November 12, 2015
HORNBECK OFFSHORE SERVICES INC.
HOS/NYSE
Continuing Coverage:
Hornbeck Offshore Stays Afloat as the
Company Rides out the Storm
Wall Street's Farm Team
Investment Rating: Market Outperform
PRICE: $ 12.44
S&P 500: 2,045.97
DJIA: 17,448.07
RUSSELL 2000: 1,154.81
Depressed oil prices to reduce exploration and production (E&P) activity, driving
down demand for Hornbeck’s vessels
Strong cash holdings and favorable senior note terms to help weather the storm
Reliance on short‐term contracts may subject revenues to greater volatility
End of newbuild program increases future free cash flow
Political and economic changes in Brazil and Mexico to open new opportunities in
the region
Our 12‐month target price is $15.00
Valuation
*EPS
P/E
CFPS
P/CFPS
2014 A
$ 2.43
5.1x
$ 4.90
2.5x
2015 E
$ 2.44
5.1x
$ 6.47
1.9x
2016 E
$ 1.13
11.0x
$ 3.49
3.6x
*Net of non‐recurri ng events
Market Capitalization
Equity Market Cap (MM):
Enterprise Value (MM):
Shares Outstanding (MM):
Estimated Float (MM):
6‐Mo. Avg. Daily Volume:
Stock Data
$ 445.35 52‐Week Range:
$ 1,223.59 12‐Month Stock Performance:
$12.20‐$32.67
‐60.84%
35.80 Dividend Yield:
31.30 Book Value Per Share:
1,185,000 Beta:
Nil
$ 40.37
1.46
Company Quick View:
These folks don’t own the biggest fleet of offshore supply vessels (that’s Tidewater) but,
the ones it does have are some of the most sophisticated deep‐water vessels in the
world. Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. provides marine transportation, subsea
installation and accommodation support services to exploration and production, oilfield
service, offshore construction and U.S. military customers. Headquartered in Covington,
Louisiana, Hornbeck services clients primarily in the Gulf of Mexico, Brazil, and Mexico.
Company Website: http://hornbeckoffshore.com/
Analysts:
Sam Fihma
Daniel Goldbaum
Spencer Kaufman
Garrett Langfeld
Investment Research Manager:
Evan Koehler
BURKENROAD REPORTS
The BURKENROAD REPORTS are produced solely as a part of an educational program of Tulane University's
Freeman School of Business. The reports are not investment advice and you should not and may not rely on
them in making any investment decision. You should consult an investment professional and/or conduct your
own primary research regarding any potential investment.
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Figure 1: 5‐year Stock Price Performance
Source: Yahoo! Finance November 12, 2015
INVESTMENT SUMMARY
We give Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. a Market Outperform rating with a 12‐month target
price of $15.00. To arrive at this price target, we used the relative multiple method with the
following financial ratios: price to earnings (P/E), price to book value (P/BV), enterprise value
to earnings before interest and tax (EV/EBIT), enterprise value to sales (EV/Sales), and price to
cash flows per share (P/CFPS).
Hornbeck will face the following risks in the short‐term: low oil prices, environmental
regulation that could limit offshore drilling activity, violations of the Jones Act by foreign
competitors, exchange rate risks, credit risk, and uncollectible accounts risks. However,
Hornbeck will be able to survive these risks due to its strategic management decisions,
attractive long‐term debt terms and maturities, versatile long‐term and short‐term contract
strategy, and increasing free cash flow.
Table 1: Historical Burkenroad Ratings and Prices
Report Date
3/18/15
3/28/14
3/20/13
4/2/12
3/21/11
4/12/10
4/6/09
4/4/08
3/30/07
Stock Price
Rating
12‐Month Target Price
$20.30
Market Outperform $26.00
$40.75
Market Perform
$47.00
$44.99
Market Perform
$47.00
$43.37
Market Perform
$35.00
$30.99
Market Perform
$35.00
$20.89
Market Perform
$24.95
$16.36
Market Outperform $28.34
$46.67
Market Outperform $56.77
$28.65
Market Outperform $39.13
Source: Past Burkenroad Reports
2
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
INVESTMENT THESIS
Our 12‐month price target of $15.00 and Market Outperform rating is due to the recent
downturn in the oil and gas industry.
Depressed oil price to reduce E&P activity, driving down demand for Hornbeck’s vessels
The price of oil will have a significant impact on Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc.’s future
outlook. The low commodity price environment has negatively affected the entire oil and gas
industry and Hornbeck is not immune. This current situation has caused a major reduction in
expensive offshore drilling projects, significantly decreasing the demand for all offshore
vessels, let alone Hornbeck’s fleet. As a result, Hornbeck’s utilization rate has declined. The
Company combats this utilization rate decrease by stacking vessels and lowering the supply of
boats in the market. However, Hornbeck does not have an answer for the significant
downward pricing pressure. Although it has not dropped prices to the levels of its peers,
Hornbeck has reduced its dayrates to accommodate its customers. Thus, lower oil prices have
led to a smaller revenue stream for Hornbeck. We do not predict oil prices to rebound in 2016,
so our projections do not predict an increase in Hornbeck’s revenue.
Strong cash holdings and favorable senior note terms to help weather the storm
Hornbeck Offshore has a healthy balance sheet. With over $300 million in cash and cash
equivalents, the Company is in a strong financial position to settle its interest payments and
pay any extraordinary expenses. Hornbeck will be able to survive this downturn even if it does
not earn a profit in future quarters. Advantageous debt financing that Hornbeck received in
2013 helps its case. The Company has just over $1 billion of senior notes, but none are due
until 2019 at the earliest. Additionally, the weighted average cost of debt on these notes is a
mere 4.48%. If disaster strikes, Hornbeck has an untapped $300 million revolving credit facility.
Reliance on short‐term contracts may subject Hornbeck to greater volatility
Hornbeck has always targeted short‐term contracts in the spot market. While the Company
engages in a few long‐term contracts to help hedge against oil prices, Hornbeck makes its
money through short‐term contracts. Shorter contracts allow for higher dayrates. Hornbeck
targets customers that are in immediate need of an extra support or supply vessel. For
instance, the Company thrives when oil rigs need servicing after a hurricane in the Gulf of
Mexico. Additionally, Hornbeck believes its boats are younger, safer, and more technologically
capable than its peers; thus, Hornbeck’s fleet should demand a higher dayrate.
