activists. ―What the government of that country is seeking is to use the armed forces of Latin America as it always has: for its own interests, and not for the security of the people,‖ human rights defender Adolfo Pérez Esquivel told IPS by telephone from Buenos Aires. In the past, Washington evoked the phantom of communism. But now, in a region where many of the governments are left-wing, it uses as a pretext common problems like drug trafficking to strengthen its predominance, said the Argentine activist and 1980 Nobel Literature Prize-winner.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 57 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Regional Groups

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 58 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

BRICS Rise Now – Latin America
BRICS is targeting Latin America for engagement Mahapatra, University of Mumbai Centre for Central Eurasian Studies associate, 6/3/13
(Debidatta Aurobinda, 6/3/13, ―BRICS see greater role in Latin America,‖ Russia and India Report, http://indrus.in/world/2013/06/03/brics_see_greater_role_in_latin_america_25721.html, accessed 7/7/13, IC) Last week witnessed some crucial developments from BRICS perspective. The Cuban foreign minister visited New Delhi and sought BRICS‘ partnership with Latin American countries, representatives from Cuba, Haiti, Costa Rica and Chile met Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov in Moscow and sought Russian cooperation for the development of Latin American countries and Chinese President, Xi Jinping toured Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico to widen Chinese engagement in the region. Like Africa, Latin America is emerging as a hub of economic development with huge natural resources; it is but natural that it has gained increasing attention of the world. In this context, BRICS‘ engagement in the region, consisting of 33 countries with population of 600 million, has become timely. The establishment of Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2011 has provided the region a unified voice, and with Brazil being a member of BRICS as well as CELAC, the BRICS‘ engagement in the region will be mutually beneficial with larger implications for the globe. Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Eduardo Rodríguez Parrilla told in New Delhi that ―CELAC wants to improve relations with BRICS.‖ He also stated, ―We wish to seek a higher level of economic cooperation with the India and the other BRICS nations, which we consider to be valuable.‖ India is the first dialogue partner of the CELAC, which has provided the group a format to develop closer relations with India in diverse areas particularly information technology, medical services and tourism as elaborated by the Cuban minister. He further announced, ―We see an opportunity for mutually beneficial economic relations with India.‖ The CELAC has a similar format of dialogue with China, which can be further extended to Russia and South Africa. The CELAC, which consists of all countries of the two American continents, but without the US and Canada, has recently started exploring economic relations with other countries including economic power houses of the BRICS. Parrilla pointed out that there are many common values and objectives between CELAC and BRICS, which need to be further explored. The foreign ministers of Cuba, Haiti and Costa Rica and deputy foreign minister of Chile met Sergei Lavrov in the Russian capital to deliberate on various issues including promoting dialogue, trade and visa-free regime. The joint communiqué brought out the commonalities of interests in the areas of tackling terrorism, developing economic relations, promoting democracy, advancing principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, countering transnational organized crime, and tackling other threats and challenges. Lavrov stated at the end of the meeting, ―Our friends have expressed their desire to make permanent contacts between the CELAC and BRICS … We believe this is a very attractive suggestion and we will definitely discuss it with other states that are members of this association.‖ Russian foreign ministry also expressed the idea of establishing a permanent mechanism for political dialogue and cooperationbetween Russia and CELAC. China has started pursuing vigorously its Latin American policy. It has already replaced the US as the largest trading partner of Brazil and Chile. Its trade with Latin America has grown since the last decade. From 2000 to 2011, it has grown 20 fold, from $3.9 billion to $86 billion. Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister, Zheng Zeguang on the eve of Xi Jinping‘s visit to Latin America dispelled any notion of competition between China and the US in the region and stated that China can work with the US in a framework based on mutual trust, equality and inclusiveness. Xi was received by the Prime Minister of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 59 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Trindad and Tobago, Kamla Persad-Bissessar. Besides this Caribbean country, Jinping also visited Costa Rica and Mexico. China is looking forward to widen its investment in the exploration of natural resources including energy resources in the region. The BRICS‘ engagement with CELAC is not only a factor in promoting multilateralism and fostering a multi-polar world structure, but it also accrues economic advantages to both the groupings. While the BRICS members are fast rising economies with huge financial resources, the CELAC countries have also registered growth despite global economic slowdown. The Latin American countries are also rich in natural resources. The Union of South American Nations on Natural Resources and Integral Development in its meeting in Venezuelan capital Caracas last week emphasized on natural resources and their exploration for the development of the region. Latin America reportedly has 38 percent of copper, 21 percent of iron, 65 percent of lithium reserves, 42 percent of silver, and 33 percent of tin. It also contains about 30 percent of the total of the world‘s water resources and 21 percent of the world‘s natural forests. Some of the Latin American countries such as Mexico and Venezuela are rich in energy resources. The huge population of CELAC makes the region a vast market for investment and also for import from the BRICS countries.

BRICS influence rising Associated Press with Reuters, 13
(3/27/13, CNBC, ―Watch out, World Bank: Here comes the BRICS Bank, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100596232, 7/7/13, AL) India's trade minister said BRICS will "have a defining influence on the global order of this century." The five countries represent a fifth of global GDP and share high growth and geopolitical importance in their separate regions, but have struggled to find common ground that would convert their economic weight into joint political clout. The two biggest economies of the group, China and Brazil, marked their determination to make changes in the world's trade and financial architecture by signing a three-year currency swap agreement covering up to $30 billion a year in bilateral trade. Brazilian officials said the aim was to ensure their fast-growing commercial ties would not suffer if a new banking crisis caused dollar trade finance to dry up. "Our interest is not to establish new relations with China, but to expand relations to be used in the case of turbulence in financial markets," Brazilian Central Bank Governor Alexandre Tombini told reporters after the signing. Brazil's mineral resources and farm products have helped fuel China's industrial growth and feed its people while bringing prosperity to the Latin American giant. Bilateral trade totaled around $75 billion last year, with Brazil selling iron ore, soy products and crude oil, and buying Chinese machinery, electronics and manufactured goods. Brazilian officials have said they hope to have the trade and currency deal operating in the second half of 2013. "If there were shocks to the global financial market, with credit running short, we'd have credit from our biggest international partner, so there would be no interruption of trade," said Economy Minister Guido Mantega.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 60 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Brazil Rise Now
Brazil is replacing US hegemony Crandall, Davidson College, International Politics Associate Professor, 11
(Russell, May-June 2011, Foreign Affairs, ―The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America‖, http://worldview.unc.edu/files/2012/02/Reading-1.pdf, 7/7/13, AL) Latin America's economic growth and political stability are driving an unprecedented power shift within the region. Countries are reassessing their interests and alliances, and the more confidentamong them are flexing their muscles. Instead of looking to Washington for guidance, Latin American countries are increasingly working among themselves to conduct diplomacy, pursue ¶ ¶ shared objectives, and, at times, even spark new rivalries. Brazil's emergence as a serious power is a direct result of the increasing absence of U.S. ¶ ¶ influence in the region. Sensing an opportunity to gain the regional stature that has long eluded it, the country has begun to act more assertively. But complicating Brazil's power play is the ¶ ¶ reaction from its fellow Latin American nations. Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian officials, ¶ ¶ among others, talk privately about their dislike of Brazil's arrogant diplomacy. In some quarters, ¶ ¶ Brazil's responses to developments such as Chavez's ongoing assault on Venezuela's democracy ¶ ¶ and even the 2009 coup in Honduras have undermined its credibility as a serious leader. ¶ ¶ (Brasilia's reluctance to speak out for hemispheric democracy is particularly inexcusable for a ¶ ¶ government that includes many officials who suffered under the successive military regimes of ¶ ¶ the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.) Many Latin American officials quietly reveal that they are not eager to see Brazil replace the United States as the hemisphere's hegemon. As one diplomat ¶ ¶ recently put it, "The new imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese.

Brazil is a rising hegemon – it‘s proposal to create a defense council proves Varas, FRIDE Associate Researcher, 08
(Augusto, 5/12/8, ―Brazil in South America: from indifference to hegemony,‖ FRIDE, http://www.fride.org/publication/415/brazil-in-south-america:-from-indifference-to-hegemony, accessed 7/7/13, IC) The Brazilian proposal to create a South American Defence Council (Consejo de Seguridad Sudamericana or CSS), announced following the Colombian military incursion into Ecuadorian territory in March of this year, has been perceived by some as just the latest development in a new landscape of regional integration. Viewed in the context of a continental hegemonic vacuum, there is the potential for a new geo-political space centred around Brazil and further removed from the USA. The need to create a common security and defense organisation would base itself on the negative appraisal of the confl ict prevention and resolution capacity of the Organisation of American States (OAS), a forum dominated by Washington which, in the case of the most recent confl ict, happens to be an unconditional ally of Colombia. With this analysis as a starting point, we can go on to highlight both the potential and the ramifi cations an agreement like this would have for the region.1 The importance and the political projection of each one of the processes described above merits a thorough analysis. Political initiatives and integration in Latin America The most striking thing about the context is the almost constant bombardment of integration proposals which the region has been subjected to of late, some of which, in their different focuses, have led to confusion regarding the various processes already in place. At fi rst glance, one might think that Latin

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 61 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz American Foreign Ministries were trying to outdo each other (some more than others) in seeing who can come up with the greatest number of proposals, while scant attention is paid to those already established, which are in poor shape. Such is the case of MERCOSUR, the main post Cold War regional initiative, which fi nds itself in a critical state of affairs thanks to the ineffi ciency of its institutions in maintaining ―the common objectives which drove its member states to engage in the process of regional integration and the consequent loss of focus and capacity to prioritise underlying political problems…. a key problem today of MERCOSUR is that it is not an ‗incomplete‘ Customs Union, but instead a precarious free trade area‖.2 Similar diagnoses could be made with respect to the Latin American Economic System (Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe or SELA), and the Andean Community of Nations (La Comunidad Andina de Naciones or CAN) and other regional organisations. Added to this loss of dynamism is the torrent of Venezuelan proposals on a wide range of matters, from the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa Bolivariana para América Latina y el Caribe or ALBA), the Trade Treaty of the Peoples (Tratado Comercial de los Pueblos or TCP), the Bank of the South (el Banco del Sur) and the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Sur or OTAS) to the proposal for a standing army for ALBA, Petrocaribe, Petrosur and TeleSUR. In the case of Brazil, it proposed the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas or UNASUR) as well as its recent initiative for a South American Defense Council. Whilst the UNASUR proposal may have been formulated in a more rigorous way than the other aforementioned initiatives, its failure to contemplate trade integration means there is no adhesive substance to glue member states together beyond that of political will. Finally, in order not to be left out, Ecuador‘s President Correa has proposed an Organisation of Latin American States to replace the OAS. An interpretative reading of the integration proposals being proffered in Latin America lately shows they do not have an exclusively inherent value in themselves, but instead should be seen as another means for their exponents to jockey for political power at the regional and global levels, something which means their fruition and long-term viability are highly open to question. In any event, in no case do they resemble the European integration process, nor should they be considered the first, experimental steps towards a common destination, such as the 1952 European Coal & Steel Community Treaty mapped out for Europe. This is the context in which the Brazilian proposal for a South American Defense Council can be understood. Brazilian hegemony in South America There are various interpretations of the role Brazil plays in the region. One is that even while Brazil has appeared to offer ―ambivalent leadership‖ in South America, ―responded to by Hugo Chavez‘s power aspirations‖, the perception is that Palácio do Planalto‘s ―growing engagement in South America‖ and its role as the ―main partner of the EU in the region‖ makes it the ―natural South American leader‖.3 However, Brazil‘s role in the region can be analysed from a different perspective. First of all, concepts ought to carry greater precision. An effective Brazilian leadership would imply recognition of its role and acceptance of its tutelage by other countries in the region, something which is far from the reality. One needs to look no further than the conflicting positions held by member states regarding the location of the UNASUR headquarters, which saw Quito rather than Río de Janeiro finally providing a home to the organisation; another example is Mexico and Argentina‘s rejection of the Brazilian aspiration to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Brazil‘s current position is instead one of regional hegemony, which it furthers by engaging in a number of activities with a view to achieving clear supremacy over other states and by sidelining competitors such as Mexico, which it has thwarted by limiting integration drives to South America, thus breaking with the idea of a single Latin America.4 Recently, some authors have characterised this position as ―Consensual hegemony – an oblique application of pressure or the advance creation of conditions that would make a future policy appear as a self-interested move by other countries…allowing Itamaraty to mask consistent efforts to structure continental relations and organisations in a manner decidedly in Brazil‘s interests‖.5 This ―Gramscian‖ version of Brazil‘s regional role might make for a good metaphor, but what appears clearly behind it is the new Brazilian desire for regional

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 62 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz hegemony. This policy can be seen once again in the case of MERCOSUR. In the same way as has been shown in the definition of a subtle kind of hegemony ―Brazilian participation in MERCOSUR has been motivated more by international strategic negotiating considerations than by purely commercial ones of a regional dimension. This in part explains Brazil‘s inclination towards a form of ―Customs Union‖ rather than a free trade zone‖.6 The old Brazilian position of indifference to the North and rivalry with the South has been transformed and organised coherently around two axes during the last two governments. On the one hand, it tries to contain the American presence7 and, on the other, to play a global role. An example of the former is the proposal for a South American Defense Council, a more diplomatic approach to relations with Washington than the calls for an OAS without US involvement, as was voiced at Quito. An illustration of Brazil‘s second strategy is its policy of lobbying to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its recent strategic Partnership with the European Union,8 and the South-South alliance it has made with India and South Africa (IBSA).9 One could add Brazil‘s growing role in Africa beyond Portuguese speaking territories, and its involvement in the Middle East as further examples of it global projection.

Brazil is balancing US influence in Latin America – da Silva‘s reforms led to regional interdependence and a joint front against the West Ponížilová, PhD from the University of West Bohemia Department of Political Science and International Relations, 11
(Martina, 1/2011, Contemporary European Studies, ―Same Goal, Different Ways: Hegemonic Efforts of Regional Powers Brazil, India and Iran,‖ http://www.ces.upol.cz/pic/item/pdffile/65.pdf, p. 67-70, accessed 7/9/13, IC) In comparison to the rest of the South American region, Brazil is obviously eligible to become one of the most influential states on the international scene. As the largest, most populated and economically powerful country in South America with large natural resources, extensive areas of fertile agricultural lands and one of the largest economies in the world, Brazil has always been seen achieving a great-power status as its natural foreign-policy objective. In this context, Alden and Vieira (2005: 1084) speak about a ―sense of distinctiveness from the rest of the region.‖ The idea of Brazil as a great power has been slowly developing since the first half of the 20th century when the country was economically dependent on the United States. But rise to world power required breaking these ties of dependence. Subsequent economic development forced later military governments (since the 1970s) to think over ―the concept of greatness‖ that represented not only Brazilian national interests and foreign-policy priority, but has been upgraded to the national purpose (Bandeira 2006: 20). Former Brazilian president Luiz Inacio ―Lula da Silva (2002–2010) built on previous efforts of its predecessors and openly claimed a leadership position for Brazil not only in South American region, but also in the rest of the world‖ (MercoPress 2009). Although Brazil has always been aware of its prominent position in South America, it never aspired to act as an oppressive regional hegemon. On the contrary, it sought to coexist peacefully with other states in the region (Bandeira 2006: 20–21). Transformation of this approach came with Lula da Silva who (more explicitly than former presidents) asserted Brazil‘s hegemonic ambitions in the region. In the past, Brazil‘s crucial foreign-policy strategy regarding its closest surroundings was to secure its borders and maintain stable relations with its neighbours, especially within the context of a longstanding geopolitical rivalry with Argentina that has been considered as another candidate for the regional-power status in the South America (Valladão 2006). In the late 1980s Brazil and Argentina settled disputes between them, which created an opportunity for closer economic cooperation within the region. What is even more important, their mutual reconciliation was followed by the formation of the Southern Common Market (or Mercosur) in 1991. Cooperation within regional

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 63 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz organizations notably facilitates the long-standing goal of Brazilian government — to develop peaceful or even friendly relations with neighbouring states and to improve general intraregional ties (Alden and Vieira 2005: 1084). Regional Integration and Multilateralism Main Brazil‘s regional-policy objectives include: first, creating regional (South American) cooperation institutions; second, closer economic ties with neighbouring countries; and third, support for and cooperation with states that — just like Brazil — prefer multilateralism in international relations and multipolar world system, both aimed at balancing and enhancing their bargaining position towards the United States (Vaz 2009: 21). The aim of building up regional organizations and supporting broader economic cooperation with neighbours relate to several governments‘ intentions. For such an economically strong country as Brazil, it is highly important to stabilize both the political and security situation in its nearest surroundings in order to secure progressive economic growth (Vaz 2009: 21). The opportunity to mutually cooperate and negotiate at the multilateral level consolidates relations between states and thereby stabilizes the political and socio-economic environment in the region. Currently, there is a strong interdependence between Brazil and its neighbours in such domains as the economy, trade, infrastructure, and also security cooperation (mainly with regard to transnational organized crime) (Valladão 2006). This interdependence forced Brazil to strive for managing and strengthening its relations with neighbouring states within economic regional integration institutions, particularly Mercosur1 and UNASUR. Together with associate members2 , Mercosur covers almost the whole of South America. In 2008, Brazil initiated creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)3 that integrates Mercosur with the Andean Community of Nations4 , Guyana and Suriname with the aim of formation of a South American free trade zone.5 Brazil dominates integration within Mercosur that plays an important role in Brazil‘s regional policy. As the biggest South American economy, Brazil benefits from Mercosur the most from all member states because the gains from this economic integration are distributed unequally (Bandeira 2006: 20–21). This can be one of the reasons why Brazil‘s foreign-policy number one priority has been to integrate the whole of South America under Brazilian leadership (Valladão 2006). This goal was reached, at least formally, with the constitution of UNASUR. This success in return should both strengthen Brazil‘s political and economic influence in the region and provide an access to new foreign markets that have become a vital necessity for the Brazilian economy. Because good relations with South American nations constitute a high-priority foreign-policy topic, Brazil seeks to improve the relations with other states not only on a multilateral basis, but also by bilateral cooperation. This effort aims to enlarge the diversity of its political allies and economic ties in order to expand its own zone of influence and to strengthen its bargaining position (Vaz 2009: 20). The third Brazilian foreign policy objective relating to the South American region refers to a, we can say typical, behaviour of regional powers towards superpower(s). Regionally powerful nations often define their foreign policies against the strongest and the most influential states in the world, the same way as Brazil has against the United States. On one hand, Brazil‘s power position benefits from economic integration with smaller South American economies, but, on the other hand, it opposes the wider integration of the whole western hemisphere, because it is afraid of weakening its position due to the larger relative power of the United States. Brazil‘s economic and political interests are not consistent with the US proposal of creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would serve US national interests in the fi rst place. In addition, the trade among Mercosur members grew much faster than trade between them and third parties, including the USA (Bandeira 2006: 21).6 For these reasons, negotiations over the FTAA deadlocked in the mid-1990s. Lula da Silva (cited in Bandeira 2006: 24) stated that the FTAA ―isn‘t really a free-trade pact. Rather, it‘s a policy of annexation of Latin America by the United States.‖ Lula‘s opinion turned out to represent a general view of the Brazilian public. That is why Brazil intends to reinforce a bargaining position of the whole region confronted with the United States by means of strengthening relations between all South American nations.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 64 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz To make it clear, Brazil has got a correct relation with the USA that is based on mutual respect and perhaps some shared values, as well as economic and political cooperation. But, although Lula da Silva sought a friendly relationship with Washington — according to Alden and Vieira (2005: 1084) as an approach ―to overcome its relative weakness within the international system‖ — there still exist many significant differences between their national interests and foreign-policy goals. Especially Brazil‘s ambitions to become the next great power in the world system influences the US perception of Brazil and has shaped their mutual relationship for several decades. The main question is whether the United States actually wants to see such a fast-growing power in its vicinity (Bandeira 2006: 21) Great Power Ambitions One of Brazil‘s foreign-policy priorities, as mentioned above, is developing better relations with countries opposing unilateralism and dominance of by the few most powerful (Western) states in the international system. Strengthening economic and political ties with Southern nations is connected with Brazil‘s great-power ambitions. The so-called South-South cooperation, e.g., within IBSA forum or BRICS, together with demanding a seat as a permanent member at the UN Security Council, constitute the most visible current signs of this aspiration. Apart from this, Brazil has been gradually developing its power capabilities and creating its image as an independent international actor with the view of becoming a great power since the 1960s. Brazil, as one of the largest economies in the world, plays a signifi cance role in global economics. Th e ruling elite envisions Brazil as one of the most important ac- tors at the global level. As Vaz (2009: 20) puts it: ―Brazil is a global trader aspiring to become an independent global actor able to exert meaningful infl uence on the international political debate and decision-making processes.‖ It intends to infl uence primarily economic issues but also to become a part of the global governance structure. As a great power, Brazil would be able to secure suitable international conditions for outstanding economic growth, e.g., to transform the structure of the international economic system, as well as for strengthening its political position among other powerful ―core‖ states that take a decision on many international issues. And this very possibility to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, moreover with veto privileges, would represent an eligible opportunity to achieve all these objectives. The permanent seat on the UN Security Council would legitimise Brazil‘s hegemonic position in the region and its great-power status, which, in addition, would be recognized by other countries in the world, including the most powerful ones. Brazil, the same way as most emerging regional (Southern) powers, seeks to change the current structure of power distribution in the international system, which only few developed Western (or Northern) and most wealthy states benefit from (Bandeira 2006: 21). That is why these most powerful states try to maintain the status quo in international relations at the expense of not so powerful states, such as Brazil. Simply said, the contemporary structure of economic and power system is advantageous to them. This is also the reason why it will not be so easy for Brazil to obtain a seat on the UN Security Council — all current permanent members have already been resisting its enlargement, which would obviously causes significant decline in their own power in the global politics. Especially the USA may not be ready to accept Brazil — increasingly powerful and autonomous nation in its neighbourhood — as an equal partner. As Alden and Vieira (2005: 1085) more than aptly note: ―Brazil has skilfully employed international law to counter-balance the power politics of core states, all the while actively seeking to be accepted into this special group.‖ Regional powers from various (Southern) regions create international organizations in order to mutually strengthen their positions at the global political scene against the United States and other influential Western states. Th erefore, in accordance to the classical motto ―strength in unity,‖ the IBSA forum (India, Brazil and South Africa) serves Brazil and also India as a platform for mutual support in their efforts to be the next two permanent members on the UN Security Council. A similar case is BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)7 — the group of large and dynamic economies that are expected to become signifi cant players in global economics (Goldman Sachs 2003: 3). At the present time, regional powers‘ proactive policy in the international system is increasingly evident

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 65 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz and with reference to the general estimation of current global politics, powerful states from the South will be more influential.

Brazil countering US hegemony – anti-Americanism and relations with Latin American coalitions prove Varas, FRIDE Associate Researcher, 8
(Augusto, 5/12/8, ―Brazil in South America: from indifference to hegemony,‖ FRIDE, http://www.fride.org/publication/415/brazil-in-south-america:-from-indifference-to-hegemony, accessed 7/7/13, IC) In the same way, the widening of MERCOSUR to include Chile and the Andean Community of Nations was the Brazilian counter-proposal to the DR-CAFTA with America and other countries outside the region. Its aim, in large part, was to contain Northern influence. Similarly, Brazil‘s reluctance to accept ALCA and its decision to resolve protectionist issues in the framework of the Doha Round reveal its new post-Cold War position in relation to the US. In spite of these considerable tensions, direct foreign investment in Brazil has not suffered in consequence; according to The Economist, Brazil is second in that regard only to China.12 Nor has a successful deal with the USA on bio-fuels been hindered as a result, widening relations between the two countries. Seen in this light, its policy of getting closer to Chavez can be seen from both perspectives; as an element of its hegemonic drive in the South and, simultaneously, as part of its US containment strategy in the region. In the case of the possible international weight which the CSS would add to the region, seen in the context of current political diffusion and the resistance to Brazilian hegemony, the chances of successfully generating a South American military force from the Council would seem more of a pipe-dream than the majority of the integration proposals previously mentioned. Moreover, the successful application of measures of mutual confidence-building in the South American region has been possible in a bilateral context and is not reliant on or at the behest of a mechanism like the CSS. The creation of the joint Argentinean - Chilean brigade called the ―Cruz del Sur‖ (Southern Cross), is an illustration of just such a successful initiative.16 Finally, regional mediation proved it can achieve positive concrete results during the recent Colombia- Ecuador crisis, ensuring greater border security. The threats according to Washington The USA is a dysfunctional actor in this space, with a poor record in Latin America. US interventionist, protectionist, unilateralist and coercive policies have not earned it much sympathy in the region. That being said, the chance to penetrate the US domestic market has proved an incentive attractive enough to convince many Latin American countries to sign FTA‘s with the USA or to begin negotiating them. Those which haven‘t done so, such as Brazil, aim to resolve market access issues at the Doha Round. In the sphere of Western Hemisphere security, current US policy – inspired by a ―broad‖ concept of what constitutes security – is probably seen even more negatively. In line with its way of looking at regional issues, the primary threats to security in the Western Hemisphere are organised crime, criminal gangs and illegal drug trafficking.17 This April, under the orders of US Southern Command, a ―Joint Interagency Security Command‖ has been established in order to deal with these threats, encompassing issues ranging from long-term economic development, to trade, and law and order, coordinating all relevant US agencies, including civilian ones which operate in the region.18 This concentration and centralisation of law and order responsibilities in military institutions has the effect of militarising civilian affairs and ―deprofessionalising‖ the armed forces, which are assigned duties which do not correspond to their expertise and for which they have been provided neither the training nor the means to address. This is made even more significant by the fact that immigration, drug trafficking and criminal activities are issues of regional importance, and ought to be dealt with by specialised civilian institutions, particularly the police, which need to be given real support and specialised training to avoid the erosion of their field of operations by the armed forces. These ideological and unilateral definitions of regional security issues prevent real questions being given immediate answers, which is vital if

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 66 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz instability in the regional strategic fi eld is to be prevented. We are referring here to the need to apply a multilateral and regional solution to the internal crisis in Colombia and its spread across the frontiers of neighbouring states such as has recently been seen in the Colombian-Ecuadorian border conflict; the failure of American counter-narcotics policy; the growing market for arms in the region; the trafficking of light arms and the lack of control of these movements from the USA; reform of the police force; as well as new developments in nuclear matters and their possible military use. Even more serious is the evident US logistical and intelligence support provided to Colombia in its violation of Ecuadorian territory, introducing the policy of pre-emptive action into the region for the first time, something which Washington has used in its war on terror around the globe. The main problem for security in the hemisphere then, is how to contain and prevent the implementation of misguided US policy in the region. Ruling out the possibility of US-Latin American military parity, the only way forward is to ―gradually reduce US military infl uence and presence in South America without openly challenging its hegemony‖, a political option which cannot be meaningfully developed without recourse to multilateral institutions. If the USA is difficult to constrain within these frameworks, then the danger it poses outside them is scarcely imaginable, with the current Colombian-style bilateral formula being repeated with other states. Whilst a US presence in the OAS can sometimes be an obstacle in the normal development of relations within the hemisphere, America can be brought around to common positions by a tight-knit Latin American coalition, as was the case in the last election of the Secretary General of the Organisation. In this setting, the OAS has a central part to play. The regional organisation has carried out a crucial role in the resolution and stabilisation of Colombian–Ecuadorian relations up until now. The OAS resolution thrashed out on March 5 condemned the Colombian incursion and put an end to the confl ict. This was later ratifi ed by the Rio Group two days later, during a meeting in Santo Domingo organised prior to the outbreak of the confl ict – which was not attended by President Lula –19 to deal with matters such as energy, natural disasters and development. Subsequently, the Secretary General undertook a mission to inspect in situ the Colombian incursion and to independently gauge the situation, something which shows the value of this institution in resolving confl icts and controlling tensions. Likewise, the permanent structure the organisation affords makes it a natural and extremely good place to deal with such issues, and it ought to be preserved and strengthened. As has been pointed out before now ―today the Security Hemisphere Commission which operates in the heart of the OAS is the only continental forum dealing with defense and security‖.20 For reasons such as the above, the deinstitutionalisation of security relations in the Western Hemisphere in the shape of informal talking-shops, such as the meeting of Ministers of Defense (many of whom are members of their respective armed forces), or proposing new formulas such as the South American Defense Council, should not be encouraged if they are going to lead to the erosion or weakening of formal institutions which play a key role in multilateral management of security in the hemisphere. Brazil and regional security From this analysis, we can conclude that the Brazilian proposal for a South American Defense Council is part of a multidimensional, global policy the aim of which is to attain a prevailing role in the world and supremacy in the region. This strategy has been aided by the current evolution of international politics, given that the global system of today, as has been noted, is no longer ―multi-polar‖ or ―uni-polar‖ but instead simply ―non-polar‖ - a system with many centres of power, some of which are not nation states, entities which have lost their monopoly on power and, in some cases, even their preeminence. In short, nowadays ―power is now found in many hands and in many places‖.21 7 Comment, May 2008 In this context, the Brazilian strategy of playing a global role on the international stage has a good chance of being successful, and for that to be the case, it must bring its South American counterparts into line. In that sense, its proposal to create the CSS – which would obviously fall under its hegemony – is consistent with its policy of trying to achieve superiority in matters of security, as it transforms itself into a military power. The recent agreement on developing nuclear submarines with French support illustrates this point. This policy coincides with the aim of ―promoting cooperation in equipment and arms and, in particular, widening the regional market for the Brazilian war industry (which would serve) as a platform and a collective legitimisation of the Brazilian aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council‖.22 At the same time, it is a smart way of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 67 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz blocking the Venezuelan backed initiative to create a standing ALBA army. Summing up, with its proposal to create a CSS, Brazil is presenting itself as a powerful actor in a non-polar world and has taken another step forward in its project of hegemonic power in South America. The European Union, in flagrant contradiction to its multilateral approach, pragmatically recognised this fact by signing a bilateral agreement of strategic partnership with Brazil in May 2007.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 68 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Brazil Rise
No Brazil dominance – lack of economic strength and isolation Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12
(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/whynobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM) Brazil is in important respects best set to emerge as a global trendsetter. It is a stable democracy, blessed with ample, land, labor, and natural resources. At least for now, Brasilia has found a developmental path that combines economic openness with redistribution programs aimed at alleviating inequality. And Brazil faces no geopolitical rivals and resides in a region that has been remarkably free of inter-state war. But Brazil is not headed for the top ranks; its economy is expected to be five times smaller than that of China in 2050. And Brazil's benign location in South America cuts both ways. Its relative isolation will enable Brasilia to remain aloof from the fray set to ensue in Eurasia and the western Pacific as China, India, Russia, and Indonesia ascend. But its distance will also limit its influence in this geopolitical heartland. Brazil is destined for regional hegemony, not global ambition.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 69 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Brazil Hegemony Benign
Brazilian influence benign Trebat, Columbia Global Center Director, 13
[Thomas, 3/22/13, The Free Library, ―New directions for a more prosperous Brazil‖, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/New+directions+for+a+more+prosperous+Brazil.-a0330143512, 7/9/13, AL] Energy is another major theme that will engage Brazil with the world in the decades ahead. Its reliance on hydropower, biofuels, and renewables in general to fuel the economy's growth are well known and lend credibility to the nation on green economy issues and low-carbon growth patterns. A major unknown in the energy picture is the extent and practical importance of the hydrocarbon reserves found in deep waters off the coast. If the technology is available, and government policies well crafted, Brazil could also emerge over the next ten to fifteen years as a major exporter of fossil fuel to a world still dependent on such resources which could reposition Brazil geostrategically. Apart from these global themes, Brazil will continue to seek new institutional mechanisms to extend its global influence. Brazil already has one of the most extensive diplomatic networks in Africa with nearly forty embassies in African capitals. Brazil will become more intertwined with the African continent and will play an important role in development assistance, agriculture, and food security. For Brazil, African nations are an increasingly important outlet for exports, including construction and mining services, as well as allies in the UN and other international forays on themes of common interest. A newly prosperous Brazil can greatly contribute to the leadership of the global south, a role that Brazil is carefully cultivating. While much of the institutional interaction with the other BRIC nations (Russia, India, and China) is not much more than a photo opportunity for Brazil's leaders, Brazil and China are the two members of this group with broader ambitions to expand trade with, and to offer leadership to, the south. The India-Brazil-South Africa initiative (IBSA) has contributed little in terms of incremental trade and investment, but it points to future directions in foreign policy and trade for Brazil. Relations with China, its largest trading partner, will grow to be an ever-larger priority for Brazil. Given the intensity of the commodity trade and the growth of Brazilian businesses in China, Sao Paulo and Shanghai are connected through a web of commercial and financial relationships, which are likely to intensify. Brazil's overall relationship with the West--the United States, Japan, and Europe--will also continue to evolve as Brazil's confidence and resources increase in the next decade. (40) The relationship with the United States and the West has not always been a smooth one. Brazil clashed multiple times with the United States over trade policy. Brazil has always sought friendly relations with the West, but it has also been willing to take individual initiative rather than line up behind the United States and its main allies, most recently in the case of Iran's uranium enrichment program. Yet, one can also see Brazil's future relationship with the United States and the rest of the West improving as common interests in trade and the environment, cultural similarities, and core democratic values play a role in encouraging convergence, while long-standing divergences, such as over Cuba, fade into the past. Finally, the new Brazil will also seek to redefine relations with its regional neighbors to reflect new realities and differential patterns of political and economic growth which are simultaneously taking place in Latin America. Brazil, along with Mexico, will inevitably remain the predominant Latin American power, yet it will exercise this power with great caution and without hegemonic impulses . For all its size and influence, Brazil is not a natural leader of Latin America, not even of its own Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) network of trading partners. Its use of the Portuguese language alone sets it apart more than is often realized. Its different culture, including important African and other nonIberian heritages, also creates important differences with the Spanish-speaking nations of Latin America.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 70 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

China

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 71 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

China Rising Now – Influence
Chinese influence inevitable, source for conflict Hilton, Open Democracy Editor 13
[Isabel, February 2013, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, ―China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?‖, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc05 4aad9.pdf, accessed 7/6/13, ALT] China‘s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the ¶ foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a ¶ loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. ¶ have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. ¶ In the context of the Obama administration‘s ―pivot‖ to Asia, however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential ¶ for increasing competition for influence in the future. An ¶ escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the ¶ South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise ¶ retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, ¶ the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face ¶ some uncomfortable choices.

China is crowding the US out now – economic engagement is key Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13
(Christopher. senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. "Will Latin America Miss US Hegemony." Journal of International Affairs 66.1 (2013): Print. JMR) Power and its sources in the Western Hemisphere today is more variegated, complex, and subtle. If the measure of U.S. power is the near 170 years of U.S. hegemony or the halcyon days after the Cold War, in which there was a patina of temporary unity and common purpose and the United States remained a global unilateral power, then yes, U.S. power has declined. Against both of those measures, one of near-absolute power and the other a short-lived and artificial aura of common purpose, U.S. power would inevitably appear to be waning if not having already evaporated entirely. To get a real measure of where the United States stands today, we need to consider in what ways U.S. power has been exercised and has worked in the Western Hemisphere. Historically, U.S. power has come from three main sources: military, economic and financial, and diplomatic, and to those should be added the admittedly vague factors of moral and aspirational power. Of these three main sources of power, the first is one of the least relevant today. The era in which the United States could unilaterally send in its marines to occupy a country has ended. One need only see the fraught debate over actual U.S. military involvement in Mexico's recent war on narcotraffickers to realize that military intervention (even at the invitation of the local government) in Latin American countries is conditioned on international and domestic politics and norms. Yet even during the era of U.S. hegemony, Latin American countries benefited from the umbrella of U.S security. The United States' military dominance over the hemisphere had the benefit of preventing the need for strong national militaries that could thwart outside intervention (though too often those militaries diverted their attentions to meddling in domestic politics and pursuing political opponents). Latin American governments did not need to worry about fending extra-hemispheric threats thanks to U.S. interests, and armed forces with limited offensive capabilities also reduced the risk of border conflicts. At the same time, U.S.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 72 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz support through security and technical cooperation has helped governments in Colombia, Mexico, and Central America in their battles with organized narcotraffickers and criminal groups. In the economic and financial realm, the influence of the United States has also become less significant but has far from disappeared. The primary reason for this relative decline of influence is the rise of China and the economic growth of Brazil. China has become a regional commercial presence and an implicit, though perhaps unintentional, political counterweight in the region. China's torrid economic growth over the last decade has had three effects. The first is an increase in the prices and demand for commodities such as iron ore, copper, oil, soy beans, and meat produced by countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. (12) The resulting global commodities boom has fueled economic growth in these countries over the last seven years, averaging over 5 percent a year. The second effect has been the growing importance of Chinese markets and investments to raw-material exporting economies like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Today, China is the number one trade partner for Chile and Brazil and ranks in the top five for Peru, Argentina, and Venezuela--allowing all of these countries to diversify their exports away from the United States and thus lessening the sway of the U.S. market. China is also the fastest growing source of foreign direct investment in countries as politically diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. Third, due to the increased value of exports (principally, though not only, to China) and investment and commercial loans, the region is facing a fiscal bonus. This bonus has allowed countries like Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela to avoid private credit markets in the West and has reduced the power of U.S. banks and the international financial institutions over sovereign debt, much the way they did in the 1980s.

China has strong ties to Latin America – Chavez and resource dependency prove Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13
(Cynthia. Former Dean Social Sciences at Loyola University Chicago. "China's use of the military instrument in Latin America: not yet the biggest stick." Journal of International Affairs 66. 2. (2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com /_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=330143510. Online. JMR) One might assume that the Chinese armed forces, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), will be at the forefront of its reach into new relationships around the world, inferring the inevitability of the competitive, threatening stance of the United States and Soviet Union that characterized the Cold War. It transfers to Beijing the ideological basis of Soviet behavior as a given for Marxist-Leninist states--even though China's regime has proven decidedly less committed to Communism, while every bit as interested in maintaining authoritarian control through all available means. The Chinese armed forces, known collectively as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), thus is assumed to mirror the approach that the Soviet military had around the world, and especially in Latin America during the 1960s through the early 1990s in Cuba. (1) A close political or economic arrangement between Latin America and China has been far from inevitable, making the expansion of interactions between the regions over the past decade noteworthy. President Jiang Zemin traveled the region in April 2001, even as U.S. and Chinese officials negotiated the repatriation of the U.S. EP-3 aircraft that landed in China after it collided with a PLA fighter off the Chinese coast. In November 2004, President Hu Jintao received immense press coverage as he toured the major capitals of South America in conjunction with the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Santiago, Chile. Chinese leaders have often travelled to the region since then and have welcomed several of their Latin American counterparts to Beijing. (2) Similarly, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez cultivated strong ties with his Chinese counterpart partially in an attempt to shift his petroleum sales from the United States to China. Numerous trade missions traverse the Pacific from each side in the hope of strengthening economic benefits for both China and various countries in South America. China seeks extractive resources

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 73 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz and Latin American countries seek to both sell their goods and be given the opportunity to access a vast Chinese market.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 74 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

China Rising Now – Military
China‘s interest in Latin America is growing – military officer training and declining US investment prove Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13
(Cynthia. Former Dean Social Sciences at Loyola University Chicago. "China's use of the military instrument in Latin America: not yet the biggest stick." Journal of International Affairs 66. 2. (2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com /_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=330143510. Online. JMR) Beijing is willing, however, to take steps to craft limited ties with Latin American militaries as Washington's use of the military instrument wanes in concert with fiscal realities . Inviting Latin American foreign officers to attend the Chinese National Defense University opens a path toward aligning the militaries of these states to Beijing. These invitations are intended to give foreign officers a much deeper empathy to China's positions. (13) Additionally, the PLA "foreign officer course" provides China with the opportunity to welcome militaries from countries that do not have access to professional military education (PME) programs for a variety of reasons. Some militaries look to this Chinese option because of their nations' ideological trajectories. For example, Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Ecuadoran officers currently serve regimes suspicious of ties with the United States, thus preferring that their officers attend schools somewhere other than in the United States, a traditional destination for many officers from Latin America. Alternatively, Washington may have withdrawn the invitations. Examples of the reasons that countries do not receive invitations to send their officers to the United States include Congressional disapproval over military abuse of human rights, a military coup d'etat, or some other policy disagreement. Consistent with China's long-standing proclamations of nonintervention and respect for state sovereignty, China has proven uncritical of the same types of actions that have provoked such disapproval from Washington. (14) This means that invitations to Latin officers not forthcoming for U.S. PMEs may result in a counter invitation from the PLA. This allows Beijing to appear more "respectful" and open to the needs and sovereignty of countries in Latin America. This policy appeals to many countries in the region due to its contrast to Washington's proclivity towards preaching on democracy and domestic behavior.

China‘s interest is growing – arms sales Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13
(Cynthia. Former Dean Social Sciences at Loyola University Chicago. "China's use of the military instrument in Latin America: not yet the biggest stick." Journal of International Affairs 66. 2. (2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com /_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=330143510. Online. JMR) China's defensive concerns have traditionally been continental in nature; thus, the ground forces of the PLA have been the predominant service, while the navy or maritime concerns have been far more limited. In building a navy that is only gradually beginning to deploy out of Asian waters, China is developing a mechanism with which it can engage others in their own territory. The U.S. and British navies have been global in their deployments for decades, while China has traditionally been limited to its peripheral seas. Today, the PLAN is using Latin America as one of several experimental destinations, where it can benefit from showing its flag while also making connections with local navies. The point of the liaisons with Latin American navies is not merely to better relations, but to learn how to operate successfully with navies, which operate with the U.S. Navy, and thus slowly learn more about how the latter engages around the world. This slowly deepening confidence,

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 75 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz cultivated over the gradual repetition of brief visits, allows China to expand its knowledge of the U.S. military and how it interacts with partners. This is an indirect manner of learning something of great interest to China as the PLAN also watches the United States interact with several maritime allies in the Asia-Pacific region. This enhanced information also accompanies opportunities for the PLAN to improve its own operational skills in deployment, similar to the experience its sailors are gaining from repeated deployments into the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy operations. Similarly, the deployment of Peace Ark to Latin America in September 2011 was a classic example of using a military instrument in a nonmilitary manner. This vessel illustrates the fundamental reassessment that the Chinese leadership has taken regarding its role around the world as well as the selection of tools with which to interact with others. The role of any hospital ship is not only to show the flag, thus making presence in a foreign land clear, but also to provide humanitarian assistance to places where conditions welcome outside care, which may not arrive in any other form. In the 2011 Peace Ark voyage, the Chinese medical team offered care to those in need in Jamaica, Cuba, and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as China's relatively new diplomatic partner, Costa Rica. (15) Since the U.S. Navy has been the traditional military power providing humanitarian relief in the Western Hemisphere, the Peace Ark was a deliberate message from the Chinese to demonstrate improved capability. Beijing has learned its lesson from its notable absence from the 2004 tsunami relief efforts in the Indian Ocean--a region some called China's backyard when the tragedy occurred. Peace Ark also signaled China's willingness to operate in a region traditionally unwelcome to outsiders because of the Monroe Doctrine's unilateral nature. Although Chinese arms sales to Latin America have been relatively small, such sales are increasing. Latin American armed forces still prefer purchasing their arms from the United States, but the staggering expense of many U.S. arms packages makes that prohibitive for the less wealthy Latin militaries. Europe and Brazil remain at least as appealing as China as sources of arms. The focus of Beijing's arms sales to Latin American governments has been on smaller amounts and less lethal items, such as uniforms, transports, or small arms. (16) As China's arms exports diversify and expand, and as U.S. systems become ever more expensive, it is likely that China's share of sales will increase as the U.S. share decreases. The fiscal options available to militaries in the region, along with their growing responsibilities to address transnational organized crime, may in any event force Latin American militaries to focus on lower-tier weaponry. If China's arms sales move up the scale in cost, this would make Latin America continue to go elsewhere for its weaponry.

China is directly competing with US military – Funding Southcom is vital Simeone, American Forces Press Service, 13 (Nick, 3/19/13, US Department of Defense, ―Southcom Chief Warns Budget Issues Could Affect national Security‖, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119571, 7/9/13, AL)
―Significantly, reduced U.S military engagement will make it difficult to counter those who would seek to exploit perceptions that the U.S. is abandoning our long-standing commitment to the region,‖ the general said. In particular, he suggested that China, which he said is expanding its influence in Latin America, appears ready to fill the void, especially in light of the likely sequestration-triggered cancellation of this year‘s deployment to the region of the hospital ship USNS Comfort. ―With an unprecedented three naval deployments to Latin America since 2008, including a hospital ship visit in 2011, China is attempting to directly compete with U.S. military activities in the region,‖ the Southcom commander said.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 76 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Kelly said Southcom already is absorbing a cut of 26 percent across a range of programs, and that if defense cuts continue in coming years, ―there will be some missions we will simply no longer be able to conduct.‖

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 77 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – China Rise
China is not a threat— US exports to Latin America are greater, and Chinese interest only creates a greater market for US goods. People‘s Daily 12
[People‘s Daily Online, 4/15/12, ―U.S. not concerned about China's influence in L. America‖, http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7787420.html, accessed 7/9/13, ALT] CARTAGENA, Colombia, April 14 (Xinhua) -- The United States is not concerned about China's growing influence in Latin America, a senior White House official said here Saturday. "We're not concerned at all," Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, said at a press briefing on the sidelines of the sixth Summit of the Americas. "In fact, if you look at the numbers, the United States is by far a more significant exporter to Latin America than China," he said, adding that the United States is also a premier export destination for Latin America. Calling China's investment in the region "a positive signal," he said the region is growing its own markets and its own middle class, a move that will mean greater markets for the U.S. goods. "Insofar as the Chinese have played a role in investing and trading with some of the countries here, we see that as a potential benefit," he added.

Latin America is not important to China—preserving their economy and the Communist Party rule come first Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13
(Cynthia. Former Dean Social Sciences at Loyola University Chicago. "China's use of the military instrument in Latin America: not yet the biggest stick." Journal of International Affairs 66. 2. (2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com /_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=330143510. Online. JMR) The PRC occupies an improved position over the past decade in Latin America but will always be thousands of miles to the west with a radically different language and culture. The CCP will continue to focus its efforts on improving the standard of living of its citizens in the hopes of preserving its authoritarian rule. Engagement with Latin America is a contributing factor to China's economic growth, but is by no means essential to its continual growth, because Latin America is not a top priority in China's international concerns. The PLA plays a minor part in Beijing's international relations. China's ongoing use of its military in foreign lands does not pose major threats to Latin America or to U.S. interests in the region. While PLA budget and capabilities have escalated substantially over the past generation, the CCP retains a strong caution against relying on the military as a dominant instrument to achieve its objectives at home and abroad. The CCP is concerned about retaining its power over the military, evidenced by almost weekly reminders that the PLA is an instrument of the CCP. Additionally, the PLA is a more capable force than before, but one that rarely deploys far from the shores of its border.

No conflict over Chinese influence Hilton, formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper, 13

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 78 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz (Isabel, February 13, NOREF, ―China in latin America: Hegemonic challenge?‖, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc05 4aad9.pdf, 7/8/13, AL) The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, ¶ has reacted calmly to date to China‘s increasing presence ¶ in Latin America. In a striking acknowledgement of China‘s ¶ importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created ¶ a mechanism for mutual transparency through the U.S.–¶ China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just ¶ before then-President Hu Jintao‘s visit to Washington, and ¶ continues under the Obama administration. Through four ¶ rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded China‘s ¶ standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set ¶ limits to China‘s action in troublesome countries such as ¶ Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when Venezuela ¶ sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, ¶ China was reluctant to lend its support. Although China ¶ eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the ¶ campaign. The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also diminished ¶ fears of Chinese competition for the region‘s energy resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan ¶ and Ecuadorian markets, and China‘s success in locking up ¶ the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports less than 50% of ¶ its oil to the U.S., down from 80% in the past. There are warnings within the U.S. security community ¶ about the potential implications of Chinese involvement in ¶ Latin America in the future, and concerns about China‘s ¶ still modest military sales to the region. Examples of these ¶ sales include Venezuela‘s 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters ¶ from China. Despite the concerns of the State Department, ¶ however, there has been little response in senior policy ¶ circles to the ―China threat‖. Regardless of whether there ¶ is any real ―threat‖ to the U.S., key decision-makers have ¶ not reacted. China‘s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the ¶ foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a ¶ loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. ¶ have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. ¶ In the context of the Obama administration‘s ―pivot‖ to Asia, 78owever, and the latent, long-term strategic competition ¶ between China and the United States, there is potential ¶ for increasing competition for influence in the future. An ¶ escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the ¶ South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise ¶ retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, ¶ the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face ¶ some uncomfortable choices.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 79 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – China Rise – Military
No risk of China military influence – economic ties, lack of focus, and civilian control of the military all check Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13
(Cynthia. Former Dean Social Sciences at Loyola University Chicago. "China's use of the military instrument in Latin America: not yet the biggest stick." Journal of International Affairs 66. 2. (2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com /_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=330143510. Online. JMR) Furthermore, China is aware that it has a complicated relationship with the United States that is vital to the CCP's goals of continuing economic expansion. By upsetting the United States with overt Chinese military engagement on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere, Beijing risks seriously undermining the goals it most seeks to achieve and currently is not likely to choose that path because Latin America is simply not as important as is the United States. However, as ongoing U.S. budget problems continue to restrict national security goals, and as China has more financial resources it can put towards its defense modernization process, the PLA may become an increasingly potent asset for China in its relations with Latin America. The goal will likely never be to have a sustained, major deployment of forces on the ground in Latin America. This goes against China's traditional strategic context and would require long lines of communication, which puts heavy demands on the military. Latin America does offer a rich set of options for the PLA to learn about relationships with other militaries--a field where it still has little experience with states so far away and in nontraditional tasks, such as military diplomacy. Indeed, Latin America's own armed forces continue to deemphasize their traditional role as security forces in favor of peacekeeping operations and domestic stability requirements against transnational organized crime. These present opportunities for exchanging ideas and learning from each other. Perhaps the testing of PLA operations in Latin America in future years may become an appealing option as China's evolving interests draw it from behind the great wall into a more traditional global power role. The CCP's willingness to give the PLA more latitude remains open to question. The constraints that China's civilian leadership retains over the military are substantial. The CCP welcomes increased interaction with Latin American states but will make certain that the PLA is an instrument of China's engagement rather than an actor of its own. The Party will insist on retaining control in directing policy for the People's Republic, as it repeatedly reminds the PLA in statements by the Party leadership. It remains clear that China is still focused on domestic needs and sees Latin America as a means to assist in achieving a level of development, which will satisfy its citizens. (17) While many predict that China will assume a worldwide role in the future as evidenced by Beijing's ultimate goals, a deep and enduring relationship with Latin America remains hazy. With that in mind, the role of the PLA in such an effort remains even hazier. It presently operates in a bounded manner, but there is no way to accurately predict whether that will be true in the future. China's military assertiveness at present is concentrated along its periphery in areas where others might harm its vital interests--namely the Taiwan Strait, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and the South China Sea. China does not currently appear to have decided that Latin America--even with its rich natural resources, available robust agricultural produce, and abundant energy--is one of those vital areas. If China reassessed its priorities in a manner which raised Latin America in the PRC's ranking of interests, the PLA might become a much more potent instrument at accomplishing China's goals. However, the PLA retains some significant weaknesses preventing its use in a manner similar to the way that the United States uses its military as an instrument of statecraft. Overcoming those issues would be possible but would require Beijing to reconfigure national strategic goals. As China

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 80 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz continues to struggle with a wide array of serious internal concerns, the reconfiguration does not appear on the horizon, but it is certainly possible in the future.

China won‘t bolster military clout – they‘re scared of the US Watson, National War College strategy professor, 13
(Cynthia. Former Dean Social Sciences at Loyola University Chicago. "China's use of the military instrument in Latin America: not yet the biggest stick." Journal of International Affairs 66. 2. (2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com /_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=330143510. Online. JMR) China views statecraft in a manner similar to the rest of the world, noting the range of instruments with which to achieve their goals. The Beijing government can still appear somewhat overbearing on foreign policy concerns, but the military has not been China's primary tool to increase its presence in Latin America. China's greater interest has largely been non-military, because Latin America's issues, largely military for the United States, are not central to China's goals in the region. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine stipulates that the United States would look with the greatest of suspicion upon actions by European countries using their military as an instrument in Latin America. The Chinese occasionally refer to this policy as one where Washington has made its most important interests clear and has shown that it is willing to react if necessary. Beijing, acutely sensitive to Washington's reactions, regards military actions in Latin America through the doctrine's lens as possibly endangering the tremendous successes of post-1972 bilateral ties between the two states and the benefits it has created for millions of Chinese citizens. Beijing has traditionally been cautious in deploying the PLA in this portion of the world where Washington is most sensitive to outside involvement.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 81 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 82 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran Rising Now – Latin America
Iran is increasing relations with Venezuela and Latin America to counter the US Karmon, Interdisciplinary Center Institute for Counter-Terrorism Senior Research Scholar, 10
(Ely, September/October 2010, ―Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,‖ American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 276-277, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-2013. RH) Farideh Farhi argues that although Iran‘s increased attention to Latin America as a region is a relatively new development, its bilateral ties with some individual Latin American nations ‗‗are long-standing and relatively robust.‘‘ Iran has shared an ideological relationship with Cuba since the end of the Iran–Iraq War and a political relationship with Venezuela since their cofounding of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1960s.3 The drive behind those long-standing bilateral relationships has been Iran‘s nonaligned position in foreign policy, the efforts by the United States at keeping Iran in diplomatic and economic isolation, and the election of a reformist president in 1997 that made it possible for countries like Brazil ‗‗to engage Iran with enough confidence to withstand pressures from the United States.‘‘ The shift to the left in many Latin American countries since the beginning of 2000 has allowed Iran to be successful in its attempt to improve relations with particular countries. From Ahmadinejad‘s point of view, ‗‗rather than responding passively towards the U.S. attempt to isolate Iran politically and economically and become the dominant player in the Middle East region, Iran‘s backyard, Iran should move aggressively in theUnited States‘s own backyard as a means to rattle it or at least make a point.‘‘4 What is Ahmadinejad looking for in Latin America? He is seeking Latin American support to counter U.S. and European pressures to stop Iran from developing nuclear capabilities. Venezuela and Cuba were, alongside Syria, the only three countries that supported Iran‘s nuclear program in a February 2006 vote at the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).5 Ahmadinejad wants to strike back at the United States in its own hemisphere and possibly destabilize U.S.-friendly governments, which suggests that he seeks a permanent Iranian presence on the U.S. doorstep. Ahmadinejad is interested in boosting his popularity at home by showing his people he is welcomed as a hero abroad. Since Ahmadinejad‘s ascendancy to power, he has made four diplomatic tours of Latin America in search of an alliance of ‗‗revolutionary countries.‘‘ He visited Venezuela in July of 2006; Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador in January of 2007; Venezuela and Bolivia in September of 2007; Brazil and again Venezuela and Bolivia in November 2009. Ahmadinejad also hosted President Chavez of Venezuela (eight times) and President Ortega of Nicaragua, President Morales of Bolivia, and President Correa of Ecuador and is expecting a visit of Brazil‘s President Lula da Silva in 2010. The cornerstone of Ahmadinejad‘s Latin America policy is the formation of an anti- American axis with Venezuela. During a July 2006 visit to Tehran, Chavez told a Tehran University crowd, ‗‗We have to save humankind and put an end to the U.S. empire.‘‘ When Chavez again visited Tehran a year later, Ahmadinejad and Chavez used the visit to declare an ‗‗Axis of Unity‘‘ against the United States.6 Commander Kavon Hakimzadeh, a special assistant in the U.S. Southern Command‘s Washington office, considers the relationship between Iran and Venezuela ‗‗the result of a convergence of unique geopolitical circumstances. Both countries are seeking out all of the allies they can find in order to

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 83 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz avoid isolation. Chavez and Ahmadinejad have similar personalities and seem to like each other, have taken advantage of every opportunity to antagonize the United States, and have been successful in doing so primarily because they are unpredictable.‘‘7 Both leaders use their relationship to overcome international isolation and sanctions and their petrodollar boon to encourage other states in Latin America to confront the United States.8

Iran‘s influence is growing in the region – the Obama administration is simply downplaying it Tribune-Review editorial, 13
(6/25/13, ―The Iranian threat in Latin America,‖ http://triblive.com/opinion/editorials/4249085-74/iraniranian-latin#axzz2YPkdyCeh, Tribune-Review, accessed 7/7/13, IC) The House ordered the study, and a strategy for countering Iranian influence in the region, based on the premise that Iran represents a ―growing hostile presence.‖ That was based, in part, on information gathered in the 1980s and 1990s showing Iran had built clandestine groups to ―sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks,‖ according to an account in The Long War Journal. The 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Argentina that killed 85 is widely believed to have been carried out by the terrorist group Hezbollah, at Iran's behest, The Washington Times reports. But The Times also reports that the coming study, despite concluding that sympathizers ―provide financial and ideological support‖ to Hezbollah and al-Qaida, suggests there's no evidence of anything deeper. The report concludes that Iran is not supporting active terrorist cells in the Western Hemisphere. Yet Rep. Jeff Duncan, R-S.C., says that just last August, during a visit to Paraguay, local officials told him how ―Iranians and their proxy are very active in that region,‖ a contention watered down by U.S. officials there. Mr. Duncan tells The Times he thinks the Obama administration is downplaying Iran's Latin American influence to ―placate‖ Iran to obtain concession on its nuclear ambitions.

Iran is expanding operations – Khamenei‘s nomination of candidates involved with the AMIA bombing proves Ros-Lehtinen, US Representative and Chair of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, 6/26/13
(Ileana, Florida Republican, 6/26/13, ―U.S. Must Remain Vigilant, We Cannot Ignore Iranian Threat from Latin America, Says Ros-Lehtinen,‖ http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/us-must-remain-vigilantwe-cannot-ignore-iranian-threat-latin-america-says-ros, Ros-Lehtinen.gov, accessed 7/7/13, IC) (WASHINGTON) – U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, made the following statement in response to a State Department report on Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere. Statement by Ros-Lehtinen: ―We should not underestimate the Iranian influence and presence in the Western Hemisphere. We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that many individuals have been sanctioned, indicted, and prosecuted due to their involvement with the Iranian regime, or its proxy Hezbollah, in this region of the world. ―We know that terrorist cells are working throughout the Hemisphere to fundraise and finance their illicit and nefarious activities. The AMIA bombing conducted by Hezbollah in 1994 serves as a somber reminder of the threat the Iranian regime poses to our allies in the region and our own national security, and the regime openly touted this connection when Supreme Leader Khamenei selected two individuals intimately connected with the bombing as final candidates in this month‘s presidential elections.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 84 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz ―Whether it‘s the foiled plot by an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps member to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador on U.S. soil, or the DEA-led investigations into the Lebanese Canadian Bank money laundering scheme to finance terrorism using drug money, or Operation Titan which helped to dismantle Hezbollah activities in South America, it is clear that the Iranian regime is supporting operatives in the region. We must remain vigilant and do whatever is in our means to counter this growing threat.‖

Iranian influence is spreading throughout Latin America Garamone, American Forces Press Service, 13
(Jim, 3/20/13, US Southern Command, ―Kelly warns of potential crime-terrorism nexus in Latin America‖, http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Kelly-Warns-of-Potential-Crime-TerrorismNexus-in-Latin-America.aspx, 7/9/13, AL) WASHINGTON, March 20, 2013 – A potential connection between crime syndicates and terrorists in Latin America would constitute a clear danger to the region, U.S. Southern Command‘s senior leader told reporters at the Pentagon today. Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly said the increase in Iranian influence in Latin America is worrisome, and an example of the peril that the combination of criminal networks and states that sponsor terrorism, like Iran, could pose. Kelly, who took over U.S. Southern Command in November, told reporters at a Pentagon news conference that in the past six years Iran has tried to increase its influence in Central and South America. The Iranian government, he said, has built embassies and cultural centers in the region. ―The concern is that … they‘re looking … for influence -- say for votes in the U.N. on sanctions,‖ he said. ―But also, and I've … made mention to some of our friends in the region that these guys are very, very good at what they do, and very, very skilled at what they do, and that people should just be careful as to who they're dealing with.‖ The general stressed he is not accusing Iran of sponsoring terrorism in Latin America, but he noted that Iran is involved in terrorism in other areas of the world.

Iran is a threat due to growing economic and political sway. Berman American Foreign Policy VP 12
[Ilan, Summer 2012, Middle East Quarterly, ―Iran Courts Latin America‖, http://www.meforum.org/3297/iran-latin-america, accessed 7/7/13, ALT] Tehran's formal political and economic contacts with regional states are reinforced by a broad web of asymmetric activities throughout the Americas. Illicit financial transactions figure prominently in this regard. Over the past several years, Tehran's economic ties with Caracas have helped it skirt the sanctions being levied by the international community as well as to continue to operate in an increasingly inhospitable global financial system. It has done so through the establishment of joint companies and financial entities as well as the formation of wholly Iranian-owned financial entities in Venezuela and the entrenchment of Iranian commercial banks there.[23] Experts note that this financial activity exploits an existing loophole in the current sanctions regime against Tehran —one that leverages the freedom of action of Venezuelan banks to provide the Islamic Republic with "an ancillary avenue through which it can access the international financial system despite Western pressure."[24] Tehran is also known to be active in the region's ubiquitous gray and black markets as well as its free trade areas—operating both directly and via its terrorist proxy Hezbollah.[25] Most notoriously, these include the so-called "Triple Frontier" at the crossroads of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil as well as Venezuela's Margarita Island.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 85 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The Iranians also boast an increasingly robust paramilitary presence in the region. The Pentagon, in its 2010 report to Congress on Iran's military power, noted that the Qods Force, the Revolutionary Guard's elite paramilitary unit, is now deeply involved in the Americas, stationing "operatives in foreign embassies, charities and religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often building on existing socioeconomic ties with the well-established Shia Diaspora" and even carrying out "paramilitary operations to support extremists and destabilize unfriendly regimes."[26]

Iran is establishing ties in Latin America – this comes from the general of SOUTHCOM himself Simeone, Department of Defense Public Affairs Specialist, 3/20
(Nick, 3/20/13, ―Southcom Chief: Iran Working to Expand Influence in Latin America,‖ U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119586, accessed 7/7/13, IC) WASHINGTON, March 20, 2013 – U.S. Southern Command‘s top officer told Congress today that Iran is actively working to expand its presence in Latin America to cultivate allies at a time when Tehran is facing tough U.S and international sanctions for its alleged nuclear weapons program. Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly told the House Armed Services Committee that Iran ―has been very, very active over the last few years‖ in cultivating diplomatic and cultural ties to the region, especially by befriending Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who died earlier this month. ―They‘ve opened embassies, they‘ve opened cultural centers,‖ he testified, adding that on the surface, all of this appears to be normal. ―But to what end is obviously the issue,‖ he told the House panel. Kelly told lawmakers he could discuss details about what the Iranian government‘s goals might be only in a closed session. He mentioned Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina as countries that have been the target of Iran‘s diplomatic and economic outreach. Despite Iran‘s outreach to countries that he said have interests unfavorable to the United States, the general cast Iran‘s overtures as being far from successful and described a region as largely uninterested in Tehran‘s diplomatic engagement. ―The region as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts,‖ Kelly said in his prepared testimony. But he cautioned that Iran‘s allies, including Hezbollah, have established a presence in several Latin-American countries to deadly effect, recalling that Iran and Hezbollah were blamed for the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, that killed more than 80 people. ―Proselytizers with ties to global Islamic groups are attempting to radicalize and recruit among the Muslim communities throughout the region,‖ he said, adding that the United States and its partners ―should be extremely concerned whenever external extremist groups or state sponsors of terrorism see the Western Hemisphere as attractive or, even worse, vulnerable.‖ Kelly pointed out that Venezuelan government officials have been sanctioned for providing financial support to Hezbollah, as well as for supporting rebels in neighboring Colombia. Kelly said China is another country far outside Latin America that wants to compete with the United States for influence in the region, and is very engaged economically, ―buying commodities in a big way and also investing in port facilities.‖ This, he added, is all the more reason for the United States to continue working to strengthen partnerships in the region.

Iran is increasing presence in Latin America ITIC, Israeli-based independent research group, 12
(Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 4/18/12, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/articleprint.aspx?id=20318, 7/7/13, AL)

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 86 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran's increased activity in Latin America is part of its global strategy, whose objectives go far beyond the desire for hegemony in the Middle East. Iran regards itself as hemmed in by the United States and its allies, stubbornly pursues the nuclear crisis with the West, and seeks to present the United States with a revolutionary challenge in its own backyard by exploiting its relative advantages with countries and populaces in Latin American: Iran's anti-American ideology and rhetoric fall on willing ears; Iranian petrodollars, which can be used for political and propaganda purposes; and a Muslim large population, some of it Lebanese, living in key Latin American countries. 4. Iran's interests and objectives in Latin America are the following: 1) Politics and strategy: Iran has found ideological-political sympathy in a number of Latin American countries, which may enable it to escape from its increasing political isolation and strengthen the so-called "resistance camp" it leads (including Syria, Hezbollah, and Palestinian terrorist organizations). Iran also regards Latin America as good area for defiance and also for challenging the United States in various ways: increased political and military collaboration, economic infiltration and extensive activities to disseminate Shi'ite Islam and eventually export the Islamic revolution to Latin America. 2) Economics: Iran focuses on economic relations with Latin American countries regarding energy and oil, and strives to increase them to help it circumvent the sanctions which have been imposed on it. Thus Iran's relations with Venezuela enable it to coordinate prices with a large oil exporter like itself (Iran and Venezuela are respectively the fourth and fifth largest oil exporters in the world). In addition, Iran wants to exploit uranium deposits in Venezuela and other Latin American countries (in 2009 Venezuela publicly stated that Iran was helping it explore for uranium.) However, Iranian-Latin American economic collaboration is still limited and a relatively small factor in Iran's overall trade. 3) Harming Israel's political relations with Latin America countries: One example was the terminating of Israeli-Venezuelan and Israeli-Bolivian relations during Operation Cast Lead. In addition, Iran's close relations with Venezuela and other countries creates an internal political atmosphere and even infrastructure (encouraged by Iranian propaganda) to harm the Jewish communities in those countries (where, as in other parts of the world, often no distinction is made between anti-Israel policy and harming and Jewish communities).

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 87 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran Rising Now – Cuba
Iran-Cuba relations are high now – they share similar ideologies. Franks, Bureau Chief Reuters News Havana, 12
(Jeff, 1/12/2012, Reuters, ―Iranian leader says Cuba, Iran think alike,‖ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/12/us-cuba-iran-idUSTRE80B1KC20120112, Accessed 7-9-13, RH) Reuters) - Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Thursday both Cuba-Iranian relations and Fidel Castro were in good shape after he met with the former Cuban leader and his younger brother President Raul Castro during a one-day visit to the communist island. He said the two countries, similarly at odds with the United States though half a world apart, were closely aligned on many issues and would continue to fight "to demand the rights of the peoples." "Our positions, versions, interpretations are alike, very close. We have been good friends, we are and will be, and we will be together forever. Long live Cuba," Ahmadinejad said through an interpreter at the Havana airport as he departed for Ecuador, the final stop in his Latin American tour. Such shows of solidarity were the main purpose of Ahmadinejad's trip to four leftist-led countries as Iran seeks support amid rising international opposition to its nuclear activities. He visited Venezuela and Nicaragua before coming to Cuba on Wednesday. The leader of the Islamic Republic said he discussed many different issues in a meeting with Fidel Castro, 85 and mostly retired, and that he was happy "to see commandante Fidel safe and sound." A recent flurry of rumors on social media claimed that Castro had died. "We see that he follows all the national and international affairs in detail and with much pleasure," he said. President Raul Castro told reporters his brother had met with Ahmadinejad for two hours and did most of the talking. The meeting was held on Wednesday. "It shows that he is very well, really very well," said the younger Castro, who succeeded his brother as president four years ago and is himself 80. About his own talks with Ahmadinejad, Castro said, "It was a good visit, we discussed quite a lot, we analyzed quite a lot, we finished very late."

Cuba-Iran relations are high – numerous meetings and economic integration Monella, Italian reporter and investigative journalist, 12
(Lillo Montalto, May 30, 2012, The Argentina Independent, ―Cuba: State Visit Deepens Relations With Iran,‖ http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/cuba-state-visit-deepens-relations-with-iran/. Accessed 7-9-13, RH) With the second Iranian state visit to Cuba, the vice-president of Iran seeks to give a further boost to the already-friendly bilateral relations between two of the fiercest US enemies. Alì Saeed Lou arrived yesterday in Havana for the second state visit on the island led by the communist regime of Raul Castro. The laconic note released by the Foreign Ministry of Cuba underlines the ―common will of improving relationships between the two countries and increasing the trade volume.‖ Local media reports that Saeed Lou invited Castro to the XVI Meeting of Not-Aligned Countries that will be held in Tehran on the next 30 and 31st of August.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 88 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz During his visit, ―the distinguished guest will have official conversation with comrade José Ramón Machado Ventura, first vice-president of the State Council and Minister of the Republic of Cuba, and will be occupied with other activities,‖ stated the official note released by Cuban authorities. During his Latin American tour, Saeed Lou will also visit Nicaragua, Venezuela and Ecuador. In January, Mahamud Ahmadinejad first came to Havana to meet president Raul Castro and his brother Fidel. Not only an anti-US and anti-imperialistic alliance: Cuba and Iran may soon be united also by oil and gas-related businesses. As the Italian newswire PangeaNews reports, recent exporations in the Caribbean seas helped discover new oil reserves. ‖The fact that both are now petro-powers, and both share the same anti-imperialist feelings, could help creating an hydrocarbon axis. With the addition of Venezuela, it would certainly cause much discomfort to the White House.‖ Cuba was amongst the few countries to express support to the Iranian nuclear progam, strongly criticised by the UN and US President Obama. In September 2010, the two countries met in Havana to discuss a €500million credit line to help Cuban industries, commerce, the energetic development sector and the local health system. Fidel Castro also warned that Iran coud be the next in line for a Israeli-US-led war ‗against terror‘.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 89 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran Rising Now – Mexico
Iran is expanding into Mexico – they use embassies and peaceful relations as a cover-up for Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. Bensman, Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Agent and Journalist, 9
(Todd, April 9, 2009, Global Post, ―Iran Reaches Out to Mexico,‖ http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/mexico/090407/iran-reaches-out-mexico, Accessed 7-9-13, RH) SAN ANTONIO, Tex. — While U.S. leaders remain fixated on Mexico‘s drug war, Iran has quietly sought to establish closer ties to Mexico, with almost no notice. Over the last year, Iran has been pushing for an expansion of trade and diplomatic ties between the two countries. The efforts mirror those Iran's leaders have made in Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua, whose leaders employ anti-U.S. rhetoric. Iran's close relationships with those three countries have prompted alarms to ripple through the U.S. national security establishment in recent years. Some foreign policy experts see nothing nefarious in Iran's reaching out to another oil producing state, while some counterterrorism experts believe the U.S. should be more vigilant in monitoring any Iranian attempt to establish closer ties with Mexico. It's just too close, they argue, not to pay careful attention. In late February, Iran‘s ruling Islamic clerics quietly sent emissaries to Mexico City with a proposal to expand relations in the ―political, economic and cultural arenas‖ for the first time since the Shah was overthrown in 1979. According to a Feb. 27 press release posted online by Mexico‘s department of foreign relations, Secretary Maria Lourdes Aranda Bezaury met with Tehran‘s deputy foreign minister for the Americas, Ali Reza Salari. More meetings are planned. The response to Iran's actions in the region weren't always so muted. Past Iranian overtures elsewhere in Latin America — most recently in Nicaragua — drew quick U.S. condemnation, along with publicly aired suspicions that Iran's motives included the desire to project a terrorism threat in America's backyard. In contrast, Iran's outreach in Mexico has proceeded with scarcely any public mention. The overtures took place (by design or not) amid the distractions of visits to Mexico by high-ranking U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Homeland Security Department Secretary Janet Napolitano, to discuss supporting Mexico in its war against rampaging drug cartels. "This is the first I've probably ever heard about this," said a State Department official closely involved in bilateral diplomacy and high-level American visits to Mexico. "And to tell you the truth it's probably something that's not going to come up (during the official U.S. diplomatic visits) — unless it's somehow forced onto the agenda." Andy Lane, a State Department spokesman in Washington D.C., appeared unaware of the Iranian proposal when a Global Post reporter called on the eve of Clinton's Mexico visit. After seeking the administration's response, Lane called back: "Many countries in the hemisphere have relations with Iran, and it is their sovereign right to pursue relations with any country that they choose." Lane said he was not authorized to elaborate. The response may reflect President Barack Obama's desire for a different approach to Iran than his predecessor. The Obama administration's approach has been marked so far by diplomatic outreach to dissuade the clerical regime from pursuing a nuclear program that Europe and many of Iran's neighbors, including Israel, fear is aimed at producing nuclear weapons.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 90 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz From the perspective of the U.S., Iran is different from other countries seeking acceptance in the region. Since Iran was tied to the 1980s bombings of a U.S. Marines barracks and an embassy complex in Beirut, every American president since Ronald Reagan has continued Iran's designation as a state sponsor of terror. And the United Nations Security Council has implemented three rounds of economic sanctions on the grounds that Iran has broken promises about its nuclear program. Foremost on the minds of national security experts who worry about Iran's forays into Latin America are the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Argentina of a Jewish center and the Israeli embassy, which killed 115 people and wounded 500. In 2007, Argentina indicted top Iranian diplomats and government officials for conspiring with Hezbollah operatives about the bombings. "Iran wants to expand its presence in the western hemisphere. And as the 1994 terrorist attack in Argentina confirmed, when you have Iran in your country that always means you have the Quds Force and Hezbollah, too," said Michael James Barton, until recently a White House Middle East policy advisor to the Bush administration. Last year, the Bush administration declared Iran's paramilitary secret police force, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, a terrorist organization on grounds that its operatives used the diplomatic cover of Iran's embassy in Iraq to help insurgents kill American troops. But not everyone sees nefarious intent in the Iranian push to build embassies through Latin America into Mexico. Gary Sick, a Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs professor, said Iran is merely breaking its UN-imposed isolation as any persecuted country would — by reaching out to oilproducing or oil-consuming nations in Africa, India, China and, quite naturally, Latin America. "The outreach to Mexico doesn't strike me as dramatically different from many of the things they've been doing," Sick said. "It's obviously in their interest to have relations with other oil producers." But former intelligence officials and counterterrorism experts note that Iran is well known for using its foreign embassies as a cover for the movement of Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah operatives, as it did in Argentina. Oliver "Buck" Revell, a retired associate deputy director in charge of FBI counterintelligence and international affairs, downplayed the threat of any direct Iranian attack mounted from Mexico. But that doesn't mean there aren't concerns, he said. "They could create back channels and cells, get more capability, more contacts and more resources," Revell said. "There are many, many opportunities if they get a foothold in Mexico that could be harmful to both Mexico and the U.S."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 91 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran Rising Now – Venezuela
Iran is on the offensive in Venezuela— diplomatic and public outreach proves Berman American Foreign Policy vice president 12
[Ilan, Summer 2012, Middle East Quarterly, ―Iran Courts Latin America‖, http://www.meforum.org/3297/iran-latin-america, accessed 7/7/13, ALT] Just as significantly, Venezuela has served as Iran's gateway for further economic and diplomatic expansion into the region. Aided by its partnership with Caracas and bolstered by a shared antiAmerican outlook, Tehran has succeeded in forging significant strategic, economic, and political links with the regime of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Even Iran's relations with Argentina, where Iranian-supported terrorists carried out major bombings in 1992 and 1994, have improved in recent times, as the government of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has hewed a more conciliatory line toward Tehran.[7] It would be a mistake, however, to view these contacts as simply pragmatic—or strictly defensive. The Iranian regime's sustained systematic outreach to regional states suggests that it sees the Western Hemisphere as a crucial strategic theater for expanding its own influence and reducing that of the United States. Indeed, a 2009 dossier prepared by Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that "since Ahmadinejad's rise to power, Tehran has been promoting an aggressive policy aimed at bolstering its ties with Latin American countries with the declared goal of 'bringing America to its knees.'"[8] This view is increasingly shared by the U.S. military: In its 2010 report on Iranian military power, the Office of the Secretary of Defense noted that "Iran seeks to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence and expanding ties with regional actors" in Latin America.[9] To this end, Tehran is ramping up its strategic messaging to the region. In late January, on the heels of Ahmadinejad's very public four-country tour of Latin America, the Iranian regime formally launched HispanTV, a Spanish-language analogue to its English-language Press TV channel.[10] The television outlet has been depicted by Ahmadinejad as part of his government's efforts to "limit the ground for supremacy of dominance seekers"—a thinly-veiled reference to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere.[11] As Ahmadinejad's statement indicates, Tehran is pursuing a strategy that promotes its own ideology and influence in Latin America at Washington's expense. In this endeavor, it has been greatly aided by Chavez, who himself has worked diligently to diminish U.S. political and economic presence in the region under the banner of a new "Bolivarian" revolution.

Venezuela and Iran are heavily increasing ties economically and diplomatically Karmon, Interdisciplinary Center Institute for Counter-Terrorism Senior Research Scholar, 10
(Ely, September/October 2010, ―Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,‖ American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 277-278, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-2013. RH) During the International Conference on Latin America held in Tehran in February 2007, Iran‘s foreign minister, Mehdi Mostafavi, announced the opening of embassies in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay and a representative office in Bolivia and said that a number of Latin American countries would open their embassies in Iran.9 The Iranian political and economic penetration in the continent in a short period of two–three years is indeed impressive. Venezuela

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 92 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Both Hugo Chavez and Ahmadinejad embrace a rhetoric emphasizing autonomy and independence from the great powers, the United States and Europe, citing unity in the struggle against imperialism and capitalism.10 ‗‗Here are two brother countries, united like a single fist,‘‘ Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan leader, was quoted as saying in Tehran. ‗‗Iran is an example of struggle, resistance, dignity, revolution, strong faith,‘‘ he told Al Jazeera. ‗‗We are two powerful countries. Iran is a power and Venezuela is becoming one. We want to create a bipolar world. We don‘t want a single power [that is, the USA].‘‘ ‗‗Despite the will of the world arrogance [of the United States], we [Iran and Venezuela] will stand by the oppressed and deprived nations of the world,‘‘ Ahmadinejad said.11 Some observers conclude that Latin America‘s willingness to embrace Iran indicates that U.S. prestige in the region has significantly dwindled. Chavez has emerged as ‗‗the godfather and relationship manager,‘‘ striving to draw in this embrace other allies such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. He is providing Iran entree into Latin America, vowing to Iran Challenges the U.S. in Latin America ‗‗unite the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean‘‘ and recently gave Iran observer status in his leftist trade-pact group known as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas.12 Iran has become the second largest investor in Venezuela after the United States. Venezuela is Iran‘s sixth most important partner in South America in terms of trade volume according to figures released by the European Commission: an exchange of U.S. $50 million. The Venezuela-Iran Fund has already amassed 200 million dollars, and by the end of 2009, it will receive 200 million more to finance common projects, according to the Venezuelan minister of finance, Ali Rodriguez.13 The first ‗‗antiimperialist cars‘‘ from a joint venture reached Venezuela‘s roads, with the first batch earmarked for army officers. The 4,000 tractors produced annually in Ciudad Bolivar have a symbolic value as agents of ‗‗revolutionary change.‘‘ Universities are teaching Farsi.14 Iran is to help build platforms in a four billion dollar development of Orinoco Delta oil deposits in exchange for Venezuelan investments. An Iranian company is building thousands of apartments for Venezuela‘s poor. The public housing project alone has brought more than 400 Iranian engineers and specialists to Venezuela, where many have learned basic Spanish.15 Venezuela also could give Iran breathing space as it tries to weather the financial pressure of UN and U.S. sanctions over its nuclear program. Venezuela could end up being an outlet for Iran to move money, obtain high-tech equipment, and access the world financial system.16 Venezuela already has become Iran‘s gateway for travel to the region. There is now a weekly flight between Caracas and Tehran, with a stopover in Damascus, operated by the Venezuelan statecontrolled airline Conviasa and Iran‘s national carrier, Iran Air.17 Press TV, the first Iranian international news network, triumphantly announced that Iran and Venezuela have moved to strengthen their cooperation in defense areas, ‗‗a move that may ruffle feathers in the United States.‘‘ During the first visit of an Iranian defense minister to Venezuela, Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammed-Najjar pledged Tehran‘s full military support ‗‗to promote the Venezuelan military‘s defense capabilities in the framework of mutual defensive agreements.‘‘ The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on military cooperation that encompassed ‗‗training and mutual exchange of military experiences.‘‘ Venezuelan Vice President Ramon Carrizalez said, ‗‗Venezuela is fully determined to strengthen defense ties with Iran.‘‘ The prospects of deep defense ties between Iran and Venezuela is not expected to receive warm welcomes in the White House, as the United States has on many occasions expressed opposition to Tehran‘s establishing a foothold in its ‗‗strategic backyard,‘‘ commented Press TV.18 United Press International reported in August 2009 that Iranian military advisers have been embedded with Venezuelan troops.19 During a visit to the sacred city of Mashhad in northern Iran, Chavez said to his host, President Ahmadinejad, that ‗‗Jesus and the Mahdi [the Shi‘ite messiah] will arrive soon and establish justice in the world.‘‘20 It seems that the Venezuelan president is buying even the apocalyptic beliefs of his Iranian friend!