Hornbeck’s spot market strategy does not allow the Company to hedge against a decrease in
oil prices. Even in this low commodity price environment, Hornbeck is sticking with its strategy.
As a result, the Company has stacked 21 vessels to date and will continue to stack vessels to
maintain its high dayrates. As one top executive said, Hornbeck would rather have a boat sit in
the harbor than be active at a lower dayrate than what the Company demands. Instead of
locking in a dayrate over a long period of time, Hornbeck will continue to experience dayrate
volatility in the spot market.
3
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
End of newbuild program increases future free cash flow
Hornbeck is nearing the completion of its fifth newbuild program. The Company spent
approximately $1.1 billion in capital expenditures (CAPEX) on the project in order to keep its
fleet more technologically advanced than its competitors’ boats. The program will be complete
over the next year and the Company expects only $95 million left to be incurred. With many
new vessels in its fleet, and a bleak outlook for the offshore drilling industry, Hornbeck will not
spend much money on growth CAPEX once the program is complete. Recently, Hornbeck also
completed the sale of its fourth vessel to the U.S. Navy, adding $38 million to its balance sheet
and reducing its maintenance CAPEX spending. While Hornbeck’s revenue will clearly suffer
from low oil prices, its future free cash flow will not be hindered by capital expenditure
spending.
Political and economic changes in Brazil and Mexico to open new opportunities in the region
Significant changes in two of Hornbeck’s key foreign markets, Mexico and Brazil, could affect
the Company’s profits. Pemex, the Mexican state‐owned energy company, recently lost its 75‐
year old monopoly over Mexican oil after a vote of Mexico’s Congress in December 2013. As a
result, private E&P companies will now be able to compete with Pemex in the deepwater
offshore oil industry. This development will amount to a net positive for Hornbeck. While
Hornbeck may have to expend efforts negotiating contracts with Pemex’s competitors, the
increased competition among E&P companies will likely drive dayrates up, increasing
Hornbeck’s revenues.
Developments in Brazil will also influence Hornbeck’s revenue. The Brazilian nationalized oil
company, Petrobras, has faced scandal and corruption charges. Petrobras has informed
Hornbeck it will not renew its contracts because of a $10 billion reduction in E&P activities. In
response, Hornbeck will send two of its vessels from Brazil to the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and leave
two vessels in Brazil to engage in operations when the market recovers. Hornbeck has the
opportunity to engage in a spot strategy if Petrobras suddenly needs Hornbeck’s vessels.
In the short‐term, reductions in Brazilian E&P activity will hurt Hornbeck’s future outlook
because Hornbeck will not receive additional revenue from contracts with Petrobras. In
addition, Hornbeck remains uncertain if Petrobras will pay the full amount specified in
contracts due to the recent scandal. However, Hornbeck’s decision to move two vessels away
from Brazil will decrease the Company’s exposure to the Brazilian market, which is
experiencing declining growth rates and a currency crisis. The Company’s future cash flows will
be more predictable as it moves a greater percentage of its activity to more politically‐stable
regions.
4
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
VALUATION
In order to arrive at our 12‐month target price, our team valued Hornbeck extrinsically based
on its performance relative to its competitors. This valuation gave us a 12‐month target price
of $15.00. Figure 2 shows a more detailed breakdown of how we arrived at this target price. A
12‐month target price of 15.00 would be approximately a 20% return within the next 12
months.
Relative Multiple Method
One method of valuing a company is by comparing it to similar companies. For example, if you
were to try and come up with a value for an apple tree, you would look at apple trees in the
same geographic area that are roughly the same size as the other apple tree. Our team used
the price to earnings (P/E), price to book value (P/BV), enterprise value to earnings before
interest and tax (EV/EBIT), enterprise value to sales (EV/Sales), and price to cash flows per
share (P/CFPS) ratios to value Hornbeck. These ratios were pulled from Capital IQ.
While it would have been beneficial to value Hornbeck intrinsically by utilizing a discounted
cash flow (DCF), it was not practical. Because Hornbeck recently refinanced its debt when
interest rates were virtually zero, its long‐term debt yielded about a 5.75% return. Applying
the appropriate tax shield to the Company’s debt, we arrived at an after tax cost of debt of
approximately 3.60%. When combining that with Hornbeck’s cost of equity (11.08%), we
arrived at a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 6.01%. When projecting out our free
cash flows as well as a terminal value and discounting those values by the WACC, we arrived
at a price target of $65.18, which is an outlier. We then changed the WACC to a more
reasonable 11.51%, a rate of return that would beat the S&P 500, and arrived at a target price
of $7.33. Therefore, the DCF was not a reliable method of valuing Hornbeck.
Figure 2: Hornbeck Relative Multiples Valuation
Hornbeck Relative Multiples Valuation
$22.00
12‐Month
Target Price:
$15.00
$17.00
Current
Price:
$12.44
$12.00
$7.00
P/E
P/BV
EV/EBIT
EV/Sales
P/CFPS
Source: Bloomberg November 12, 2015
5
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
Analysts expect the revenue of the entire oilfield services to be $100.2 billion by the end of
2015, down from $126 billion in 2014. Meanwhile, the number of enterprises in the industry
decreased from 32,059 in 2014 to approximately 30,592 in 2015. Marine transportation is an
important segment of the oilfield services industry. Approximately one‐third of domestic oil
comes from deepwater offshore rigs and marine transportation companies provide
equipment and servicing for these rigs.
Rig counts, rig utilization rates, vessel utilization rates, and dayrates are all important factors
in analyzing demand for marine transportation. Confidence in higher oil prices encourages
exploration & production (E&P) companies to find new offshore oil fields. As a result, E&P
companies will construct new rigs and demand marine transportation services depending on
oil prices. Expectations of low oil prices can lead companies to halt new rig construction or
even reduce current rig activity. Therefore, the current reduction in rig counts indicates that
E&P companies expect oil prices to remain low in the near future.
Rig utilization rates, which represent the percentage of active rigs in a designated region,
influence the demand for offshore vessels. Figure 3 illustrates the decline in utilization rates
over the past year in three key areas for offshore drilling: the Gulf of Mexico (GoM), Mexico,
and Brazil.
Figure 3: Offshore Rig Utilization
100%
90%
89%
91%
86%
Percent Utilized
80%
70%
80%
72%
67%
60%
50%
86%
63%
52%
40%
30%
40%
36%
36%
Mar '15
Aug '15
Sep '15
20%
10%
0%
Sep '14
US GoM
Mexico
Brazil
Source: Rigzone September 22, 2015
Declining rig utilization rates will likely lead to a reduction in demand for offshore vessels.
Therefore, marine transportation companies that service offshore oil rigs should expect
revenues to decline.
6
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Vessel utilization rate refers to the percentage of a company’s vessels currently in use out of
the total fleet. However, the marketed vessel utilization rate is a better metric than the
general utilization rate because it only looks at active, readily‐available vessels. High marketed
vessel utilization rates indicate a healthy market for offshore support vessels (OSVs). The fall
in oil prices has hurt demand for OSVs and other offshore vessels, decreasing marketed vessel
utilization rates.
Marine transportation companies earn revenue by charging dayrates for the use of its vessels.
Within the oilfield services industry, dayrates vary by company, region, and vessel capacity. In
the U.S., average industry dayrates for OSVs with a deadweight tonnage (DWT) between 3,000
and 4,000 are $23,750 for August 2015, a decline from $31,500 in August 2014. The average
industry dayrates for August 2014 are likely higher than the yearly average because oil prices
began to drop only after August 2014. Lower oil prices decrease demand for offshore drilling,
creating downward pressure on industry‐wide dayrates. An oversupply of vessels in relation to
demand could also force dayrates to decline.
Although marine transportation companies price its services based on dayrates, firms typically
engage in long‐term contracts with E&P customers to service rigs. Therefore, revenues for
marine transportation companies likely correspond to revenues of E&P companies. Revenues
of offshore oil rig construction companies are mildly correlated with oil prices, as shown in
Figure 4:
Figure 4: Percent Changes in Oil Prices and Revenues of Rig Companies
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
‐20%
‐40%
‐60%
Revenue (%)
World price of crude oil (%)
Source: IBISworld Industry Reports
While oil prices and revenues of offshore rig construction companies generally move in the
same direction, oil prices are more volatile than revenues. Offshore oil rigs require long‐term
investments. While long‐term declines in oil prices may reduce the demand for offshore rigs,
revenues for offshore rig construction companies will change less than oil prices will.
Therefore, we expect revenues for the marine transportation companies that service the
offshore oil industry to move in the same direction as oil prices, but with less volatility.
7
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Geographic Areas
Marine transportation companies conduct operations in regions with offshore oil rigs. Figure 5
shows the number of rigs in some of the largest offshore oil regions, which are the regions
with the highest demand for OSVs:
Figure 5: Number of offshore rigs worldwide as of 2015, by region
Brazil
104
Mexico
113
Persian Gulf
145
Far East Asia
163
Southeast Asia
173
North Sea
184
Gulf of Mexico (US)
213
0
50
100
Source: Statista
150
200
250
Brazil
Political stability plays an important role in Hornbeck’s operations. For example, Hornbeck
currently has four vessels working for the nationalized Brazilian oil company Petrobras, but
Petrobras has already informed Hornbeck that it will not renew its contracts. The four
contracts all expire in the second half of 2015. Petrobras has chosen to use only domestic
vessels in its offshore oil industry. Furthermore, the company is facing a corruption scandal
involving money laundering and other illegal activities. As a result, Petrobras has already
announced a $10 billion reduction in exploration and production (E&P) activities, and
additional reductions could further depress demand for OSVs. The Brazilian economy is also
performing poorly. Brazil’s currency, the Real, fell to all‐time lows against the dollar on
September 24, and Brazil’s central bank predicts a 2.7% contraction for 2015. Due to the
declining Real and relatively strong dollar, Brazilian companies such as Petrobras will find it
more expensive to do business internationally, reducing demand for U.S.‐based marine
transportation companies.
Mexico
The nationalized Mexican oil company PEMEX has cancelled contracts due to a reduction in its
budget. PEMEX’s monopoly over drilling activities in Mexico ended in 2013. Companies that
have existing contracts with PEMEX may scramble to secure additional contracts with new
drilling companies in Mexico, but increased competition for vessels could lead to increased
dayrates.
8
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Mediterranean
Eni, an Italian energy company, recently discovered one of the world’s largest natural gas
fields, Zohr, just off the coast of Egypt. According to Eni, Zohr may hold up to 5.5 billion
barrels of oil. As a result of this discovery, the Mediterranean Sea could be a new market for
Hornbeck.
Customers
Customers of the marine transportation industry include integrated oil companies, oilfield
service companies, national oil companies, the U.S. government, and independent exploration
and production companies. Customers vary year to year based on several factors including the
total level of exploration and production, the availability and suitability of each customer’s
projects, and many more external factors. Customer loyalty in this industry is low because
drilling companies sign individual contracts with service providers and there is little to no
switching cost.
Regulatory Environment
The Jones Act prohibits non‐U.S. flagged vessels from trading in U.S. Coastal Waters. U.S.
flagged vessels are those built in and owned by citizens of the U.S. The Jones Act limits foreign
competitors from using OSVs to service rigs because foreign OSVs cannot transport
equipment or personnel from the U.S. shore to rigs. However, the Jones Act does not restrict
foreign multi‐purpose support vessels (MPSVs) so long as vessels do not engage in U.S. coastal
trade. Therefore, U.S. marine transportation companies face foreign competition in MPSV
operations.
The Clean Water Act serves as a guideline for activity in U.S. waters. The law prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. OSVs carry diesel fuel and chemicals, and must
have response plans in case of an oil spill or chemical discharge.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) includes vessels servicing a rig as a responsible party in
the case of an oil spill. The limits of such a liability are the greater of $854,000 or $1,000 per
gross ton. Therefore, offshore vessel companies need to purchase insurance or keep enough
cash on hand to cover these potential liabilities.
In certain cases, the U.S. government may issue a moratorium on all deepwater offshore
drilling, as demonstrated by the six month moratorium following the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. A moratorium can greatly affect the offshore energy drilling industry by shutting down all
operations, causing a reduction in both E&P and marine transportation.
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision to regulate carbon under the Clean Air
Act could affect future demand for oil. The Obama administration recently submitted an
initiative to the United Nations to cut current greenhouse gas emissions to 26‐28% below
2005 levels. Although nobody can accurately predict this plan’s consequences, the initiative
could make oil and gas more expensive or limit oil production, decreasing demand for oil. A
reduction in demand could decrease the level of offshore drilling, which would hurt the
marine transportation industry.