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 93 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Ahmadinejad was received during his latest (fourth) visit in Venezuela in November 2009 with military honors by Chavez, who called him an antiimperialist gladiator.‘‘ ‗‗I am your brother; we will be together until the end,‘‘ Ahmadinejad replied. The two leaders signed 12 cooperation agreements on electricity, housing, agriculture, and tourism.21 Starting October 2009, Venezuela has been exporting to Iran 20,000 barrels=day of refined oil at a cost of $200 million.

Iran has intensified ties with Venezuela seeking to obtain nuclear and military support and counter US hegemony Berman, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, 12
(Ilan, Summer 2012, ―Iran Courts Latin America,‖ Middle East Quarterly, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, page 6364, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-13, RH) Outreach to Latin America is seen by the Iranian regime first and foremost as a means to lessen its deepening international isolation. Since 2003, when its previously clandestine nuclear program became a pressing international issue, Tehran has sought to mitigate the mounting political and economic restrictions levied against it by the United States and its allies through intensified diplomatic outreach abroad. Due to its favorable geopolitical climate— typified by vast ungoverned areas and widespread antiAmericanism—Latin America has become an important focus of this effort. Over the past decade, the regime has nearly doubled the number of embassies in the region (from six in 2005 to ten in 2010) and has devoted considerable energy to forging economic bonds with sympathetic regional governments.2 Far and away the most prominent such partnership has been with Venezuela. Since Hugo Chavez became president in 1999, alignment with Tehran has emerged as a cardinal tenet of Caracas‘s foreign policy. The subsequent election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005 kicked cooperation into high gear with dramatic results. Today, the two countries enjoy an extensive and vibrant strategic partnership. Venezuela has emerged as an important source of material assistance for Tehran‘s sprawling nuclear program as well as a vocal diplomatic backer of its right to atomic power.3 The Chavez regime also has become a safe haven and source of financial support for Hezbollah, Iran‘s most powerful terrorist proxy.4 In turn, Tehran‘s feared Revolutionary Guard has become involved in training Venezuela‘s secret services and police.5 Economic contacts between Caracas and Tehran likewise have exploded—expanding from virtually nil in the early 2000s to more than $20 billion in total trade and cooperation agreements today.6 Just as significantly, Venezuela has served as Iran‘s gateway for further economic and diplomatic expansion into the region. Aided by its partnership with Caracas and bolstered by a shared antiAmerican outlook, Tehran has succeeded in forging significant strategic, economic, and political links with the regime of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Even Iran‘s relations with Argentina, where Iranian-supported terrorists carried out major bombings in 1992 and 1994, have improved in recent times, as the government of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has hewed a more conciliatory line toward Tehran.7 It would be a mistake, however, to view these contacts as simply pragmatic—or strictly defensive. The Iranian regime‘s sustained systematic outreach to regional states suggests that it sees the Western Hemisphere as a crucial strategic theater for expanding its own influence and reducing that of the United States. Indeed, a 2009 dossier prepared by Israel‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that ―since Ahmadinejad‘s rise to power, Tehran has been promoting an aggressive policy aimed at bolstering its ties with Latin American countries with the declared goal of ‗bringing America to its knees.‘‖8 This view is increasingly shared by the U.S. military: In its 2010 report on Iranian military power, the Office of the Secretary of Defense noted that ―Iran seeks to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence and expanding ties with regional actors‖ in Latin America.9

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 94 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz To this end, Tehran is ramping up its strategic messaging to the region. In late January, on the heels of Ahmadinejad‘s very public fourcountry tour of Latin America, the Iranian regime formally launched HispanTV, a Spanish language analogue to its English-language Press TV channel.10 The television outlet has been depicted by Ahmadinejad as part of his government‘s efforts to ―limit the ground for supremacy of dominance seekers‖—a thinly veiled reference to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere.11 As Ahmadinejad‘s statement indicates, Tehran is pursuing a strategy that promotes its own ideology and influence in Latin America at Washington‘s expense. In this endeavor, it has been greatly aided by Chavez, who himself has worked diligently to diminish U.S. political and economic presence in the region under the banner of a new ―Bolivarian‖ revolution.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 95 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran Rising Now – Venezuela – Chavez Not Key
Chavez wasn‘t key – Morales and Correa are filling in for Chavez to cooperate with Iran Berman, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, 12
(Ilan, Summer 2012, ―Iran Courts Latin America,‖ Middle East Quarterly, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, page 69, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-13, RH) Tehran‘s expanding regional activism, therefore, can be understood at least in part as contingency planning of sorts: an effort to broaden contacts and ensure the continuance of its regional influence in a post-Chavez environment. In this context, the regimes of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador are significant with Correa in particular increasingly considered a potential successor to Chavez as a standard bearer of the new ―Bolivarianism‖—and an inheritor of cooperation with Iran.32 Tehran‘s future progress in solidifying and expanding those partnerships will serve as an important barometer of the long-term survival of its bonds to the region as a whole. For their part, since October 2011, policymakers in Washington have begun to pay serious attention to Tehran‘s activities in the Western Hemisphere. Yet they have done little concrete to respond to it, at least so far. Despite heartening early steps (including new legislation now under consideration by Congress),33 a comprehensive strategy to contest and dilute Iranian influence in the Americas remains absent. Unless and until such a strategy does emerge, Tehran‘s Latin American efforts—and the threats posed by them to American interests and the U.S. homeland—will only continue to expand.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 96 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran Rising Now – Brazil
Brazil is increasing ties with Iran – Silva has negotiated nuclear power deals with Iran against US will. Morgan, British Journalist and Latin American Specialist, 10
(Susie, October 2010, ―Iran‘s Growing Influence in Latin America,‖ Middle East Magazine, Issue: 415, page 15, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-9-13, RH) The US had considered Brazil's President Lula da Silva an unconditional ally but instead he is developing a powerful, independent voice on the world stage, notably over Iran's nuclear policy, putting it at odds with the US. Brazil is keen to develop extensive, peaceful, nuclear energy of its own. This spring, Brazil together with Turkey helped to broker a separate nuclear deal with Iran, and both subsequently voted against a fourth round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in May that Washington had been pushing hard for. Brazil is continuing to argue for ongoing diplomacy, not punishment. The country's new assertive independence - President Lula da Silva recently queried why an emerging power like his should not be considered a viable intermediary for Iran - reflects a steady, inexorable shift in the global balance of power, especially since both Turkey and Brazil are non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. This new reality was graphically reflected in the photograph that flashed around the world of a beaming President Abmadinejad flanked by the leaders of Turkey and Brazil after their nuclear deal.

Latin America is at the top of the agenda for Iran – trade with Brazil, cooperation with ALBA, and Ahmadinejad‘s visits prove Walser, Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C., 12
(Ray, Summer 2012, ―The Future of Iran‘s Influence in Latin America,‖ The Jewish Policy Center, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/3233/iran-influence-latin-america, accessed 7/7/13, IC) Iran's confrontation with the U.S. and international community over its nuclear program, as well as its ability to threaten U.S. interests and friends from Israel and Iraq to the Straits of Hormuz and Afghanistan, pose major challenges to U.S. power and influence. By contrast, Iran's ventures into the Americas represent a less direct challenge. Nevertheless, the issue has received attention in Washington. In the past five years there have been numerous studies and congressional hearings focused on Iran's penetration into Latin America, but little consensus on the severity of the challenge. On the geopolitical chessboard, Iran pursues a multiple track policy in the Western Hemisphere. With Latin America's democracies, it professes to want only normal diplomatic, trade, and cultural ties. With the set of states participating in the Chavez-Castro alliance (the Bolivarian Alternative for our Americas, or ALBA), Iran acts as friend and ally in relentless contention with what it considers a U.S. dominated world. Overall, Iran has multiple objectives: regular diplomatic relations, trade, prestige, sanction evasion, and a potential action base for asymmetric warfare and terror. Iran: Ordinary Nation in the New World Since the overthrow of the Shah and the emergence of the Islamic Republic, Iran has attempted to expand its influence as a middle-sized, regional power with global reach. It clearly seeks to avoid isolation as an international pariah despite the fact its extremist ideology, repressive police state, abhorrent anti-Semitism, and state sponsorship of terror make it an unfit and dangerous international actor. It aims to demonstrate it is a responsible—if often misunderstood and unfairly treated—global citizen demanding respect and sovereignty and prepared to work within international rules.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 97 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Tehran's ability to build a strong relationship with Brazil and other Latin American democracies remains a key objective with trade and prestige diplomacy atop its agenda. Recently, Iranian trade has grown with the Western Hemisphere, reaching $3.5 billion in 2010, mainly in Iranian imports. Likewise, Brazil leads the way as an important agricultural exporter to Iran. Under President Inacio Lula de Silva (2004-2010), Brazil's relations with Iran reached an amicable highpoint. Lula downplayed the post-election violence of 2009, callously comparing Iran's brutal repression of the Green Movement with a clash of rival soccer fans in Brazil, and later hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in November 2009. The following May, Lula traveled to Tehran and with the Turkish prime minister announced a nuclear fuel swap agreement that handed a momentary victory to Iran as it battled against UN sanctions. Lula's diplomacy gave credibility to Iran's claim that its ambitions do not include nuclear weapons and left a false impression of Iranian readiness to compromise on the nuclear issue. As a rotating member of the United Nations Security Council, Brazil also voted against 2010 UN Iran sanctions. Since the arrival of President Dilma Rousseff in January 2011, however, relations have cooled significantly. Advancing relations with Iran is tempting for Brazil's foreign policy makers. It allows them to appear as a counterweight to the U.S. It also reflects Brazil's ability, as now the world's sixth largest economy and an aspirant global status, to project influence and assume a more assertive role in troublesome issues that menace global peace. In addition to trade and prestige diplomacy, Iran also aims to improve its image as a "civilized" nation by projecting "soft power." Iran supports 36 Shi'a cultural centers in Latin America. In February 2012, Iran launched a region-wide Spanish language television network. Yet, the number of converts to Shi'a Islam will likely remain small and Iran's capacity to win friends and extend influence to people across a divide of civilizations remains minimal. Relations between Iran and the Western democracies hinge on rational choices by elected leaders who must weigh the costs (such as U.S. disapproval, perceptions of hypocrisy, and danger of Iranian covert action) against the benefits (such as standing up against the U.S. and commercial advantage). For the foreseeable future, Iran will pursue relations with the region's democracies via a mix of Persian charm, trade and commercial offers, and secretiveness. Iran as Geo-Strategic Partner and Ally A second, smaller set of nations in the region view Iran as friend and ally; they are led by radical populists, strongmen(caudillos), and dictators (Castro brothers) who harbor deep-seated antagonism toward the U.S. They proclaim themselves nationalist, pro-poor, and anti-imperial, standing in opposition to capitalism, globalism, materialism, and the values of representative or liberal democracy. With Iran, they share similar psychologies that mix revolutionary zeal, paranoia, and hostility toward a common enemy, be it "the Great Satan" or "Yankee Empire." They hope for a multi-polar world where U.S. power and influence is vastly reduced or destroyed. Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, with support from Fidel Castro, launched ALBA in 2002. Today ALBA has eight members and is largely sustained by Venezuela's petroleum largesse. The oil that binds ALBA together helped open doors for Iranian-Venezuelan cooperation in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). ALBA has increasingly presented a united diplomatic front, aligning itself with Iran and Syria, while demonstrating sympathy for violent non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This year Venezuela has provided Iran's ally, the brutal Asad regime in Syria, with much needed fuel supplies, while ALBA members defend Syria's right to put its house in order and vote in the UN against censure or sanctions for either Syria or Iran. In January 2012, Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited the region—his fifth visit since 2005—with stops in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador. The choice of destinations, many argue, reflected a key narrowing of Iranian influence and opportunities. A sixth brief visit followed in June when the Iranian leader visited Bolivia and Caracas on the margins of his controversial participation in the UN environmental conference in Rio. Ahmadinejad's stop in Havana helped the die-hard Castro regime re-validate its anti-American credentials. Dictator Raul Castro offered his Iranian counterpart a hearty welcome, while the University of Havana awarded him an honorary doctorate in humanities. At first glance there is little

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 98 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz impoverished Cuba has to offer Tehran. It is hard to imagine Cuban rum and cigars becoming popular in Tehran or waves of Iranian tourists hitting Cuba's beaches. Yet, for Iran, Cuba—the quintessential anti-American "police state"—actually possesses revolutionary legitimacy, potent intelligence capabilities, a network of radical allies, and a capacity to serve as a clearinghouse for clandestine logistics, false documents, secure training facilities, and safe haven for would-be terrorists, making it an attractive partner. Both nations are still considered State Sponsors of Terrorism by the U.S. State Department. Iran's strongest support, however, continues to come from Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. The former army lieutenant colonel delights in flaunting support for Iran and the so-called "axis of unity." Publicized ties between the two have included a direct air link; Iranian investments in auto, bicycle, and cement factories; and joint petroleum and mining ventures. Reports of military cooperation abound but remain hidden from public view. The use of Venezuela for "false flag" operations to circumvent sanctions on trade and investment is a prized asset for Iran. The U.S. Treasury has already targeted Iran's Export Development Bank for sanctions. In May 2011, the U.S. also imposed financial sanctions on Venezuela's state-owned PDVSA oil company for its sales of a petroleum derivative to Iran. Nevertheless, Iran's future relations with Venezuela are heavily contingent on Chavez's ability to hold on to the presidency he has held since 1999. In 2011, Chavez underwent surgery to remove a "baseball size tumor." He returned to Cuba for surgery and therapy in 2012 and speculation about his ability to live to compete in the October presidential elections abound. An electoral victory by opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski would certainly lead to a swift downgrading of ties with Iran. Recently relations with Bolivia and Ecuador have figured more prominently on Iran's agenda. Both Evo Morales and Rafael Correa—younger leaders who are out to extend their grip on power and advance "progressive" anti-American policies—are clearly attracted to stronger ties with Iran. In return, Iran has promised hundreds of millions in projects and commercial deals. In addition to commercial ventures with Iran, Bolivia is hosting an ALBA military academy for the "people's war" to which Iran's Revolutionary Guards have reportedly been invited as trainers. Ecuador's foreign minister recently visited Tehran, signing new investment agreements and receiving promise of Iranian investment in Ecuador's oil industry. Often debated is the potential for nuclear cooperation by ALBA members to advance Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. ALBA members defend Iran's right to develop a "peaceful" nuclear program and pursue uranium enrichment. While Iran's ALBA partners in the Americas possess important deposits of uranium and could aid Iran either with direct supply or indirect support such as sanctions evasion or illegal technology transfers—evidence of complicity remains sketchy.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 99 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iran Rising Now – Argentina
Iranian influence growing now – Argentina has explicitly allowed them to gain a foot hold in Latin America Kredo, The Washington Free Beacon National Security & Foreign Policy Senior Writer, 7/9
(Adam, 7/9/13, The Washington Free Beacon, ―Kirchner Opens Door to Latin America for Iran,‖ http://freebeacon.com/kirchner-opens-door-to-latin-america-for-iran/, accessed 7/9/13, IC) Argentina‘s populist-socialist president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has allowed Iran to infiltrate its economic sector and potentially use the country as a terrorist launching pad, U.S. officials and multiple experts said on Tuesday. Iranian agents have been permitted access to Latin America‘s Free Trade Zones, which operate throughout the porous borders that separate Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, the terrorism experts testified before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency. Iran has significantly boosted its diplomatic ties with Argentina and other socialist countries, a move that allows Iranian officials to circulate through the region, according to the experts and independent U.S. officials not present at the hearing. Under Kirchner, Argentina has begun to export large amounts of food and agricultural products to feed its hungry population, which has suffered under Western sanctions, according to U.S. officials. Iran also recently opened a joint chamber of commerce last year in Buenos Aires, according to the U.S. officials. Exports from Argentina to Iran jumped from around $84 million in 2008 to some $1.2 billion in 2011, according to U.S. officials. Argentina is Iran‘s second largest trading partner in the region, according to the intelligence officials. As Tehran gains access to Latin America it has been able to build a complex ―pipeline to move illicit products all across the region,‖ according to Joseph M. Humire, executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society. These Latin American trade zones help Iran launder money and move people, military hardware, and other products throughout the region, Humire said. The experts ultimately concluded that Iran has built a full-blown terror network that includes spies and senior military officials across Latin America, as socialist countries such as Argentina strengthen ties with Iran. Iran has signed more than 500 trade and diplomatic agreements with a handful of Latin American countries over the past several years. The agreements are estimated to be worth some $40 billion dollars, experts said. Iranian officials have said that it has 11 embassies and 17 cultural centers across Latin America, according to U.S. officials and expert Ilan Berman, vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council. These diplomatic compounds and embassies have traditionally been used as a base for Iran‘s Quds Force, which also is tied to Hezbollah, according to U.S. officials. These agreements have allowed Iran to place its diplomats and military-backed businessmen throughout the region. While Tehran claims to operate legitimate businesses and embassies, Iranian agents have quietly radicalized the indigenous populations and used their influence to procure illicit military hardware, according to Humire.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 100 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The expert testimony comes just a month after the State Department published a mostly classified report that concluded, ―Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning.‖ Lawmakers and experts rejected this conclusion, claiming that all available evidence indicates that Iran‘s presence in the region has grown exponentially in recent years. ―I seriously question the administration‘s judgment to [downplay] Iran‘s presence at home,‖ Rep. Jeff Duncan (R., S.C.) said during the hearing, criticizing the Obama White House for neglecting to include ―the input of our foreign allies across the region.‖ Duncan said there is no way to be sure that Iran is not ―smuggling people, drugs, and weapons through our porous southern border.‖ ―The overall conclusion was the influence is waning. That took me aback,‖ Humire said during a small press conference earlier in the day. ―I really don‘t see many indicators where you can say the influence is waning.‖ Iran has actually built ―a maze of subsidiaries all through the region that don‘t just work in the defense industry but the private industry,‖ Humire said. ―It hoodwinks these companies to work on‖ weapons technology and nuclear hardware. Iran‘s access to the transportation, mining, and shipping industries have ―put a veil over Iran‘s military program‖ and recruitment, Humire said. From Venezuela to Bolivia and other socialist-oriented countries in the region, Iran has planted engineers, scientists, and private businessmen who are affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to Humire. Iran ―now [has] a military presence that is unprecedented in the region,‖ he said. U.S. officials have further determined that Iran is funding a defense academy in Bolivia. The academy, which is training various Latin American forces, was formally inaugurated last years by Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, according to the U.S. officials, who estimate that around 50 to 300 Iranian trainers are stationed in Bolivia. Others warned that Iran is quickly building a network that extends to countries bordering North America.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 101 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Engagement Checks Iran
US engagement prevents challenge of hegemony by Iranian involvement Fite Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12
[Brandon, 4/4/12, Center for Strategic and International Studies, ―U.S. And Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States‖, https://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf, p. 31, accessed 7/7/13, ALT] The US should neither overestimate Iran‘s capabilities in the periphery, nor treat peripheral ¶ theaters of competition as critical ones; it should monitor Iranian advances with an eye toward ¶ discerning Iran‘s overarching strategy to evade Western pressure and expand its regional ¶ interests. By all accounts, Iran is far from achieving a global alliance to counterbalance against ¶ the West; but Iran‘s distance from that goal is in part provided for by the engagement and ¶ vigilance of status quo powers. To secure the periphery, the United States must continue to¶ engage where possible, and closely monitor Iran‘s relationships with states on the geographic ¶ and political margins of the USIranian competition.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 102 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iranian Influence Bad – Proliferation
Iranian influence in Latin America has allowed them to obtain uranium for nuclear proliferation Berman, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, 12
(Ilan, Summer 2012, ―Iran Courts Latin America,‖ Middle East Quarterly, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, page 6466, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-13, RH) Since the start of the international crisis over Iran‘s nuclear ambitions nearly nine years ago, it has become an accepted belief that Tehran‘s atomic program is now largely selfsufficient and that its progress is, therefore, largely inexorable. This, however, is far from the truth; in fact, the Iranian regime currently runs a considerable, and growing, deficit of uranium ore, the critical raw material needed to fuel its atomic effort. According to nonproliferation experts, Tehran‘s indigenous uranium ore reserves are known to be both ―limited and mostly of poor quality.‖12 When Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi mapped out an ambitious national plan for nuclear power in the 1970s, his government was forced to procure significant quantities of the mineral from South Africa. Nearly four decades later, this aging stockpile has reportedly been mostly depleted.13 As a result, in recent years, Tehran has embarked on a widening quest to acquire uranium ore from abroad. In 2009, for example, it is known to have attempted to purchase more than 1,000 tons of uranium ore from the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan at a cost of nearly half-a-billion dollars.14 In that particular case, deft diplomacy on the part of Washington and its European allies helped stymie Tehran‘s efforts—at least for the time being. The Iranian quest, however, has not abated. In February 2011, an intelligence summary from a member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency reaffirmed the Islamic regime‘s continued search for new and stable sources of uranium to fuel its nuclear program. 15 This effort has recently focused on two principal geographic areas. The first is Africa where Tehran has made concerted efforts to engage a number of uranium producers such as Zimbabwe, Senegal, Nigeria, and the Democratic People‘s Republic of Congo.16 The second is Latin America where Tehran now is exploring and developing a series of significant resource partnerships. The best known of these partnerships is with Venezuela; cooperation on strategic resources has emerged as a defining feature of the alliance between the Islamic Republic and the Chavez regime. The Iranian regime is currently known to be mining in the Roraima Basin, adjacent to Venezuela‘s border with Guyana. Significantly, that geological area is believed to be analogous to Canada‘s Athabasca Basin, the world‘s largest deposit of uranium.17 Bolivia, too, is fast becoming a significant source of strategic resources for the Iranian regime. With the sanction of the Morales government, Tehran is now believed to be extracting uranium from as many as eleven different sites in Bolivia‘s east, proximate to the country‘s in- dustrial capital of Santa Cruz.18 Not coincidentally, it is rumored that the now-infamous Tehran- Caracas air route operated jointly by Conviasa, Venezuela‘s national airline, and Iran‘s state carrier, Iran Air, will be extended in the near future to Santa Cruz.19 Additionally, a series of cooperation agreements concluded in 2010 between La Paz and Tehran have made Iran a ―partner‖ in the mining and exploitation of Bolivia‘s lithium, a key strategic mineral with applications for nuclear weapons development.20 Iran even appears to be eyeing Ecuador‘s uranium deposits. A $30 million joint mining deal concluded between Tehran and Quito back in 2009 has positioned the Correa regime to eventually become a supplier for the Islamic Republic.21 Regional experts note that Iran‘s mining and extraction efforts in Latin America are still comparatively modest in nature, constrained by competition from larger countries such as Canada and China and by

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 103 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Tehran‘s own available resources and know-how.22 However, the region is unquestionably viewed as a target of opportunity in Iran‘s widening quest for strategic resources— both because of its favorable political operating environment and because states there (especially Bolivia) represent unknown quantities in terms of resource wealth. This raises the possibility that Latin America could emerge in the near future as a significant provider of strategic resources for the Iranian regime and a key source of sustenance for Iran‘s expanding nuclear program.

Venezuela and Iran are sharing nuclear technology – Venezuela is exporting uranium to Iran. Karmon, Interdisciplinary Center Institute for Counter-Terrorism Senior Research Scholar, 10
(Ely, September/October 2010, ―Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,‖ American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 278-279, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-2013. RH) One of the most disturbing aspects of the Venezuelan–Iranian alliance is cooperation in the nuclear field. On November 13, 2008, the two governments further formalized their collaboration in a memorandum of understanding to ‗‗cooperate in the field of nuclear technology.‘‘ According to reliable reports cited by Roger F. Noriega, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, in an article dedicated mostly to this subject, Venezuela is supplying Iran with uranium. It was reported even that the British authorities confronted Chavez with those reports and warned him of the consequences of that irresponsible behavior.22 In his first visit to California since he was kicked out of the United States in a diplomatic row last year, the ambassador of Venezuela defended his country‘s exploration of nuclear energy and said there was nothing secret about it. ‗‗We have a lot of oil, but we have to start thinking of when there‘s a prospect of running out,‘‘ said Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez. ‗‗It‘s good to explore that potential.‘‘ Commenting on revelations of the Venezuelan mining minister that the government of Iran was helping to explore uranium deposits in areas of Venezuela, Alvarez said that those comments were misconstrued. ‗‗The only thing we‘re doing with nuclear is what we did with Russia,‘‘ he said, referring to an accord made last year in which Russia will help Venezuela develop a nuclear power plant.23 In an interview with the French Le Figaro, Chavez declared that he and Ahmadinejad, ‗‗an ally and a friend,‘‘ agreed to transfer Iranian nuclear technology to Venezuela after a new agreement was signed in Tehran. Chavez mentioned that preliminary steps have been taken to enable Venezuela to kick off its plan to establish a ‗‗nuclear village‘‘ with the help of the Iranians. On this occasion he reiterated that ‗‗Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy.‘‘24

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 104 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Iranian Influence Bad – Terrorism
An increase in Iranian and Hezbollah presence in Latin America boost Iranian proliferation and instability in Latin America. Karmon, Interdisciplinary Center Institute for Counter-Terrorism Senior Research Scholar, 10
(Ely, September/October 2010, ―Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,‖ American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 290-291, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-2013. RH) This article gives a glimpse of the extensive Iranian and Hezbollah presence and activity in Latin America, which intensified during 2009 and has been successful in developing closer ties with Brazil, the continent‘s giant and world player, and the small, vulnerable Caribbean states. The problem with this presence and activity is that it goes beyond the normal political, economic, social, and cultural levels and creeps into the dangerous area of terrorism and subversion, threatening not only outside actors and interests but possibly the very stability of the host countries. It is evident that Iran‘s political and strategic standing in Latin America strengthens the Tehran regime and diminishes the possibility of United Nations backed international diplomatic and economic pressures to convince it to renounce the nuclear project. Thus indirectly at least, it enhances the threat of Iran‘s nuclear hegemonic projection vis-a`-vis the moderate Arab states, with all that means for the stability of the Middle East, the stability of oil prices, and nuclear proliferation to other states in the region. The proved Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in the worst terrorist attacks on the continent, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is a bad omen for the future. In case Iran‘s vital interests such as the survival of the nuclear project were threatened by the international community, by the United States alone, or by Israel, Latin America would be preferred ground for retaliation, directly or with Hezbollah‘s support. One of the most worrying aspects of Iran‘s strategic penetration in Latin America is cooperation in the nuclear field with countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and possibly Brazil, just when the international community is trying to convince the Tehran regime to renounce the uranium enrichment and military aspects of the project. What if Iran decided to deploy its long-range missiles in Venezuela at the request of President Chavez if he feels threatened? Based on Chavez‘s invitation to Russian Navy and military aircraft to visit his country, such a nightmarish scenario seems possible.

Iran will conduct a terrorist attack against the United States – their failed operation means Iran views Latin America as a strategic point for an attack. Berman, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, 12
(Ilan, Summer 2012, ―Iran Courts Latin America,‖ Middle East Quarterly, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, page 6768, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-13, RH) Conventional wisdom in Washington has long held that Tehran‘s activism in the Americas is opportunistic—rather than operational. Yet Iran‘s growing asymmetric capabilities throughout the region have the potential to be directed against the U.S. homeland. This was hammered home by the foiled October 2011 plot, an attack which—had it been successful—would potentially have killed scores of U.S. citizens in the nation‘s capital in the most significant terrorist event since 9/11.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 105 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The incident represents a seismic shift in Tehran‘s strategic calculations. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper observed in his January 2012 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in response to mounting international pressure and asymmetric activity against Tehran‘s nuclear program, it appears that ―Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamene‘i—have changed their calculus and are now willing to conduct an attack in the United States.‖29 Latin America figures prominently in this equation. The foiled October 2011 plot suggests that Tehran increasingly deems the region an advantageous operational theater. Moreover, as its influence and activities there intensify, the Iranian regime will be able to field a progressively more robust operational presence in the Americas. Clapper concluded his Senate testimony with an ominous warning: ―The Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, Ortega, Castro, and Correa that many believe can destabilize the hemisphere,‖ he noted. ―These alliances can pose an immediate threat by giving Iran—directly through the IRGC, the Qods force, or its proxies like Hezbollah—a platform in the region to carry out attacks against the United States, our interests, and allies.‖30

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 106 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Iran Rise
Iran influence is waning in Latin America Kelly, US Marine Corps Commander, 13
(John, 3/19/13, SOUTHCOM, ―Posture statement of General John Kelly, United States Marine Corps Commander, United States Southern Command‖. http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM%202013%20Posture%20Statement%20F INAL%20SASC.pdf, p. 12, 7/9/13, AL) Iran in the Western Hemisphere. This brings me to the next issue I would like to discuss, which has serious implications for U.S. national security. I share the Congress‘ concerns over Iran‘s attempts to increase its influence in the region. The reality on the ground is that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States are waning. In an attempt to evade international sanctions and cultivate anti-U.S. sentiment, the Iranian regime has increased its diplomatic and economic outreach across the region with nations like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina. This outreach has only been marginally successful, however, and the region as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts.

Iran influence waning – sanctions, diplomacy, and Iranian mismanagement. Goodman, Bloomberg News 6/26/13
[Joshua, 6/26/13, Bloomberg News, ―Iran Influence in Latin America Waning, U.S. Report Says‖, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-influence-in-latin-america-waning-u-s-reportsays.html, accessed 7/9/13, ALT] Iran isn‘t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report. While Iran‘s interest in Latin America is a ―concern,‖ sanctions have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterday‘s report. ―As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies‘ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran‘s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,‖ according to the report.

Iranian influence shrinking now – US and EU sanctions and the new, more moderate president check growth Fox News Latino, 6/27/13
(6/27/13, ―Iranian Influence In Latin America On the Wane, State Department Report Says,‖ http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/06/27/iranian-influence-in-latin-america-on-wane-statedepartment-report-says/, Fox News Latino, accessed 7/7/13, IC) Iran is not actively supporting terrorist groups in Latin America, the U.S. State Department acknowledged in a recent report – even though for years it has insisted the influence was growing.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 107 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The report, which said that the Islamic Republic‘s influence in the region is still a ―concern,‖ said that due to strong sanctions imposed on the country by both the United States and the European Union, Iran has been unable to expand its economic and political ties in Latin America. ―As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies‘ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran‘s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,‖ the report stated, according to Bloomberg News. While the State Department declined to comment on the report because it had not yet been sent to Congress, some Republican lawmakers said that it was too lax on Iran and downplayed the Middle Eastern nation‘s threat in the U.S.‘s perceived backyard. ―I believe the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran‘s presence here at home,‖ said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the legislation requiring the State Department report, told Bloomberg. ―I question the methodology that was used in developing this report.‖ Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran had forged strong relationships with the leftleaning governments of Bolivian President Evo Morales and the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez. Current Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced in late May that three surveillance drones built with Iran‘s help were launched by the Venezuelan government as part of an initiative to curb drug trafficking. The U.S. government and analysts throughout the region will be keeping a close eye on Iranian-Latin American relations in the coming in the wake of Iran‘s presidential election two weeks ago. Hassan Rohani, the only moderate-reformist candidate in Iran's presidential election, secured a surprising first-round victory after garnering more than 50 percent of the ballots. Rohani, who was backed by two reformist ex-presidents, Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, defeated four ultra-conservative candidates and a technocrat who finished in last place The victory by Rohani, who will succeed two-term incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, could usher in significant changes in Iran's foreign and economic policy and lead to expanded rights for women in the Islamic nation, although there are many restrictions on presidential power and foreign and nuclear policy is determined by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Iran is being solved now – Obama recently signed legislation to increase US counterradicalization in Latin America against Iran. Agence France-Presse, French News Agency, 12
(Agence France-Presse, 12/28/2012, Raw Story News, ―Obama signs law against Iran Latin America influence,‖ http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/12/28/obama-signs-law-against-iran-latin-americainfluence/. Accessed 7-9-13, RH) President Barack Obama enacted a law to counter Iran‘s alleged influence in Latin America, through a new diplomatic and political strategy to be designed by the State Department. The Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, passed by lawmakers earlier this year, calls for the State Department to develop a strategy within 180 days to ―address Iran‘s growing hostile presence and activity‖ in the region. Although the strategy is confidential and only accessible to lawmakers, it must contain a public summary. The text also calls on the Department of Homeland Security to bolster surveillance at US borders with Canada and Mexico to ―prevent operatives from Iran, the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), its Quds Force, Hezbollah or any other terrorist organization from entering the Untied States.‖

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 108 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz And within Latin American countries, the text provides for a multiagency action plan to provide security in those countries, along with a ―counterterrorism and counter-radicalization plan‖ to isolate Iran and its allies. Washington has repeatedly stated it is closely monitoring Tehran‘s activities in Latin America, though senior State Department and intelligence officials have indicated there is no apparent indication of illicit activities by Iran. Iran, placed under a series of international sanctions because of its suspect nuclear program, has opened six new embassies in the region since 2005 — bringing the total to 11 — and 17 cultural centers. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made regular visits to Latin America, though he only toured the region twice this year. Tehran has particularly close ties with Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, where it has strengthened its presence through investments.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 109 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Iran Rise – Mexico
Mexico will reject Iran – they value relations with the US Bensman, Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Agent and Journalist, 9
(Todd, April 9, 2009, Global Post, ―Iran Reaches Out to Mexico,‖ http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/mexico/090407/iran-reaches-out-mexico, Accessed 7-9-13, RH) For their part, Mexican government officials seemed uncharacteristically cavalier about the Iranian proposal, reflecting the Obama administration's apparent change of attitude toward Tehran. Before 1979, Mexico and Shah-era Iran had a strong relationship, as two oil producers wedded by their interests in petroleum and friendly relations with the U.S. Since 1979, however, Mexico's relationship with Iran has dried up, partly due to Mexico's deference to its northern neighbor's feelings about Iran. Today, the Iranian mission in Mexico invites email inquiries to a hotmail account and offers phone numbers that don't work. Mexico's ambassador to the U.S., Arturo Sarukhan, did not respond to multiple GlobalPost interview requests. Neither did Mexico's ambassador to Iran, Carlos Tirado. But one Mexican diplomat who requested anonymity told GlobalPost that Mexico welcomed Tehran's proposal, as it would outreach from any country. The diplomat explained that this was a new outlook based on the Obama administration's approach to Iran. "I think the Obama administration made it very clear that they would not push other countries the way the Bush administration used to," the diplomat said. Iran's Mexico City-stationed ambassador, Mohammad Hassan Ghariri Abyaneh, did not return repeated phone calls. But an assistant told GlobalPost that he, like President Obama next week, will be meeting with Mexican President Felipe Calderon. The inroads may come to nothing, however. Mario Loyola, a former U.S. Senate and Pentagon advisor who is now a national security expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, predicted the Mexicans would ultimately snub the Iranian proposal. "There just isn't any upside in the Iranian proposal for a conservative government like president Calderon's, which values its relations with the U.S. and looks at things our way," Loyola said. "The Mexicans will certainly avoid insulting the Iranians, but they will also avoid get(ting) mixed up in any sort of shady business with them. Calderon's advisors will advise him to avoid any changes in the tenor or nature of Mexican-Iranian relations."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 110 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Iran Rise – Venezuela
Iran‘s relationship with Venezuela will not last – Ahmadinejad was key and Venezuela is in economic turmoil Morgan, British Journalist and Latin American Specialist, 10
(Susie, October 2010, ―Iran‘s Growing Influence in Latin America,‖ Middle East Magazine, Issue: 415, page 17, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-9-13, RH) Some believe the current rapprochement between Iran and Latin America - especially with the radical bloc centred around President Chavez - is driven more by short term political opportunism than by a longterm economic or military partnership, that the current intensity is unsustainable and that it may not continue beyond President Ahmadinejad's term in office. There are also financial constraints on both sides, which inhibit many planned projects and cooperation. It is not clear, for instance, how far Venezuela, which is experiencing economic problems and 30% inflation, will be able or willing to commit to helping Iran's nuclear programme, despite President Chavez's expressions of support. Iran has reciprocated by offering to support a nuclear programme in Venezuela: there are even unsubstantiated reports of offers to help search for uranium there as well as in Bolivia. President Chavez announced last year that he was working on a so-called 'nuclear village' in Venezuela with Iran's assistance. So far the US has imposed sanctions on two companies in Venezuela in connection with alleged Iranian nuclear proliferation.

Iran-Venezuela coop not a threat: temporary, and not a focal point. Fite, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12
[Brandon, 4/4/12, Center for Strategic and International Studies, ―U.S. And Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States‖, https://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf, p. 14, accessed 7/7/13, ALT] While the verbal battles of Venezuela and Iran with the US continue—and are likely to do so as ¶ long as Venezuela has any leader like Chavez—economic realities, and the fragility of leaderbased political ties temper the real strategic threat of the Venezuela-Iranian alliance to the US.¶ Venezuela is far more annoying in other ways, and the other aspects of US and Iranian ¶ competition are far more serious.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 111 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Iran Influence Impact
No threat— SOUTHCOM concludes Latin America is unreceptive Simeone American Forces Press 13
[Nick, 3/20/13, ―Southcom Chief: Iran Working to Expand Influence in Latin America‖, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119586, accessed 7/7/13, ALT] Despite Iran‘s outreach to countries that he said have interests unfavorable to the United States, the general cast Iran‘s overtures as being far from successful and described a region as largely uninterested in Tehran‘s diplomatic engagement. ―The region as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts,‖ Kelly said in his prepared testimony. But he cautioned that Iran‘s allies, including Hezbollah, have established a presence in several Latin-American countries to deadly effect, recalling that Iran and Hezbollah were blamed for the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, that killed more than 80 people.

There‘s no impact to Iranian influence – they have not solidified their presence and Latin America is not key for their nuclear program Berman, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President, 12
(Ilan, Summer 2012, ―Iran Courts Latin America,‖ Middle East Quarterly, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, page 6869, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-13, RH) Understanding these motivations is essential to assessing the significance of Latin America in Tehran‘s strategic calculus and to determining whether its efforts there are successful . For the moment, Iranian regional inroads represent a work in progress. The Islamist regime has demonstrated a clear interest in Latin America over the past decade and is now striving to expand its influence there. As of yet, however, it has not succeeded in solidifying this presence—or in fully operationalizing its regional relationships and institutionalizing its influence. As experts have noted, despite Tehran‘s generous promises of economic engagement with regional states, precious little of this aid has actually materialized, save in the case of Venezuela.31 Moreover, despite increasingly robust cooperation with regional states on mining and extraction, there is as yet no indication that Latin America by itself can serve as the answer for Iran‘s strategic resource needs. Furthermore, an expansion of Tehran‘s footprint in the region is not necessarily inevitable. Over the past year, the health of the Islamic Republic‘s foremost regional ally, Hugo Chavez, has become increasingly critical, and the Venezuelan strongman is now believed to be in the terminal stages of cancer. Significant ambiguity abounds over Venezuela‘s future direction and, as a result, about the durability of the partnership forged between Caracas and Tehran under Chavez.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 112 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Terrorism

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 113 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hezbollah Rise Now – Latin America
Hezbollah is active in Latin America – there have been multiple bombings and US investigations prove. Karmon, Interdisciplinary Center Institute for Counter-Terrorism Senior Research Scholar, 10
(Ely, September/October 2010, ―Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,‖ American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 287, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-2013. RH) The Hezbollah presence and nefarious activity in South America is well documented. It was behind the two deadliest terrorist attacks in the continent‘s history: the Israeli embassy and Jewish community center bombings in Buenos Aires. Hezbollah also established a significant presence in the ‗‗triborder area‘‘ (TBA) where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay converge, using local businesses, drug trafficking, and contraband networks to launder funds for terrorist operations worldwide.84 Since 9/11, under U.S. pressure, local governments in the triborder area and other countries such as Chile and Colombia have monitored and discovered part of the wide Hezbollah network active in the continent.85 However, in spite of some arrests of important activists in Paraguay, Brazil, and Chile, mainly for economic crimes or narcotics trafficking, this large Hezbollah network continues to be active on the continent.86 Increased focus on the TBA after Hezbollah linked bombings in Buenos Aires and again after the September 11 attacks in the United States produced an increased understanding of Hezbollah‘s fund-raising operations and led Hezbollah to shift its fund-raising operations to other Latin American countries where their location, nature, and extent are largely unknown.87 Hezbollah‘s promotion of radical religious ideology identifies Shia diasporas as strategically valuable to terrorist operations and provides several important policy implications for their treatment by host nations determined to combat terrorist operations.88

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 114 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hezbollah Rise Now – Venezuela
Venezuela is a state sponsor of terrorism Poe, Texas Representative, chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 13
(Ted. "HEZBOLLAH‘S STRATEGIC SHIFT: A GLOBAL TERRORIST THREAT." 113th Congress. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Congress, Washington DC. 20 May 2013. Address. JMR) Venezuela's internal security apparatus has been organized and directed by Cuba, a country designated by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism. That same report cited Venezuela's "economic, financial and diplomatic cooperation with Iran .... " Chavez's aides make no secret of ongoing oil shipments to a third terrorist state, Syria. Just as Hezbollah, Cuba, Syria and Iran are considered terrorist threats to U.S. national security interests, Venezuela's crucial support for each of them should be, too. Although this support may not pose a classical conventional threat, it is precisely the kind of asymmetrical tactics that our enemies favor today. The chavista regime also has served as the principal interlocutor on Iran's behalf with other like-minded heads of state in the region, primarily Rafael Correa (of Ecuador) and Evo Morales (of Bolivia), both members of the Chavez-sponsored Bolivarian alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and both 'of whom have established dubious networks with criminal transnational groups.

Venezuela is a key supporter of Hezbollah—offers safe havens, diplomatic immunity, and proximity to the US Poe, Texas Representative, chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 13
(Ted. "HEZBOLLAH‘S STRATEGIC SHIFT: A GLOBAL TERRORIST THREAT." 113th Congress. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Congress, Washington DC. 20 May 2013. Address. JMR) In recent congressional testimony, investigative journalist Doug Farah describes "the merging of [Hugo Chavez's] Bolivarian Revolution's criminal-terrorist pipeline activities and those of the criminalterrorist pipeline of radical extremist groups (Hezbollah in particular) supported by the Iranian regime. "xxvi Such ties are invaluable to groups like Hezbollah, as they afford them protection, safe havens in which to operate, and even diplomatic status and immunity. In short, Venezuela plays a singular role as a platform for the Hezbollah threat in the Americas. It is important to bear in mind that Venezuela is not just another developing country that is unable to control its territory. Venezuela is an oil-rich state that has collected about $1.1 trillion in oil revenue in the last decade. It also is not just an isolated hostile state: Venezuela has collected $28 billion in loans from China in the last two years, and has purchased at least $9 billion in loans from the Russians in the last decade.

Venezuela allows Hezbollah operations in Venezuela – the regime is apologetic in the face of terrorist activity Karmon, Interdisciplinary Center Institute for Counter-Terrorism Senior Research Scholar, 10

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 115 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz (Ely, September/October 2010, ―Iran Challenges the United States in Its Backyard, in Latin America,‖ American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume: 32, Issue: 5, page 288, Academic Search Complete, Accessed 7-7-2013. RH) According to The Los Angeles Times, a credible intelligence source claimed that Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guard of Iran have formed terrorist cells to kidnap Jews in South America and smuggle them to Lebanon. The source alleged that Venezuelans have been recruited at Caracas‘s airport to provide information about Jewish travelers.92 In June 2008 the U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of two Venezuelans after having designated them as Hezbollah supporters. Ghazi Nasr al Din, a Venezuelan diplomat of Lebanese ancestry, is accused of using his position at embassies in the Middle East to raise funds for Hezbollah and ‗‗discuss operational issues with senior officials‘‘ of the militia. In late January 2006 he facilitated the travel of two Hezbollah representatives to the Lebanese parliament to Caracas to solicit donations for Hezbollah and to announce the opening of a Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela. He is currently assigned to Venezuela‘s embassy in Lebanon. Fawzi Kanan, a Caracas based travel agent, allegedly facilitated travel for Hezbollah members and discussed ‗‗possible kidnappings and terrorist attacks‘‘ with senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon.93 Instead of opening an investigation, Chavez said that the world was using the allegations to ‗‗make a move‘‘ against him.94 A Kuwaiti newspaper reported that Hezbollah was training young Venezuelans in military camps in south Lebanon to prepare them for attacking American targets.95 It was reported a few months later that the Venezuelan minister of the interior, Tayek al-Ayssami, was working with Ghazi Nasr al-Din to recruit young Venezuelans of Arab descent that were supportive of the Chavez regime to train in Lebanon with Hezbollah in order to prepare them for asymmetric warfare against the United States in the event of a confrontation. According to this report, Hezbollah also established training camps inside Venezuela, complete with ammunition and explosives.96 Chavez is perhaps the most open apologist for Hezbollah in the hemisphere. During the Israeli– Hezbollah War in 2006, Chavez withdrew the Venezuelan ambassador to Israel. He later accused Israel of conducting its defensive war in ‗‗the fascist manner of Hitler.‘‘97 It comes as no surprise that Hezbollah‘s director of international relations, Nawaf Musawi, attended an April 2008 ceremony at Venezuela‘s embassy in Beirut commemorating the sixth anniversary of the defeat of the anti-Chavez uprising in Venezuela. As an invited speaker, Musawi praised the survival of President Chavez‘s revolution while denouncing the United States and ‗‗other powers that try to defeat the sovereignty and free will of the combative peoples of the world.‘‘98

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Hezbollah Influence Bad – Laundry List
Impact laundry list—terrorism, human trafficking, and drug trade Poe, Texas Representative, chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 13
(Ted. "HEZBOLLAH‘S STRATEGIC SHIFT: A GLOBAL TERRORIST THREAT." 113th Congress. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Congress, Washington DC. 20 May 2013. Address. JMR) As I stated before another Congressional subcommittee nearly two years ago, the "Hezbollah‖ Iranian presence in Latin America constitutes a clear threat to the security of the U.S. homeland .... In addition to operational terrorist activity, Hezbollah also is immersed in criminal activity throughout the region- from trafficking in weapons, drugs, and persons .... If our government and responsible partners in Latin America fail to act, I believe there will be an attack on U.S. personnel, installations or interests in the Americas ... " as a result of this dangerous conspiracy. The narcoterrorism on our doorstep, perpetrated by Hezbollah with Iranian and Venezuelan support, demands a response from those whose job it is to keep us safe. Our government must take effective measures-unilaterally and with willing partners-to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable threats.

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Narco-Terrorism Rise Now – Latin America
Narco-terrorism is on the upswing – drug trafficking is funding groups like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda Neumann, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11
(Vanessa, 12/2011, Foreign Policy Research Institute, ―The New Nexus of Narcoterrorism: Hezbollah and Venezuela,‖ http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201112.neumann.narcoterrorism.html, accessed 7/9/13, IC) Press stories, as well as a television documentary, over the past two months have detailed the growing cooperation between South American drug traffickers and Middle Eastern terrorists, proving that the United States continues to ignore the mounting terrorist threat in its own ―backyard‖ of Latin America at its own peril. A greater portion of financing for Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, is coming from Latin America, while they are also setting up training camps and recruiting centers throughout our continent, endangering American lives and interests globally. Some Latin American countries that were traditional allies for the U.S. (including Venezuela) have now forged significant political and economic alliances with regimes whose interests are at odds with those of the U.S., particularly China, Russia and Iran. In fact Iran and Iran‘s Lebanese asset, ―the Party of God,‖ Hezbollah, have now become the main terror sponsors in the region and are increasingly funded by South American cocaine. Venezuela and Iran are strong allies: Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly call each other ―brothers,‖ and last year signed 11 memoranda of understanding for, among other initiatives, joint oil and gas exploration, as well as the construction of tanker ships and petrochemical plants. Chávez‘s assistance to the Islamic Republic in circumventing U.N. sanctions has got the attention of the new Republican leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, resulting in the May 23rd, 2011 announcement by the US State Department that it was imposing sanctions on the Venezuelan government-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) as a punishment for circumventing UN sanctions against Iran and assisting in the development of the Iran‘s nuclear program. Besides its sponsored terrorist groups, Iran also has a growing direct influence in Latin America, spurred by three principal motivations: 1) a quest for uranium, 2) a quest for gasoline, 3) a quest for a base of operations that is close to the US territory, in order to position itself to resist diplomatic and possible military pressure, possibly by setting up a missile base within striking distance of the mainland US, as the Soviets did in the Cuban Missile Crisis. FARC, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda all have training camps, recruiting bases and networks of mutual assistance in Venezuela as well as throughout the continent. I have long argued that Latin America is an increasing source of funding for Middle Eastern terrorism and to overlook the political changes and security threats in the region with such geographic proximity to the US and its greatest source of immigrants is a huge strategic mistake. It was inevitable that South American cocaine traffickers and narcoterrorists would become of increasing importance to Hezbollah and other groups. While intelligence officials believe that Hezbollah used to receive as much as $200 million annually from its primary patron, Iran, and additional money from Syria, both these sources have largely dried up due to the onerous sanctions imposed on the former and the turmoil in the latter. A recent New York Times front-page article (December 14, 2011) revealed the extensive and intricate connections between Hezbollah and South American cocaine trafficking. Far from being the passive beneficiaries of drug-trafficking expats and sympathizers, Hezbollah has high-level officials directly involved in the South American cocaine trade and its most violent cartels, including the Mexican gang Los Zetas. The ―Party of God‘s‖ increasing foothold in the cocaine trade is facilitated by an

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 118 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz enormous Lebanese diaspora. As I wrote in my May 2011 e-note, in 2005, six million Muslims were estimated to inhabit Latin American cities. However, ungoverned areas, primarily in the Amazon regions of Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, present easily exploitable terrain over which to move people and material. The Free Trade Zones of Iquique, Chile; Maicao, Colombia; and Colón, Panama, can generate undetected financial and logistical support for terrorist groups. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru offer cocaine as a lucrative source of income. In addition, Cuba and Venezuela have cooperative agreements with Syria, Libya, and Iran. Some shocking revelations into the global interconnectedness of Latin American governments and Middle Eastern terrorist groups have come from Walid Makled, Venezuela‘s latter-day Pablo Escobar, who was arrested on August 19, 2010 in Cúcuta, a town on the Venezuelan-Colombian border. A Venezuelan of Syrian descent known variously as ―El Turco‖ (―The Turk‖) or ―El Arabe‖ (―The Arab‖), he is allegedly responsible for smuggling 10 tons of cocaine a month into the US and Europe—a full 10 percent of the world‘s supply and 60 percent of Europe‘s supply. His massive infrastructure and distribution network make this entirely plausible, as well as entirely implausible the Venezuelan government did not know. Makled owned Venezuela‘s biggest airline, Aeropostal, huge warehouses in Venezuela‘s biggest port, Puerto Cabello, and bought enormous quantities of urea (used in cocaine processing) from a governmentowned chemical company. After his arrest and incarceration in the Colombian prison La Picota, Makled gave numerous interviews to various media outlets. When asked on camera by a Univisión television reporter whether he had any relation to the FARC, he answered: ―That is what I would say to the American prosecutor.‖ Asked directly whether he knew of Hezbollah operations in Venezuela, he answered: "In Venezuela? Of course! That which I understand is that they work in Venezuela. [Hezbollah] make money and all of that money they send to the Middle East." A prime example of the importance of the Lebanese diaspora in triangulating amongst South American cocaine and Middle Eastern terrorists, is Ayman Joumaa, a Sunni Muslim of the Medellín cartel with deep ties with Shiites in the Hezbollah strongholds of southern Lebanon. His indictment made public on Tuesday ―charges him with coordinating shipments of Colombian cocaine to Los Zetas in Mexico for sale in the United States, and laundering the proceeds‖ (NY Times, Dec. 14, 2011).

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Narco-Terrorism Rise – Venezuela
Venezuela is facilitating Iranian-funded narco-terrorists – lifting visa requirements for Iranians means terrorists can easily access Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, and Panama Shinkman, U.S. News & World Report national security reporter, 4/24
(Paul D., 4/24/13, U.S. News & World Report, ―Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?‖ http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narcoterrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2, accessed 7/9/13, IC) At a conference earlier this month, top U.S. military officers identified what they thought would be the top threats to the U.S. as it draws down from protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. James Amos, commandant of the Marine Corps, was unequivocal about a largely unreported danger: "Narco-terrorism just on our south border: [it is] yet to be seen just how that is going to play out in our own nation, but it is an issue and it is something that our nation is going to have to deal with." "Colombia is doing particularly well, but there is an insurgency growing," Amos continued. "They have been fighting it, probably the greatest success story in this part of the world." The commandant's remarks came a week before the April 14 election where Venezuelans chose a successor to the wildly popular and charismatic Hugo Chavez, who died March 5. Amos indicated the outcome of this election would define much of future relations between the U.S. and Venezuela, located on a continent that has rarely appeared on America's foreign policy radar in the last decade. Experts, analysts and pundits could not have predicted the election outcome: The establishment's Nicolas Maduro beat reformer Henrique Capriles by a margin of roughly 1 percent. Chavez's hand-picked successor inherited the presidency, but he would not enjoy a broad public mandate to get a teetering Venezuela back on track. The situation in the South American nation remains dire amid skyrocketing inflation, largely due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize private industry and increase social benefits. Maduro's immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to remedying widespread blackouts and food shortages. One expert on the region says the new leader may need to tap into a shadow world of transnational crime to maintain the stability his countrymen expect. "Venezuela is a really nice bar, and anybody can go in there and pick up anybody else," says Doug Farah, an expert on narco-terrorism and Latin American crime. He compares the country to the kind of establishment where nefarious actors can find solutions to a problem. Anti-American groups can find freelance cyber terrorists, for example, or potential drug runners can make connections with the FARC, the Colombian guerilla organization, he says. "Sometimes it creates a long-term relationship, and sometimes it creates a one-night stand," says Farah, a former Washington Post investigative reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. Under Chavez, Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for decades has navigated treacherous financial waters and desperate economic straits, all while dodging U.S. influence. But the help Venezuela receives is not limited to its own hemisphere. Farah produced a research paper for the U.S. Army War College in August 2012 about the "growing alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents and other anti-American groups in Latin America, including the governments of Venezuela and Cuba.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 120 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz This alliance with Iran uses established drug trade routes from countries in South and Central America to penetrate North American borders, all under a banner of mutual malevolence toward the U.S. The results of this access are largely secret, though security experts who spoke with U.S. News believe the attempted assassination of the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington, D.C.'s Georgetown neighborhood was carried out by Iranian intelligence operatives. "Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens, thereby erasing any public record of the Iranian citizens that come and go to these countries," wrote Farah of countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama. He also cited Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez who said, while speaking at a press conference in Tehran in 2010, "We are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism."

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AT – Latin American Terrorism Impact
No terrorism in Latin America – Hezbollah hasn‘t had an attack in over two decades Weitz, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for PoliticalMilitary Analysis, 11
(Richard, 11/9/11, Project Syndicate, ―Where are Latin America‘s Terrorists,‖ http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-, accessed 7/9/13, IC) WASHINGTON, DC – The Colombian army‘s killing of Alfonso Cano, head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), will not eliminate that country‘s largest guerrilla group anytime soon. But it does partly illustrate why international terrorism has not established a major presence in Latin America. Local security forces, bolstered by generous American assistance, have made the region a difficult place for foreign terrorists to set up operational cells – and other conditions also help to make Latin America less vulnerable. One reason why the FARC has survived repeated blows to its leadership is the support that it receives from various groups, perhaps including government officials, in neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela. Fortunately, this backing appears to have declined in the last year or so, following improvement in Colombia‘s relations with these countries. Another factor contributing to the FARC‘s survival has been its transformation over the years from a revolutionary organization into a narco-terrorist group that uses violence to support its criminal operations. Many former terrorist and insurgent groups in the region have undergone similar transformations over the last two decades. These groups, some with transnational reach, mostly engage in narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and kidnapping. At worst, they sometimes employ terrorist tactics (commonly defined as violence that deliberately targets civilians). In Colombia, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) finance their operations through drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. These groups might kill civilians, but their main targets are the police and security personnel who threaten their activities. Latin America is distinctive in the recurring and broad overlap of mass movements professing revolutionary goals with transnational criminal operations. The Internet and modern social media are allowing these mass criminal movements to expand their activities beyond kidnapping, extortion, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and people, to include fraud, piracy, information theft, hacking, and sabotage. Violent mass movements remain in some Latin American countries, but, like the FARC, they are typically heavily engaged in organized crime. Drug cartels and gang warfare may ruin the lives of thousands of innocent people, but they should not be seen as equivalent to the ideological revolutionaries who used to wreak havoc in the region, or to contemporary mass terrorists. Extra-regional terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda have minimal presence in South America, with little independent operational activity and few ties to local violent movements. At most, the two types of groups might share operational insights and revenue from transnational criminal operations. Hezbollah has not conducted an attack in Latin America in almost two decades. Indigenous organized criminal movements are responsible for the most serious sources of local violence.

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Latin America is not a good environment for terrorists – no large Muslim communities and organized crime – their evidence is crying wolf, Latin American governments simply want US funding to combat ―terrorism‖ Weitz, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for PoliticalMilitary Analysis, 11
(Richard, 11/9/11, Project Syndicate, ―Where are Latin America‘s Terrorists,‖ http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-, accessed 7/9/13, IC) Latin American countries generally are not a conducive environment for major terrorist groups. They lack large Muslim communities that could provide a bridgehead for Islamist extremist movements based in Africa and the Middle East. The demise of military dictatorships and the spread of democratic regimes throughout Latin America (except for Cuba) means that even severe economic, class, ethnic, and other tensions now more often manifest themselves politically, in struggles for votes and influence. No Latin American government appears to remain an active state sponsor of foreign terrorist movements. At worst, certain public officials may tolerate some foreign terrorists‘ activities and neglect to act vigorously against them. More often, governments misapply anti-terrorist laws against their non-violent opponents. For example, despite significant improvement in its human-rights policies, the Chilean government has at times applied harsh anti-terrorism laws against indigenous Mapuche protesters. Indeed, Latin American terrorism is sometimes exaggerated, because governments have incentives to cite local terrorist threats to secure foreign support, such as US capacity-building funding. Just as during the Cold War, when Latin American leaders were lavished with aid for fighting communist subversion, governments seek to fight ―terrorist‖ threats at America‘s expense. Ironically, the strength of transnational criminal organizations in Latin America may act as a barrier to external terrorist groups. Extra-regional terrorists certainly have incentives to penetrate the region. Entering the US, a high-value target for some violent extremist groups, from Latin America is not difficult for skilled operatives. Extra-regional terrorist groups could also raise funds and collaborate operationally with local militants. But Latin America‘s powerful transnational criminal movements, such as the gangs in Mexico that control much of the drug trafficking into the US, do not want to jeopardize their profits by associating themselves with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Supporting terrorism would merely divert time and other resources from profit-making activities, while focusing unsought US and other international attention on their criminal operations.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 123 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Internal Links

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 124 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Latin America Relations

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 125 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Uniqueness – Current Policies Undercut Hegemony
Current engagement strategies hurt US image, we need more human rights and development coop – WOLA report supports Lobe, IPS Washington Bureau Chief, 2007
(Jim, Upside Down World, ―Next US President Must Pursue "Fresh Approach" in Latin America,‖ 9/24/2007, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/international-archives-60/909--next-us-president-mustpursue-qfresh-approachq-in-latin-america, AFGA).
(IPS) With Washington's image in Latin America at its lowest ebb in memory, President George W.

Bush's successor must pursue a "fresh approach" to the region -- one aimed, in particular, at reducing poverty and the yawning gap between rich and poor , according to a new report by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) released last week. The 14-page report, "Forging New Ties: A Fresh Approach to U.S. Policy in Latin America", argues that 20 years of U.S. economic prescriptions for the region, often called the "Washington Consensus", have "done little to improve the lives of ordinary Latin Americans", with the result that the U.S. has looked "at best indifferent" to their plight. The failure of such policies has strengthened populist and social democratic movements, some of which rely on anti-U.S. sentiment, throughout the region, according to the report. Instead of portraying these movements as potential threats to U.S. security, Washington "should respond positively to the impulse behind (them)." "Fear-mongers think these (movements) are threats from the region, but the fundamental issue is poverty and inequality," said Geoff Thale, WOLA's policy director. "U.S. policy-makers have yet to grasp the magnitude of the new dynamics in the region and the implications for our own country," according to the report, which noted that, while Bush himself gave lip service to the cause of social justice in a trip to Latin America earlier this year, little has changed in policy terms. "Our media and politicians need to think about Latin America in terms that go beyond the current debates over immigration issues or the drug trade," according to the report. "Old approaches need to be discarded and new relationships forged." The report, which is designed to spur debate on Inter-American relations among the already crowded field of presidential contenders for the November 2008 elections, comes amid growing concern among Latin America specialists and policy-makers about Washington's image and continued influence in the region. A BBC poll released earlier this year found that majorities of respondents in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico held "mainly negative" views of the U.S. influence in the world, while a combined average of only about one in five respondents in the four countries said their views were "mainly positive". While those perceptions are explained in major part by the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq and other actions related to Bush's "war on terror", including the indefinite detention of terrorist suspects at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, according to Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group (ICG), other factors relating directly to Latin America have also played a role. He pointed most recently to Congress' handling of the increasingly divisive immigration debate here which "ended in the default decision to build a high wall along the border. The Berlin Wall was a symbol of a failed Soviet policy, and this border wall will be a symbol of a failed immigration policy," said Schneider.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 126 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz A former director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Schneider coupled his endorsement of the report with a call for Washington to adopt a "New Deal" for the Americas similar to that adopted by Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The report stressed that U.S. policy initiatives in Latin America should be based on three over-arching principles: pursuing economic growth strategies to promote greater equity in the region's societies; increasing support for programmes designed to improve the rule of law and public security; and promoting the consolidation of democracy and civil society and respect for human rights. Washington must recognise, according to Thale, that poverty and inequality are two of the main driving forces for immigration to the U.S. To address the issue, Washington should focus its aid and its influence in multilateral development banks on advancing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Latin America for reducing poverty, disease, and illiteracy. In particular, the U.S. should make a much greater commitment to rural development, which has been sorely neglected in Latin America over the last 20 years; focus, in particular, on efforts to reduce poverty in indigenous and Afro-Latin communities; and adjust existing and pending trade agreements with Latin partners to ensure greater protection for worker rights, small producers, local communities, and the environment. The rise in violence and crime has become a major issue throughout the region should also be addressed more effectively by any new administration in Washington. In particular, the U.S. should increase its support for violence-prevention programmes, the professionalisation of civilian-based policing, judicial reform, and universal primary education. Washington should also adopt more effective drug-control strategies, beginning with enhanced efforts to reduce demand in the United States; crack down on the trafficking of weapons from the U.S. to Latin America; investigate drug-trafficking networks; and promote alternative livelihoods and crops for small farmers. To promote more democratic governance, Washington should begin by closing down the Guantanamo detention facility; make clear that its human rights assessments will not be manipulated for political reasons or applied selectively against governments considered hostile to the U.S.; and increase support for democratic institutions, including parliaments and civil society.

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Engagement Increases Credibility
US-Latin American economic engagement will increase US credibility, decrease hypocrisy, and spur other countries to act Cato Institute, 9
(Cato Institute, ―Cato Handbook For Policy Makers,‖ pg. 642, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-61.pdf, AFGA). Washington should likewise continue to pursue free trade with other¶ Latin American countries that have liberalized their economies and are¶ eager to sign a trade treaty with the United States. Independent of free¶ trade negotiations, the United States should immediately reduce its barriers¶ to Latin America‘s exports, especially textiles and agricultural products.¶ At a time when U.S. credibility is being questioned, such a move would¶ restore some goodwill toward Washington and might help persuade reluctant countries to reduce some of their own trade barriers. At the very least,¶ the United States could then not be blamed for hypocrisy, and the welfare¶ of both the United States and Latin America would improve. Such a¶ unilateral policy of reducing trade barriers, moreover, would not conflict¶ with the goal of negotiating free trade agreements. As Cato Institute scholar¶ Brink Lindsey points out, the United States has regularly signed trade¶ agreements affecting sectors of the U.S. economy that enjoy virtually no¶ protection. For countries that are interested in free trade with the United¶ States, such agreements offer the advantage of ‗‗locking in‘‘ free trade¶ both at home and abroad. Indeed, the certainty provided by free trade¶ treaties is one of their greatest benefits and explains why they tend to¶ result in increases of both trade and investment.

US influence and popularity increase with investment, aid and cooperation – many historical/current examples Katzenstein et al, Cornell University international studies professor, 9
(Peter, Jack Snyder, Colombia international relations professor, Stephen Krasner, Stanford international relations professor and former Us Dept. of State director of policy planning, Matthew A. Baum, Harvard professor of global communication, APSA, ―U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future,‖ October 2009, http://www.apsanet.org/media/PDFs/APSAUSStandingShortFinal.pdf, AFGA). One indicator of U.S. standing is found in polls of foreign opinion. These polls have many limitations, especially in authoritarian countries, but they nonetheless deserve attention. Global opinion towards the United States has fluctuated since the 1960s and experienced a particularly deep downturn between 2002 and 2007. In the past two years, favorable public attitudes towards the United States have turned sharply upward, especially in 2009. The recent improvement may reflect the success of the surge in Iraq and an ―Obama effect‖: the honeymoon period of a new president, his acknowledged rhetorical skills, and what his election signifies about the openness of America. In policy terms, however, most believe that there has been little change in the U.S. disregard for the interests of their country, and that U.S. influence in the world is still mostly bad. It is likely that the disconnect between high expectations of what the United States should do in the years ahead, and what it actually can and will do, will pose a persistent challenge for managing U.S. standing. That task will require particularly close attention to variation in standing across regions. The decline was uneven across different world regions: very strong in the Middle East and Europe; strong in Latin America and Southeast Asia; and, with some notable exceptions, less pronounced in Africa and South and East Asia. The recent recovery in these opinion polls has also been uneven, with

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 128 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz the most significant improvements in Europe and the Americas (See Figure 3). One way in which regions vary involves differences between national elites and the general public. An important predictor of U.S. standing among foreign elites is whether U.S. policy is perceived to be helping or harming their interests. The public, however, tends to focus on the justness and morality of U.S. conduct. When foreign publics believe the United States is not playing by the rules, is applying double standards, and is engaging in hypocrisy, U.S. standing suffers. The legacy of Iranian hostility towards the United States has roots in America‘s overthrow of Mosaddeq and support for the Shah despite the U.S.‘s professed adherence to self-determination/liberal democratic norms. The disconnect between national elites and mass publics has led to different political dynamics in the Middle East and in Europe, the two regions that have seen American standing plunge most sharply. In the Middle East, authoritarian regimes are often quietly more supportive of American policy than they can say publicly. Similarly, the public‘s critical view of America and U.S. policy is often also a political indictment of local regimes, which It is likely that the disconnect between high expectations of what the United States should do in the years ahead and what it actually can and will do will pose a persistent challenge for managing U.S. standing. Task Force on U.S. Standing in World Affairs 7 are cooperating with the United States. Policies that improve American standing with Arab governments, such as being tough on Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq or on Khameni‘s Iran, tend to please rulers and irritate public opinion. Likewise, many Arab leaders were happy to see Israel bomb Hamas and Hezbollah, but the attacks infuriated the Arab public. In Europe, democratically elected leaders by and large express their citizenries‘ sentiments. Globally, the erosion of American standing was greatest in the least and most democratic regions, the Middle East and Europe respectively. This should not be surprising. Priorities mattered, and differed, across the regions. In the Middle East, the professed U.S. policy of democratization since 2002 threatened authoritarian regimes; and perceived U.S. disengagement from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reinforced the view that the United States was neither a fair nor an engaged arbiter in the conflict. In East Asia, the continued availability of American markets for East Asian exports had a strong effect on national prosperity, which enjoyed strong support among elites and the public. In addition, many Europeans viewed the American turn toward unilateralism and the doctrine of preemptive war as unraveling the multilateral fabric of Europe‘s preferred international order. Obama‘s leadership style is reassuring European publics without eliminating lingering suspicions that the change may be one of style rather than substance. American standing is also influenced by the presence of a major regional power. Where such a power exists and is hostile, as in Cold War Europe (Soviet Union), or potentially not entirely benign, as in contemporary East Asia (China), American standing is bolstered by fears that domination by the regional power would be even worse. Even in the Middle East, Iran‘s regional aspirations give the United States some strong support among the elites of Sunni states. In Latin America, where there has traditionally been no dominant regional power, American standing has been more exposed (though that may now be changing with Brazil‘s emergence on the global stage). Serious political fallout from this crisis may still lie ahead: waning esteem may limit the credibility of the United States in economic affairs. Some herald the ―Beijing consensus‖—a Chinese approach that promises capitalist development without political interference—as a replacement for the U.S. model. The ―status‖ of the dollar as the global reserve currency is increasingly a topic of discussion. American standing may in some places and at some times also be affected by the presence or absence of regional concepts of identity. In areas where people have regional identities, as well as national ones, American standing is diminished. The building of a European polity during the last 25 years—one with supranational institutions and a common currency—can be credited in part to a conscious political attempt to delink Europe from American policies. Many European political elites see it as a better political model not only for Europe, but also for the world. There is, as of yet, no clear finding that U.S. relative standing is suffering Globally, the erosion of American standing was greatest in the least and most democratic regions, the Middle East and Europe respectively. There is, as of yet, no clear finding that U.S. relative standing is suffering in terms of credibility or esteem based on the rise of ―competing‖ models offered by Europe, China, or even Russia.8

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 129 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz APSA • U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future in terms of credibility or esteem based on the rise of ―competing‖ models offered by China, Europe, or Russia. Polls in 2009 suggest recent declines in the relative attractiveness of these actors. At the same time, the economic meltdown of 2008-09 has led to widespread critiques of the U.S. economic model. A liberal Chinese economist bemoaned that ―the popular view is that the American model is failing.‖ A Social Democrat in Germany‘s parliament concluded, ―[the U.S. model] has lost its attraction entirely.‖ During the last four decades American standing has sometimes seen major declines, but has typically bounced back because the American model continued to have strong appeal (i.e., esteem). One indicator of this is the continuing attractiveness of the U.S. higher education system and the fact that many who come to study in the United States end up staying (See Figure 4). U.S. universities are being used for models and actively establishing programs in places like Qatar, Singapore, and China. That said, the potential for a resurgence in America‘s current standing varies by region. How America responds to the global financial and economic crisis will be especially important. If the United States provides fewer global and regional public goods, its standing will diminish in East Asia and erode even further in Europe. Similarly, if growing U.S. budget deficits require cuts in the recent expansion of American aid programs in Africa, this might also erode American standing in a continent where trends have been more positive in recent years. Economic and military capabilities in the form of aid or public goods are one of the ways in which U.S. hard power shapes U.S. standing. International Organizations To get a sense of how U.S. standing has evolved in international forums, consider Figure 5, which tracks support for the United States in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) votes since the UN‘s founding in 1945. The United States was instrumental in the UN‘s creation. Yet, as Figure 5 illustrates, support for U.S. positions within UNGA has declined considerably over time—a trend that began as early as the 1960s, accelerated during the Reagan years, and, despite an uptick following the USSR‘s collapse, resumed its downward slide in the mid-1990s. The drop in support for the United States is especially pronounced during the George W. Bush administration, with agreement between the United States and Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries plummeting by around 50 percent in the last decade alone. Astonishingly, the absolute level of agreement today between the United States and the typical country in each region is below the level of agreement between America and its existential rival, the Soviet Union, at the height of the Cold War. Other measures of U.S. standing in the eyes of the world paint a similar picture of decline—even in areas where the United States has traditionally prided itself as a leader. In the Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index, for example, the United States has fallen from number 17 in 2002 to number 36 in 2008, below Mali, Ghana, and Slovakia. Astonishingly, the absolute level of agreement today between the United States and the typical country in each region is below the level of agreement between America and its existential rival, the Soviet Union, at the height of the Cold War.Task Force on U.S. Standing in World Affairs 9 Why has U.S. standing in the international arena eroded, even though—as Figure 5 demonstrates—its relative power has not? In part, this is because of something beyond America‘s control: the sheer number of countries in the world has risen from 151 in 1973 to more than 190 today. More countries means more diverse agendas around the global table, which may compete with or diverge from that of the United States. But two additional factors have come into play over which America has some control: first, a sense that Washington is no longer a dependable ―team player,‖ and second, a belief that Americans are less committed to providing international public goods today than they were during the Cold War. Whether these perceptions of U.S. behavior are accurate is open to debate, but when it comes to America‘s standing in the world, perceptions define the reality. What is clear is that when the United States is seen as acting as a ―team player,‖ it can have positive repercussions for U.S. standing, whereas perceptions of U.S. unilateralism can have the opposite effect. Perceived evidence in the late 1990s of the United States behaving as what then French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine memorably termed a ―hyperpower‖—declining to sign the Ottawa Convention on the Banning of Land Mines, refusing to pay its UN dues, failing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 130 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz not waiting for UN Security Council approval before the 1998 bombing of Iraq, not seeking UN approval in the bombing campaign against Serbia in the spring of 1999—coincided with a drop in agreement with U.S. positions in the UN General Assembly. Similarly, the Bush administration found that U.S. participation in the Six Party talks on North Korea boosted America‘s image in Asia. Yet the administration‘s ―with us or against us‖ posture, its unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty and dismissal of the Kyoto agreement on climate change, its refusal to join the International Criminal Court, and its violation of the Geneva Convention on torture clearly hurt U.S. standing more broadly, not only in the UN but as measured by opinion polls, statements by foreign governments, and NGOs. U.S. standing in the global order is also defined by America‘s ability and willingness to provide public goods and leadership. After World War II, the United States invested significant resources and political will in a range of global public goods that advanced U.S. interests too— from alliances to extended deterrence, sea lanes security, multilateral peacekeeping, and conflict resolution. The United States also led in restoring and rebuilding the shattered global economy, opening domestic markets, providing liquidity in times of crisis, and promoting free trade. U.S. efforts in recent years that have provided public goods in humanitarian aid and global health have seen positive returns for the United States. For example, humanitarian aid in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami significantly improved favorable attitudes towards the United States in Indonesia. And U.S. spending on AIDS and two other diseases, tuberculosis and malaria, primarily in Africa helps to explain that region‘s distinctive positive attitude towards the United States. If the United States becomes unwilling or unable to provide such goods, or others perceive it is not carrying its weight, it is a safe bet that U.S. standing and influence will both decline. Of course, there is sometimes a tension between being a team player and an effective leader. To give an example of teamwork potentially working at cross-currents with leadership, U.S. support of the G20 as the hub of international economic rulemaking demonstrates American willingness to cooperate with an increasingly diverse group of countries; yet the G20‘s apparent superseding of the G8 in economic affairs inevitably dilutes America‘s sway in global economic governance, and its emergence in November 2008 as a forum of heads of state, not just finance ministers, ties its new prominence directly to the current economic crisis—a crisis that many global observers believe was sparked by American irresponsibility. Conversely, leaders must sometimes take a lonely stand against the crowd—as the United States often does in supporting Israel at the United Nations.

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Relations Increase Credibility
Better relations are needed to increase US credibility Zaharna, American University international strategic communications professor, 6
(Rhonda, Foreign Policy in Focus, ―The U.S. Credibility Deficit,‖ 12/23/2006, http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_us_credibility_deficit, AFGA). As Nancy Snow compellingly argues, more listening and civic diplomacy may be viable, preliminary steps to salvaging the U.S. international reputation from charges of arrogance and impatience. However, while ―more ears than mouth‖ may counter the U.S. image problem, U.S. public diplomacy has a much more serious problem. It has a credibility deficit of global proportions. To tackle that credibility deficit, U.S. public diplomacy needs a comprehensive, innovative, and strategic approach that entails developing more creative relationship-building strategies, matching policy decisions with viable communication options, and coordinating traditional and public diplomacy initiatives. Snow effectively underscores the severity and repercussions of anti-Americanism on the U.S. image. However nebulous the term, anti-Americanism has very real costs in terms of diminished U.S. prestige, restricted foreign policy options, lost revenues for American businesses, and, of course, decreased American security. International poll results give a disturbing glimpse of how pervasive and deep the sentiment has become. While anti-Americanism is not new, its growth despite an aggressive public diplomacy effort to refurbish the U.S. image is alarming. In this, I agree with Snow that U.S. public diplomacy needs ―a fundamentally different approach.‖ Where I differ somewhat is on the depth and direction of that approach. America's inability to listen is tied to its preoccupation with designing and delivering messages. Since 9/11, U.S. public diplomacy has gone into overdrive to get the message out about U.S. values, policies, and positions. This information-centered approach presumes either a lack of information or an abundance of misinformation—hence the flurry of U.S. public diplomacy initiatives such as the Shared Values advertising campaign, Hi magazine, Al-Hurra television, and Radio Sawa. Yet, because of the U.S. superpower status, countries are continuously monitoring and gathering as much information as they can about U.S. activities and policies. What U.S. officials don't seem to register is that no amount of information pumped out by U.S. public diplomacy will be enough to improve the U.S. image. The problem, ultimately, is not lack of information but lack of credibility. People around the world questioned the Bush administration's actions before it entered Iraq back in February 2003. Last month, the U.S. public resoundingly expressed their misgivings about the Bush administration's handling of the war. Iraq has focused a spotlight on U.S. credibility. The more the United States flounders in Iraq, the more U.S. credibility erodes in the world. Without credibility, no amount of information holds persuasive weight, and U.S. soft power can't attract and influence others. Beyond Listening Listening, as Snow argues, would indeed help minimize perceptions of U.S. arrogance and impatience. In 2002, a Council on Foreign Relations task force on U.S. public diplomacy urged the same—it even included a ―listening-engagement‖ diagram. However, listening is Communications 101—ask any good parent or successful professional. Without the ability to comprehend and reflect on what another is saying, it is difficult to maintain productive relationships or achieve desired tasks. As competent communicators, U.S. professionals should already be listening. If U.S. diplomats are struggling at the level of listening, then U.S. public diplomacy is in worse shape than we realize. Unfortunately, even listening—without first establishing credibility—can be perceived as gratuitous and insincere.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 132 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz All U.S. representatives need to master this very basic level of communication very fast if they hope to communicate effectively in today's culturally diverse, politically charged global arena. To begin to restore U.S. credibility, however, U.S. public diplomacy needs to aim considerably higher. It must become more comprehensive, creative, and strategic. A first step toward making U.S. public diplomacy more strategic entails matching U.S. policy decisions with viable communication options. Public diplomacy is as much a political as a communicative activity. It requires political knowledge and skills as well as communication knowledge and skills. U.S. public diplomacy needs to critically assess U.S. policies from the audience's vantage point and red-flag two types of policies: those that appear to contradict stated U.S. values and those that negatively affect the public in some way. Aggressive communication in a political environment where U.S. policy appears to contradict its values—or where U.S. policies negatively affect the public—will heighten perceptions of duplicity and lower U.S. credibility. Faced with such political challenges, U.S. public diplomacy has three strategic communication options. First, Washington could change its policy to make public diplomacy efforts more effective. Second, it could engage in serious, open dialogue with people affected by its policies as part of the public diplomacy effort. Third, Washington could maintain its policy, but tactically assume a low profile until a reservoir of public trust and goodwill can be established. The brass-band approach of promoting U.S. policies or values in an unfavorable political climate will tend to reinforce negative perceptions, not reduce them. Strategic communication is knowing when and where to turn the volume up—or down—so as not to inadvertently fuel anti-Americanism and reduce U.S. credibility. From Information to Relationships U.S. public diplomacy can also become more strategic by moving from a reliance on informationcentered, mass media strategies to more creative, relations-centered strategies. To date, informationcentered strategies that focus on designing and delivering information dominate U.S. public diplomacy. Since 9/11, U.S. public diplomacy has been very creative in experimenting with innovative broadcasting such as Radio Sawa, using alternative formats such as advertising and magazines, and incorporating new media such as Internet websites and RSS news feeds. While information-centered strategies are U.S. public diplomacy's forte, the majority of people around the world have a relations-centered perspective of communication. Communication is less about strategically designing and delivering information and more about cultivating strategic relationships. Relationshipbuilding cultural and educational programs, such as the Edward R. Murrow Journalism Program that Snow mentions, work well with these publics. However, such one-to-one exchange programs represent only the most rudimentary relations-centered strategies. More sophisticated and creative initiatives include relationship-building campaigns (such as ―Think U.K.-China 2003‖), non-policy networking schemas (such as the British ―Science & Innovation Network‖), or policy formation networks (such as the ―Ottowa Process‖ or ―Kimberly Process‖). U.S. public diplomacy could be much more strategic with culturally diverse publics if it became as innovative in developing relations-centered initiatives as it has been with information-centered ones. Finally, U.S. public diplomacy can become more strategic by reconciling its relationship with ―official‖ or traditional diplomacy. Civic diplomacy cannot substitute for official U.S. representation in the international political arena. Since 9/11, there has been a tremendous emphasis on U.S. public diplomacy—almost to the exclusion of traditional diplomacy. Here I differ with Snow. Instead of calling for a rise in civic diplomacy, U.S. public diplomacy needs more strategic coordination with U.S. traditional diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East. The region and its people have suffered greatly by the U.S. reluctance to engage diplomatically on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Had the United States been as aggressive and innovative with its diplomatic initiatives as it was with its public diplomacy ones, both U.S. image and credibility might be stronger today. Without the active involvement of U.S. traditional diplomacy, U.S. public diplomacy will remain paralyzed by the weight of this conflict, and America's credibility deficit will only deepen.

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AT – Latin America Key
Latin American countries will not become more important – historic boom-bust economy proves Bonnor, The Political Bouillon editor-in-chief, 13
(Clara, The Political Bouillon, ―No One Cares About Latin America,‖ 5/14/2013, http://thepoliticalbouillon.com/en/no-one-cares-about-latin-america, AFGA). How is this possible? How is it that all of the leaders of the Americas, including the most powerful man in the world, Barack Obama, could meet and not come up with a single agreement on anything that could improve any of their nation‘s fortunes? How could there be no public pressure on them do so? Is Latin America, and in particular, the once mighty South America, that unimportant of a player on the world stage? In a word, yes. For all of the limelight that has been shone on various South American country after country, from Argentina to Venezuela to Chile to the now omnipresent Brazil, each has failed to prove its mettle. Not a single one has managed to meet the expectations set for it. Instead, they disintegrate into cycles of erratic socialism, boom and bust economic cycles and enduring capital flight. The only improvement that South America has seen in recent years has been the conspicuous lack of military coups – and yet the bureaucratic authoritarian military regimes were what, in fact, promoted the confidence of foreign investors, for most of the coups were backed by the United States. Brazil‘s recent rise to fame is particularly relevant. With its now ten years of socialism under Lula and his successor Dilma Rousseff, Brazil has seemingly managed to beat the odds and attract foreign investment to help develop its endless natural resources. However, Brazil has to face more than just the stigma that has blighted other South American countries; it too has been characterized by boom and bust economic cycles. From the late 1960s and into the early 1970s Brazil showed spectacular economic growth that only ended in inflation, capital flight and crisis. Both then and now, Brazil has proven itself to be too dependent on imports and susceptible to an overly strong Real, their currency, hampering its ability to export. As economic growth for 2012 is projected to be nearer to 0% than at any time in the past five years, Brazil appears to be falling back into the Latin American trap. Thus, it seems that Latin America can‘t win. If it reverts back to its military regimes, the economy will only grow for a short period of time. If they continue to promote socialism without enforcing any structural changes in the lower classes‘ access to government benefits, and if they continue to turn their backs on the United States by nationalizing industries (like Argentina and Bolivia have done in recent weeks for their oil and power companies), they risk reinforcing the worldwide perspective that Latin America is a mirage more than a reality or a hope of economic stabilization and growth.

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AT – Relations Boost Influence
Greater US economic relations help it at the other country‘s expense – desperate measures and less negotiating power STRATFOR, 2002
(STRATFOR, ―Latin America: Bilateral Trade Deals Favor U.S. Interests,‖ 11/12/2002, http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/latin-america-bilateral-trade-deals-favor-us-interests, AFGA). The Bush administration says it is committed to launching a hemispheric free trade area in Latin America by 2005, but meanwhile it is pursuing bilateral deals with Chile and other countries in the region. Bilateral deals are more politically advantageous to the U.S. administration, because sensitive domestic issues like agriculture subsidies and anti-dumping rules can be kept off the table. Bilateral deals also may undermine regional support for Brazil's efforts to enlist the region in a united negotiating front against the United States. Analysis The United States is committed to completing negotiations on a hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005, according to U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick. However, Zoellick also warned recently that if the negotiations, which involve 34 countries, fall behind schedule or stall, then the Bush administration will negotiate bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with any Latin American states that want to accelerate the process of expanding trade with the United States. In effect, the Bush administration already is emphasizing bilateral deals over broader and more complex regional negotiations in Latin America. For instance, U.S. negotiators expect to wrap up a bilateral trade deal with Chile in 2002 and to start negotiations with five Central American countries in 2003. Now that U.S. President George W. Bush has trade promotion authority to negotiate deals that Congress can approve but not amend, countries lined up for bilateral trade agreements include Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic. Argentina likely will seek a bilateral trade deal in 2003, after that country elects a new president. From a U.S. perspective, building a network of bilateral trade agreements in Latin America currently might be perceived as more advantageous in the near term than regional or multilateral trade negotiations. U.S. negotiators can control the pace, content and direction of bilateral negotiations with individual countries more easily than they can with larger negotiating frameworks. In effect, Chilean sources familiar with the bilateral discussions currently under way with Washington claim that USTR negotiators are making tough demands, offering fewer concessions than Chile would like and excluding in-depth discussion of agriculture, import-sensitive industries, dumping rules and other issues that are politically sensitive in Washington. "Whatever trade agreement Chile finally signs with the United States will not be as good, from Chile's perspective, as the deal Mexico got under the North American Free Trade Agreement," a South American recently source told STRATFOR. Regardless of which political party controls the U.S. Congress, there is much less support now for large, comprehensive trade agreements that would require changes in U.S. tariffs, subsidies or other protection measures that directly impact special interests in agriculture or industry, such as Florida citrus farmers or Pennsylvania steel makers. However, the more narrowly focused and less concession-heavy bilateral trade deals are more likely to be passed, since they would affect fewer special interests. From a Latin American perspective, the USTR's aggressive pursuit of bilateral trade agreements is undermining Brasilia's efforts to strengthen the South American Customs Union (Mercosur) and to align South America with Brazil in presenting a united front in the FTAA negotiations. Since 1995, Brazil has touted Mercosur's customs union model -- anchored on Brazilian economic and political leadership -- as a better alternative to the U.S.-dominated FTAA. Shortly before his Oct. 27

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 135 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz election, Brazilian President-elect Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva told the Washington Post that the FTAA would be the "annexation" of Latin America's economies by the United States. However, Mercosur was weakened economically and politically by Argentina's default and devaluation in December 2001. The Argentine crisis plunged the smaller economies of Uruguay and Paraguay into recession, and their governments are more concerned now with economic recovery than with Brazil's ambitions for Mercosur. Brazil also will confront a potential debt crisis and financial turmoil in 2003 that likely will weaken its leverage in the FTAA negotiations, since other countries in the region might be reluctant to align themselves with Brasilia if the nation's economy is ravaged by default. Finally, although Brazil is commonly ranked the world's ninth-largest economy, its export performance over the past 20 years has been weak. Brazil has done little to diversify its exports, especially in the 1990s, according to data from entities like the World Bank and U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). For instance, the bulk of Brazil's top 10 export products in 1999 were mainly natural resource-based goods, with manufactured goods accounting for only 27 percent of the total. Moreover, the nation's share of global exports declined from 1.06 percent in 1980 to 0.97 percent in 1998, reflecting its inability to add more manufactured and knowledge-intensive products to its export package. In a weakened economic environment, these statistics imply that Brazil is not a stronger alternative than the United States as Latin American countries seek new markets for their exports and new sources of technology and investment capital. This reality will give U.S. trade negotiators significantly more leverage in FTAA discussions if Brazilian negotiators attempt to slow the negotiations over the next two years. Nevertheless, the Bush administration's expectations of establishing a hemispheric free trade area by 2005 likely will meet fierce opposition in the United States and regionally. U.S. groups opposed to more trade agreements in Latin America are highly organized and will fight hard through their grassroots political networks to defeat new trade agreements. Similarly, the fact that Republicans now control Congress does not mean that Congress will rubberstamp the Bush administration's trade initiatives. The Republicans lack a sufficiently large majority in either chamber to ramrod any trade bills through Congress. Also, as Latin America's economic fortunes have soured, voters throughout the region have become more and more convinced that their social and economic troubles were the result of U.S.-prescribed free trade and free-market policies. Disenchantment with what Latin Americans call "neo-liberalism" has spurred the rise of new leaders in several countries who seek election on platforms that mix populism, economic nationalism and opposition to U.S.-centric globalization and free-market policies. Many Latin American voters opposed to the FTAA are looking to Brazilian President-elect da Silva to lead the resistance. Both the Bush administration and Brazil's next president have expressed a desire to cooperate in strengthening the economies and democracies of Latin America. However, the bilateral honeymoon might end soon after da Silva takes office on Jan. 1. In reality, both sides are wary and suspicious of each other, and da Silva clearly does not share any sense of strategic convergence with the Bush administration's most important foreign policy priorities. For instance, he opposes the FTAA, Plan Colombia and a U.S. military invasion of Iraq. Like many Brazilians, da Silva sees the FTAA as a preferential system that benefits the United States at the expense of its trading partners -- and he is not entirely mistaken. In fact, U.S. representatives are making tough demands in bilateral and FTAA negotiations that go far beyond what Mexico agreed to in NAFTA, but they are not granting the concessions on agriculture and dumping rules that the region's governments would prize. Nevertheless, the growing number of Latin American countries seeking bilateral trade deals indicates that any concerns they might harbor about asymmetrical deals with the United States are outweighed by their overwhelming need for greater access to U.S. markets and their desire to attract foreign direct investment into the region to spur growth.

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Increased US influence would inspire hostility, promote instability and further harmful agendas Cooke, writer for Workers Action, 9
(Shamus, Global Research, Obama‘s Real Plan in Latin America, 4/20/2009, http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-s-real-plan-in-latin-america/13281, AFGA). Many of the heads of states that Obama mingled with at the Summit of the Americas came to power because of social movements born out of opposition to U.S. foreign policy. The utter hatred of U.S. dominance in the region is so intense that any attempt by Obama to reassert U.S. authority would result in a backlash, and Obama knows it. Bush had to learn this the hard way, when his pathetic attempt to tame the region led to a humiliation at the 2005 Summit, where for the first time Latin American countries defeated yet another U.S. attempt to use the Organization of American States (O.A.S.), as a tool for U.S. foreign policy. But while Obama humbly discussed hemispheric issues on an ―equal footing‖ with his Latin American counterparts at the recent Summit of Americas, he has subtly signaled that U.S. foreign policy will be business as usual. The least subtle sign that Obama is toeing the line of previous U.S. governments — both Republican and Democrat — is his stance on Cuba. Obama has postured as being a progressive when it comes to Cuba by relaxing some travel and financial restrictions, while leaving the much more important issue, the economic embargo, firmly in place. When it comes to the embargo, the U.S. is completely unpopular and isolated in the hemisphere. The U.S. two-party system, however, just can‘t let the matter go. The purpose of the embargo is not to pressure Cuba into being more democratic: this lie can be easily refuted by the numerous dictators the U.S. has supported in the hemisphere, not to mention dictators the U.S. is currently propping up all over the Middle East and elsewhere. The real purpose behind the embargo is what Cuba represents. To the entire hemisphere, Cuba remains a solid source of pride. Defeating the U.S. Bay of Pigs invasion while remaining fiercely independent in a region dominated by U.S. corporations and past government interventions has made Cuba an inspiration to millions of Latin Americans. This profound break from U.S. dominance — in its ―own backyard‖ no less — is not so easily forgiven. There is also a deeper reason for not removing the embargo. The foundation of the Cuban economy is arranged in such a way that it threatens the most basic philosophic principle shared by the two-party system: the market economy (capitalism). And although the ―fight against communism‖ may seem like a dusty relic from the cold war era, the current crisis of world capitalism is again posing the question: is there another way to organize society? Even with Cuba‘s immense lack of resources and technology (further aggravated by the U.S. embargo), the achievements made in healthcare, education, and other fields are enough to convince many in the region that there are aspects of the Cuban economy — most notably the concept of producing to meet the needs of all Cubans and NOT for private profit — worth repeating. Hugo Chavez has been the Latin American leader most inspired by the Cuban economy. Chavez has made important steps toward breaking from the capitalist economic model and has insisted that socialism is ―the way forward‖ — and much of the hemisphere agrees. This is the sole reason that Obama continues the Bush-era hostility towards Chavez. Obama, it is true, has been less blunt about his feelings towards Chavez, though he has publicly stated that Chavez ―exports terrorism‖ and is an ―obstacle to progress.‖ Both accusations are, at best, petty lies. Chavez drew the correct conclusion of the comments by saying:

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 137 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz ―He [Obama] said I‘m an obstacle for progress in Latin America; therefore, it must be removed, this obstacle, right?‖ It‘s important to point out that, while Obama was ―listening and learning‖ at the Summit of Americas, the man he appointed to coordinate the summit, Jeffrey Davidow, was busily spewing anti-Venezuelan venom in the media. This disinformation is necessary because of the ―threat‖ that Chavez represents. The threat here is against U.S. corporations in Venezuela, who feel, correctly, that they are in danger of being taken over by the Venezuelan government, to be used for social needs in the country instead of private profit. Obama, like his predecessor, believes that such an act would be against ―U.S. strategic interests,‖ thus linking the private profit of mega-corporations acting in a foreign country to the general interests of the United States. In fact, this belief that the U.S. government must protect and promote U.S. corporations acting abroad is the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, not only in Latin America, but the world. Prior to the revolutionary upsurges that shook off U.S. puppet governments in the region, Latin America was used exclusively by U.S. corporations to extract raw materials at rock bottom prices, using cheap labor to reap super profits, while the entire region was dominated by U.S. banks. Things have since changed dramatically. Latin American countries have taken over industries that were privatized by U.S. corporations, while both Chinese and European companies have been given the green light to invest to an extent that U.S. corporations are being pushed aside. To Obama and the rest of the two-party system, this is unacceptable. The need to reassert U.S. corporate control in the hemisphere is high on the list of Obama‘s priorities, but he‘s going about it in a strategic way, following the path paved by Bush. After realizing that the U.S. was unable to control the region by more forceful methods (especially because of two losing wars in the Middle East), Bush wisely chose to fall back a distance and fortify his position. The lone footholds available to Bush in Latin America were, unsurprisingly, the only two farright governments in the region: Colombia and Mexico. Bush sought to strengthen U.S. influence in both governments by implementing Plan Colombia first, and the Meridia Initiative second (also known as Plan Mexico). Both programs allow for huge sums of U.S. taxpayer dollars to be funneled to these unpopular governments for the purpose of bolstering their military and police, organizations that in both countries have atrocious human rights records. In effect, the diplomatic relationship with these strong U.S. ―allies‖ — coupled with the financial and military aide, acts to prop up both governments, which possibly would have fallen otherwise (Bush was quick to recognize Mexico‘s new President, Calderon, despite evidence of large-scale voter fraud). Both relationships were legitimized by the typical rhetoric: the U.S. was helping Colombia and Mexico fight against ―narco-terrorists.‖ The full implication of these relationships was revealed when, on March 1st 2008, the Colombian military bombed a FARC base in Ecuador without warning (the U.S. and Colombia view the FARC as a terrorist organization). The Latin American countries organized in the ―Rio Group‖ denounced the raid, and the region became instantly destabilized (both Bush and Obama supported the bombing). The conclusion that many in the region have drawn — most notably Chavez — is that the U.S. is using Colombia and Mexico as a counterbalance to the loss of influence in the region. By building powerful armies in both countries, the potential to intervene in the affairs of other countries in the region is greatly enhanced. Obama has been quick to put his political weight firmly behind Colombia and Mexico. While singing the praises of Plan Colombia, Obama made a special trip to Mexico before the Summit of the Americas to strengthen his alliance with Felipe Calderon, promising more U.S. assistance in Mexico‘s ―drug war.‖ What these actions make clear is that Obama is continuing the age old game of U.S. imperialism in Latin America, though less directly than previous administrations. Obama‘s attempt at ―good neighbor‖ politics in the region will inevitably be restricted by the nagging demands of ―U.S. strategic interests,‖ i.e., the demands of U.S. corporations to dominate the markets, cheap labor, and raw materials of Latin America. And while it is one thing to smile for the camera and shake the hands of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 138 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Latin American leaders at the Summit of the Americas, U.S. corporations will demand that Obama be pro-active in helping them reassert themselves in the region, requiring all the intrigue and maneuvering of the past.

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Hard Power

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General
Hard power solves peace and nuclear deterrence Dowd, Sagamore Institute Senior Fellow for Policy Research, 7
[Alan, 8-1-7, Hoover Institution Stanford University, ―Declinism,‖ http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5864, accessed 7-6-13, MSG] To be sure, the U.S. faces challenges, competitors and threats that could erode its global position: China and India are ascending economically; the world abounds with asymmetrical threats that have the capacity to undermine the liberal order that Washington has sought to spread for generations; and Americans find themselves in the midst of yet another ―great ideological conflict,‖ in the words of the president‘s most recent security strategy document. Today as in the past, U.S. primacy is neither inevitable nor a birthright. It is a burden that must be justified and shouldered anew by each generation in its own way. Even so, and notwithstanding Iraq, this is an unusual moment to diagnose the United States as a nation in decline. Just as the past is littered with unfulfilled predictions by the declinists, the present is teeming with evidence of unprecedented U.S. power. From peace-keeping to war-fighting, deterrence to disaster relief, it is the U.S. military that the world turns to when in need. Johns Hopkins professor Fouad Ajami has noted, ―The world rails against the United States, yet embraces its protection, its gossip and its hipness.‖12 Especially its protection: More than half the globe enjoys overt defense and security treaties with the United States. The U.S. military is the last (and first) line of defense for most of the rest. Of course, the U.S. military does more than protect and defend: In the span of about 23 months, it overthrew two enemy regimes located on the other side of the planet and replaced them with popularly supported governments. Even as American forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, they kept watch on the Korean peninsula and kept the sea-lanes open for the oil and goods that feed a truly global economy; did the dirty work of counterterrorism from Tora Bora to Timbuktu; and responded to disasters of biblical proportion in places as disparate as Louisiana and Sumatra. This does not seem to be the handiwork of a faltering empire. Indeed, no other military could attempt such a feat of global multitasking. ―The British empire,‖ writes Niall Ferguson in Colossus (Allen Lane, 2004), ―never enjoyed this kind of military lead over the competition . . . [and] never dominated the full spectrum of military capabilities the way the United States does today.‖

Only shifting more forces to Asia maintains stability – there are no balancers in Western Europe or Latin America Markowitz, Harvard Research Fellow, and Fariss, UCSD Research Fellow, 13
(Jonathan Markowitz and Christopher Fariss, Jan 22, 2013, ―Geopolitical Competition and the Rise of Naval Power,‖ SSRN, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204867, accessed 7/9/13, KR) The United States currently maintains ten combatant commands that are designed to facilitate the projection of U.S. military force to every corner of the globe. Part of the justification for deploying U.S. military forces globally is that they are needed to maintain stability both globally and in specific regions. This justification appears to be reasonable for many parts of the world, such as the Middle East and Asia, but not in others. The United States still dedicates military forces to Latin America and Western Europe, yet these regions have experienced little military competition since the end of the Cold War and are likely to continue to see low levels of military competition, according to our theory and empirical findings. For these reasons, we would suggest that the U.S. can begin to shift its forces away

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 141 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz from these regions, as they are unlikely to return to military competition in the absence of a strong U.S. military presence. This is not to say that the U.S should politically disengage from these regions, but that it no longer needs to deploy so much of its military power there. Freeing up U.S. forces allows policy makers to either reduce spending on U.S. armed forces (currently larger than most of the world‘s combined military spending) or shift forces to regions in which U.S. strategic interests are at greater risk. The most recent U.S. pivot to the Pacific saw an increase in the number of U.S. ships in operation there from 50% to 55%. This proportion will eventually reach only 60%. Representatives of the U.S. military have claimed that U.S. forces are tightly constrained and cannot more strongly pivot to Asia without compromising other U.S. commitments. The question is how necessary are these commitments for defending U.S. interests and/or ―maintaining stability‖ in regions of the world that are unlikely to militarily compete or threaten U.S interests in the absence of U.S. forces? In short, our theory and empirical evidence suggests that the U.S. may be oversupplying security in some areas of the world and under-supplying it in others.

Readiness key to stopping terror, global instability, and genocide Talbot, founder and former editor-in-chief of Salon, 2
(David Talbot, Jan 3 2002, Salon, ―The making of a hawk‖, http://www.salon.com/2002/01/03/hawk/, 77-13, DAG The transition from dove to hawk is a political, intellectual and personal journey that many others in my generation have been making in recent years, some since Sept. 11. The length of this collective trek came home for me this morning on the way to work, as I listened closely for the first time to the lyrics of Neil Young‘s new song, ―Let‘s Roll,‖ inspired by the words of United Airlines Flight 93 passenger Todd Beamer as he and his brave comrades rushed the cockpit. Thirty years ago, I was equally stirred by Young‘s bitter ―Ohio,‖ his antiwar anthem about the Kent State student protesters who were cut down by ―tin soldiers in Nixon‘s army.‖ (It was the one time the fortunate sons in the National Guard saw action during Vietnam, to kill their fellow citizens.) But it‘s the simplicity of Young‘s current song that sums up the world today: ―No one has the answers/but one thing is true/You‘ve got to turn on evil/ when it‘s coming after you … Time is running out, let‘s roll.‖ For years after Vietnam, I wanted America to step back from the world, and what I regarded as its arrogant — if not imperial — need to impose its own sense of order on history. But I have come to share the view of Robert Kagan, that ―if you are the president of the United States, you do not find trouble, trouble finds you.‖ Or as Richard Holbrooke told Halberstam, speaking of Clinton‘s early desire to focus almost exclusively on domestic issues (believing this was the electorate‘s message in choosing him over the internationalist Bush): ―What Clinton did not yet understand was that foreign policy never lets an American president go.‖ There are inevitably times when the darkest powers of the human heart find the means and opportunity to threaten not just the world‘s peace but its sense of decency. And while international coalitions or U.N. peacekeeping forces would, in a better world, be the best way to respond to these explosions of evil, the sober truth is that — from Kuwait to Kosovo to Kabul — only the United States has demonstrated the force and the will to do so effectively. I am no foreign policy expert, as is surely plain by now. But I believe it‘s incumbent on all America‘s citizens to learn as much as our busy lives allow about the world — and not just leave it to our best and brightest — because the United States‘ unique leadership role assures that all of us will feel the impact of the globe‘s crises, no matter how remote they might initially seem. I have developed my own criteria for when I think American intervention is justified; that is, when it‘s worth the cost in blood and treasure, not only for the U.S., but for the people we are trying to rescue. In my mind, there are three cases when resorting to military force is necessary: 1) When the United States is directly attacked — which it was not only on Sept. 11 but in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, as well as the explosions aimed at the U.S. embassies in Africa and naval ship in Yemen; 2) When an aggressor threatens regional stability and world peace — such as Saddam Hussein‘s

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 142 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz invasion of Kuwait and Milosevic‘s assaults on Bosnia and Kosovo; 3) When a nation launches a campaign of genocidal extermination against its own people or those of its neighbors — as Milosevic did against the Muslims of the former Yugoslavia and the Hutu tribe did against the Tutsis in Rwanda. Bloodbaths like Rwanda strike many Americans as not worth the cost of intervention, since they do not directly threaten our national security. But we do indeed have a dog in these fights. These orgies of violence are crimes against humanity — and unless they‘re stopped and their perpetrators brought to justice, they degrade the world we live in and embolden future Pol Pots and Interhamwes, the machete-wielding vigilantes who hacked to death nearly a million of their Rwandan neighbors in a 100-day spasm of gore, while the U.S. did nothing and U.N. soldiers fled the country. The tragedy of Rwanda, as a 1999 ―Frontline‖ report on PBS documented, was that this low-tech genocide could have been stopped with a minimal show of force. Instead it was a ―triumph of evil,‖ as ―Frontline‖ titled its report, ―which the philosopher Edmund Burke observed happens when good men do nothing.‖ When demonic visionaries are allowed to put their Grand Guignol theories into practice, the moral universe that all of us inhabit shrivels.

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Navy
Naval power solves hegemony – it‘s key to power projection Markowitz, Harvard Research Fellow, and Fariss, UCSD Research Fellow, 13
(Jonathan Markowitz and Christopher Fariss, Jan 22, 2013, ―Geopolitical Competition and the Rise of Naval Power,‖ SSRN, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204867, accessed 7/9/13, KR) We define power projection capabilities as the force structure required to deploy military force over distance. To operationalize this concept we use capital ships. Capital ships are a useful measure for several reasons. First, capital ships, unlike land armies, are not useful for domestic suppression. Therefore, a leader‘s decision to build a navy is not likely to be for the purpose of domestic suppression. Second, no state can project power globally without building capital ships. Thus, a leader‘s choice to build and maintain capital ships is a costly signal that they seek to build the capabilities to project military force beyond their immediate borders. Some leaders can project power great distances without building capital ships (e.g. pre-20th century Russia). However, no state has ever projected a substantial amount of conventional forces globally without building a navy. Third, the oceans have increased in relative importance due to increases in maritime trade and the opening of deep-sea maritime resources due to technological innovation. Additionally, as territorial borders have stabilized and the number and intensity of maritime disputes have increased, predicting which states will be likely to enhance their naval capabilities will have important implications for how the global commons is to be governed.

Naval versatility and response times sustain leadership Smith, Rear Admiral, 12
(Michael, Oct 19, 2012, ―Power Projection and #WARFIGHTING‖ http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2012/10/19/power-projection-and-warfighting/, accessed 7/9/13, KR) Power projection is the ability of a nation to apply elements of its national power outside of its territory to respond to crises, contribute to deterrence, and protect national interests. Naval power projection involves influencing events on land from the sea, and requires a full spectrum of lethal, nonlethal, conventional, and special capabilities applied in concert to gain an advantage.¶ With our Navy we have the unique ability to help influence events overseas by being continuously forward deployed and operationally ready to respond to events quickly and effectively. In short, power projection is the Navy‘s ready, versatile offensive punch, employed across a broad spectrum of military operations to deter or defeat aggression and, if required, enable the introduction and sustainment of follow-on forces.¶ In cooperation with our allies and joint force partners, the Navy is able to apply the inherent lethality, flexibility, and reach of our naval forces across all operational domains: sea, air, land, space and cyberspace. Power projection capabilities include cruise missiles, naval aircraft, naval surface fires, electronic warfare, amphibious forces (employed in concert with our Marine partners), SEALs, and other naval special warfare units.

Aircraft carriers are key to hegemony – deterrence and operational flexibility Buss, Vice Admiral, et al 13
(DAVID H. BUSS, with WILLIAM F. MORAN and THOMAS J. MOORE, Rear Admirals, April 26, 2013, ―Why America Still Needs Aircraft Carriers‖, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/26/why_america_still_needs_aircraft_carriers?page=0,0 accessed 7/9/13, KR)

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Numbers alone do not guarantee attainment of the goals of naval presence, which include, as J.J. Widen has noted, assistance, cooperation, assurance, influence, persuasion, deterrence, compellence, and coercion. The Navy must, as Greenert's "Sailing Directions" states, provide "offshore options to deter, influence and win in an era of uncertainty." Devolving the qualitative value of naval presence afforded by a CVN and her embarked air wing into the quantitative value of a larger number of smaller surface combatants neglects the fundamental purpose of naval presence: deter, influence, and win in an uncertain environment. There are a number of navies around the globe that can sustain a force consisting of smaller surface combatants, but none that can equal the global presence of the U.S. Navy. What clearly distinguishes the U.S. Navy from the rest of the world is its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and extremely effective (and becoming more so) embarked carrier air wing (CVW). But the strength of the U.S. Navy derives from more than just hardware. It derives from the adaptability and flexibility of this combat-proven team that throughout the past 70 years has evolved to overcome potential adversary capabilities. Time and again, the innovative and evolutionary character of naval aviation has proven its value to deter -- or substantively and decisively contribute -- to major conflicts around the globe, protect commerce and free trade, and ultimately contribute to the security of the United States. Smaller fleets around the globe are relatively limited in what they can accomplish, both at sea and ashore. Naval gunfire is traditionally effective on shore and the revolution in precision strike weapons, such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), has increased the range, precision, and explosive yield of its kinetic effects. However, these are principally kinetic effects, limited to what we call the "right side of the kill chain." An aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing, meanwhile, have the capability to operate across the full spectrum of warfare, including the electromagnetic spectrum and the nonkinetic or "left side of the kill chain." Additionally, an air wing operating from a nuclear-powered aircraft is capable of transcending the airland boundary with high-end effects (precision strikes), mid-level effects (non-kinetic shows of force), and lower-end but strategically significant effects (security cooperation or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief). In the end, the CVN/CVW combination is the only maritime force anywhere in the world capable of delivering effects along the entire spectrum -- from assistance to coercion -- with the ability to rapidly transition into large-scale major combat operations if required. Emerging and re-emerging navies around the world understand this. That's why countries aspiring to extend their influence are building aircraft carriers. As the Department of Defense considers future force design, it must recognize that in many scenarios, the United States can deploy a CVN/CVW combination in place of a large onshore footprint, while taking full advantage of international air and sea space, without requiring over flight or basing rights. Affordability -- the central tenet in big-deck carrier critics' arguments -- fails to consider the costavoidance value of these marvels of power, efficiency, and adaptability. Seen this way, the dollar cost of the carrier is a bargain and the political advantages are overwhelming, especially for a war-weary nation looking to avoid protracted commitments in foreign lands. But the United States is also struggling to repair its fiscal house, and the aircraft carrier is expensive -being arguably the most complicated and technologically advanced weapon system in the history of warfare. But if one views that investment through the lens of a 50-year service life (which, by the way, is how long our CVNs are designed to last) that includes warfighting upgrades, modernization, and upkeep, carriers promise a pretty good return. Consider the legendary 51-year history of the recently retired USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Designed in and for a different age, "Big E" was combat-ready and credible in her first deployment during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, just as she was combat-ready and credible during her final deployment in support of operations in Afghanistan in 2012. Today, the U.S. Navy is building the Ford class of aircraft carriers. Many recent articles quote values ranging from $13-15 billion as the cost to build the first ship of the class, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78). Those figures, however, include not only the cost of building the first of ship, but also all of the design and development costs for the entire Ford class -- a class of ship that will be in service for the next

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 145 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz 94 years. Factoring the design and development cost of the entire class into the price of the first ship is like saying the first iPhone cost $150 million or the first Toyota Prius cost more than $1 billion. When the design and development costs are removed from the inflated "shock value" cost of the CVN 78, it is only 18 percent more expensive than the most recent ship built in our current Nimitz carrier class. Moreover, the design and development investment in the Ford class will deliver a product that is more capable and has lower life cycle costs ($4 billion less) than its predecessors, and which will continue paying dividends for nearly a century. Even in light of that return-on-investment timeline, affordability remains a key consideration and the Navy is leveraging the learning on CVN 78 to further reduce costs on the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79). In real terms, CVN 79 will cost more than $1 billion less to build than CVN 78, and will require fewer man-hours to build than the last carrier in the current class. In the end, the Navy is building one Ford class carrier every 5 years, which represents about 0.4 percent of the defense budget during that time frame. If we take a long strategic view and keep the USS Enterprise in mind, that is pretty good return on investment. Finally, some critics have questioned whether an aircraft carrier can remain relevant in tomorrow's threat environment. The answer to that question lies not only with the aircraft carrier, but also with her embarked air wing. The USS Midway (CV 41) was commissioned in 1945, with an air wing consisting of Corsairs and Avengers. During her final combat cruise in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, her air wing was comprised of Intruders, Hornets, Prowlers, and Hawkeyes. Likewise, the air wing complement on Ford class carriers at the end of their service life, we postulate, will be radically different than the air wing CVN 78 will carry at the time of her commissioning. Unlike other classes of ships, the aircraft carrier does not need to be retired when its primary weapons system becomes obsolete. Similarly, defensive systems are more easily upgraded aboard an aircraft carrier than any other ship. The USS Midway's 1945 five-inch guns, for example, had been replaced by the Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile system as well as Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS) capable of defending the carrier against Anti Ship Missiles (ASM), aircraft, and littoral warfare threats by 1991. Likewise, by the time she retires in 2065, the Ford's Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, Rolling Airframe Missile, and CIWS will likely be replaced by entirely new defensive systems that we can't even imagine today -- and her two nuclear reactors and unprecedented electrical power will provide plenty of "juice" to integrate the directed energy weapons of the future. Greenert has used the USS Enterprise as a prime example in his "Payloads Over Platforms" theme for the future design of our Navy, and it is a testament to the aircraft carrier's proven track record of strategic adaptability. This record of strategic adaptability is proof-positive that we ought never to cede battlespace to any potential adversary. For more than 70 years, the unmatched range, speed, endurance, and flexibility of the U.S. Navy's aircraft carrier strike force has presented the United States with global freedom of action while operating -- even when contested -- in international waters and air domains. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings enable the United States to act as a key guarantor of peace and stability around the world. Having the ability to operate without a "permission slip" for basing and over-flight access, while generating the range of effects necessary to deter potential adversaries, is more than just a symbol of power. It is the essence of power.

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Air Power
Air power solves hegemony – specifically key to East Asia Schmitt, co-director of the AEI Center for Security Studies and Donnelly, senior fellow at the Project for the New American Century, 11
(Gary and Thomas, 1/17/11, WSJ, ―Shore Up America's Air Superiority‖, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704511404576085171839462108.html, accessed 7/9/13, KR) The F-22 flies faster, higher and its suite of sensors makes it an even more effective platform than the F35. In the best of all worlds, the U.S. would already have a longer-range, day-night, stealth bomber capability on hand to supplement the use of the F-22s. But it doesn't. And in the meantime, the reduced numbers of F-22s leave the U.S. tactically at a disadvantage.¶ All of this will cost money, of course. American political leaders on both sides of the aisle seem bound and determined to cut the Pentagon's budget rather than increase it. The cuts are the work of the green eyeshade folks in the administration and in Congress, whose agenda is driven largely by the politics of the budget and little or no strategic analysis. ¶ While keeping the peace always seems expensive when totaling up today's budget, the failure to do so is even more costly. Regaining American air superiority in East Asia is absolutely essential to ensure stability and prosperity in the region in the years ahead.

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Readiness
Military readiness key to hegemony Talbot, founder and former editor-in-chief of Salon, 2
(David Talbot, Jan 3 2002, Salon, ―The making of a hawk‖, http://www.salon.com/2002/01/03/hawk/, 77-13, DAG) Despite their eventual success, each U.S. military response in the past decade — even to the brazen sky terrorism that leveled the World Trade Center and devastated the Pentagon — has sparked passionate opposition in political, media and cultural circles. Conservative commentators like Andrew Sullivan, Charles Krauthammer and the Wall Street Journal editorial board have blamed current antiwar resistance on the left and its tradition of pacifism and criticism of American hegemony. And it‘s true, any liberal who came of age during the Vietnam War, as I did, feels some kinship with these implacable critics of American policy, even a lingering sense of alienation from our own country‘s world-straddling power. But most of us, at some point during the last two decades, made a fundamental break from this pacifistic legacy. For me, it came during the savage bombing of Sarajevo, whose blissfully multi-ethnic cosmopolitanism was, like New York would later become, an insult to the forces of zealous purity. Most liberals of my generation, however, feel deeply uneasy about labeling themselves hawks — to do so conjures images for them of Gen. Curtis ―Bombs Away‖ LeMay, it suggests a break from civilization itself, a heavy-footed step backwards, toward the bogs of our ancestors. What I have come to believe, however, is that America‘s unmatched power to reduce tyranny and terror to dust is actually what often makes civilization in today‘s world possible. I want to retrace my journey here, for those who might be wrestling with similar thoughts these days. In truth, the opposition to assertive American foreign policy over the past decade has come from liberals and conservatives alike (as has support for interventionism), and while the Susan Sontags and Noam Chomskys have become convenient targets for pro-war pundits in recent months, the most effective critiques of American power since Vietnam have come not from Upper East Side salons and Berkeley‘s ivory towers but from within the government itself, including even the Pentagon. Ever since the Vietnam War, the foreign policy establishment has been suffering from what the astute analyst Robert Kagan calls a ―loss of nerve.‖ This failure of will within the foreign policy elite — and Washington‘s struggle to escape the shadow of Vietnam — is the theme of David Halberstam‘s recent bestseller, ―War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals.‖ As in his Vietnam classic, ―The Best and the Brightest,‖ Halberstam builds his new book around portraits of key policymakers. But unlike his Vietnam book — which laid the blame for the debacle on arrogant interventionists like Robert MacNamara and the Bundy brothers — Halberstam‘s new book is clearly sympathetic toward foreign policy boldness. The irony here has not escaped observers like Kagan, who in a withering essay in last month‘s New Republic pinned much of the establishment‘s loss of confidence on popular critics like Halberstam himself. According to Kagan, prominent writers like Halberstam ―fixed it in the popular mind, and in the elite mind, that ‗the best and the brightest‘ were dangerous. To be among the best and the brightest was to stand accused of criminal incompetence. And what did that mean about America? If our best and brightest could not be trusted not to destroy us, then we were doomed. Could American power be wielded with a measure of confidence? No, it was impossible to wield power at all. Was national greatness a possibility if the best among us were fools?‖ Though he doesn‘t concede his thinking has undergone any revision, Halberstam‘s views have clearly changed with time. The heroes in ―War in a Time of Peace‖ are the hawks in the Clinton administration — Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Balkans negotiator and later U.N. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, and Kosovo air war commander General Wes Clark. Both Holbrooke, who served as a young

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 148 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz diplomat in Saigon, and Clark, who commanded an Army company and was wounded four times in one battle, were shaped by Vietnam. But unlike other future political and military leaders who came of age in the crucible of that jungle war, neither of these men was incapacitated by it. Despite America‘s failure in Vietnam, both men recognized how important it was for the country to play a strong global role — and their hawkish views of the Milosevic killing machine in the Balkans finally helped convince Clinton to strike back at the dictator, who despite all the dire predictions from GOP doves like Trent Lott and Newt Gingrich (and perennial Vietnam-era peace crusaders like Tom Hayden) promptly wilted. But, as Halberstam makes clear, the hawks were an embattled minority during the Clinton years — as they were during most of the senior Bush‘s administration. Whether it was the cynical James Baker, who famously concluded that America did not ―have a dog in that fight‖ and thereby allowed the Balkans war to take its savage course, or the ineffectual Warren Christopher (―Dean Rusk without the charisma,‖ as Democratic Party insiders mordantly summed up Clinton‘s choice for secretary of state), America‘s foreign policy was led during these years by men who believed it must operate within very narrow constraints

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Soft Power

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General Key to Hegemony
Soft power is the key internal link – other areas are declining, but soft power is sustaining power Meyer, Stellenbosch Master of Arts in international studies, 7
(Marius, March 2007, Stellenbosch Press, ―An Exploration of the Role of Soft Power in Hegemony: the USA and China‖, scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/10019.1/2391/1/Meyer.pdf, accessed 7/7/13, KR) On the ideational levels the US seems to have the most primacy or strength within the system- at the moment. Goh (2003: 80) notes that US power resides in: • US values and cultural appeal • The perception that US hegemony is benign • US actions/ power is legitimate based on consent These are all ‗soft power‘ variables which Goh indicates. These variables are imperative to the reascendance of US hegemony as it is these factors which form the base of US primacy. It was however indicated that anti-US sentiments and US unilateral diplomacy severely retarded US ‗soft power.‘ This is why the next section is wholly devoted to exploring the nature of US hegemony exclusively with regards to its ‗soft power‘ capabilities. It is argued that the US is not in the process of new ascension-in the light of discrepancies with regards to all the spheres of hegemony. Yet the US still exerts much influence in the world system which is inexplicable-unless one explores the ‗soft power‘ capabilities which serve to attract, legitimize and enable US hegemony. This is why in the next section we will look at the current nature of US ‗soft power‘-having indicated that it has declined in real terms, it is still important to explore the nature of US ‗soft power‘ in order to predict or forecast the future of the US and how it will behave.

Soft power is declining in the status quo – saving it is key to hegemony Meyer, Stellenbosch Master of Arts in international studies, 7
(Marius, March 2007, Stellenbosch Press, ―An Exploration of the Role of Soft Power in Hegemony: the USA and China‖, scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/10019.1/2391/1/Meyer.pdf, accessed 7/7/13, KR) To come back to the question of ‗what makes the US hegemonic‘ – it has become prevalent that for perhaps even three decades the US has ‗cheated‘ hegemonic decline through careful alliance forming in the guise of regimes and international organisations. The US was saved by the fact that they were focusing on ‗us‘ and not ‗me‘. Thus consensus makes the US hegemonic. Yet at the moment- in the light of growing US unilateralism- the US seems to be focusing on the ‗US‘ (me) and not on ‗us‘ as in their alliances. Thus the US‘s ‗soft power‘ seems to be waning under the pressure of crumbling alliances- due to over investment and reliance on ‗hard power‘ capabilities to reach the ends which they could reach if ‗soft power‘ was implemented instead.

Increasing soft power resources would balance US priorities and sustain leadership Nye, Harvard government professor, 11
(Joseph, 5/12/11, Foreign Policy, ―The War on Soft Power‖, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12/the_war_on_soft_power, accessed 7/7/13, KR) Smart power is the ability to combine the hard power of coercion or payment with the soft power of attraction into a successful strategy. U.S. foreign policy has tended to over-rely on hard power in

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 151 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz recent years because it is the most direct and visible source of American strength. The Pentagon is the best-trained and best-resourced arm of the U.S. government, but there are limits to what hard power can achieve on its own. Democracy, human rights, and civil society are not best promoted with the barrel of a gun. It is true that the U.S. military has an impressive operational capacity, but the practice of turning to the Pentagon because it can get things done leads to the image of an over-militarized foreign policy. Moreover, it can create a destructive cycle, as the capacity of civilian agencies and tools gets hollowed out to feed the military budget. Today, the United States spends about 500 times more on its military than it does on broadcasting and exchanges combined. Congress cuts shortwave broadcasts to save the equivalent of one hour of the defense budget. Is that smart? It sounds like common sense, but smart power is not so easy to carry out in practice. Diplomacy and foreign assistance are often underfunded and neglected, in part because of the difficulty of demonstrating their short-term impact on critical challenges. The payoffs for exchange and assistance programs is often measured in decades, not weeks or months. American foreign-policy institutions and personnel, moreover, are fractured and compartmentalized, and there is not an adequate interagency process for developing and funding a smart-power strategy. Many official instruments of soft or attractive power -- public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military-to-military contacts -- are scattered around the government, and there is no overarching strategy or budget that even tries to integrate them. The obstacles to integrating America's soft- and hard-power tool kit have deep roots, and the Obama administration is only beginning to overcome them, by creating a second deputy at State, reinvigorating USAID, and working with the Office of Management and Budget. Increasing the size of the Foreign Service, for instance, would cost less than the price of one C-17 transport aircraft, yet there are no good ways to assess such a tradeoff in the current form of budgeting. Now, that progress may be halted. Leadership in a global information age is less about being the king of the mountain issuing commands that cascade down a hierarchy than being the person in the center of a circle or network who attracts and persuades others to come help. Both the hard power of coercion and the soft power of attraction and persuasion are crucial to success in such situations. Americans need better to understand both these dimensions of smart power.

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Outweighs Hard Power
Soft power outweighs hard power – it legitimizes actions Meyer, Stellenbosch Master of Arts in international studies, 7
(Marius, March 2007, Stellenbosch Press, ―An Exploration of the Role of Soft Power in Hegemony: the USA and China‖, scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/10019.1/2391/1/Meyer.pdf, accessed 7/7/13, KR) Joseph Nye‘s term ‗soft power‘ was explored, as it is the chief aspect which is almost synonymous with non- material power. It was found that ‗soft power‘ attracts and legitimises actions whilst building alliances and consensus. It was found that ‗soft power‘ is a more peaceful alternative to the zerosum strategy of the realists- that focuses excessively on hard power capabilities. Thus the ‗soft power‘ of attraction creates uniform behaviour far better than force in ‗hard power‘ terms .

Even the military agrees we need more soft power Nye, Harvard government professor, 11
(Joseph, 5/12/11, Foreign Policy, ―The War on Soft Power‖, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12/the_war_on_soft_power, accessed 7/7/13, KR) The sad irony is that the Obama administration had been moving things in the right direction. When Hillary Clinton became secretary of state, she spoke of the importance of a "smart power" strategy, combining the United States' hard and soft-power resources. Her Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, and her efforts (along with USAID chief Rajiv Shah) to revamp the United States' aid bureaucracy and budget were important steps in that direction. Now, in the name of an illusory contribution to deficit reduction (when you're talking about deficits in the trillions, $38 billion in savings is a drop in the bucket), those efforts have been set back. Polls consistently show a popular misconception that aid is a significant part of the U.S. federal budget, when in fact it amounts to less than 1 percent. Thus, congressional cuts to aid in the name of deficit reduction are an easy vote, but a cheap shot. In 2007, Richard Armitage and I co-chaired a bipartisan Smart Power Commission of members of Congress, former ambassadors, retired military officers, and heads of non-profit organizations at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. We concluded that America's image and influence had declined in recent years and that the United States had to move from exporting fear to inspiring optimism and hope. The Smart Power Commission was not alone in this conclusion. Even when he was in the George W. Bush administration, Defense Secretary Robert Gates called on Congress to commit more money and effort to soft-power tools including diplomacy, economic assistance, and communications because the military alone cannot defend America's interests around the world. He pointed out that military spending then totaled nearly half a trillion dollars annually, compared with a State Department budget of just $36 billion. In his words, "I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power." He acknowledged that for the secretary of defense to plead for more resources for the State Department was as odd as a man biting a dog, but these are not normal times. Since then, the ratio of the budgets has become even more unbalanced.

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Solves Terrorism
Soft Power boosts international cooperation key to preventing terrorism – military action alone is insufficient Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, ‗04
(Joseph S., ―Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,‖ Summer 2004, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, proquest, download date: 7-06-13, DAG) Some hard-line skeptics might say that whatever the merits of soft power, it has little role to play in the current war on terrorism. Osama bin Laden and his followers are repelled, not attracted by American culture, values, and policies. Military power was essential in defeating the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and soft power will never convert fanatics. Charles Krauthammer, for example, argued soon after the war in Afghanistan that our swift military victory proved that "the new unilateralism" worked. That is true up to a point, but the skeptics mistake half the answer for the whole solution. Look again at Afghanistan. Precision bombing and Special Forces defeated the Taliban government, but U.S. forces in Afghanistan wrapped up less than a quarter of al Qaeda, a transnational network with cells in sixty countries. The United States cannot bomb al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur, or Detroit. Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation, whether sharing intelligence, coordinating police work across borders, or tracing global financial flows. America's partners cooperate partly out of self-interest, but the inherent attractiveness of U.S. policies can and does influence the degree of cooperation. Equally important, the current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations but a contest whose outcome is closely tied to a civil war between moderates and extremists within Islamic civilization. The United States and other advanced democracies will win only if moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory. We need to adopt policies that appeal to moderates and to use public diplomacy more effectively to explain our common interests. We need a better strategy for wielding our soft power. We will have to learn better how to combine hard and soft power if we wish to meet the new challenges.

Soft Power key to the international cooperation that is vital to preventing terrorism Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, 4
(Joseph S., ―Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,‖ Summer 2004, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, download date: 7-6-13, DAG) Skeptics about soft power say not to worry. Popularity is ephemeral and should not be a guide for foreign policy in any case. The United States can act without the world's applause. We are so strong we can do as we wish. We are the world's only superpower, and that fact is bound to engender envy and resentment. Fouad Ajami has stated recently, "The United States need not worry about hearts and minds in foreign lands."IJ Columnist CaI Thomas refers to "the fiction that our enemies can be made less threatening by what America says and does."10 Moreover, the United States has been unpopular in the past, yet managed to recover. We do not need permanent allies and institutions. We can always pick up a coalition of the willing when we need to. Donald Rumsfeld is wont to say that the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the recent decline in our attractiveness so lightly. It is true that the United States has recovered from unpopular policies in the past, but that was against the backdrop of the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. Moreover, while America's size and association with disruptive modernity are real and unavoidable, wise policies can soften the sharp

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 154 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz edges of that reality and reduce the resentments that they engender. That is what the United States did after World War II. We used our soft power resources and co-opted others into a set of alliances and institutions that lasted for sixty years. We won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with a strategy of containment that used our soft power as well as our hard power. It is true that the new threat of transnational terrorism increased American vulnerability, and some of our unilateralism after September 11 was driven by fear. But the United States cannot meet the new threat identified in the national security strategy without the cooperation of other countries. They will cooperate, up to a point, out of mere self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the attractiveness of the United States. Take Pakistan for example. President Pervez Musharraf faces a complex game of cooperating with the United States on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constituency at home. He winds up balancing concessions and retractions. If the United States were more attractive to the Pakistani populace, we would see more concessions in the mix.

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Alt Causes
Alt causes to soft power decline – military unilateralism and pressure to conform to US values Meyer, Stellenbosch Master of Arts in international studies, 7
(Marius, March 2007, Stellenbosch Press, ―An Exploration of the Role of Soft Power in Hegemony: the USA and China‖, scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/10019.1/2391/1/Meyer.pdf, accessed 7/7/13, KR) Goh (2003: 89) argues that the US‘s reaction to the September 11 attacks severely destabilised their ‗soft power‘ capabilities as they not only lost a significant amount of influence over other actors within the system-but this also cost the US many alliances due to the incongruence in their actions and policies. To explain: US ‗soft power‘ is very much built on regimes which uphold shared values and codes within the system and are based on mutual acceptance. The US was very much a champion and father of this system and most of the regimes which are paramount to it (having been instrumental in the creation and sustenance of these values through formal institutional means). Yet with the US‘s retort to 9/11 they have found that they are losing alliances in the light of (Goh, 2003: 84- 85, 90): •inconsistent military targets (why did the US not invade North Korea which proclaimed to have WMD capabilities) •growing unilateralism which adversely affects consensus building (e.g. not signing the Kyoto protocol and invading Iraq with no UN support) •refusing to submit to UN war crimes tribunals •allies fear retribution by those who are aligned against the US (which are growing in number) The decline of US hegemony (soft power) can also be attributed to the ‗blow back‘ or adverse reaction which was forced through military intervention in response to the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks (Goh, 2003: 82). ‗Blowback‘ as a term, within this context, refers strictly to the advent of malevolent reaction by terrorist movements to the actions of the perceived aggressors (US)- and most importantly not the ideas which they propagate but rather their physical actions (Goh, 2003: 82). Thus, according to Goh, terrorist and fundamentalist reaction and anti US sentiment which is causal to it- does not stem from the deficiency of shared ideas between the US and the terrorist- but rather from the direct policy and military influence which the US is exerting in the Middle East and the rest of the world. This suggests that the US is experiencing a decline in ‗soft power‘ in the light of their opting for hard power influence – which adversely affects ‗soft power‘ capabilities and hence the ability to influence others within the international system. The US is alienating the world through the use of ‗hard power‘. It needs to reinvigorate its ‗soft power‘ capabilities in order to stem the avalanche of anti US sentiment which is growing in momentum against them. The US has lost a great amount of legitimacy in the eyes of the world- in the light of their military interventionist policies and actions. Legitimacy is imperative to the advent and sustenance of global hegemony. This does, however, indicate decline in ‗soft power‘ for the US- yet the damage is not irreparable. Samuel Huntington is a staunch advocator of US decline- focusing on differentiation between cultures (or civilisations) as the main cause for conflict within the system (Huntington, 1993: 22). Huntington (1999: 36- 37) provides a list of US policies and actions which he argues are the cause for the growing antiUS sentiment and thus the decline in US ‗soft power‘: •pressurises states to conform to US values (overtly and covertly) •prevents and controls other nations‘ military capabilities •enforces US law and propagates US values in other states •applies sanctions based on the US‘s notion of what is right or wrong

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 156 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz •promotes economic liberalism- contradicting this by also promoting US MNCs‘ interest above that of other countries‘ MNCs •shapes agendas and influence leadership in IGOs (UN, WTO, IMF, etc.) •intervene in sovereign states (Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Somalia, Balkans, etc.) •force economic policies on sovereign states (Structural Adjustment Programmes) •military expansionism and the labelling of states as ‗rogue‘ or evil based on US values

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Credibility
Credibility is key to cooperation and the influence of the US – popular theory and Bush examples Kydd, University of Wisconsin political science professor, 5
(Andrew, In America We (Used to) Trust: U.S. Hegemony and Global Cooperation, pgs 19-21, AFGA). In his State of the Union address in January 2004, President George W. Bush argued that Libya's decision to abandon its quest for weapons of mass destruction was due to the United States invasion of Iraq. As he put it, "Nine months of intense negotiations involving the United States and Great Britain succeeded with Libya, while twelve years of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America." The President was articulating a central tenet of deterrence theory, that threats must be credible if they are to influence the behavior of other states.1 The United States said that it would invade Iraq if Saddam Hussein remained in power, and when he did, the United States invaded. Other states can now believe that if a similar threat is made in the future, it is likely to be carried out as well. Deterrence theorists view the credibility of this kind of threat as a key foundation of global order. International hegemons like the United States maintain stability by issuing credible threats that those who violate the rules will be punished, and then backing up these threats with action. In the view of the Bush administration, then, the invasion of Iraq reinforced American credibility, and strengthened world order. Unfortunately, much of the rest of the world took a different view. The in- ability to find weapons of mass destruction or related manufacturing facilities indicated to many observers that twelve years of sanctions and United Nations inspections, along with U.S. and British military pressure, did effectively dis- arm Iraq. The evidence on Iraqi weapons programs presented before the war was thin and did no! support the claims being made about them. With the stated reason for going to war now rather than later so dubious, the United Slates was seen as. at best, trigger happy—exercising poor judgment and prone to violence— or. more sinister!)', acting on interests that it failed to acknowledge: a desire to control oil resources, protect Israel, or even attack Islam in general. Many foreign observers argued that the Bush administration's uni- lateralism was evidence that the United States was a rogue state, using its military forces in unjustified ways in pursuit of its own interests. In short, the word of America is doubted as never before. This mistrust has led to a failure of international cooperation. If the hegemon cannot be trusted to act deliber- ately and in the common interest, with due respect for the opinions of others and for international law. other states will refuse to be associated with it. This will deprive the hegemon of material aid and international legitimacy, thereby undermining world order. Both sides would agree that belief in the word of the United States is crucial to its ability to influence international events and maintain stability. However, each side has a very different view of how this matters, and why. The Bush administration's viewpoint is based on deterrence theory and the theory of public goods. The public goods theory of hegemony argues that hegemons unilaterally produce public goods that other stales free ride on. The public good in question is the coercion or deterrence of potential rule breakers in the international system. In this view of hegemony, it is not crucial that most states trust the hegemon. because their cooperation or lack thereof is of negligible importance. What is important is that the potential rule breakers fear the hegemon and find its threats to be credible. This conception of hegemony underlies the Bush administration's emphasis on preventive action against threats, undertaken alone if necessary, as articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy."1 The war against Iraq was conceived of as a public good, benefiting all, which the United States provided while others rode free. The United States should be considered more credible post-Iraq: it said it would invade and it did.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 158 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz An alternative view of hegemony, however, has a very different under- standing of the role of credibility. In what can be called the hegemonic as- surance perspective, hegemons are seen as overcoming multilateral mistrust problems. Many states want to cooperate if they believe that the cooperative endeavor is well designed to achieve a shared goal, and that enough other slates will cooperate to ensure success. However, there is always uncertainty about the best way to proceed and about the motivations of other states—some states may try to hijack international efforts to serve their own more narrow interests, whereas others want to free ride or exploit the cooperation of others. Trustworthy hegemons solve these problems by working with other states to identify policies that a majority can support, and then providing assurances that the hegemon and enough other states will cooperate in the common good to make it worthwhile for all the well-disposed states to cooperate. Untrustworthy hegemons would be incapable of fulfilling this role, because they would arouse suspicions of the aims or tactics of the cooperative venture, or of the hegemon's intentions of actually cooperating.

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Humanitarian
Humanitarian missions are key to US legitimacy Thayer, Professor of Political Science Baylor University, 6
[Bradley A., Nov/Dec 2006, ―In Defense of Primacy,‖ The National Interest, No. 86, Pg. 36, JZ] American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

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Hard Power Undercuts Soft Power
Too much hard power hurts soft power Nye, former US assistant secretary of defense and National Intelligence Council chair, 2
[Joseph S, The Guardian, 3-30-2002, ―Why military power is no longer enough‖, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/31/1, accessed 7-7-13 BLE] There is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may secure the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. It is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This aspect of power is "soft power" - getting people to want what you want. Wise parents know that if they have brought up their children with the right values, their power will be greater than if they have relied only on cutting off allowances or taking away the car keys. Similarly, political leaders and thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that comes from determining the framework of a debate. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do. Soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilised Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And countries like the Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight because of their support for international aid and peace-keeping. The countries that are likely to gain soft power are those closest to global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance. These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States and Europe. By the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration became convinced that 'America's security depended on its ability to speak to and to win the support of people in other countries.' With World War II and the Cold War, the government sponsored efforts including the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America and the Fulbright student exchange programme. But much soft power arises from forces outside government control. Even before the Cold War, 'American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of Hollywood studios, were selling not only their products but also America's culture and values, the secrets of its success, to the rest of the world.'

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Economy

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Key to Hegemony
Regression analysis proves the economy‘s key to hegemony Hubbard, Open Society Foundations Washington DC Program Assistant, 10
(Jesse Hubbard, Hubbard Jesse Hubbard Program Assistant at Open Society Foundations Washington, District Of Columbia International Affairs Previous National Democratic Institute (NDI), National Defense University, Office of Congressman Jim Himes Education PPE at University of Oxford, May 28, 2010, IRSJ: think Globally: American University undergraduate SIS Journal, ―Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis,‖ http://isrj.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/hegemonic-stabilitytheory/http://isrj.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/hegemonic-stability-theory/, accessed July 9, 2013, EK) Regression analysis of this data shows that Pearson‘s r-value is -.836. In the case of American hegemony, economic strength is a better predictor of violent conflict than even overall national power, which had an r-value of -.819. The data is also well within the realm of statistical significance, with a p-value of .0014. While the data for British hegemony was not as striking, the same overall pattern holds true in both cases. During both periods of hegemony, hegemonic strength was negatively related with violent conflict, and yet use of force by the hegemon was positively correlated with violent conflict in both cases. Finally, in both cases, economic power was more closely associated with conflict levels than military power. Statistical analysis created a more complicated picture of the hegemon‘s role in fostering stability than initially anticipated. VI. Conclusions and Implications for Theory and Policy To elucidate some answers regarding the complexities my analysis unearthed, I turned first to the existing theoretical literature on hegemonic stability theory. The existing literature provides some potential frameworks for understanding these results. Since economic strength proved to be of such crucial importance, reexamining the literature that focuses on hegemonic stability theory‘s economic implications was the logical first step. As explained above, the literature on hegemonic stability theory can be broadly divided into two camps – that which focuses on the international economic system, and that which focuses on armed conflict and instability. This research falls squarely into the second camp, but insights from the first camp are still of relevance. Even Kindleberger‘s early work on this question is of relevance. Kindleberger posited that the economic instability between the First and Second World Wars could be attributed to the lack of an economic hegemon (Kindleberger 1973). But economic instability obviously has spillover effects into the international political arena. Keynes, writing after WWI, warned in his seminal tract The Economic Consequences of the Peace that Germany‘s economic humiliation could have a radicalizing effect on the nation‘s political culture (Keynes 1919). Given later events, his warning seems prescient. In the years since the Second World War, however, the European continent has not relapsed into armed conflict. What was different after the second global conflagration? Crucially, the United States was in a far more powerful position than Britain was after WWI. As the tables above show, Britain‘s economic strength after the First World War was about 13% of the total in strength in the international system. In contrast, the United States possessed about 53% of relative economic power in the international system in the years immediately following WWII. The U.S. helped rebuild Europe‘s economic strength with billions of dollars in investment through the Marshall Plan, assistance that was never available to the defeated powers after the First World War (Kindleberger 1973). The interwar years were also marked by a series of debilitating trade wars that likely worsened the Great Depression (Ibid.). In contrast, when Britain was more powerful, it was able to facilitate greater free trade, and after World War II, the United States played a leading role in creating institutions like the GATT that had an essential role in facilitating global trade (Organski 1958). The possibility that

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 163 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz economic stability is an important factor in the overall security environment should not be discounted, especially given the results of my statistical analysis. Another theory that could provide insight into the patterns observed in this research is that of preponderance of power. Gilpin theorized that when a state has the preponderance of power in the international system, rivals are more likely to resolve their disagreements without resorting to armed conflict (Gilpin 1983). The logic behind this claim is simple – it makes more sense to challenge a weaker hegemon than a stronger one. This simple yet powerful theory can help explain the puzzlingly strong positive correlation between military conflicts engaged in by the hegemon and conflict overall. It is not necessarily that military involvement by the hegemon instigates further conflict in the international system. Rather, this military involvement could be a function of the hegemon‘s weaker position, which is the true cause of the higher levels of conflict in the international system. Additionally, it is important to note that military power is, in the long run, dependent on economic strength. Thus, it is possible that as hegemons lose relative economic power, other nations are tempted to challenge them even if their short-term military capabilities are still strong. This would help explain some of the variation found between the economic and military data. The results of this analysis are of clear importance beyond the realm of theory. As the debate rages over the role of the United States in the world, hegemonic stability theory has some useful insights to bring to the table. What this research makes clear is that a strong hegemon can exert a positive influence on stability in the international system. However, this should not give policymakers a justification to engage in conflict or escalate military budgets purely for the sake of international stability. If anything, this research points to the central importance of economic influence in fostering international stability. To misconstrue these findings to justify anything else would be a grave error indeed. Hegemons may play a stabilizing role in the international system, but this role is complicated. It is economic strength, not military dominance that is the true test of hegemony. A weak state with a strong military is a paper tiger – it may appear fearsome, but it is vulnerable to even a short blast of wind.

US economy crucial to hegemony – empirically proven. Dymski, Former University of California Economics Professor, 2
(Gary A. Dymski, 2002, University of California, Riverside, ―Post-Hegemonic U.S. Economic Hegemony: Minskian and Kaleckian Dynamics in the Neoliberal Era,‖ http://economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers02/02-13.pdf, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) Until 1971, the U.S. enjoyed global economic hegemony because it underwrote the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. It was hegemonic in the sense defined by Kindleberger (1973, 1974)—it underwrote the system of fixed exchange rates, and operated as a lender of last resort within that system. After 1971, the U.S. has been a global economic hegemon in the sense defined above, though not in Kindleberger‘s sense: it has been a posthegemonic hegemon. This hegemony has rested on the U.S. economy‘s importance in global trade, the U.S. dollar‘s role as a reserve currency and unit of global exchange, and the dominance of U.S. markets and institutions in global finance. This recent period, an era of great instability and recurrent crashes, has seen a step-by-step global deregulation of financial markets and a relaxation of controls on cross-border capital movements. In this period, global growth has been slower and more unstable; but U.S. military hegemony has, if anything, become stronger. With fewer restrictions on cross-border capital movements, a slower pace of global economic growth, and continued U.S. military power, the U.S. has increasingly been a ―safe harbor‖ magnet for globally mobile wealth. These changes in the character of U.S. global economic hegemony are root cause of changes in the character and timing of U.S. cyclical fluctuations.

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Economic Hegemony is Key to Military Hegemony
Economic power is a prerequisite to military power Beckley, Harvard International Security Program Research Fellow, 11
(Michael, Winter 2011/12, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, ""China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," p. 57-58, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21649/chinas_century_why_americas_edge_will_endure.h tml?breadcrumb=%2Fproject%2F58%2Fquarterly_journal%3Fparent_id%3D46, accessed 7-5-12, CNM) The key point is that national power is multifaceted and cannot be measured with a single or a handful of metrics. In the analyses that follow, I allot more space to economic indicators than to military indicators. This is not because economic power is necessarily more important than military power, but rather because most declinist writings argue that the United States is in economic, not military, decline. Moreover, military power is ultimately based on economic strength. International relations scholars tend to view civilian and military realms as separate entities, but militaries are embedded within economic sys- tems. In a separate study, I show that countries that excel in producing com- mercial products and innovations also tend to excel in producing military force.83 Part of this advantage stems from greater surplus wealth, which allows rich states to sustain large military investments . Economically developed states, however, also derive military benefits from their technological infrastructures, efficient production capacities, advanced data analysis net- works, stocks of managerial expertise, and stable political environments. In short, economic indicators are, to a significant degree, measures of military ca- pability. Focusing on the former, therefore, does not imply ignoring the latter.

Economic supremacy is a linchpin of hegemony Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6
(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,‖ 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF) What is hegemony? First, hegemony is about raw, hard power. Militarily, a hegemon's capabilities are such that "no other state has the wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it." 11 A hegemon also enjoys "economic supremacy" in the international system and has a "preponderance of material resources." 12 Second, hegemony is about the dominant power's ambitions. A hegemon acts self-interestedly to safeguard its security, economic, and ideological interests. 13 Third, hegemony is about polarity. Because of its overwhelming advantages in relative military and economic power over other states in the international system, a hegemon is the only great power in the system, which is therefore, by definition, unipolar. 14 Fourth, hegemony is about will. A hegemon purposefully exercises its overwhelming power to impose order on the international system . 15 Finally, hegemony is fundamentally about structural change, because "if one state achieves hegemony, the system ceases to be anarchic and becomes hierarchic." 16 Yet, as Robert Gilpin notes, because "no state has ever completely controlled an international system," hegemony is a relative, not an absolute, concept. 17 When a great power attains hegemony, as, for example, the United States did in Western Europe after World War II, the system is more hierarchic—and less anarchic—than it would be in the absence of hegemonic power. 18 Implicit in Gilpin's observation is a subtle, but important, point: although [End Page 11] the United States is a hegemon, it is not omnipotent—there are limits to its ability

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 165 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz to shape international outcomes. This explains why the United States has been unable to suppress the insurgency in Iraq (and failed in the Vietnam War), and why it has not succeeded in compelling either North Korea or Iran to halt their nuclear weapons programs. Nevertheless, the United States' hegemonic power is not illusory. As Kenneth Waltz notes, power does not mean that a state possesses the ability to get its way all of the time. 19 Material resources never translate fully into desired outcomes (military strategists acknowledge this when they observe that "the enemy has a vote" in determining the degree to which a state can realize its strategic goals). Although a hegemon does not get its way all of the time, its vast power will help it get its way with other states far more often than they will get their way with it. Precisely because the United States is a hegemon, there is a marked asymmetry of influence in its favor. In international politics, the United States does not get all that it wants all of the time. But it gets most of what it wants an awful lot of the time, and it affects other states far more than other states affect it.

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Economic Leverage Key to Exercising Hegemony
Economic power allows US to use leverage to perpetuate hegemony Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6
(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,‖ 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF) Hegemonic stability theory posits that the United States can employ its many military, economic, and diplomatic instruments as inducements to ward [End Page 17] off potential challenges to its preeminence. 40 Militarily, it has considerable leverage. For example, it can offer a protective shield to states in unstable regions, which is a strong incentive for them to bandwagon with the United States— or, less charitably, to free ride by passing the buck for maintaining their security to the United States. 41 Also, U.S. military power helps provide the geopolitical prerequisites for an open international economy from which most states supposedly benefit: stability in key regions as well as secure access to what Barry Posen calls the "global commons" of sea, air, and space—that is, the media through which global communications are transmitted and through which goods and people move. 42 In addition, the United States has lots of economic and financial carrots that it can either withhold from states that contest its hegemony or give as rewards to those that accept it. 43 The United States also supposedly can defuse other states' fears of its hegemonic power by voluntarily exercising self-restraint and forgoing unilateral actions. As Ikenberry puts it, "American hegemony is reluctant, open, and highly institutionalized—or, in a word, liberal. This is what makes it acceptable to other countries that might otherwise be expected to balance against hegemonic power, and it is also what makes it so stable and expansive." 44 That is, by exercising its preponderance through multilateral institutions and accepting externally imposed restraints on its power, the United States can demonstrate to others that its hegemony is benign, because it is based on mutual consent, and give-and-take. 45 Moreover, the fact that the United States is a democratic hegemon not only alleviates others' fears of its hegemonic power, [End Page 18] but also pulls them into the U.S. orbit. Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan have argued that the liberal democratic nature of the United States' domestic political system legitimates U.S. hegemony and simultaneously reassures others of its benevolence. 46

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Economic Power Key to Soft & Hard Power
Strong economy key to soft and hard power Nye, former US assistant secretary of defense, 11
(Joseph S, Project Syndicate, ―Has Economic Power Replace Military‖, 6-6-11, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/has-economic-power-replaced-military-might-, accessed 6-29-12, FFF) Economic resources can produce soft-power behavior as well as hard military power. A successful economic model not only finances the military resources needed for the exercise of hard power, but it can also attract others to emulate its example. The European Union‘s soft power at the end of the Cold War, and that of China today, owes much to the success of the EU and Chinese economic models.

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Economy Outweighs Military
The economy‘s a better internal link to hegemony than hard power Hubbard, Open Society Foundations Washington DC Program Assistant, 10
(Jesse Hubbard, Hubbard Jesse Hubbard Program Assistant at Open Society Foundations Washington, District Of Columbia International Affairs Previous National Democratic Institute (NDI), National Defense University, Office of Congressman Jim Himes Education PPE at University of Oxford, May 28, 2010, IRSJ: think Globally: American University undergraduate SIS Journal, ―Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis,‖ http://isrj.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/hegemonic-stabilitytheory/http://isrj.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/hegemonic-stability-theory/, accessed July 9, 2013, EK) Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. I then matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts in the international system since 1815. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. Regression analysis of the data revealed that there was a statistically significant negative correlation between relative hegemonic power and conflict levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further analysis revealed that in both cases, military power was a less accurate predictor of military conflict than economic power. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the most important implication of this research is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power than through the exercise of military force.

Nation‘s calculate power using the economy not the military Gelb, Council on Foreign Relations President Emeritus, 10
Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, and he was a Columnist and Editor at The New York Times from 1981 to 1993, November/December 2010, Foreign Affairs, ― GDP Now Matters More Than Force,‖ Vol. 89 Issue 6, p35-43, ebsco, accessed July 9, 2013, EK) U.S. policymakers must also be patient. The weakest of nations today can resist and delay. Pressing prematurely for decisions--an unfortunate hallmark of U.S. style--results in failure, the prime enemy of power. Success breeds power, and failure breeds weakness. Even when various domestic constituencies shout for quick action, Washington's leaders must learn to buy time in order to allow for U.S. power--and the power of U.S.-led coalitions--to take effect abroad. Patience is especially valuable in the economic arena, where there are far more players than in the military and diplomatic realms. To corral all these players takes time. Military power can work quickly, like a storm; economic power grabs slowly, like the tide. It needs time to erode the shoreline, but it surely does nibble away. To be sure, U.S. presidents need to preserve the United States' core role as the world's military and diplomatic balancer--for its own sake; and because it strengthens U.S. interests in economic

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 169 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz transactions. But economics has to be the main driver for current policy, as nations calculate power more in terms of GDP than military might. U.S. GDP will be the lure and the whip in the international affairs of the twenty-first century. U.S. interests abroad cannot be adequately protected or advanced without an economic reawakening at home.

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Economy Outweighs Credibility
US economy bolsters hegemony Gelb, Council on Foreign Relations President Emeritus, 10
Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, and he was a Columnist and Editor at The New York Times from 1981 to 1993, November/December 2010, Foreign Affairs, ― GDP Now Matters More Than Force,‖ Vol. 89 Issue 6, p35-43, ebsco, accessed July 9, 2013, EK) A U.S. Foreign Policy for the Age of Economic Power Most nations today beat their foreign policy drums largely to economic rhythms, but less so the United States. Most nations define their interests largely in economic terms and deal mostly in economic power, but less so the United States. Most nations have adjusted their national security strategies to focus on economic security, but less so the United States. Washington still principally thinks of its security in traditional military terms and responds to threats with military means. The main challenge for Washington, then, is to recompose its foreign policy with an economic theme, while countering threats in new and creative ways. The goal is to redefine "security" to harmonize with twenty-firstcentury realities. The model already exists for such an economic-centric world and for a policy to match: the approach of U.S. Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. They understood that a strong economy is the basis of both a vibrant democracy at home and U.S. military might abroad. They also knew that no matter how strong the U.S. economy and military, Washington would need a lot of help in checking communism. Accordingly, they bolstered U.S. power by resurrecting the economies of Western Europe and Japan, and they added legitimacy to that power by establishing international institutions such as the World Bank and NATO. To respond to threats from the Soviet Union and communism, Truman and Eisenhower fashioned the policies of containment and deterrence, backed up by military and economic aid. The idea was to check Soviet military power without bankrupting the United States. Today, of course, any U.S. approach must account for the complexity of the global economy as well as new threats from terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. All this can be done--but not without causing some intellectual and political mayhem. The most ferocious fight will be over how to rejuvenate the U.S. economy. Everyone agrees that it must be fixed, lest the nation face further decline and more dangers. But few agree on how. The basic must-do list is lengthy, unforgiving, and depressingly obvious: improve public schools to sustain democracy and restore global competitiveness; upgrade the physical infrastructure critical to economic efficiency and homeland security; reduce public debt, the interest on which is devouring revenue; stimulate the economy to create jobs; and promote new sources of energy and freer trade to increase jobs, lower foreign debt, and reduce dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

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Mexico Specific
Mexico economy key to US hegemony Gelb, Council on Foreign Relations President Emeritus, 10
Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, and he was a Columnist and Editor at The New York Times from 1981 to 1993, November/December 2010, Foreign Affairs, ― GDP Now Matters More Than Force,‖ Vol. 89 Issue 6, p35-43, ebsco, accessed July 9, 2013, EK) Today, the Truman and Eisenhower approach would almost certainly revolutionize basic priorities--for example, by elevating Mexico far above Afghanistan as a national priority. The fact is that Mexico could damage of help the United States profoundly and inescapably--just consider illegal immigration, drugs, crime, as well as the trade and investment potential. By contrast, the war in Afghanistan will have little lasting effect on the United States, whatever the outcome, except for the incredible cost in lives and dollars. Terrorists will still find homes in Pakistan and many other locales. In the face of all this, Washington nonetheless showers its attentions on Afghanistan and virtually ignores Mexico. By following a second basic principle--to not just strengthen the United States but also bulk up its key allies--Truman and Eisenhower constructed an impregnable wall against communist encroachment while nurturing mutual trade and investment. The main beneficiaries were Western Europe (through the brilliance of the Marshall Plan) and Japan. By the late 1950s, this triangle of allies--the United States, Western Europe, and Japan--constituted the bulk of the world's economic, military, and diplomatic punch. Together, they could not be defeated, whatever the setbacks. Even [today, this triangle represents the world's greatest commonality of interests and values and, as such, is the best place to start constructing twenty-first-century coalitions. Such coalitions would, however, have to include a number of other nations, as situations required. Of course, the present-day U.S. economy barely resembles that of the Truman and Eisenhower days. Today, trade accounts for about one-quarter of U.S. GDP, more than double its share during the early Cold War years. Trillions of dollars cross national boundaries daily, mostly unconstrained by governments. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which Truman essentially created, now occupy a much smaller place in the global economy. The United States is still the beacon for world trade, but its power has declined from the days when Truman created the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was the precursor to the World Trade Organization. The reason for the United States' decline in trade power is that the U.S. economy is relatively weaker than before. The country's past trade power rested largely on the size and vitality of its economy. Thus, in trade talks, the United States could give more access to markets than it got, confident that it would recoup more than its fair share in the long run.

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AT – Economy Key to Hegemony
A nation‘s economy is irrelevant to its power and influence Kagan, Brookings Institute senior fellow, 2012
(Robert, Jan 1, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-powerdeclinism?page=0,1&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm _source=Editors%20and%20Bloggers&utm_campaign=cbaee91d9dEdit_and_Blogs&utm_medium=email, accessed 7/7/13, CBC) BUT WHAT ABOUT the ―rise of the rest‖—the increasing economic clout of nations like China, India, Brazil, and Turkey? Doesn‘t that cut into American power and influence? The answer is, it depends. The fact that other nations in the world are enjoying periods of high growth does not mean that America‘s position as the predominant power is declining, or even that ―the rest‖ are catching up in terms of overall power and influence. Brazil‘s share of global GDP was a little over 2 percent in 1990 and remains a little over 2 percent today. Turkey‘s share was under 1 percent in 1990 and is still under 1 percent today. People, and especially businesspeople, are naturally excited about these emerging markets, but just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising great power. Wealth matters in international politics, but there is no simple correlation between economic growth and international influence. It is not clear that a richer India today wields greater influence on the global stage than a poorer India did in the 1950s under Nehru, when it was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, or that Turkey, for all the independence and flash of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, really wields more influence than it did a decade ago. As for the effect of these growing economies on the position of the United States, it all depends on who is doing the growing. The problem for the British Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century was not its substantial decline relative to the United States, a generally friendly power whose interests did not fundamentally conflict with Britain‘s. Even in the Western hemisphere, British trade increased as it ceded dominance to the United States. The problem was Britain‘s decline relative to Germany, which ai med for supremacy on the European continent, and sought to compete with Britain on the high seas, and in both respects posed a threat to Britain‘s core security. In the case of the United States, the dramatic and rapid rise of the German and Japanese economies during the Cold War reduced American primacy in the world much more than the more recent ―rise of the rest.‖ America‘s share of the world‘s GDP, nearly 50 percent after World War II, fell to roughly 25 percent by the early 1970s, where it has remained ever since. But that ―rise of the rest‖ did not weaken the United States. If anything, it strengthened it. Germany and Japan were and are close democratic allies, key pillars of the American world order. The growth of their economies actually shifted the balance irretrievably against the Soviet bloc and helped bring about its demise. When gauging the impact of the growing economies of other countries today, one has to make the same kinds of calculations. Does the growth of the Brazilian economy, or of the Indian economy, diminish American global power? Both nations are friendly, and India is increasingly a strategic partner of the United States. If America‘s future competitor in the world is likely to be China, then a richer and more powerful India will be an asset, not a liability, to the United States. Overall, the fact that Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa are enjoying a period of economic growth—which may or may not last indefinitely—is either irrelevant to America‘s strategic position or of benef it to it. At present, only the growth of China‘s economy can be said to have implications for American power in the future, and only insofar as the Chinese translate enough of their growing economic strength into military strength.

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Increased debt does not hurt primacy, America is still the top hegemon after one of the worst economic crises in history Cohen, New America Foundation senior fellow, 2012
(Michael, July 13, The Democracy Arsenal, ―This Week In Threat Mongering—The Debt Version,‖ http://tcf.org/blogs/botc/2012/07/this-week-in-threat-mongering-the-debtversion, accessed 7/7/13, CBC) The fact is, if last year's debt limit debacle hasn't already convinced other nations to be skeptical of America's future then I think we're probably in the clear. Of course, the debt limit debate is instructive in this regard. Even though both parties agreed to a mandated reduction of the defense budget, which would basically return the Pentagon budget to FY 2007 levels (or what some might call, non-crazy levels of spending), the ink was barely dry on the agreement before both parties began falling over themselves to restore the cuts. The House of Representatives even went so far as to take a sledgehammer, earlier this year, to key social safety net programs in order to prevent the Pentagon from taking a haircut. Secretary of Defense Panetta practically ran around Washington with his hair on fire decrying the impact of sequestration cuts. O'Hanlon and Lieberthal's predictions of doom are fanciful at best and are based on the notion that the world is a dangerous place when in fact it's never been safer. But even if they are right that their calamitous series of events could occur there are about $690 billion reasons to believe that the sort of defense cuts that would lead to this series of events will never happen - especially when the country can rely on esteemed national security experts to convince Americans that if it were to occur the world would descend into a dystopian state. But that isn't even the worst part of the debt is a national security threat argument - O'Hanlon and Lieberthal, as well as pretty everyone else who makes this assertion, don't appear to understand the difference between debt and economic growth. Yes, America's economy is weak; but it has very little to do with the fact that we have a lot of debt. Indeed, the problem is that the federal government hasn't taken on enough debt in order to grow our economy, create jobs and pull ourselves out of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Quite simply, the government has failed at one of its most basic responsibilities in the face of economic calamity - spending money (even that which is borrowed) in order to fill the gap in aggregate demand. As Ezra Klein rightly points out, the world is desperate to loan us money so that we can spend it on important national priorities, rebuild out infrastructure and create jobs. Instead we have folks telling us that we should reducing out debt . . . and that it's a national security priority. So while debt-mongers are right to be concerned about America's economic future, their diagnosis is way off-base. Indeed a greater focus on reducing the national debt will mean less resources to grow the economy, less money for infrastructure, less money for improving our education system and less money to support clean energy initiatives . . . unless O'Hanlon, Lieberthal, Haass and Mullen believe that cutting government spending to reduce the deficit will somehow grow the economy. It won't. Instead it will make things worse.

Economic gains and losses do not affect unipolarity Edelman, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2010
(Eric, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ―Understanding America‘s Contested Primacy, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/CSBA_UACP_web.pdf, accessed 7/8/13, CBC) American decline and the longevity of a unipolar world order will not be determined purely by economic gains or losses. The future shape of the international system will depend on broader measures of national power than the percentage of global production that a given state controls .

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 174 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Measuring national power, however, is notoriously difficult. In an unprecedented situation of unipolarity, with little historical precedent to guide analysts, the measurement of relative power shifts is perhaps harder still.

Size of economy is not key to hegemony Kagan, Brookings Institute senior fellow, 2-14-12
(Robert, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Gideon Rachman is chief foreign-affairs commentator for the Financial Times, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM) As a matter of geopolitics and power, the size of a country's economy by itself is not a great measure. If it were, then China would have been the world's strongest power in 1800, when it had the largest share of global GDP. So the next question is whether China can translate its economic power into geopolitical influence. Again, it will undoubtedly do so to some extent. But power and influence do not stem from economic strength alone, and China is already the best proof of this. Over the past couple of years, as the U.S. economy has been slumping and China's has been booming, the United States has significantly improved its standing in East Asia and Southeast Asia, while China's position has deteriorated. In fact, the more China uses its newfound muscle, the more it sparks a reaction in the region, which then looks to the United States for succor. (This was the key insight of William Wohlforth years ago in his brilliant essay, "The Stability of a Unipolar World.") Gideon keeps predicting that Japan is about to tilt toward China, but all signs point in the opposite direction -- and not only for Japan but also for most of China's other neighbors. The fact that China is the top trading partner of all these countries does not necessarily increase China's clout. I gather that even Brazilians are increasingly unhappy at becoming merely a raw materials provider to the Chinese. No economy in the world is more dependent on China than Australia's, but look at the new U.S. base the Australians just welcomed onto their soil. Trade does not necessarily breed comity or strategic dependence. As many have pointed out, in 1914 Germany and Britain were each other's largest trading partners too.