9
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Competitors
Competitors in the marine transportation industry are mostly large, established companies.
The capital expenditures required for servicing the offshore oil industry prevent the entry of
small competitors. In addition, most of the customers in the industry are large, integrated
energy companies who prefer to do business with companies with established safety records.
The Company’s three major competitors are Tidewater, SEACOR, and Edison Chouest.
Tidewater has the largest fleet of OSVs in the oilfield services industry, but over 90% of its
operations are international. SEACOR Holdings Inc. operates four main businesses: offshore
marine services, inland river services, and shipping service. Edison Chouest Offshore is the top
operator of New Generation OSVs worldwide and the largest operator of Jones Act Hi‐Spec
OSVs in the Gulf of Mexico.
Future Outlook
Revenues in the offshore drilling industry have a strong positive correlation with oil prices. Oil
prices, therefore, dictate the drilling rates E&P companies are willing to pay. With oil selling
for just about half the price it was selling for at the end of the second quarter of 2014, E&P
companies now require lower drilling rates. In turn, oilfield service providers, such as
Hornbeck, will likely have to cut its dayrates.
The decline in oil prices affects the offshore oilfield services (OFS) industry less than it affects
onshore E&P related companies, especially in the short‐term. In the long‐term, offshore OFS
companies should expect to see a lagged effect from the oil price downturn because of delays
in final investment decisions on new projects. According to a press release by Douglas‐
Westwood, offshore OFS capital expenditure will decline after 2016 before increasing again in
2019. Over the next five years, total OFS expenditure is expected to grow at a compounded
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7% as opposed to the 12% CAGR experienced from 2010‐2014.
ABOUT HORNBECK
Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. provides marine transportation, subsea installation and
accommodation support services to exploration and production, oilfield service, offshore
construction and U.S. military customers. The Company’s fleet of 60 new generation offshore
support vessels (OSVs) and six multi‐purpose support vessels (MPSVs) is among the youngest in
the industry with an average vessel age of seven years as opposed to the industry’s ten‐year
average. Along with its young, primarily U.S. flagged fleet, Hornbeck’s financial strength,
operating capabilities, and reputation for quality and safety enables the Company to
effectively contend against its competitors in the same operating areas.
Current Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Todd M. Hornbeck founded Hornbeck
Offshore Services in 1997 and took the Company public in 2004. Originally founded by his
father Larry Hornbeck in 1980, Todd M. Hornbeck re‐established Hornbeck Offshore Services
one year after the original company merged with Tidewater. Headquartered in Covington,
Louisiana, Hornbeck owns and operates OSVs and MPSVs primarily in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico
(GoM), Mexico, and Brazil.
10
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Customers
Hornbeck tries to maintain a diversified revenue stream, as only one client accounted for more
than 10% of its revenue in 2014. However, the percentage of revenues attributable to each
customer vary year to year based on the total level of exploration and production, the
availability and suitability of each customer’s project, and many more external factors.
As of August 11, 2015 Hornbeck’s customers include integrated oil companies, oilfield service
companies, national oil companies, the U.S. government, and independent exploration and
production companies, as shown in Figure 6.
The Company charters its vessels based on either long‐term or spot market contracts. The
company prices those contracts based on negotiation of competitive bids. Hornbeck prices
charters on a dayrate basis, meaning the Company charges for each contracted day that it
makes vessels available for customer use.
Figure 6: Hornbeck 2015 Revenue by Customer Type
Integrated Oil
Companies
52%
Independent
E&P
Companies
4%
National Oil
Companies
12%
Oilfield Service
Companies
22%
U.S. Government
10%
Source: Hornbeck Investor Presentation August 2015
Products and services
Hornbeck owns and operates a fleet of vessels used to service the offshore oil and gas
industry. As of the end of June 2015, the Company operates 48 active vessels, 29 domestic and
19 foreign. Specifically, 42 of these ships are new generation OSVs and six are larger, more
specialized MPSVs. All of these vessels support deep‐well, deepwater, and ultra‐deepwater
activities.
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Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Figure 7: Hornbeck OSV
Photo Courtesy of offshoreenergytoday.com
Strategy
In July 2013, Hornbeck announced the divestiture of its non‐core downstream segment to
focus on expanding its upstream business. Hornbeck received $230 million from the sale of all
nine of its ocean‐going tugs as well as its nine double‐hulled tank barges. Because of 80‐90%
utilization rates and high demand in the barge market, Hornbeck sold its assets at a price
above market value. The Company utilized proceeds from the sale to support the construction
of new OSVs.
Hornbeck focuses on long‐term growth and investment‐oriented growth strategies. The
Company will continue to expand its fleet through construction of new vessels, retrofitting of
certain vessels, and strategic acquisitions. The Company commits to maintaining a
technologically advanced fleet by utilizing existing technology and developing new technology
on all new generation OSVs and MSPVs. As the offshore exploration and production trend
continues to move toward deeper waters and deeper well depths, clients’ vessel needs are
becoming more and more complex. To meet demand, Hornbeck’s fifth OSV newbuild program
focuses on constructing high‐spec vessels capable of servicing the deep and ultra‐deepwater
drilling rigs. With oil prices near record lows, upstream segment companies are struggling.
Hornbeck believes that inexpensive acquisition opportunities will arise and the Company has
the experience and expertise to strategically acquire its competitors.
To ensure consistent cash flows, Hornbeck pursues a balance of long‐term and short‐term
charters. Long‐term charters provide the Company with predictable cash flows, while short‐
term charters allow Hornbeck to take advantage of increasing dayrates during favorable
market cycles. Compared to its competitors, Hornbeck prefers short‐term spot contracts that
receive high dayrates. This strategy threatens the utilization rate of the vessels, but Hornbeck
strategically stacks its boats in order to maintain a consistent utilization rate among active
vessels.
Hornbeck focuses its services on three core geographic markets, the Gulf of Mexico (GoM),
Brazil, and Mexico. Currently, as shown in Figure 8, the majority of Hornbeck’s vessels service
the GoM. However, the Company is expanding its presence in Brazil and Mexico to take
advantage of the two markets’ expected long‐term growth. Hornbeck is licensed in Mexico as a
naviera and in Brazil as a navigation company.
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Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
These licenses allow Hornbeck to bid directly to PEMEX and Petrobas, Mexico’s and Brazil’s
national oil companies, respectively, to streamline future operations and to reduce future
costs. The proximity of its three core geographic operating areas’ allow Hornbeck to better
manage its contracts to enhance dayrates and vessel utilization rates.