Growth is not the sole determinant of influence Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1-11-12
(Robert, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-powerdeclinism?page=0,1&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm _source=Editors%20and%20Bloggers&utm_campaign=cbaee91d9dEdit_and_Blogs&utm_medium=email, accessed 7-6-12, CNM) BUT WHAT ABOUT the ―rise of the rest‖—the increasing economic clout of nations like China, India, Brazil, and Turkey? Doesn‘t that cut into American power and influence? The answer is, it depends. The fact that other nations in the world are enjoying periods of high growth does not mean that America‘s position as the predominant power is declining, or even that ―the rest‖ are catching up in terms of overall power and influence. Brazil‘s share of global GDP was a little over 2 percent in 1990 and remains a little over 2 percent today. Turkey‘s share was under 1 percent in 1990 and is still under 1 percent today. People, and especially businesspeople, are naturally excited about these emerging markets, but just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising great power. Wealth matters in international politics, but there is no simple correlation

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 175 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz between economic growth and international influence. It is not clear that a richer India today wields greater influence on the global stage than a poorer India did in the 1950s under Nehru, when it was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, or that Turkey, for all the independence and flash of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, really wields more influence than it did a decade ago.

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Trade

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Trade Good For Hegemony
Free trade is key to hegemony Lake, University of California Political Science Professor, 93
[David A., December 1993, ―International Studies Quarterly‖, Vol. 37, No. 4, Pg. 459-489, JZ] Although free trade or economic openness is not necessarily preferred by all countries, it is strongly desired by the hegemon. Openness arises, in this view, when the hegemon-or, in some versions, a coalition of middle-sized powers- alters the trade policies of other states. Thus, hegemony is necessarily coercive and based on the exercise of power; the hegemon must effectively change the policies of others to satisfy its own goals. Whereas leaders may use coercion to overcome the free rider, problem, hegemons must use it to reconcile conflicting national trade policy preferences. The leverage exerted by the hegemon may take many different forms, including negative sanctions (threats), positive sanc- tions (rewards), the restructuring of market incentives, ideological leadership, or simply success worthy of emulation.14 The issue of how the hegemon alters the policies of others is a second-order question. The instruments of power are less important here than the role of power in creating and maintaining inter- national economic openness.

Free trade is used to boost US hegemony Ahnlid, Swedish Ambassador, 96
[Anders, Spring of 1996, ―Comparing GATT and GATS: Regime Creation under and after Hegemony‖, Review of the International Economy, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 65-94] The relative US decline since the heyday of its hegemonic power, measured in terms of share of world production and trade, went hand in hand with a decrease in US productivity as compared to major trading partners. Faced with the consequences of its less privileged position with regard to trade in goods, including a seemingly ever mounting trade deficit, the US in the early 1980s looked for ways and means to improve its external balance, its competitiveness and, thereby, its position in the structure of economic power. In this context the area of services was seen as one of great prospects, not the least since services trade grew substantially faster than trade in goods. Between 1970 and 1980 the annual rate of growth for trade in services was 19 percent compared with 5.4 percent for trade in goods. Furthermore, in the late 1980s, services accounted for approximately 70 percent of US gross national product. The latter led American policy makers to assume that the United States had a comparative advantage in the field of services, which could, and indeed ought to, be further exploited through liberalization of services markets in other countries. Thus, the quest for GATS was orchestrated. The considerations behind the interest in an international regime for trade in services were very different from those that were instrumental in the US promotion of the creation of GAIT. Nationally, US business interests played a more pronounced role in starting negotiations on GATS, than they did in the prelude to GATT. The American impetus for negotiations on services arose primarily as insurance, financial services, travel and tourism, and information-based service sectors began to press for negotiations aimed at removing restrictions that impeded trade with other countries. According to Balassa: 'the fact that US political and business groups were in the vanguard in introducing services issues in the trade negotiations reflects the belief that liberalizing trade in services would benefit the United States' The negotiations on a services agreement were seen as a promise of 'new economic vitality and balanceof-trade surpluses in an era of declining competitiveness and excess capacity in traditional industries'.24T his was important for Congress when it gave the executive branch the mandate to pursue negotiations in the area of services within the auspices of GATT.25

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Proliferation

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Proliferation Undercuts Hegemony
Proliferation undercuts hegemony Lind, Policy director of the Economic Growth Program, 7
(Michael Lind, June 2007, ―Beyond American Hegemony‖, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381, Accessed 7-613, DAG) During the Cold War, the United States was the stronger of two superpowers in a bipolar world. The antiSoviet alliance was not a traditional alliance of equals, but a hegemonic alliance centered on the United States. West Germany, Japan and South Korea were semi-sovereign U.S. protectorates. Britain and France were more independent, but even they received the benefits of "extended deterrence," according to which the United States agreed to treat an attack on them as the equivalent of an attack on the American homeland. America‘s Cold War strategy was often described as dual containment -- the containment not only of America‘s enemies like the Soviet Union and (until the 1970s) communist China, but also of America‘s allies, in particular West Germany and Japan. Dual containment permitted the United States to mobilize German and Japanese industrial might as part of the anti-Soviet coalition, while forestalling the re-emergence of Germany and Japan as independent military powers. The Cold War officially ended in Paris in 1990, but the United States has continued to pursue a dual containment strategy based on three principles: dissuasion, reassurance and coercive nonproliferation. Dissuasion -- directed at actual or potential challengers to the United States -- commits the United States to outspend all other great military powers, whether friend or foe. This policy‘s goal -- in the words of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance draft leaked from then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney‘s Pentagon -is the dissuasion or "deterring [of] potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." By the end of the 1990s, as Charles Krauthammer noted in these pages four years ago: "The result is the dominance of a single power unlike anything ever seen. Even at its height Britain could always be seriously challenged by the next greatest powers. Britain had a smaller army than the land powers of Europe and its navy was equaled by the next two navies combined. Today, American military spending exceeds that of the next twenty countries combined. Its navy, air force and space power are unrivaled." This approach flies in the face of the strategy usually adopted by traditional status quo great powers, which sought to ensure that they belonged to alliances with resources that exceeded those of potential challengers. It is no surprise that, despite the absence of any threat to the United States equivalent to that of the Soviet Union, our defense spending today, as a share of our total GDP, is nearly at the Cold War average. High levels of defense expenditures are not merely to overawe potential challengers. (In outlining possible competitors, Krauthammer noted, "Only China grew in strength, but coming from so far behind it will be decades before it can challenge American primacy -- and that assumes that its current growth continues unabated.") To again quote from the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, "we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order." Reassurance, the second prong of the hegemonic strategy, entails convincing major powers not to build up their military capabilities, allowing the United States to assume the burdens of ensuring their security instead. In other words, while outspending allies like Germany and Japan on defense, the United States should be prepared to fight wars on behalf of Germany and Japan, sparing them the necessity of re-arming -- for fear that these countries, having "renationalized" their defense policies and rearmed, might become hostile to the United States at some future date. For example, even though the threats emanating from the

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 181 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz spillover of the Balkan conflicts affected Germany and its neighbors far more than a geographically farremoved United States, Washington took the lead in waging the 1999 Kosovo war -- in part to forestall the emergence of a Germany prepared to act independently. And the Persian Gulf War was, among other things, a reassurance war on behalf of Japan -- far more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than the United States -- confirmed by the fact that Japan paid a substantial portion of the United States‘ costs in that conflict. Today, the great question is whether or not two other Asian giants -- India and China -- will eschew the development of true blue-water navies and continue to allow the United States to take responsibility for keeping the Gulf open. Finally, the global hegemony strategy insists that America‘s safety depends not on the absence of a hostile hegemon in Europe, Asia and the Middle East -- the traditional American approach -- but on the permanent presence of the United States itself as the military hegemon of Europe, the military hegemon of Asia and the military hegemon of the Middle East. In each of these areas, the regional powers would consent to perpetual U.S. domination either voluntarily, because the United States assumed their defense burdens (reassurance), or involuntarily, because the superior U.S. military intimidated them into acquiescence (dissuasion). American military hegemony in Europe, Asia and the Middle East depends on the ability of the U.S. military to threaten and, if necessary, to use military force to defeat any regional challenge-but at a relatively low cost. This is because the American public is not prepared to pay the costs necessary if the United States is to be a "hyperpower." Given this premise, the obsession with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) makes perfect sense. WMD are defensive weapons that offer poor states a possible defensive shield against the sword of unexcelled U.S. conventional military superiority. The success of the United States in using superior conventional force to defeat Serbia and Iraq (twice) may have accelerated the efforts of India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to obtain nuclear deterrents. As an Indian admiral observed after the Gulf War, "The lesson is that you should not go to war with the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Moreover, it is clear that the United States treats countries that possess WMD quite differently from those that do not. So proliferation undermines American regional hegemony in two ways. First, it forces the U.S. military to adopt costly and awkward strategies in wartime. Second, it discourages intimidated neighbors of the nuclear state from allowing American bases and military build-ups on its soil. With this in mind, proponents of the hegemony strategy often advocate a policy of preventive war to keep countries deemed to be hostile to the United States from obtaining nuclear weapons or WMD. Preventive war (as distinguished from pre-emptive attack to avert an impending strike) is not only a violation of international law but also a repudiation of America‘s own traditions. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all ruled out preventive wars against the Soviet Union and China to cripple or destroy their nuclear programs, and President Ronald Reagan, along with Britain‘s Margaret Thatcher, denounced Israel‘s 1981 attack on Iraq‘s nuclear reactor at Osirak. Yet, by 2002, a bipartisan majority in the Congress authorized President George W. Bush to wage the first -- and to date the only -- preventive war in American history against Iraq. Although it turned out to be a disaster, it was perfectly consistent with the radical neoconservative variant of U.S. global hegemony strategy.

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Internal Link Answers

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AT – Hegemony Influences Others
Hegemony can‘t cause smaller countries to obey – smaller countries realize their relative power Weisbrode, European University Institute diplomatic historian, 11
(Kenneth Weisbrode is a diplomatic historian at the European University Institute and author of "The Atlantic Century." 2-8-11, World Politics Review, ―The U.S. and Egypt: The Limits of Hegemony,‖ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7805/the-u-s-and-egypt-the-limits-of-hegemony, accessed 78-12, CNM) The Obama administration's air of ambivalence, however, evokes a perennial condition of international relations. Accustomed as most of us are to power hierarchies, we often overlook how difficult and complex actual relations can be between big and small countries, especially when those relations fall into the category of patron and client. In this respect, the difficulties the U.S. confronts as its Egyptian ally shows signs of collapsing are similar to those China has faced in recent years with regard to North Korea, those between Iran and its various auxiliaries in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, and, for that matter, between the United States and other important allies, like Israel: For every bit of leverage a patron seeks to wield, the client comes to realize its own relative power. Rarely does the big power command and the smaller obey. In other words, no member of the latter group above is a proxy, strictly speaking.

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Hegemony Inevitable – Power Consolidation
Hegemony is inevitable – America has consolidated power
Brooks, Dartmouth associate government professor, and Wohlforth, Dartmouth government professor, 8 (Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, World Out of Balance, ―Realism, Balance-of-Power Theory , and the Counterbalancing Constraint,‖ p. 27-31, Accessed 6/29/12, THW) ―Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,‖ historian Paul Kennedy observes: ―I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.‖ Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from ―command of the commons‖ – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen‘s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy‘s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 185 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States‘ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, ―Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world‘s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.‖

Hegemony inevitable – the US cannot be caught up to, and the rival countries don‘t want to, either. They don‘t view the US as a threat and are busy dealing with other threats. Ye, Boston University IR professor, 4
(Min, ―The US Hegemony and Implication for China,‖ http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper_Ye.pdf, pgs. 25-26, accessed 7/7/13, AX) First, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up. William Wohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a ―benign hegemon‖ and it is in the world‘s benefit for its presence. Similarly, Joanne Gowa observed that allies of the U.S benefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the nations‘ interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony. Second, alliance against the U.S is unlikely and ineffective. Stephen Walt has listed the causes for alliance formation. Alliances form not to balance the biggest power but to balance against the biggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined by (1) aggregate power, (2) geographic proximity, (3) offensive power, and (4) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all major powers geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate aggressive intentions against other major powers. Hence their balancing against the U.S is unlikely. Wohlforth observed that the other major powers before they balance against the U.S face counterbalancing of their own. China was perceived as a potential balancer of the U.S in many cases. Yet, China faces counterbalancing from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, and India in the Asian continent alone. Similarly, the other major powers—Russia, Japan, India, and Europe—have more difficulties dealing with their relationships than their relations with the U.S. In belief, the American hegemon not only does not face substantial balancing but serve as a balancer against others‘ balancing actions. As a result, we see more ―bandwagoning‖ with the U.S superpower rather than ―balancing‖. Finally, as John Ikenberry and other scholars observed, the U.S unipolarity is a hegemony based on ―constitutional order‖. At the end of the World War II, alongside its supremacy in power, the U.S also established the UN, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions in dealing with weapons proliferation and managing relations with allies. U.S exercise of power was self restraint through its memberships in the international institutions. Consequently, the other nations in the world can not only benefit from this constitutional order but to an extent exercise checks on the sole superpower and feel safer even in the unipolar world.

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Hegemony Inevitable – Other Countries Want Unipolarity
Hegemony is inevitable – The US has consolidated power and other countries want a unipolar world
Ye, Boston University international relations professor, 4 (Min Ye, ―The US Hegemony and Implication for China,‖ http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper_Ye.pdf, pgs. 25-6, accessed 6/29/12, THW) First, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up. William Wohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a ―benign hegemon‖ and it is in the world‘s benefit for its presence. Similarly, Joanne Gowa observed that allies of the U.S benefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the nations‘ interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony. Second, alliance against the U.S is unlikely and ineffective. Stephen Walt has listed the causes for alliance formation. Alliances form not to balance the biggest power but to balance against the biggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined by (1) aggregate power, (2) geographic proximity, (3) offensive power, and (4) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all major powers geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate aggressive intentions against other major powers. Hence their balancing against the U.S is unlikely. Wohlforth observed that the other major powers before they balance against the U.S face counterbalancing of their own. China was perceived as a potential balancer of the U.S in many cases. Yet, China faces counterbalancing from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, and India in the Asian continent alone. Similarly, the other major powers— Russia, Japan, India, and Europe—have more difficulties dealing with their relationships than their relations with the U.S. In belief, the American hegemon not only does not face substantial balancing but serve as a balancer against others‘ balancing actions. As a result, we see more ―bandwagoning‖ with the U.S superpower rather than ―balancing‖. Finally, as John Ikenberry and other scholars observed, the U.S unipolarity is a hegemony based on ―constitutional order‖. At the end of the World War II, alongside its supremacy in power, the U.S. also established the UN, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions in dealing with weapons proliferation and managing relations with allies. U.S exercise of power was self-restraint through its memberships in the international institutions. Consequently, the other nations in the world can not only benefit from this constitutional order but to an extent exercise checks on the sole superpower and feel safer even in the unipolar world.

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Hegemony Inevitable – Nuclear Deterrence
US deterrence sustainable – empirics prove Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies Counselor and Trustee, Feist, CNN‘s Washington Bureau Chief and Senior Vice President 12
(Zbigniew, Former White House National Security Adviser, Sam, March 29, 2012, Council of Foreign Relations, ―A Conversation With Zbigniew Brzezinski,‖ http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-andpolitics/conversation-zbigniew-brzezinski/p27829, accessed 7/4/12, YGS) Look, that kind of a guarantee by the United States has a solid, 100 percent record of reliability. We have protected Japan and South Korea from North Korea on that basis, and neither one of them is pleading for a war against North Korea. We defended our allies in Europe for 40 years during the worst days of the Cold War -- very threatening days of the Cold War -- and nothing happened. So deterrence does work. So first of all that's one option. Secondly, if for some reason there was evidence that the Iranians seeking a large-scale nuclear program with weaponry, we could go to the Security Council and ask for approval for action against Iran from China and from Russia -- FEIST: Do you think we would get it? BRZEZINSKI: Probably not. But if we don't get it, isn't that a significant message to us, that we are no longer the unilateral policemen of the world? I think these are the kinds of things we have to think about and talk about seriously and calmly and without hype and without too much emotion, but with a sense of responsibility. FEIST: What if they were to get a nuclear weapon before the U.S. or Israel took action? So imagine for a moment that we are in a world where Iran has now tested a nuclear weapon. How de-stabilizing is that? Fareed Zakaria last week said, you know, it might not be so bad, it might not be de-stabilizing at all. It might actually be stabilizing. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, I don't understand, frankly, what you're talking about, because how can you have a nuclear weapon without having nuclear explosions or test it? FEIST: I'm just saying, if you have a -- if you test -- if Iran becomes a nuclear capable power -- BRZEZINSKI: It -- I don't know what nuclear capable is. It either has them or doesn't have them. FEIST: They have them. BRZEZINSKI: Well, that means they have had to test it. FEIST: OK. BRZEZINSKI: After testing it, they have to weaponize it and they have to have a delivery system. In other words, there are time sequences here. So it doesn't become weapons capable all at once. FEIST: No. BRZEZINSKI: There are stages and stages. We have plenty of time. FEIST: So -BRZEZINSKI: And during that time, we can make it very clear that if they use that weapon to threaten anyone, it is as if they were threatening us. And that is a system of deterrence that has worked reliably for decades. There's no argument to the contrary because it has, except one extremely silly argument that, somehow or other, the Iranians are messianic; they want desperately to commit suicide, a course of action which apparently hasn't occurred to them in the course of 3,000 years of their history. But all of a sudden, now they want to be messianic. You know who's messianic? Netanyahu, because he talks that way. And that's a very risky position. This is why I favor the position that most Israelis have, which is this should not be done. Public opinion polls in Israel are very clear: that the majority of the Israelis don't want that to happen. FEIST: A strike. BRZEZINSKI: Yeah. FEIST: Sounds like you're less concerned if Iran were to gain that power. BRZEZINSKI: Well, why should I be so concerned if I dealt with the Soviet Union, which had 4,000 weapons, and I remember being woken up one night at 3:00 a.m. to be told by my military assistant that we are under nuclear attack. It obviously didn't happen, since we're all here. (Laughter.) There would have been 85,000 -- 85 million Americans and Soviets dead six hours later. FEIST: All right, I want to talk about -- BRZEZINSKI: We deterred them. If we can deter the Soviet Union, if we can deter North Korea, why on earth can't we deter Iran?

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Hegemony Inevitable – Multipolarity Fails
No real multipolarity – US uses multilateralism as a cover for unilateralist motives Grunstein, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief, 6-22-12
(Judah, World Politics Review, 6-22-12, ―Obama's Record: Tactics Trump Strategy in an Age of Constraints,‖ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12085/obamas-record-tactics-trump-strategyin-an-age-of-constraints, accessed 7-8-12, CNM) In the meantime, in the absence of diplomatic progress toward halting Iran‘s nuclear ambitions, Obama has resorted to covert action (Flame, Stuxnet), with unpredictable consequences for both outcomes in Iran and broader policy precedents in the cyber domain. Along with his use of drone warfare, this highlights another major facet of Obama‘s idealist-realist split, whereby his highly visible multilateralism in support of collective action is undergirded by a hidden unilateralism in pursuit of U.S. national interests. On one hand, the U.S. is posited as the guarantor of global stability in the transition to an uncertain and unstable emergent order. On the other, it is placed above that order as the unilateral rule-set enforcer. In a 21st century update of Theodore Roosevelt‘s famous ―walk softly but carry a big stick,‖ Obama leads from behind but strikes from above.

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Hegemony Good

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Uniqueness

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Lead Now
US has an unprecedented lead Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1-11-12
(Robert, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-powerdeclinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm_source=Ed itors+and+Bloggers&utm_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit_and_Blogs&utm_medium=email, accessed 7-612, CNM) Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of America‘s decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on ―the rise and fall of the great powers,‖ America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great ―disparity of power‖ as between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that ―no other great power‖ had held ―such formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of American power‖ was ―unprecedented.‖ In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a ―comprehensive unipolarity‖ unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing about the ―post-American world‖ and ―the rise of the rest,‖ and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals of America‘s relative power shift so dramatically in just a few short years?

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Lead Now – Military
Lead now – military Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1-11-12
(Robert, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-powerdeclinism?page=0,1&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm _source=Editors%20and%20Bloggers&utm_campaign=cbaee91d9dEdit_and_Blogs&utm_medium=email, accessed 7-6-12, CNM) Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, ―military strength underpins hegemony.‖ Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America‘s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America‘s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire‘s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

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AT – Challengers Now
Hegemony high – everyone is declining Gvodsdev, National Interest former editor, 6-15-12
(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. 6-15-12, World Politics Review, ―The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,‖ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-sshould-go-minilateral, accessed 7-8-12, CNM) This is not to argue that the United States has entered into a period of irreversible decline. Indeed, the other major power centers that are often presented as future peer competitors are experiencing their own shocks, from the eurozone crisis to economic stagnation in Japan to the protests rocking Russia to the formidable challenges that Xi Jinping and the ―fifth generation‖ of leadership in China will have to confront. As a result, the United States is benefiting from the perception that it, like the dollar, remains a ―safe haven.‖ But though the U.S. is still a superpower, its current fiscal and economic problems leave it in no position to finance a new global system or impose common standards on the nations of the world, the way it did in the postwar period by rebuilding Western Europe and East Asia and creating the institutional foundations that paved the way for globalization.

No major rival now – but US must act to preserve its status Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School‘s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program Research Fellow, 12
(Michael, University of Virginia‘s Miller Center‘s fellow, International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, ―China‘s Century? Why America‘s Edge Will Endure,‖ http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http% 3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC_a_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8 q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, pg.78, accessed 6-27-12, FFF) Order and prosperity, however, are unnatural. They can never be presumed. When achieved, they are the result of determined action by powerful actors and, in particular, by the most powerful actor, which is, and will be for some time, the United States. Arms buildups, insecure sea-lanes, and closed markets are only the most obvious risks of U.S. retrenchment. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as global warming, water scarcity, and disease, which may fester without a leader to rally collective action. Hegemony, of course, carries its own risks and costs. In particular, America‘s global military presence might tempt policymakers to use force when they should choose diplomacy or inaction. If the United States abuses its power, however, it is not because it is too engaged with the world, but because its engagement lacks strategic vision. The solution is better strategy, not retrenchment. The first step toward sound strategy is to recognize that the status quo for the United States is pretty good: it does not face a hegemonic rival, and the trends favor continued U.S. dominance. The overarching goal of American foreign policy should be to preserve this state of affairs. Declinists claim the United States should ―adopt a neomercantilist international economic policy‖ and ―disengage from current alliance commitments in East Asia and Europe.‖161 But the fact that the United States rose relative to China while propping up the world economy and maintaining a hegemonic presence abroad casts doubt on the wisdom of such calls for radical policy change.

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AT – China Threat Now
China is not a threat now – US still has hegemony Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School‘s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program, Research Fellow, 12
(Michael, University of Virginia‘s Miller Center, fellow, ―China‘s Century? Why America‘s Edge Will Endure‖, International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, Pg. 42-43, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http% 3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC_a_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8 q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, accessed 6-27-12, FFF) Resolving the debate between these two perspectives is imperative for prudent policymaking. If proponents of the dominant, or ―declinist,‖ perspective are correct, then the United States should contain China‘s growth by ―[adopting] a neomercantilist international economic policy‖ and subdue China‘s ambitions by ―disengag[ing] from current alliance commitments in East Asia.‖4 If, however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China‘s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China‘s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia. With few exceptions, however, existing studies on the decline of the United States and the rise of China suffer from at least one of the following shortcomings. 5 First, most studies do not look at a comprehensive set of indicators. Instead they paint impressionistic pictures of the balance of power, presenting tidbits of information on a handful of metrics. In general, this approach biases results in favor of the declinist perspective because most standard indicators of national power—for example, gross domestic product (GDP), population, and energy consumption—conºate size with power and thereby overstate the capabilities of large but underdeveloped countries. For example, in a recent study Arvind Subramanian contends that ―China‘s dominance is a sure thing‖ based on ―an index of dominance combining just three factors: a country‘s GDP, its trade (measured as the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the world.‖6 The United States and China, however, are each declining by some measures while rising in terms of others. To distinguish between ascendance and decline writ large, therefore, requires analyzing many indicators and determining how much each one matters in relation to others. Second, many studies are static, presenting single-year snapshots of U.S. and Chinese power. This ºaw tends to bias results in favor of the alternative perspective because the United States retains a significant lead in most categories. The key question, however, is not whether the United States is more powerful than China at present, but whether it will remain so in the future. Without a dynamic analysis, it is impossible to answer this question.

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AT – Hegemony Unsustainable/Cost
Claims that engagement is too expensive are flawed – they mis-estimate costs Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement--numbers that are hard to pin down. If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad. The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies. Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney s proposed non- war spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.

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AT – Hegemony Unsustainable
Hegemony is sustainable – accommodation precedes containment and nuclear peace promotes one power Monteiro, Yale Political Science Professor, 11
[Nuno P., April 25, 2011, ―Balancing Act: Why Unipolarity May Be Durable,‖ http://irworkshop.sites.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Monteiro_IRW.pdf, p. 13-19, accessed 7/6/13, WD] What is, then, wrong with the argument that unipolarity is indeed durable? Why are primacists not right? If the impact of the nuclear revolution on the structure of international politics reduces the salience of survival concerns for major powers, then unipolarity should necessarily last . 44 This should settle the debate on unipolar durability in favor of primacist views. Not so fast. Survival is indeed the first goal of states and, therefore, nuclear weapons , by guaranteeing state survival, eliminate the need for major powers to balance against a unipole . But states do not care only about survival. Economic growth is also important for states, for at least two reasons. First, states care about economic growth as an end in itself. 45 One of the primary raisons d‘être of the state is, after all, the well-being of its citizens, defined largely in terms of material wealth. Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, states care about economic growth also for security reasons. If a major power is prevented from continuing to grow economically, then its future security may be imperiled. Nothing ensures that nuclear weapons will continue to guarantee survival indefinitely. A major technological breakthrough, such as comprehensive missile defense, might erode the deterring effect of a survivable nuclear arsenal. Major powers therefore have strong incentives not to fall behind in economic terms. But this pursuit of wealth is subordinated to survival concerns. In other words, I expect major powers to pursue wealth only once the goal of state survival is fully ensured and in ways that do not undermine it. To borrow a concept from John Rawls, this means that survival has ‗lexical priority‘ over all other state aims, including wealth creation. 46 What does this mean for balancing and, consequently, for the durability of a unipolar world? In the previous section, I introduced a revised logic of balancing focused exclusively on the goal of state survival. It is now time to expand it to account for the secondary goal of economic growth. This means that (2‘) must be revised to include not only threats to state survival but also to their economic growth. In the expanded logic, then, states will (3‘) balance against concentrated power to the extent that it threatens both these goals. Consequently, states will now balance until they minimize (4‘‘) both threats to their survival and to their economic growth. The expanded logic goes like this (with italics indicating change from the revised version above): 1) States care first and foremost about their own survival and only pursue other goals, such as wealth, to the extent they do not threaten survival; 2‘‘) An unmatched concentration of power in one state may threaten the survival of others as well as their pursuit of economic growth; 3‘) To the extent that it does, other states will balance against concentrated power; 4‘‘) Threats to survival and to economic growth may be minimized short of amassing as much or more power than any other state; 5‘) Balancing efforts will therefore not necessarily lead to shifts in the systemic balance-of-power; 6‘) As a result, unmatched concentrations of power in one state may be longlasting. The result (6‘) is the same. But the conditions of possibility for an unmatched concentration of power in one state to be long-lasting have changed. Now, the durability of unipolarity depends, beyond major powers‘ guaranteed survival, on a second factor: the presence of international conditions that make the continuation of their economic growth possible. The absence of such conditions, by endangering the long-term ability of the state to maintain its deterrent capability, ultimately places the survival of the state at risk. Therefore, major powers have a strong incentive to balance against a unipole that is -- purposely or

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 197 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz not -- containing their economic growth. This extends the conditions of possibility of a durable unipolar world from the structural to the strategic level. In a nutshell, if a major power‘s economic growth is constrained by the unipole‘s strategy then that major power has incentives to continue to balance against the unipole beyond the point at which nuclear weapons ensure its immediate survival. In sum, a strategy of containment on the part of the unipole, by constraining the economic growth of major powers, will lead the latter to balance, converting their latent capabilities into military power. Containment , therefore , leads major powers to balance beyond the point at which their immediate survival is guaranteed , up to the point at which they effect a shift in the systemic balance of power, bringing about the end of unipolarity. A strategy of accommodation , on the contrary, allows major powers to continue their economic growth, thus guaranteeing that their immediate ability to secure their own survival will not be eroded over time. By doing so, accommodation takes away the incentives major powers might have to balance beyond the point at which their immediate survival is guaranteed. Consequently, a strategy of accommodation -- when implemented under conditions in which survival may be guaranteed even in the absence of a systemic balance of power -- makes unipolarity durable . V. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATION This section extracts empirical implications from my theory and tests the argument against the evolving empirical record. My ―qualified durability‖ argument yields two empirical implications for contemporary world politics. First, for as long as the United States pursues a strategy of economic accommodation , major powers , all of which today possess a survivable nuclear arsenal, should not pursue further balancing against the United States. Second, in case the United States shifts towards a strategy of containment , major powers should initiate a balancing effort, increasing the rate at which they convert their latent power into military capabilities and pooling those capabilities together through the formation of alliances, eventually shifting the systemic balance of power and putting an end to unipolarity.

Unipolarity is sustainable – military and nuclear deterrence ensure it and no impact to economic challengers Monteiro, Yale Political Science Professor, 11
[Nuno P., April 25, 2011, ―Balancing Act: Why Unipolarity May Be Durable,‖ http://irworkshop.sites.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Monteiro_IRW.pdf, p. 24-25, accessed 7/6/13, WD] Debate on unipolar durability has generated great controversy, placing it at the center of scholarship on unipolarity. This prominent place stems from two factors driving scholarly concerns. First, having failed to predict the end of the Cold War -- arguably the most momentous transformation of the international system since the emergence of IR as a scientific discipline in the post-WWII years -- IR scholars are determined to ―get it right‖ next time. 69 Second, systemic theory has always placed a great emphasis on balance-of-power mechanisms, creating an expectation that unipolarity (a systemic imbalance of power) would last only briefly until other great powers (re)emerged. Accordingly, a durable unipolar system poses a serious theoretical challenge, emphasizing the importance of the durability question. 70 In response to this challenge, two views have emerged. Declinists predict the inevitable, nay, impending end of our unipolar world. Primacists argue that, on the contrary, US-led unipolarity is here to stay. In this paper, I make three central claims. First, I argue that neither declinists nor primacists -- both of which focus on latent, economic power -- are looking at the right variable to predict the durability of a unipolar world. Unipolarity is a description of the balance of military, not economic power. For as long as the US military remains unchallenged, the world will remain unipolar regardless of the relative

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 198 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz size of the US economy. Second, I argue that the distribution of military power is independent from the distribution of economic power . In other words, balancing will only result in a change in the systemic balance of power when the latter is required to guarantee state survival. That is the case in a conventional world. But in a nuclear world, possession of a small but robust nuclear arsenal virtually guarantees survival. Therefore, rising economic powers may, in a nuclear world, achieve the primary goal of balancing short of effecting a systemic balance of power. This means that , in a nuclear world, unipolarity is in principle durable . Third, I argue that whether rising economic powers in a nuclear world will continue to balance past the point at which their survival is ensured by a robust nuclear deterrent depends on the strategy of the unipole towards their economic growth. If the unipole accommodates their economic growth, rising powers have no incentive to continue balancing past that point, making unipolarity durable. If, however, the unipole takes actions that contain their economic growth, then rising powers have an incentive to continue balancing, ultimately leading to the end of a unipolar world. My theory thus draws attention to the logical separation between theories of balancing and balance-of-power theories. The goals of balancing may successfully be achieved without any transformations in the systemic balance of power. Such is the case in a nuclear unipolar world. While states will balance against a unipolar power regardless of its strategy by acquiring survivable nuclear arsenals, the fact that they can guarantee their survival by doing so frees them from the need to pursue a shift in the systemic balance of power in order to guarantee this aim. This argument has important policy implications. First of all, it gives the unipole significant agency in determining the durability of a unipolar world. Rather than being at the mercy of differential rates of economic growth, a unipole in a nuclear world is fully in control of whether its military power preponderance lasts. Its policies vis-à-vis major powers‘ economic growth thus acquire a central place in the toolkit with which it manages the systemic balance of military power. Second, my argument suggests that unipolarity presents particular incentives for nuclear proliferation. But, as Robert Jervis has noted, the spread of nuclear weapons -- the nuclear revolution -- brings with it a decreased salience for the systemic balance of power. For a nuclear power, the systemic balance of power no longer necessarily determines its chances of survival. On the transformational character of proliferation in a unipolar world, Jervis writes: This raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. How they would use this increased security is far from clear, however. They might intensify conflict with neighbors because they no longer fear all-out war, or, on the contrary, they might be willing to engage in greater co-operation because the risks of becoming dependent on others would be reduced. In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important. Unipolarity -- at least under current circumstances -- may then have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification, and the resulting world would pose interesting challenges to both scholars and national leaders. 71 More broadly, my theory highlights what is perhaps the key dilemma faced by a unipolar power. It may attempt to contain the economic growth of other states, thus remaining the most powerful state in terms of latent power, but triggering a balancing effort that may ultimately undermine its preeminence in military power. Or it may accommodate other states‘ economic growth, thus avoiding a military challenge and maintaining its preeminence in military power, but eventually losing its place as the most powerful economy in the system. In other words, military unipolarity is durable only at the expense of economic hegemony.

Nuclear deterrence ensures that unipolarity is durable Monteiro, Yale Political Science Professor, 11

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 199 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz [Nuno P., April 25, 2011, ―Balancing Act: Why Unipolarity May Be Durable,‖ http://irworkshop.sites.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Monteiro_IRW.pdf, p. 8-10, accessed 7/6/13, WD] To begin with proposition (2): an unmatched concentration of power in one state only threatens the survival of other states under certain conditions, which are underspecified in balance-of-power theory. Unmatched power threatens the survival of less powerful states only if survival depends on a balance of power. This is the case in a conventional world. 21 In order to deter an attack launched by a competitor, a state needs to possess matching conventional power. Conventional inferiority vis-à-vis another state leads to military vulnerability and the inability to deter the adversary, ultimately undermining the goal of state survival. But this is not the case in a nuclear world. Deterrence between nuclear powers -- those with survivable nuclear arsenals -- is based on each state being unable to avoid suffering horrendous cost at the hands of the other in the case of an all-out conflict. Since this ability does not depend on a balance of conventional power, a nuclear power may deter any state -- even states significantly more powerful in conventional terms -- from threatening its survival. This conditioning of proposition (2) does not impact (3), the claim that states will balance against concentrated power in order to improve their odds of survival. At least some states will balance against more powerful states even in a nuclear world. Minor powers, particularly those not aligned with the unipole, will try to develop a nuclear capability and ascend to the ranks of major powers, those states that possess the capability to deter any state, including one possessing unmatched conventional power. But the caveat to proposition (2) I introduced above does condition whether proposition (3) will indeed lead to (4). In other words, the caveat that a nuclear power is able to deter any state despite being conventionally inferior requires us to revise the view that states are able to guarantee their survival, and therefore stop their balancing efforts, only once they have amassed as much power as any other state. In a conventional world, that is in fact true. In the absence of nuclear weapons, states, in order to guarantee their survival, will have to balance against more powerful states until they have matched or even surpassed the latter‘s military capabilities. Only at this point would threats to their survival be minimized, as postulated by (4). In a nuclear world, however, the foremost goal of balancing (to guarantee survival) can be achieved short of amassing as much power as any potential competitor, thus violating proposition (4). States that acquire a nuclear arsenal have virtually guaranteed their survival even though they may possess negligible relative conventional capability. Therefore, in a nuclear world, proposition (4) must acquire a conditional character, becoming ―threats to survival may be minimized short of amassing as much or more power than any other state.‖ The reason for this is welldeveloped in the literature. Basically, there is no defense against nuclear weapons . Their offensive advantage, being insurmountable, places an emphasis on deterrence -- the avoidance of conflict because victory is impossible, or meaningless. They therefore end up, in a counterintuitive way, providing an overwhelming advantage to the defense. As Campbell Craig writes, ―[n]uclear weapons create stability primarily because they give a decisive advantage to a nation defending itself over a nation wanting to attack.‖ 22 John Mearsheimer puts it with characteristic succinctness: ―no state is likely to attack the homeland or vital interests of a nuclear-armed state for fear that such a move might trigger a horrific nuclear response.‖ 23 This realization that, in a nuclear world, threats to a state‘s survival can be minimized short of amassing as much power as any other state in the system in turn requires us to revise proposition (5), decoupling balancing efforts from any necessary shift in the systemic balance-of-power. As a result, proposition (6) must now accommodate the possibility that unmatched concentrations of power in one state may last for long. In other words, unipolarity may be durable.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 200 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony is sustainable- its collapse would lead to transition wars and it solves for relations with other countries Thayer, Missouri State University Department of Defense and Strategic Studies professor, 6
[Bradley A., December 2006, The National Interest, ―In Defense of Primacy,‖ lexis, accessed 7-9-13, MSG] A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 201 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.2 This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 202 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 203 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

Hegemony is sustainable – the US still remains the top world hegemon Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 6

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 204 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

(Robert, January 15, The Washington Post, ―Still the Colossus‖, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/13/AR2006011301696.html, accessed 7/6/13, CBC)
The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- has simply not occurred. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? In East Asia, meanwhile, U.S. relations with Japan grow ever closer as the Japanese become increasingly concerned about China and a nuclear-armed North Korea. China's (and Malaysia's) attempt to exclude Australia from a prominent regional role at the recent East Asian summit has reinforced Sydney's desire for closer ties. Only in South Korea does hostility to the United States remain high. This is mostly the product of the new democracy's understandable historical resentments and desire for greater independence. But even so, when I attended a conference in Seoul recently, the question posed to my panel by the South Korean organizers was: "How will the United States solve the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons?" The truth is, America retains enormous advantages in the international arena. Its liberal, democratic ideology remains appealing in a world that is more democratic than ever. Its potent economy remains the driving wheel of the international economy. Compared with these powerful forces, the unpopularity of recent actions will prove ephemeral, just as it did after the nadir of American Cold War popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are also structural reasons why American indispensability can survive even the unpopularity of recent years. The political scientist William Wohlforth argued a decade ago that the American unipolar era is durable not because of any love for the United States but because of the basic structure of the international system. The problem for any nation attempting to balance American power, even in that power's own region, is that long before it becomes strong enough to balance the United States, it may frighten its neighbors into balancing against it. Europe would be the exception to this rule were it increasing its power, but it is not. Both Russia and China face this problem as they attempt to exert greater influence even in their traditional spheres of influence. It remains the case, too, that in many crises and potential crises around the world, local actors and traditional allies still look primarily to Washington for solutions, not to Beijing, Moscow or even Brussels. The United States is the key player in the Taiwan Strait. It would be the chief intermediary between India and Pakistan in any crisis. As for Iran, everyone on both sides of the Atlantic knows that, for all the efforts of British, French and German negotiators, any diplomatic or military resolution will ultimately depend on Washington. Even in the Middle East, where hostility to the United States is highest, American influence remains remarkably high. Most still regard the United States as the indispensable player in the Israeli-Palestinian

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 205 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz conflict. The Bush administration's push for democracy, though erratic and inconsistent, has unmistakably affected the course of events in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon -- never mind Iraq. Contrary to predictions at the time of the Iraq war, Arab hostility has not made it impossible for both leaders and their political opponents to cooperate with the United States. This does not mean the United States has not suffered a relative decline in that intangible but important commodity: legitimacy. A combination of shifting geopolitical realities, difficult circumstances and some inept policy has certainly damaged America's standing in the world. Yet, despite everything, the American position in the world has not deteriorated as much as people think. America still "stands alone as the world's indispensable nation," as Clinton so humbly put it in 1997. It can resume an effective leadership role in the world in fairly short order, even during the present administration and certainly after the 2008 election, regardless of which party wins. That is a good thing, because given the growing dangers in the world, the intelligent and effective exercise of America's benevolent global hegemony is as important as ever.

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AT – Empire Decline
Heg does not cause US decline – empirics and actual military cost low Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes-infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on--that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would. The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them--a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline. To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around A quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense--a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels--just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance.

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AT – Multipolar Transition
There is no risk of a transition to a multipolar world – countries are not capable nor willing to balance against the US Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7
(Robert, July 17, Stanford University Hoover Foundation, ―End of Dreams, Return of History,‖ http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136, Policy Review, Volume: 144, accessed 7/6/13, CBC)
These American traditions, together with historical events beyond Americans‘ control, have catapulted the United States to a position of pre-eminence in the world. Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of this ―unipolar‖ world, there has been much anticipation of the end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar world in which the United States is no longer the predominant power. Not only realist theorists but others both inside and outside the United States have long argued the theoretical and practical unsustainability, not to mention undesirability, of a world with only one superpower. Mainstream realist theory has assumed that other powers must inevitably band together to balance against the superpower. Others expected the post-Cold War era to be characterized by the primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics and foresaw a multipolar world with the economic giants of Europe, India, Japan, and China rivaling the United States. Finally, in the wake of the Iraq War and with hostility to the United States, as measured in public opinion polls, apparently at an all-time high, there has been a widespread assumption that the American position in the world must finally be eroding. Yet American predominance in the main categories of power persists as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters. Chinese strategists, who spend a great deal of time thinking about these things, see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by ―one superpower, many great powers,‖ and this configuration seems likely to persist into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily. 11 Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted effort at balancing. The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a long-term military buildup. But Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China ‘s buildup is driven at least as much by its own long-term ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 208 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz In any case, China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort. Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States.

Unipolarity is durable and promotes peace Wohlforth, Georgetown University Professor of International Relations, 92
(William, 3-10-92, The MIT Press Journals, ―The Stability of a Unipolar World,‖ http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf, pages 7-9, accessed 7/6/13, CBC)
In this article, I advance three propositions that undermine the emerging conventional wisdom that the distribution of power is unstable and conºict prone. First, the system is unambiguously unipolar. The United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading state in the last two centuries. Moreover, the United States is the ªrst leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical.10 To describe this unprecedented quantitative and qualitative concentration of power as an evanescent ―moment‖ is profoundly mistaken. Second, the current unipolarity is prone to peace.The raw power advantage of the United States means that an important source of conºict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system. No other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry. None is likely to take any step that might invite the focused enmity of the United States. At the same time, unipolarity minimizes security competition among the other great powers. As the system leader, the United States has The Stability of a Unipolar World 7the means and motive to maintain key security institutions in order to ease local security conºicts and limit expensive competition among the other major powers. For their part, the second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive. Third, the current unipolarity is not only peaceful but durable.11 It is already a decade old, and if Washington plays its cards right, it may last as long as bipolarity. For many decades, no state is likely to be in a position to take on the United States in any of the underlying elements of power. And, as an offshore power separated by two oceans from all other major states, the United States can retain its advantages without risking a counterbalance. The current candidates for polar status (Japan, China, Germany, and Russia) are not so lucky. Efforts on their part to increase their power or ally with other dissatisªed states are likely to spark local counterbalances well before they can create a global equipoise to U.S. power. The scholarly conventional wisdom holds that unipolarity is dynamically unstable and that any slight overstep by Washington will spark a dangerous backlash.12 I ªnd the opposite to be true: unipolarity is durable and peaceful, and the chief threat is U.S. failure to do enough.13 Possessing an undisputed preponderance of power, the United States is freer than most states to disregard the international system and its incentives. But because the system is built around U.S. power, it creates demands for American engagement. The more efªciently Washington responds to these incentives and provides order, the more long-lived and peaceful the system. To be sure, policy choices are likely to affect the differential growth

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 209 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz of power only at the margins. But given that International Security 24:1 8unipolarity is safer and cheaper than bipolarity or multipolarity, it pays to invest in its prolongation. In short, the intellectual thrust (if not the details) of the Pentagon‘s 1992 draft defense guidance plan was right.

The unipolar concentration of resources is symmetrical in the US, meaning that the United State‘s heg is sustainable Wohlforth, Georgetown University Professor of International Relations, 92
(William, 3-10-92 , The MIT Press Journals, ―The Stability of a Unipolar World,‖ http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf, accessed 7/6/13, CBC)
Moreover, the power gap in the United States‘ favor is wider than any single measure can capture because the unipolar concentration of resources is symmetrical. Unlike previous system leaders, the United States has commanding leads in all the elements of material power: economic, military, technological, and geographical. All the naval and commercial powers that most scholars identify as the hegemonic leaders of the past lacked military (especially landpower) capabilities commensurate with their global inºuence. Asymmetrical power portfolios generate ambiguity. When the leading state excels in the production of economic and naval capabilities but not conventional land power, it may seem simultaneously powerful and vulnerable. Such asymmetrical power portfolios create resentment among second-tier states that are powerful militarily but lack the great prestige the leading state‘s commercial and naval advantages bring. At the same time, they make the leader seem vulnerable to pressure from the one element of power in which it does not excel: military capabilities. The result is ambiguity about which state is more powerful, which is more secure, which is threatening which, and which might make a bid for hegemony.

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Hegemony Good Impacts

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 211 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Laundry List
On balance, hegemony key to stable global order Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] In Defense of American Engagement Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure , and thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary for a stable and open international order. Now, more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand strategy and pull back from the world. The rise of China is chipping away at the United States' preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense spending on the chopping block, and two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as most politicians continue to assert their commitment to global leadership, a very different view has taken hold among scholars of international relations over the past decade: that the United States should minimize its overseas military presence, shed its security ties, and give up its efforts to lead the liberal international order. Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged grand strategy wastes money by subsidizing the defense of well-off allies and generates resentment among foreign populations and governments. A more modest posture, they contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American sentiment. Even if allies did not take over every mission the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security and only risk entrapping the United States in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and treasure but also make the United States more secure. They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars. The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 212 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential.

US retrenchment risks economic decline, collapse of cooperation and conflicts Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know , and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

Hegemony solves all the impacts – Economy, Free Trade, Great Power, Nuclear, Regional and Smaller Wars. Collapse triggers those impacts Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate, 11
(Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-17-07, ―End of Dreams, Return of History,‖ Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 213 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Others have. For decades ―realist‖ analysts have called for a strategy of ―offshore balancing.‖ Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed ―passing the mantle of regional stabilizer‖ to a consortium of ―Russia, China, Iran, and India.‖ In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly ―stabilize‖ the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan‘s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build ―situations of strength‖ (Acheson‘s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a ―preponderance of power,‖ and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 214 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman‘s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of ―imperial overstretch,‖ arguing that American decline was inevitable ―if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]‖ were allowed to continue at the same time as ―massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.‖ Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the greatpower struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don‘t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the ―end of history.‖ It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

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Deters Nuclear Crises
Hegemony deters conflict and nuclear crises Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] KEEPING THE PEACE Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 216 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.

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Deters Regional Crises
Hegemony dampens competition, preventing regional crises Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world‘s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony-China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.

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Deters Conflict
Hegemony is key to prevent great power wars Zhang, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Researcher, et al. 11
[Yuhan, and Lin Shi, Columbia University, January 22, 2011, East Asia Forum, ―America‘s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,‖ http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-aharbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/, accessed 7/7/13, WD] Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America‘s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‗rules the waves.‘ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere‘s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared . And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America‘s influence declines? Given that America‘s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry . Furthermore , multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations . For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington‘s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 219 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

U.S. primacy solves war – empirical and statistical data McLean, Center for Security Policy research associate, 7
[Robert, 5-10-13, American Thinker, ―The Case for Hegemony,‖ http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/05/the_case_for_hegemony.html, accessed 7-5-13, MSG] With the growing level of agreement that the United States should abandon its role as world's lone superpower, some questions must be asked. May Mearsheimer and his radical leftist counterparts have been right? Is the Kremlin accurate in its assessment they we have indeed reached a time of unprecedented conflict and global disorder? A rather simple exploration of history illustrates that, on the contrary to those who disparage the preservation of American hegemony, the world has indeed become significantly more peaceful since the end of the Cold War. According to data compiled by the University of Maryland, an average of 52.5 wars occurred per decade of the Cold War through 1984. As a result of those conflicts, an average of nearly 4.6 million people died per decade. This is hardly peaceful. By contrast, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in Sweden found that state-based conflicts decreased by approximately 40% from 1992 to 2005. Battle deaths since 1990 make up only a small fraction of those incurred through any decade during the Cold War, and the frequency of attempted military coups has dropped significantly; an average of 12.8 occurred per year between 1962 and 1991, while just 5.9 were attempted per year from 1992 through 2006. From 1989 to 2005 the number of genocides decreased by 90%. A common misperception of the post-Cold War era maintains that while conventional battles between states have decreased, globalization and the deterioration of stability have put civilian lives at risk as the barriers between combatant and civilian have broken down from the growing number terror attacks and civil conflicts. However, as the authors of the University of British Columbia's Human Security Brief 2006 noted in their latest annual report: "notwithstanding the increase in terrorist attacks, the number of civilian victims of intentional organized violence remains appreciably lower today than it was during the Cold War years." Thus, all of the leading indicators - number of wars, battle deaths, civilian lives lost - point to a more peaceful and stable world under American primacy. If the confrontation of the Cold War is not a correct paradigm for a peaceful future, perhaps one resembling that of the Concert of Powers and the long held mutual goal of a balance of power that prevailed in Europe between 1815 and 1914 would provide a greater blueprint for the 21st century. Such a restructuring of the world order has been called for from analysts and commentators as diverse as Henry Kissinger and Noam Chomsky. But was the world after the fall of Napoleon until the outbreak of World War I really as peaceful as some of the advocates of balance of power would lead you to believe? While a continent-spanning great power conflict was avoided until the outbreak of the First World War, the peace established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 did not last long. By 1829, the RussoTurkish War had concluded leaving more than 130,000 dead. This was not the last time these two powers would go to war as an approximate 200,000 died in further hostilities in 1877 and 1878. In the meantime, the Russians faced the Polish Insurrection between 1830 and 1831 - they had been granted control of much of Poland at the Congress of Vienna - leaving at least 20,000 dead, while the First Carlist War in Spain ended only after more than 30,000 lost their lives. The Crimean War of 1854 to1856 resulted in approximately 300,000 deaths; the Seven Weeks War in 1866 killed 35,000; and by the time the FrancoPrussian War concluded in 1871 more than 200,000 had lost their lives. Additional competition

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 220 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz between the European powers for empire and the influence and resources that go along with it was also not without incident. In fact, it was largely the example of the tumultuous environment of 19th century Europe that molded America's earliest perceptions of a proper security environment. What was essentially conceived by George Washington and was later refined by John Quincy Adams, American leaders have long sought to avoid entangling the nation in any sort of foreign policy based on balance of power. Expressing his deep seated reluctance for any type of balance of power in the Western Hemisphere, Adams noted in 1811 that were the United States not to emerge as the hegemon of the Americas, "we shall have an endless multitude of little insignificant clans and tribe at eternal war with one another for a rock or a fish pond, the sport and fable of European masters and oppressors." Multipolarity, in the absence of a global congruence of interests and widespread cooperation, will inevitably lead to such a situation the world over. Critics of American efforts to maintain its primacy often point to the economic, political, and military costs associated with such ambition. These concerns are not without merit, but they also overlook the costs incurred when a peer competitor arises as was the case throughout much of the Cold War. The average annual percentage of GDP spent on defense during the Cold War was roughly 7% compared to less than 4% since 1991. Thus, the so-called "peace dividend" would be more appropriately labeled the "primacy dividend" as the United States was not at war at until the collapse of the Soviet Union, but rather was in a costly struggle to outlast a peer competitor. Additional criticisms about the costs in American lives are also unfounded. During the Cold War an average of about 18,000 American military personnel died as a result of hostile action per decade. Even if we count the civilian lives lost on 9/11, that number has decreased a staggering 83% since 1990. Finally, the questions of the political consequences incurred as a result of hegemony are, at the minimum, significantly exaggerated. It was the not so not-aligned Non-Aligned Movement that emerged out of the Cold War, and even "Old Europe" is returning to the acknowledgement that there is a pervasive parallel in values and interests with the United States. Indeed, any future deterioration of American hegemony would be accompanied by catastrophic consequences. History reveals that tragic violence inevitably follows newly created power vacuums. The decline of the Ottoman Empire brought on a massacre of the Armenians, and the end of British rule in India resulted in massive devastation in South Asia. As was persuasively illustrated in Niall Ferguson's War of the World, the weakening and contraction of Western empires were indispensable contributors to the unprecedented bloodshed of the 20th century. Make no mistake, history will repeat itself - beginning in Iraq - should the United States loose its nerve and retract from its responsibilities as the world's lone superpower. While it has become fashionable to proclaim that the 21st Century will emerge as the "Asian Century," the United States - and its many allies - should do everything in their powers to insure that we are indeed at the dawn of a new American century.

Unipolarity prevents great power wars and economic collapse – smaller conflicts may be inevitable but hegemony keeps them from escalating Tammen, Portland State University International Relations professor, and Kugler, Elisabeth Helm Rosecrans World Politics professor, 6
[Ronald and Jacek, 2006, Chinese Journal of International Politics, ―Power Transition and China–US Conflicts,‖ http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/35.full.pdf, p. 37-44, accessed 7-5-13, MSG] The sine qua non of the pre-eminent global power‘s foreign policy is global¶ stability. Determined US stewardship over the last half century has forged a¶ stable international political and economic system and a global regime that¶ promotes, but does not absolutely insist upon, democracy, human rights,¶ free press and open economic practices. These fundamental institutional¶ structures tend to quell radical elements and help prevent tyranny by a¶ minority or majority, regardless of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 221 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz ideological or religious preferences. The¶ US liberal economic and political leadership is designed to utilize incentives¶ (economic, financial and political) or, less often and less successfully,¶ sanctions to align other nations‘ interests to those of our own. Where those¶ interests cannot be aligned and a threat to global stability is evident, the¶ United States exercises the use of force. Force tends to be the last resort as it¶ is expensive. When force is used effectively, it has fundamental consequences for the¶ global system. For example, following World War II, the United States¶ recast the international system in a much more successful manner than the¶ British did following the previous great war, solidifying the role of the¶ United States in the world during the 20th century. Military occupation and¶ the resulting change in political and economic systems, aided in the¶ transitions of Germany, Italy and Japan into stable democratic members of¶ the international community. Today, Germany is one of the leading nations¶ of the European Union (EU), and Japan is a major economic player in Asia¶ and beyond. The United States altered the political preferences and goals of¶ populations in these countries to one more consistent with the international¶ norms instituted for the global hierarchy led by the United States. The Cold¶ War evidenced a similar end: the Soviet challenge was halted not because of¶ ideological or military confrontation, but because the Soviet Union¶ dissolved due to its internal bankruptcy and adopted an open market¶ economy and an elementary democratic system. Experience demonstrates¶ that changing preferences is the path to stability and prosperity. A unified strategic framework would provide a guide to the future¶ of a complex evolutionary process. Such a framework could lead to¶ understanding world structures, because it allows decision makers to¶ anticipate periods of confrontation and cooperation. Knowing the¶ likely threats permits policy prioritization and timing. This kind of¶ framework has been absent from US foreign policy since the end of¶ the Cold War. This article represents a first step towards using¶ empirically tested propositions to frame future world politics within a¶ strategic perspective. Dynamics of the Theoretical Framework Figure 1 integrates and relates in a dynamic fashion the central variables of¶ our strategic argument: power, hierarchy, satisfaction and the probability of¶ war or peace. It illustrates interactions among the three key variables under¶ the condition that the international hierarchy is dominated by one¶ recognized preponderant power.5 This theoretical framework, described in policy terms in the earlier¶ paragraphs, draws many conclusions, but one in particular stands out in its¶ strategic importance: wars (in dark grey) occur at the global level when a¶ dissatisfied challenger sees an opportunity to take on the pre-eminent¶ international leader. Under an equal distribution of power, peace and¶ integration (in light grey) may take place, but only when major global¶ participants all agree on the set of norms and rules that govern world¶ politics. From this perspective, the democratic peace—among Germany,¶ Britain and France after the World War II and the subsequent evolution of¶ the EU—emerged precisely because the United States imposed a common¶ set of democratic institutions on Europe and forced the emergence of¶ ‗liberal‘ democracies. Thus, even though the power distribution in Europe¶ was similar to that preceding World Wars I and II, peace broke out and¶ integration followed because nations shared common institutions and norms¶ as established by the United States. Following the collapse of the Soviet¶ Union it became clear, albeit slowly, that the theoretical proposition that a¶ balance of power guaranteed peace was inconsistent with the structural¶ reality of the international system. Global peace is maintained when there is¶ one overwhelmingly powerful dominant country. Figure 1 intellectually turns the balance of power concept on its head.6 In Figure 2, by comparison,¶ the region of cooperation and integration is vastly expanded. This¶ ‗preponderant‘ view of the world is now accepted explicitly by those who¶ measure the probability of wars, and implicitly by many in the policy¶ community.7 The basic argument of power parity is that key contenders in the¶ international system challenge one another for dominance when they¶ anticipate that the prospects of overtaking the regime leader are credible.¶ An important new insight emerges from Figure 1. Conflict can still take¶ place despite strong power asymmetry, but its severity will be much reduced.¶ This deduction is

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 222 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz supported by empirical evidence.¶ When the global hierarchy was uniform, the United States and its¶ allies were engaged in World War II. After 1945, the United States emerged¶ as the preponderant power. It continued to wage wars in Korea, Vietnam,¶ Kuwait and Iraq, but these wars produced limited casualties (compared¶ to World Wars), as did the attack on the US by Al Qaeda. Despite US¶ preponderance, these wars were not deterred but losses were reduced. This¶ formally derived figure also accounts for what Bueno de Mesquita and¶ Lalman identify as a seeming contradiction; the Seven Weeks‘ War between¶ Austria and Prussia occurred at parity, but both nations were jointly¶ satisfied producing a conflict of low intensity among contenders.¶ The probability of conflict under parity is high, thus the conflict, but¶ the structural constraints imposed by satisfaction kept the severity of that¶ war limited.8 This new representation of the parity model also offers a formal answer to¶ the argument of Choucri and North that the theory is inconsistent in failing¶ to account for the peaceful transfer of control over the world hierarchy from¶ England to the United States.9 As Figure 1 indicates, the condition required¶ for peaceful overtaking between two major powers includes agreement on¶ the rules that guide the hierarchy. It is not just power relations—as realists¶ would argue—that lead nations to wage conflict. Agreement or disagreement with preferences, in coordination with parity, leads to war and¶ peace.10 This leads us to the final unexpected implication of the graphic that¶ informs our political strategy. At the bottom left corner, Figure 1 accounts¶ for the process of integration. Integration is the most important new¶ phenomenon emerging since World War II. A comparison of Figures 1¶ and 2 shows that this process is most likely in a post-overtaking asymmetric¶ period. Deutsch et al. independently observed such a pattern in 1957. They¶ indicated that integration did not take place when nations were at parity.¶ Rather, integration occurred around ‗cores of strength‘ where a dominant¶ nation provided the ‗nucleus‘ for integration.11 A hierarchy dominated by a preponderant nation imposes high costs¶ for conflict on smaller challengers and reduces costs for integration.¶ This produces a bias towards stability. The dominant power desires to¶ maintain the status quo. As Keohane correctly infers, preponderant powers¶ have the ability to absorb the costs of integration and allow smaller nations¶ to ‗free ride‘ because their actions are consistent with stable economic¶ growth.12 In a uniform hierarchy (Figure 2), the probability of conflict and¶ escalation to severe war increases, while prospects for integrations are¶ reduced. No single party is willing to carry the burden of integration, and¶ concurrently each member of the hierarchy is able to enhance individual¶ growth by avoiding the costs of the collective good. Thus, rather than¶ supporting trade opportunities that lead to expansion among all, large¶ nations that can affect the market price of goods impose tariffs in a selfish¶ attempt to advance their own growth.13 Policy Implications The internal mobilization of resources, and effective alliance formation or¶ neutralization, can be manipulated in response to policy changes. A reliable¶ strategic perspective is needed to make choices in world politics, particularly¶ for the United States, as key decisions can sway the balance in favour of¶ either global stability or instability. There is substantial empirical support for the power parity proposition¶ throughout the conflict literature.14 In other research environments, such¶ formal and empirical evidence would have been sufficient to challenge the¶ fundamental assertion that a parity or ‗balance of power‘ preserves peace.¶ However, given the widely held belief among practitioners and academics¶ that the underlying logic of balance of power is correct, these two research¶ directions continue to develop side by side. The collapse of the Soviet Union¶ is one such critical test that has awakened the need to reformulate long-held¶ beliefs. No one can argue today that Russia presents a direct threat to the Western¶ world or that another challenger of a similar magnitude is already in place;¶ yet stability increased after the decline of the Soviet Union. Further, the¶ emergence of asymmetry in nuclear weapons combined with the retargeting¶ of such weapons by both the United States and Russia make it difficult to¶ argue that

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 223 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Mutual Assured Destruction continues to preserve the existing¶ stability in the international system.¶ Probability of Conflict at the Global Level¶ Power parity provides the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation.¶ While power is central to the deductions of balance of power and power parity, the conditions that lead to war and peace are very distinct.¶ Moreover, each perspective provides different substantive policy advice. The¶ parity approach allows contenders to anticipate the choice of peace or war.¶ When there is an extended dispute—in particular, a lasting territorial¶ dispute—that creates the underlying condition required for a serious¶ confrontation. Military buildups and arms races are predictors of the¶ willingness of contenders to choose war over peace when both parity and an¶ extended dispute are present. Werner and Kugler show that these conditions¶ are associated historically with the overwhelming number of choices to wage¶ major war.15 Empirical Implications: The Asian Challenge Applying the power parity logic to the Asian region permits us to determine¶ which interactions have the potential to escalate to a serious confrontation and possibly a major war. These interactions, while being potentially¶ dangerous, are not deterministically conflictual and can be resolved¶ peacefully even though they appear threatening at this time. Figure 3 presents the relative power and income of the main international¶ competitors compared with that of the United States from 1950 extrapolated¶ to 2070. The conditions for parity are met when a challenger has over 80%¶ of the capabilities of the dominant nation and cease when the challenger has¶ exceeded the dominant nation‘s capability by 20%—when it becomes the¶ dominant nation. Previous research strongly suggests that the period of¶ greatest danger is when the challenger manages to overtake the dominant¶ nation and traverses the region between 100 and 120%.16 In order to address¶ the Asian region, first we will detail the global context in terms of structural¶ power relations.17 At the global level, the lack of an open confrontation between the United¶ States and Russia, so feared by most analysts during the Cold War, is¶ completely consistent with the power parity perspective. The Cold War¶ did not become ‗hot‘ because the USSR never approached parity with¶ the United States. Between 1945 and 1989, despite arms buildups¶ and ideological confrontations, the USSR did not approach or overcome¶ US preponderance. Furthermore, following the breakup of the Soviet Union¶ the prospects for such an overtaking are remote. This means the probability of war between the US and Russia well into the future is quite remote even¶ if they have significant policy disputes. Next consider the US–European relationship. No challenger to the US is¶ expected to arise here. No single nation in Europe—Germany, UK, Italy or¶ France—has sufficient resources to become a contender. The largest, Germany,¶ even after re-unification only approaches the size of Japan. Again, given the¶ population base of major European nations, none can overcome the United¶ States in the foreseeable future, or challenge China or India. Thus, the¶ probability of a confrontation between any European country and the¶ United States is very small and such a conflict would not be severe.

US hegemony and alliances deter arms races, security competition, and wars Thayer, Missouri State University Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Associate Professor, 6
[Bradley, American Empire: A Debate, p. 108-109, http://books.google.com/books?id=YgE1HjR70sC&pg=PT120&lpg=PT120&dq=%22The+fourth+critical+fact+to+consider+is+that+the+securit y+provided+by+the+power+of+the+United+States+creates+stability+in+international+politics%22+%22 Thayer%22&source=bl&ots=Iis_jTPT73&sig=LXJVWPrRNhtXHZm-tgCsMKzLMo&hl=en&sa=X&ei=R9rYUb_UGOG8jAKQ5IGABA&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage &q&f=false, accessed 7-6-13, MSG]

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 224 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the¶ power of the United States creates stability in international politics. That is¶ vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph¶ Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it¶ were taken away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were taken away, most countries would be¶ much worse off, and arms races, vicious security competition, and wars would¶ result. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We¶ can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey,¶ Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia,¶ Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race¶ between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would¶ have been a far bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another¶ European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that¶ the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace¶ and stability. The United States does not provide security to other countries because it¶ is altruistic. Security for other states is a positive result (what economists call¶ a positive externality) of the United States pursuing its interests. Therefore, it¶ would be a mistake to seek "benevolence" in great power politics. In international politics, states advance their self-interest and, most often, what might¶ appear to be "benevolent" actions are undertaken for other reasons. To assist¶ Pakistani earthquake refugees, for example, is benevolent but also greatly aids¶ the image of the United States in the Muslim world—so self-interest is usually¶ intertwined with a humanitarian impulse.¶ The lesson here is straightforward: Countries align themselves with the¶ United States because to do so coincides with their interests, and they will continue to do so only as long as their interests are advanced by working with Uncle Sam. In 1848, the great British statesman Lord Palmerston captured this point best when he said: "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."2

The present world is structured around American interests and in a post-American world, the current world order would be destructured. The lack of structure without heg would lead to potential conflicts. Kagan, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution 2012 (Robert W., February 11, ―Why the World Needs America,‖ Wall Street Journal,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html, Accessed online 7/6/13, AX) If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great-power autocracies. Both Beijing and Moscow already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. The balance in a new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democracies—Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa—picked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to do it. What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People assume that China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Unfortunately, they might not be able to help

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 225 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz themselves. The creation and survival of a liberal economic order has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is unable to maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas, would other nations take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would this produce an open global commons—or rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic order.

Hegemony key to check conflicts – prevents the rise of hostile rivals Khalilizad, Former US Ambassador to the UN, 95
[Zalmay, 3-22-95, Washington Quarterly, ―Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the Cold War.,‖ http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-16781957/losing-moment-united-states.html, accessed 7-9-13, MSG] Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 226 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Collapse Causes War
No alternative to American hegemony – collapse causes transition wars, economic collapse, global instability and destroys all international cooperation – no other global power can fill the void Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor, 12
[Zbigniew, January/February 2012, Foreign Policy, ―After America: How does the world look in an age of U.S. decline? Dangerously unstable.‖ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america, accessed 7/5/13, WD] Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -not even China . International uncertainty , increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder , a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 227 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability . In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict. None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 228 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

Hegemonic decline causes global war – unstable multipolarity, Chinese aggression, and conflict escalation – empirical evidence Khalilzad, Former UN Ambassador, 11
[Zalmay, February 8, 2011, National Review, ―The Economy and National Security,‖ http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad, accessed 7/6/13, WD] If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation . The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership . By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars . American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing‘s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China‘s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China‘s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

Collapse of hegemony guarantees multiple scenarios for nuclear war and extinction within one year Drezner, University of Chicago political science professor, 3
[Daniel W., 1-6-03, Foreign Policy, ―The perils of hegemonic power,‖ http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2003/01/06/the_perils_of_hegemonic_power, accessed 7-9-13, MSG] Michael Ignatieff's cover story on empirein yesterday's New York Times Magazine will be discussed in the next few days, but I actually think James Dao's Week in Review piece on U.S. troops in Korea makes many of the same points more concisely. The problem facing the U.S. is that even though critics on all

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 229 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz sides are currently attacking the U.S. right now for trying to dictate affairs across the globe, these same critics are also likely to assail the U.S. for any retreat from its current positions. Imagine for a second that the U.S. announced that it had decided to heed the calls to reign in its power. Say U.S. troops were pulled out of Europe, Korea, and the Middle East. No change in our economic or cultural policies, just a withdrawal of troops from the globe. What would happen? Undoubtedly, some of the animus towards the U.S. would dissipate in the short run. However, within the next year: 1) Japan would go nuclear. 2) The Balkans would be likely to erupt again, with Macedonia being the trigger this time. 3) Afghanistan would implode. 4) India and Pakistan would likely escalate their border skirmishes. 5) Israel would escalate its quasi-military actions in the occupied territories. 6) Arab fury at the U.S. inaction in the Middle East would rise even further. 7) Anti-American activists would criticize the U.S. for isolationism and inaction in the face of global instability. I don't deny that the looming specter of U.S. hard power in Iraq and elsewhere is eroding our capital of soft power. However, to paraphrase Churchill, the current policy is without question an awful one, until you consider the alternatives. On the margins, I believe that more accommodating U.S. policies on trade and the environment might buy an additional amount of good will from the developing and developed world, respectively. But those changes will not conceal the overwhelming U.S. advantage in military might, nor will it erase the natural emnity that comes with it.

Collapse of US hegemony causes apolar vacuum risking leads to terrorism, economic collapse, disease, and nuclear wars Ferguson, Stanford University‘s Hoover Foundation Senior Fellow, 4
[Niall, July 2004, Foreign Policy, ―A World Without Power,‖ https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/vac.htm, accessed 7-7-13, MSG] Yet universal claims were also an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. With the end of states' monopoly on the means of violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication, humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors who truly wield global power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction between the world's disparate ―tribes‖ is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 230 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony— its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

The perception of American hegemony collapse causes transition wars Friedberg, Princeton Professor of International Affairs, 11
[Aaron L., June 21, 2011, The National Interest, ―Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,‖ http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439, accessed 7/6/13, WD] THE UNITED States and the People‘s Republic of China are locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world. And in spite of what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent Sino-American rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it is driven instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the international system and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers. Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line, with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war‘s deepest, truest cause was ―the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.‖ The fact that the U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 231 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz the richest and most powerful nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been growing most rapidly. America is still ―number one,‖ but China is fast gaining ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict particularly fraught . At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a nation‘s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. As they begin to assert themselves, ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutions and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were still relatively weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Germany at the turn of the twentieth, rising powers want their place in the sun. This, of course, is what brings them into conflict with the established great powers—the so-called status quo states—who are the architects, principal beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system. The resulting clash of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo states) have occasionally tried to attack and destroy a competitor before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. Others—hoping to avoid war—have taken the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers, they look for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing international order. But however sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in failure . Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler‘s Germany, an aggressor may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning themselves to servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are conceivable in theory but in practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition, when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state, have so often been marked by war.

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Decline Hurts Russia-US Relations
Transitions away from hegemony lead the US to seek confrontation with Russia in the Middle East Friedman, Stratfor president, 8
[George. 4-1. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/rotating_focus ―Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus.‖] The global system is making a major shift now, as we have been discussing. Having gotten off balance and bogged down in the Islamic world, the only global power is trying to extricate itself while rebalancing its foreign policy and confronting a longer-term Russian threat to its interests. That is a delicate maneuver, and one that requires deftness and luck. As mentioned, it is also a long shot. The Russians have a lot of cards to play, but perhaps they are not yet ready to play them. Bush is risking Russia disrupting the Middle East as well as increasing pressure in its own region. He either thinks it is worth the risk or he thinks the risk is smaller than it appears. Either way, this is an important moment.

US-Russia relations on the Middle East are key to preventing Russia collapse and nuclear war Suslov, Deputy Director on Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Moscow, Russia, ‗5
[Dmitry V., 2-28-5, ―US-Russia Relations Saved for Now‖, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5348] Putin's appreciation of power - and his readiness to use it - could allow him to realize the objective necessity to become a good US partner, but only if Russia's almost desperate domestic situation is changed, or at least better managed. "Containing Putin's authoritarianism" is already off the Bush agenda. Russia's domestic situation is so unstable and explosive, its state apparatus so ineffective, and the majority of bureaucrats so frightened (and deaf at the same time), that an overt attempt to stop Putin would produce an opposite result: a severe blowback on the part of the regime, which would finally destabilize the situation altogether. However, a disaster might come even sooner should the US consider a "regime change" in Russia itself. Most likely, the result would be either total chaos - with an uncontrollable nuclear arsenal - or an authoritarian nationalist regime. The outlet for the United States to strengthen Russian democracy is through continuing dialogue with Putin, and cautious actions that disprove his advisors' arguments. Possibilities include real support to stabilize the CIS, avoiding indirect help to Chechen separatists, easing access of Russian non-fuel goods to the Western markets, and strengthening Russian civil society by intensified US-Russian civil society dialogue. The Bush administration must convince Putin that it is truly interested in a stable, strong, and integral Russia. As for the foreign policy agenda, its basis should be stabilization and governance promotion in the broader Middle East.

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Decline Causes China War
Hegemonic decline causes war with China over Taiwan Kagan, Brookings Institute senior fellow, 2-14-12
(Robert, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Gideon Rachman is chief foreign-affairs commentator for the Financial Times, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM) The Chinese, as good historians, are acutely aware of the fate that befell these others and have worked hard to avoid a similar fate, following as best they can Deng Xiaoping's advice to "keep a low profile and never take the lead." As relative power shifts, however, that advice becomes harder and harder to follow. We saw some early signs of what the future might hold in China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The response of the United States, which swung in behind the nervous powers in the region, has possibly convinced the Chinese that their moves were premature. They may have themselves bought in too much to the widespread talk of America in decline. Were that decline to become real in the coming years, however, it is a certainty that Chinese pressures and probes will return. Greater relative power on China's part might also lead Beijing to become less patient with Taiwan's lack of movement toward acquiescing to the mainland's sovereignty. A situation in which U.S. power were declining, China's power were rising, and the Taiwan issue became fractious is practically a textbook instance of how wars start -- even if neither side wants war. That is why some have referred to Taiwan as East Asia's Sarajevo.

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Solves Stability
US hegemony is key to a stable international system and solving future challenges Clark, ESRC Professorial Fellow and E H Carr Professor in Department of International Affairs, 9
[Ian, 2009, International Affairs, ―Bringing hegemony back in: the United States and International Order,‖ http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-03250.pdf, accessed 7-6-13, MSG] It has become fashionable enough across the past decade to refer to US hegemony ¶ as the defining feature of the post-Cold War international order. Such claims ¶ seldom rest on anything more than a view of US primacy, namely that the system ¶ is now unipolar, and the US enjoys an unprecedented preponderance of material ¶ resources within it. There have more recently been premonitions of the possible ¶ end of this hegemony, as the US is predicted to lose either its will or its nerve to ¶ sustain that role, or even more importantly because of US ‗decline‘ in the face ¶ of the ‗rise of the rest‘.1¶ This article stands that conventional analysis on its head. ¶ It starts from a wholly different understanding of hegemony, as rooted in social ¶ legitimacy.2¶ Accordingly, it rejects the contention that we are now experiencing, ¶ or have recently experienced, any American hegemony at all. Appealing to the ¶ same logic, it argues that evidence for the rise of others does not, by itself, amount ¶ to any decisive objection to the development of hegemony in the near future. ¶ The key question, as Barry Buzan reminds us, is whether the United States will prove capable of recruiting ‗followers‘.3¶ Hegemony, as advanced here, describes an ¶ international order project that confers on the United States a leading, but circumscribed, role. Moreover, the possible textures of that role can better be grasped ¶ after closer reflection on the relevant historical precedents. What is meant by this hegemony? It does not refer simply to a set of material ¶ conditions in which one state is predominant: it is not, in other words, primacy ¶ alone.4¶ Neither is it something that is unilaterally possessed by the hegemon, nor ¶ something that the dominant state has in its pocket, to save or squander at will. ¶ Rather, it is a status bestowed by others, and rests on recognition by them. This ¶ recognition is given in return for the bearing of special responsibilities. In short, ¶ by hegemony is meant an institutionalized practice of special rights and responsibilities ¶ conferred on a state with the resources to lead. This draws explicitly on the international society approach to international ¶ relations.5¶ International society interpretations generally seek to negotiate an ¶ accommodation between systems of power relations and shared normative frameworks. They take both equally seriously. This enables such recurrent practices ¶ to be regarded as institutions. Classically, these theorists have specified a number ¶ of such institutions of international society: international law, diplomacy, war, ¶ the balance of power and—most directly relevant for this argument—the role of ¶ the Great Powers.6¶ Historically, international society has recognized the collective ¶ special role and status of the Great Powers—the permanent five members of the ¶ United Nations Security Council provide one clear example. This has been done, ¶ it is claimed, because it simplifies international life, and helps instil a degree of ¶ central direction to it. So, in the past, international society has been able to institutionalize disparities of power and hierarchical degrees. Can it now do so in the ¶ case of hegemony? Once a hegemon? A hegemon still? The present state of the ‗hegemony debate‘ is, to say the least, confusing. There ¶ are broadly three types of story commonly told about US hegemony since 1945: ¶ the tale from continuity; the tale from structural discontinuity in 1990; and the ¶ tale from agential discontinuity at the beginning of the 2000s. For some analysts, ¶ American hegemony stretches back unbroken to 1945. Having emerged as a ¶ hegemon-inwaiting in the early decades of the twentieth century, the United ¶ States fully embraced this role after 1945, and has played it ever since. ‗For the US ¶ power elite, being on top of the world has been a habit

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 235 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz for 60 years. Hegemony has been a way of life.‘7¶ From this perspective, it is unquestionable that the United ¶ States remains a hegemon still, whatever the future may hold. Bruce Cumings, among many, shares this note of continuity. Describing the ¶ postwar order, he insists that it has been ‗a hegemonic one, and it has had—and ¶ must have—a hegemonic leader‘.8¶ Others concur: ‗If ever the term ―hegemony‖ ¶ were appropriately applied, it is to what the United States became in the latter half ¶ of the twentieth century and now remains.‘9¶ A surprisingly wide constituency of ¶ analysts shares this perspective, even when having little else in common. Historian ¶ Eric Hobsbawm, for example, speaks confidently of the ‗US hegemony of the ¶ second half of the last century‘, resting upon its enormous wealth.10 Chomsky ¶ meanwhile insists that there has been continuity in the ‗basic missions of global ¶ management‘ since the end of the war, even if there has now emerged a new ¶ declaratory strategy ‗aimed at permanent global hegemony‘.11 The second perspective contrasts sharply, in some fundamental respects, with the ¶ above. It attests not to continuity but to discontinuity. At some finite point around ¶ the early 1970s, the United States ceased to be the hegemon. ‗U.S. hegemony began ¶ during the Second World War‘, we are told, ‗and peaked some thirty years later.‘12¶ Elsewhere, Wallerstein agrees that we ‗have to start in 1945 when the United States ¶ became hegemonic, really hegemonic‘, but is of the view that this ‗lasted only about ¶ twenty-five years‘.13 It was only the new constellation of power consequent upon ¶ the end of the Cold War that subsequently allowed it to resume its former, or new, ¶ hegemonic role. This is important because it emphasizes a radical break between the ¶ 1970s and 1980s, taken together, and the following period from the 1990s onwards. ¶ In short, there are two major ingredients in this perspective. One is that the United ¶ States initially experienced a period of decline, such that its hegemonic position ¶ was eroded; the second is that, under the new conditions of unipolarity after 1990, ¶ it became possible for that role to be resumed, or reinvented. This perspective then focuses upon the restoration of US hegemony after 1990. ¶ Whatever became of that earlier hegemony during the 1970s and 1980s, it was ¶ the end of the Cold War that created the opportunity for its renewal.14 The only ¶ interesting questions about this new hegemony, we were told, concerned how ¶ stable and durable it might prove; whether it was so unnatural a condition that it ¶ would evoke new forms of balancing behaviour to displace it. Finally, those accounts that trace the origins of a new American hegemony ¶ after 2001 simply extend the logic of the same arguments: the incoming Bush ¶ administration exploited the potential of the system to a greater degree than had ¶ been attempted during the 1990s.15 However, the emphasis now shifts away from ¶ hegemony as a structural product, and towards hegemony as an agential design. ¶ Hegemony, in this latter understanding, needs to be approached as a policy ¶ choice, and the emphasis shifts to the volition of the new Bush administration, ¶ especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Hegemony is the new agency, not the new ¶ structure. Those who espouse this view locate it in a ‗grand strategy aimed at preventing the ¶ emergence of new great powers that could challenge US hegemony‘.16 Although ¶ already clearly articulated by previous administrations, this policy became much ¶ more pronounced after 9/11, and for this reason it is common enough to date ¶ a ‗new‘ phase of US hegemony from this period. Its centrepiece was the Bush ¶ Doctrine in its various manifestations, which encapsulated a ‗largely unilateral ¶ project of hegemonic renewal and global transformation‘.17 At the very least, if ¶ not ushering in an entirely new hegemony, ‗the terms of that hegemony have been ¶ changed‘ by the doctrine.18 Collectively, the administration‘s doctrinal statements were taken to represent ¶ a formal promulgation of hegemony on the part of the United States.19 Above all, ¶ the National Security Strategy in 2002 was understood as ‗the declared intent of ¶ the most powerful state in history to maintain its hegemony through the threat ¶ or use of military force‘.20 This was implicit also in the Nuclear Posture Review, ¶ and its expressed intent to dissuade future competitors.21 Running through the ¶ Bush Doctrine as a whole is a commitment to ‗the establishment of American ¶ hegemony‘, within which ‗the dominant power behaves quite differently from the ¶ others‘.22 Others see the Bush Doctrine as giving expression to a more deep-seated ¶ reorientation in US strategy whereby ‗America‘s temporary Cold War hegemony ¶ in Western Europe and East Asia should be converted into permanent U.S.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 236 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz global ¶ hegemony‘.23 Such an American hegemony, especially in its military sense, has ¶ been considered ‗unassailable for at least a decade‘.24 This all amounts to a terribly confusing history, and we might be well advised ¶ to abandon the term ‗hegemony‘ at this point. However, in the specific terms ¶ advanced here, little of this history refers to any kind of hegemony; it simply ¶ refers to stages in primacy—its quest, realization, and possible loss. Accordingly, ¶ we need a stricter concept. If we define hegemony such that a consensual legitimacy is a necessary part of it rather than an optional extra, then the recent phase of ¶ US strategy represents no kind of hegemony at all. At best, it is a tale of hegemony ¶ lost. In terms of a social theory of hegemony— whereby hegemony becomes ¶ an accepted institution of international society—there has then been no recent ¶ American hegemony, its primacy in material power notwithstanding. The focus ¶ must then shift away from the attributes of the putative hegemon, and the resources ¶ at its command, towards the perceptions and responses of the ‗followers‘. The great paradox is that a US hegemony conceived of in these terms is now ¶ arguably ever more necessary at a time when its primary conditions may be ever ¶ less attainable. The necessity arises in the context of the challenges currently facing ¶ the international order—climate change above all—and the need for consensual ¶ leadership to respond with a sense of urgency.25 Drawing his own distinction ¶ between hegemony and empire, Schroeder concurs. He insists that, historically, ¶ ‗real advances in international order … have been connected with choices leading ¶ powers have made for durable, tolerable hegemony‘. Moreover, he thinks, recent ¶ trends in the contemporary system have made hegemony ‗more needed, and more ¶ potentially stable and beneficial‘.26 What light, if any, can the history of past ¶ hegemonies shed on this?