Figure 8: Hornbeck Core Geographic Operating Markets
Source: Hornbeck Investor Presentation August 2015
Competition
Marine transportation for the offshore oil and gas industry is highly competitive. Each
company competes based on the technological capability, availability, age of vessels,
experience of its crewmembers, reputation for safety, and price. Hornbeck has an advantage in
its primary market, the Gulf Of Mexico, because the Jones Act stipulates that only U.S.‐flagged
OSVs may operate in U.S. coastal waters. Hornbeck has the second largest Jones Act‐qualified
OSV fleet in the U.S. (see Figure 9). Although the Jones Act does not protect the MPSV,
Hornbeck operates the largest MPSV fleet in the region. Internationally, the Company is the
third largest operator of new generation OSVs worldwide, but only owns 5% of the market
share. As offshore exploration and production becomes more complex, customers tend to
move towards the largest operators. The size and capability of its fleet will enable Hornbeck to
gain market share.
13
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Figure 9: Top Operators of OSVs in the Gulf of Mexico
GulfMark
3%
Other
3%
Otto Candies
9%
Harvey Gulf
9%
Hornbeck Offshore
37%
Tidewater
6%
Edison Chouest
33%
Source: Hornbeck Investor Presentation August 2015
Latest Developments
Oil prices plunged in July 2015 and nearly hit $40 per barrel this summer. These low prices do
not bode well for Hornbeck and the marine transportation industry. According to IHS Cera,
71% of all offshore rigs in the Gulf of Mexico were in use the week of September 4, 2015, down
7% from last month and 11% from last year. This is a sign that offshore producers have been
consistently slashing producing units over the past year, and even more so recently due to
historically low oil prices and global market volatility.
In late August, the Italian energy company Eni discovered a “supergiant” oil field in the
Egyptian waters of the Mediterranean Sea. Not only is Eni Hornbeck’s customer, but the
Company also has prior experience working in the Mediterranean Sea. With only two vessels
currently situated in Europe, Hornbeck could look to expand its geographical reach and
participate in this new project.
Hornbeck’s plans to expand operations in Brazil and Mexico are largely reliant on the
performance of the countries’ state‐owned oil companies, Petrobras and PEMEX, respectively.
In 2015, national oil companies are expected to account for 12% of Hornbeck’s upstream
revenue and Petrobras and PEMEX are two of Hornbeck’s largest state‐run customers. The
weakening Brazilian Real, falling oil prices and rising debt costs forced Petrobras to cut its five
year spending plan by 40 percent in June 2015, and now the company expects to cut back even
further. While Hornbeck may lose Brazilian contracts in the short‐term, in the future, the
Company will likely benefit from Petrobras’ declining regional domination in the long‐term.
Petrobras’ decline will enable large integrated oil and gas companies operating in the Gulf of
Mexico to gain market share in Brazil. Thus, Hornbeck should be able to gain more contracts
from the new players in Brazil than the Company gained from Petrobras.
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Hornbeck’s key customer in Mexico, PEMEX, recently lost its oil and gas production monopoly
in the country. After years of decline in domestic oil and gas production, the Mexican
government began lifting regulations and permitting foreign companies to start developing
offshore projects in Mexico. While Hornbeck may not see as many contracts coming from
PEMEX, the Mexican government is committed to auctioning its offshore blocks to
international players. Therefore, Mexico’s deepwater wells will still be a growing operating
region for Hornbeck.
PEER ANALYSIS
Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. operates in the globally competitive offshore oilfield services
sector. Nearly 200 companies compete in the offshore oilfield services sector, although
Hornbeck does not compete directly with the entire market. Peer companies range in size,
capabilities, and operational areas. In the marine transportation fragment of the offshore
oilfield services sector, Hornbeck’s young high‐end fleet differentiates the firm from its peers.
Table 2: Peer Financial Metrics
Company (data as
of 10/01/2015)
Market Cap
(USD bn)
P/E
P/BV
EV/EBITDA
Debt/Equity
Dividend
Yield
ROE
Hornbeck Offshore
0.48
6.12
0.33
5.61
75%
N/A
7.25
Tidewater
0.62
5.99
0.25
8.99
63%
8%
(4.80)
SEACOR Holdings
1.05
41.64
0.77
8.88
63%
N/A
3.42
Gulfmark Offshore
0.15
14.68
0.16
11.16
60%
8%
1.78
Source: Bloomberg October 1, 2015
Table 2 displays key financial metrics and ratios for Hornbeck and three of its most similar
publicly traded peers. Of the four companies, Hornbeck noticeably has the highest debt/equity
ratio, at approximately 75%, but this is largely due to the Company’s building of highly
specialized new generation vessels. At $480 million, Hornbeck has the second smallest market
capitalization of its peer group. While the Company’s return on equity is the highest of its peer
group, its price to earnings (P/E) ratio is the second lowest. Hornbeck does not pay a dividend.
Tidewater (NYSE/TDW)
Tidewater, a public marine transportation company headquartered in New Orleans, has the
largest fleet of OSVs in the oilfield services industry. The company’s revenue, $1.4 billion in
2014, is the highest among Hornbeck’s competitors. Although Tidewater is the oldest company
in the marine transportation industry in the Gulf of Mexico, over 90% of its operations are
international, and 70% of the company’s revenue come from outside the Western Hemisphere.
Furthermore, customers in the oilfield services industry consider the company’s OSVs of
average quality.
Like many companies in the oilfield services industry, Tidewater is performing poorly this year.
Net income for the second quarter has decreased 135% from the same quarter last year, from
$43.7 million to ‐$15.0 million. The company’s stock price has also dropped 62.4% since last
year.
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SEACOR Holdings Inc. (NYSE/CKH)
SEACOR Holdings Inc. operates four main business segments: offshore marine services, inland
river services, shipping services, and alcohol manufacturing. Roughly 70% of SEACOR’s
revenues from 2014 were from operations in the U.S., mainly the Gulf of Mexico. The offshore
marine service sector accounted for 40% of SEACOR’s revenues in 2014. The company is
headquartered in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
Because of the current state of the oil industry, SEACOR has stacked an additional three vessels
in the Gulf of Mexico since March 31, 2015. The company has now cold‐stacked ten vessels.