Unipolarity good – stratified hierarchy promotes stability Wohlforth Dartmouth College Government Professor 9 [William C., January 2009, ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, And Great Power War‖,http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Wohlforth%20(2009).pdf, World Politics 61, no. 1, p. 40-41, accessed 7/3/13, ALT]
Unipolarity implies the most stratified hierarchy, presenting the ¶ starkest contrast to the other two polar types. The intensity of the competition over status in either a bipolar or a multipolar system might vary depending on how evenly the key dimensions of state capability ¶ are distributed—a multipolar system populated by states with very even ¶ capabilities portfolios might be less prone to status competition than a ¶ bipolar system in which the two poles possess very dissimilar portfolios. ¶ But unipolarity, by definition, is characterized by one state possessing ¶ unambiguous preponderance in all relevant dimensions. The unipole ¶ provides the relevant out-group comparison for all other great powers, ¶ yet its material preponderance renders improbable identity-maintenance strategies of social competition. While second-tier states would ¶ be expected to seek favorable comparisons with the unipole, they would ¶ also be expected to reconcile themselves to a relatively clear status ordering or to engage in strategies of social creativity.

Unipolarity encourages stability – psychological and sociological research proves Wohlforth Dartmouth College Government Professor 9
[William C., January 2009, ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, And Great Power War‖,http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Wohlforth%20(2009).pdf, World Politics 61, no. 1, p. 30, accessed 7/3/13, ALT] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations ¶ are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 237 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz capabilities, ¶ and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of ¶ capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income ¶ distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings.6¶ Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that ¶ even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous ¶ status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over ¶ the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, ¶ the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over ¶ status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives ¶ to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such ¶ incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7¶ ―If everyone has high status,‖ Randall Schweller notes, ―no one does.‖8¶ While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do ¶ so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status ¶ tend to be zero sum.

US hegemony key to global stability, empirical evidence prove Kagan, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, 12
[Robert, Wall Street Journal, ―Why the world needs America‖ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html] accessed 7-713, WZ History shows that world orders, including our own, are transient. They rise and fall, and the institutions they erect, the beliefs and "norms" that guide them, the economic systems they support—they rise and fall, too. The downfall of the Roman Empire brought an end not just to Roman rule but to Roman government and law and to an entire economic system stretching from Northern Europe to North Africa. Culture, the arts, even progress in science and technology, were set back for centuries. Modern history has followed a similar pattern. After the Napoleonic Wars of the early 19th century, British control of the seas and the balance of great powers on the European continent provided relative security and stability. Prosperity grew, personal freedoms expanded, and the world was knit more closely together by revolutions in commerce and communication. With the outbreak of World War I, the age of settled peace and advancing liberalism—of European civilization approaching its pinnacle—collapsed into an age of hyper-nationalism, despotism and economic calamity. The oncepromising spread of democracy and liberalism halted and then reversed course, leaving a handful of outnumbered and besieged democracies living nervously in the shadow of fascist and totalitarian neighbors. The collapse of the British and European orders in the 20th century did not produce a new dark age—though if Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had prevailed, it might have—but the horrific conflict that it produced was, in its own way, just as devastating. If the U.S. is unable to maintain its hegemony on the high seas, would other nations fill in the gaps? On board the USS Germantown in the South China Sea, Tuesday. Would the end of the present American-dominated order have less dire consequences? A surprising number of American intellectuals, politicians and policy makers greet the prospect with equanimity. There is a general sense that the end of the era of American pre-eminence, if and when it comes, need not mean the end of the present international order, with its widespread freedom, unprecedented global prosperity (even amid the current economic crisis) and absence of war among the great powers. American power may diminish, the political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive." The commentator Fareed Zakaria believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers like China "will continue to live

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 238 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz within the framework of the current international system." And there are elements across the political spectrum—Republicans who call for retrenchment, Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutions—who don't imagine that a "post-American world" would look very different from the American world. If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the greatpower autocracies. Both Beijing and Moscow already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. The balance in a new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democracies—Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa—picked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to do it. What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People assume that China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Unfortunately, they might not be able to help themselves. The creation and survival of a liberal economic order has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open trade and free markets, often with naval power.

A collapse of US hegemony would devolve world relations and bring chaos Kagan, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, 12
[Robert, Wall Street Journal, ―Why the world needs America‖ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html accessed 7-7-13, WZ] If a declining America is unable to maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas, would other nations take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would this produce an open global commons—or rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic order. And do the Chinese really value an open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the largest in the world, but it will be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the country's enormous population, but in per capita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S., Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over $40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and Belize. Even if optimistic forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly where Slovenia and Greece are today. As Arvind Subramanian and other economists have pointed out, this will make for a historically unique situation. In the past, the largest and most dominant economies in the world have also been the richest. Nations whose peoples are such obvious winners in a relatively unfettered economic system have less temptation to pursue protectionist measures and have more of an incentive to keep the system open. China's leaders, presiding over a poorer and still developing country, may prove less willing to open their economy. They have already begun closing some sectors to foreign competition and are likely to close

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 239 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz others in the future. Even optimists like Mr. Subramanian believe that the liberal economic order will require "some insurance" against a scenario in which "China exercises its dominance by either reversing its previous policies or failing to open areas of the economy that are now highly protected." American economic dominance has been welcomed by much of the world because, like the mobster Hyman Roth in "The Godfather," the U.S. has always made money for its partners. Chinese economic dominance may get a different reception. Another problem is that China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal of preserving the rule of the Communist Party. Unlike the eras of British and American pre-eminence, when the leading economic powers were dominated largely by private individuals or companies, China's system is more like the mercantilist arrangements of previous centuries. The government amasses wealth in order to secure its continued rule and to pay for armies and navies to compete with other great powers. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays the golden eggs because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Would it survive in a post-American world? Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American predominance would be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful. Rough parity among powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to miscalculation. Conflicts erupt as a result of fluctuations in the delicate power equation. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity from the 16th to the 18th centuries, culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europe-wide wars that followed the French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were killed or wounded. The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition, numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W. Tucker has observed, "Such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the essential means for maintaining the balance of power." There is little reason to believe that a return to multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in the past. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. President Bill Clinton left office believing that the key task for America was to "create the world we would like to live in when we are no longer the world's only superpower," to prepare for "a time when we would have to share the stage." It is an eminently sensible-sounding proposal. But can it be done? For particularly in matters of security, the rules and institutions of international order rarely survive the decline of the nations that erected them. They are like scaffolding around a building: They don't hold the building up; the building holds them up. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It will last only as long as those who favor it retain the will and capacity to defend it. Many foreign-policy experts see the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government—forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. Americans certainly like to

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 240 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz believe that our preferred order survives because it is right and just—not only for us but for everyone. We assume that the triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better system, and that both are irreversible. That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen. But international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others—in America's case, the domination of freemarket and democratic principles, together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II . No divine providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to champion it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe—which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

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Solves Terrorism
Hegemony is crucial to preventing WMD terrorism that guarantees immediate extinction Korb, Council on Foreign Relations Council Policy Initiative Project Director, 3
[Lawrence, ―A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction‖, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/National_Security_CPI.pdf, p. 5-6, accessed 7-11-13, AFB] U.S. Dominance and Preventive Action. The most serious threats to American security come from the combination of terrorism, rogue states, and WMD. The temptation to try using these weapons against Americans is high for several reasons, including the fact that clearly identifying and punishing an attacker is inherently difficult. We are not going to be able to talk others out of developing these weapons, nor are we likely to be able to build an international coalition to help us get rid of these weapons. Therefore we must have both the capability and the will to use force against those states and the groups within them that represent the most serious threats to our security and way of life. And we should be prepared to do this essentially with U.S. military power alone, unbound by the need for allies or UN approval. In the longer term, we must undercut our potential adversaries by ensuring the spread of free market democracy throughout the world. Larger trends have conspired to make the threat posed by radicalism much greater in recent times. Given the rapid dissemination of destructive technologies, sensitive information, and capital flows in today‘s globalized world, threats from terrorist networks and rogue states can and will materialize more rapidly than in the past. Moreover, any attacks promise to be much more devastating if and when these actors get their hands on WMD. As the world‘s leading military and economic power, the United States is the most likely target of these terrorists and tyrants. In the face of, and in response to, these imminent dangers, it has not only the duty but also the legal and moral right to launch preemptive attacks, unilaterally if necessary. Common sense dictates that the government not stand idly by and wait to act until catastrophic attacks are visited upon the American people. The United States has the unrivaled military and economic capability to repel these challenges to our security, but it must display the will to do so. To be able to carry out a strategy of preventive action, taking preemptive military action when necessary, this country must be a hegemonic power. The United States can protect its security and that of the world in the long run only by maintaining military dominance. Only America can effectively respond to the perils posed by terrorists, regional thugs, weapons proliferators, and drug traffickers. It can do the most to resolve problems created by ―failed‖ states before they fester into major crises. And it alone can ensure that the world‘s sea lanes and skies are kept safe and open for free trade. But the array of challenges in its path requires military dominance and cannot be met on the cheap. The ultimate goal of American foreign policy will be to use this power, alone if necessary, to extend freemarket democracy around the globe. This is the only way in which the United States can deal with the long-term causes of terrorism. These terrorists come from countries that suffer from political repression, economic incompetence, and a broad lack of respect for the rule of law. And, contrary to what some believe, democracy and capitalism do not spread inexorably on their own. The United States therefore needs to assume a leadership role in spreading and accelerating the growth of free-market democracies that have been taking hold in the aftermath of the Cold War.

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Hegemony solves nuclear terrorism, which would lead to US retaliation and extinction Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace senior associate, 7
(Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-17-7, ―End of Dreams, Return of History,‖ Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136, Accessed 711-13, AFB) Throughout all these efforts, whose success is by no means guaranteed and certainly not any time soon, the United States and others will have to persist in fighting what is, in fact, quite accurately called ―the war on terrorism.‖ Now and probably for the coming decades, organized terrorist groups will seek to strike at the United States, and at modernity itself, when and where they can. This war will not and cannot be the totality of America ‘s worldwide strategy. It can be only a piece of it. But given the high stakes, it must be prosecuted ruthlessly, effectively, and for as long as the threat persists. This will sometimes require military interventions when, as in Afghanistan, states either cannot or will not deny the terrorists a base. That aspect of the ―war on terror‖ is certainly not going away. One need only contemplate the American popular response should a terrorist group explode a nuclear weapon on American soil. No president of any party or ideological coloration will be able to resist the demands of the American people for retaliation and revenge, and not only against the terrorists but against any nation that aided or harbored them. Nor, one suspects, will the American people disapprove when a president takes preemptive action to forestall such a possibility — assuming the action is not bungled.

Hegemony is crucial to preventing WMD terrorism Schmitt, American Enterprise Institute Program on Advanced Strategic Studies director and resident scholar, 6
[Gary, ―Is there any alternative to U.S. primacy?‖ The Weekly Standard, Books & Arts, Vol. 11 No. 22, February, Lexis] The core argument itself is not new: The United States and the West face a new threat--weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists--and, whether we like it or not, no power other than the United States has the capacity, or can provide the decisive leadership, required to handle this and other critical global security issues. Certainly not the United Nations or, anytime soon, the European Union. In the absence of American primacy, the international order would quickly return to disorder. Indeed, whatever legitimate concerns people may have about the fact of America's primacy, the downsides of not asserting that primacy are, according to The American Era, potentially far more serious. The critics "tend to dwell disproportionately on problems in the exercise of [American] power rather than on the dire consequences of retreat from an activist foreign policy," Lieber writes. They forget "what can happen in the absence of such power.

Hegemony solves terrorism via deterrence Thayer, Missouri State University Department of Defense and Strategic Studies professor, 7
(Bradley A., Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, American Empire, Routledge, page 16, http://www.ewidgetsonline.com/dxreader/Reader.aspx?token=ngtpyRGJisBAPGQYv2lU8Q%3d%3d&ra nd=1449293188&buyNowLink=&page=&chapter=, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 243 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Another critical question is not simply how much the United States spends on defense but what benefits it receives from its spending: ―Is the money spent worth it?‖ The benefits of American military power are considerable, and I will elaborate on five of them. First, and most importantly, the American people are protected from invasion and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are—mercifully—an aberration. The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence community do an outstanding job deterring aggression against the United States. Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America‘s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America‘s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it possessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, ―I think the reason Mu‘ammar Qadhai agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.‖21

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Solves Proliferation
Hegemony solves proliferation – nuclear guarantees reduce demand Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins American Foreign Policy Program Professor and Director, 5
[Michael, The Case For Goliath: How America Acts As The World's Government in the Twenty-first Century, pg. 46, http://books.google.com/books?id=PXR5VZCFXqMC&dq=The+Case+for+Goliath:+How+America+Act s+As+the+World%E2%80%--99s+Government+in+the+TwentyFirst+Century&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s, accessed 7-7-13, MSG] By contributing in this way to the global public good of nuclear nonproliferation, the United States functions as governments do within sovereign states. American nuclear guarantees help to secure something that all countries want but would probably not get without the United States. The military deployments and political commitments of the United States have reduced the demand for nuclear weapons, and the number of nuclear-armed countries, to levels considerably below what they would otherwise have reached. But American policies have not entirely eliminated the demand for these armaments, and so the ongoing effort to restrict their spread must address the supply of them as well.

Hegemony deters proliferation – security commitments create a nuclear umbrella Jo, University of Seoul Department of International Relations, & Gartzke, Colombia University Department of Political Science, 7
[Dong-Joon and Erik, February 2007, ―Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume: 51, p. 170, JSTOR, accessed 7-7-13, MSG] Conversely, states with security commitments from patrons with nuclear weapons may be less likely to proliferate. The presence of a "nuclear umbrella" may be sufficient for many proteges to dampen concerns about security risks, allowing nuclear ambitions to remain dormant. To make nuclear deterrence more credible and in spite of pressure to accept a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons, the four declared nuclear states besides China have consistently refused to rule out the possibility of relying on nuclear weapons to protect their allies (see United Nations Security Council Resolution 984, April 11, 1995). South Korea, for example, abandoned its nuclear weapons program after receiving assurances of nuclear protection from the United States, even though its own manufacture of nuclear weapons would have been relatively easy (Mazarr 1995, 27).

United States leadership key to reverse reliance on nuclear weapons – solves proliferation and terrorism Shultz, former Secretary of State, et. al. 7
[George, 1-4-7, The Wall Street Journal, ―A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,‖ http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/A_WORLD_FREE.pdf, accessed 7-7-13, MSG] Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. ¶ U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a solid consensus ¶ for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing ¶ their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a ¶ threat to the world.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 245 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold ¶ War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the ¶ doctrine of mutual SovietAmerican deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a ¶ relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But ¶ reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and ¶ decreasingly effective. North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium -¶ - potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice ¶ of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state ¶ terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on ¶ world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. ¶ And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds ¶ of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges. Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be ¶ compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically ¶ disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far ¶ from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually ¶ assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide ¶ without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear ¶ states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the ¶ Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The ¶ United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both ¶ countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War ¶ by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the ¶ next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

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Cooperation
US leadership key to defusing global threats – terrorism, pandemics, climate Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability . U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."

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Solves Democracy
US hegemony is key to spread global democracy Thayer, Baylor Political Science Professor, 7
[Bradley A., ―American Empire: A Debate,‖ p. 42-43, http://libgen.info/view.php?id=515441, accessed 7/7/13, WD] The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government, democracy, and other elements of its ideology of liberalism . Using American power to spread democracy can be a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as for the United States. This is because democracies are more likely to align themselves with the United States and be sympathetic to its worldview. In addition, there is a chance—small as it may be—that once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict will be reduced further. Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict against Israel.58 This idea has had a big effect on President George W. Bush. He has said that Sharansky‘s worldview ―is part of my presidential DNA.‖59 Whether democracy in the Middle East would have this impact is debatable. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in October 2004, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. Elections were held in Iraq in January 2005, the first free elections in that country‘s history. The military power of the United States put Iraq on the path to democracy. Democracy has spread to Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Caucasus, and now even the Middle East is becoming increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western‑ style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt. The march of democracy has been impressive. Although democracies have their flaws, simply put, democracy is the best form of government . Winston Churchill recognized this over half a century ago: ―Democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.‖ The U nited S tates should do what it can to foster the spread of democracy throughout the world .

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Human Rights
US hegemony key to solving global human rights issues Kiracofe, Former Senior Professional Staff Member of US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12
(Clifford, June 13, Global Times, ―Syria targeted by US advocates of unipolar global order,‖ http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/714749.shtml, accessed 7/9/13, CBC)
During the Kosovo crisis in 1999, however, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair launched a significant attack on international law and state sovereignty in a speech to the Economic Club of Chicago. Blair said that military intervention should be used to solve human rights issues. Blair's doctrine of military interventionism with state sovereignty as an anachronism was well received by human rights and democracy activists in the US. Indeed, the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations have all been in step with the Blair doctrine. In recent years, this policy concept has emerged as the "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)" doctrine. In support of the R2P doctrine, the Obama administration recently made a significant bureaucratic change to promote interventionism as a tool of US foreign policy. The White House established an Atrocities Prevention Board which reports to the president. Irish-born Samantha Power, a close Obama confidante and human rights activist, is director of the new board which will advise on when, where, and how to intervene in support of human rights. Predictably, killings in Syria, including the Houla massacre, are being cited as the atrocity which should trigger military intervention. Some US officials, such as Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN and an ally of Power on human rights issues, call for countries to go outside the UN process and independently intervene with military force in Syria. Such an extremist position reflects the increasing influence of US policy circles who wish to undermine international law and launch military interventions in support of their unipolar world project. Human rights and democracy promotion provide convenient cover for the main strategic objective of hegemony.

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Solves Climate
The leadership of the US as the world hegemon is key to solving warming Kim, president of the World Bank Group, 2013
(Jim, June 27, The Washington Post, ―U.S. takes key climate change steps, but the world must do more,‖ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-27/opinions/40233089_1_climate-changegreenhouse-gas-emissions-jim-yong-kim, accessed 7/9/13, CBC)
The world is starting to get serious about climate change. This is happening for one major reason: leadership. President Obama‘s announcement this week of a broad set of actions to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that are changing our climate was very welcome. His plan, largely based on executive orders, will cut carbon pollution in the United States, prepare the country for the rising number of extreme weather events such as hurricanes and droughts, invest more in clean-energy sources and help lead international efforts to combat climate change and manage its effects. These steps must be seen in the context of growing mobilization on climate change worldwide because the United States is one part of a larger puzzle. Obama is joining the leaders of some of the largest carbon emitters — China, India and the European Union — in committing to reduce harmful emissions. The world can now see the potential for a global alignment of political leaders with substantial power to stop the dangerous warming of our planet.

There must be a world hegemon that encourages efforts to combat climate change – it‘s the only way to solve warming Gupta, University of Amsterdam environment and development professor, 2012
(Joyeeta, Science Policy, ―Negotiating challenges and climate change,‖ http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/about_us/meet_us/max_boykoff/readings/gupta_2012.pdf, accessed 7/7/13, CBC) As argued, if dangerous climate change is to be avoided, the countries involved in climate change negotiations need a leader to encourage them to move away from the use of defensive, hard bargaining strategies and instead towards constructive, soft (integrative) bargaining strategies. Such a change in strategy is depicted by a move from the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 2 to the top right-hand corner. At least three objections might be raised against the preceding analysis. First, it might be claimed that the issue of which norms should be adopted is a distributive issue which may lead to a situation in which one involved party wins while another loses. Thus the adoption of the precautionary principle may require countries that are emitting large quantities of GHGs to reduce their emissions while benefitting others who emit low quantities of GHGs but are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. This, arguably, disqualifies the issue from being addressed in the negotiations through the use of soft bargaining strategies. However, as argued above, one need not view the climate change negotiations through this frame. In the long term, using soft bargaining strategies can lead to the creation of win – win situations for all those concerned. This is because the system becomes predictable when there is clarity about how responsibilities are to be shared between defined categories of countries based on specific criteria. It also sends a long-term message to all concerned parties about how they should develop in the future and, moreover, that the responsibilities of a country that graduates into a different category of country will change. Such signals change the cost – benefit analyses of governments and other social actors, and help with the process of planning new infrastructure, and

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 250 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz production and consumption patterns. If developed countries adopt targets, then all future developed countries (based on clear criteria) will be on notice that they have to modify their development paths. Thus, the question of the future emissions growth of developing countries becomes irrelevant. Even if developed countries find that such emissions reductions are not cost-effective in the short term, they will become so because developing countries will have to (in a good faith) approachpacta sunt servanda(‗agreements must be kept‘), follow suit, and indeed fairly soon. The second objection is that the application of the precautionary principle when adopting a longterm objective limits the size of the potential pie and as such would be part of a distributive strategy. However, this would only limit the size of the GHG pie and not the development pie, which might be enlarged inter alia through decarbonization, dematerialization, the green economy, sustainable infrastructure, sustainable product chains, multiple land use, and sustainable procurement policies. These options will only have the space to grow and become cost-effective when a long-term legally binding GHG stabilization objective is adopted by all involved parties. Moreover, these may even be promoted in alternative fora with new actors. The third and perhaps most worrying objection is that countries can simply opt out of treaties. Developing countries might follow the precedents of the US, Canada, and Russia, and simply decide not to participate in a post-Kyoto regime. Currently, although there are many rules at the global level, global governance is anarchic and, according to Annan (2000), there is a limited rule of law. The rule of law implies that there is a common, normative framework and that there is a nondiscriminatory application of clear, consistent (and not arbitrary), equitable, and stable principles for all countries, both of which provide for a certain degree of predictability about the evolution of law. Some powerful nations reject the global rule of law because this makes them a mere subject (and not creator) of international rules (cf. Whittell, 2002), presenting a clear risk to the extant distribution of power between countries (Craig, 1997; Hager, 2000). However, promoting the global rule of law is becoming increasingly important for at least five reasons: (i) humanity is crossing global planetary boundaries (Rockstro¨m et al., 2009); (ii) long-term problems need to be addressed in a consistent and predictable manner as societies need to re-order their long-term production patterns and infrastructure; (iii) powerful countries that currently see the rule of law and good governance as essential within countries and as an ‗objective of and condition for development assistance‘ (Santiso, 2001, p. 1) cannot subsequently and plausibly deny that it is not necessary at the global level (cf. Sandelius, 1993, Fitzpatrick, 2003); (iv) politics needs the law to make it legitimate (Fitzpatrick, 2003), such that ‗those who seek to bestow legitimacy must themselves embody it; and those who invoke international law must themselves submit to it‘ (Annan, 2000); and (v) even if it has been in the past interest of some hegemons (such as the US) not to promote the rule of global law, it may be wiser – as the global centre of power shifts to Russia, China, India, and South Africa – to promote it rather than to wait and see how the new hegemons shape the new global (dis)order (Roberts, 2011). Indeed, further development of the legal concept of obligations erga omnes (‗for all‘) that are owed to the global community may be able to deal with the problem of free-riders (Gupta, 1997).

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Solves Trade
Hegemony is the key internal link to free trade – prevents great power wars Zhang, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Researcher, et al 11
[Yuhan, and Lin Shi, Columbia University, January 22, 2011, East Asia Forum, ―America‘s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,‖ http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-aharbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/, accessed 7/7/13, WD] Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America‘s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‗rules the waves.‘ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere‘s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared . And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America‘s influence declines? Given that America‘s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry . Furthermore , multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations . For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington‘s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 252 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

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Solves Economy
US hegemony is key to global economic order – Chinese alternative fails Kagan, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies senior fellow, 12
(Robert W., 2-11-12, ―Why the World Needs America,‖ Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html, Accessed online 7/6/13, AX) And do the Chinese really value an open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the largest in the world, but it will be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the country's enormous population, but in per capita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S., Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over $40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and Belize. Even if optimistic forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly where Slovenia and Greece are today. As Arvind Subramanian and other economists have pointed out, this will make for a historically unique situation. In the past, the largest and most dominant economies in the world have also been the richest. Nations whose peoples are such obvious winners in a relatively unfettered economic system have less temptation to pursue protectionist measures and have more of an incentive to keep the system open. China's leaders, presiding over a poorer and still developing country, may prove less willing to open their economy. They have already begun closing some sectors to foreign competition and are likely to close others in the future. Even optimists like Mr. Subramanian believe that the liberal economic order will require "some insurance" against a scenario in which "China exercises its dominance by either reversing its previous policies or failing to open areas of the economy that are now highly protected." American economic dominance has been welcomed by much of the world because, like the mobster Hyman Roth in "The Godfather," the U.S. has always made money for its partners. Chinese economic dominance may get a different reception. Another problem is that China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal of preserving the rule of the Communist Party. Unlike the eras of British and American preeminence, when the leading economic powers were dominated largely by private individuals or companies, China's system is more like the mercantilist arrangements of previous centuries. The government amasses wealth in order to secure its continued rule and to pay for armies and navies to compete with other great powers. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays the golden eggs because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive.

American primacy is key to the global economy – jobs, markets Nau, George Washington Political Science Professor, 9
[Henry R., 2009, International Studies Review, ―Is American Hegemony Bad or Just Better than Alternatives?‖ http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.01834.x/pdf, p. 185-186, accessed 7/6/13, WD] If American leadership has been so deficient, how did the Cold war end without a hot war and how has the world enjoyed unprecedented prosperity since the Cold War ended? The volume seems completely oblivious to the fact that this latest ―outburst‖ of capitalism has raised the standard of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 254 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz living of more people living under the poverty line than ever before. China and India, with most of the world‘s poorest population, are growing three or four times faster than Europe, Japan and America, and have been for 20 years or more. Would this have happened under Soviet (if Moscow had won the Cold War), European, Chinese, Indian or Japanese hegemony or consortium? Would these countries have championed freer trade policies for East Asian and now Chinese, Indian and Latin American exporters, or sympathized with the promotion of human rights in places such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, where Russian and Chinese policies currently block international efforts to stop humanitarian atrocities? The criticism of America is not the problem. A dominant power is fair game. But the criticism also ironically takes for granted the benefits of American hegemony-the open markets and global security provided by US foreign policy , the flexibility of America‘s middle classes , which have transitioned to better jobs in America so that more jobs could be created in poorer countries , and the light footprint of American imperialism that since 1945 has nurtured not colonies but democratic selfgovernments in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Admittedly, America‘s soft power is under a cloud, but the relevant question is, compared to what. Some, if not much, of the opposition to America has little to do with America. It has to do with authoritarian ideologies in other countries, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, that prefer elitist over middle-class economies and nationalist over liberal political ideologies.

US withdrawal would collapse the global economy
Ferguson, 4 (Niall. Prof of history @ Harvard. Hoover Digest, ―A World without Power‖ July/August 4. http://www.hooverdigest.org/044/ferguson.html) So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—meaning that friction between the world‘s disparate ―tribes‖ is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on fresh water and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too; it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe‘s Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists‘ infiltration of the E.U. would become irreversible, increasing transatlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home were preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 255 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?

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Economy
US hegemony crucial to economic preeminence and stable global trade Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk.

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Collapse of hegemony leads to massive economic collapse that has a high probability of nuclear escalation Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins American Foreign Policy Program director and professor, 5
[Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World‘s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 224] At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic uncertainty that characterized the years before World War II. At worst, the retreat of American power could lead to a repetition of the great global economic failure and the bloody international conflicts the world experienced in the 1930s and 194os. Indeed, the potential for economic calamity and wartime destruction is greater at the outset of the new century than it was in the first half of the preceding one because of the greater extent of international economic interdependence and the higher levels of prosperity—there is more to lose now than there was then—and because of the presence, in large numbers, of nuclear weapons.

US hegemony is crucial to the global economy Thayer, University of Minnesota political science professor, 7
[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page 43] Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIED)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that "economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability"; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and "we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity...business follows the flag.

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AT – Hegemony Bad Args

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AT – Hegemony Causes Great Power War
No great power struggles – US interests are based on proliferation and terrorism, which Russia, India, China, and the EU also see as a threat – cooperation in the War on Terror proves; states that didn‘t cooperate don‘t have the will to challenge the US Lieber, University of Notre Dame Political Science Assistant Professor and Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Alexander University of Virginia Politics Associate Professor, 5
(Keir A., Gerard, Summer 2005, International Security, ―Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,‖ http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, pages 134-135, accessed 7/5/13, IC) Great powers seek to organize the world according to their own preferences, looking for opportunities to expand and consolidate their economic and mili- tary power positions. Our analysis does not assume that the United States is an exception. It can fairly be seen to be pursuing a hegemonic grand strategy and has repeatedly acted in ways that undermine notions of deeply rooted shared values and interests. U.S. objectives and the current world order, however, are unusual in several respects. First, unlike previous states with preponderant power, the United States has little incentive to seek to physically control for- eign territory. It is secure from foreign invasion and apparently sees little benefit in launching costly wars to obtain additional material resources. More- over, the bulk of the current international order suits the United States well. Democracy is ascendant, foreign markets continue to liberalize, and no major revisionist powers seem poised to challenge U.S. primacy. This does not mean that the United States is a status quo power, as typically defined. The United States seeks to further expand and consolidate its power position even if not through territorial conquest. Rather, U.S. leaders aim to bolster their power by promoting economic growth, spending lavishly on mili- tary forces and research and development, and dissuading the rise of any peer competitor on the international stage. Just as important, the confluence of the proliferation of WMD and the rise of Islamist radicalism poses an acute danger to U.S. interests. This means that U.S. grand strategy targets its assertive en- mity only at circumscribed quarters, ones that do not include other great powers. The great powers, as well as most other states, either share the U.S. interest in eliminating the threats from terrorism and WMD or do not feel that they have a significant direct stake in the matter. Regardless, they understand that the United States does not have offensive designs on them. Consistent with this proposition, the United States has improved its relations with almost all of the major powers in the post–September 11 world. This is in no small part be- cause these governments—not to mention those in key countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, such as Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia— are willing partners in the war on terror because they see Islamist radicalism as a genuine threat to them as well. U.S. relations with China, India, and Russia, in particular, are better than ever in large part because these countries similarly have acute reasons to fear transnational Islamist terrorist groups. The EU‘s official grand strategy echoes that of the United States. The 2003 European se- curity strategy document, which appeared months after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, identifies terrorism by religious extremists and the proliferation of WMD as the two greatest threats to European security. In language familiar to students of the Bush administration, it declares that Europe‘s ―most frighten- ing scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruc- tion.‖60 It is thus not surprising that the major European states, including France and Germany, are partners of the United States in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Certain EU members are not engaged in as wide an array of policies

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 260 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz toward these threats as the United States and other of its allies. European criticism of the Iraq war is the preeminent example. But sharp differences over tactics should not be confused with disagreement over broad goals. After all, compa- rable disagreements, as well as incentives to free ride on U.S. efforts, were common among several West European states during the Cold War when they nonetheless shared with their allies the goal of containing the Soviet Union.61 In neither word nor deed, then, do these states manifest the degree or nature of disagreement contained in the images of strategic rivalry on which balanc- ing claims are based. Some other countries are bystanders. As discussed above, free-riding and differences over tactics form part of the explanation for this behavior. And some of these states simply feel less threatened by terrorist organizations and WMD proliferators than the United States and others do. The decision of these states to remain on the sidelines, however, and not seek opportunities to balance, is crucial. There is no good evidence that these states feel threatened by U.S. grand strategy. In brief, other great powers appear to lack the motivation to compete strate- gically with the United States under current conditions. Other major powers might prefer a more generally constrained America or, to be sure, a world where the United States was not as dominant, but this yearning is a long way from active cooperation to undermine U.S. power or goals.

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AT – Entanglements/Wars
No entanglement – hegemony reduces likelihood of conflict Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts--a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake. History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment. If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.Taiwanese relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence. For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes. Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 262 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations. Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations--what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing.

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AT – Counterbalancing
Balancing arguments false – no meaningful balancing Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13
[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, ―Lean Forward‖, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] UNBALANCED One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own-- or that they will do so in the future. Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point. If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback--especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms.

No counterbalancing – security threshold makes it impossible and causes states to bandwagon Fiammenghi, University of Bologna Department of Politics Fellow, 11
[Davide, Spring 2011, ―The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis,‖ International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 136-137, EBSCOhost, accessed 7/9/13, WD]

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 264 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Balancing makes sense as long as it has a theoretical possibility of success . When an aspiring hegemon‘s concentration of power becomes too great, however, balancing ceases to be possible. If a state were to become so powerful that it no longer feared its rivals, even if they were in a coalition, then opposing it would be useless. This hypothesis appears to drive William Wohlforth‘s analysis of U.S. unipolarity.39 I refer to this concept as the ―absolute security threshold,‖40 that is, the amount of relative power beyond which negative security externalities revert to being positive because balancing becomes impossible (see ªgure 1). One could argue that when rivals pool their efforts to counter a hegemon, the hegemon‘s relative power position should decline. Although this is probably true, it is not always so. Sometimes the hegemon‘s latent power is simply too great , as the Macedonians and Romans demonstrated.41 Aware of their limitations in the face of such preponderant adversaries, weaker states bandwagon with the hegemon , and the hegemon‘s security increases rapidly in step with its power. The security threshold is ―absolute‖ because no state or group of states can impede the hegemon. From a theoretical perspective, the structural incentives are ambiguous, because the function that describes the relationship between power and security is not linear. Up to a certain point, the maximization of power coincides with the maximization of security. But when an aspiring hegemon crosses the security threshold, it must decide whether to aim for the absolute security threshold or maintain a position of preeminence as a great power, though not as the hegemon. In neither case can it be said that the state has disregarded structural constraints or that structural variables are the only determinants of its behavior. In light of the security curve, scholars should reconsider the debate regarding the strategy of maximization.

The US is past the security threshold which means that only a collapse in hegemony risks conflict Fiammenghi, University of Bologna Department of Politics Fellow, 11
[Davide, Spring 2011, ―The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis,‖ International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 143, EBSCOhost, accessed 7/9/13, WD] In principle, the absolute security threshold should not pose the same problem because of the logical limits in determining it. Ideally, the absolute threshold should represent 50 percent of the capabilities in the system, because at this level the sum of all the forces opposing the aspiring hegemon is in - sufficient to successfully balance it. Still, it is useful to consider William Wohlforth‘s admonition: ―If balancing were the frictionless, costless activity assumed in some balance-of-power theories, then the unipolar power would need more than 50 percent of the capabilities in the great power system to stave off a counterpoise. . . . But such expectations miss the fact that alliance politics always impose costs.‖ 59 It is therefore reasonable to assume that the absolute security threshold is around 45 percent of the military capabilities in the system. This is the figure William Thompson suggests in describing a near- unipolar system. 60 In this light, the absence of balancing against the United States today appears less puzzling. The United States has already moved beyond the absolute threshold, making balancing futile . 61 Levy and Thompson raise the important question of why other states failed to balance against the United States when it was a rising power but not yet a hegemon. 62 Part of the answer lies in the United States‘ unusual path to primacy. For decades, the Soviet Union maintained a rough balance with the United States. 63 U.S. primacy resulted from the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. It may be an exaggeration to suggest that the United States became a hegemon by accident, but the outcome was not planned. 64 The extraordinarily wide gap in capabilities created by the fall of the Soviet Union left other states with little choice but to acquiesce. Countries such as China, Iran, Russia, and Syria, or even Brazil and

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 265 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Pakistan, may not like U.S. primacy, but they lack the capabilities to challenge it . 65 Meanwhile, other countries benefiting from U.S. primacy appear not to be worried about it. The next section considers hegemonic strategies that can soften opposition.

Even if others want to counterbalance, the US is way too far ahead Thayer, Baylor Political Science Professor, 6
[Bradley A., November 1, 2006, National Interest, ―In Defense of Primacy,‖ p. 37, EBSCOhost, accessed 7/7/13, WD] THERE IS no other state , group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close . The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities . Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

500 years of statistical evidence is on our side – no counterbalancing – and simply maintaining the status quo of US hegemony does not provoke coalitions Levy, Rutgers University Professor, and Thompson, Indiana Political Science Professor, 10
[Jack S., and William R., Summer 2010, ―Balancing on Land and at Sea,‖ International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 41-42, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00001, accessed 7/9/13, WD] Our argument and our empirical findings have important implications for contemporary debates about balancing behavior. The absence of a great power balancing coalition against the United States is not the puzzle that some have claimed it to be, but it is consistent with at least five centuries of behavior in the global system. This is not to say that balancing coalitions never form against leading maritime or global powers, only that the threshold for balancing is both higher and different. We can certainly imagine the United States behaving in such a way as to threaten the interests of other great powers and eventually to provoke a balancing coalition, but the trigger would have to involve specific behavior that threatens other great powers, not the fact of U.S. power . Whereas dominant continental powers are inherently threatening because of their power and system-induced uncertainties regarding their intentions, the threat from predominant global powers to other great powers emerges primarily from their behavior and from what that signals about their intentions.

No counterbalancing – heg is sustainable Monteiro, Yale Political Science Professor, 11
[Nuno P., April 25, 2011, ―Balancing Act: Why Unipolarity May Be Durable,‖ http://irworkshop.sites.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Monteiro_IRW.pdf, p. 19-20, accessed 7/6/13, WD]

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 266 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

The post-Cold War empirical record is insufficient for a definitive test of my theory. Still, the absence of militarization by China provides support for my qualified-durability thesis in contrast with declinist views. Declinists have no good account for why a balancing effort has not taken place thus far but is nevertheless guaranteed to take place in the future. Their argument that US competitors are still too weak to put up a militarized challenge to US hegemony is unpersuasive. Japan challenged US preponderance in the Pacific head-on in 1941 when it had only about 12% of US GDP. China‘s GDP is today over 35% of the US‘s, or three times higher in comparison. 47 And yet, China has not challenged US global preponderance militarily. But, by the same token, the history of the last twenty years does not allow us to adjudicate between my theory and primacists views. After all , primacists can only be refuted once a balancing effort against the United States is under way. Nonetheless, it is possible to compare the two theories‘ accounts of the reasons behind the absence of balancing. According to my view, China has not balanced against the United States because its nuclear arsenal guarantees its survival and its long-term economic prospects are facilitated by a US strategy of accommodation. According to the primacist view, in contrast, the absence of a Chinese balancing effort against the United States results from the insurmountable power gap between the two countries. For primacists, the power gap between the United States and China heightens the difficulty -in terms of inefficiency, cost, and collective-action problems -- of balancing, beyond the point at which it stops making sense. 48 But this cannot be the case. Again, if Japan challenged US preponderance in 1941 with one-third of the relative economic power China possesses today, something other than insufficient economic power must account for the absence of a Chinese military challenge to the United States . In order to show how the contemporary historical record matches the empirical implications of my theory, the remainder of this section will establish four points. First, that Chinese economic power has been increasing steadily and rapidly. Second, that the United States has actively accommodated this rise in Chinese latent power , even at the expense of its own relative power. Third, that China‘s survival is guaranteed by its nuclear arsenal. Fourth, that despite the rapid rise in Chinese economic power, Beijing has thus far eschewed a strategy of militarization and armed competition with the United States.

No threat to preeminence – foreign policy allows for regional leaders without counter-balancing threat Wohlforth Dartmouth College Government Professor 9
[William C., January 2009, ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, And Great Power War‖,http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Wohlforth%20(2009).pdf, World Politics 61, no. 1, p. 53, accessed 7/3/13, ALT] Given its material dominance and activist foreign policy, the United ¶ States is a salient factor in the identity politics of all major powers, and ¶ it plays a role in most regional hierarchies. Yet there is scant evidence in ¶ U.S. foreign policy discourse of concerns analogous to late cold war perceptions of a Soviet ―thrust to global preeminence‖ or mid-nineteenthcentury British apprehensions about Tsar Nicholas‘s ―pretensions to be ¶ the arbiter of Europe.‖ Even when rhetoric emanating from the other ¶ powers suggests dissatisfaction with the U.S. role, diplomatic episodes ¶ rich with potential for such perceptions were resolved by bargaining ¶ relatively free from positional concerns: tension in the Taiwan Strait ¶ and the 2001 spy plane incident with China, for example, or numerous tense incidents with Russia from Bosnia to Kosovo to more recent ¶ regional disputes in post-Soviet Eurasia.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 267 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz On the contrary, under unipolarity U.S. diplomats have frequently ¶ adopted policies to enhance the security of the identities of Russia, ¶ China, Japan, and India as great (though second-tier) powers, with an ¶ emphasis on their regional roles. U.S. officials have urged China to ¶ manage the six-party talks on North Korea while welcoming it as a ¶ ―responsible stakeholder‖ in the system; they have urged a much larger ¶ regional role for Japan; and they have deliberately fostered India‘s status ¶ as a ―responsible‖ nuclear power. Russia, the country whose elite has ¶ arguably confronted the most threats to its identity, has been the object ¶ of what appear to be elaborate U.S. status-management policies that ¶ included invitations to form a partnership with NATO, play a prominent ¶ role in Middle East diplomacy (from which Washington had striven to ¶ exclude Moscow for four decades), and to join the rich countries‘ club, ¶ the G7 (when Russia clearly lacked the economic requisites). Statusmanagement policies on this scale appear to be enabled by a unipolar ¶ structure that fosters confidence in the security of the United States‘ ¶ identity as number one. The United States is free to buttress the status of these states as second-tier great powers and key regional players precisely because it faces no serious competition for overall system ¶ leadership.

No balancing – US rivals haven‘t ramped up defense spending, nor have states changed their policies towards the US – relations with China, Russia, and India have actually improved Lieber, University of Notre Dame Political Science Assistant Professor and Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Alexander University of Virginia Politics Associate Professor, 5
(Keir A., Gerard, Summer 2005, International Security, ―Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,‖ http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, p. 109, accessed 7/5/13, IC) Many scholars and policy analysts predicted the emergence of balancing against the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Since then, however, great power balancing—when states seriously commit them- selves to containing a threatening state—has failed to emerge, despite a huge increase in the preponderant power of the United States. More recently, the prospect and then onset of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 gener- ated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Some observers claim that signs of traditional balancing by states— that is, internal defense buildups or external alliance formation—can already be detected. Others suggest that such ―hard balancing‖ may not be occurring. Instead, they argue that the world is witnessing a new phenomenon of ―soft balancing,‖ in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures. But in both versions, many believe that the wait is over and that the world is beginning to push back. This article argues, in contrast, that both lines of argument are unpersuasive. The past few years have certainly witnessed a surge in resentment and criti- cism of specific U.S. policies. But great power balancing against the United States has yet to occur, a finding that we maintain offers important insights into states‘ perceptions and intentions. The United States‘ nearest rivals are not ramping up defense spending to counter U.S. power, nor have these states sought to pool their efforts or resources for counterbalancing. We argue, fur- ther, that discussion of soft balancing is much ado about nothing. Defining or operationalizing the concept is difficult; the behavior typically identified by it seems identical to normal diplomatic friction; and, regardless, the evidence does not support specific predictions suggested by those advancing the concept. Global interactions during and after the Iraq war have been filled with both a great deal of stasis—as many states leave their policies toward the United States fundamentally unchanged—and ironies, such as repeated requests by the United States for its allies to substantially boost their military spending and capabilities, requests that so far have gone unfilled. Moreover, U.S. rela- tions with regional powers such as China, Russia, India, and other key states (e.g., Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 268 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Saudi Arabia) have improved in recent years. These revealing events and trends are underappreciated by many, perhaps most, analyses in search of balancing

No reason that balancing would occur – shared interests, limitations, and values mean both realists and liberals agree Lieber, University of Notre Dame Political Science Assistant Professor and Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Alexander University of Virginia Politics Associate Professor, 5
(Keir A., Gerard, Summer 2005, International Security, ―Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,‖ http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, p. 133 accessed 7/5/13, IC) Why Countries Are Not Balancing against the United States The major powers are not balancing against the United States because of the nature of U.S. grand strategy in the post–September 11 world. There is no doubt that this strategy is ambitious, assertive, and backed by tremendous of- fensive military capability. But it is also highly selective and not broadly threatening. Specifically, the United States is focusing these means on the greatest threats to its interests—that is, the threats emanating from nuclear proliferator states and global terrorist organizations. Other major powers are not balancing U.S. power because they want the United States to succeed in defeating these shared threats or are ambivalent yet understand they are not in its crosshairs. In many cases, the diplomatic friction identified by proponents of the concept of soft balancing instead reflects disagreement about tactics, not goals, which is nothing new in history. To be sure, our analysis cannot claim to rule out other theories of great power behavior that also do not expect balancing against the United States. Whether the United States is not seen as a threat worth balancing because of shared interests in nonproliferation and the war on terror (as we argue), be- cause of geography and capability limitations that render U.S. global hege- mony impossible (as some offensive realists argue), or because transnational democratic values, binding international institutions, and economic interde- pendence obviate the need to balance (as many liberals argue) is a task for fur- ther theorizing and empirical analysis. Nor are we claiming that balancing against the United States will never happen. Rather, there is no persuasive evi- dence that U.S. policy is provoking the kind of balancing behavior that the Bush administration‘s critics suggest. In the meantime, analysts should con- tinue to use credible indicators of balancing behavior in their search for signs that U.S. strategy is having a counterproductive effect on U.S. security. Below we discuss why the United States is not seen by other major powers as a threat worth balancing. Next we argue that the impact of the U.S.-led in- vasion of Iraq on international relations has been exaggerated and needs to be seen in a broader context that reveals far more cooperation with the United States than many analysts acknowledge. Finally, we note that something akin to balancing is taking place among would-be nuclear proliferators and Islamist extremists, which makes sense given that these are the threats targeted by the United States.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 269 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Soft Balancing
No evidence for soft balancing – Iraq and Afghanistan prove. International institutions actually bolster US hegemony Lieber, University of Notre Dame Political Science Assistant Professor and Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Alexander University of Virginia Politics Associate Professor, 5
(Keir A., Gerard, Summer 2005, International Security, ―Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,‖ http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, p. 125-128 accessed 7/5/13, IC) Evidence of a Lack of Soft Balancing In the absence of evidence of traditional balancing, some scholars have ad- vanced the concept of soft balancing. Instead of overtly challenging U.S. power, which might be too costly or unappealing, states are said to be able to undertake a host of lesser actions as a way of constraining and undermining it. The central claim is that the unilateralist and provocative behavior of the United States is generating unprecedented resentment that will make life difficult for Washington and may eventually evolve into traditional hard bal- ancing.38 As Walt writes, ―States may not want to attract the ‗focused enmity‘ of the United States, but they may be eager to limit its freedom of action, com- plicate its diplomacy, sap its strength and resolve, maximize their own auton- omy and reaffirm their own rights, and generally make the United States work harder to achieve its objectives.‖39 For Josef Joffe, ―‗Soft balancing‘ against Mr. Big has already set in.‖40 Pape proclaims that ―the early stages of soft balanc - ing against American power have already started,‖ and argues that ―unless the United States radicall y changes course, the use of international institu- tions, economic leverage, and diplomatic maneuvering to frustrate American intentions will only grow.‖41 We offer two critiques of these claims. First, if we consider the specific pre- dictions suggested by these theorists on their own terms, we do not find per- suasive evidence of soft balancing. Second, these criteria for detecting soft balancing are, on reflection, inherently flawed because they do not (and possi- bly cannot) offer effective means for distinguishing soft balancing from routine diplomatic friction between countries. These are, in that sense, nonfalsifiable claims. Evaluating soft-balancing predictions Theorists have offered several criteria for judging the presence of soft balanc- ing. We consider four frequently invoked ones: states‘ efforts (1) to entangle the dominant state in international institutions, (2) to exclude the dominant state from regional economic cooperation, (3) to undermine the dominant state‘s ability to project military power by restricting or denying military bas- ing rights, and (4) to provide relevant assistance to U.S. adversaries such as rogue states.42 entangling international institutions. Are other states using interna- tional institutions to constrain or undermine U.S. power? The notion that they could do so is based on faulty logic. Because the most powerful states exercise the most control in these institutions, it is unreasonable to expect that their rules and procedures can be used to shackle and restrain the world‘s most powerful state. As Randall Schweller notes, institutions cannot be simulta- neously autonomous and capable of binding strong states.43 Certainly what re- sistance there was to endorsing the U.S.-led action in Iraq did not stop or meaningfully delay that action. Is there evidence, however, that other states are even trying to use a web of global institutional rules and procedures or ad hoc diplomatic maneuvers to constrain U.S. behavior and delay or disrupt military actions? No attempt was made to block the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, and both the war and the en- suing stabilization there have been almost entirely conducted through an in- ternational institution: NATO. Although a number of countries refused to endorse the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, none sought to use international institu- tions to block or

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 270 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz declare illegal that invasion. Logically, such action should be the benchmark for this aspect of soft balancing, not whether states voted for the invasion. No evidence exists that such an effort was launched or that one would have succeeded had it been. Moreover, since the Iraqi regime was toppled, the UN has endorsed and assisted the transition to Iraqi sovereignty.44 If anything, other states‘ ongoing cooperation with the United States explains why international institutions continue to amplify American power and facilitate the pursuit of its strategic objectives. As we discuss below, the war on terror is being pursued primarily through regional institutions, bilateral ar- rangements, and new multilateral institutions, most obviously the Prolifera- tion Security and Container Security Initiatives, both of which have attracted new adherents since they were launched.45 economic statecraft. Is post–September 11 regional economic cooperation increasingly seeking to exclude the United States so as to make the bal- ance of power less favorable to it? The answer appears to be no. The United States has been one of the primary drivers of trade regionalization, not the ex- cluded party. This is not surprising given that most states, including those with the most power, have good reason to want lower, not higher, trade barri- ers around the large and attractive U.S. market. This rationale applies, for instance, to suits brought in the World Trade Or- ganization against certain U.S. trade policies. These suits are generally aimed at gaining access to U.S. markets, not sidelining them. For example, the suits challenging agricultural subsidies are part of a general challenge by develop- ing countries to Western (including European) trade practices.46 Moreover, many of these disputes predate September 11; therefore, relabeling them a form of soft balancing in reaction to post–September 11 U.S. strategy is not credible. For the moment, there also does not appear to be any serious discus- sion of a coordinated decision to price oil in euros, which might undercut the United States‘ ability to run large trade and budget deficits without propor- tional increases in inflation and interest rates.47 restrictions on basing rights/territorial denial. The geographical isolation of the United States could effectively diminish its relative power ad- vantage. This prediction appears to be supported by Turkey‘s denial of the Bush administration‘s request to provide coalition ground forces with transit rights for the invasion of Iraq, and possibly by diminished Saudi support for bases there. In addition, Pape suggests that countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea will likely impose new restrictions or reductions on U.S. forces stationed on their soil. The overall U.S. overseas basing picture, however, looks brighter today than it did only a few years ago. Since September 11 the United States has established new bases and negotiated landing rights across Africa, Asia, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. All told, it has built, upgraded, or ex- panded military facilities in Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Diego Garcia, Djibouti, Georgia, Hungary, Iraq, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.48

No soft balancing – basing and the US‘ ability to shift troops liberally proves Lieber, University of Notre Dame Political Science Assistant Professor and Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Alexander University of Virginia Politics Associate Professor, 5
(Keir A., Gerard, Summer 2005, International Security, ―Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,‖ http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, p. 128-130 accessed 7/5/13, IC) The diplomatic details of the basing issue also run contrary to soft-balancing predictions. Despite occasionally hostile domestic opinion surveys, most host countries do not want to see the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The economic and strategic benefits of hosting bases outweigh purported desires to make it more difficult for the United States to exercise power. For example, the Philippines asked the United States to leave Subic Bay in the 1990s (well before the emer- gence of the Bush Doctrine), but it has been angling ever since for a return. U.S. plans to withdraw troops from South

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 271 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Korea are facing local resistance and have triggered widespread anxiety about the future of the United States‘ secu- rity commitment to the peninsula.49 German defense officials and businesses are displeased with the U.S. plan to replace two army divisions in Germany with a single light armored brigade and transfer a wing of F-16 fighter jets to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.50 (Indeed, Turkey recently agreed to allow the United States expanded use of the base as a major hub for deliveries to Iraq and Afghanistan.)51 The recently announced plan to redeploy or withdraw up to 70,000 U.S. troops from Cold War bases in Asia and Europe is not being driven by host- country rejection, but by a reassessment of global threats to U.S. interests and the need to bolster American power-projection capabilities.52 If anything, the United States has the freedom to move forces out of certain countries because it has so many options about where else to send them, in this case closer to the Middle East and other regions crucial to the war on terror. For example, the United States is discussing plans to concentrate all special operations and anti- terrorist units in Europe in a single base in Spain—a country presumably primed for soft balancing against the United States given its newly elected prime minister‘s opposition to the war in Iraq—so as to facilitate an increasing number of military operations in sub-Saharan Africa.53 the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Finally, as Pape asserts, if ―Europe, Russia, China, and other important regional states were to offer economic and technological assistance to North Korea, Iran, and other ‗rogue states,‘ this would strengthen these states, run counter to key Bush administration poli- cies, and demonstrate the resolve to oppose the United States by assisting its enemies.‖54 Pape presumably has in mind Russian aid to Iran in building nu- clear power plants (with the passive acquiescence of Europeans), South Ko- rean economic assistance to North Korea, previous French and Russian resistance to sanctions against Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq, and perhaps Pakistan‘s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) assistance to North Korea, Iraq, and Libya. There are at least two reasons to question whether any of these actions is evi- dence of soft balancing. First, none of this so-called cooperation with U.S. ad- versaries is unambiguously driven by a strategic logic of undermining U.S. power. Instead, other explanations are readily at hand. South Korean economic aid to North Korea is better explained by purely local motivations: common ethnic bonds in the face of famine and deprivation, and Seoul‘s fears of the consequences of any abrupt collapse of the North Korean regime. The other cases of ―cooperation‖ appear to be driven by a common nonstrategic motiva- tion: pecuniary gain. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan‘s nuclear pro- gram, was apparently motivated by profits when he sold nuclear technology and methods to several states. And given its domestic economic problems and severe troubles in Chechnya, Russia appears far more interested in making money from Iran than in helping to bring about an ―Islamic bomb.‖55 The quest for lucrative contracts provides at least as plausible, if banal, an explana- tion for French cooperation with Saddam Hussein. Moreover, this softbalancing claim runs counter to diverse multilateral nonproliferation efforts aimed at Iran, North Korea, and Libya (before its deci- sion to abandon its nuclear program). The Europeans have been quite vocal in their criticism of Iranian noncompliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency guidelines, and the Chinese and Rus- sians are actively cooperating with the United States and others over North Korea. The EU‘s 2003 European security strategy document declares that rogue states ―should understand that there is a price to be paid‖ for their be- havior, ―including in their relationship‖ with the EU.56 These major powers have a declared disinterest in aiding rogue states above and beyond what they might have to lose by attracting the focused enmity of the United States. In sum, the evidence for claims and predictions of soft balancing is poor.

Soft balancing is a flawed concept – anti-Americanism can be present without institutionalized balancing procedures Lieber, University of Notre Dame Political Science Assistant Professor and Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Alexander University of Virginia Politics Associate Professor, 5

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 272 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz (Keir A., Gerard, Summer 2005, International Security, ―Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,‖ http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, p.130-133, accessed 7/5/13, IC) There is a second, more important, reason to be skeptical of soft-balancing claims. The criteria they offer for detecting the presence of soft balancing are conceptually flawed. Walt defines soft balancing as ―conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences, outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support.‖57 This and other accounts are problematic in a crucial way. Conceptually, seeking outcomes that a state (such as the United States) does not prefer does not necessarily or convincingly reveal a desire to balance that state geostrategically. For example, one trading partner often seeks outcomes that the other does not prefer, without balancing being rele- vant to the discussion. Thus, empirically, the types of events used to operationalize definitions such as Walt‘s do not clearly establish the crucial claim of soft-balancing theorists: states‘ desires to balance the United States. Widespread anti-Americanism can be present (and currently seems to be) without that fact persuasively revealing impulses to balance the United States. The events used to detect the presence of soft balancing are so typical in his- tory that they are not, and perhaps cannot be, distinguished from routine dip- lomatic friction between countries, even between allies. Traditional balancing criteria are useful because they can reasonably, though surely not perfectly, help distinguish between real balancing behavior and policies or diplomatic actions that may look and sound like an effort to check the power of the domi- nant state but that in actuality reflect only cheap talk, domestic politics, other international goals not related to balances of power, or the resentment of par- ticular leaders. The current formulation of the concept of soft balancing is not distinguished from such behavior. Even if the predictions were correct, they would not unambiguously or even persuasively reveal balancing behavior, soft or otherwise. Our criticism is validated by the long list of events from 1945 to 2001 that are directly comparable to those that are today coded as soft balancing. These events include diplomatic maneuvering by U.S. allies and nonaligned coun- tries against the United States in international institutions (particularly the UN), economic statecraft aimed against the United States, resistance to U.S. military basing, criticism of U.S. military interventions, and waves of anti- Americanism. In the 1950s a West Europe–only bloc was formed, designed partly as a polit- ical and economic counterweight to the United States within the so-called free world, and France created an independent nuclear capability. In the 1960s a cluster of mostly developing countries organized the Nonaligned Movement, defining itself against both superpowers. France pulled out of NATO‘s military structure. Huge demonstrations worldwide protested the U.S. war in Viet- nam and other U.S. Cold War policies. In the 1970s the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries wielded its oil weapon to punish U.S. policies in the Middle East and transfer substantial wealth from the West. Waves of extensive anti-Americanism were pervasive in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, and Europe and elsewhere in the late 1960s and early 1970s and again in the early-to-mid 1980s. Especially prominent protests and harsh criticism from intellectuals and local media were mounted against U.S. policies toward Cen- tral America under President Ronald Reagan, the deployment of theater nu- clear weapons in Europe, and the very idea of missile defense. In the Reagan Waiting for Balancing 131 era, many states coordinated to protect existing UN practices, promote the 1982 Law of the Sea treaty, and oppose aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. In the 1990s the Philippines asked the United States to leave its Subic Bay military base; China continued a long-standing military buildup; and China, France, and Russia coordinated to resist UN-sanctioned uses of force against Iraq. China and Russia declared a strategic partnership in 1996. In 1998 the ―Euro- pean troika‖ meetings and agreements began between France, Germany, and Russia, and the EU announced the creation of an independent, unified Euro- pean military force. In many of these years, the United States was engaged in numerous trade clashes, including with close EU allies. Given all this, it is not surprising that contemporary scholars and commentators periodic- ally identified ―crises‖ in U.S. relations with the world, including within the

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 273 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Atlantic Alliance.58 These events all rival in seriousness the categories of events that some schol- ars today identify as soft balancing. Indeed, they are not merely difficult to dis- tinguish conceptually from those later events; in many cases they are impossible to distinguish empirically, being literally the same events or trends that are currently labeled soft balancing. Yet they all occurred in years in which even soft-balancing theorists agree that the United States was not being bal- anced against.59 It is thus unclear whether accounts of soft balancing have pro- vided criteria for crisply and rigorously distinguishing that concept from these and similar manifestations of diplomatic friction routine to many periods of history, even in relations between countries that remain allies rather than stra- tegic competitors. For example, these accounts provide no method for judging whether post–September 11 international events constitute soft balancing, whereas similar phenomena during Reagan‘s presidency—the spread of antiAmericanism, coordination against the United States in international institu- tions, criticism of interventions in the developing countries, and so on—do not. Without effective criteria for making such distinctions, current claims of soft balancing risk blunting rather than advancing knowledge about international political dynamics. In sum, we detect no persuasive evidence that U.S. policy is provoking the seismic shift in other states‘ strategies toward the United States that theorists of balancing identify.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 274 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Hard Counterbalancing
Counter-balancing theory wrong– it isn‘t occurring, defense spending in most places other than the US has gone down, and the US isn‘t even preventing balancing – Europe, Russia, China, and India all could try but they don‘t want to Lieber, University of Notre Dame Political Science Assistant Professor and Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Alexander University of Virginia Politics Associate Professor, 5
(Keir A., Gerard, Summer 2005, International Security, ―Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,‖ http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, p. 110-124 accessed 7/5/13, IC) The lack of balancing behavior against the United States constitutes a genu- ine puzzle for many observers, with serious implications both for theorizing and for U.S. foreign policy making, and so is a puzzle worth explaining. The next section of this article reviews approaches that predict balancing under current conditions. The second section presents evidence that classic forms of balancing are not occurring. The third section argues that claims of soft balanc- ing are unpersuasive because evidence for them is poor, especially because they rely on criteria that cannot effectively distinguish between soft balancing and routine diplomatic friction. These claims are, in that sense, nonfalsifiable. The fourth section proposes that balancing against the United States is not oc- curring because the post–September 11 grand strategy designed by the George W. Bush administration, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat only to a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups. As a result, most coun- tries either do not have a direct stake in the ―war on terror‖ or, often, share the U.S. interest in the reduction of threats from rogue states and terrorist groups. This line of argument refocuses analytic attention away from U.S. relations with the entire world as a disaggregated whole and toward a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, U.S. policy toward rogue states and transnational terrorist organizations and, on the other, U.S. relations with other states. Predictions of Balancing: International Relations Theory and U.S. Foreign Policy The study of balancing behavior in international relations has deep roots, but it remains fraught with conceptual ambiguities and competing theoretical and empirical claims.1 Rather than offer a review of the relevant debates, we focus here on a specific set of realist and liberal predictions that states will balance against U.S. power under current conditions. Although realists tend to see great power balancing as an inevitable phenomenon of international politics and liberals generally see it as an avoidable feature of international life, the ar- guments discussed below share the view that balancing is being provoked by aggressive and imprudent U.S. policies. Traditional structural realism holds that states motivated by the search for security in an anarchical world will balance against concentrations of power: ―States, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threat ens them.‖2 According to Kenneth Waltz and other structural realists, the most powerful state will always appear threatening because weaker states can never be certain that it will not use its power to violate their sovereignty or threaten their survival. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States was left with a preeminence of power unparalleled in modern history. The criteria for expecting balancing in structural realist terms do not require that U.S. power meet a specific threshold; all that matters is that the United States is the preeminent power in the system, which it was in 1990 and clearly remains today. Consistent with earlier theorizing, prominent real- ists predicted at the end of the Cold War that other major powers would bal- ance against it.3 A decade later, Waltz identified ―balancing tendencies already taking place‖ and argued that it was only a matter of time before other great powers formed a serious balancing coalition, although that timing is theoreti- cally underdetermined: ―Theory enables one to say that a new balance of power will form but not to say how long it will take. . . . In our perspective,

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 275 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz the new balance is emerging slowly; in historical perspectives, it will come in the blink of an eye.‖4 John Mearsheimer‘s work is an important exception to the structural realist prediction of balancing against the United States. He argues that geography— specifically, the two oceans that separate the United States from the world‘s other great powers—prevents the United States from projecting enough mili- tary power to pursue global hegemony. Given this lack of capability, the United States must be content with regional hegemony. This means that the United States is essentially a status quo power that poses little danger to the survival or sovereignty of other great powers. Thus, according to Mear- sheimer, no balancing coalition against the United States is likely to form. (For similar reasons, history‘s previous ―offshore balancer‖—Great Britain—did not provoke a balancing coalition even at the height of its power in the nine- teenth century.)5 A distinctive strand of realist theory holds that states balance against per- ceived threats, not just against raw power. Stephen Walt argues that perceived threat depends on a combination of aggregate power, geography, technology, intentions, and foreign policy behavior.6 With this theoretical modification, Walt and others seek to explain why the United States provoked less balancing in the last half century than its sheer power would suggest.7 Although geogra- phy is important, as in Mearsheimer‘s explanation above, balance of threat theorists find the key to the absence of real balancing in the United States‘ dis- tinct history of comparatively benign intentions and behavior, especially the absence of attempts to conquer or dominate foreign lands. As Robert Pape ar- gues, ―The long ascendancy of the United States has been a remarkable excep- tion‖ to the balance of power prediction, and the main reason for this is its ―high reputation for non-aggressive intentions.‖8 Given the United States‘ long-standing power advantages, this has been partly the result of self-re- straint, which Walt believes can continue to ―keep the rest of the world ‗off- balance‘ and minimize the opposition that the United States will face in the future.‖9 Now, however, many balance of threat realists predict balancing based on what amounts to an empirical claim: that U.S. behavior since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks is sufficiently threatening to others that it is accelerating the process of balancing. For these balance of threat theorists, U.S. policies are undermining the reputation of the United States for benevolence. Walt com- pares the position of the United States today with that of imperial Germany in the decades leading up to 1914, when that country‘s expansionism eventually caused its own encirclement. According to Walt, ―What we are witnessing is the progressive self -isolation of the United States.‖10 Pape argues that Presi- dent George W. ―Bush[‗s] strategy of aggressive unilateralism is changing America‘s long-enjoyed reputation for benign intent and giving other major powers reason to fear America‘s power.‖ In particular, adopting and imple- menting a preventive war strategy is ―encouraging other countries to form counterweights to U.S. power.‖11 Pape essentially suggests that the Bush ad- ministration‘s adoption of the preventive war doctrine in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks converted the United States from a status quo power into a revisionist one. He also suggests that by invading Iraq, the United States has become an ―‗on-shore‘ hegemon in a major region of the world, abandoning the strategy of off-shore balancing,‖ and that it is perceived accordingly by others.12 Traditional structural realists agree that U.S. actions are hastening the bal- ancing process. They argue that the United States is succumbing to the ―hegemon‘s temptation‖ to take on extremely ambitious goals, use military force unselectively and excessively, overextend its power abroad, and gener- ally reject selfrestraint in its foreign policy—all of which invariably generate counterbalancing. Christopher Layne‘s stark portrayal is worth citing at length: ―Many throughout the world now have the impression that the United States is acting as an aggressive hegemon engaged in the naked aggrandize- ment of its own power. The notion that the United States is a ‗benevolent‘ he- gemon has been shredded. America is inviting the same fate as that which has overtaken previous contenders for hegemony.‖13 The Bush administration‘s decision to go to war against Iraq is singled out as a catalytic event: ―In coming years, the Iraq War may come to be seen as a pivotal geopolitical event that heralded the beginning of serious counter-hegemonic balancing against the United States.‖14 Liberal theorists typically argue that democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions largely obviate the need for states to engage in balancing behavior.15 Under current conditions, however, many liberals have joined these realists in predicting balancing against the United States. These liberal theorists share the view that U.S. policymakers have violated a grand bargain of sorts—one that reduced incentives to balance against

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 276 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz preponderant U.S. power. In the most detailed account of this view, John Ikenberry argues that hegemonic power does not automatically trigger balancing because it can take a more benevolent form. Specifically, the United States has restrained its own power through a web of binding alliances and multilateral commitments infused with trust, mutual consent, and reciprocity. This U.S. willingness to place restraints on its hegemonic power, combined with the open nature of its liberal democracy, reassured weaker states that their interests could be pro- tected and served within a U.S.-led international order, which in turn kept their expected value of balancing against the United States low. This arrangement allowed the United States to project its influence and pursue its interests with only modest restraints on its freedom of action.16 Invoking a similar em- pirical claim, Ikenberry argues that U.S. policies after September 11 shattered this order: ―In the past two years, a set of hard-line, fundamentalist ideas have taken Washington by storm‖ and have produced a grand strategy equivalent to ―a geostrategic wrecking ball that will destroy America‘s own half-century- old international architecture.‖17 This has greatly increased the incentives for weaker states to balance.18 These claims and predictions rest on diverse theoretical models with differ- ent underlying assumptions, and one should not conclude that all realist or liberal theories now expect balancing. But there is unusual convergence among these approaches on the belief that other countries have begun to en-gage in balancing behavior against the United States, whether because of the U.S. relative power advantage, the nature of its foreign policies (at least as those policies are characterized), or both. Evidence of a Lack of Hard Balancing The empirical evidence consistently disappoints expectations of traditional forms of balancing against the United States. This section first justifies a focus on this evidence and then examines it. justifying a focus on hard balancing Some international relations theorists appear to have concluded that measure- ments of traditional balancing behavior since September 11 are irrelevant to assessing the strength of impulses to balance the United States. They have done so because they assume that other states cannot compete militarily with the United States. Therefore, they conclude, any absence of hard balancing that may (well) be detected would simply reflect structural limits on these states‘ capabilities, and does not constitute meaningful evidence about their inten- tions. Evidence of such an absence can thus be dismissed as analytically meaningless to this topic. We dispute this and argue instead that evidence con- cerning traditional balancing behavior is analytically significant. William Wohlforth argues that the United States enjoys such a large margin of superiority over every other state in all the important dimensions of power (military, economic, technological, geopolitical, etc.) that an extensive counter- balancing coalition is infeasible, both because of the sheer size of the U.S. mili- tary effort and the huge coordination issues involved in putting together such a counterbalancing coalition.19 This widely cited argument is invoked by theo- rists of soft balancing to explain, and explain away, the absence of traditional balancing, at least for now.20 Wohlforth‘s main conclusion on this matter is unconvincing empirically. As a result, the claim that the absence of hard balancing does not reveal intentions is unconvincing analytically. There is certainly a steep disparity in worldwide levels of defense spending. Those levels fell almost everywhere after the end of the Cold War, but they fell more steeply and more durably in other parts of the world, which resulted in a widening U.S. lead in military capabilities. Even Europe‘s sophisticated militaries lack truly independent command, intelli- gence, surveillance, and logistical capabilities. China, Russia, and others are even less able to match the United States militarily. In 2005, for example, the United States may well represent 50 percent of defense spending in the entire world. Although this configuration of spending might appear to be a structural fact in its own right, it is less the result of rigid constraints than of much more malleable budgetary choices. Of course, it would be neither cheap nor easy to bal- ance against a country as powerful as the United States. Observers might point out that the United States was able to project enough power to help defeat Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan; it managed to con- tain the Soviet Union in Europe for half a century; and most recently it toppled two governments on the other side of the world in a matter of weeks (the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baathist regime in Iraq). But it is easy to exag- gerate the extent and effectiveness of American power, as the ongoing effort to pacify Iraq suggests. The limits of U.S. military power might be showcased if one

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 277 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz imagines the tremendous difficulties the United States would face in try- ing to conquer and control, say, China. Whether considered by population, economic power, or military strength, various combinations of Britain, China, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia—to name only a relatively small number of major powers—would have more than enough actual and latent power to check the United States. These powers have substantial latent capabilities for balancing that they are unambiguously failing to mobilize. Consider, for example, Europe alone. Although the military resources of the twenty-five members of the European Union are often depicted as being vastly overshadowed by those of the United States, these states have more troops un- der arms than the United States: 1.86 million compared with 1.43 million.21 The EU countries also have the organizational and technical skills to excel at com- mand, control, and surveillance. They have the know-how to develop a wide range of high-technology weapons. And they have the money to pay for them, with a total gross domestic product (GDP) greater than that of the United States: more than $12.5 trillion to the United States‘ $11.7 trillion in 2004.22 It is true that the Europeans would have to pool resources and overcome all the traditional problems of coordination and collective action common to counterbalancing coalitions to compete with the United States strategically. Even more problematic are tendencies to free ride or pass the buck inside bal- ancing coalitions.23 But numerous alliances have nonetheless formed, and the EU members would be a logical starting point because they have the lowest barriers to collective action of perhaps any set of states in history. Just as im- portant, as discussed below, the argument about coordination barriers seems ill suited to the contemporary context because the other major powers are ap- parently not even engaged in negotiations concerning the formation of a bal- ancing coalition. Alternatively, dynamics of intraregional competition might forestall global balancing. But this, too, is hardly a rigid obstacle in the face of a commonly perceived threat. Certainly Napoleon, Adolf Hitler, and Joseph Sta- lin after World War II all induced strange bedfellows to form alliances and per- mitted several regional powers to mobilize without alarming their neighbors. That said, even if resources can be linked, there are typically limits to how much internal balancing can be undertaken by any set of powers, even wealthy ones, given that they usually already devote a significant proportion of their resources to national security. But historical trends only highlight the degree to which current spending levels are the result of choices rather than structural constraints. The level of defense spending that contemporary econo- mies are broadly capable of sustaining can be assessed by comparing current spending to the military expenditures that West European NATO members—a category of countries that substantively overlaps with the EU—maintained less than twenty years ago, during the Cold War. In a number of cases, these states are spending on defense at rates half (or less than half) those of the mid- 1980s (see Table 1). Consider how a resumption of earlier spending levels would affect global military expenditures today. In 2003 the United States spent approximately $383 billion on defense. This was nearly twice the $190 billion spent by West European NATO members. But if these same European countries had resumed spending at the rates they successfully sustained in 1985, they would have spent an additional $150 billion on defense in 2003. In that event, U.S. spend- ing would have exceeded theirs by little more than 10 percent, well within his- toric ranges of international military competition.24 Moreover, this underlying capacity to fully, if not immediately, match the United States is further en- hanced if one considers the latent capabilities of two or three other states, espe- cially China‘s manpower, Japan‘s wealth and technology, and Russia‘s extensive arms production capabilities. In sum, it appears that if there were a will to balance the United States, there would be a way. And if traditional balancing is in fact an option available to contemporary great powers, then whether or not they are even beginning to exercise that option is of great analytic interest when one attempts to measure the current strength of impulses to balance the United States. International relations theorists have developed commonly accepted stan- dards for measuring traditional balancing behavior. Fairly strictly defined and relatively verifiable criteria such as these have great value because they reveal behavior—costly behavior signifying actual intent—that can be distinguished from the diplomatic friction that routinely occurs between almost all countries, even allies. We use conventional measurements for traditional balancing. The most im- portant and widely used criteria concern internal and external balancing and the establishment of diplomatic ―red lines.‖ Internal balancing occurs when states invest heavily in defense by transforming their latent power (i.e., eco- nomic, technological, social, and

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 278 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz natural resources) into military capabilities. External balancing occurs when states seek to form military alliances against the predominant power.25 Diplomatic red lines send clear signals to the aggres- sor that states are willing to take costly actions to check the dominant power if it does not respect certain boundaries of behavior.26 Only the last of these mea- surements involves the emergence of open confrontation, much less the out- break of hostilities. The other two concern instead states‘ investments in coercive resources and the pooling of such resources. examining evidence of internal balancing Since the end of the Cold War, no major power in the international system ap- pears to be engaged in internal balancing against the United States, with the possible exception of China. Such balancing would be marked by meaning- fully increased defense spending, the implementation of conscription or other means of enlarging the ranks of people under arms, or substantially expanded investment in military research and technology. To start, consider the region best positioned economically for balancing: Europe. Estimates of military spending as a share of the overall economy vary because they rely on legitimately disputable methods of calculation. But recent estimates show that spending by most EU members fell after the Cold War to rates one-half (or less) the U.S. rate. And unlike in the United States, spending has not risen appreciably since September 11 and the lead-up to the Iraq war, and in many cases it has continued to fall (see Table 2). In the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Sweden, military spending has been substantially reduced even since September 11 and the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. Several recent spending upticks are modest and predomi-nantly designed to address in-country terrorism. Long-standing EU plans to deploy a non-NATO rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops do not undermine this analysis. This light force is designed for quick deployment to local-conflict zones such as the Balkans and Africa; it is neither designed nor suited for con- tinental defense against a strategic competitor. In April 2003 Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Germany (the key player in any potential European counterweight) announced an increase in coopera- tion in both military spending and coordination. But since then, Germany‘s government has instead trimmed its already modest spending, and in 2003–04 cut its military acquisitions and participation in several joint European weap- ons programs. Germany is now spending GDP on the military at a rate of un- der 1.5 percent (a rate that is declining), compared with around 4 percent by the United States in 2003, a rate that is growing. Alternative explanations for this spending pattern only undercut the logical basis of balancing predictions. For example, might European defense spending be constrained by sizable welfare-state commitments and by budget deficit limits related to the common European currency? Both of these constraints are self-imposed and can easily be construed to reveal stronger commitments to entitlement programs and to technical aspects of a common currency than to the priority of generating defenses against a supposed potential strategic threat.27 This contrasts sharply with the United States, which, having unam- biguously perceived a serious threat, has carried out a formidable military buildup since September 11, even at the expense of growing budget deficits. Some analysts also argue that any European buildup is hampered deliber- ately by the United States, which encourages divisions among even traditional allies and seeks to keep their militaries ―deformed‖ as a means of thwarting ef- forts to form a balancing coalition. For example, Layne asserts that the United States is ―actively discouraging Europe from either collective, or national, efforts to acquire the full-spectrum of advanced military capabilities . . . [and] is engaged in a game of divide and rule in a bid to thwart the E.U.‘s political unification process.‖28 But the fact remains that the United States could not prohibit Europeans or others from developing those capabilities if those coun- tries faced strong enough incentives to balance. Regions other than Europe do not clearly diverge from this pattern. Defense spending as a share of GDP has on the whole fallen since the end of the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, and it has remained broadly steady in most cases in the past several years.29 Russia has slightly increased its share of de- fense spending since 2001 (see Table 3), but this has nothing to do with an at- tempt to counterbalance the United States.30 Instead, the salient factors are the continuing campaign to subdue the insurgency in Chechnya and a dire need to forestall further military decline (made possible by a slightly improved overall budgetary situation). That Russians are unwilling to incur significant costs to counter U.S. power is all the more telling given the expansion of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 279 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz NATO to Russia‘s frontiers and the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Antiballistic Mis- sile Treaty and deploy missile defenses. China, on the other hand, is engaged in a strategic military buildup. Al- though military expenditures are notoriously difficult to calculate for that country, the best estimates suggest that China has slightly increased its share of defense spending in recent years (see Table 3). This buildup, however, has been going on for decades, that is, long before September 11 and the Bush administration‘s subsequent strategic response.31 Moreover, the growth in Chi-nese conventional capabilities is primarily driven by the Taiwan problem: in the short term, China needs to maintain the status quo and prevent Taiwan from acquiring the relative power necessary to achieve full independence; in the long term, China seeks unification of Taiwan with the mainland. China clearly would like to enhance its relative power vis-à-vis the United States and may well have a long-term strategy to balance U.S. power in the future.32 But China‘s defense buildup is not new, nor is it as ambitious and assertive as it should be if the United States posed a direct threat that required internal bal- ancing. (For example, the Chinese strategic nuclear modernization program is often mentioned in the course of discussions of Chinese balancing behavior, but the Chinese arsenal is about the same size as it was a decade ago.33 More- over, even if China is able to deploy new missiles in the next few years, it is not clear whether it will possess a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability vis-àvis the United States.) Thus, China‘s defense buildup is not a persuasive indi- cator of internal balancing against the post–September 11 United States specifically. In sum, rather than the United States‘ post–September 11 policies inducing a noticeable shift in the military expenditures of other countries, the latters‘ spending patterns are instead characterized by a striking degree of continuity before and after this supposed pivot point in U.S. grand strategy. assessing evidence of external balancing A similar pattern of continuity can be seen in the absence of new alliances. Using widely accepted criteria, experts agree that external balancing against the United States would be marked by the formation of alliances (including lesser defense agreements), discussions concerning the formation of such alli- ances or, at the least, discussions about shared interests in defense cooperation against the United States. Instead of September 11 serving as a pivot point, there is little visible change in the alliance patterns of the late 1990s—even with the presence of what might be called an ―alliance facilitator‖ in President Jacques Chirac‘s France. At least for now, diplomatic resistance to U.S. actions is strictly at the level of maneuvering and talk, indistinguishable from the friction routine to virtually all periods and countries, even allies. Resources have not been transferred from some great powers to others. And the United States‘ core alliances, NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance, have both been reaffirmed. Walt recognized in 2002 that Russian-Chinese relations fell ―well short of formal defense arrangements‖ and hence did not constitute external balanc- ing; this continues to be the case.34 Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s ex- pressed hope that India becomes a great power to help re-create a multipolar world hardly rises to the standard of external balancing. Certainly few would suggest that the Indo-Russian ―strategic pact‖ of 2000, the Sino-Russian ―friendship treaty‖ of 2001, or media speculation of a Moscow-Beijing- Delhi ―strategic triangle‖ in 2002 and 2003 are as consequential as, say, the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 or even the less-formal U.S.-Chinese balanc- ing against the Soviet Union in the 1970s.35 In 2002–03 Russia, China, and sev- eral EU members broadly coordinated diplomatically against granting international-institutional approval to the 2003 Iraq invasion, but there is no evidence that this extended at the time, or has extended since, to anything be- yond that single goal. The EU‘s common defense policy is barely more devel- oped than it was before 2001. And although survey data suggest that many Europeans would like to see the EU become a superpower comparable to the United States, most are unwilling to boost military spending to accomplish that goal.36 Even the institutional path toward Europe becoming a plausible counterweight to the United States appears to have suffered a major setback by the decisive rejection of the proposed EU constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005. Even states with predominantly Muslim populations do not reveal incipient enhanced coordination against the United States. Regional states such as Jor- dan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia cooperated with the Iraq invasion; more have sought to help stabilize postwar Iraq; and key Muslim countries are cooperat- ing with the United States in the war against

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 280 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Islamist terrorists. Even the loosest criteria for external balancing are not being met. For the moment at least, no countries are known even to be discussing and debating how burdens could or should be distributed in any arrangement for coordinat- ing defenses against or confronting the United States. For this reason, the argu- ment (discussed further below) that external balancing may be absent because it is by nature slow and inefficient and fraught with buck-passing behavior is not persuasive. No friction exists in negotiations over who should lead or bear the costs in a coalition because no such discussions appear to exist.