Compared to Hornbeck, SEACOR’s fleet is larger and more diversified, but also older and less
technologically advanced. Therefore, Hornbeck does not consider SEACOR a major competitor
for the types of contracts the Company attempts to secure.
Gulfmark Offshore (NYSE/GLF)
Gulfmark is a public marine transportation company headquartered in Houston, Texas.
Founded in 1990, the company has built an industry reputation for safe, consistent vessels. The
company’s revenue was $495.8 million in 2014, but analysts expect revenue to decline to $295
million in 2015, a drop of roughly 40%. While the company’s main operations are in the North
Sea and offshore Southeast Asia regions, Gulfmark also operates in the Gulf of Mexico, Mexico,
Trinidad, and Brazil. Unlike Hornbeck, only 40% of the company’s revenue is from the Western
Hemisphere; 45% from the North Sea, and the remaining 15% from Southeast Asia. As of
December 2014, the company has 1,800 employees.
Gulfmark Offshore is the largest operator of platform supply vessels in the North Sea region. Of
the company’s 71 active vessels, 60% are less than ten years old, making its fleet older than
Hornbeck’s fleet. Gulfmark typically posts stronger revenues in the summer months.
Conditions in the North Sea region, the company’s largest region of operations, typically favor
the summer months. Gulfmark’s large number of international operations expose the company
to currency risk more than Hornbeck, whose primary operations are domestic. In addition,
Gulfmark’s vessel utilization rates have decreased across multiple regions, following industry
trends.
Edison Chouest Offshore (Private Company)
Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO) is a private marine transportation company based in Galliano,
Louisiana. Since 1960, the company has offered diverse marine transportation solutions with a
focus on staying at the forefront of technological advances. ECO offers over 200 vessels to
serve deepwater customers both in the U.S. and around the world. While the company’s main
area of operations is the Gulf of Mexico, ECO also sends vessels to South America, Africa, and
other regions outside the U.S.
In December 2014, ECO purchased Bollinger Shipyards, a vessel repair firm with ten shipyards
in Louisiana and Texas. Bollinger provides repair services and constructs OSVs, rigs, barges, and
inland waterways boats. This acquisition adds to ECO’s existing shipyards and puts the
company in a strong position to build, repair, and stack vessels.
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Furthermore, Bollinger supplies cutter vessels to the U.S. Coast Guard, and ECO will now take
over these contracts. Edison Chouest is Hornbeck’s largest direct competitor as the company is
the number one operator of new generation OSVs worldwide, with 11% of the market share
versus Hornbeck’s 6% market share. With 42% of the market, Chouest is the number one
operator of Jones Act Hi‐Spec OSVs in the GoM.
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE AND BACKGROUND
Hornbeck Offshore Service Inc.’s Board of Directors is comprised of nine members, two of
whom are insiders: Todd M. Hornbeck and Larry D. Hornbeck. There are four members on the
Compensation Committee: Kevin O. Meyers, John T. Rynd, Nicholas L. Swyka, and Bernie W.
Stewart, the chairperson of the committee. As members of the Compensation Committee,
they are tasked with determining the proper compensation for Hornbeck’s key executives
based on the company’s performance relative to companies of similar industry and size. The
Committee uses the Company’s EBITDA as a primary financial metric to determine executive
compensation based on whether corporate goals were achieved. The Committee also looks at
the Company’s return on invested capital (ROIC) relative to its peers. ROIC shows how
efficiently a company can allocate its capital to generate a profit.
Table 3: Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)
Company
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Hornbeck Offshore
4.48%
2.05%
3.33%
4.15%
3.81%
Tidewater
3.40%
2.74%
4.70%
4.18%
(1.05%)
SEACOR Holdings
8.38%
2.28%
0.82%
2.42%
4.49%
Gulfmark Offshore
(1.65%)
5.55%
3.24%
6.04%
5.78%
Peer Average
3.66%
3.16%
3.02%
4.20%
3.26%
Source: Bloomberg October 5, 2015
Executive Compensation
Hornbeck compensates its executives in the following ways:
Base Salary payment for day‐to‐day services reviewed by the compensation committee
Cash incentive compensation/cash bonuses payment based on targets for adjusted
EBITDA, operating margin, total recordable incident rate, and the discretion of the
compensation committee. Achieving a threshold metric grants an executive 50% of
base salary multiplied by a percentage weight, 100% for reaching a target metric, and
200% for reaching a maximum metric
Equity incentive compensation awards of restricted stock to executives, with a ratio of
60% ‐ 40% time‐based to performance‐based
Benefits and certain perquisites include health insurance, 401(k) plans, company
vehicles, and deferred compensation plans
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Over the past five years, an average of 59% of executive compensation came from stock
awards, while only 17% originated from salaries. Therefore, management has a vested
interest in maintaining the fiscal health of the company. See Figure 10 for the five‐year
breakdown of executive compensation.
Figure 10: Hornbeck Executive Compensation
$16
$14
Compensation ($millions)
$12
$10
$8
$6
$4
$2
$‐
2010
SALARY
BONUS
2011
2012
STOCK AWARDS
OPTION AWARDS
2013
2014
NON‐EQUITY INCENTIVE
Source: Bloomberg October 4, 2015
Hornbeck’s compensation committee consists of non‐employee Directors who create and
oversee the Company’s compensation and employee benefit plans. In 2014, the committee
altered the methods for determining operating margins and safety components. The
committee made changes to incentivize management to keep operating margins high relative
to the Company’s peers, and also changed annual safety benchmarks to reflect industry
standards. Also in 2014, the committee modified the ratio of time‐based to performance‐
based stock awards from 70%‐30% to 60%‐40%. This change increases the incentive for
management to take actions to increase Hornbeck’s stock price while also incentivizing
management to stay with the Company.
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Todd M. Hornbeck
CEO, President, Chairman, Cofounder (47)
Todd M. Hornbeck founded Hornbeck Offshore in 1997. He is the son of Larry Hornbeck, who
founded the original Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc. in 1981. Todd worked for his father’s
company in roles such as business strategy and development until Tidewater merged with
Hornbeck in 1996. He then worked for Tidewater as Marketing Director‐Gulf of Mexico. While
at Tidewater, Todd developed a business plan for a marine transportation company focused
on servicing the deepwater offshore oil industry, but Tidewater’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
did not wish to take the company in Todd’s proposed direction. Mr. Hornbeck left Tidewater
in 1997 and became the Cofounder, President, and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the new
Hornbeck Offshore Services. In February 2002, Todd left the position of COO and became the
company’s CEO, and in 2005, the Board of Directors appointed him Chairman.