Unipolarity discourages military competition – narrowing the gap would encourage militarization and competition Wohlforth Dartmouth College Government Professor 9 [William C., January 2009, ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, And Great Power War‖,http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Wohlforth%20(2009).pdf, World Politics 61, no. 1, p. 57, accessed 7/3/13, ALT]
The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps ¶ foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their ¶ basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity ¶ theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence ¶ are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes ¶ strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. ¶ The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military ¶ competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a ¶ return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of ¶ such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way ¶ the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the ¶ rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. ¶ Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke‘s argument: ¶ ―[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with ¶ dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.‖ 81 Given that ¶ today‘s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, ¶ many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be ¶ readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most ¶ material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition ¶ seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could ¶ present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to ¶ craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this ¶ positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity ¶ is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to ¶ primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war ¶ could once again form the backdrop of world politics.

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AT – China Rise
China rise isn‘t threatening— empirically proven. Wohlforth Dartmouth College Government Professor, 9
[William C., January 2009, ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, And Great Power War‖,http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Wohlforth%20(2009).pdf, World Politics 61, no. 1, p. 31, accessed 7/3/13, ALT] First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what ¶ matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that ¶ had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this ¶ question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best known ¶ and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising ¶ challengers that were prospering mightily under the status quo. In case ¶ after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the existing rules ¶ and practices that constituted the order of the day. In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising ¶ power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. ¶ In R. Ned Lebow‘s reading, for example, Thucydides‘ account tells us ¶ that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security ¶ or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek ¶ world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assembly‘s vote for ¶ war.11 The issues that inspired Louis XIV‘s and Napoleon‘s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled ¶ primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states ¶ in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger‘s dissatisfaction is ¶ often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status ¶ quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.12

China is committed to economic growth within unipolar system. Wohlforth Dartmouth College Government Professor 9
[William C., January 2009, ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, And Great Power War‖,http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Wohlforth%20(2009).pdf, World Politics 61, no. 1, p. 54-55, accessed 7/3/13, ALT] China‘s quest for great power status after ―the century of shame and ¶ humiliation‖ is a staple of foreign policy analysis . Its preference for multipolarity and periodic resentment at what it sees as the United States‘ ¶ assertion of special rights and privileges is also well established. Chinese analyses of multipolarity explicitly reflect the predicted preference ¶ for a flat hierarchy over one in which a single state has primacy; that is, ¶ they express a preference for a world in which no power has a special ¶ claim to leadership.72 In the early 1990s Jiang Zemin attempted to act ¶ on this preference by translating China‘s growing economic and military power into enhanced status in world affairs through competitive ¶ policies. As Avery Goldstein shows, this more forward policy soon provoked a nascent U.S. backlash against the perceived ―China threat.‖73¶ The signature event was Beijing‘s decision to heighten tensions around ¶ the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96 in order to curb Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui‘s independence policies and punish Washington for encouraging them. This resulted in the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carrier ¶ groups to the area and a dramatic upgrading of the U.S.-Japan security ¶ relationship, including potential collaboration on a theater missile defense system covering the East China Sea (and possibly Taiwan). According to many China watchers, the result was a clearer appreciation in Beijing of the costs and benefits of a competitive search for ¶ status under unipolarity. As Peter Gries puts it: ―While

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 282 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz many Chinese ¶ have convinced themselves that U.S. power predominance cannot last, ¶ they do grudgingly acknowledge the world‘s current unipolar nature.‖74¶ As a result, Beijing adopted a ―peaceful rise‖ strategy that downplays ¶ the prospect of direct competition for global parity with or primacy ¶ over the United States.75 Thus, notwithstanding an underlying preference for a flatter global status hierarchy, in terms of concrete policies ¶ China remains a status quo power under unipolarity, seeking to enhance its standing via strategies that accommodate the existing global ¶ status quo.76

The US is much more powerful than its nearest competitor, China, and the gap only increases. Ye, Boston University IR professor, 4
(Min, ―The US Hegemony and Implication for China,‖ http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper_Ye.pdf, pg. 29, accessed 7/7/13, AX) For one, the distance between China‘s power and US power remains enormous. Although China has achieved tremendous progress in military, economy, and technology, the gap with the U.S only widens rather than narrows. Besides, China itself is confronted with rather complicated regional geo-politics. Russia remains to be an uncertain ally. In a moment of truth facing US-China confrontation, it is more likely to bandwagon with the United States. Japan is US closest ally in AsiaPacific. Its relations with China become increasingly restrained due to history problem and economic frictions. Taiwan has stored some advanced military weapons and directly threatens China‘ southeast sea. Southeast Asian countries all have territory disputes with China. South Korea, presumably the most important pro-China nation in Asia, spurred strong anti-China sentiments and demonstration in response to historical disputes between the two countries.

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AT – Hierarchy Bad
Status competition less likely with hegemony – Resentment theory works in the ambiguous theoretical, but in reality leaders account status in utility, make rational decisions and constrain comparisons in highly consequential ways. Wohlforth, Dartmouth Government Professor, 9
[William C., January 2009,World Politics ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War‖ Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH] ¶ Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the relevance for states¶ of SIT‘s core finding that individual preferences for higher status will¶ affect intergroup interactions. Individuals who identify with a group¶ transfer the individual‘s status preference to the group‘s relations with¶ other groups. those who act on behalf of a statecan be expected to derive¶ utility from its status in international society In addition, there are no¶ evident reasons to reject the theory‘s applicability to interstate settings¶ that mimic the standard SIT experimental setup—namely, in an ambiguous¶ hierarchy of states that are comparable in material terms. As¶ Jacques Hymans notes: ―In the design of most SIT experiments there is¶ an implicit assumption of rough status and power parity. Moreover, the¶ logic of SIT theory suggests that its findings of ingroup bias may in fact¶ be dependent on this assumption.‖29 Status conflict is thus more likely in flat, ambiguous hierarchies than¶ in clearly stratified ones. And there are no obvious grounds for rejecting¶ the basic finding that comparison choice will tend to be ―similar¶ but upward‖ (that is, people will compare and contrast their group with¶ similar but higher status groups).30 In most settings outside the laboratory¶ this leaves a lot of room for consequential choices, but in the¶ context of great power relations, the set of feasible comparison choices¶ is constrained in highly consequential ways.

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AT – Unipolarity Bad
Empirically proven- countries will go to war over status- there will always be war for primacy. Wohlforth, Dartmith Government Professor, 9
[William C., January 2009,World Politics ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War‖ Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH] Archives regarding this war have long been open and the historiography¶ is vast.¶ war was about status.51 The issue at stake became whether Russia could¶ obtain rights in the Ottoman Empire that the other powers lacked. The¶ diplomats understood well that framing the issue as one of status made¶ war likely, and they did everything they could in the slow run-up to¶ military hostilities to engineer solutions that separated the issues on the¶ ground from matters of rank. But no proposed solution (eleven were attempted)¶ promised a resolution of the Russians‘ status dissonance. The¶ draft compromises accepted by Russia yielded on all points—except¶ they included language that, however vaguely, codified Russia‘s rights¶ vis-à-vis its coreligionists that the tsar and his ministers had demanded¶ at the outset. For Russia, these clauses symbolized the restoration of¶ the status quo ante. For Turkey, France, and Britain, they implied a¶ dramatic increase in Russia‘s status unwarranted by any increase in its¶ capabilities.

The U.S. checks primacy struggles – carefully manages perceptual statuses. Wohlforth, Dartmith Government Professor, 9
[William C., January 2009,World Politics ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War‖ Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH] On the contrary, under unipolarity U.S. diplomats have frequently¶ adopted policies to enhance the security of the identities of Russia,¶ China, Japan, and India as great (though second-tier) powers, with an¶ emphasis on their regional roles. U.S. officials have urged China to¶ manage the six-party talks on North Korea while welcoming it as a¶ ―responsible stakeholder‖ in the system; they have urged a much larger¶ regional role for Japan; and they have deliberately fostered India‘s status¶ as a ―responsible‖ nuclear power. Russia, the country whose elite has¶ arguably confronted the most threats to its identity, has been the object¶ of what appear to be elaborate U.S. status-management policies that¶ included invitations to form a partnership with NATO, play a prominent¶ role in Middle East diplomacy (from which Washington had striven to¶ exclude Moscow for four decades), and to join the rich countries‘ club,¶ the G7 (when Russia clearly lacked the economic requisites). Status management¶ policies on this scale appear to be enabled by a unipolar¶ structure that fosters confidence in the security of the United States‘¶ identity as number one. The United States is free to buttress the status¶ of these states as second-tier great powers and key regional play ers precisely because it faces no serious competition for overall system¶ leadership.

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AT – Hegemony Alternatives

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AT – Multipolarity Good
The US, as the world‘s hegemon, provides security and stability – multipolarity would cause a disruption in this security Kagan, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 2007
(Robert, July 17, Stanford University Hoover Foundation, ―End of Dreams, Return of History,‖ http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136, Policy Review, Volume: 144, accessed 7/6/13, CBC)
It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ‘s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ‘s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

Multipolarity is empirically proven to fail – Unipolarity is key to prevent nuclear war Khalilzad, former US ambassador to the UN, 95
(Zalmay, Mar 22, The Washington Quarterly, ―Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the Cold War,‖ http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-16781957/losingmoment-united-states.html, accessed 7/6/13, CBC)

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Finally, and most important, there is no guarantee that the system will succeed in its own terms. Its operation requires subtle calculations and indications of intentions in order to maintain the balance while avoiding war; nations must know how to signal their depth of commitment on a given issue without taking irrevocable steps toward war. This balancing act proved impossible even for the culturally similar and aristocratically governed states of the nineteenth-century European balance of power systems. It will be infinitely more difficult when the system is global, the participants differ culturally, and the governments of many of the states, influenced by public opinion, are unable to be as flexible (or cynical) as the rules of the system require. Thus, miscalculations might be made about the state of the balance that could lead to wars that the United States might be unable to stay out of. The balance of power system failed in the past, producing World War I and other major conflicts. It might not work any better in the future - and war among major powers in the nuclear age is likely to be more devastating. Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. Precluding the rise of a hostile global rival is a good guide for defining what interests the United States should regard as vital and for which of them it should be ready to use force and put American lives at risk. It is a good prism for identifying threats, setting priorities for U.S. policy toward various regions and states, and assessing needs for military capabilities and modernization.

Multipolarity bad – resource wars, arms races, economic crises, and climate change Layne, Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at Texas A&M, 9
(Christopher, summer 2009, Texas A&M University, International Security, ―The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?,‖ http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html, accessed 7/9/13, CBC)
What will multipolarity mean? The NIC‘s answer is equivocal. Although it predicts that, along with Europe, new great powers will oppose a continuation of a U.S.-dominated unipolar system, Global Trends 2025 does not anticipate that the emerging great powers will seek to radically alter the international system as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (p. 84).20 Still, there are factors that could lead to a more fraught international environment, including: the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, which could fuel new regional arms races (p. 97); competition for control of natural resources—especially energy—which could drive great power competitions (pp. 63–66)21; and fallout from the financial and economic crisis, which could cause the international economic system to become more mercantilist (pp. 93–94). Finally, in a multipolar world, established international institutions may not be able to deal with the challenges posed by economic and financial turmoil, energy scarcity, and global climate change. In such a world, a nonhegemonic United States will lack the capability to revitalize them (p. 81). Although no one can be certain how events will unfold in coming decades, Global Trends 2025 makes a strong argument that a multipolar world will be fundamentally different than the post–Cold War era of U.S. preeminence. [End Page 154]

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Multipolarity prompts miscalculation and reckless wars Ye, Boston University International Relations Professor, 2004
(Min, September 2004, China Institute for Public Affairs, ―The U.S. Hegemony and Implication for China,‖ http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper_Ye.pdf, accessed 7/9/13, CBC)
In the wake of the Cold War, many scholars from Europe and quite a few in the United States have argued that the world is heading toward a multipolar system and multipolarity is better for the stability of system. To them, multipolarity enables flexible and efficient balancing and hence enhances stability, according to classic realists like Kissinger. This argument is not tenable because, the more poles exist in the system, the more unstable the balancing becomes. Minor powers have choices to change allies readily. Besides, multipolarity makes miscalculations rather easy in international relations. States can miscount their allies‘ loyalty and their own material capabilities; reckless wars are rather easy to occur.

History proves multipolarity unstable – collapse of hegemony risks wars. Kagan, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Senior Fellow, 12
(Robert W., February 11, ―Why the World Needs America,‖ Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html, Accessed online 7/6/13, AX) Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Would it survive in a post-American world? Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American predominance would be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful. Rough parity among powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to miscalculation. Conflicts erupt as a result of fluctuations in the delicate power equation. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity from the 16th to the 18th centuries, culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europe-wide wars that followed the French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were killed or wounded. The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition, numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W. Tucker has observed, "Such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the essential means for maintaining the balance of power." There is little reason to believe that a return to multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in the past. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand.

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Without US presence, American ideals disappear and chaos is the result. Kagan, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution 2012
(Robert W., February 11, ―Why the World Needs America,‖ Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html, Accessed online 7/6/13, AX) Americans certainly like to believe that our preferred order survives because it is right and just— not only for us but for everyone. We assume that the triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better system, and that both are irreversible. That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen. But international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others—in America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to champion it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe—which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

Multipolarity theory fails- a multipolar future would be marked by violent bids for primacy- the theory assumes a preference for equality. Wohlforth, Dartmith Government Professor, 9
[William C., January 2009,World Politics ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War‖ Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH] When applied to the setting of great power politics, these propositions¶ suggest that the nature and intensity of status competition will be influenced¶ by the nature of the polarity that characterizes the system.¶ Multipolarity implies a flat hierarchy in which no state is unambiguously¶ number one. Under such a setting, the theory predicts status inconsistency¶ and intense pressure on each state to resolve it in a way that¶ reflects favorably on itself. In this sense, all states are presumptively¶ revisionist in that the absence of a settled hierarchy provides incentives¶ to establish one. But the theory expects the process of establishing a¶ hierarchy to be prone to conflict: any state would be expected to prefer a¶ status quo under which there are no unambiguous superiors to any other¶ state‘s successful bid for primacy. Thus, an order in which one‘s own¶ state is number one is preferred to the status quo, which is preferred to¶ any order in which another state is number one. The expected result¶ will be periodic bids for primacy, resisted by other great powers.


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Cooperation doesn‘t solve security issues – no consensus Gvodsdev, National Interest former editor, 6-15-12
(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. 6-15-12, World Politics Review, ―The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,‖ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-sshould-go-minilateral, accessed 7-8-12, CNM) As for the possibility that the ―international community‖ might play the collective role of system-enabler, Bremmer is pessimistic, as am I. He anticipates no significant outcomes from the upcoming G-20 summit, for instance, because there is simply no consensus among the participating states on how to cope with any of the problems topping the global agenda. No state, not even the United States, can impose its will on the rest, while all the major powers can exercise effective vetoes to torpedo action. The United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized the no-fly zone over Libya last year, once considered a possible model of great power cooperation, looks more and more like an outlier.

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AT – Bipolarity Solves
Bipolarity theory fails- a bipolar future would be marked by violent bids for primacy- the theory assumes submissive secondary states and a preference for equality. Wohlforth, Dartmith Government Professor, 9
[William C., January 2009,World Politics ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War‖ Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH] 37¶ For its part, bipolarity, with only two states in a material position¶ to claim primacy, implies a somewhat more stratified hierarchy that is¶ less prone to ambiguity. Each superpower would be expected to see the¶ other as the main relevant out-group, while second-tier major powers¶ would compare themselves to either or both of them. Given the two¶ poles‘ clear material preponderance, second-tier major powers would¶ not be expected to experience status dissonance and dissatisfaction, and,¶ to the extent they did, the odds would favor their adoption of strategies¶ of social creativity instead of conflict. For their part, the poles would be¶ expected to seek to establish a hierarchy: each would obviously prefer¶ to be number one, but absent that each would also prefer an ambiguous¶ status quo in which neither is dominant to an order in which it is¶ unambiguously outranked by the other.¶

Overwhelming theory and evidence indicate that it is human nature to pursue higher status- means that bipolarity or multipolarity will never solve. Wohlforth, Dartmith Government Professor, 9
[William C., January 2009,World Politics ―Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War‖ Project Muse Accessed 7-3-2013 EJH] Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition¶ for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and¶ related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to¶ the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings¶ presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory,¶ but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist¶ theories of hegemonic war.¶ How much status competition matters in light of the many competing¶ explanations remains to be seen. The theory is distinguished¶ chiefly by its causal mechanisms rather than by its brute predictions—¶ mechanisms that continue to operate in a world in which the mechanisms¶ central to other theories do not. In experimental settings, competition¶ for status can be neatly distinguished from behavior motivated¶ by instrumental pursuit of material rewards. In actual world politics,¶ by contrast, the quest for status is likely to be intertwined with other¶ aims in extremely complex ways. Substantial further refinement, ideally¶ informed by new experimental work, would be necessary to conduct¶ convincing tests against aggregate data.

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AT – Retrenchment Solves/AT – Posen
Posen is wrong – the US will not willingly relinquish its power – global engagement is inevitable which means your turns don‘t matter and it‘s only a question of effectiveness Ferguson, Oxford Senior Research Fellow, 7
[Niall, November/December 2007, The American Interest, ―The Case for Restraint,‖ http://www.theamerican-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=335, accessed 7/6/13, WD] So much for the American predicament. What of Posen‘s alternative grand strategy based on American self-restraint? The terms he uses are themselves revealing. The United States needs to be more ―reticent‖ about its use of military force, more ―modest‖ about its political goals overseas, more ―distant‖ from traditional allies, and more ―stingy‖ in its aid policies. Good luck to the presidential candidate who laces his next foreign policy speech with those adjectives: ―My fellow Americans, I want to make this great country of ours more reticent, modest, distant and stingy!‖ Let us, however, leave aside this quintessentially academic and operationally useless rhetoric. What exactly does Posen want the United States to do? I count six concrete recommendations. The United States should: 1) Abandon the Bush Doctrine of ―preemption‖, which in the case of Iraq has been a policy of preventive war. Posen argues that this applies even in cases of nuclear proliferation. By implication, he sees preventive war as an inferior option to deterrence, though he does not make clear how exactly a nucleararmed Iran would be deterred, least of all if his second recommendation were to be implemented. 2) Reduce U.S. military presence in the Middle East (―the abode of Islam‖) by abandoning ―its permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries.‖ Posen does not say so, but he appears to imply the abandonment of all these bases, not just the ones in Iraq, but also those in, for example, Qatar. It is not clear what would be left of Central Command after such a drastic retreat. Note that this would represent a break with the policy not just of the last two Presidents, but with that of the last 12. 3) Ramp up efforts to provide relief in the wake of natural disasters, exemplified by Operation Unified Assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. No doubt the American military did some good in the wake of the tsunami, but Posen needs to explain why a government that so miserably bungled the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina less than a year later should be expected to be consistently effective in the wake of natural disasters. 4) Assist in humanitarian military interventions only ―under reasonable guidelines‖ and ―in coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate.‖ Does Posen mean that he would favor sending American troops to Darfur at the same time as he is withdrawing them from other ―abodes of Islam?‖ He does not say. 5) Promote not democracy abroad but ―the rule of law, press freedom and the rights of collective bargaining.‖ Here again I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. The government that sought systematically to evade the Geneva Conventions in order to detain indefinitely and torture suspected terrorists as an upholder of the rule of law? 6) Stop offering ―U.S. security guarantees and security assistance, [which] tend to relieve others of the need to do more to ensure their own security.‖ This is in fact the most important of all Posen‘s recommendations, though he saves it until last. He envisages radical diminution of American support for other members of NATO. Over the next ten years, he writes, the United States ―should gradually withdraw from all military headquarters and commands in Europe.‖ In the same timeframe it should ―reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero‖, as well as reducing (though not wholly eliminating) assistance to Egypt. And it should ―reconsider its security relationship with Japan‖,

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 293 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz whatever that means. Again, this represents a break with traditional policy so radical that it would impress even Noam Chomsky, to say nothing of Osama bin Laden (who would, indeed, find little here to object to). Posen, in other words, has proceeded from relatively familiar premises (the limits of American ―hyperpower‖) to some quite fantastic policy recommendations, which are perhaps best summed up as a cross between isolationism and humanitarianism. Only slightly less fantastic than his vision of an American military retreat from the Middle East, Europe and East Asia is Posen‘s notion that it could be sold to the American electorate—just six years after they were the targets of the single largest terrorist attack in history—in the language of self-effacement. Coming from a man who wants to restart mainstream debate on American grand strategy, that is pretty rich.

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AT – Offshore Balancing Solves
Hegemony is key to solve conflicts—offshore balancing does not solve Lind, New America Foundation Economic Growth Program Policy Director, 7
[Michael, May 2007, New America Foundation, ―Beyond American Hegemony,‖ http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381, accessed 7-613, MSG] Another option favored by some realists and libertarians, an offshore-balancing strategy, is unlikely to be adopted and would be unwise. The offshore-balancing strategy would have the United States intervene only at the last moment to "tip the balance" against one side in a contest among Eurasian great powers -- China versus Japan, or Russia versus Germany or the European Union. It would be far better for the United States to maintain a role in diplomacy and security in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, in the hope of defusing conflicts and deterring aggressors, rather than to intervene belatedly, as it did in the two world wars.

Offshore balancing fails to achieve international objectives and causes war Schake, Hoover Institution Research Fellow, 10
[Kori, October 13, 2010, ―Limits of offshore balancing,‖ http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/13/limits_of_offshore_balancing?wp_login_redirect=0, accessed 7/9/13, WD] The New America Foundation convened a conference this week to showcase the work of Robert Pape, in the hopes that his policy prescriptions will be picked up as an alternative to our current strategy in Afghanistan. This would be a terrible idea. Pape's research shows that the majority of suicide bomb attacks occur in places occupied by U.S. military forces; from this he concludes that we should adopt a strategy of "offshore balancing." By which he means to remove U.S. forces and rely on military strikes into the countries, along with more effective political and economic engagement. Neither the research nor the prescriptions are sound bases for policy. To say that attacks occur where U.S. forces are deployed is to say no more than Willy Sutton, who robbed banks because "that's where the money is." Pape's approach ignores the context in which deployment and stationing of U.S. forces occurs. We send troops to advance our interests, protect our allies, and contest the political and geographic space that groups like al Qaeda and the Taliban are operating in. Of course the attacks will stop if we cede those political objectives. But the troops are not the point, the political objectives are the point. The second important context Pape glosses over is that suicide attacks do not occur wherever in the world U.S. troops are deployed. Troops stationed in Germany, Japan, or South Korea are not at risk of suicide attacks from the people of those countries. This is not just about U.S. troops, but also about the societies we are operating in. It is about a radical and violent interpretation of Islam that we are using military force to contest. The policy prescriptions Pape advances are also problematic. An offshore balancing approach means that we will not be engaged with military forces on the ground, and yet what we have learned in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that we achieve our objectives most fully when indigenous forces are partnered with us and made able to take over the work of U.S. forces in the fight. They have greater legitimacy, local knowledge, and make the outcome most durable. That was the

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 295 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Bush administration's strategy in Iraq, and it is the purported approach of the Obama administration in Afghanistan. Pape's policies have no way to achieve that improvement in the capacity of partner forces. An offshore balancing approach is also inherently retaliatory and has been shown to increase the resistance of affected populations to supporting our objectives . We threaten to use force from the safe confines of distance; that use of force may have pinpoint accuracy but will often be less precise and cause more civilian casualties than forces on the ground, which will again feed into public attitudes about whether to support U.S. goals. Instead of working with the people most affected and helping build their capacity to protect themselves, offshore balancing does little to change the problem in positive ways. Except for the "improved" political and economic activity. How that will be undertaken in a deteriorating security environment is mysterious. Moreover, if we could do any better at the provision of political and economic engagement, we'd already be doing that. Convincing allies the U.S. will commit itself to fight unless we have troops stationed where we expect the fight to occur has always been difficult. The history of the Cold War is replete with transatlantic discussion of extended deterrence: would the United States really send the boys back over if Germany were attacked? Would the United States really use nuclear weapons when our own homeland would be at risk of retaliation? It seems unlikely those concerns would be attenuated in societies we are less politically and culturally similar to than we are to Europeans. In short, Robert Pape's " offshore balancing " approach would reduce violence by giving our enemies what they want: our disengagement, the ability to terrorize with impunity the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other places where the battle of ideas about Muslim modernity is engaged.

Offshore balancing will never happen – no support domestically or internationally Taliaferro, Tufts University Associate Professor of Political Science, 7
[Jeffrey W., Summer 2007, ―Hegemonic Delusions: Power, Liberal Imperialism, and the Bush Doctrine,‖ p. 181, dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00064.00015, accessed 7/9/13, WD] Second, many of Layne's arguments about the feasibility of an offshore balancing strategy today seem disconnected from political reality . He devotes only five pages in a 2 90-page book to a discussion of how the United States ought to go about implementing his preferred strategy. He never grapples with the tremendous sunk costs of U.S. forward deployment in Europe and East Asia, nor does he consider the lack of support for such a radically different grand strategy among officials in Washington or the American people . It is also difficult to imagine Washington's allies in the Persian Gulf, East Asia, and even Western Europe openly advocating the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in the near future, if for no other reason than that the American military presence dampens the security dilemma in those three regions.

No debate – offshore balancing is terrible – destroys all US heg and causes regional nuclear escalation Kagan, Brookings Foreign Policy Senior Fellow, 11
[Robert, January 24, 2011, ―The Price of Power: The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs,‖ http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3, accessed 7/9/13, WD]

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 296 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Others have. For decades ―realist‖ analysts have called for a strategy of ―offshore balancing.‖ Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed ―passing the mantle of regional stabilizer‖ to a consortium of ―Russia, China, Iran, and India.‖ In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly ―stabilize‖ the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan‘s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously , in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build ―situations of strength‖ (Acheson‘s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a ―preponderance of power,‖ and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 297 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman‘s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of ―imperial overstretch,‖ arguing that American decline was inevitable ―if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]‖ were allowed to continue at the same time as ―massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.‖ Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II —the prevention of major war , the support of an open trading system , and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government . How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don‘t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the ―end of history.‖ It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

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Hegemony Bad

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1NC – Hegemony Bad Case Turn
A. Transition to multipolarity now Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies Counselor and Trustee, Feist, CNN‘s Washington Bureau Chief and Senior Vice President 12
(Zbigniew, Former White House National Security Adviser, Sam, March 29, 2012, Council of Foreign Relations, ―A Conversation With Zbigniew Brzezinski,‖ http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-andpolitics/conversation-zbigniew-brzezinski/p27829, accessed 7/4/12, YGS) QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Dr. Brzezinski, I want to ask you about the other side of the coin. I was just at the World -- the Affordability World Security (sic\Affordable World Security two-day meeting here in town that was put on by the East-West Center and Kerry Foundation (ph), and had an amazing collection of people. But what they said that means is that we have to address climate, water, food, population, jobs -- I mean, it was this long list of things that we have to figure out how to work together on solving them so that we all sort of stay alive. How do we make that happen? BRZEZINSKI: Well, you make that happen by avoiding the kind of global politics that we have had for the last 200 years. And that is to say we have to have entities that are to some extent balanced in equilibrium and as there a consequence of which they realize they cannot prevail. And I think what gives me some degree of optimism is also the knowledge that we now live in a world in which in fact hegemony by a single power is not attainable because the people the worldwide are politically awakened. I've written a great deal about the notion of the global political awakening, and that's a new phenomenon; we've never had that historically. It only started with the French Revolution, then it spread to Asia with World War I and its aftermath. It's now global, and that makes it much more difficult for any power to think it can be dominant. You know, President George Bush II once said that God has chosen America to be the model for the world. Well, you know, I don't know where he got this information -- whether it was from the CIA -- my sources tell me that God is neutral on these subjects. (Laughter.) But in any case, the world is no longer congenial to domination by a single power. So we and the Chinese are operating in a very different environment from the one in which we and the Soviets competed and threatened each other, or we and the Nazis fought against each other or the British and the French fought against the Germans and then we joined in in World War I and so forth, because these problems are potentially as destructive or even more destructive than the wars that we have fought. FEIST: Question. Yes sir? QUESTIONER: Zbig, my question to you is a follow-on for really, I think, what you've just been talking about. And that is, you've laid out a pretty sophisticated kind of road map, as you say -- but maybe a vision for where the United States should go in terms of thinking about its role. But -- BRZEZINSKI: You'd better speak up, because I'm not sure everyone can hear you. QUESTIONER: I'm sorry. But -- do we have a political culture and a political system that is capable of thinking in these terms? Or do we have to instead talk about exceptionalism and think in terms of bumper sticker terms in terms of foreign policy? BRZEZINSKI: Well, that's one of my grave concerns in my book. In fact, I talk about some of the basic structural weaknesses of America, which actually threaten our ability to play a preeminent role. And I leave that slightly open in terms of whether we will or will not be able to do it.

B. Primacy rationalizations are compelling – begetting more efforts at primacy Walt, Harvard University international affairs professor, 11

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 300 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz (Steven M., professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, October 25, 2011, The National Interest, “The End of the American Era,‖http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037?page=show, Accessed: 6/29/12, LPS) THE UNITED States has been the dominant world power since 1945, and U.S. leaders have long sought to preserve that privileged position. They understood, as did most Americans, that primacy brought important benefits. It made other states less likely to threaten America or its vital interests directly. By dampening great-power competition and giving Washington the capacity to shape regional balances of power, primacy contributed to a more tranquil international environment. That tranquility fostered global prosperity; investors and traders operate with greater confidence when there is less danger of war. Primacy also gave the United States the ability to work for positive ends: promoting human rights and slowing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It may be lonely at the top, but Americans have found the view compelling.

C. Prolonging transition risks global stability Farley, University of Kentucky assistant professor of Diplomacy and International Commerce, 3-7-12
(Dr. Robert, World Politics Review, "Over the Horizon: The Future of American Hegemony," http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11696/over-the-horizon-the-future-of-american-hegemony, accessed 7-6-12, CNM) What are the dangers? Hegemony has never meant the ability to achieve any outcome the United States wants, whenever it wants. Indeed, hegemony may mean the luxury to make dreadful mistakes without suffering dreadful consequences. However, as the gap between the United States and other great powers declines, the margin for error narrows. The most dangerous steps for the United States to take would involve projects that threaten fiscal capacity while also undercutting the U.S.sponsored system of global management. The invasion of Iraq, for example, is not an undertaking that the United States would want to repeat in the future. It undermined global confidence in both the international system of governance and the decision-making capacity of the United States government, while damaging the fiscal health of the United States. Ironically, advocates of the war believed that it would demonstrate not only American power, but also reinforce confidence in American leadership. For better or worse, the U.S. has imparted the character of the major formal and informal institutions that have managed international life for the past 70 years. The shift from U.S. hegemony to multipolarity -or to unipolarity around another nation -- will change the nature of those institutions, likely leading to a significant degree of upheaval and uncertainty. The great danger is that the United States will, in an effort to prolong and maintain its hegemony, undertake policies that undermine the foundations of American‘s place in the world. It is not comforting that those who talk loudest of U.S. exceptionalism and a new American Century consistently recommend policies that misunderstand the relationship between U.S. power and the modern international system. Nothing about the future is guaranteed; wise policies can revise and extend a globally acceptable ―American Century,‖ while foolish policies can cut it short.

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D. Turns the case – Hegemony causes econ collapse, backlash, and foreign overstretch – only retreat is sustainable Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13
[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, ―Pull Back,‖ Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD] Despite a decade of costly and indecisive warfare and mounting fiscal pressures, the long-standing consensus among American policymakers about U.S. grand strategy has remained remarkably intact. As the presidential campaign made clear, Republicans and Democrats may quibble over foreign policy at the margins, but they agree on the big picture: that the United States should dominate the world militarily, economically, and politically, as it has since the final years of the Cold War, a strategy of liberal hegemony The country, they hold, needs to preserve its massive lead in the global balance of power, consolidate its economic preeminence, enlarge the community of market democracies, and maintain its outsized influence in the international institutions it helped create. To this end, the U.S. government has expanded its sprawling Cold War-era network of security commitments and military bases. It has reinforced its existing alliances, adding new members to NATO and enhancing its security agreement with Japan. In the Persian Gulf, it has sought to protect the flow of oil with a full panoply of air, sea, and land forces, a goal that consumes at least 15 percent of the U.S. defense budget. Washington has put China on a watch list, ringing it in with a network of alliances, less formal relationships, and military bases. The United States' activism has entailed a long list of ambitious foreign policy projects. Washington has tried to rescue failing states, intervening militarily in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya, variously attempting to defend human rights, suppress undesirable nationalist movements, and install democratic regimes. It has also tried to contain so-called rogue states that oppose the United States, such as Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, North Korea, and, to a lesser degree, Syria. After 9/11, the struggle against al Qaeda and its allies dominated the agenda, but the George W. Bush administration defined this enterprise broadly and led the country into the painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the United States has long sought to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons, the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists has added urgency to this objective, leading to constant tension with Iran and North Korea. In pursuit of this ambitious agenda, the United States has consistently spent hundreds of billions of dollars per year on its military -- far more than the sum of the defense budgets of its friends and far more than the sum of those of its potential adversaries. It has kept that military busy: U.S. troops have spent roughly twice as many months in combat after the Cold War as they did during it . Today, roughly 180,000 U.S. soldiers remain stationed on foreign soil, not counting the tens of thousands more who have rotated through the war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thousands of American and allied soldiers have lost their lives, not to mention the countless civilians caught in the crossfire. This undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy has done untold harm to U.S. national security. It makes enemies almost as fast as it slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense, and convinces powerful states to band together and oppose Washington's plans, further raising the costs of carrying out its foreign policy. During the 1990s, these consequences were manageable because the United States enjoyed such a favorable power position and chose its wars carefully Over the last decade, however, the country's relative power has deteriorated, and policymakers have made dreadful choices concerning which wars to fight and how to fight them. What's more, the Pentagon has come to depend on continuous infusions of cash simply to retain its current force structure -- levels of spending that the Great Recession and the United States' ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable. It is time to abandon the United States' hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint. This approach would mean giving up on global reform and sticking to protecting narrow national security interests. It would mean transforming the military into a smaller force that goes to war

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 302 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz only when it truly must. It would mean removing large numbers of U.S. troops from forward bases, creating incentives for allies to provide for their own security And because such a shift would allow the United States to spend its resources on only the most pressing international threats, it would help preserve the country's prosperity and security over the long run.

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Uniqueness

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Transition Now is Key
Multipolarity is inevitable but transition now is key – the alternative is political turmoil and deadly transition wars Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13
[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, ―Pull Back,‖ Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD] Shifting to a more restrained global stance would yield meaningful benefits for the United States, saving lives and resources and preventing pushback, provided Washington makes deliberate and prudent moves now to prepare its allies to take on the responsibility for their own defense. Scaling down the U.S. military's presence over a decade would give partners plenty of time to fortify their own militaries and develop the political and diplomatic machinery to look after their own affairs. Gradual disengagement would also reduce the chances of creating security vacuums, which opportunistic regional powers might try to fill. U.S. allies, of course, will do everything they can to persuade Washington to keep its current policies in place. Some will promise improvements to their military forces that they will then abandon when it is convenient. Some will claim there is nothing more they can contribute, that their domestic political and economic constraints matter more than America's. Others will try to divert the discussion to shared values and principles. Still others will hint that they will bandwagon with strong neighbors rather than balance against them. A few may even threaten to turn belligerent. U.S. policymakers will need to remain cool in the face of such tactics and keep in mind that these wealthy allies are unlikely to surrender their sovereignty to regional powers. Indeed, history has shown that states more often balance against the powerful than bandwagon with them. As for potential adversaries, the United States can continue to deter actions that threaten its vital interests by defining those interests narrowly, stating them clearly, and maintaining enough military power to protect them. Of course, the United States could do none of these things and instead continue on its present track, wasting resources and earning the enmity of some states and peoples while infantilizing others. Perhaps current economic and geopolitical trends will reverse themselves, and the existing strategy will leave Washington comfortably in the driver's seat, with others eager to live according to its rules. But if the U.S. debt keeps growing and power continues to shift to other countries, some future economic or political crisis could force Washington to switch course abruptly, compelling friendly and not-sofriendly countries to adapt suddenly. That seems like the more dangerous path.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 305 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Uniqueness – Brink
Hegemony is in crisis Ikenberry, Princeton University professor of Politics and International Affairs, 11
(John, 10-16-11, Foreign Policy, "Ikenberry's turn," http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/16/ikenberrys_turn, accessed 7-3-12, CNM) I go on to argue that this hegemonic order is in crisis. Importantly, it is not liberal internationalism -as a logic of order -- that is in crisis. It is America's hegemonic role that is in trouble. There is a global struggle underway over the distribution of rights, privileges, authority, etc. I argue that this is a "crisis of success" in that it is the rise of non-Western developing states and the ongoing intensification of economic and security interdependence that have triggered the crisis and overrun the governance institutions of the old order. This is a bit like Samuel Huntington's famous "development gap" -- a situation in which rapidly mobilizing and expanding social forces and economic transformation, facilitated by the old political institutions, have outpaced and overrun those institutions. That is what has happened to American hegemony. The book ends by asking: what comes next? And I argue that the constituencies for open, rules-based order are expanding, not contracting. The world system may become "less American," but it will not become "less liberal." So that is my argument.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 306 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Transition Now
U.S. losing influence and leverage –Iran proves Cunningham, International Affairs Expert Writer, 13
(Finian Cunningham is a Master‘s graduate in Agricultural Chemistry and worked as a scientific editor for the Royal Society of Chemistry, Cambridge, England and worked as a scientific editor for the Royal Society of Chemistry, Cambridge, England¶ , 4-13-13, PressTV, ―Iran deals deathblow to US global hegemony,‖ http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/04/12/297864/iran-key-to-us-global-defeat/, accessed 79-13, LLM) The United States of America has become a byword for war. No other nation state has started as many wars or conflicts in modern times than the USA - the United States of Armageddon. Beneath the Western media façade of ―unpredictable‖ and ―aggressive‖ North Korea, the real source of conflict in the present round of war tensions on the Korean Peninsula is the US. Washington is presented as a restraining, defensive force. But, in reality, the dangerous nuclear stand-off has to be seen in the context of Washington‘s historical drive for war and hegemony in every corner of the world. North Korea may present an immediate challenge to Washington‘s hegemonic ambitions. However, as we shall see, Iran presents a much greater and potentially fatal challenge to the American global empire. It is documented record, thanks to writers and thinkers like William Blum and Noam Chomsky, that the US has been involved in more than 60 wars and many more proxy conflicts, subterfuges and coups over the nearly seven decades since the Second World War. No other nation on earth comes close to this American track record of belligerence and threat to world security. No other nation has so much blood on its hands. Americans like to think of their country as first in the world for freedom, humanitarian principles, technology and economic prowess. The truth is more brutal and prosaic. The US is first in the world for war-mongering and raining death and destruction down on others. Since then we have seen the US become embroiled in more and more wars - sometimes under the guise of ―coalitions of the willing‖, the United Nations or NATO. A variety of pretexts have also been invoked: war on drugs, war on terror, Axis of Evil, responsibility to protect, the world‘s policeman, upholding global peace and security, preventing weapons of mass destruction. But always, these wars are Washington-led affairs. And always the pretexts are mere pretty windowdressing for Washington‘s brutish strategic interests. Now it seems we have reached a phase of history where the world is witnessing a state of permanent war prosecuted by the US and its underlings: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq (again), Libya, Pakistan, Somalia (again), Mali and Syria, to mention a few. These theaters of criminal US military operations join a list of ongoing covert wars against Palestine, Cuba, Iran and North Korea. Iran, however, presents a greater and more problematic challenge to US global hegemony. The US in 2013 is a very different animal from what it was in 1945. Now it resembles more a lumbering giant. Gone is its former economic prowess and its arteries are sclerotic with its internal social decay and malaise. Crucially, too, the lumbering American giant has squandered any moral strength it may have had in the eyes of the world. Its veil of morality and democratic principle may have appeared credible in 1945, but that cover has been torn asunder by the countless wars and nefarious intrigues over the ensuing decades to reveal a pathological warmonger. The American military power is still, of course, a highly dangerous force. But it is now more like a bulging muscle hanging on an otherwise emaciated corpse. Iran presents this lumbering, dying power with a fatal challenge. For a start, Iran does not have nuclear weapons or ambitions and it has

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 307 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz repeatedly stated this, thereby gaining much-reciprocated good will from the international community, including the public of North America and Europe. The US or its surrogates cannot therefore credibly justify a military strike on Iran, as it might do against North Korea, without risking a tsunami of political backlash. Secondly, Iran exerts a controlling influence over the vital drug that keeps the American economic system alive - the world‘s supply of oil and gas. Any war with Iran, if the US were so foolish to embark on it, would result in a deathblow to the waning American and global economy. A third reason why Iran presents a mortal challenge to US global hegemony is that the Islamic Republic is a formidable military power. Its 80 million-strong people are committed to antiimperialism and any strike from the US or its allies would result in a region-wide war that would pull down the very pillars of Western geopolitical architecture, including the collapse of the Israeli state and the overthrow of the House of Saud and the other the Persian Gulf oil dictatorships. US planners know this and that is why they will not dare to confront Iran head-on. But that leaves the US empire with a fatal dilemma. Its congenital belligerence arising from in its capitalist DNA, puts the US ruling elite on a locked-in stalemate with Iran. The longer that stalemate persists, the more the US global power will drain from its corpse. The American empire, as many others have before, could therefore founder on the rocks of the ancient Persian empire.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 308 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Constrained Now
Hegemony is unsustainable – hegemony constrained now – realists agree
Snyder, University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management Research Scholar, 12 (Quddus Z. Snyder, Fall 2009, University of Maryland, ―Systemic Theory in an Era of Declining US Hegemony,‖ http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.pdf, pgs. 10-2, Accessed 77-13, LLM) What the above suggestsis that hegemony in the military-security context has been rather ¶ different from US hegemony in the context of the world economic system. In the former, the US ¶ has maintained important security ties with Europe and Japan; US involvement has probably ¶ worked to manage regional security dilemmas. For instance, US security guarantees have played ¶ an important role in German and Japanese decisions not to build military capability befitting of a ¶ great power, developments that would certainly change regional security dynamics. In security ¶ affairs, the US has tolerated free riders and shown a willingness to foot the bill.35 But in the ¶ economic realm, since the 1970s, the US has become increasingly intolerant of asymmetry and ¶ unwilling to underwrite the system.¶ 36 This became evident when Nixon ended the gold standard ¶ and instituted an import surcharge. US impatience with its allies was also apparent in the trade ¶ conflicts between the US and Japan throughout the 1980s and into the 90s. Though the dollar is ¶ still the main reserve currency, since the 1970s the economic order appears much less hegemonic ¶ when viewed from the lens of political economy than it does when viewed with an eye toward ¶ security. At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‗hegemonic age.‘37 But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion.38 With its armed forces ¶ over-extended, and resources stretched, the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago.39 The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds ¶ itself in:¶ This three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) ¶ produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequence ¶ can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the ¶ costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If ¶ the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry ¶ and agriculture, the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either ¶ consumption or protection will decline.40¶ Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment ¶ have been sustained by deficit spending. It is unclear how long this formula will work.¶ 41¶ The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars, it is ¶ also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. Of course, everyone is getting hit. Because all ¶ are suffering, the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials.42 Relative power is ¶ important, but so is the hegemon‘s ability to actually do things. It is unlikely that the US will ¶ have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. It is ¶ unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; however, these projects will¶ gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America‘s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China.43 The point is simply that America‘s ¶ unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing.¶ 44 US security guarantees may ¶ prove less credible than they once were, leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. ¶ The US may still be a giant, but one that, for now at least, seems more bound.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 309 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Constraints on foreign policy now – domestic intervention fatigue and overstretch Grunstein, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief, 6-22-12
(Judah, World Politics Review, 6-22-12, ―Obama's Record: Tactics Trump Strategy in an Age of Constraints,‖ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12085/obamas-record-tactics-trump-strategyin-an-age-of-constraints, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) One common criticism of Obama -- that he just hasn't accomplished anything of significance -- is in large part due to the geopolitical context in which the administration is operating, characterized most prominently by constraints on action. Some of these constraints have to do with the Bush administration‘s legacy, not least the need to nurture multilateral legitimacy for U.S. action. Domestic intervention fatigue and the need to reset an overstretched U.S. military also mean that the use of military force must be reserved for cases of either vital national interest or little risk (Libya), leaving out the broad middle range of typical crises, such as Syria.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 310 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Low – No Leverage
US has no leverage – Egypt proves Weisbrode, European University Institute diplomatic historian, 11
(Kenneth Weisbrode is a diplomatic historian at the European University Institute and author of "The Atlantic Century." 2-8-11, World Politics Review, ―The U.S. and Egypt: The Limits of Hegemony,‖ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7805/the-u-s-and-egypt-the-limits-of-hegemony, accessed 77-13, LLM) When U.S. President Barack Obama dispatched diplomat Frank Wisner to deliver a personal message to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the symbolism was obvious to anyone who remembered Ronald Reagan's message in 1986 to Philippine leader Ferdinand Marcos, then in power for 20 years, at the acme of the "People Power" movement in the Philippines: Yes, you have been among our most loyal allies, but your time is up. Either Mubarak didn't get the message or Wisner delivered a somewhat different one. The diplomat waited in Cairo a day or two, then returned home while Mubarak continued to resist ever louder calls for his resignation. A few days later Wisner spoke publicly in favor of keeping Mubarak in place. Meanwhile Obama resorted to a long phone call and a subsequent public insistence that the Egyptian ruler begin a "transition," repeated several times over the course of the week. This was not to be, either, at least not right away, raising the question: If the U.S. can't compel the leader of a country that is the second-largest recipient of direct assistance and whose welfare depends in so many ways directly upon the United States to do as it wishes, then who can it compel ? What does this say about American power? Having graduated from the status of superpower to that of hyperpower, has the U.S. still not moved beyond the Gulliver stereotype of the 1960s?

U.S. losing influence and leverage, rising powers like Brazil prove Hakim, Senior fellow of International Economic and Political for the InterAmerican Dialogue, 12
(Peter, October 22, 2012, Inter-American Dialogue, ―Inter-American Discord: Brazil and the United States‖ http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3115, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) The US and Brazil have not had an easy time with each other in recent years. Although relations between the two countries are by no means adversarial or even unfriendly, they have featured more discord than cooperation—both regionally and globally. And there is little reason to expect dramatic change any time soon. At the 2005 summit meeting of hemispheric leaders, disagreements between the US and Brazil brought a halt to the faltering negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In 2009, it was largely US-Brazilian differences that delayed resolution of the Honduran political impasse for almost a year. Later in 2009, Brazil galvanized opposition across South America to block a USColombian military accord. Today, the two countries remain at loggerheads over Cuba‘s participation in hemispheric affairs, disagree on how to manage relations with Paraguay in the aftermath of the impeachment and ouster of President Lugo, and continue to have sharply diverging views on the appropriate roles of the Organization of American States and its InterAmerican Human Rights Commission. Even more unsettling for US-Brazilian relations have been the clashes over global issues. Washington has been especially troubled, and the bilateral relationship most bruised, by Brazil‘s defense of Iran‘s nuclear program and its opposition to UN sanctions on Iran. The two countries have also

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 311 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz taken conflicting positions on nonproliferation questions, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and international responses to the uprisings in Syria and Libya. World trade negotiations have long been a matter of contention for both nations. Brazilian and US leaders often publicly assert that their bilateral relationship is as good or better than it has ever been, and claim that it is continuing to improve. Although more commonly expressed by US officials, it is not unusual for each of the two governments to refer to the other as a global or regional partner—and to suggest that the two nations are working toward a more robust, even strategic relationship. Yet, despite the continuing rhetoric, neither country has done much in recent years to advance the development of deeper, more cooperative ties. Relations are not getting worse, but they are not getting better either. The two countries are not cooperating more today than they were a dozen years ago—and their differences have extended to a wider range of issues. They certainly have not found many areas for collaboration. The agreements they have reached seem mostly to be insubstantial or peripheral to the relationship, or they have not been effectively implemented. They have not led to any particularly productive collaboration. On most fronts, relations seem to be drifting, propelled largely by inertia, without much direction or decision. Even when the two nations have identified shared objectives that would advance the interests of both, they have rarely developed the cooperation needed to pursue them. The US and Brazil clearly have an array of common economic interests. Yet, they have not signed a single major economic pact in more than two decades—a period when Washington has reached free trade accords with some 20 countries worldwide, 11 in Latin America alone. In 2007, the two countries, which produce nearly 90 percent of the world‘s ethanol, agreed to work together to establish world markets for the fuel and develop improved technologies for its production. But they have made little progress on either front. More generally, as the world‘s two largest agricultural exporters, Brazil and the US are well aware of how much they would gain by diminishing global trade barriers to food products. But they have never been able to collaborate effectively to achieve that goal. On the contrary, agricultural trade issues remain a source of bitter dispute between the two countries. Cooperation has been equally elusive and disappointing in many other areas of interest to both governments including, for example, nuclear nonproliferation, transnational drug and crime challenges, and climate change.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 312 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Unsustainable
New challengers to US heg mean at best it‘s only sustainable in the short term Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13
[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, ―Pull Back,‖ Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD] The United States emerged from the Cold War as the single most powerful state in modern times, a position that its diversified and immensely productive economy supports. Although its share of world economic output will inevitably shrink as other countries catch up, the United States will continue for many years to rank as one of the top two or three economies in the world. The United States' per capita GDP stands at $48,000, more than five times as large as China's, which means that the U.S. economy can produce cutting-edge products for a steady domestic market. North America is blessed with enviable quantities of raw materials, and about 29 percent of U.S. trade flows to and from its immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico. The fortuitous geostrategic position of the United States compounds these economic advantages. Its neighbors to the north and south possess only miniscule militaries. Vast oceans to the west and east separate it from potential rivals. And its thousands of nuclear weapons deter other countries from ever entertaining an invasion. Ironically, however, instead of relying on these inherent advantages for its security, the United States has acted with a profound sense of insecurity, adopting an unnecessarily militarized and forwardleaning foreign policy. That strategy has generated predictable pushback. Since the 1990s, rivals have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing" -- low-grade diplomatic opposition. China and Russia regularly use the rules of liberal international institutions to delegitimize the United States' actions. In the UN Security Council, they wielded their veto power to deny the West resolutions supporting the bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and more recently, they have slowed the effort to isolate Syria. They occasionally work together in other venues, too, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Although the Beijing-Moscow relationship is unimpressive compared with military alliances such as NATO, it's remarkable that it exists at all given the long history of border friction and hostility between the two countries. As has happened so often in history, the common threat posed by a greater power has driven unnatural partners to cooperate. American activism has also generated harder forms of balancing. China has worked assiduously to improve its military, and Russia has sold it modern weapons, such as fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and diesel-electric submarines. Iran and North Korea, meanwhile, have pursued nuclear programs in part to neutralize the United States' overwhelming advantages in conventional fighting power. Some of this pushback would have occurred no matter what; in an anarchic global system, states acquire the allies and military power that help them look after themselves. But a country as large and as active as the United States intensifies these responses. Such reactions will only grow stronger as emerging economies convert their wealth into military power. Even though the economic and technological capacities of China and India may never equal those of the United States, the gap is destined to narrow. China already has the potential to be a serious competitor. At the peak of the Cold War, in the mid-1970s, Soviet GDP, in terms of purchasing power parity, amounted to 57 percent of U.S. GDP. China reached 75 percent of the U.S. level in 2011, and according to the International Monetary Fund, it is projected to match it by 2017. Of course, Chinese output must support four times as many people, which limits what the country can extract for military purposes, but it still provides enough resources to hinder U.S. foreign policy Meanwhile, Russia, although a shadow of its former Soviet self, is no longer the hapless weakling it was in the 1990s. Its economy is roughly the size of the United Kingdom's or France's, it has plenty of energy resources to export, and it still produces some impressive weapons systems.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 313 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

US hegemony spending unsustainable Macdonald, Wellesley College political science professor, & Parent, University of Miami political science professor, 11
(Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, November/December 2011, Foreign Affairs, ―The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,‖ Vol. 90 Issue 6, p32-47, ebsco, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) Today, however, U.S. power has begun to wane. As other states rise in prominence, the United States' undisciplined spending habits and open-ended foreign policy commitments are catching up with the country. Spurred on by skyrocketing government debt and the emergence of the Tea Party movement, budget hawks are circling Washington. Before leaving office earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced cuts to the tune of $78 billion over the next five years, and the recent debt-ceiling deal could trigger another $350 billion in cuts from the defense budget over ten years. In addition to fiscal discipline, Washington appears to have rediscovered the virtues of multilateralism and a restrained foreign policy. It has narrowed its war aims in Afghanistan and Iraq, taken NATO expansion off its agenda, and let France and the United Kingdom lead the intervention in Libya. But if U.S. policymakers have reduced the country's strategic commitments in response to a decline in its relative power, they have yet to fully embrace retrenchment as a policy and endorse deep spending cuts (especially to the military), redefine Washington's foreign policy priorities, and shift more of the United States' defense burdens onto its allies. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has warned that a cut in defense spending beyond the one agreed to in the debt-ceiling deal would be devastating. "It will weaken our national defense," he said. "It will undermine our ability to maintain our alliances throughout the world." This view reflects the conventional wisdom of generations of U.S. decision-makers: when it comes to power, more is always better. Many officials fear that reducing the country's influence abroad would let tyranny advance and force trade to dwindle. And various interest groups oppose the idea, since they stand to lose from a sudden reduction in the United States' foreign engagements.

U.S. heg is unsustainable- strategic flaws in underlying presumptions Mazzar, U.S. National War College National Security Strategy professor, 12
(Michael J., Fall 2012, Center for Strategic and International Studies, ―The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency‖, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallMazarr.pdf, accessed 7/6/13, LLM) Throughout history, major powers have confronted painful inflection points¶ when their resources, their national will, or the global geopolitical context no¶ longer sustained their strategic postures. The very definition of grand strategy is¶ holding ends and means in balance to promote the security and interests of the¶ state.4¶ Yet, the post-war U.S. approach to strategy is rapidly becoming insolvent¶ and unsustainable not only because Washington can no longer afford it but¶ also, crucially, because it presumes an American relationship with friends, allies,¶ and rivals that is the hallmark of a bygone era. If Washington continues to¶ cling to its existing role on the premise that the international order depends¶ upon it, the result will be increasing resistance, economic ruin, and strategic¶ failure. The alleged insolvency of American strategy has been exhaustively¶ chronicled and debated since the 1990s. The argument here is that twenty¶ years of warnings will finally come true over the next five to ten years, unless¶ we adjust much more fundamentally than¶ administrations of either party have been¶ willing to do so far. The forces undercutting¶ the U.S. strategic posture are reaching critical¶ mass. This is not an argument about ‗‗decline‘‘ as¶ such; the point here is merely that specific,¶ structural trends in U.S. domestic governance¶ and international politics are rendering

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 314 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz a¶ particular approach to grand strategy insolvent.¶ Only by acknowledging the costs of pursuing¶ yesterday‘s strategy, under today‘s constraints,¶ will it be possible to avoid a sort of halfway adjustment billed as true reform,¶ forfeiting the opportunity for genuine strategic reassessment. That opportunity¶ still exists today, but it is fading. The consensus of conventional wisdom today holds several specific tenets of¶ U.S. national security strategy dear. It is important to grasp the paradigm because¶ existing trends are making a very specific U.S. national security posture¶ infeasible. The primary elements include: America‘s global role was central to constructing the post-war order and remains essential to its stability today;. American military power, including the ability to project power into any major regional contingency, is predominant and should remain so for as long as possible, both to reassure allies and to dissuade rivals;. The stability of many regions has become dependent on a substantial U.S. regional presence of bases, forward-deployed combat forces, and active diplomatic engagement; . That stability is also inextricably linked to the security and well-being of the U.S. homeland;. The United States must commit to the force structures, technologies, nonmilitary capacities, and geopolitical voice required to sustain these concepts. This conventional wisdom is the core of the current administration‘s major U.S. strategy documentsthe 2010 National Security Strategy and 2011¶ National Military Strategywhich envision continued U.S. predominance¶ and global power projection. In fact, it has been central to all postCold War¶ U.S. foreign policy doctrines. It was Bill Clinton‘s Secretary of State who called¶ America ‗‗the indispensable nation,‘‘5 Clinton who decided to expand NATO to¶ Russia‘s doorstep and Clinton who inaugurated the post-Cold War frenzy of¶ humanitarian intervention.6¶ The George W. Bush administration embraced a¶ strategy of primacy and dissuading global competition. As Barry Posen has¶ remarked, the debate in post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy has been over what¶ form of hegemony to seek, not whether to seek it.7¶ A variety of powerful trends now suggest that the existing paradigm is¶ becoming unsustainable in both military and diplomatic terms, and that the¶ United States will inevitably have to divert from its current posture to a new,¶ more sustainable role .

Hegemony is unsustainable – Overstretch Snyder, University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management Research Scholar, 12
(Quddus Z. Snyder, Fall 2009, University of Maryland, ―Systemic Theory in an Era of Declining US Hegemony,‖ http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.pdf, pgs. 10-2, Accessed 7/6/13, LLM) At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‗hegemonic age.‘ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. With its armed forces over-extended, and resources stretched, the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture, the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. It is unclear how long this formula will work. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars, it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. Of course, everyone is getting hit. Because all are suffering, the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. Relative power is important, but so is the hegemon‘s ability to actually do things. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 315 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz undertakings. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; however, these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America‘s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China.43 The point is simply that America‘s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were, leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. The US may still be a giant, but one that, for now at least, seems more bound.

US hegemonic decline coming – hard balancing and geopolitical backlash Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6
(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,‖ 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) Since the Cold War's end, most U.S. grand strategists have believed that American hegemony is exceptional, and therefore that the United States need not worry about other states engaging in counterhegemonic balancing against it. They advance two reasons for this assessment. First, drawing on balance of threat and hegemonic stability theories, some scholars argue that other states regard the United States as a benevolent, or nonthreatening, hegemon. Second, some scholars claim that strategically the United States is immune from counterhegemonic balancing because overwhelming U.S. military and economic power makes it impossible for others to balance against the United States. The case for U.S. hegemonic exceptionalism, however, is weak. [End Page 36] To be sure, contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, unipolarity persists. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—at least, not yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. However, the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behavior—notably leash-slipping—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. Unipolarity is the foundation of U.S. hegemony and, if it ends, so will U.S. primacy. U.S. hegemony cannot endure indefinitely. Even the strongest proponents of primacy harbor an unspoken fear that U.S. hegemony will provoke the very kind of geopolitical backlash that they say cannot happen (or at least cannot happen for a very long time). 119 In fact, although a new geopolitical balance has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states have been engaging in balancing against the United States—including hard balancing. U.S. concerns about China's great power emergence reflect Washington's fears about the military, as well as economic, implications of China's rise. Other evidence suggests—at least by some measures—that the international system is closer to a multipolar distribution of power than primacists realize. In its survey of likely international developments through 2020, the National Intelligence Council's report Mapping the Global Future notes: "The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own." 120 In a similar vein, a recent study by the Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future argues will then be "by any measure a first-rate military power") and the European Union could each have nearly as much power as the United [End Page 37] States. 121 Projecting current trends several decades into the future has its pitfalls (not least because of the difficulty of converting economic power into effective military power). But if this ongoing shift in

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 316 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge in the next decade or two. The future of U.S. hegemony centers on the questions of timing and costs. How long can the United States maintain its unipolar position? Do the benefits of perpetuating unipolarity outweigh the costs? In 1993 I suggested that by 2010, unipolarity would give way to multipolarity. 122 In contrast, in 1999 William Wohlforth stated "that if Washington plays its cards right, [U.S. hegemony] may last as long as bipolarity." 123 The post–World War II bipolar era lasted forty-five years. So by Wohlforth's calculations, U.S. preponderance could last until around 2030. The difference in these two predictions was, at most, only about twenty years. The United States enjoys no privileged exemption from the fate of past hegemons. American primacists conflate balancing (a grand strategy pursued by individual states) with the attainment of balance in the international system (a more or less equal distribution of power among the great powers). That others' balancing efforts have not yet produced a balance of power does not mean they are not trying to offset U.S. hegemony, although these balancing efforts will require time to bear fruit. Thus, contrary to my 1993 prediction, the United States probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010. Yet, it also is doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until 2030, as Wohlforth predicted in 1999. The key question facing American strategists, therefore, is: Should the United States cling to unipolarity for, at best, another two decades? Or should it abandon its hegemonic grand strategy for a less ambitious one of offshore balancing? There are two versions of offshore balancing from which the United States can choose: multilateral or unilateral. 125 As a multilateral offshore balancer, the United States would act both to "reassure its allies that it will use force with wisdom and restraint" and to "reduce the fear created by its superior power by giving other states a voice in the circumstances in which it will use force." 126 Multilateral offshore balancing is problematic for four reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent, because its twin goals of preserving U.S. primacy while persuading others that they need not fear U.S. power do not mesh. 127 Second, the idea that the United States should exercise its power in concert with others runs counter to the fundamental realities of international politics. 128 Third, even if the United States could reassure its allies that it will use [End Page 39] its power wisely, its ability to reassure potential adversaries such as China and Russia remains doubtful. Finally, multilateral offshore balancing can fairly be viewed as a backdoor strategy for preserving U.S. hegemony, rather than as a policy of restraint. 129 At bottom, multilateral offshore balancing does not address the United States' "hegemony problem," which is not caused by U.S. unilateralism. The real problem is that too often the United States acts unwisely (or, as in the case of Iraq, foolishly)—something it just as easily can do multilaterally as unilaterally. Although some analysts blame the George W. Bush administration for the United States' hegemony problem, the facts suggest otherwise. Concerns about unchecked U.S. power in a unipolar world first were voiced almost simultaneously with the Soviet Union's collapse . And it was during the Clinton administration that U.S. officials first acknowledged in so many words that America had a hegemony problem. The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. 131 Thus, to reduce others' concerns about its power, the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 317 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

Heg collapse is inevitable by 2020 – economic decline will prompt gradual military retrenchment culminating in multipolarity Layne, Texas A&M National Security Professor, 11
(Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M‘s George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service, 3/28/2011, The European Magazine, http://theeuropeanmagazine.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) The epoch of American hegemony is drawing to a close. Evidence of America‘s relative decline is omnipresent. According to the Economist, China will surpass the U.S. as the world‘s largest economy in 2019. The U.S. relative power decline will affect international politics in coming decades: the likelihood of great power security competitions – and even war – will increase; the current era of ―globalization‖ will end; and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order that reflects the interests of China and the other emerging great powers. American primacy‘s end is result of history‘s big, impersonal forces compounded by the United States‘ own self-defeating policies. Externally, the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. China‘s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States‘ over the last two decades and continues to do so. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles U.S. decline reflects its own economic troubles. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are gone forever. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States‘ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar‘s vulnerability is the United States‘ real geopolitical Achilles‘ heel because the dollar‘s role as the international economy‘s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. If the dollar loses that status America‘s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. In coming years the U.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary nondefense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. Faced with these hard choices, Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. If so, the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U.S.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 318 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz created after World War II. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U.S. military and economic preponderance. The decline of American power means the end of U.S. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power. Indeed, the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion.

U.S. heg waning and unsustainable – Snowden proves Taylor, Senior Analyst for the Examiner, 13
(Robert Taylor , 7-4-13, Examiner, ―Edward Snowden extradition battle puts spotlight on US tyranny around the world,‖ http://www.examiner.com/article/edward-snowden-extradition-battle-puts-spotlighton-us-tyranny-around-the-world, accessed 7-9-13, LLM) As of this writing, NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden is currently hiding out in Moscow and is seeking asylum in at least 20 countries as he continues to dodge U.S. extradition efforts. The fact that much of the world is ignoring U.S. demands to extradite Snowden reveals that America's hegemonic power may be waning and that this decline is a welcome development for the future of individual liberty and international peace. But global American power has been built on debt, borrowing, deficit-financing, heavy taxation, and inflating away the American middle class, a combination that, like Rome's, can not be sustained forever. As the U.S. not only continues this path, but expands upon it with ever increasing military budgets and interventionism, the world is perhaps beginning to see that America's threats are empty. Edward Snowden's Paul Revere-esque moves around the globe have helped confirm this loss of hegemony. China ignored requests by the U.S. to extradite Snowden, and despite the hysterical calls of Congress to "punish" Russia, Vladimir Putin — while less than enthusiastic about holding Snowden — appears to enjoy annoying the U.S. and is doing nothing while Snowden waits in Moscow. While rumors of Ecuador granting Snowden asylum were a mistake, Ecuador has a recent history of standing up to U.S. meddling. They have granted Wikileaks' Julian Assange, a man that American officials have publicly desired to be assassinated, asylum and protection. When President George W. Bush wanted to put a military base in Ecuador, President Rafael Correa agreed only on the condition that Ecuador get to put one of their own in Florida. Bush quickly backed off. Europe too is openly defying the American empire. While in Dar es Salaam yesterday, President Obama defended the mass surveillance of European diplomats, arguing that is "standard practice" and would continue despite protests by European leaders. This type of arrogance and dismissiveness has led to political leaders in Germany and France to urge their countries to grant Snowden asylum. Even the U.S. government's domestic colonies are protesting, reaffirming their sovereignty, and ignoring blatantly unconstitutional laws. What Snowden has done is not only reveal the details of a massive, covert surveillance program, but like a domino pushed just a bit too hard, is encouraging others to exhibit a similar type of courage. Standing up to history's most expansive and hegemonic power takes the guts of a libertarian whistleblower seeking justice and truth with little regard for the potentially deadly consequences, and undoubtedly others are taking notice. The U.S. can huff-and-puff all it wants, but one can only bully others for so long before others finally start to stand up and fight back. Like the whistleblowers that have come before him, Snowden's defiance in the face of a government that claims the right to kill anyone at any time around the world might just be the spark that weakens America's imperial military power by urging others around the world to emulate Snowden.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 319 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz But didn't the American revolutionaries enlist the help of the French monarchy — no friend of liberty — in their fight against the British Empire? Snowden is simply seeking safety from an even greater hegemon in his desires to expose it. China and Russia are undoubtedly incredibly brutal regimes, but their violence is limited mainly to their own borders. The U.S. is a global aggressor, proudly disregarding international law while condemning others for lesser crimes. How can one not cheer on Snowden and the withering of a tax-guzzling empire that threatens our liberty and prosperity? Snowden's defiance and the near worldwide rejection of U.S. demands may well be seen as one of the turning points in the future of American history. The American empire won't collapse, but poke enough holes in something that bureaucratic and top-heavy, and it begins to lean. Our ancestors fought for independence from a corrupt empire, and as the Fourth of July approaches, perhaps this generation can begin their independence from one as well.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 320 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Unsustainable – Rising Powers
Decline in heg is inevitable – challengers coming now Bacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 12
(Andrew J., professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is editor of The Short American Century: A Postmortem, just published by Harvard University Press, 2-19-12, The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Good bye the American Century- Good Riddance,‖ http://chronicle.com/article/TheAmerican-Century-Is/130790/, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) Alas, the bracing future that Luce confidently foresaw back in 1941 has in our own day slipped into the past. If an American Century ever did exist, it's now ended. History is moving on—although thus far most Americans appear loath to concede that fact. Historians should be the first to acknowledge the difficulty of identifying historical turning points. In the spring of 2003, around the time U.S. troops were occupying Saddam Hussein's various palaces, President George W. Bush felt certain he'd engineered one. More than a few otherwisesober observers agreed. But "Mission Accomplished" turned out to be "Mission Just Begun." Those who celebrated the march on Baghdad as a world-altering feat of arms ended up with egg on their faces. Still, I'm willing to bet that future generations will look back on the period between 2006 and 2008 as the real turning point. Here was the moment when what remained of the American Century ran out of steam and ground to a halt. More specifically, when Bush gave up on victory in Iraq (thereby abandoning expectations of U.S. military power transforming the Greater Middle East) and when the Great Recession brought the U.S. economy to its knees (the consequences of habitual profligacy coming home to roost), Luce's formulation lost any resemblance to reality. Politicians insist otherwise, of course. Has the American Century breathed its last? Mitt Romney, frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination, leaves no room for doubt where he stands on the matter: I am guided by one overwhelming conviction and passion: This century must be an American Century. In an American Century, America has the strongest economy and the strongest military in the world. In an American Century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world. ... This is America's moment. We should embrace the challenge, not shrink from it, not crawl into an isolationist shell, not wave the white flag of surrender, nor give in to those who assert America's time has passed. That is utter nonsense . Foremost among those waving that white flag of surrender, according to Romney, is President Barack Obama. Yet Obama's expressed views align closely with those of his would-be challenger. "America is back," the president declared during his recent State of the Union address. "Anyone who tells you otherwise, anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about." As with most contemporary political speeches, this qualifies as pure malarkey. Among the conjurers of imperial dreams in Washington, the American Century might live on. In places like Newark or Cleveland or Detroit, where real people live, it's finished. As a member of the historical fraternity, count me among those more than content to consign the American Century to the past. After all, what's past becomes our turf—precisely where the American Century ought to be. Exploration of that myth-enshrouded territory has barely begun. Grasping what this era actually signified and what it yielded promises to be an exciting enterprise, one that may leave the reputations of heroes like John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan a bit worse for wear.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 321 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz From the jaded, not to say cynical, observer of international politics, the passing of the American Century elicits a more ambivalent response. I'd like to believe that the United States will accept the outcome gracefully. Rather than attempting to resurrect Luce's expansive vision, I'd prefer to see American policy makers attend to the looming challenges of multipolarity. Averting the serial catastrophes that befell the planet starting just about 100 years ago, when the previous multipolar order began to implode, should keep them busy enough. But I suspect that's not going to happen. The would-be masters of the universe orbiting around the likes of Romney and Obama won't be content to play such a modest role. With the likes of Robert Kagan as their guide—"It's a wonderful world order," he writes in his new book, The World America Made (Knopf)—they will continue to peddle the fiction that with the right cast of characters running Washington, history will once again march to America's drumbeat. Evidence to support such expectations is exceedingly scarce—taken a look at Iraq lately?—but no matter. Insiders and would-be insiders will insist that, right in their hip pocket, they've got the necessary strategy. Strategy is a quintessential American Century word, ostensibly connoting knowingness and sophistication. Whether working in the White House, the State Department, or the Pentagon, strategists promote the notion that they can anticipate the future and manage its course. Yet the actual events of the American Century belie any such claim. Remember when Afghanistan signified victory over the Soviet empire? Today, the genius of empowering the mujahedin seems less than self-evident. Strategy is actually a fraud perpetrated by those who covet power and are intent on concealing from the plain folk the fact that the people in charge are flying blind. With only occasional exceptions, the craft of strategy was a blight on the American Century. What does the passing of the American Century hold? To answer that question, inquisitive students of international relations might turn for instruction to television commercials now being aired by Allstate Insurance. The ads feature a character called Mayhem, who unbeknownst to you, hangs onto the side of your car or perches on your rooftop concocting mischief. The message is clear. Be alert: Mayhem is always lurking in your path. Throughout the American Century, Mayhem mocked U.S. strategic pretensions. His agents infiltrated the National Security Council, sowing falsehoods. Mayhem whispered in the ear of whoever happened to occupy the Oval Office. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff met in the "Tank," he had a seat at the table. Mayhem freely roamed the halls of the Capitol (although Congressional dysfunction of our own day may have rendered such efforts redundant). Having learned nothing from the American Century, present-day strategists—the ones keen to bomb Iran, confront China, and seize control of outer space as the "ultimate high ground"—will continue the practice of doing Mayhem's bidding. As usual, the rest of us will be left to cope with the havoc that results, albeit this time without the vast reserves of wealth and power that once made an American Century appear plausible. Brace yourself.

Other countries will come together to rise up against the US – empirical evidence proves Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6
(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,‖ 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) Second, hegemons invariably are defeated because other states in the international system, frequently spearheaded by newly emerged great powers, form counterbalancing coalitions against them. Thus, the English and the Dutch defeated Philip II. Various coalitions anchored by Holland, the newly emerged great powers of England and Austria, and an established great power in Spain

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 322 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz undid Louis the XIV. A coalition composed of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia rebuffed Napoleon's bid for hegemony. Instead of war, the enervating economic effects of trying to maintain primacy against the simultaneous challenges of the United States, Russia, France, and Germany undermined British hegemony in the nineteenth century. The wartime grand alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union defeated Hitler.

US hegemonic decline coming Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6
(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,‖ 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF) U.S. hegemony cannot endure indefinitely. Even the strongest proponents of primacy harbor an unspoken fear that U.S. hegemony will provoke the very kind of geopolitical backlash that they say cannot happen (or at least cannot happen for a very long time). 119 In fact, although a new geopolitical balance has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states have been engaging in balancing against the United States—including hard balancing. U.S. concerns about China's great power emergence reflect Washington's fears about the military, as well as economic, implications of China's rise. Other evidence suggests—at least by some measures—that the international system is closer to a multipolar distribution of power than primacists realize. In its survey of likely international developments through 2020, the National Intelligence Council's report Mapping the Global Future notes: "The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own." 120 In a similar vein, a recent study by the Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future argues will then be "by any measure a first-rate military power") and the European Union could each have nearly as much power as the United [End Page 37] States. 121 Projecting current trends several decades into the future has its pitfalls (not least because of the difficulty of converting economic power into effective military power). But if this ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge in the next decade or two.

Challenges now Patrick, Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow, 11
(Stewart M., senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance, 7-3-11, CNNWorld, "Don‘t tread on me! July 4th and U.S. sovereignty," http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/03/don%E2%80%99t-tread-on-mejuly-4th-and-u-s-sovereignty/, accessed 7-2-12, CNM) The sovereignty of all nations is being challenged by a combination of forces, including deepening global integration, rising security interdependence and developing international law. Multilateral cooperation does pose dilemmas for traditional concepts of U.S. sovereignty. It‘s important to think clearly about the implications of these trends, about what U.S. prerogatives must be protected and about what circumstances might warrant adjustments in U.S. psychology and policy.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 323 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The place to begin is by getting clarity on what‘s at stake. The sovereignty debate actually encompasses several categories of concern: For some, the basic problem is a loss of U.S. freedom of action. As the nation becomes enmeshed in multilateral institutions or treaties, it may well find its room for maneuver constrained, whether the issue is the use of force (governed by the UN Security Council) or trade policy (where the U.S. has accepted a binding WTO dispute resolution mechanism).

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 324 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Multipolarity Coming Now
Multipolarity coming now – rising powers‘ economies, lingering effects of the recession, globalization Edelman, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Distinguished Fellow, 10
(Eric S. Edelman, ambassador, 10/21/10, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ―Understanding America‘s Contested Primacy,‖ http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/10/understanding-americas-contested-primacy/1/, p. 1, Accessed 7-7-13, LLM) In November 2008, the National Intelligence Council released Global Trends 2025 which argued that ―the international system — as constructed following the Second World War — will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, a historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of non-state actors. By 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries‖ [emphasis in original].‖ This conclusion represented a striking departure from the NIC‘s conclusion four years earlier in Mapping the Global Future 2020 that unipolarity was likely to remain a persistent condition of the international system. Between the two reports America‘s zeitgeist had clearly shifted under the impact of persistent difficulty in the counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased questioning of United States global leadership (at home and abroad), the seemingly inexorable rise of the newly emerging economies (suggestively labeled as the BRICs by Goldman Sachs analysts), and the global economic downturn and recession in the United States. The overall impact was the creation of a new conventional wisdom that foresees continued decline of the United States, an end to the unipolar world order that marked the post-Cold War world and a potential departure from the pursuit of US primacy that marked the foreign policies of the three presidential administrations that followed the end of the Cold War. The debate over unipolarity and continued US primacy is not merely an academic debate. Perceptions of US power will guide both American policymakers and other nations as they consider their policy options. Primacy has underpinned US grand strategy since the end of the Cold War because no other nation was able to provide the collective public goods that have upheld the security of the international system and enabled a period of dramatically increased global economic activity and prosperity. Both the United States and the global system have benefitted from that circumstance. The arguments for US decline are not new but before they harden into an unchallenged orthodoxy it would be good to carefully examine many of the key assumptions that undergird the emerging conventional wisdom. Will the undeniable relative decline of the United States, in fact, lead to the end of unipolarity? Do the BRIC countries really represent a bloc? What would multipolarity look like? How does one measure national power anyhow, and how can one measure the change in the power distribution globally? Is the rise of global competitors inevitable? What are some of the weaknesses that might hamper the would-be competitors from staying on their current favorable economic and political trajectory? Does the United States possess some underappreciated strengths that might serve as the basis for continued primacy in the international system and, if so, what steps would a prudent government take to extend that primacy into the future? The history of straight-line projections of economic growth and the rise of challengers to the dominance of the United States has not been kind to those who have previously predicted US decline. It is not necessarily the case that the United States will be caught between the end of the ―unipolar moment‖ of post-Cold War predominance and a global multipolar world. The emerging international environment is

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 325 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz likely to be different than either of the futures forecast by the NIC in Mapping the Global Future in 2004 or Global Trends 2025 in 2008. It would seem more likely that the relative decline of American power will still leave the United States as the most powerful actor in the international system. But the economic rise of other nations and the spread of nuclear weapons in some key regions are likely to confront the US with difficult new challenges. The revived notion of America‘s decline has once again brought to the fore a question about the purposes of United States power and the value of US international primacy. Seeking to maintain America‘s advantage as the prime player in the international system imposes costs on the US budget and taxpayer. It is certainly fair to ask what the United States gets from exerting the effort to remain number one. It is also worth considering what the world would look like if the United States was just one power among many, and how such perceptions might affect the strategic and policy choices national security decision-makers will face over the next twenty-odd years.

Unipolarity is collapsing in the status quo and will result in multipolarity Layne, Texas A&M professor in national security, 4-25-12
(Christopher, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University‘s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, National Interest, ―The Global Power Shift from West to East,‖ http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-global-power-shift-west-east-6796, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) The signs of the emerging new world order are many. First, there is China‘s astonishingly rapid rise to great-power status, both militarily and economically. In the economic realm, the International Monetary Fund forecasts that China‘s share of world GDP (15 percent) will draw nearly even with the U.S. share (18 percent) by 2014. (The U.S. share at the end of World War II was nearly 50 percent.) This is particularly startling given that China‘s share of world GDP was only 2 percent in 1980 and 6 percent as recently as 1995. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world‘s largest economy (measured by market exchange rate) sometime this decade. And, as argued by economists like Arvind Subramanian, measured by purchasing-power parity, China‘s GDP may already be greater than that of the United States. Until the late 1960s, the United States was the world‘s dominant manufacturing power. Today, it has become essentially a rentier economy, while China is the world‘s leading manufacturing nation. A study recently reported in the Financial Times indicates that 58 percent of total income in America now comes from dividends and interest payments. Since the Cold War‘s end, America‘s military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country‘s ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China‘s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a feedback loop will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America‘s fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus—not to mention the role of guarding the world‘s sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists—a strategically overextended United States inevitably will need to retrench. Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power‘s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 326 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished. All of this will unleash growing challenges to the Old Order from ambitious regional powers such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Indonesia. Given America‘s relative loss of standing, emerging powers will feel increasingly emboldened to test and probe the current order with an eye toward reshaping the international system in ways that reflect their own interests, norms and values. This is particularly true of China, which has emerged from its ―century of humiliation‖ at the hands of the West to finally achieve great-power status. It is a leap to think that Beijing will now embrace a role as ―responsible stakeholder‖ in an international order built by the United States and designed to privilege American interests, norms and values.

No one will dominate the 21st century – no one has the material and ideological strength Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12
(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/whynobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) The distribution of global power is fast changing. That much is certain. China and other developing nations are quickly ascending the pecking order. Meanwhile, the three pillars of the Western world - the United States, Europe, and Japan - are beset by a prolonged economic downturn and disaffected electorates. But despite widespread recognition of the changing global landscape, opinions differ widely as to which country will emerge on top. As the twenty-first century unfolds, who will lead the pack? Many analysts foresee a twenty-first century that will belong to China, whose decades of impressive economic growth make its steady rise seem unstoppable. Most American politicians, with the backing of commentators such as Robert Kagan and Robert Lieber, are quick to dismiss the prospects for a changing of the guard, insisting that U.S. hegemony is alive and well. They contend that the U.S. economy will snap back and that America's military superiority is untouchable. The dark horse candidates are India and Brazil. India will have the world's largest population by about 2025, while Brazil is blessed with abundant resources and a benign geopolitical environment. Both have democratic governments that may give them the legitimacy and good governance needed to make it to the top. The absence of consensus over which country will oversee the coming world is just as it should be. That's because the twenty-first century will not be dominated by any country . The United States will do just fine, but the era of Western primacy is coming to an end. Meanwhile, none of the world's rising nations will have the combination of material and ideological strength needed to exercise global hegemony. And although ascending nations have forged a new grouping - the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) - to coordinate their policies and aggregate their muscle, they do not share a coherent vision of what comes next. They know what they do not want: the continuation of a world dominated by the West. But they are very unlikely to arrive at a common view of what they want instead. This century will not belong to the United States, China, India, Brazil, or anyone else; it will be no one's world. The United States, due to its economic resilience, rising population, and military superiority, will make it into the top ranks for decades to come. Nonetheless, the supremacy that the United States and its Western allies have enjoyed since World War II is fast fading. During the second half of the

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 327 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz twentieth century, the Western allies usually accounted for over two-thirds of global output. They now provide about half of global output - and soon much less. In 2010, four out of the top five economies in the world came from the developed West - the United States, Japan, Germany, and France. Only one developing country - China, at number two qualified for this exclusive club. In 2050, according to Goldman Sachs, the United States will be the only Western power to make it into the top five. China will be number one, followed - at a significant distance -- by the United States, India, Brazil, and Russia. If China is poised to sit atop the global economy, why not expect a Chinese century? The appeal of China's brand of state capitalism - its competence and performance - is offset by its lack of democratic legitimacy. China's success also depends on assets that many other countries lack - a communitarian ethic with deep roots in Confucian culture, a meritocratic leadership and bureaucracy, a vast labor pool, and a top-notch industrial and transportation infrastructure. Moreover, although Beijing will surely seek to extend its sway in its own neighborhood, China's ethnocentrism suggests that its hegemonic aspirations may well be only regional, not global, in scope. Like China, India has an expansive labor pool at its disposal. And its embrace of democracy gives India an international appeal that China lacks. But India's democratic institutions are also a liability. Lethargic bureaucracies, social stratification, biting inequality, and striking linguistic and ethnic diversity make the Indian government weak and ineffective; New Delhi enjoys none of Beijing's purposeful efficiency. Indeed, India's private sector has thrived in spite of, not because of, its democratic institutions. The lack of good governance will ensure that India's rise is slow and bumpy. Brazil is in important respects best set to emerge as a global trendsetter. It is a stable democracy, blessed with ample, land, labor, and natural resources. At least for now, Brasilia has found a developmental path that combines economic openness with redistribution programs aimed at alleviating inequality. And Brazil faces no geopolitical rivals and resides in a region that has been remarkably free of inter-state war.

Multipolarity happening now—key to international order Bacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 12
[Andrew J., 2-19-12, professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is editor of The Short American Century: A Postmortem, just published by Harvard University Press, February 19, 2012, The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Good bye the American Century- Good Riddance‖ http://chronicle.com/article/The-American-Century-Is/130790/, accessed 7-9-13 BLE] Still, I'm willing to bet that future generations will look back on the period between 2006 and 2008 as the real turning point. Here was the moment when what remained of the American Century ran out of steam and ground to a halt. More specifically, when Bush gave up on victory in Iraq (thereby abandoning expectations of U.S. military power transforming the Greater Middle East) and when the Great Recession brought the U.S. economy to its knees (the consequences of habitual profligacy coming home to roost), Luce's formulation lost any resemblance to reality. Politicians insist otherwise, of course. Has the American Century breathed its last? Mitt Romney, front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination, leaves no room for doubt where he stands on the matter: I am guided by one overwhelming conviction and passion: This century must be an American Century. In an American Century, America has the strongest economy and the strongest military in the world. In an American Century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world. ... This is America's moment. We should embrace the challenge, not shrink from it, not crawl into an isolationist shell, not wave the white flag of surrender, nor give in to those who assert America's time has passed. That is utter nonsense. Foremost among those waving that white flag of surrender, according to Romney, is President Barack Obama. Yet Obama's expressed views align closely with those of his would-be challenger. "America is back," the president declared during his recent State of the Union address.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 328 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz "Anyone who tells you otherwise, anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about." As with most contemporary political speeches, this qualifies as pure malarkey. Among the conjurers of imperial dreams in Washington, the American Century might live on. In places like Newark or Cleveland or Detroit, where real people live, it's finished. As a member of the historical fraternity, count me among those more than content to consign the American Century to the past. After all, what's past becomes our turf—precisely where the American Century ought to be. Exploration of that myth-enshrouded territory has barely begun. Grasping what this era actually signified and what it yielded promises to be an exciting enterprise, one that may leave the reputations of heroes like John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan a bit worse for wear. From the jaded, not to say cynical, observer of international politics, the passing of the American Century elicits a more ambivalent response. I'd like to believe that the United States will accept the outcome gracefully. Rather than attempting to resurrect Luce's expansive vision, I'd prefer to see American policy makers attend to the looming challenges of multipolarity. Averting the serial catastrophes that befell the planet starting just about 100 years ago, when the previous multipolar order began to implode, should keep them busy enough. But I suspect that's not going to happen. The would-be masters of the universe orbiting around the likes of Romney and Obama won't be content to play such a modest role. With the likes of Robert Kagan as their guide—"It's a wonderful world order," he writes in his new book, The World America Made (Knopf)—they will continue to peddle the fiction that with the right cast of characters running Washington, history will once again march to America's drumbeat. Evidence to support such expectations is exceedingly scarce—taken a look at Iraq lately?—but no matter. Insiders and would-be insiders will insist that, right in their hip pocket, they've got the necessary strategy.

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No Unilateralism Now
No unilateralism now – global economic integration Grunstein, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief, 6-22-12
(Judah, World Politics Review, 6-22-12, ―Obama's Record: Tactics Trump Strategy in an Age of Constraints,‖ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12085/obamas-record-tactics-trump-strategyin-an-age-of-constraints, accessed 7-7-13, LLM) The global financial crisis has further limited the range of options by introducing budgetary constraints that require strategic choices and trade-offs. At the same time, rapidly accelerating global economic integration has added another layer of constraints, with the economic framework of mutually assured dependence deterring unilateral action, even as the global shift of power to the emerging East and South has expanded opportunities to block collective action.

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Economy Uniqueness

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Decline Now
Decline is inevitable – hegemony is economically unsustainable- dollar vulnerability Layne, Texas A&M Bush School of Government and Public Service International Affairs professor, 9
(Christopher Layne, Professor of International Affairs, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Summer 2009, ―The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay,‖ International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, https://www.webdepot.umontreal.ca/Usagers/fortmanm/MonDepotPublic/9.%20La%20fin%20de%20l'un ipolarit%C3%A9/Layne%20Waning%20of%20US%20hegemony.pdf, pgs. 167-9, Accessed 6/29/12, THW) The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline, but a growing number of analysts disagree.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair, Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Yet, even before the meltdown, longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U.S. economic power to wane.76 The warning signs with respect to U.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency, both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery, the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.77 Optimists contend that once the United States recovers, fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The postwar era, however, was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates . The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945, however, which is why many economists believe that even in the best case, it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the entitlements overhang, and the cost of two ongoing wars, there is reason to worry about the United States‘ longterm fiscal stability.80 The CBO states, ―Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem.‖81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right, it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown, the dollar‘s vulnerability ―presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.‖82 The dollar‘s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U.S. dominance, and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. 83 First, the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous ―allies‖ (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Because of these two factors, as Eric Helleiner notes, if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future, there is a ―risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum‖ away from it.84

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Unsustainable – Debt
American debt crushes ability to sustainably deploy power- also causes allies to shift towards China for due to economic incentives Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12
(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full, accessed 7-8-13, LLM) Furthermore, it is not just China that faces troubling questions. You are right to point out America's enduring strengths. But the rapid growth of the U.S. national debt raises the prospect of a really nasty fiscal crunch. When it comes to sovereign debt, we in Europe have just discovered the truth of that old economists' joke that "things that can't go on forever, don't." The United States cannot continue running up debts at its current rate. And even a controlled, rational effort to manage the debt will have serious implications for U.S. spending -- and deployable power. I agree that the balance of power between the United States and China will depend to a huge extent on the choices made by other countries. You are right that I was probably overimpressed by the Japanese tilt to China under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. That proved to be transient. Nonetheless, it was an interesting episode because it underlined a central point about the emerging world order. As China grows more powerful, the United States cannot assume that traditional allies or fellow democracies will cleave to America. In the last U.S. presidential election, the candidates did a lot to promote the idea of a "league of democracies." But in the intervening four years, we have seen that democracies do not always stick together. At the climate change talks in Copenhagen, Brazil, India, and South Africa were on China's side, not America's -- their identity as developing countries trumped their identity as democracies. The same countries condemned the recent NATO-led intervention in Libya as it developed into a real military campaign. Their suspicion of Western intentions trumped their support for human rights.

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Unsustainable – Budget Cuts
Declining defense spending risks losing U.S. prosperity and economic growth Carafano, Kathyrn‘s Deputy Director and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, et al., 11
(James Jay, and Mackenzie Eaglen, National Security Studies Research Fellows, and Baker Spring, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, 3-17-11, The Heritage Foundation, ―How to Field the Right Military Force to Protect America,‖ http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/how-to-fieldthe-right-military-force-to-protect-america, accessed 6-29-12, FFF) Adequate defense funding is affordable. To sustain this force over time, however, requires addressing (1) mandatory federal government outlays that, if unchecked, will consume the entire federal budget; (2) defense manpower costs that will need to be controlled without cutting overall manning levels; and (3) wasteful, unnecessary, and inefficient defense expenditures. Reducing U.S. forces below strategic requirements also presents grave risks to U.S. prosperity and economic growth. The military‘s reliability has reassured allies and deterred potential adversaries from aggression. If the U.S. lacks the capacity to protect its vital interests, both the security and economy of the nation will suffer in the long term.

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China Taking Over
The United States is declining economically – China is taking over after 08 crisis Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12
(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full, accessed 7-8-13, LLM) In 2008, there was indeed a massive economic and financial crisis, but it came in the West, not in China. This unexpected development has accelerated a trend that was already in place: a shift in economic power from West to East and, within that, from the United States to China. Since then, it has become much harder to argue that globalization has created a win-win world. Instead, Americans are beginning to wonder, with good reason, whether a richer and more powerful China might mean a relatively poorer, relatively weaker United States. That is why I called my book ZeroSum Future. Now, I know that Bob disputes the idea that there has been a shift in economic power. He says the U.S. share of the world economy has stayed roughly steady at 25 percent. But that is not how I read the figures. The Economist (my old employer) now projects that China will be the world's largest economy, in real terms, by 2018. Writing in Feb. 9's Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs puts it well: In 1980, the US share of world income (measured in purchasing power parity prices) was 24.6 per cent. In 2011, it was 19.1 per cent. The IMF projects that it will decline to 17.6 per cent as of 2016. China, by contrast, was a mere 2.2 per cent of world income in 1980, rising to 14.4 per cent in 2011, and projected by the IMF to overtake the US by 2016, with 18 per cent. If this isn't a world-altering shift, it's hard to imagine what would be.

Hegemony is unsustainable – China economic rise Freeman, Center for Strategic and International Studies‘ Senior Adviser in Trade and Economics, ‗11
(Charles, CSIS, ―China‘s innovation and competitiveness policies,‖ http://csis.org/program/chinasinnovation-and-competitiveness-policies-lessons-us-and-japan, accessed 7/8/13, LLM) Over the past few decades, China‘s rapid economic transformation into a global manufacturing hub has attracted billions of dollars in foreign direct investment, and lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. The growth of the Chinese economy is astonishing. In 2000, China‘s GDP was just a quarter of Japan‘s but in 2010 China became the second largest economy in the world. In comparison with the U.S. GDP, China‘s GDP was a little more than a tenth in 2000 but reached two fifths in 2010. Standard Chartered Bank issued a report in November 2010 stating that China would likely overtake the U.S. to become the world‘s largest economy by 2020. Chinese companies have competitiveness in producing low-value, labor-intensive goods. Today, Chinese competitiveness is not confined to traditional areas. China successfully absorbed foreign technologies and has become a strong competitor to companies of the developed countries. The Chinese leadership is trying to upgrade Chinese innovative capabilities; Beijing has set clear objectives to promote indigenous innovations with the recently approved 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015), which calls for bolder steps in reform and innovation.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 335 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The rise of China and the relative declines of the U.S. and Japan cause a risk of strategic miscalculation among Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo. Hubris on its competitiveness and future prospects of economic growth as well as strong nationalism serve as a basis of Chinese sentiments, policies, and actions. On the other hand, as shown in several public opinion polls, the U.S. and Japan overestimate Chinese strength and have excessive fears of decline. We should avoid the ―déjà vu‖ of U.S.-Japan trade frictions in the late 1980s; an opinion poll in the U.S. showed Japanese economic strength was a greater threat to the U.S. than Soviet‘s military strength. Miscalculations among the three are likely to produce serious obstacles to developing sound relationships among them. The U.S., Japan, and China need a positive-sum game. Today, there is no need to explain how China is important to U.S. and Japanese economies. At the same time, Chinese economic development, which is a key to domestic political stability, has critical stakes in its relations with the U.S. and Japan. Chinese companies still owe their innovative capabilities to U.S. and Japanese companies. Given India‘s rapid economic development, future decline of working-age population in China, and increasing Chinese domestic attention to environment, there are many reasons for Chinese companies to strengthen their ties with U.S. and Japanese companies. It is imperative that the U.S. and Japan establish better understanding of the true nature and scope of China‘s competitiveness in key technology areas, as well as current state of Chinese competitiveness policies. Objective assessments of Chinese reliance on U.S. and Japanese capabilities (such as FDI, technology and service trade, global business operation network, and so forth) will reduce a risk of the miscalculation and serve as a basis of future development of their sound relations. Moreover, identifying relevant U.S. and Japanese policies or strategies to encourage China to integrate into the liberal and open market economies could enlarge possibilities of the world.

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AT – China Decline
Even if China has an economic crisis – it will still be number 1 Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12
(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full, accessed 7-8-13, LLM) As for the U.S. pivot to Asia, I think it's a predictable and rational response to rising Chinese power. But I'm not sure it will work. America's allies in the region face an interesting dilemma. Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea have their most important trading relationship with China -and their most important strategic relationship with the United States. Unless China grossly overplays its hand and terrifies its neighbors, over time those economic ties will weigh more heavily than the military relationship with the United States. As a result, China's influence in Asia will steadily increase -- at the expense of the United States. All this, of course, is posited on the continuing growth of the Chinese economy. So what about those "hints that China's economic growth is slowing down"? I wouldn't be at all surprised. Indeed, I would go further and suggest that both the Chinese economy and the Chinese political system are unstable and crisis-prone. If a crisis hits, plenty of people in the United States and elsewhere will eagerly proclaim that the rise of China was a mirage. They will be wrong. This is a long-term process of huge historical significance, comparable with the rise of the United States in the 19th century. U.S. history should tell you that it is perfectly possible to combine political turmoil with the rise of a dynamic, continental economy. After all, America fought a civil war and still emerged as "No. 1" by the early 20th century.

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US Won‘t Play Leadership Role
The US won‘t play an economic leadership role Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12
(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full, accessed 7-8-13, LLM) This American confidence was very important to the world system. It allowed the United States to embrace a development that, in other circumstances, might have seemed threatening: the rise of China. In the Age of Optimism, successive U.S. presidents welcomed China's economic development. The argument they made was that capitalism would act as a Trojan horse, transforming the Chinese system from within. If China embraced economic freedom, political freedom would surely follow. But if China failed to embrace capitalism, it would fail economically. In 2008, there was indeed a massive economic and financial crisis, but it came in the West, not in China. This unexpected development has accelerated a trend that was already in place: a shift in economic power from West to East and, within that, from the United States to China. Since then, it has become much harder to argue that globalization has created a win-win world. Instead, Americans are beginning to wonder, with good reason, whether a richer and more powerful China might mean a relatively poorer, relatively weaker United States. That is why I called my book Zero-Sum Future. Now, I know that Bob disputes the idea that there has been a shift in economic power. He says the U.S. share of the world economy has stayed roughly steady at 25 percent. But that is not how I read the figures. The Economist (my old employer) now projects that China will be the world's largest economy, in real terms, by 2018. Writing in Feb. 9's Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs puts it well: In 1980, the US share of world income (measured in purchasing power parity prices) was 24.6 per cent. In 2011, it was 19.1 per cent. The IMF projects that it will decline to 17.6 per cent as of 2016. China, by contrast, was a mere 2.2 per cent of world income in 1980, rising to 14.4 per cent in 2011, and projected by the IMF to overtake the US by 2016, with 18 per cent. If this isn't a world-altering shift, it's hard to imagine what would be. I know battles of rival statistics can be mind-numbing, so let me just add that my experiences reporting around the world strongly re-enforce this impression of growing Chinese influence based on surging economic strength. In Brazil, I was told that President Dilma Rousseff was paying her first state visit to Beijing, not Washington, because China -- her country's largest trading partner -- is now more important to Brazil. In Brussels, they talk hopefully of China, not America, writing a large check to alleviate the euro crisis. And, of course, China looms ever larger over the rest of Asia. This shift in economic and political power has important implications for the world order. A weaker United States is less willing and able to play a leading role in sorting out the world's economic and political crises. There will be no Marshall Plan for Europe. There will not even be an American-led "committee to save the world" as there was during the Asian and Russian crises. And when it comes to the turmoil in the Middle East, the United States was more than happy to "lead from behind" on Libya. Meanwhile, the United States has pulled out of Iraq and is pulling back from Afghanistan. Don't get me wrong. I think it's perfectly sensible for Obama to try to reduce U.S. military commitments around the world, especially given the grim budgetary outlook. But we are unmistakably in a new era. No U.S. president can now say the country will "bear any burden" to secure its goals.

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Economy Not Only Factor
The economy is key to influence Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12
(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM) That said, even though political power and economic size are not the same thing, they surely are closely related. So as China becomes wealthier, its geopolitical power grows and becomes much more of a challenge to America's. China's growing wealth gives it more money to spend on assets abroad, foreign aid, and its military. Above all, the lure of Chinese investment and the Chinese market become a powerful tool to shape the behavior of other countries. You can see this with Europe right now. China's ability to supply credit and juicy contracts is making Europeans significantly less willing to confront China, whether on human rights or the environment.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 339 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Hegemony Bad Impacts

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 340 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Laundry List
Hegemony causes econ collapse, backlash, and foreign overstretch – only retreat is sustainable Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13
[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, ―Pull Back,‖ Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD] Despite a decade of costly and indecisive warfare and mounting fiscal pressures, the long-standing consensus among American policymakers about U.S. grand strategy has remained remarkably intact. As the presidential campaign made clear, Republicans and Democrats may quibble over foreign policy at the margins, but they agree on the big picture: that the United States should dominate the world militarily, economically, and politically, as it has since the final years of the Cold War , a strategy of liberal hegemony The country, they hold, needs to preserve its massive lead in the global balance of power, consolidate its economic preeminence, enlarge the community of market democracies, and maintain its outsized influence in the international institutions it helped create. To this end, the U.S. government has expanded its sprawling Cold War-era network of security commitments and military bases. It has reinforced its existing alliances, adding new members to NATO and enhancing its security agreement with Japan. In the Persian Gulf, it has sought to protect the flow of oil with a full panoply of air, sea, and land forces, a goal that consumes at least 15 percent of the U.S. defense budget. Washington has put China on a watch list, ringing it in with a network of alliances, less formal relationships, and military bases. The United States' activism has entailed a long list of ambitious foreign policy projects. Washington has tried to rescue failing states, intervening militarily in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya, variously attempting to defend human rights, suppress undesirable nationalist movements, and install democratic regimes. It has also tried to contain so-called rogue states that oppose the United States, such as Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, North Korea, and, to a lesser degree, Syria. After 9/11, the struggle against al Qaeda and its allies dominated the agenda, but the George W. Bush administration defined this enterprise broadly and led the country into the painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the United States has long sought to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons, the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists has added urgency to this objective, leading to constant tension with Iran and North Korea. In pursuit of this ambitious agenda, the United States has consistently spent hundreds of billions of dollars per year on its military -- far more than the sum of the defense budgets of its friends and far more than the sum of those of its potential adversaries. It has kept that military busy: U.S. troops have spent roughly twice as many months in combat after the Cold War as they did during it . Today, roughly 180,000 U.S. soldiers remain stationed on foreign soil, not counting the tens of thousands more who have rotated through the war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thousands of American and allied soldiers have lost their lives, not to mention the countless civilians caught in the crossfire. This undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy has done untold harm to U.S. national security. It makes enemies almost as fast as it slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense, and convinces powerful states to band together and oppose Washington's plans, further raising the costs of carrying out its foreign policy. During the 1990s, these consequences were manageable because the United States enjoyed such a favorable power position and chose its wars carefully Over the last decade, however, the country's relative power has deteriorated, and policymakers have made dreadful choices concerning which wars to fight and how to fight them. What's more, the Pentagon has come to depend on continuous infusions of cash simply to retain its

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 341 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz current force structure -- levels of spending that the Great Recession and the United States' ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable. It is time to abandon the United States' hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint. This approach would mean giving up on global reform and sticking to protecting narrow national security interests. It would mean transforming the military into a smaller force that goes to war only when it truly must. It would mean removing large numbers of U.S. troops from forward bases, creating incentives for allies to provide for their own security And because such a shift would allow the United States to spend its resources on only the most pressing international threats, it would help preserve the country's prosperity and security over the long run.

Hegemony fails – liberal intervention causes backlash, terrorism, and instability – Iraq and Afghanistan prove Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13
[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, ―Pull Back,‖ Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD] Just as emerging powers have gotten stronger, so, too, have the small states and violent substate entities that the United States has attempted to discipline, democratize, or eliminate . Whether in Somalia, Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya, the U.S. military seems to find itself fighting enemies that prove tougher than expected. (Consider the fact that Washington spent as much in real terms on the war in Iraq as it did on the war in Vietnam, even though the Iraqi insurgents enjoyed little external support, whereas China and the Soviet Union lent major support to the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese.) Yet Washington seems unable to stay out of conflicts involving substate entities, in part because their elemental nature assaults the internationalist values that U.S. grand strategy is committed to preserving. Having trumpeted the United States' military superiority, U.S. policymakers have a hard time saying no to those who argue that the country's prestige will suffer gravely if the world's leader lets wars great and small run their course. The enduring strength of these substate groups should give American policymakers pause, since the United States' current grand strategy entails open-ended confrontation with nationalism and other forms of identity politics that insurgents and terrorists feed off of . These forces provide the organizing energy for groups competing for power within countries (as in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq), for secessionist movements (as in Kosovo), and for terrorists who oppose the liberal world order (mainly al Qaeda). Officials in Washington, however, have acted as if they can easily undercut the power of identity through democratic processes, freedom of information, and economic development, helped along by the judicious application of military power. In fact, identity is resilient, and foreign peoples react with hostility to outsiders trying to control their lives. The Iraq war has been a costly case in point. Officials in the Bush administration convinced themselves that a quick application of overwhelming military power would bring democracy to Iraq, produce a subsequent wave of democratization across the Arab world, marginalize al Qaeda, and secure U.S. influence in the region. Instead, Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds stoked the violence that the United States labored to suppress, and Shiite and Sunni factions fought not only each other but also the U.S. military. Today's Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad has proved neither democratic nor effective. Sunni terrorists have continued to carry out attacks. The Kurdish parts of Iraq barely acknowledge their membership in the larger state. By now, it is clear that the United States has worn out its welcome in Afghanistan, too. The Taliban continue to resist the U.S. presence, drawing their strength largely from Pashtun nationalism, and members of the Afghan security forces have, in growing numbers, murdered U.S. and other NATO soldiers who were there to assist them. Instead of simply punishing the Taliban for their indirect role in

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 342 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz 9/11 and hitting al Qaeda as hard as possible, true to its global agenda, the Bush administration pursued a costly and futile effort to transform Afghanistan, and the Obama administration continued it.

Hegemony causes outsourcing which results in escalation of regional conflict and destroys foreign relations Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13
[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, ―Pull Back,‖ Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD] Another problematic response to the United States' grand strategy comes from its friends: freeriding. The Cold War alliances that the country has worked so hard to maintain -- namely, NATO and the U.S. Japanese security agreement -- have provided U.S. partners in Europe and Asia with such a high level of insurance that they have been able to steadily shrink their militaries and outsource their defense to Washington. European nations have cut their military spending by roughly 15 percent in real terms since the end of the Cold War, with the exception of the United Kingdom, which will soon join the rest as it carries out its austerity policy. Depending on how one counts, Japanese defense spending has been cut, or at best has remained stable, over the past decade. The government has unwisely devoted too much spending to ground forces, even as its leaders have expressed alarm at the rise of Chinese military power -- an air, missile, and naval threat. Although these regions have avoided major wars, the United States has had to bear more and more of the burden of keeping the peace. It now spends 4.6 percent of its GDP on defense, whereas its European NATO allies collectively spend 1.6 percent and Japan spends 1.0 percent. With their high per capita GDPS, these allies can afford to devote more money to their militaries, yet they have no incentive to do so. And so while the U.S. government considers draconian cuts in social spending to restore the United States' fiscal health, it continues to subsidize the security of Germany and Japan. This is welfare for the rich. U.S. security guarantees also encourage plucky allies to challenge more powerful states, confident that Washington will save them in the end -- a classic case of moral hazard. This phenomenon has caused the United States to incur political costs, antagonizing powers great and small for no gain and encouraging them to seek opportunities to provoke the United States in return. So far, the United States has escaped getting sucked into unnecessary wars, although Washington dodged a bullet in Taiwan when the Democratic Progressive Party of Chen Shui-bian governed the island, from 2000 to 2008. His frequent allusions to independence, which ran counter to U.S. policy but which some Bush administration officials reportedly encouraged, unnecessarily provoked the Chinese government; had he proceeded, he would have surely triggered a dangerous crisis. Chen would never have entertained such reckless rhetoric absent the long-standing backing of the U.S. government. The Philippines and Vietnam (the latter of which has no formal defense treaty with Washington) also seem to have figured out that they can needle China over maritime boundary disputes and then seek shelter under the U.S. umbrella when China inevitably reacts. Not only do these disputes make it harder for Washington to cooperate with Beijing on issues of global importance; they also risk roping the United States into conflicts over strategically marginal territory. Georgia is another state that has played this game to the United States' detriment. Overly confident of Washington's affection for it, the tiny republic deliberately challenged Russia over control of the disputed region of South Ossetia in August 2008. Regardless of how exactly the fighting began, Georgia acted far too adventurously given its size, proximity to Russia, and distance from any plausible source of military help. This needless war ironically made Russia look tough and the United States unreliable. This dynamic is at play in the Middle East, too. Although U.S. officials have communicated time and again to leaders in Jerusalem their discomfort with Israeli settlements on the territory occupied during the 1967 war, Israel regularly increases the population and dimensions of those settlements.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 343 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The United States' military largess and regular affirmations of support for Israel have convinced Israeli hawks that they will suffer no consequences for ignoring U.S. advice. It takes two to make peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the creation of humiliating facts on the ground will not bring a negotiated settlement any closer. And Israel's policies toward the Palestinians are a serious impediment to improved U.S. relations with the Arab world.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 344 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Prolonging Transition Causes War
Prolonging transition makes war inevitable Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6
(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,‖ 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF) If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

Try or die – the longer the transition, the more dangerous the decline Larison, American Conservative contributing editor, 9
[Daniel Larison has a PhD in Byzantine history and is a contributing editor at the American Conservative and a columnist for The Week online. 12-12-9, ―Six questions for Daniel Larison,‖ http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/12/six_questions_for_daniel_laris. DIA: Do you think Barack Obama's conciliatory gestures to the rest of the world represent an abandonment of American hegemony, or are they an effort to make the world more comfortable with it? Mr Larison: Most of his conciliatory gestures have been nothing more than just that, gestures. I find this preferable to riding roughshod over allies and rivals, but it is undeniably a matter of adopting a different tone and style rather than changing the nature of America's relations with other nations. Mr Obama has no interest in abandoning American hegemony or, as he would prefer to call it, American leadership, but he is attempting to exercise it under straitened conditions. To that end he has made a number of speeches, and these have naturally been misunderstood and distorted as "apologies". In reality, Mr Obama has not once apologised for anything America has done in the past, but he is ridiculed this way because he does not engage in boastful triumphalism. In the zero-sum reckoning of his extremely insecure domestic critics, any rhetorical or symbolic concession, no matter how minor, is a defeat and an embarrassment for America. Even on those policies where he has made a great show of changing course, such as engaging with Iran or "resetting" relations with Russia, the substance of the policies has not changed much at all. DIA: You are not a hegemonist. Is that a result of the way America has conducted itself abroad, or do you think unipolarity is inherently bad? Mr Larison: Unipolarity is abnormal and it is unsustainable, so I think it unwise to organize American foreign policy around the preservation of something that is going to disappear sooner or later. Because unipolarity never lasts, the chief means for preserving it is military power, and this leads a government to entangle itself in a number of unnecessary, costly and ultimately

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 345 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz ruinous wars to keep hold of something that will slip away from it in any case. Indeed, the strenuous effort to hold on to preeminence usually hastens an even steeper decline than would have happened otherwise. The paradox is that it is the hegemonists who have done more to undermine American hegemony than anything their opponents could have hoped to achieve, while their opponents have called for husbanding America's resources responsibly and carefully rather than frittering them away. Certainly, the frequent recourse to military force over the last 20 years has deepened my antipathy to the constant and unnecessary projection of American power around the world. The goal of maintaining hegemony seems to me a foolish one, but it is the means employed to that end that I find indefensible and outrageous.

Heg causes instability Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6
(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,‖ 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF) Although at first the conclusion may appear counterintuitive, states that seek hegemony invariably end up being less, not more, secure. Being powerful is good in international politics, but being too powerful is not. The reasoning behind this axiom is straightforward as well as the geopolitical counterpart to the law of physics that holds that, for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Simply put, the response to hegemony is the emergence of countervailing power. Because international politics is indeed a competitive, "self-help" system, when too much power is concentrated in the hands of one state, others invariably fear for their own security. Each state fears that a hegemon will use its overwhelming power to aggrandize itself at that state's expense and will act defensively to offset hegemonic power. Thus, one of hegemony's paradoxes is that it contains the seeds of its own destruction.

Risk is linear – costs to maintaining heg will only escalate Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 6
(Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2006, The Peace of Illusions, p 190, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of
American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America‘s Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America‘s military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in a great power Eurasian wars.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 346 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Prolonging hegemony ensures backlash and conflict Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 3
(Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush school of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, ―The American Conservative, The Cost of Empire‖, October 6 2003, http://www.amconmag.com/10_06_03/cover.html, accessed 6/27/12, THW) These are not compelling arguments. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there are no such animals. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them. Others dread both the over-concentration of geopolitical weight in America‘s favor and the purposes for which it may be used. Washington‘s (purportedly) benevolent intentions are ephemeral, but the hard fist of American power is tangible—and others worry that if U.S. intentions change, they might get smacked. As for the argument that the U.S. is too mighty to be counter-balanced, history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. Perhaps the proponents of America‘s imperial ambitions are right and the U.S. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Don‘t bet on it. The very fact of America‘s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it‘s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. Indeed, on its present course, the United States seems fated to succumb to the ―hegemon‘s temptation.‖ Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them, they are tempted to use it repeatedly, and thereby overreach themselves. Over time, this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines, possibly in a failed Pakistan, and elsewhere), regional powers (Iran, North Korea), and rising great powers like China could erode America‘s relative power— especially if the U.S. suffers setbacks in future conflicts, for example in a war with China over Taiwan.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 347 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Causes Entanglements
Hegemony ensures U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts, increasing the risk of nuclear war Layne, Texas A&M Bush School of Government and Public Service professor, 6
[Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University 2006 ―The Peace of Illusions‖ p 169, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapon were not involved—would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 348 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Causes Conflict
US invented the nuclear weapon—further international leadership leads to war Bacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 9
[Andrew, April 30, 2009, Salon, ―Fairwell to the American Century‖ http://www.salon.com/writer/andrew_bacevich/. Accessed 7-7-13 BLE] What flag-wavers tend to leave out of their account of the American Century is not only the contributions of others, but the various missteps perpetrated by the United States — missteps, it should be noted, that spawned many of the problems bedeviling us today. The instances of folly and criminality bearing the label ―made in Washington‖ may not rank up there with the Armenian genocide, the Bolshevik Revolution, the appeasement of Adolf Hitler, or the Holocaust, but they sure don‘t qualify as small change. To give them their due is necessarily to render the standard account of the American Century untenable. Here are several examples, each one familiar, even if its implications for the problems we face today are studiously ignored: Cuba. In 1898, the United States went to war with Spain for the proclaimed purpose of liberating the so-called Pearl of the Antilles. When that brief war ended, Washington reneged on its promise. If there actually has been an American Century, it begins here, with the U.S. government breaking a solemn commitment, while baldly insisting otherwise. By converting Cuba into a protectorate, the United States set in motion a long train of events leading eventually to the rise of Fidel Castro, the Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and even today‘s Guantánamo Bay prison camp. The line connecting these various developments may not be a straight one, given the many twists and turns along the way, but the dots do connect. The Bomb. Nuclear weapons imperil our existence. Used on a large scale, they could destroy civilization itself. Even now, the prospect of a lesser power like North Korea or Iran acquiring nukes sends jitters around the world. American presidents — Barack Obama is only the latest in a long line — declare the abolition of these weapons to be an imperative. What they are less inclined to acknowledge is the role the United States played in afflicting humankind with this scourge. The United States invented the bomb. The United States — alone among members of the nuclear club — actually employed it as a weapon of war. The U.S. led the way in defining nuclear-strike capacity as the benchmark of power in the postwar world, leaving other powers like the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China scrambling to catch up. Today, the U.S. still maintains an enormous nuclear arsenal at the ready and adamantly refuses to commit itself to a no-first-use policy, even as it professes its horror at the prospect of some other nation doing as the United States itself has done. Iran. Extending his hand to Tehran, President Obama has invited those who govern the Islamic republic to ―unclench their fists.‖ Yet to a considerable degree, those clenched fists are of our own making. For most Americans, the discovery of Iran dates from the time of the notorious hostage crisis of 1979-1981 when Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, detained several dozen U.S. diplomats and military officers and subjected the administration of Jimmy Carter to a 444-day-long lesson in abject humiliation.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 349 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Causes Terrorism
US hegemony triggers backlash, fostering terrorism Layne, Texas A&M George Bush School of Government and Public Service professor, 7
[Christopher, 2007 and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, American Empire: A Debate//, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, ―Why do they hate us?‖ his question missed the key point, however. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do ―hate‖ the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And, for sure, notwithstanding American neoconservatives‘ obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the War on Terrorism inescapably has overtones of a ―clash of civilizations.‖ Still, this isn‘t—and should not be allowed to become—a replay of the Crusades. As Scheuer says, ―one of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe—at the urging of senior U.S. leaders—that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do.‖ The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it‘s hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself as violently as it did on 9/11. Experts on terrorism understand the political motives that drive the actions of groups like al Qaeda. In his important recent study of suicide terrorists, Robert A. Pape found that what ―nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.‖ Pape found that ―even al Qaeda fits this pattern: although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation per se, a principal objective of Osama bin Laden is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington‘s power in the region.‖ This finding is seconded by Scheuer, who describes bin Laden‘s objectives as: ―the end of U.S. aid to Israel and the ultimate elimination of that state; the removal of U.S. and Western forces from the Arabian Peninsula; the removal of U.S. and Western military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim lands; the end of U.S. support for oppression of Muslims by Russia, China, and India; the end of U.S. protection for repressive, apostate Muslim regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, et cetera; and the conservation of the Muslim world‘s energy resources and their sale at higher prices.‖ Simply put, it is American primacy, and the policies that flow from it, that have made the United States a lightning rod for Islamic anger.

US hegemony pursuit makes terrorist attacks more likely Layne, professor at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 07
[Christopher, 2007 and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, American Empire: A Debate//, pg. 67-68, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Terrorism: When Over There Becomes Over Here 9/11was not a random act of violence visited upon the United States. The United States was the target of al Qaeda's terrorist strikes because that group harbored specific political grievances against the United States. If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. AsMichael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 350 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Osamabin Laden andal Qaeda,put it, "In the context of ideas bin Laden shares withhis brethren, the military actions of al Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, notterrorism...meant to advance bin Laden's clear, focused, limited, and widelypopular foreign policy goals..." Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman says, is "about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change.' As Clausewitz himself observed, "war is not anact of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object ?'" Terrorism really is a form of asymmetric warfare waged against the United States by groups that lack the military wherewithal to slug it out with the United Statest oe-to-toe. 9/11 was a violent counterreaction to America's geopolitical—andcultural—primacy. As Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 For-eign Affairsarticle, "It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would behatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the UnitedStates had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah ofIran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault onIslam." U.S. primacy fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of "blowback" against America's preponderance and its world roles"As long as the United States uses its global primacy to impose its imperial sway on regions like the Persian Gulf, it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups likeal Qaeda.

A world of US hegemony is more susceptible to terrorism Butko, University of Alberta international relations professor, 5
[Thomas, Professor of International Relations, teaches about terrorism at the University of Alberta, Ph.D at University of Alberta, Researches Terrorism as counter-hegemonic violence and Middle East Politics. ―TERRORISM REDEFINED: TERRORISM AS ―COUNTER-HEGEMONIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE,‖ Published As a Paper in the Canadian Political Science Association in 2005, page 13, no specific date provided, http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Butko.pdf, accessed 7-7-13 BLE] In this section, a historical analysis will assist in linking the phenomenon of ―terrorism‖ with the broader concept of hegemony. Throughout the modern historical age, commencing with the first contemporary usage of ―terrorism‖ during the French Revolution, the term has been solely applied to those states, groups, organizations, or individuals who have refused to consent to the ―common sense‖ views or hegemony of the dominant powers within the international system. Perhaps Beril Dedeoglu is most succinct in creating this link when he states: ―In other words, actors capable of defining the international system rules can define certain facts that seem in opposition to their way of existence as manifestations of ‗terror‘ and thus identify them as ‗other‘.‖36 It is through this hegemony that the principal powers have been able to designate as ―terrorists‖ their specific enemies or opponents within the international system. Once more, Dedeoglu argues: As each state‘s ‗terror criminal‘ (its enemy) is different, its perception of crime or enemy is also different. This difference is based on the various interests of the states in the international system.‖37 Of course, it is only when a particular power is dominant and hegemonic, such as the United States, that such a classification can be internationalized and accepted, either coercively or consensually, by all the constituent parts of the system (i.e., the weaker powers). Historically, while these variously deemed ―terrorist‖ groups have sought to challenge the Western dominance or hegemony of the international system or, perhaps more accurately, have been perceived to be the primary threat to the contemporary entrenched status quo powers, such challenges have exhibited a number of distinct, but similar, characteristics.

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Causes China Conflict
US hegemony leads to conflict with China and resource competition Shor, historian at Wayne State University, 12
[Francis Shor, 1-1-2012, BRILL, ―Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict?‖ 7-6-13, JZ]
While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world‘s largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world‘s copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of U.S. foreign reserves, e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, ―the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises.‖ [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China‘s rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite‘s ideological commitment to national security. At the same time, China is now the world‘s largest consumer of essential metals (copper, zinc, platinum) and one of the most voracious importers of hydrocarbons. Essential investment and trade by China in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela, plus engagement with a host of Central Asian countries, indicates China‘s growing need for oil and natural gas, as well as its growing challenge to U.S. geostrategic interests in these aforementioned countries and regions. [7] With China‘s energy consumption approaching 20% of the world‘s total, it may well overtake the U.S. as the largest hydrocarbon consumer in the next decade or so. It is already the number one producer of greenhouse gasses although the U.S. is still the per capita leader. Nonetheless, as Michael Klare points out , the scramble for more oil will lead to extracting what he calls ―tough oil,‖ resulting in more expensive and environmentally destructive production. [8] Compounding the energy strains and resource competition are additional environmental catastrophes in the form of global warming and desertification. As one skeptical analysis of China‘s rise warns: ―By impinging on the very process of world-systemic reproduction itself, the mutually interpenetrating character of energy resource bottlenecks and extreme climate perturbations should make an already unlikely transition in world-systemic leadership between a declining U.S. and a rising China even more inconceivable – especially considering these bottlenecks and perturbations will both compound China‘s well-documented explosion of peasant and worker protests and hamstring the capacity of the Chinese state to respond to myriad crises.‖ [9] Beyond the internal and external environmental crises facing China and the United States, the resource competition between these two powers will invariably lead to geostrategic conflicts. The U.S. obsession over the growing Chinese economic and geopolitical threats deliberately obfuscates

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 352 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz those factors that have led to a declining global hegemony. James Petras captures the global contradictions that flow from these differing geostrategic postures in the world:

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Causes Russian-Chinese Alliance
US hegemonic stance causes Russia-China counter-balancing Cohen & Tigay, writers for the Heritage Foundation, 13
[Ariel & Benjamin, March 1, 2013, ―Mr. Xi Goes to Moscow: For China‘s Leader, It‘s Russia First‖, http://blog.heritage.org/2013/03/01/mr-xi-goes-to-moscow-for-chinas-leader-its-russia-first/, accessed 77-13 BLE] China‘s new president, Xi Jinping, will make his first official foreign visit to Russia this month. Xi‘s decision to make his first visit abroad to Russia suggests an effort to improve relations and cement their strategic partnership. Washington should pay attention to the growing ties between Moscow and Beijing. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian and Chinese bilateral relations have vastly improved. Currently, both countries would like to displace U.S. ―hegemony,‖ especially along their borders. Russia repeatedly demanded that the U.S. pull out of the air force base in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, while China would like to keep the U.S. naval presence in the Pacific in check. Russia‘s anti-American foreign policy, often with shrill propaganda overtones, seeks to establish a Russian ―pole‖ in the global world order. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that Xi‘s ―upcoming visit is expected to add new impetus to the further development of the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.‖ The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Moscow and Beijing founded, aims to fight ―the three evils‖: separatism, extremism, and terrorism. However, Sino–Russian cooperation is not just geopolitical but also ideological. Russia and China want to halt the spread of democracy and keep the U.S. out of their internal affairs, as well as of regimes friendly to them. They believe that any government has a right to crack down on internal dissent or censure the press, including the Internet. With these principles in mind, they have worked in concert to check U.S. efforts in the Middle East and protect its own interests, such as legitimizing authoritarian regimes. They vetoed and stifled sanctions and internationally supported peace plans for Syria. They enabled Iran to continue its nuclear program by refusing to tighten sanctions. China, which is the principal supporter of North Korea, condemns even the possibility of military action against Pyongyang—and so does Russia. They increasingly present an alternative to Western-style democracy and are two stalwarts of the broad front against the U.S. Russia and China are moving to publicize their economic ties. The two countries have already moved to trade with each other using their own currencies—and excluding the dollar. The two countries have promised to increase trade dramatically over the next decade, and they are working on finalizing a deal on the most important sector of their bilateral trade: energy. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich is conducting negotiations in China on a natural gas deal, saying that a ―significant breakthrough‖ had been made over the past few months. This gas pipeline will connect Russia‘s abundant gas reserves with China‘s ever-growing need for energy. However, China‘s rapid economic rise and desire for an enhanced global position could spell trouble for the relationship down the road. Russia‘s economy is lagging behind China, and Moscow can become subservient to Beijing economically, turning into the natural resource appendage of China‘s continued growth. As China continues to expand its sphere of influence through military, economic, smart, and soft power, Russia may become its junior partner in international affairs. For now, mutual geopolitical and economic interests are drawing Russia and China together. Xi‘s first visit sends the clear message that China seeks to cement closer ties with its anti-American northern neighbors—and not with the U.S.

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US hegemony provokes Russian and Chinese military alliance—risks nuclear exchange Roberts, American economist and a columnist for Creators Syndicate, 7
[Paul Craig, August 12, 2007, ―U.S. Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance ―, http://www.creators.com/opinion/paul-craig-roberts/u-s-hegemony-spawns-russian-chinese-militaryalliance.html, accessed 7-7-13 BLE] This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about U.S. hegemony. Neocons believe that the United States is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the United States must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. As the United States has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite five years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US antiballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the U.S. failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, U.S. administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. The United States gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of V. Putin. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the United States, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach.

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Causes Iran Conflict
American hegemonic pursuits in Middle East makes conflict with Iran inevitable Layne, at Texas A&MGeorge Bush School of Government and Public Service professor, 7
[Christopher, 2007 and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, American Empire: A Debate//, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. The main source of conflict—or at leastthe one that has grabbed thelion'sshare of the headlines—is Tehran's evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington's policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is"intolerable."Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation.Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq's recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on thebrink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America's ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in currentU.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. TheBush Doctrine's three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor ofpreventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radicalshake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S.dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that the administration's policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democ-ratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay theadministration's pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. Thekey question today is whether these assumptions are correct.

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Causes Middle East Instability
US hegemony causes Middle East instability Yale Global 4
[―Gulf Security in a Globalizing World: Going Beyond US Hegemony‖, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/gulf-security-globalizing-world-going-beyond-us-hegemony, June 29, 2004, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Under a hegemonic approach, Gulf relations would be exclusionary, with US ―friends and allies‖ on one side, and US enemies such as Iran on the other. The United States would make a decision on who is excluded, and this decision would be based on factors such as internal regime structure, support of terrorism, and WMD aspirations. Confidence-building measures in the military realm (such as arms limitations, cooperative military exercises, or transparency on arms buildups) would only apply to friends and allies. The ultimate goal would be to target those ―rogue‖ states outside the established order, isolate them, and bring about a ―regime conversion‖ or regime change. WMD would not be viewed as ―bad‖ in and of themselves; rather, the character of the state obtaining WMD would be the primary criterion for counter-proliferation efforts. Implicitly, Israel, Pakistan, and India would not be pressured to moderate their nuclear behavior, despite the potentially negative effects of their nuclear activities on Gulf states‘ security. Arab friends and allies would not base security on their own indigenous capabilities but rather on continued bilateral dependence on the United States as an outside power. Finally, the United States would probably treat Iraq as a base for US economic, diplomatic, and military power projection throughout the region, including against Syria and Iran. The hegemonic strategy does not deviate from US policies in previous periods and thus risks more policy failure. Bilateral ties, by themselves, will neither solve outstanding political conflicts nor prevent new conflicts from arising among the Gulf states. Moreover, continued dependence on the United States would only increase domestic pressures against current Arab regimes.

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Causes Oil Dependence
US hegemony requires energy imperialism – dependence on oil high Foster, University of Oregon sociology professor, 5 (John Bellamy, editor of Monthly Review, 5-25-5, Monthly Review, "Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism," http://monthlyreview.org/2008/07/01/peak-oil-and-energyimperialism, accessed 7/7/13, AR)
The rise in overt militarism and imperialism at the outset of the twenty-first century can plausibly be attributed largely to attempts by the dominant interests of the world economy to gain control over diminishing world oil supplies. 1 Beginning in 1998 a series of strategic energy initiatives were launched in national security circles in the United States in response to: (1) the crossing of the 50 percent threshold in U.S. importation of foreign oil; (2) the disappearance of spare world oil production capacity; (3) concentration of an increasing percentage of all remaining conventional oil resources in the Persian Gulf; and (4) looming fears of peak oil. The response of the vested interests to this world oil supply crisis was to construct what Michael Klare in Blood and Oil has called a global ―strategy of maximum extraction.‖2 This required that the United States as the hegemonic power, with the backing of the other leading capitalist states, seek to extend its control over world oil reserves with the object of boosting production. Seen in this light, the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (the geopolitical doorway to Western access to Caspian Sea Basin oil and natural gas) following the 9/11 attacks, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the rapid expansion of U.S. military activities in the Gulf of Guinea in Africa (where Washington sees itself as in competition with Beijing), and the increased threats now directed at Iran and Venezuela—all signal the rise of a dangerous new era of energy imperialism.

Oil dependence leads to superpower conflict with China Luft, LA Times writer, 4 (Gal, Analysis of Global Security, 2/2/4 ―U.S., China Are on Collision Course Over Oil‖
http://www.iags.org/la020204.htm, accessed 7/9/13, AR) Sixty-seven years ago, oil-starved Japan embarked on an aggressive expansionary policy designed to secure its growing energy needs, which eventually led the nation into a world war. Today, another Asian power thirsts for oil: China. While the U.S. is absorbed in fighting the war on terror, the seeds of what could be the next world war are quietly germinating. With 1.3 billion people and an economy growing at a phenomenal 8% to 10% a year, China, already a net oil importer, is growing increasingly dependent on imported oil. Last year, its auto sales grew 70% and its oil imports were up 30% from the previous year, making it the world's No. 2 petroleum user after the U.S. By 2030, China is expected to have more cars than the U.S. and import as much oil as the U.S. does today. Dependence on oil means dependence on the Middle East, home to 70% of the world's proven reserves. With 60% of its oil imports coming from the Middle East, China can no longer afford to sit on the sidelines of the tumultuous region. Its way of forming a footprint in the Middle East has been through providing technology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to unsavory regimes in places such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. A report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a group created by Congress to monitor U.S.-China relations, warned in 2002 that "this arms trafficking to these regimes presents an increasing threat to U.S. security interests in the Middle East." The report concludes: "A key driver in China's relations with

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 358 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz terrorist-sponsoring governments is its dependence on foreign oil to fuel its economic development. This dependency is expected to increase over the coming decade." Optimists claim that the world oil market will be able to accommodate China and that, instead of conflict, China's thirst could create mutual desire for stability in the Middle East and thus actually bring Beijing closer to the U.S. History shows the opposite: Superpowers find it difficult to coexist while competing over scarce resources. The main bone of contention probably will revolve around China's relations with Saudi Arabia, home to a quarter of the world's oil. The Chinese have already supplied the Saudis with intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and they played a major role 20 years ago in a Saudi-financed Pakistani nuclear effort that may one day leave a nuclear weapon in the hands of a Taliban-type regime in Riyadh or Islamabad. Since 9/11, a deep tension in U.S.-Saudi relations has provided the Chinese with an opportunity to win the heart of the House of Saud. The Saudis hear the voices in the U.S. denouncing Saudi Arabia as a "kernel of evil" and proposing that the U.S. seize and occupy the kingdom's oil fields. The Saudis especially fear that if their citizens again perpetrate a terror attack in the U.S., there would be no alternative for the U.S. but to terminate its long-standing commitment to the monarchy — and perhaps even use military force against it. The Saudis realize that to forestall such a scenario they can no longer rely solely on the U.S. to defend the regime and must diversify their security portfolio. In their search for a new patron, they might find China the most fitting and willing candidate. The risk of Beijing's emerging as a competitor for influence in the Middle East and a Saudi shift of allegiance are things Washington should consider as it defines its objectives and priorities in the 21st century. Without a comprehensive strategy designed to prevent China from becoming an oil consumer on a par with the U.S., a superpower collision is in the cards. The good news is that we are still in a position to halt China's slide into total dependency.

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Hurts India-US Relations
US unilateralism causes a decline in Indian relations – resentment Mehta, Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University professor, 3
(Pratap Bhanu, 7-1-3, Foreign Policy, ―Grading the President: A View From South Asia, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2003/07/01/grading_the_president_a_view_from_south_a sia, accessed 7/7/13, AR)
But overall, the perception of Bush remains directly related to the perception of the United States itself. Many people, Hindu nationalists in particular, who think of India as a great power, are genuinely ambivalent about the president‘s demeanor. On the one hand, there is a sneaking admiration for his unilateralism, his single-minded ability to do whatever it takes to advance U.S. power—even if it means relying on military force and disregarding world opinion. On the other hand, because India is, to put it mildly, in no position to act like the United States, the country resents the president when he does not fully acknowledge India‘s interests. In both India and Pakistan, Bush benefits from the natural esteem many have for U.S. power, but he does little to assuage those who see that power as a provocation.

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Causes Proliferation
Heg causes prolif and terrorism Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 7 (Christopher, Holder of the Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professorship of International Affairs at Texas A & M University‘s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. 8/2/7, ―America's Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing has Arrived,‖ Paper Prepared for the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 29 August-2 September 2007, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/9/7/pages21097 3/p210973-1.php, Accessed 7/7/13, AR)
In addition to soft balancing, asymmetric strategies are another type of non- traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. When employed by states, asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US‘ dominant high-tech conventional forces. Because they are threatened by the US, however, these states seek other methods of offsetting American power, and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance.

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Hurts Cooperation
American withdrawal would create avenues for international cooperation for multiple issues, but now is key Kupchan, writer for Political Science Quarterly, 3
[Charles, Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer 2003, Vol. 118, Issue 2 ―The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy‖ Database: Academic Search Premier, accessed 7-9-13 BLE]

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[*]

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Decline Good – Counterbalancing
Pulling back solves counterbalancing and forces our allies to bear some of the burden of their own defense. Walt, Belfer Professor of IR at Harvard, 2013
(Stephen, 1/2/2013, ―More or Less: The Debate on US Grand Strategy‖, Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/02/more_or_less_the_debate_on_us_grand_strategy, accessed 7/9/13, DVO) Fourth, B, I, & W largely ignore the issue of opportunity cost. Advocates of restraint like Posen (and myself) are not saying that the United States cannot afford to intervene in lots of overseas venues, they are saying that the United States would be better off with a smaller set of commitments and a more equitable division of labor between itself and its principal allies. If the United States were not spending more than more of the world combined on "deep engagement," it could invest more in infrastructure here at home, lower taxes, balance budgets more easily, provide more generous health or welfare benefits, or do whatever combination of the above the public embraced. Fifth, B, I, & W argue that deep engagement works because hardly anybody is actively trying to balance American power. In their view, most of the world likes this strategy, and is eager for Washington to continue along the same path. On the one hand, this isn't that surprising: why shouldn't NATO countries or Japan prefer a world where they can spend 1-2% of GDP on defense while Uncle Sucker shoulders the main burden? More importantly, advocates of restraint believe doing somewhat less would encourage present allies to bear a fairer share of the burden, and also discourage some of them from adventurist behavior encouraged by excessive confidence in U.S. protection (which Posen terms "reckless driving"). If the U.S. played hard-to-get on occasion, it would discover that some of its allies would do more both to secure their own interests and to remain eligible for future U.S. help. Instead of bending over backwards to convince the rest of the world that the United States is 100 percent reliable, U.S. leaders should be encouraging other states to bend over backwards to convince us that they are worth supporting. Moreover, even if most of the world isn't balancing U.S. power, the parts that are remain troublesome. For instance, "deep engagement" in the Middle East has produced some pretty vigorous balancing behavior, in the form of Iraq and Iran's nuclear programs, Tehran's support for groups such as Hezbollah, and the virulent anti-Americanism of Al Qaeda. Indeed, the more deeply engaged we became in the region (especially with the onset of "dual containment" following the first Gulf War), the more local resistance we faced. Ditto our "deep engagement" in Iraq and Afghanistan. And given that those two wars may have cost upwards of $3 trillion, it seems clear that at least a few people have "balanced" against the United States with a certain amount of success.

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Retrenchment Good – On Balance
Benefits of retrenchment outweigh the harms Macdonald and Parent, Wellesley College and University of Miami Political Science Assistant Professors, 11
(Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, November/December 2011, Foreign Affairs, ―The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,‖ Vol. 90 Issue 6, p32-47, ebsco, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall.

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Hurts the Economy
Overseas influence causes economic decline—empirically proven Eland, Independent Institute Center on Peace and Liberty Senior Fellow and Director, 9
[Ivan, 5-11-9, The Independent Institute, ―How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis‖, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] A few—and only a few—prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. Making things worse, governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such ―make-believe‖ wealth has funded many U.S. wars. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton‘s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States‘ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation‘s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 365 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer.

Hegemony hurts America‘s fiscal health Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] There are two significant caveats to this body of evidence, however. The first reservation is that in all of these theories—hegemonic stability, power transition, long cycle—eventually the cost of maintaining global public goods catches up to the sole superpower. Other countries free-ride off of the hegemon, allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that these phenomena, occurring right now, are allowing China to outgrow [End Page 72] the United States.95 The absence of burden sharing is particularly acute on the military side of the public goods equation. Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press argue that the costs of a forward military presence outweigh the gains accruing to the United States from global stability.96 Nuno Monteiro observes that the United States has been at war in thirteen of the twenty-two post–Cold War years—a marked contrast to pre-1989 levels.97 These military operations might have prevented wider wars from breaking out, but the United States continues to pay the price in blood and treasure. The costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations have exacted a significant toll on America‘s fiscal health—more than $3 trillion to date, with an estimated $4 trillion to $6 trillion total projected for both conflicts.98

Attempts to bolster the economy through hegemony, allow other countries to undermine hegemony. Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] The other hypothesized voluntary benefit comes from geopolitical favoritism, wherein other sovereign jurisdictions provide voluntary economic concessions to the dominant security actor. Primacy allows the hegemon to use its military power as a form of extended deterrence to protect multiple strategic partners. In return, these allies and partners can confer economic benefits, helping to underwrite military hegemony.41 If these countries give preferential treatment to the hegemon‘s investors, support its currency as the world‘s reserve currency, buy hegemon-issued debt as a way to finance defense spending, or subsidize the hegemon‘s power projection through basing fees, arms purchases, or other

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 366 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz transfers, then the relationship between military power and pecuniary benefits comes into greater focus. More generally, those actors who rely on the hegemon‘s security umbrella are less likely to question or subvert its economic [End Page 62] order. As Norrlof explains, ―The United States is obligated by treaty to defend roughly fifty countries. These interventions, whether to push back aggressors, or for humanitarian reasons, have purchased goodwill and provided Great Powers with an interest in preserving an American-centered world order.‖42

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Retrenchment Good – Economy
US economy will benefit from retrenchment Verschoor-Kirss, Williams College, 12
(Alex Verschoor-Kirss, April 23, 2012, International Policy Digest, ―Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy,‖ http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolationand-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) In modern foreign policy the United States faces a complicated irony: in a bid to ensure national security and maintain global primacy the U.S. spends a large quantity of blood and treasure on interventionist policies that may actually compromise national security and the future of American hegemony. The culmination of these exercises in grandiose foreign policy has been the invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, at the combined cost of between three and four trillion dollars. While it is possible to argue that the invasions have been successful in preventing further terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, such a counterfactual proposition is difficult to prove. What is clear, however, is that such expenditures are unsustainable given a national debt of over $15 trillion. As the country debates the potential for military action in the Middle East in both Syria and Iran the necessity of a levelheaded understanding of the costs of such interventions, and their potentially fatal consequences for American standing in the world, cannot be overstated. Given the costs of large-scale foreign interventions, and the disproportionate share of the funding of organizations such as NATO and the United Nations that the United States carries, it is readily apparent that an isolationist foreign policy would present a prudent fiscal alternative to the current state of affairs. Given the historical and ideological connotations associated with the term ―isolationism‖ it is important to clarify its intended meaning here. By ―isolationism‖ I am advocating for a steady devolvement from foreign commitments and military involvements while maintaining economic and diplomatic ties, as well as overall U.S. military might, in order to preserve the long-term future of American hegemony. Here it might be argued that the concepts of isolationism and hegemony are antithetical. It would appear impossible to be both isolationist and hegemonic. At the same time, however, nothing could be further from the case.

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Hegemony Alternatives

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Offshore Balancing Solves
Offshore balancing is key to solve all global problems – counterbalancing, terrorism, and prolif – allows small powers to solve regional problems while the US intervenes only if necessary Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13
[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, ―Pull Back,‖ Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD] The United States should replace its unnecessary, ineffective, and expensive hegemonic quest with a more restrained grand strategy. Washington should not retreat into isolationism but refocus its efforts on its three biggest security challenges: preventing a powerful rival from upending the global balance of power, fighting terrorists, and limiting nuclear proliferation. These challenges are not new, but the United States must develop more carefully calculated and discriminating policies to address them. For roughly a century, American strategists have striven to ensure that no single state dominated the giant landmass of Eurasia, since such a power could then muster the resources to threaten the United States directly. To prevent this outcome, the United States rightly went to war against Germany and Japan and contained the Soviet Union. Although China may ultimately try to assume the mantle of Eurasian hegemon, this outcome is neither imminent nor inevitable. China's economy still faces many pitfalls, and the country is surrounded by powerful states that could and would check its expansion, including India and Russia, both of which have nuclear weapons. Japan, although it underspends on defense today, is rich and technologically advanced enough to contribute to a coalition of states that could balance against China. Other maritime Asian countries, even without the United States as a backstop, could also make common cause against China. The United States should maintain the capability to assist them if need be. But it should proceed cautiously in order to ensure that its efforts do not unnecessarily threaten China and thus encourage the very ambitions Washington hopes to deter or prompt a new round of free-riding or reckless driving by others in Asia. The United States must also defend itself against al Qaeda and any similar successor groups. Since such terrorists can threaten Americans' lives, the U.S. government should keep in place the prudent defensive measures that have helped lower the risk of attacks, such as more energetic intelligence efforts and better airport security. (A less interventionist foreign policy will help, too: it was partly the U.S. military's presence in Saudi Arabia that radicalized Osama bin Laden and his followers in the first place.) When it comes to offense, the United States must still pursue terrorists operating abroad, so that they spend their scarce resources trying to stay alive rather than plotting new attacks. It will need to continue cooperating with other vulnerable governments and help them develop their own police and military forces. Occasionally, the U.S. military will have to supplement these efforts with air strikes, drone attacks, and special operations raids. But Washington should keep the threat in perspective. Terrorists are too weak to threaten the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity, or power position. Because the threat is modest, and because trying to reform other societies by force is too costly, the United States must fight terrorism with carefully applied force, rather than through wholesale nation-building efforts such as that in Afghanistan. Finally, a restrained grand strategy would also pay close attention to the spread of nuclear weapons, while relying less on the threat of military force to stop it. Thanks to the deterrence provided by its own massive nuclear forces, the United States faces little risk of a direct nuclear attack by another state. But Washington does need to keep nonstate actors from obtaining nuclear weapons or material. To prevent them from taking advantage of lax safeguards at nuclear facilities, the U.S. government should share best practices regarding nuclear security with other countries, even ones that it would prefer

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 370 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz did not possess nuclear weapons in the first place. The United States does already cooperate somewhat with Pakistan on this issue, but it must stand ready to do more and ultimately to undertake such efforts with others. The loss of a government's control over its nuclear weapons during a coup, revolution, or civil war is a far harder problem to forestall. It may be possible for U.S. forces to secure weapons in a period of instability, with the help of local actors who see the dangers for their own country if the weapons get loose. Conditions may lend themselves to a preventive military attack, to seize or disable the weapons. In some cases, however, the United States might have to make do with less sure-fire responses. It could warn those who seized the nuclear weapons in a period of upheaval that they would make themselves targets for retaliation if the weapons were ever used by terrorists. And it could better surveil international sea and air routes and more intensively monitor both its own borders for nuclear smuggling and those of the potential source countries. These measures may seem incommensurate with the terrible toll of a nuclear blast. But the alternative strategy -- fighting preventive conventional wars against nascent nuclear powers -- is an expensive and uncertain solution to proliferation. The Obama administration's oft-repeated warning that deterrence and containment of a nuclear Iran is unacceptable makes little sense given the many ways a preventive war could go wrong and in light of the redundant deterrent capability the United States already possesses. Indeed, the more Washington relies on military force to halt proliferation, the more likely it is that countries will decide to acquire the ultimate deterrent. A more restrained America would also have to head off nuclear arms races. In retrospect, the size, composition, doctrine, and highly alert posture of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces during the Cold War seem unduly risky relative to the strategic problem those weapons were supposed to solve. Nuclear weapons act as potent deterrents to aggression, but significantly smaller forces than those the United States now possesses, carefully managed, should do the job. To avoid a replay of Cold Warstyle nuclear competition, the United States should pursue a new multilateral arms control regime that places ceilings on nuclear inventories and avoids hair-trigger force postures.

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Retrenchment Solves
Retrenchment solves – naval and air force can adequately address global issues without foreign presence Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, 13
[Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, ―Pull Back,‖ Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13, WD] A grand strategy of restraint would narrow U.S. foreign policy to focus on those three larger objectives. What would it look like in practice? First, the United States would recast its alliances so that other countries shared actual responsibility for their own defense. NATO is the easiest case; the United States should withdraw from the military command structure and return the alliance to the primarily political organization it once was. The Europeans can decide for themselves whether they want to retain the military command structure under the auspices of the European Union or dismantle it altogether. Most U.S. troops should come home from Europe, although by mutual agreement, the United States could keep a small number of naval and air bases on the continent. The security treaty with Japan is a more difficult problem; it needs to be renegotiated but not abandoned. As the treaty stands now, the United States shoulders most of the burden of defending Japan, and the Japanese government agrees to help. The roles should be reversed, so that Japan assumes responsibility for its own defense, with Washington offering backup. Given concerns about China's rising power, not all U.S. forces should leave the region. But the Pentagon should pare down its presence in Japan to those relevant to the most immediate military problems. All U.S. marines could be withdrawn from the country, bringing to an end the thorny negotiations about their future on the island of Okinawa. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force should keep the bulk of their forces stationed in and around Japan in place, but with appropriate reductions. Elsewhere in Asia, the U.S. military can cooperate with other states to ensure access to the region should future crises arise, but it should not seek new permanent bases. The military should also reassess its commitments in the Persian Gulf: the United States should help protect states in the region against external attacks, but it cannot take responsibility for defending them against internal dissent. Washington still needs to reassure those governments that fear that a regional power such as Iran will attack them and hijack their oil wealth, since a single oil-rich hegemon in the region would no doubt be a source of mischief. The U.S. military has proved adept at preventing such an outcome in the past, as it did when it defended Saudi Arabia and repelled Saddam's forces from Kuwait in 1991. Ground forces bent on invasion make easy targets for air attacks. The aircraft and cruise missiles aboard U.S. naval forces stationed in the region could provide immediate assistance. With a little advance notice, U.S. Air Force aircraft could quickly reinforce land bases maintained by the Arab states of the Gulf, as they did during the Gulf War when the regional powers opposed to Saddams aggression prepared the way for reinforcement from the U.S. military by maintaining extra base capacity and fuel. But U.S. soldiers no longer need to live onshore in Gulf countries, where they incite antiAmericanism and tie the U.S. government to autocratic regimes of dubious legitimacy. For example, Bahrain is suffering considerable internal unrest, which raises questions about the future viability of the United States' growing military presence there. The Iraq war proved that trying to install new regimes in Arab countries is a fool's errand; defending existing regimes facing internal rebellion will be no easier. Under a restrained grand strategy, U.S. military forces could shrink significantly, both to save money and to send allies the message that it's time they did more for themselves. Because the Pentagon would, under this new strategy, swear off counterinsurgency, it could cut the number of ground forces

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 372 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz in half. The navy and the air force, meanwhile, should be cut by only a quarter to a third, since their assets take a long time to produce and would still be needed for any effort to maintain the global balance of power. Naval and air forces are also well suited to solving the security problems of Asia and the Persian Gulf. Because these forces are highly mobile, only some need be present in key regions. The rest can be kept at home, as a powerful strategic reserve. The overall size and quality of U.S. military forces should be determined by the critical contingency that they must address: the defense of key resources and allies against direct attack. Too often in the past, Washington has overused its expensive military to send messages that ought to be left to diplomats. That must change. Although the Pentagon should continue leading joint exercises with the militaries of other countries in key regions, it should stop overloading the calendar with pointless exercises the world over. Making that change would save wear and tear on troops and equipment and avoid creating the impression that the United States will solve all the world's security problems.

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Nuclear Deterrence Solves
Nukes solve all challenges to national security and deter great power wars—US heg is unnecessary. Walt, Belfer Professor of IR at Harvard, 2013
(Stephen, 1/2/2013, ―More or Less: The Debate on US Grand Strategy‖, Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/02/more_or_less_the_debate_on_us_grand_strategy, accessed 7/9/13, DVO) Sixth, reading B, I, & W, one would hardly know that the nuclear revolution had even occurred. Nuclear weapons are not very useful as instruments of coercion, but they do make their possessors largely unconquerable and thus reduce overall security requirements considerably. Because the United States has a second-strike capability sufficient to devastate any country foolish enough to attack us, the core security of the United States is not in serious question. The presence of nuclear weapons in the hands of eight other countries also makes a conventional great power war like World War I or World War II exceedingly unlikely. Yet despite this fundamental shift in the global strategic environment, B, I & W believe the United States must remain "deeply engaged" in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in order to prevent a replay of the first half of the 20th century.

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Multipolarity Helps Cooperation
Multipolarity good – leads to global cooperation Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6
[Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,‖ 2006, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-9-13 BLE] Second, although regional balancing could work to the United States' advantage, it would be more likely to do so in a future multipolar system rather than in a unipolar one. The Cold War illustrates this point. During the Cold War, the United States was hegemonic in the non-Soviet world. Although deeply ambivalent (or worse) about U.S. hegemony, the West Europeans nonetheless accepted— reluctantly—U.S. primacy because the United States protected them from the Soviet threat. 58 In the absence of a hostile countervailing pole (or poles) of power in today's unipolar world, however, there is a higher risk that others—even erstwhile U.S. allies—will come to see U.S. hegemony as a greater threat than U.S. preponderance during the Cold War. The likelihood that the major Eurasian powers may engage in regional balancing, in fact, is a more powerful argument for an offshore balancing strategy than it is for a hegemonic one: as an offshore balancer in a multipolar world, the United States could safely retract its military power from Eurasia because the regional powers would focus their strategic attention primarily on the security threats posed by their neighbors rather than on the United States. 59 The United States could enhance its relative power position simply by standing on the sidelines while security competitions sapped the relative power positions of the major Eurasian powers.

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Multipolarity Helps Economy
Multipolarity helps the world economy World Bank 10
[―Multipolarity to Bring Benefits and New Challenges to the Developing World‖ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/EXTGDH/0,,content MDK:22915330~menuPK:7935814~pagePK:64167689~piPK:64167673~theSitePK:7933464,00.html, accessed 7-9-13 BLE] A more multipolar global economy will, on balance, be positive for developing countries as a whole—though not necessarily for each of them individually. Growth spillovers—flowing from trade, finance, migration, and technology channels— will induce technological transfer, spur demand for exports, and improve the terms of trade in developing countries as well as enable them to develop their domestic agricultural and manufacturing industries. For example, since 1990, bilateral trade f lows between the least developed countries (LDCs) and the major emerging economies have increased threefold; trade wiThemerging economies now accounts for a greater share of LDCs‘ bilateral trade flows than their trade with major advanced economies. Moreover, a more diff use distribution of global growth will also create new external growth drivers, meaning that idiosyncratic shocks in individual growth pole economies will have less impact on the volatility of external demand in those countries than at present. This characteristic was evident in the aftermath of the 2008–09 financial crisis, when cross-border M&A originating in emerging economies accounted for more than a quarter of the value of all deals in 2009 and 2010. Greater multipolarity could also have a tangible effect on patterns of foreign aid, as increased aid disbursements by emerging economies push official development assistance to even greater shares of gross national income in LDCs.

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AT – Hegemony Good Args

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AT – Deterrence
US hegemonic deterrence fails—questionable credibility and ignored threats Monteiro, Yale political science professor, 10
[Nuno, P., Spring/Summer 2010, ―Why U.S. Power Does Not Deter Challenges‖, http://yalejournal.org/2010/07/20/why-u-s-power-does-not-deter-challenges/, accessed 7-3-13 BLE]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis‐à‐vis the world's sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world's other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America's new enemies are not more "irrational" than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming "we will bury you" Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today's world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world's most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth.

American hegemony is impossible to support and administer Freeman, American Diplomat, 12

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[Chas Freeman, 2-23-12, The National Interest, ―The China Bluff,‖ http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-china-bluff-6561, 7-6-13, JZ]
Actually, we have a much bigger problem than that presented by the challenge of dealing with a rising China. We cannot hope to sustain our global hegemony even in the short term without levels of expenditure we are unprepared to tax ourselves to support. Worse, the logic of the sort of universal sphere of influence we aspire to administer requires us to treat the growth of others' capabilities relative to our own as direct threats to our hegemony. This means we must match any and all improvements in foreign military power with additions to our own. It is why our militaryrelated expenditures have grown to exceed those of the rest of the world combined. There is simply no way that such a militaristic approach to national security is affordable in the long term , no matter how much it may delight defense contractors.

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AT – Hegemony Solves Conflict
American hegemony does not solve conflict Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato institute, 13
[Doug Bandow, special assistant to President Reagan, editor of political magazine Inquiry, 7-5-13, ―Egypt and American Hubris,‖ http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/egypt -american-hubris-8692, 7-7-13, JZ] American foreign policy is a wreck. The presumption that Washington controls events around the globe has been exposed to all as an embarrassing illusion. Egypt teeters on the brink, again. Syria worsens by the day. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are dead, with another intifada in the wind. North Korea threatens to nuke the world. Violence grows in Nigeria. The Europeans have gone from disillusioned to angry with President Barack Obama. Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela reject U.S. leadership in Latin America. Even Iranian reformers support Iran‘s nuclear program. Zimbabwe‘s vicious Robert Mugabe is likely to retain power in upcoming elections. Iraq is friendly with Iran and supporting Bashar al-Assad. The Afghan government remains corrupt, incompetent, and without legitimacy. Bahrain cracks down on democracy supporters with Washington‘s acquiescence. China and Russia resist U.S. priorities in Syria and elsewhere. Venezuela without Chavez looks like Venezuela with Chavez. It wasn‘t supposed to be this way. America was the unipower, the hyperpower, the sole superpower, the essential nation. Washington was the benevolent hegemon. Only members of the axis of evil had something to fear from the United States. All the U.S. government had to do was exercise ―leadership‖ and all would be well. That U.S. pride swelled with the end of the Cold War is hardly a surprise. But what unfortunately emerged was a rabid arrogance, the view that ―what we say goes.‖ It was the very hubris about which the ancient Greeks warned. Alas, this all proved to be a world of illusion, filled with smoke and mirrors. On 9/11 a score of angry young Muslims brought war to America, destroying the World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon. A bunch of ill-equipped and ignorant Afghan fundamentalists refused to admit that they were defeated, and more than a decade later still resist the United States backed by a multitude of allies and a covey of local elites. The invasion of Iraq was met by IEDs instead of flowers, and created an ally in name only, with Baghdad ready to thwart U.S. military objectives when it saw fit. American pleading, threats, promises and sanctions had no effect on the course of events in North Korea. Civil and military conflicts ebbed and flowed and political contests waxed and waned in Congo, Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe with Washington but an ineffective bystander. Russia‘s Vladimir Putin ignored U.S. priorities both before and after the fabled ―reset‖ in relations. China protected North Korea and bullied its other neighbors, despite diplomatic pleadings and military pivots. As for succeeding events, where is the evidence that Morsi, Egypt‘s generals and the Egyptian people sat around awaiting the opinion of U.S. policymakers? Washington‘s support for the odious Mubarak left it with little credibility. Maybe the generals can be bought with the promise of more military aid, but even they know that the U.S. cannot protect them if their soldiers refuse their orders. Morsi‘s fate was decided in Cairo, not Washington. Americans understandably pine for a simpler world in which Washington is the center of the world and the U.S. orchestrates international events. Alas, that world never really existed. It certainly does not exist today. Instead of embracing the illusion of Washington‘s omniscience, Washington officials should acknowledge the limitations on their power and influence. They should reflect on events spinning

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 380 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz out of control in Egypt. It‘s time for the more ―humble‖ foreign policy that candidate George W. Bush promised in what seems to be a lifetime ago.

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AT – Transition Wars
Hegemony is not key to stability and no transition wars – empirics prove the theory false Fettweis, Naval War College, Professor of Security Studies, 10
(Christopher J., Tulane University‘s Assistant Professor of Political Science, October 27, 2010, ―Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace‖, p.173-4, accessed 7/5/12, YGS) Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace in only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break our around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today‘s interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would ―become a more dangerous place‖ and, sooner or later, that would ―redound to America‘s detriment.‖71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that U.S hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great power is if selfpolicing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world‘s population that live in the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ―peace dividend‖ endangered both national and global security. ―No serious analyst of American military capabilities,‖ argued Kristol and Kagan, ―doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America‘s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.‖73 If the pacific trend were due not the U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 382 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a lesscapable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

Transition from unipolarity will be to multipolarity – that ensures stability through international institutions Ikenberry, Princeton Politics and International Affairs professor, 11
(G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ―The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,‖ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, lexis, accessed 6/28/12, THW) There is no longer any question: wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue that the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal. Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away, they say, but so, too, is the open and rule-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s. In this view, newly powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. The hallmarks of liberal internationalism -- openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries. The fact that today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis has tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the United States to act as the global economic leader. For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." But this panicked narrative misses a deeper

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 383 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

No transition wars – rising powers will integrate into international institutions with no incentives for aggression Ikenberry, Princeton Politics and International Affairs professor, 11
(G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ―The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,‖ Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis, accessed 6/28/12, THW) REASON FOR REASSURANCE Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 384 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself . So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 385 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Loss of Alliances Causes Violence
Loss of allies doesn‘t cause violence – 1960‘s France proves Weisbrode, European University Institute diplomatic historian, 11
(Kenneth Weisbrode is a diplomatic historian at the European University Institute and author of "The Atlantic Century." 2-8-11, World Politics Review, ―The U.S. and Egypt: The Limits of Hegemony,‖ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7805/the-u-s-and-egypt-the-limits-of-hegemony, accessed 78-12, CNM) Some of today's big powers resemble hegemons; others are more imperial. But all, to one degree or another, find their responses toward smaller powers driven by circumstance and not merely by inclination. The United States, for example, has invaded and occupied several countries over the years. But when former President Charles de Gaulle of France withdrew that country from NATO's military command in 1966, then-President Lyndon Johnson did not lead an armed overthrow of the French government. In fact, he barely did more than wish the French a bon voyage. Here, too, gradations of influence and power mattered: France never defected from the North Atlantic alliance itself, but merely from its military organization. If it had joined the Soviet bloc, or declared itself to be genuinely neutral, Johnson may have reacted differently. The French case offers a useful comparison in another respect. To what extent does world order require the semblance of tolerance among allies? Among the many grievances against Mubarak held by own people was that he has been too loyal to his American backers, to the detriment of Egypt's interests. A certain respect for independence, and not just codependence, can have a certain utility in sustaining order. It preserves the voluntary character of hegemony, tempers the tendency of the superpower to overcommit itself and enhances the perception among allies that they are not mere satraps.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 386 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Cooperation
Many world problems require US/Chinese cooperation; US cannot lead independent of China Cohen, former Secretary of Defense, 9
(William, 4-23-9, The Wall Street Journal, ―The World Depends on U.S.-China Cooperation,‖ 4/23/2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html, accessed 7-8-13, AFGA). Recent events confirm that we're living in a new world of disorder. North Korea tested a missile that could reach the U.S., and is threatening to resume its nuclear-weapons program; the Taliban is using drug money to destabilize Afghanistan and turn that country back into a terrorist safe haven; the financial crisis has sparked a global recession; and unchecked greenhouse gas emissions are transforming the global climate. These disparate challenges share one thing in common: They cannot be addressed successfully without cooperation between the U.S. and China. The most immediate opportunity for cooperation is in confronting the international financial crisis. China currently holds $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves, and it is by far the world's largest holder of U.S. government debt. As the Obama administration increases that debt to finance its economic stimulus plan, China will almost certainly be called upon to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments. China also has an interest in working with the U.S. to ensure those efforts succeed, because it depends on economic growth in the U.S. (still its largest single trading partner) to ensure stability at home. There is a compelling need to create a new dialogue on finance and economics. This conversation began with President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao's discussions at the G-20 summit this month in London. Meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders have been dubbed the "G-2" by some to reflect the crucial role of economic negotiations between our two countries. This first meeting between the two men, and the agreement reached by world leaders at the close of the summit, mark a positive beginning to the effort to harmonize our financial management and banking regulatory practices, and explore ways to expand bilateral trade opportunities in areas such as energy and environmental technologies. The U.S. and China are the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. This means that our nations have the opportunity, and the primary responsibility, for shaping the global response to climate change. To date, both sides have used each other as an excuse for inaction. This must end. The Obama administration has made it clear that it will work hard on energy and environmental issues within our bilateral relations. China and the U.S. together have the power to set the de facto global standard for energy efficiency and emissions control. To do so, we should jointly promote the development and transfer of clean energy technology between our countries, initiate bilateral projects on energy and climate issues, and develop common principles to drive the multilateral negotiations on a new international climate-change agreement. China and the U.S. have a shared interest in denuclearizing North Korea. That state's erratic behavior and brinkmanship, of which the missile launch was yet another manifestation, may one day persuade Japan to develop a nuclear deterrent. This is something China should want to avoid. As North Korea's principal supplier of oil and other essential commodities, China has significant leverage with the North Korean regime. The U.S. and China must stand together and increase pressure on the North to stop its missile testing, return to the six-party talks with Japan, Russia and South Korea, and abandon its nuclear-weapons program. The U.S. and China have a shared interest in combating the international drug trade that fuels terror in Afghanistan. Today, Afghanistan competes with Burma as the main provider of narcotics

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 387 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz to China. Much of the drug trade is facilitated by trafficking and organized crime networks in Western China. To combat these networks on both sides of the border, the U.S. and China should propose a new NATO-China antinarcotics program. Such a program could increase antidrug cooperation along China's border with Afghanistan. And it could serve as the basis for increased cooperation on other Central Asian security issues, including Pakistan. To be sure, there remain a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. But with so many challenges facing our nations, the stakes are too high to allow old hostilities to impede constructive cooperation. Virtually no global challenge can be met without China-U.S. cooperation. By finding new ways to promote our common interests, the Obama administration can transform our relations with China and promote the global good.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 388 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Offshore Balancing Weakens Deterrence
Offshore balancing solves hegemony offense – it prevents us from being drawn into conflicts Layne, Naval Postgraduate School, visiting professor 98
(Christopher, World Policy Journal, ―Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?‖ Volume 15, Issue 2, Summer, p. 22, Proquest, accessed 7/6/13, AR) Because of the interlocking effects of geography, nuclear weapons (which enhance insularity's strategic advantages), and formidable military and economic capabilities, the United States is virtually impregnable against direct attack. The risk of conflict, and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack, derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by an expansive definition of U.S. interests. In multipolar systems, insular great powers have a much broader range of strategic choices than less fortunately placed powers. They can avoid being entrapped by alliance commitments and need worry little about being abandoned by actual or potential allies. Offshore great powers also can choose to stay out of great power wars altogether or to limit their involvement--a choice unavailable to states that live in dangerous neighborhoods in which rivals lurk nearby. As an insular great power in a multipolar world, the United States would retain a free hand strategically: although it might need to enter into temporary coalitions, America would disengage from permanent alliance relationships. An insular great power like the United States need not subject itself to strategic constraints of this kind. The strategy of preponderance is based, in part, on the assumption that the United States must prevent the rise of a hegemonic challenger because other states either will not do the job, or at least will not do so effectively. In contrast, an offshore balancing strategy would recognize that, in a multipolar world, other states will balance against potential hegemons, and it is to America's advantage to shift this responsibility to them. In a multipolar world, the United States could be confident that effective balancing ultimately would occur because, to ensure their survival, other states have an incentive to balance against geographically proximate rivals, and great powers do not "bandwagon"--that is, they do not align with threatening, would-be hegemons.