Carl G Annessa
Executive Vice President, COO (59)
Carl G. Annessa began his career at Hornbeck in September 1997, when he served as
Hornbeck’s Vice President of Operations until February 2002. In February, Mr. Annessa was
appointed Vice President and Chief Operating Officer. In February 2005, Mr. Annessa was
appointed Executive Vice President. Today, he oversees fleet operations and the design and
implementation of vessel construction programs. Before Mr. Annessa joined the Hornbeck
team in 1997, he worked for Tidewater as the Manager of Fleets in the Arabian Gulf,
Caribbean, and West African markets, as well as the architect of several vessels. Mr. Annessa
studied marine engineering and naval architecture at the University of Michigan and
graduated in 1979.
James O. Harp Jr.
Executive Vice President, CFO, Investor Relations (55)
James Harp joined Hornbeck in 2001 as the Company’s Vice President (VP) and Chief Financial
Officer (CFO). He became Executive Vice President of Hornbeck in 2005. Prior to joining for
Hornbeck, Mr. Harp worked as VP in the Energy Group of RBC Dominion Securities
Corporation, and from 1997 ‐ 1999, served as VP in the Energy Group of Jefferies. Mr. Harp is
also an inactive C.P.A. who worked in the tax section of Arthur Andersen. He concentrated on
clients in the oil services and marine industries in his accounting and investment banking
career. He also served as Hornbeck’s investment banker concerning private placement of
common stock in November 2000.
Samuel A. Giberga
Executive VP, CCO, General Counsel
Samuel A. Giberga joined Hornbeck in January 2004 as General Counsel. Soon after, he was
appointed Senior Vice President in February 2005. In 2011, Mr. Giberga was promoted Chief
Compliance Officer and Executive Vice President. Prior to joining Hornbeck, Mr. Giberga
practiced law for 14 years. He was also a co‐founder of Maritime Claims Americas L.L.C., which
serves as a network of offices for marine protection and indemnity associations in Latin
America.
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John S. Cook Jr.
Executive VP, CIO, CCO (46)
John S. Cook began his career at Hornbeck in May 2002, following a ten year consulting career
at Arthur Andersen LLP. Before his departure, Mr. Cook served as Senior Manager for Arthur
Andersen LLP. As a consultant, Cook assisted marine and energy service companies
with various business processes and information technology initiatives. Cook joined Hornbeck
as Chief Information Officer. In 2006, he was promoted to Vice President, moving up to
Executive Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer in February 2013.
SHAREHOLDER ANALYSIS
As of September 30, 2015, Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. had 35.8 million shares
outstanding, 87.7 percent of which were free float. The Company’s Board of Directors last
authorized a repurchase of common stock shares in October 2014, worth $150 million.
Institutional Investors
Fourteen Hornbeck insiders hold a total of 12.4% of all shares as of October 2, 2015. While the
number of insiders decreased this year from 15 last year, the percentage of shares held by
insiders increased this year by 1.0%. The top three types of shareholders are investment
advisors, hedge fund managers, and individuals. Investment advisors hold 58.8%of shares
outstanding down from 62.7% last year.
Table 4 shows the top ten institutional and strategic investors who own 72.7% of Hornbeck’s
outstanding common shares. Of the top ten institutional investors, nine hold positions greater
than 5%; however, none of these top ten institutional investors have acted as activist
investors. All of the current top ten funds pursue either growth or growth at a reasonable
price (GARP) investment strategies. Therefore, Hornbeck, as a non‐dividend paying growth
stock, accurately fits each funds strategy. The largest activist investor is Raging Capital
Management, owner of 4.3% of total shares outstanding. While Raging Capital Management
has launched 14 activist campaigns since its inception, the firm has never launched an activist
campaign involving Hornbeck.
Since September 30, 2014, three investors have exited the top ten while Fidelity Investments,
Anchor Bolt Capital, and Raging Capital Management have entered among the top ten
institutional investors. Shares held by the top ten investors has increased by 15.5% over the
last year. While ownership has increased among the top ten institutional investors, the
number of new buyers has decreased by 19.6% and the number of selloffs has decreased by
31.3% over the last year. We believe this change is due to the price collapse over the last year
combined with the current market uncertainty regarding the oil and gas industry. Similarly,
less investors are selling their shares since Hornbeck’s stock price is near its 52‐week low. Less
investors are buying shares because they are still not convinced that global oil supply will
decline and global demand will grow in the near future.
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Table 4: Top Ten Institutional and Strategic Shareholders
%
Ownership
Position
(000)
%
Change
Report
Date
Investor type
Fine Capital Partners, L.P.
9.79
3,507,736
(1.39)
6/30/2015
Hedge Fund
Fidelity Investments
8.95
3,208,100
New
6/30/2015 Investment Fund
Dimensional Fund
Advisors LP
8.47
3,034,718
1.05
6/30/2015 Investment Fund
BHR Capital LLC
8.26
2,959,000
(1.0)
6/30/2015
BlackRock, Inc. (NYSE:BLK)
8.03
2,876,362
(7.12)
6/30/2015 Investment Fund
The Vanguard Group, Inc.
6.47
2,318,880
0.63
6/30/2015 Investment Fund
Anchor Bolt Capital, LP
6.42
2,301,069
102.81 9/11/2015
Columbia Wanger Asset
Management, LLC
6.22
2,229,868
(13.91) 6/30/2015 Investment Fund
Hunt William Herbert
Trust Estate
5.74
2,058,390
Raging Capital
Management, LLC
4.3
1,540,973
72.66
26,035,096
Institutional Investor
Total
0
7/1/2015
287.08 6/30/2015
Hedge Fund
Hedge Fund
Investment Fund
Hedge Fund
Source: Capital IQ October 4, 2015
Insider Investors
Table 5 shows the top five insider investors, all of whom are management. Together, they
hold 11.0% while all 14 insiders hold 12.6% of shares outstanding. The total shares held by
insiders increased by 9.4% since the end of third quarter 2014 when insiders held 11.5%
percent of shares outstanding. All but one of these insiders have increased their share
positions since last year, suggesting that these five shareholders are confident that the stock
price will rebound.
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Table 5: Top Five Insiders/Shareholders
Insider/Stakeholder
Percent Ownership
Position
Percent Change
Report Date
Hunt, Bruce W.