Transition now is key to offshore balancing Layne, Naval Postgraduate School visiting professor, 2
[Christopher, Spring 2002, Washington Quarterly, ―Offshore

Balancing Revisited.‖ http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.2layne.html, accessed 7/12/13, AR]
The events of September 11 make offshore balancing an attractive grand strategic alternative to primacy for two reasons. First, looking beyond the war on terrorism, the Persian Gulf/Middle East region is clearly, endemically unstable. If the United States attempts to perpetuate its hegemonic role in the region after having accomplished its immediate war aims, the probability of a serious geopolitical backlash within the region against the United States is high. Second, because the U.S. victory in the war on terrorism will underscore U.S. predominance in international politics, victory's paradoxical effect will be to heighten European, Russian, and Chinese fears of U.S. power.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 389 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz By adopting an offshore balancing strategy once the war on terrorism ends, the United States would benefit in two ways. First, others have much greater intrinsic strategic interests in the region than does the United States. For example, Western Europe, Japan, and, increasingly, China are far more dependent on the region's oil than the United States. Because they live next door, Russia, China, Iran, and India have a much greater long-term security interest in regional stability in the Persian Gulf/Middle East than the United States. By passing the mantle of regional stabilizer to these great and regional powers, the United States could extricate itself from the messy and dangerous geopolitics of the Persian Gulf/Middle East and take itself out of radical Islam's line of fire. Second, although a competitive component to U.S. relations with the other great powers in a multipolar world would be inescapable, multipolar politics have historically engendered periods of great-power cooperation. On the cooperative side, an offshore balancing strategy would be coupled with a policy of spheres of influence, which have always been an important item in the toolbox of great-power policymakers. By recognizing each other's paramount interests in certain regions, great powers can avoid the kinds of misunderstandings that could trigger conflict. Moreover, the mere act of signaling that one country understands another's larger security stake in a particular region, a stake that it will respect by noninterference, allows states to communicate a nonthreatening posture to one another. By recognizing the legitimacy of other interests, a great power also signals that it accepts them as equals. An offshore balancing strategy would immunize the United States against a post -- waron-terrorism backlash against U.S. hegemony in one other way. By accepting the emergence of new great powers and simultaneously pulling back from its primacy-driven military posture, the United States would reduce perception of a "U.S. threat," thereby lowering the chances that others will view it as an overpowerful hegemon. In this sense, offshore balancing is a strategy of restraint that would allow the United States to minimize the risks of open confrontation with the new great powers. Being Panglossian about the reemergence of multipolarity in international politics would be silly. Multipolarity is not the best outcome imaginable. The best outcome would be a world in which every other state willingly accepted U.S. hegemony -- an outcome about which some may dream, but one that will never be realized in the real world. That outcome, however, is much better than the predictable outcome if the United States continues to follow a grand strategy of primacy. The outcome of that strategy will be really bad: not only will new great powers rise, they will also coalesce against what they perceive to be a U.S. threat. Notwithstanding the events of September 11, U.S. hegemony is the salient fact that defines the U.S. role in international politics. The articles in "Through the Looking Glass" reflect a deep mistrust of U.S. power that the temporary convergence of interests brought about by the war on terrorism will not wash away. Indeed, the reverse is true. In attaining victory in the war's opening round, the United States underlined its dominant role in the international system, and talk of a "new U.S. empire" echoes inside the beltway. Underscoring the paradox of U.S. power is the paradox of victory. Flushed with triumph and the awesome display of U.S. might, U.S. policymakers may succumb to hubris and overreach strategically in the false belief that U.S. hegemony is an unchallengeable fact of international life. Other states, however, will draw the opposite conclusion: that the United States is too powerful and that its hegemony must be resisted. Now, more than ever, having a great debate about future U.S. grand strategy is imperative. As that debate unfolds, offshore balancing will become the obvious successor strategy to primacy because it is a grand strategic escape hatch by which the United States can avoid the fate that has befallen previous hegemons in modern international history.>

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 390 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

AT – Withdrawal Causes Economic Decline
US withdrawal won‘t collapse the economy – global trade will continue Layne, Texas A&M Bush School of Government and Public Service professor, 6
[Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University 2006, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-global-power-shift-west-east-6796, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] Advocates of hegemony (and selective engagement) also seem to have a peculiar understanding of international economics and convey the impression that international trade and investment will come to a grinding halt if the United States abandons its current grand strategy—or if a Eurasian great power war occurs. This is not true, however. If the United States abandons its current grand strategic role as the protector of international economic openness, international economic intercourse will not stop, even in time of great power war.110 If the United States were to adopt an offshore balancing grand strategy, its own and global markets would adapt to the new political and strategic environment. Finns and investors would reassess the risks of overseas trade and investment, and over time investment and trade flows would shift in response to these calculations. Instead of being diminished, international trade and investment would be diverted to more geopolitically secure regions, and these "safe havens"—especially the United States—would be the beneficiaries. Finally, the assumption that a Eurasia dominated by a hegemon would be closed economically to the United States is dubious. A Eurasian hegemon would have a stake in its own economic well-being (bothfor strategic and domestic political reasons), and it would be most unlikely to hive itself off completely from international trade.

U.S. primacy is unaffordable Layne, Ph. D. Political Science, 12
[Christopher Layne, 4-26-12, The Atlantic, ―The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable‖http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-paxamericana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single_page=true, 7-5-13, JZ]
But even during the Cold War's last two decades, the seeds of American decline had already been sown. In a prescient--but premature--analysis, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believed that the bipolar Cold War system would give way to a pentagonal multipolar system composed of the United States, Soviet Union, Europe, China and Japan. Nixon also confronted America's declining international financial power in 1971 when he took the dollar off the Bretton Woods gold standard in response to currency pressures. Later, in 1987, Yale's Paul Kennedy published his brilliant Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, which raised questions about the structural, fiscal and economic weaknesses in America that, over time, could nibble away at the foundations of U.S. power. With America's subsequent Cold War triumph--and the bursting of Japan's economic bubble-Kennedy's thesis was widely dismissed. Now, in the wake of the 2008 financial meltdown and ensuing recession, it is clear that Kennedy and other "declinists" were right all along. The same causes of decline they pointed to are at the center of today's debate about America's economic prospects: too much consumption and not enough savings; persistent trade and current-account deficits; deindustrialization; sluggish economic growth; and chronic federal-budget deficits fueling an ominously rising national debt. Indeed, looking forward a decade, the two biggest domestic threats to U.S. power are the country's bleak fiscal outlook and deepening doubts about the dollar's future role as the international economy's reserve currency. Economists regard a 100 percent debt-to-GDP ratio as a flashing

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 391 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz warning light that a country is at risk of defaulting on its financial obligations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has warned that the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio could exceed that level by 2020--and swell to 190 percent by 2035. Worse, the CBO recently warned of the possibility of a "sudden credit event" triggered by foreign investors' loss of confidence in U.S. fiscal probity. In such an event, foreign investors could reduce their purchases of Treasury bonds, which would force the United States to borrow at higher interest rates. This, in turn, would drive up the national debt even more. America's geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar's role as reserve currency. If the dollar loses that status, U.S. primacy would be literally unaffordable. There are reasons to be concerned about the dollar's fate over the next two decades. U.S. political gridlock casts doubt on the nation's ability to address its fiscal woes; China is beginning to internationalize the renminbi, thus laying the foundation for it to challenge the dollar in the future; and history suggests that the dominant international currency is that of the nation with the largest economy. (In his piece on the global financial structure in this issue, Christopher Whalen offers a contending perspective, acknowledging the dangers posed to the dollar as reserve currency but suggesting such a change in the dollar's status is remote in the current global environment.)

America‘s fiscal predicament constrains international influence Neu, Senior Economist at RAND, 13
[C. Richard Neu, 1-31-13, US News, ―U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch‖ http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/01/31/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losingits-punch, 7-6-13, JZ]
This is a small example of what may be a troubling trend: America's fiscal predicament and the seeming inability of its political system to resolve these matters may be taking a toll on the instruments of U.S. "soft power" and on the country's ability to shape international developments in ways that serve American interests. The most potent instrument of U.S. soft power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy. As the biggest economy in the world, America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics profession is beginning to understand that high levels of public debt can slow economic growth, especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or 90 percent of GDP. The United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in the future. These will come at a bad time. The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling since 1999—by nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's GDP share declined, so did its share of world trade, which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for international trade. Investors may be growing skittish about U.S. government debt levels and the disordered state of U.S. fiscal policymaking. And what about unmet needs at home—healthcare costs, a foundering public education system, deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality? A strained fiscal situation that limits resources for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot be helping with any of these matters. But without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for unified action abroad or the moral authority to lead other nations by example? Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require painful adjustments over a number of years—increased government revenue and painful reductions in government outlays, almost certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of fiscal adjustment and constrained government resources, U.S. international influence may decline yet further.

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AT – Hegemony Key to the Economy
U.S. hegemony no longer key to global economy Mandelbaum, John Hopkins International Relations Program Director, 11
(Michael Mandelbaum, the Christian A. Herter Professor and Director of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, August 9, 2011, Foreign Affairs, ―America's Coming Retrenchment,‖ http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael-mandelbaum/americascoming-retrenchment, accessed July 6, 2013, EK) Yet the 2008 economic crash was an unmistakable reminder that worldwide monopoly production is no longer stable. Rivalry between banks and hedge funds over investment in the most profitable companies destabilized the financial system, as one bubble after another burst. In the coming years, as Chinese economic growth and south-south economic ties begin to overtake U.S. leadership, the role of U.S. military might will also come into question internationally as an increasing number of countries and movements seek to arrange matters differently. The crash also raised questions in the minds of millions about the ability of the world capitalist economic system to deliver jobs, life, and prosperity to them. People are scrutinizing the desirability of capitalism and globalization as never before. Among the more than 99 percent of Americans who don‘t own global companies, the question is there, waiting to be asked, of whether U.S. foreign policy actually serves their interests. The time is therefore ripe for the peace movement to offer a new foreign policy which serves the interests of the domestic and global 99 percent better than the hegemonic order.

Security spending not justified – hurts the economy trading off with other programs Betts, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 7
(Richard K. Betts, November/December 7, Foreign Affairs, ―A Disciplined Defense,‖ Vol. 86 Issue 6, p67-80, ebsco, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) During the Cold War, the U.S. armed forces were constantly preparing for World War III. U.S. military strength was geared to be ready to battle an opposing superpower that had 175 army divisions, 40,000 nuclear weapons, and numerous allies. Yet even in the early phases of the Cold War, when tensions were highest and fears greatest, the value of economizing was not forgotten. Defense spending was kept in check by the limits on revenues, the extent of other government spending, and a serious commitment to balancing the budget. As the political scientists Glenn Snyder and Samuel Huntington noted in their classic studies of defense policymaking under President Harry Truman and President Eisenhower, those presidents calculated military spending using the "remainder method": they started with tax revenues, subtracted domestic spending, and gave whatever was left over to defense. Truman did this before the shock of the Korean War caused him to unleash a military buildup; Eisenhower did it to preserve a healthy domestic economic base for strategic competition over the long haul. The remainder method was a strategically arbitrary means of limiting expenditures and was not used for very long. It would not make sense to resurrect it now. But nor does it make sense to benchmark current defense spending against spending during any other phase of the Cold War, given that the Cold War is over. The last time the United States faced a multipolar international system, in the decades prior to World War II, its peacetime defense spending was usually no more than two percent of GDP. In 1939, the last year before U.S. mobilization for World War II began in earnest, it was only 1.4 percent. Such a level was certainly too low, and the United States learned that lesson for good after Pearl Harbor. But on

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 393 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz what grounds can one conclude that the current level should be three times as high? Certainly, it cannot be justified based on any actual threats that the U.S. armed forces might plausibly be expected to encounter. The military capabilities of the United States need to be kept comfortably superior to those of present and potential enemies. But they should be measured relatively, against those enemies' capabilities, and not against the limits of what is technologically possible or based on some vague urge to have more.

Defense spending trades off with social programs Betts, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 7
(Richard K. Betts, November/December 7, Foreign Affairs, ―A Disciplined Defense,‖ Vol. 86 Issue 6, p67-80, ebsco, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) TO ASK whether the United States can afford higher levels of military spending is stupid. It can, and if necessary, it would. The problem is that there are other important things that the United States wants and can afford too, and a dollar spent on one thing cannot be spent on another. Defense spending has to be balanced not simply against presumed military needs but against other needs as well. Those needs include not just bedrock domestic programs such as Social Security and Medicare entitlements, which are imperiled by looming deficits, but also other programs affecting national security. The State Department, for example, is comparatively starved. It is struggling to staff embassies and project the United States' message around the world with a Foreign Service of a few thousand officers and a requested operating budget of just over $7 billion. Its total budget request for 2008--including foreign aid, contributions to international organizations and peacekeeping missions, and supplementals for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan--is just over $42 billion, which is equal to 6.5 percent of the funding request for the Pentagon. For dealing with a world in which many threats stem from political and economic instability and anti-American sentiment, and in which the U.S. government has great trouble communicating at the grass-roots level, these numbers appear badly unbalanced. Even if there were infinite resources available to support them, military capabilities would still be useful for only some purposes. The ability to use military power to regulate the world according to American values is more limited than post-Cold War optimism assumed. Imperial policing is feasible where the problem consists of individuals or gangs of thugs rather than organized and trained armed forces. In most cases, imposing political order against resistance requires waging war--a much bloodier and more involved enterprise. The professional military understands this, which is why it usually tries to avoid such policing operations and usually argues for strategies that rely on overwhelming force. Civilians, in contrast, often prefer a lean and light application of military power, in the hopes that significant gains can be had on the cheap. Given the difficulties the United States has had with military interventions recently, there is reason to believe that it will resort to fewer such operations in the near future.

Increased defense spending is unsustainable and kills the US economy Macdonald and Parent, Wellesley College and University of Miami Political Science Assistant Professors, 11
(Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, November/December 2011, Foreign Affairs, ―The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,‖ Vol. 90 Issue 6, p32-47, ebsco, accessed July 7, 2013, EK) Beyond these challenges to the country's military dominance, a weakened economic condition is contributing to the decline of U.S. power. The U.S. economy remains the largest in the world, yet its position is in jeopardy. Between 1999 and 2009, the U.S. share of global GDP (measured in terms of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 394 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz purchasing power parity) fell from 23 percent to 20 percent, whereas China's share of global GDP jumped from seven percent to 13 percent. Should this trend continue, China's economic output will surpass the United States' by 2016. China already consumes more energy than the United States, and calls are growing louder to replace the dollar as the international reserve currency with a basket of currencies that would include the euro and the yuan. The fiscal position of the United States is alarming, whether or not one believes that Standard & Poor's was justified in downgrading U.S. Treasury bonds. Between 2001 and 2009, U.S. federal debt as a percentage of GDP more than doubled, from 32 percent to 67 percent, and state and local governments have significant debts, too. The United States' reliance on imports, combined with high rates of borrowing, has led to a considerable current account deficit: more than six percent of GDP in 2006. Power follows money, and the United States is leaking cash.

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AT – Military Hegemony Key to the Economy
Hegemony doesn‘t affect the economy Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, EK] Each of these arguments is less empirically persuasive than is commonly articulated in policy circles. There is little evidence that military primacy yields appreciable geoeconomic gains. The evidence for geopolitical favoritism is much more robust during periods of bipolarity than it is under unipolarity, which suggests that primacy in and of itself does not yield material transfers. The evidence for public goods benefits is strongest, but military predominance plays a supporting role in that causal logic; it is only full-spectrum unipolarity—a condition in which a single actor is universally acknowledged to be the dominant actor across a variety of power dimensions—that yields appreciable economic gains. The economic benefits from military predominance alone seem, at a minimum, to have been exaggerated in policy and scholarly circles. While there are economic benefits to possessing a great power military, diminishing marginal returns are evident well before achieving military primacy. The principal benefits that come with military primacy appear to flow only when coupled with economic primacy. These findings have significant implications for theoretical debates about the fungibility of military power, and should be considered when assessing U.S. fiscal options and grand strategy for the coming decade.

Hegemony is not key to the economy Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] The evidence for geoeconomic favoritism is mixed. To be sure, some measure of military power is generally acknowledged to be a prerequisite for developing a reserve currency.26 There has been a powerful correlation between states with significant amounts of military power and economic wealth.27 Since the beginning of the modern Westphalian state system, leaders have equated military power with economic plenty.28 The direction of causality in this relationship is much more difficult to ascertain, however. It is possible that military power generates greater economic benefits, but most researchers draw the opposite conclusion: the primary causal arrow moves from economic vitality toward a strong military. This was Kennedy‘s conclusion in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, matching the general consensus of most scholars who work on hegemonic stability, power transition, or long cycles.29 Realists such as Barry Posen have reached a similar conclusion: ―If the United States were not [End Page 59] the dominant economic and technological power, it would not be the dominant military power.‖30 For the causal logic of geoeconomic favoritism to hold up, military power must generate concomitant economic gains rather than vice versa. There is modest evidence for this assertion. At a base level, geoeconomic favoritism clearly exists. As a necessary condition, a state‘s ability to defend its borders determines its ability to develop its economy, capital markets, and regional economic ties.31 Thus, military capabilities can help to reduce political risk, which is a significant explanatory factor for cross-border capital flows.32 The necessary condition for this relationship is not military

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 396 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz predominance, but some sufficient level of great power military capabilities. For geoeconomic favoritism to occur, military primacy and deep engagement must generate greater inflows of capital than would otherwise be the case.

The relationship between military spending and the economy is severely overstated and fails to acknowledge alternate causes. Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] Carla Norrlof‘s work represents the most direct effort to test the relationship between U.S. military prowess and financial strength. She argues, for example, that since 1979 ―funds have more readily flowed to the United States‖ when it has won its wars.33 When the United States has gotten bogged down in military quagmires, on the other hand, the reverse has been true. Her evidence for testing this assertion, however, rests solely on an annual bivariate comparison of U.S. military performance with financial flows into the United States. The failure to consider other causal factors in determining the flow of funds—such as economic growth, monetary policy, or fiscal policy measures— introduces significant omitted variable bias into her analysis.

Other factors key – primacy doesn‘t yield economic gains Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] The recent economics literature on the causes of national financial strength further downplays the role of military power and favors that of domestic political institutions. While both democratic and authoritarian great powers have possessed large military establishments, this literature concludes that inclusive, democratic political institutions play the crucial role in allowing large states to exploit their financial power. Because these institutions can allow political leaders to credibly commit, states housing such institutions are perceived as more likely to honor their debts.37 States with large militaries are also [End Page 61] more vulnerable to the development of ―extractive‖ political institutions: politically powerful actors can exploit the coercive apparatus of a large military to develop political institutions that reward members of the selectorate with private goods, rather than the public goods necessary to attract inward capital flows.38 History suggests that absolutist leaders with large militaries have been far more likely to repudiate their debts.39 As Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson have demonstrated, countries based on extractive political institutions are more likely to possess comparatively more sclerotic economies.40 For any national government, some degree of defense spending and military prowess reassures privatesector actors that their investments will be secure. Beyond that base level, however, all of the literature indicates that primacy yields little in the way of geoeconomic returns. Security is certainly a necessary condition for attracting foreign capital inflows, but predominance does not appear to be a prerequisite. If anything, an outsized military, by loosening constraints on the state to refrain from military adventurism, retards rather than enhances inward private capital flows.

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Hegemony not key to the US economy – studies prove Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] For the past generation, U.S. military hegemony has been a concrete fact in world politics. The anticipated austerity of the defense budget has prompted concerns among some analysts that the costs of any reduction in defense spending outweigh the benefits to the U.S. economy. This article has assessed the merits and demerits of military hegemony for a superpower‘s economy. Reasons have been put forward to describe how U.S. military supremacy represents a net economic gain: the inculcation of geoeconomic and geopolitical [End Page 77] favoritism, and the generation of greater benefits from global public goods under the shadow of military primacy. The empirical record suggests that many of the hypothesized benefits have been overstated. The private sector responds positively to a country‘s military capability, but only up to a point; military primacy is hardly a prerequisite for attracting trade and investment. Geopolitical favoritism does occur, but only during periods of bipolarity. Economic exchange is actually less correlated with security ties under conditions of unipolarity. Finally, military primacy does appear to be an important adjunct to the creation of an open global economy and the reduction of militarized disputes and security rivalries, but military supremacy is only one component of unipolarity. A decline in the hegemon‘s economic power undercuts many of unipolarity‘s posited benefits. Both the public goods and geopolitical favoritism arguments have some validity, but both rely on the hegemon‘s economic might as much as its military might for the causal pathways to function.

Their evidence supporting the correlation between hegemony and economy comes from the Cold War era—newest evidence supports our claims Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] There are some significant flaws to this supporting evidence, however. Most of the data that support a connection between security alliances and economic integration come from the Cold War era, not from the post–Cold War era of U.S. military predominance. Theoretically, a bipolar distribution of power is most likely to lead to coherent and segmented blocs of countries. Structural realists predict that under bipolarity, relative gains concerns between the two blocs should be relatively high, leading to a tighter integration between security and economic blocs.49 Statistical tests confirm that it was during the bipolar era of the Cold War that foreign economic policies seemed to most strictly follow the flag.50 Indeed, whereas the 1990–91 Gulf War happened during the waning days of bipolarity, the 2003 Iraq War occurred during a period of un-contested military primacy—and yet the United States secured far less burden-sharing during Operation Iraqi Freedom than during Operation Desert Storm. A glance at the global political economy of the pre-1914 period or post-1990 era suggests that the linkage between security and economic ties has been much weaker during these eras. In the nineteenth-century era of globalization, trade agreements, trade flows, migration flows, and capital flows bore little relationship to emerging alliance structures.51 Indeed, economic interdependence was so strong among non-allies that it triggered security concerns among the great powers at the turn of the century.52 Most famously, Germany and the United Kingdom were each other‘s largest trading partner immediately prior to the start of the World War I. The same pattern emerges in the post–Cold War global economy. During a period when the direct economic benefits from U.S. military primacy should have been at

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 398 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz their greatest, China became the epicenter of the global supply chain and the largest foreign market for stalwart U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Furthermore, U.S. military primacy has not deterred China from dramatically expanding its commercial interests across the developing world over the past decade—nor [End Page 64] has it deterred countries in the Pacific Rim, Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East from welcoming Chinese trade and investment.53

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AT – Military Hegemony Helps the Global Economy
Hegemony results in instability in global markets—empirically proven Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] The historical literature does not lend much support to geoeconomic favoritism. Jonathan Kirshner‘s work demonstrates that financial interests are concerned with the minimization of risk. As part of ensuring global order, military hegemons frequently need to exercise their military power; such actions introduce the possibility of macroeconomic instability into financial markets and national economies. Kirshner shows that, historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics. Even military hegemons must therefore be wary of alienating global capital: ―[S]tates,‖ he writes, ―must be alert to the fact that by choosing a more assertive or ambitious national security strategy... they may be ‗punished‘ by international financial markets, principally via capital flight, pressure on the exchange rate, [End Page 60] and greater difficulty in borrowing abroad.‖34 At a minimum, this set of capital market preferences implies that hegemons receive negligible geoeconomic benefits from military primacy. The behavior of reserve currencies between the two world wars is another data point against geoeconomic favoritism. If this logic is valid, then military power should also be a principal factor in determining which state issues the reserve currency. Both the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and the United States after 1945 meet this criterion. Because these states were also the largest economies and largest financial centers during those respective periods, however, the causal factors are overdetermined. During the interwar period, however, there was a significant disparity between the military capabilities of Great Britain and the United States; the former had far greater power projection capabilities than those of the latter.35 On other dimensions—market size, financial depth—the United States and the United Kingdom were more evenly matched. Despite the British military advantage, however, the most recent economic history on this subject shows that public- and private-sector actors began treating the dollar as a reserve currency as early as the mid-1920s.36 Economic and financial factors, not the military balance of power, primarily determine the location of the reserve currency.

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AT – Military Hegemony Helps Jobs
Military spending does not create jobs Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] This article does not exhaustively survey every hypothesized relationship between military predominance and economic benefit. Fortunately, some arguments can be dispatched quickly. For example, the argument that military primacy promotes employment by providing a Keynesian or innovative boost to [End Page 57] the economy is unpersuasive. Economists have concluded that any employment effect from defense spending is inefficient compared to similar levels of tax cuts or civilian government spending.21 Similarly, arguments persist to this day that military primacy yields rents through the existence of ―informal empire.‖22 A quick cursory review of the literature, however, reveals that whatever imperial rents existed in the pre-industrial era have not existed for recent military hegemons.23 The failure of the United States to convert its postinvasion control of Afghanistan or Iraq into lucrative commercial relationships is the latest data point to contradict this hypothesis.24

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AT – Hegemony Key to Oil Stability
US hegemony not key to preventing oil shocks Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] Furthermore, direct evidence exists that the exercise of military power to protect sea-lanes boosts global trade flows (though the magnitude of the effect [End Page 70] is disputed). The presence of naval forces during times of militarized disputes has reduced market expectations of supply disruptions.84 It could be argued, however, that concerns about energy disruptions have been overstated; even in instances when U.S. military intervention was absent, world oil markets have rapidly adjusted to price spikes .85 A similar story can be told when analyzing the naval reaction to the post-2008 surge in Somali piracy. Attacks spiked after the financial crisis and peaked in 2011. Attacks remain at an elevated level after peaking in 2011, but their success rate has fallen markedly. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of successful global piracy attacks declined by 67 percent. The presence of multinational naval patrols— including the U.S. Navy—in the most vulnerable sea-lanes has helped matters, but the improved private security on board the commercial tankers appears to have helped even more.86

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AT – Hegemony Benign
US primacy fails—states are uneasy about so-called benevolence Layne, professor at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 07
[Christopher, 2007 and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, American Empire: A Debate//, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html, accessed 7-6-13 BLE] The claim that others regard American primacy as benevolent because of U.S. sot power and shared values is similarly dubious. And again, Iraq played an important role in exploding this

myth. Beginning with the run-up to the invasion of Iraq to the present, one public opinion survey after another has revealed that a vast ―values gap‖ exists between the United States and the rest of the world. Tellingly, this gap exists not just between the United States and East Asia and the Middle East, but between the United States and Europe. One would think that if there is any part of the world where shared values really do cause others to view American primacy as benevolent, Europe would be the place. Yet, a September 2004 poll of eight thousand respondents on both sides
of the Atlantic found that 83 percent of Americans, and 79 percent of Europeans, agreed that Europe and the United States have different social and cultural values.48 On a host of issues—

including the death penalty, the role of religion in everyday life, and attitudes toward the role of international law and institutions—Europeans and Americans hold divergent views, not common ones. he Iraq war has exposed the huge gulf in values that gradually is causing the United States and Europe to drift apart—in large measure because Europe regards the United States as being a geopolitical rogue elephant, rather than as a ―benevolent hegemon.‖ the problem with rogue elephants, of course, is that when they are on the loose anyone nearby is at risk of being trampled. This is why other states are uneasy about American primacy. For sure, many states do benefit both economically and in terms of security from American primacy. And it also is true that not all other states will feel threatened by U.S. hard power. Eventually, however, some of the other states
in the international political system are going to believe that they are menaced by American primacy. For example, far from being ―of-shore‖ as the primacists claim, U.S. power is very

much on shore—or lurking just beyond the coastline—and very much in the faces of China, Russia, and the Islamic world. And, in this sense, international politics is not a lot different than basketball: players who push others around and get in their faces are likely to be the targets of a self-defensive punch in the nose. Doubtless, American primacy has its dimension of benevolence,
but a state as powerful as the United States can never be benevolent enough to offset the fear that other states have of its unchecked power. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there is no such animal. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear

them—and for good reason. In today‘s world, others dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical weight in America‘s favor and the purposes for which it may be used. After all, ―No great power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a great deal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such by them. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, but they are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by the existence of countervailing power and the possibility of it being exercised.‖49 While Washington‘s self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of American power is tangible. Others must worry constantly that if U.S. intentions change, bad things may happen to them. In a one-superpower world, the overconcentration of

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power in America‘s hands is an omnipresent challenge to other states‘ security, and Washington‘s ability to reassure others of its benevolence is limited by the very enormity of its power.

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AT – History Proves US Leadership Good
History proves the United States causes violence Walt, Harvard School of Government professor of international affairs, 11
(Stephen M., November 2011, Foreign Policy, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism?print=yes&hi decomments=yes&page=full, accessed 7-2-12, CNM) Declarations of American exceptionalism rest on the belief that the United States is a uniquely virtuous nation, one that loves peace, nurtures liberty, respects human rights, and embraces the rule of law. Americans like to think their country behaves much better than other states do, and certainly better than other great powers. If only it were true. The United States may not have been as brutal as the worst states in world history, but a dispassionate look at the historical record belies most claims about America's moral superiority. For starters, the United States has been one of the most expansionist powers in modern history. It began as 13 small colonies clinging to the Eastern Seaboard, but eventually expanded across North America, seizing Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California from Mexico in 1846. Along the way, it eliminated most of the native population and confined the survivors to impoverished reservations. By the mid-19th century, it had pushed Britain out of the Pacific Northwest and consolidated its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. The United States has fought numerous wars since then -- starting several of them -- and its wartime conduct has hardly been a model of restraint. The 1899-1902 conquest of the Philippines killed some 200,000 to 400,000 Filipinos, most of them civilians, and the United States and its allies did not hesitate to dispatch some 305,000 German and 330,000 Japanese civilians through aerial bombing during World War II, mostly through deliberate campaigns against enemy cities. No wonder Gen. Curtis LeMay, who directed the bombing campaign against Japan, told an aide, "If the U.S. lost the war, we would be prosecuted as war criminals." The United States dropped more than 6 million tons of bombs during the Indochina war, including tons of napalm and lethal defoliants like Agent Orange, and it is directly responsible for the deaths of many of the roughly 1 million civilians who died in that war. More recently, the U.S.-backed Contra war in Nicaragua killed some 30,000 Nicaraguans, a percentage of their population equivalent to 2 million dead Americans. U.S. military action has led directly or indirectly to the deaths of 250,000 Muslims over the past three decades (and that's a lowend estimate, not counting the deaths resulting from the sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s), including the more than 100,000 people who died following the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. U.S. drones and Special Forces are going after suspected terrorists in at least five countries at present and have killed an unknown number of innocent civilians in the process. Some of these actions may have been necessary to make Americans more prosperous and secure. But while Americans would undoubtedly regard such acts as indefensible if some foreign country were doing them to us, hardly any U.S. politicians have questioned these policies. Instead, Americans still wonder, "Why do they hate us?" The United States talks a good game on human rights and international law, but it has refused to sign most human rights treaties, is not a party to the International Criminal Court, and has been all too willing to cozy up to dictators -- remember our friend Hosni Mubarak? -- with abysmal human rights records. If that were not enough, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the George W. Bush administration's reliance on waterboarding, extraordinary rendition, and preventive detention should shake America's belief that it consistently acts in a morally superior fashion. Obama's decision to retain many of these policies suggests they were not a temporary aberration.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 405 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz The United States never conquered a vast overseas empire or caused millions to die through tyrannical blunders like China's Great Leap Forward or Stalin's forced collectivization. And given the vast power at its disposal for much of the past century, Washington could certainly have done much worse. But the record is clear: U.S. leaders have done what they thought they had to do when confronted by external dangers, and they paid scant attention to moral principles along the way. The idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous may be comforting to Americans; too bad it's not true.

Most recent history proves heg is bad Walt, Harvard School of Government professor of international affairs, 11
(Stephen M., November 2011, Foreign Policy, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism?print=yes&hi decomments=yes&page=full, accessed 7-2-12, CNM) Finally, any honest accounting of the past half-century must acknowledge the downside of American primacy. The United States has been the major producer of greenhouse gases for most of the last hundred years and thus a principal cause of the adverse changes that are altering the global environment. The United States stood on the wrong side of the long struggle against apartheid in South Africa and backed plenty of unsavory dictatorships -- including Saddam Hussein's -- when short-term strategic interests dictated. Americans may be justly proud of their role in creating and defending Israel and in combating global anti-Semitism, but its one-sided policies have also prolonged Palestinian statelessness and sustained Israel's brutal occupation.

The US got lucky to be successful - geography Walt, Harvard School of Government professor of international affairs, 11
(Stephen M., November 2011, Foreign Policy, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism?print=yes&hi decomments=yes&page=full, accessed 7-2-12, CNM) The United States has enjoyed remarkable success, and Americans tend to portray their rise to world power as a direct result of the political foresight of the Founding Fathers, the virtues of the U.S. Constitution, the priority placed on individual liberty, and the creativity and hard work of the American people. In this narrative, the United States enjoys an exceptional global position today because it is, well, exceptional. There is more than a grain of truth to this version of American history. It's not an accident that immigrants came to America in droves in search of economic opportunity, and the "melting pot" myth facilitated the assimilation of each wave of new Americans. America's scientific and technological achievements are fully deserving of praise and owe something to the openness and vitality of the American political order. But America's past success is due as much to good luck as to any uniquely American virtues. The new nation was lucky that the continent was lavishly endowed with natural resources and traversed by navigable rivers. It was lucky to have been founded far from the other great powers and even luckier that the native population was less advanced and highly susceptible to European diseases. Americans were fortunate that the European great powers were at war for much of the republic's early history, which greatly facilitated its expansion across the continent, and its global primacy was ensured after the other great powers fought two devastating world wars. This account of America's rise does not deny that the United States did many things right, but it also acknowledges that America's present position owes as much to good fortune as to any special genius or "manifest destiny."

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History doesn‘t prove that US leadership is good Patrick, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance Director, 11
(Stewart M., 11-12-11, Council on Foreign Relations, "Still Exceptional After All These Years?" http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/10/12/still-exceptional-after-all-these-years/, accessed 7-2-12, CNM) Walt seeks to demolish the pillars of American exceptionalism, showing that the United States is neither particularly benevolent nor divinely predestined. He documents historical excesses of America‘s global role, from its scorched earth atrocities in the Philippines from 1898-1903 to its controversial conduct in the global war on terrorism. He suggests that ―America‘s past success is due as much to good luck‖—including a fortunate geographical location—―as to any uniquely American virtues.‖ Walt disputes the tendency of U.S. politicians and academics alike to attribute all positive global trends and outcomes—from the spread of democracy to postwar global prosperity—to U.S. global leadership. He points out that such analysis ignores the downside of U.S. primacy, like lack of progress on climate change. Finally, Walt dismisses the myth that God has somehow granted the United States a special providence, or ―mandate of heaven,‖ to bring freedom, peace and justice to the world.

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AT – China Decline
Even if China has an economic crisis – it will still be number one Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School international politics professor, et al., 12
(Daniel W., Gideon Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full, accessed 7-8-13, LLM) As for the U.S. pivot to Asia, I think it's a predictable and rational response to rising Chinese power. But I'm not sure it will work. America's allies in the region face an interesting dilemma. Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea have their most important trading relationship with China -and their most important strategic relationship with the United States. Unless China grossly overplays its hand and terrifies its neighbors, over time those economic ties will weigh more heavily than the military relationship with the United States. As a result, China's influence in Asia will steadily increase -- at the expense of the United States. All this, of course, is posited on the continuing growth of the Chinese economy. So what about those "hints that China's economic growth is slowing down"? I wouldn't be at all surprised. Indeed, I would go further and suggest that both the Chinese economy and the Chinese political system are unstable and crisis-prone. If a crisis hits, plenty of people in the United States and elsewhere will eagerly proclaim that the rise of China was a mirage. They will be wrong. This is a long-term process of huge historical significance, comparable with the rise of the United States in the 19th century. U.S. history should tell you that it is perfectly possible to combine political turmoil with the rise of a dynamic, continental economy. After all, America fought a civil war and still emerged as "No. 1" by the early 20th century.

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AT – Military Primacy Key
Military primacy not key – China proves Drezner, Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy international politics professor, 13
[Daniel W., International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, ―Military Primacy Doesn‘t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think).‖, Project Muse, accessed, 7-9-13, ] This observation is problematic for the present and the future. As previously noted, there is a broadbased consensus that the military primacy of the United States will remain uncontested for the next decade at least; indeed, even extrapolating current trends, it is far from clear whether Chinese military spending will catch up with that of the United States in the next generation.102 U.S. economic primacy is another matter entirely. Multiple private- and public-sector estimates suggest that China will overtake the United States within the next decade. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that China‘s gross domestic product will overtake U.S. gross domestic product, as measured using purchasing power parity, by the year 2016. At least one estimate posits that China has already overtaken the U.S. economy in terms of purchasing power parity.103 China has been increasingly willing to use its economic power to influence its near neighbors, such as withholding rare earth exports to Japan after it seized a Chinese fishing boat captain in disputed territorial waters.104 It has also attempted to use its economic power to influence U.S. economic policy.105 China‘s economic rise has reintroduced uncertainty into assessments about the global distribution of power. This perceptual gap is revealed in the different national responses to the April 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey.106 [End Page 74] When asked to name ―the world‘s leading economic power,‖ only Turkey and Mexico had majorities of respondents name the United States. On the other hand, in five of the original Group of Seven economies, strong majorities or pluralities named China as the world‘s leading economic power. In other words, an increasing proportion of the developed and developing world thinks that economic primacy has shifted to China. One could argue that elite policymakers are immune from mass misperceptions; U.S. policymaking elites interpret China‘s rise differently.107 Nevertheless, both public rhetoric and private diplomatic discourse suggest that U.S. policymakers share this view of China‘s new economic status with the global public.108 This perception is wrong. By any objective assessment, the United States remains the world‘s largest and most powerful economy; it is also more appropriate to measure economic power using market exchange rates rather than purchasing power parity.109 Furthermore, there are excellent reasons to doubt the straight-line extrapolation of China‘s economic ascent.110 Still, according to Wohlforth‘s logic, the shift in perceptions alone should lead to increases in status-seeking behavior by China. And, indeed, this argument parsimoniously explains the Sino-American relationship since the start of 2009.111 In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China challenged the security status quo. In early 2009, Chinese ships engaged in multiple skirmishes with U.S. surveillance vessels in an effort to hinder American naval intelligence-gathering efforts.112 Beijing responded angrily and forcefully to the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese activist Liu Xiaobo. China reacted to routine U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with extremely hostile rhetoric and threats to sanction [End Page 75] U.S. firms. China refused to condemn North Korea for the sinking on the South Korean ship Cheonan, frustrating Japan and South Korea. In response to push-back from the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on the South China Sea at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded angrily, bluntly lecturing other participants that ―China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that‘s just a fact.‖113 The policy responses to China‘s post-2008 policy shifts have been particularly interesting for the argument that military primacy generates stability. On the American side, the fall of 2011 saw a

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 409 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz widely reported ―pivot‖ or re-balancing by the United States toward the Pacific Rim that included a range of security-related statements and actions.114 The United States signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and began attending the East Asia Summit; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea to be in the U.S. national interest; the State Department averred that the U.S. defense treaty with Japan covered the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; and the U.S. Navy ramped up activity in the region and announced that a greater preponderance of naval assets would be allocated to the Pacific. Washington facilitated or enhanced security dialogues and military exercises with friends and partners in the region; five hundred U.S. Marines were stationed in Darwin, Australia. In addition, the Obama administration fostered a diplomatic, economic, and security opening with Myanmar, a longtime ally of China. Although there have been economic components to the rebalancing toward East Asia, the most prominent elements have been military.115 Furthermore, most of China‘s neighbors warmly embraced the U.S. pivot. If the public goods logic of military unipolarity held true, then these actions should have deterred China from further aggressive actions. Yet, despite the flexing of U.S. military power, China did not ratchet down its behavior in the region. As Wu Xinbo observed, ―[G]iven the comprehensive rise in its national power in recent years, China feels more confident in confronting the U.S. rebalancing strategy.‖116 Indeed, if anything, Beijing increased its aggressive [End Page 76] behavior. China ratcheted up tensions with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal in the spring and summer of 2012. In the fall of 2012, it escalated tensions with Japan over the latter‘s claim of ownership of islands in the East China Sea. The pacifying effects of unipolarity appear to have dissipated. Instead, Chinese behavior is consistent with predictions of great power behavior under status uncertainty. Within the Chinese policymaking and scholarly communities, there is a growing obsession with measuring and comparing Chinese power to U.S. power.117 In one recent assessment, Wang Jisi summarized the worldview of the top Chinese leadership: ―The rise of China, with its sheer size and very different political system, value system, culture, and race, must be regarded in the United States as the major challenge to its superpower status.‖118

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Heg Authors Wrong
Proponents of deep engagement are wrong—they ignore the collapse of the Soviet Union which should have dramatically altered our understanding of international relations. Walt, Belfer Professor of IR at Harvard, 2013
(Stephen, 1/2/2013, ―More or Less: The Debate on US Grand Strategy‖, Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/02/more_or_less_the_debate_on_us_grand_strategy, accessed 7/9/13, DVO) Second, there is something deeply puzzling about B, I & W's devotion to what Ikenberry used to called "liberal hegemony," and what he and his co-authors now prefer to call "deep engagement." B, I & W argue that deep engagement has been America's grand strategy since World War II and they believe it was the optimal strategy for the bipolar Cold War, when the United States faced a global threat from a major great-power rival. Not only was the USSR a formidable military power, but it was also an ideological rival whose Marxist-Leninist principles once commanded millions of loyal followers around the world. Here's the puzzle: the Soviet Union disappeared in 1992, and no rival of equal capacity has yet emerged. Yet somehow "deep engagement" is still the optimal strategy in these radically different geopolitical circumstances. It's possible that U.S. leaders in the late 1940s hit on the ideal grand strategy for any and all structural conditions, but it is surely odd that an event as significant as the Soviet collapse can have so few implications for how America deals with the other 190-plus countries around the globe.

Proponents of deep engagement attempt to divorce it from all of its disastrous consequences—wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan prove it‘s bad. Walt, Belfer Professor of IR at Harvard, 2013
(Stephen, 1/2/2013, ―More or Less: The Debate on US Grand Strategy‖, Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/02/more_or_less_the_debate_on_us_grand_strategy, accessed 7/9/13, DVO) Third, B, I, & W give "deep engagement" full credit for nearly all the good things that have occurred internationally since 1945 (great power peace, globalization, non-proliferation, expansion of trade, etc.), even though the direct connection between the strategy and these developments remains contested. More importantly, they absolve the strategy from most if not all of the negative developments that also took place during this period. They recognize the events like the Indochina War and the 2003 war in Iraq were costly blunders, but they regard them as deviations from "deep engagement" rather than as a likely consequence of a strategy that sees the entire world as of critical importance and the remaking of other societies along liberal lines as highly desirable if not strategically essential. The problem, of course, is that U.S. leaders can only sell deep engagement by convincing Americans that the nation's security will be fatally compromised if they do not get busy managing the entire globe. Because the United States is in fact quite secure from direct attack and/or conquest, the only way to do that is by ceaseless threat-mongering, as has been done in the United States ever since the Truman Doctrine, the first Committee on the Present Danger and the alarmist rhetoric of NSC-68. Unfortunately, threat-mongering requires people in the national security establishment to

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 411 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz exaggerate U.S. interests more-or-less constantly and to conjure up half-baked ideas like the domino theory to keep people nervous. And once a country has talked itself into a properly paranoid frame of mind, it inevitably stumbles into various quagmires, as the United States did in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Again, such debacles are not deviations from "deep engagement"; they are a nearly inevitable consequence of it.

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Terminal Impacts

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Free Trade

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Free Trade Good Impact
Collapse of free trade risks nuclear war Copley News Service, 99
[12-1-99, Commentary, Lexis] For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.

Free trade checks global nuclear conflict Miller & Elwood, International Society for Individual Liberty, President and Vice President, 88
[Vincent and James, Founder and President of the International Society for Individual Liberty, and VicePresident of the ISIL, ―FREE TRADE OR PROTECTIONISM? The Case Against Trade Restrictions,‖ http://www.isil.org/resources/lit/free-trade-protectionism.html] WHEN GOODS DON'T CROSS BORDERS, ARMIES OFTEN DO History is not lacking in examples of cold trade wars escalating into hot shooting wars: * Europe suffered from almost non-stop wars during the 17th and 18th centuries, when restrictive trade policy (mercantilism) was the rule; rival governments fought each other to expand their empires and to exploit captive markets.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 415 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz * British tariffs provoked the American colonists to revolution, and later the Northern-dominated US government imposed restrictions on Southern cotton exports - a major factor leading to the American Civil War. * In the late 19th Century, after a half century of general free trade (which brought a half-century of peace), short-sighted politicians throughout Europe again began erecting trade barriers. Hostilities built up until they eventually exploded into World War I. * In 1930, facing only a mild recession, US President Hoover ignored warning pleas in a petition by 1028 prominent economists and signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act, which raised some tariffs to 100% levels. Within a year, over 25 other governments had retaliated by passing similar laws. The result? World trade came to a grinding halt, and the entire world was plunged into the "Great Depression" for the rest of the decade. The depression in turn led to World War II. THE #1 DANGER TO WORLD PEACE The world enjoyed its greatest economic growth during the relatively free trade period of 19451970, a period that also saw no major wars. Yet we again see trade barriers being raised around the world by short-sighted politicians. Will the world again end up in a shooting war as a result of these economically-deranged policies? Can we afford to allow this to happen in the nuclear age?

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Democracy

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Democracy Good Impact
Global democracy solves multiple scenarios for extinction Diamond, Hoover Institution Senior Fellow, 95
[Larry, December 1995, Carnegie Corporation of New York, ―Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,‖ http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Promoting%20Democracy%20in%20the%201990s %20Actors%20and%20Instruments,%20Issues%20and%20Imperatives.pdf, p. 9, accessed 7/7/13, WD] The experience of this century offers important lessons . Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically ―cleanse‖ their own populations , and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built .

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AT – Democracy Peace Theory
Democratic peace theory false Layne, Ph. D. Political Science, 10
[Christopher Layne, 5-1-10, The American Conservative, ―Graceful Decline‖, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/graceful-decline/, 7-8-13, JZ] We attempt to tame the world by exporting democracy because—we are told—democracies do not fight each other. We export our model of free-market capitalism because—we are told—states that are economically interdependent do not fight each other. We work multilaterally through international institutions because—we are told—these promote cooperation and trust among states. None of these propositions is self-evident. Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence that they are wrong. But they are illusions that ―express the deepest beliefs which Americans, as a nation, hold about the world.‖ So we cling to the idea that our hegemony is necessary for our own and everyone else‘s security. The consequence has been to contribute to the very imperial overstretch that is accelerating the United States‘ decline.

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Terrorism

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Terrorism Retaliation Bad Impact
Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China Ayson, Victoria University professor in strategic studies, 10(Robert, Professor of Strategic
Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, July, ―After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,‖ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld) A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today‘s and tomorrow‘s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be ―spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.‖41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington‘s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 421 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington‘s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country‘s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

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AT – Nuclear Terrorism Impact
No chance of a state-sponsored nuclear terrorist attack—attribution to the terrorist organization and state sponsor is almost guaranteed Lieber, Georgetown School of Foreign Service professor, & Press, Dartmouth Government professor, 2013
[Keir A., & Daryl G., International Security, Volume 38, No. 1, Summer 213, ―Why States Won‘t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists‖, Project Muse, p.82-84 accessed 7/9/13, CB] This article assesses the risk that states would give nuclear weapons to terrorists. We examine the logical and empirical basis of the core proposition: that a state could surreptitiously transfer a nuclear weapon to a like-minded terror group, thus providing the means for a devastating attack on a common enemy while remaining anonymous and avoiding retaliation. The strategy of nuclear attack by proxy hinges on one key question: What is the likelihood that a country could sponsor a nuclear terror attack and remain anonymous? We examine this question in two ways. First, having no data on the aftermath of nuclear terrorist incidents, we use the ample data on conventional terrorism to discover attribution rates. We examine the fraction of terrorist incidents attributed to the perpetrating terrorist organization and the patterns in the rates of attribution. Second, we explore the challenge of tracing culpability for a nuclear terror event from the guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor. We ask: How many suspects would there be in the wake of a nuclear detonation? How many foreign terrorist organizations have state sponsors? Of those that do, how many state sponsors do they typically have? And how many state sponsors of terrorism have nuclear weapons or sufficient stockpiles of nuclear materials on which to base such a concern? We conclude that neither a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear terror attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirtyseven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsored terror group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a [End Page 83] weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries an escape from the constraints of deterrence.12 This analysis has two important implications for U.S. foreign policy. First, the fear of terrorist transfer seems greatly exaggerated and does not—in itself—seem to justify costly measures to prevent proliferation. Nuclear proliferation poses risks, so working to prevent it should remain a U.S. foreign policy goal, but the dangers of a state giving nuclear weapons to terrorists have been overstated, and thus arguments for taking costly steps to prevent proliferation on those grounds—as used to justify the invasion of Iraq and fuel the debate over attacking Iran—rest on a shaky foundation. Second, analysts and policymakers should stop understating the ability of the United States to attribute terrorist attacks to their sponsoring states. Such rhetoric not only is untrue, but it also undermines deterrence. States sometimes exaggerate their capabilities to deter an enemy‘s attacks;13 but U.S. analysts and leaders, by understating U.S. attribution capabilities, inadvertently increase the odds of catastrophic terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies.

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State-sponsored nuclear terrorism is deterred – attribution rates, lack of control over the outcome, unwillingness to deplete small arsenals, and possibility of discovery Lieber, Georgetown School of Foreign Service professor, & Press, Dartmouth Government professor, 2013
[Keir A., & Daryl G., International Security, Volume 38, No. 1, Summer 213, ―Why States Won‘t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists‖, Project Muse, p. 86 accessed 7/9/13, CB] Some analysts are skeptical about such sponsored nuclear terrorism, arguing that a state may not be willing to deplete its small nuclear arsenal or stock of precious nuclear materials. More important, a state sponsor would fear that a terrorist organization might use the weapons or materials in ways the state never intended, provoking retaliation that would destroy the regime.14 Nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons a state can acquire, and handing that power to an actor over which the state has less than complete control would be an enormous, epochal decision—one unlikely to be taken by regimes that are typically obsessed with power and their own survival. Perhaps the most important reason to doubt the nuclear-attack-by-proxy scenario is the likelihood that the ultimate source of the weapon might be discovered.15 One means of identifying the state source of a nuclear terrorist attack is through ―nuclear forensics‖—the use of a bomb‘s isotopic fingerprints to trace the fissile material device back to the reactors, enrichment facilities, or uranium mines from which it was derived. In theory, the material that remains after an explosion can yield crucial information about its source: the ratio of uranium isotopes varies according to where the raw uranium was mined and how it was processed, and the composition of weapons-grade plutonium reveals clues about the particular reactor used to produce it and how long the material spent in the reactor.16 The possibility that the covert plot could be discovered [End Page 85] before being carried out also acts as a deterrent. For these and other reasons, some analysts argue that nuclear terrorism is unlikely.

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AT – Loose Nukes
Investigators would see through an excuse that nukes were stolen with ease- most countries have secure fissile material, and those that don‘t have small, well documented arsenals Lieber, Georgetown School of Foreign Service professor, & Press, Dartmouth Government professor, 2013
[Keir A., & Daryl G., International Security, Volume 38, No. 1, Summer 213, ―Why States Won‘t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists‖, Project Muse, p. 97-99, accessed 7/9/13, CB] The first strategy—giving nuclear weapons to terrorists and then pleading guilty to the lesser charge of maintaining inadequate stockpile security—is highly dubious. Any state rational enough to seek to avoid retaliation for a nuclear attack would recognize the incredible risk that this strategy entails. In the wake of an act of nuclear terrorism, facing an enraged and vindictive victim, would the state sponsor step forward to admit that its weapons or materials were used to attack a staunch enemy, with the hope that the victim would believe a story about theft and grant clemency on those grounds? If that logic does not appear implausible enough, recall that no state would be likely to give its nuclear weapons or materials to a terrorist organization with which it did not have a long record of cooperation and trust. Thus, a state sponsor acknowledging that it was the source of materials used in a nuclear attack would be doing so in light of its enemies‘ knowledge that the terrorists who allegedly [End Page 96] stole the materials happened to have been its close collaborators in prior acts of terrorism. This strategy would be nearly as suicidal as launching a direct nuclear attack.37 The second strategy—giving nuclear weapons to terrorists and then hiding behind the possibility that they were stolen from some unspecified insecure foreign source—deserves greater scrutiny. The list of potential global sources of fissile material seems long. Nine countries possess nuclear weapons, and eleven more have enough fissile material to fashion a crude fission device.38 In 2011 the world‘s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU), the fissile material most likely to be sought by terrorists,39 was about 1.3 million kilograms, meaning that the material needed for a single crude weapon could be found within the rounding error of the rounding error of global stocks. Perhaps, therefore, nearly all twenty countries with sufficient stocks of fissile material would need to join the lineup of suspects after a terrorist nuclear attack, not as possible sponsors but as potential victims of theft. And if enough fissile material to make a nuclear weapon could be purloined from any of these countries, [End Page 97] then perhaps the victim would be unable to rule out all possible sources and thus be unable to punish the real culprit. This gloomy picture overstates the difficulty of determining the source of stolen material after a nuclear terrorist attack. In the wake of a detonation, the possibility of stolen fissile material complicates the task of attribution—but only marginally. At the end of the Cold War, several countries—particularly in the former Soviet Union—confronted major nuclear security problems, but great progress has been made since then.40 Although no country has perfect nuclear security, today the greatest concerns surround just five countries: Belarus, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and South Africa.41 In addition, not all of those states are equally worrisome as potential sources of nuclear theft. Substantial concerns exist about the security of fissile materials in Pakistan and Russia (the latter if simply because of the large size of its stockpile), but Belarus, Japan, and South Africa would likely be quickly and easily ruled out as the source of stolen fissile material. Belarus has a relatively small stockpile of fissile material—approximately 100 kilograms of HEU42—so in the wake of a nuclear terrorist attack, it would be easy for Belarus to show that its stockpile remained intact.43 Similarly, Japan (one of the United States‘ closest allies) and [End Page 98] South Africa would be keen to allow the United States to verify the integrity of their full stocks of materials. (In the wake of a nuclear

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 425 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz terror attack, a lack of full cooperation in showing all materials accounted for would be highly revealing.) Iran is not believed to have any weapons-usable nuclear material to steal,44 although that could change. In short, a nuclear handoff strategy disguised as a loose nukes problem would be very precarious.45

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AT – Harder to Attribute
Nuclear terrorism is easier to attribute than conventional terrorism is- massive investigations, international assistance, high rate of attribution, restricted suspect list, and difficulty in hiding the plans Lieber, Georgetown School of Foreign Service professor, & Press, Dartmouth Government professor, 2013
[Keir A., & Daryl G., International Security, Volume 38, No. 1, Summer 213, ―Why States Won‘t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists‖, Project Muse, p. 99-102, accessed 7/9/13, CB] There are at least five reasons, however, to expect that attributing a nuclear terrorist attack would be easier than attributing a conventional terrorist attack. First, no terrorism investigation in history has had the resources that would be deployed to investigating the source of a nuclear terror attack— particularly one against the United States or a U.S. ally. Rapidly attributing the attack would be critical, not merely as a first step toward satisfying the rage of the victims but, more importantly, to determine whether additional nuclear attacks were imminent. The victim would use every resource at its disposal—money, threats, and force—to rapidly identify the source of the attack.47 If necessary, any investigation would go on for a long time; it would never ―blow over‖ from the victim‘s standpoint. The second reason why attributing a nuclear terror attack would be easier than attributing a conventional terrorist attack is the level of international assistance the victim would likely receive from allies, neutrals, and even adversaries. An attack on the United States, for example, would likely trigger unprecedented intelligence cooperation from its allies, if for no other reason than the fear that subsequent attacks might target them. Perhaps more important, even adversaries of the United States—particularly those with access to fissile materials—would have enormous incentives to quickly demonstrate their innocence. To avoid being accused of sponsoring or supporting the attack, and thus to avoid the wrath of the United States, these countries would likely go to great lengths to demonstrate that their weapons were accounted for, that their fissile materials had different isotopic properties than the type used in the attack, and that they were sharing any information they had on the [End Page 100] attack. The cooperation that the United States received from Iran and Pakistan in the wake of the September 11 attacks illustrates how potential adversaries may be motivated to help in the aftermath of an attack and stay off the target list for retaliation.48 The pressure to cooperate after an anonymous nuclear detonation on U.S. soil would be many times greater.49 Third, the strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities stemming from an attack and the rate of attribution (as depicted in figures 1 to 3 above) suggests that the probability of attribution after a nuclear attack—with its enormous casualties—should be even higher. The 97 percent attribution rate for attacks that killed ten or more people on U.S. soil or that of its allies is based on a set of attacks that were pinpricks compared to nuclear terrorism. The data in those figures suggest that our conclusions understate the actual likelihood of nuclear attribution. Fourth, the challenge of attribution after a terrorist nuclear attack should be easier than after a conventional terrorist attack, because the investigation would begin with a highly restricted suspect list. In the case of a conventional terror attack against the United States or an ally, one might begin the investigation at the broadest level with the U.S. Department of State‘s list of fifty-one foreign terrorist organizations. In the case of a nuclear terror attack, only fifteen of these FTOs have state sponsors—and only one sponsor (Pakistan) has either nuclear weapons or fissile materials. (If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, that number will grow to two, but there is no overlap between the terror groups that Pakistan supports and those that Iran assists.) Finally, any operation to detonate a nuclear weapon would involve complex planning and coordination—securing the weapon, learning to use it, planning the time and location of detonation,

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 427 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz moving the weapon to the target, and conducting the attack. Even if only a small cadre of operatives knew the nuclear nature of the attack, the planning of a spectacular operation would be hard to keep [End Page 101] secret.50 For example, six months prior to the September 11 attacks, Western intelligence detected numerous indications that al-Qaida was planning a major attack. The intelligence was not specific enough—or the agencies were not nimble enough—to prevent the operation, but the indicators were ―blinking red‖ for months, directing U.S. attention to al-Qaida as soon as the attacks began.51

Even the weakest data shows that terrorist attacks are easily traced Lieber, Georgetown School of Foreign Service professor, & Press, Dartmouth Government professor, 2013
[Keir A., & Daryl G., International Security, Volume 38, No. 1, Summer 213, ―Why States Won‘t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists‖, Project Muse, p. 88-89, accessed 7/9/13, CB] To explore the history of terrorist attribution, we use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), a widely referenced dataset compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, which includes incidents dating back to 1970.22 The version employed here ends in 2008 and includes more than 87,000 terrorist events. We use a subset of the GTD data that includes 18,328 terrorist incidents that occurred from 1998 to 2008.23 We rely on this portion of the data because GTD first started recording whether terror groups claimed responsibility for an attack in 1998, an important consideration in assessing the data on attribution rates.24 Figure 1 shows the number of terror incidents that occurred from 1998 to 2008, and the rate of attribution, organized by the number of fatalities. The [End Page 88] solid line, corresponding to the logarithmic scale along the right y-axis, indicates the number of terrorist incidents for each level of fatalities.25 The columns, corresponding to the left y-axis, reveal the rate of attribution per fatality. The data in figure 1 yield two key findings. First, of the 18,328 attacks conducted from 1998 to 2008, GTD researchers identified the attacker 42 percent of the time. That estimate of the ―attribution rate,‖ however, implies greater precision than is warranted, because the researchers who coded the data did not have all the information then or currently available to intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Therefore, some cases that the researchers coded as ―un-attributed‖ may, in fact, have been attributed; and on the other hand, some of the perpetrators identified in the GTD data set may have been incorrectly accused. Despite the possibility of errors in both directions, the data suggest that the perpetrators of terror attacks are identified slightly less than half the time. The implication of a 40–45 percent attribution rate is subject to competing interpretations. On the one hand, states that seek to retaliate after terrorist attacks may desire a much higher rate of attribution. On the other hand, from the perspective of a potential perpetrator, knowing that a covert nuclear terror attack has only about a 60 percent chance of remaining anonymous should be sobering. The second principal finding reflected in figure 1 is that the rate of attribution is strongly tied to the number of fatalities caused by the attack. Most terror attacks kill relatively few people. In fact, most of the incidents in the sample caused 0 to 4 deaths; and only 40 percent of those were attributed by GTD to the perpetrator. But as fatalities increase, so does the rate of attribution. Of the 49 attacks that killed more than 100 people, the guilty party was identified 73 percent of the time. Based on these data, a terror group contemplating a mass casualty attack should not expect to remain anonymous. While figure 1 reveals a link between the level of fatalities and the likelihood of attribution, most of the underlying data are derived from events unlike the kind of incident that drives U.S. fears about proliferation and terrorism: an anonymous nuclear terror strike on the United States or a U.S. ally. The 18,000-plus cases in the dataset are mostly failed attacks, in foreign lands, against target

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 428 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz countries with less-capable intelligence agencies than those of the United States and many key U.S. allies.

Extremely high risk of failure and ease of tracing terrorist organizations back to state sponsors mean leaders would never arm a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons Lieber, Georgetown School of Foreign Service professor, & Press, Dartmouth Government professor, 2013
[Keir A., & Daryl G., International Security, Volume 38, No. 1, Summer 213, ―Why States Won‘t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists‖, Project Muse, p. 91-93, accessed 7/9/13, CB] Taken together, the data on conventional terrorism suggest that nuclear attacks—especially those that target countries with sophisticated intelligence agencies—would not remain anonymous for long. In fact, both because of its shocking nature and because of fears of an additional follow-up nuclear terror attack, any instance of nuclear terror would trigger an unprecedented global investigation. The data in this section, therefore, likely understate the probability of attribution. For a state leader contemplating giving a nuclear weapon to terrorists, the implication is clear: your proxy will very likely be identified. Linking Terrorists to Their Sponsors The data presented above reveal that devastating attacks are usually attributed to the responsible terrorist organization. But to deter states from passing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, one must also be able to connect the terrorists to their state sponsor. How difficult would it be to do this? Passing nuclear weapons or material to a terrorist group under any circumstances would be a remarkably risky act. A leader who sponsored nuclear terrorism [End Page 91] would be wagering his life, the lives of family members, his regime, and his country‘s fate on the hope that the operation would remain anonymous. If the terror group used the weapon against a different enemy or revealed the source of the weapon, or if the terror group‘s operatives or senior leadership were penetrated by foreign intelligence, the consequences could be catastrophic for the sponsor. Click for larger view Figure 3. Attribution after Unclaimed Attacks Given the enormous risks involved, it is difficult to imagine a state‘s leaders placing so much faith in a terrorist organization unless they already had a long-running, close, and trusting relationship with that group, and unless that group had repeatedly demonstrated its reliability, competence, and ability to maintain secrecy. Furthermore, leaders considering giving nuclear weapons to terror groups would need to find a group with the demonstrated capability to conduct complex operations across international borders.27 Many violent nonstate groups can plant roadside bombs or conduct smallscale ambushes against unsuspecting targets, but those relatively simple attacks do not imply an ability to conduct complex international operations involving training, [End Page 92] travel, visas, finances, and secure communications.28 In short, both the complexities of the mission and the need for unwavering trust mean that a state seeking to orchestrate a nuclear attack by proxy would be limited to collaborations with well-established terrorist organizations with which it has existing relationships, simplifying the task of connecting terrorist perpetrators to their state sponsors. To assess the difficulty of connecting terrorists to their sponsors, we compiled a list of terror organizations—focusing on those with close relationships to one or more countries. We began with the U.S. State Department‘s list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), which we then adjusted, as described below, to account for potential omissions.29 The adjustments generally involved adding state-

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 429 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz sponsored terror groups to the State Department‘s list, which, by itself, would make it harder to establish our claim that victims could trace attacks from guilty terrorists to their sponsors. According to the State Department, there are fifty-one FTOs, only nine of which have state sponsors.30 Furthermore, according to the State Department, only four countries actively sponsor terror groups: Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Syria.

Tracing an attack back to a state sponsor would not be hard because there are so few sponsors Lieber, Georgetown School of Foreign Service professor, & Press, Dartmouth Government professor, 2013
[Keir A., & Daryl G., International Security, Volume 38, No. 1, Summer 213, ―Why States Won‘t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists‖, Project Muse, p. 95, accessed 7/9/13, CB] Table 1 appears to present a daunting list of FTOs and states, but the data show that tracing an attack from a terror group to its sponsor would be relatively simple. First, nearly all of the terror groups listed have only one or two sponsors: nine FTOs have a single sponsor; five have two sponsors; and only one—the Abu Nidal Organization—has three (and it might soon have only a single sponsor).36 Furthermore, only one of the sponsors has nuclear weapons or bomb quantities of fissile material (Pakistan). If Pakistan were to consider giving a weapon to terrorists, it would not turn to Hezbollah or Hamas, with which it has weak connections. Nor, for the same reason, would Iran give nuclear weapons or material to Jaish-e-Mohammed. The implication is clear: if a terrorist group is identified in a nuclear attack, the list of possible sponsors will be short. In almost every conceivable case, a single nuclear-armed suspect will stand out. Finally, table 1 does not capture the momentous changes under way in the Middle East. It is unclear whether post-Qaddafi Libya will continue to sponsor terrorism or whether Syria (currently enmeshed in civil war) will remain a sponsor for long. If those two states were to cease supporting FTOs, then no FTO would have more than a single sponsor—making it simple to trace an attack from an identified group to the country that supplied it.

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AT – Deterrence Doesn‘t Apply
Deterrence still applies to state-sponsored nuclear terrorist attacks Lieber, Georgetown School of Foreign Service professor, & Press, Dartmouth Government professor, 2013
[Keir A., & Daryl G., International Security, Volume 38, No. 1, Summer 213, ―Why States Won‘t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists‖, Project Muse, p. 99-102, accessed 7/9/13, CB] There are two problems with this counterargument. First, while attribution uncertainty might restrain a state from responding to an act of nuclear terror with a major nuclear retaliatory strike, that option is not the only devastating response available to a country such as the United States or one of its allies. Indeed, regardless of the level of attribution certainty, a nuclear strike might not be the preferred response. For example, in the wake of a nuclear terror attack against the United States thought to be sponsored by Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea, U.S. leaders might not feel compelled to determine those countries‘ guilt ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ or to narrow down the suspect list further; Washington might simply decide that the era in which ―rogue states‖ possessed nuclear weapons must end, and threaten to conquer any country that refused to disarm or that was less than forthcoming about the terror attack.52 Second, this counterargument would be unlikely to carry much weight with a leader contemplating nuclear attack by proxy. A leader tempted to attack because of the prospect of residual attribution uncertainty and the hope that such uncertainty would restrain his victim from lashing out in retaliation would need enormous confidence in the humaneness of his enemy, even at a time [End Page 102] when that enemy would be boiling over with rage. For example, could one really imagine an Iranian aide convincing the supreme leader that if Iran gave a nuclear bomb to Hezbollah, knowing that Israel would strongly suspect Iran as the source, Israel‘s leaders would be too restrained by their deep humanity and lingering doubts about sponsorship to retaliate harshly against Tehran? In fact, the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks, including the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, indicates a willingness to retaliate strongly against those directly culpable (al-Qaida), their associates (the Taliban), and others simply deemed to be troublemakers in the neighborhood (Iraq). There was debate in the United States over the strategic wisdom of invading Iraq, but none of Saddam Hussein‘s crimes—either known, suspected, or fabricated—were held to an evidentiary standard even close to certainty.53 States that consider giving nuclear weapons to terrorists cannot be certain how the victim will react, but basing one‘s hope for survival on a victim‘s reluctance to act on partial evidence of culpability would be a tremendous gamble.

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Proliferation

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Proliferation Bad Impact
Proliferation escalates into nuclear war – hegemon key to stop it Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analysis Strategy, Forces and Resources Division deputy director, 11
[Victor, 2-15-11, ―Proliferation, missile defence and American ambitions‖, Survival, Volume: 44, pg. 8790, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396330212331343352#.UdoiFfmsiSo, accessed 7-713, MSG ] Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‗six-shooters‘ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. This kind of world is in no nation‘s interest. The means for preventing it must be pursued vigorously. And, as argued above, a most powerful way to prevent it or slow its emergence is to encourage the more capable states to provide reliable protection to others against aggression, even when that aggression could be backed with nuclear weapons. In other words, the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff‘s posse, even in the face of nuclear threats.

Unfettered nuclear tech development risks global war Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center director, 9 (Henry, 6/1/9, Policy Review, ―Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd‖, No. 155, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5534, accessed 7/7/13, AR)
Finally, several new nuclear weapons contenders are also likely to emerge in the next two to three decades. Among these might be Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Algeria, Brazil (which is developing a nuclear submarine and the uranium to fuel it), Argentina, and possibly Saudi Arabia (courtesy of weapons leased to it by Pakistan or China), Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. All of these states have either voiced a desire to acquire nuclear weapons or tried to do so previously and have one or more of the following: A nuclear power program, a large research , or plans to build a large power reactor by 2030. With a large reactor program inevitably comes a large number of foreign nuclear experts (who are exceedingly difficult to track and identify) and extensive training, which is certain to include nuclear fuel making.19 Thus, it will be much more difficult to know when and if a state is acquiring nuclear weapons (covertly or overtly) and far more dangerous nuclear technology and materials will be available to terrorists than would otherwise. Bottom line: As more states bring large reactors on line more will become nuclear-weapons-ready — i.e., they could come within months of acquiring nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.20 As for nuclear safeguards keeping apace, neither the iaea‘s nuclear inspection system (even under the most optimal conditions) nor technical

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 433 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz trends in nuclear fuel making (e.g., silex laser enrichment, centrifuges, new South African aps enrichment techniques, filtering technology, and crude radiochemistry plants, which are making successful, small, affordable, covert fuel manufacturing even more likely)21 afford much cause for optimism. This brave new nuclear world will stir existing security alliance relations more than it will settle them: In the case of states such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, it could prompt key allies to go ballistic or nuclear on their own.

Nuclear 1914
At a minimum, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers‘ strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them ―strategic partners‖ (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), ―non-nato allies‖ (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state‘s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 434 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with ―strategic‖ consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world ―every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.‖23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want. None of this, however, is inevitable.

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Russia War

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Russia-US War Bad Impact
Russia-US war risks extinction Bostrom, Oxford philosophy professor, 2
(Nick, March 2002, The Journal of Evolution and Technology, ―Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,‖ http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html, accessed 7-8-13) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind‘s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

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Asia

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China War Impact
US-China conflict escalates to nuclear war Glaser, George Washington University Political Science Professor, 11
(Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University., Foreign Affairs, Mar/April 2011, "Will China's Rise Lead to War? ", Vol. 90, Issue 2, Ebsco, accessed 79-13)

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China-whatever they might formally agree to-have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

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Escalation will spiral out of control Swaine, Carnegie Endowment senior associate & University California-Berkeley Asia Program postdoctoral fellow, 4
(Dr. Michael, “Trouble in Taiwan”, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=1460, accessed 11-8-11, CMM)

A war with China over Taiwan would, of course, be far more dangerous than any of the United States' post-Cold War operations. Although not a match for the United States, China is nonetheless a continental power with very large conventional ground, naval, and air forces, as well as a nuclear weapons arsenal capable of reaching any target in the United States and beyond. Taiwan's proximity to China, the difficulty involved in interdicting Chinese attacks without directly striking the Chinese mainland, and the historical inclination of both sides to display resolve in a crisis through decisive -- and sometimes rapid -- military action suggest that escalation might prove extremely difficult to control.

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Asian Instability Bad Impact
Asian instability leads to nuclear war Landay, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, 00
[Jonathan, 3-10-00, Knight Ridder, ―Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts‖, Lexis] Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy, and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan, and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations, and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. ―Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,‖ said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. ―We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the region‘s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia‘s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.

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India-US Relations Good Impact
India-US relations reduce the risk of South Asian nuclear war Schaffer, Center for Strategic and International Security South Asia Program director, 2 (Teresita, Washington Quarterly, Spring, ―Building a new partnership with India‖, p. Lexis)
Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

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India-Pakistan Nuclear War Impacts
India-Pakistan nuclear war risks extinction Caldicott, Physicians for Social Responsibility founder, 2
[Helen, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and Nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, ―The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush‘s Military-Industrial Complex‖, p. xiii] The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy could respond in kind. China, India‘s hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America‘s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.

South Asian nuclear war risks extinction Hundley, Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting senior editor, 12
(Tom, 9-5-12, Foreign Policy, ―Race to the End‖, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race_to_the_end?page=0,3, accessed 7/7/13, AR)
The arms race could make a loose nuke more likely. After all, Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear arsenal is safe and secure rest heavily on the argument that its warheads and their delivery systems have been uncoupled and stored separately in heavily guarded facilities. It would be very difficult for a group of mutinous officers to assemble the necessary protocols for a launch and well nigh impossible for a band of terrorists to do so. But that calculus changes with the deployment of mobile battlefield weapons. The weapons themselves, no longer stored in heavily guarded bunkers, would be far more exposed. Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately. What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve. This is the real

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 443 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation.

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AT – China War
Economic interdependence checks war Menon, Lehigh University international relations professor & New America Foundation fellow, 8
(Rajan, Jan/Feb 2008, The National Interest, "The Changing of the Guard, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/changing_guard_6586, accessed 9-4-9) The possibility of conflict is all the more unpalatable for Beijing because China's economic miracle is the result of shedding autarky and embracing economic interdependence or, in its turbocharged variant, globalization. For example, if China were to unload its dollar holdings and opt for the euro as its main reserve currency, it would damage the American economy (the U.S. government would have to hike interest rates to keep attracting dollars). But Beijing would also wound itself. While Americans certainly benefit from the relatively inexpensive goods that U.S. companies export from China, it is no less true that a reliable American market is important to China. Its exports to the United States totaled $287 billion in 2006, making the United States the number one foreign destination for Chinese goods; on top of that, the United States is the fifth-largest source of foreign direct investment in China. So, the costs of willfully creating instability--indeed, of upheaval unrelated to Chinese actions--have risen now that China's economic engine is powered by capital inflows, global markets and reliable energy supplies. And the constraints imposed by such dependence will not diminish even though China will be less susceptible to economic sanctions as rising incomes expand the internal market.

Interdependence is inevitable and solves war

Deudney, John Hopkins Political Science professor & Ikenberry, Princeton Politics and International Affairs professor, 9
[Daniel, G. John, Jan/Feb 2009, Foreign Affairs, "The Myth of the Autocratic Revival," http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88106/daniel-deudney-g-john-ikenberry/the-myth-of-theautocratic-revival.html?mode=print, accessed 7-8-13] Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The declining utility of war, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 445 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.

China‘s integration in the Western political and economic order checks conflict Ikenberry, Princeton University International Affairs professor, 8,
[G. John, Jan/Feb 2008, Foreign Affairs, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West ," Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87102/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-thefuture-of-the-west.html?mode=print, access 9-4-9) The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to facilitate Chinese integration. At first, China embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive purposes: protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its peaceful intentions by getting involved in regional and global groupings. But as the scholar Marc Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status." China, in short, is increasingly working within, rather than outside of, the Western order. China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a legacy of Roosevelt's determination to build the universal body around diverse great-power leadership. This gives China the same authority and advantages of "great-power exceptionalism" as the other permanent members. The existing global trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so. Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global economic system -- a system that is open and loosely institutionalized and that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in. State power today is ultimately based on sustained economic growth, and China is well aware that no major state can modernize without integrating into the globalized capitalist system; if a country wants to be a world power, it has no choice but to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The road to global power, in effect, runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions.

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War

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Escalation Likely
Interdependence makes risk of escalation high Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins American Foreign Policy Program director and professor, 5
[Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World‘s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 224] At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic uncertainty that characterized the years before World War II. At worst, the retreat of American power could lead to a repetition of the great global economic failure and the bloody international conflicts the world experienced in the 1930s and 194os. Indeed, the potential for economic calamity and wartime destruction is greater at the outset of the new century than it was in the first half of the preceding one because of the greater extent of international economic interdependence and the higher levels of prosperity—there is more to lose now than there was then—and because of the presence, in large numbers, of nuclear weapons.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 448 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Can‘t Solve War
It‘s impossible to plan for every worst case scenario Greenblatt, NPR, 2-15-12
(Alan, NPR, ―As Wars Wind Down, What Are U.S. Security Needs?‖, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146892853/as-wars-wind-down-what-are-u-s-security-needs, accessed 629,12, FFF) It's impossible to plan for every scenario. There's no amount of military spending that would keep the nation completely safe. "We could spend the entire federal budget on the military and we wouldn't be able to eliminate every risk to U.S. national security," Bensahel says. That leaves open the question of how much risk policymakers are willing to tolerate. That's inevitably a political question, Feaver says, and one that never gets fully resolved. After the Cold War, Washington was too complacent about U.S. security, he says. After Sept. 11, many politicians exaggerated the threat that terrorism posed, he adds. "The al-Qaida threat was and to a certain extent is very, very serious, but it was not the Soviet Union with tens of thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles on hair-trigger alert," Feaver says. "So it's a categorically different threat."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 449 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Risk of War Low
Threat of war and terrorism exaggerated Greenblatt, NPR writer, 2-15-12
(Alan, NPR, ―As Wars Wind Down, What Are U.S. Security Needs?‖, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146892853/as-wars-wind-down-what-are-u-s-security-needs, accessed 629-12, FFF) Wars are less frequent — and far less deadly — than they were even a few decades ago. The U.S. has built up a military apparatus that dwarfs any potential rivals — spending nine times as much as China on defense, for instance. Even terrorist attacks pose little threat to most Americans, Zenko and Cohen argue. They are fellows, respectively, at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Century Foundation. They note that in 2010, 13,186 people were killed in terrorist attacks worldwide, but only 15 of them were Americans. In other words, Americans face greater risk from drowning in a bathtub. "The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place," Zenko and Cohen write. "It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history."

Even with budget cuts the military still remains high and war is unlikely Greenblatt, NPR, 2-15-12
(Alan, NPR, ―As Wars Wind Down, What Are U.S. Security Needs?‖, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146892853/as-wars-wind-down-what-are-u-s-security-needs, accessed 629,12, FFF) Even Obama's budget, despite its significant cuts, assumes U.S. troop levels will remain higher than they were before 2001. Figuring out just how much military force and spending is enough is going to remain a primary argument in Washington. It's "preposterous" to worry that the U.S. can't afford to cut defense spending because of threats that might arise years down the road, says Jack Snyder, an international relations professor at Columbia University. On the other hand, Snyder says, a good deal of the security the U.S. enjoys today is the byproduct of its military resolve. U.S. strategy hasn't always been flawless, he says, but the country has made it clear it won't tolerate aggression across internationally recognized borders — and has had the wherewithal to back that policy up. "War is less likely and the U.S. is certainly more secure now than it has been in a long, long time," Snyder says. "But some of the reasons for the decline of war have to do with the power of the United States and the other liberal advanced democracies."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 13 450 Hegemony Core – Brovero/Verney/Hurwitz

Risk of Missile Attack Low
Missile attacks pose no threat, interceptors and relations check Pak, Medill National Security zone writer, 6-9-12
(Susanna, Medill National Security zone, ―U.S. more secure today despite growing ballistic missile threat‖, 6-9-12, http://nationalsecurityzone.org/site/u-s-more-secure-today-despite-growing-ballisticmissile-threat/, accessed 6-28-12, FFF) ―The situation today is radically different,‖ said Stephen Rademaker, a former Bush administration arms control and nonproliferation official, in a phone interview. ―Ten years ago, America was completely defenseless against the threat of missile attack.‖ Rademaker says the U.S. now has about 45 interceptors in Alaska and California, which is ―more than enough‖ to defend against accidental launches from Russia, as well as attacks from Iran and North Korea. He adds that tensions between the U.S. and Russia have relaxed since the Cold War, so that intentional launches are unlikely and accidental launches pose the greatest threat. The improved relationship with Russia and the technological advances allowing the U.S. to build a stronger defense system come years after the U.S. walked away from an agreement to stop building missile defenses.

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