5.98
2,142,663
0.08%
10/1/2015
Hornbeck, Todd M.
2.71
970,430
0.41%
3/24/2015
Hornbeck, Larry D.
0.92
329,499
11.95%
10/1/2015
Harp, James O. Jr.
0.73
261,368
3.98%
3/2/2015
Annessa, Carl G
0.64
228,093
(0.82%)
2/18/2015
Total
10.98
3,932,053
Source: Bloomberg October 4, 2015
RISK ANALYSIS AND INVESTMENT CAVEATS
While the current state of the oil industry is hurting energy companies, this is not the first
down cycle. Ten years ago, category five Hurricane Katrina devastated homes and businesses
in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama and destroyed oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico.
Then, the moratorium following the Deepwater Horizon Spill completely halted all deepwater
offshore drilling and services for six months, slamming profits. Hornbeck has survived various
catastrophic and other adverse events in its 18‐year history. The Company has the resources
to make it through the current market state due to its technologically advanced Jones Act‐
qualified fleet and experienced management executives. Inevitably, there will always be
insecurities in such a volatile and dangerous industry.
Regulatory Risks
Various laws govern the marine transportation and offshore oil industry. One of the most
important such acts is the Jones Act. The Jones Act stipulates that only U.S.‐flagged vessels
may engage in U.S. coastal trade. The vessels must be U.S. made and manned by American
mariners. Foreign offshore supply vessels (OSVs) cannot transport cargo from U.S. ports to
offshore rigs. The Jones Act aids Hornbeck because a significant portion of its vessels in the
Gulf of Mexico are Jones Act certified, while foreign competitors have a more difficult time
obtaining Jones Act certification for vessels. Therefore, the Jones Act creates a barrier to entry
in the Gulf of Mexico, reducing competition and allowing Hornbeck to charge high dayrates.
However, some politicians have threatened to repeal or alter the Jones Act, although none of
the previous efforts have experienced any success. Nevertheless, repeal or modification of the
Jones Act would expose Hornbeck to more competition and would likely force the Company to
lower its dayrates, stack more vessels, or lose customers to competitors. Furthermore,
competitors who build vessels in foreign countries would have a cost advantage over
Hornbeck if politicians repealed the Jones Act.
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In addition, U.S. law requires that a certain percentage of Hornbeck’s marine workers are U.S.
citizens. Foreign competitors, however, have gotten away with hiring non‐U.S. workers for
lower wages in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM). In this regard, Hornbeck faces a cost disadvantage
compared to foreign competitors. Hornbeck, is working to lobby politicians to change the law
to actually force foreign competitors to abide by the same rules as U.S. operators. If these
efforts fail, foreign operators would maintain cost advantages over Hornbeck.
Executive actions or rulings by regulatory agencies could also affect Hornbeck’s business.
Following the Deepwater Horizon Spill in 2010, the Obama Administration banned all offshore
drilling in U.S. coastal waters. As a result, exploration & production (E&P) companies did not
demand Hornbeck’s or competitors’ services, hurting revenues for 2010. Similarly, future
executive actions could also reduce Hornbeck’s ability to operate and generate revenue. More
broadly, actions by agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency to limit oil
production could restrict overall demand for oil. Such regulations would decrease demand for
Hornbeck’s vessels, reducing the Company’s revenues.
Operational Risks
Safety
The oil and gas industry is one of the most dangerous industries, as oil and gas are both highly
flammable. The Gulf of Mexico (GoM), Hornbeck’s core market, is considered one of the most
dangerous markets, as demonstrated by the Deepwater Horizon Spill in April 2010. Eleven BP
employees went missing following the spill and are still missing, creating a liability for all
companies in the energy industry to keep workers safe and healthy. In order to effectively
compensate for this risk, it is important for Hornbeck to take extreme precautionary
measures. In terms of safety, Hornbeck is an industry leader compared to its peers. The
Company has recently implemented its Goal Zero safety program, which strives to maintain a
zero incidence rate and a zero lost time incidence rate for its employees. Hornbeck also offers
incentives to crews who meet this goal by having a Safety Bonus Program, a Safety Awards
Program, and a Safe Boat of the Year Program.
Cyclicality
Demand for Hornbeck’s vessels is directly affected by the levels of offshore drilling in the
Company’s markets. Most drilling in the GoM occurs during the summer, as weather
conditions are more favorable for offshore projects. Hornbeck’s increased revenues during
the second and third quarter directly reflect this seasonality. Extreme weather conditions,
such as Hurricanes, can also affect the Company’s operations. While hurricanes are usually
considered good for marine transportation companies due to the need to service the rigs,
hurricanes can also do permanent damage to Hornbeck’s vessels. These damages may force
Hornbeck to withdraw vessels, reducing revenues. However, recent weather conditions in the
summer months have been ideal for offshore activities. Hornbeck should be prudent in
predicting similar future weather, as it is difficult to predict storms year over year.
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Management and Labor
In order for Hornbeck to maximize the efficiency of its technologically advanced fleet of OSVs
and multi‐purpose supply vessels (MPSVs), it must have a highly skilled labor force. Without
proper training of its employees, Hornbeck’s operations cannot be carried out. With the
current state of the oil industry, Hornbeck has reduced its mariner labor force by 20%, as well
as discontinuing its Defined Contribution Plan. Mariners worried about the safety of their jobs
can have an adverse impact on their work, as their minds wander elsewhere. Hornbeck should
be cautious when cutting its workforce because, when oil prices surge, the mariners will
demand a higher wage when hired. Without a doubt, the current state of the oil industry is
very unique, but Hornbeck will be tasked with correctly balancing its short‐term cost cutting
measure with its future growth plans when oil rebounds.
Financial Risks
Hornbeck has undertaken an ambitious OSV newbuild program. The cost of the program is
$1.265 billion, with $1.032 billion already incurred at the end of 2014. Benefits of the
newbuild program include Hornbeck maintaining its status as an operator of new, state of the
art vessels, a differentiator among its competitors. This competitive advantage allows
Hornbeck to charge higher dayrates than many of its competitors. However, if oil continues to
stay low and E&P companies demand lower dayrates, then Hornbeck may not earn enough
revenue to justify the capital expenditures on the newbuild program.
Although the oil market is currently in a downturn, companies often increase capital
expenditures during a downturn to prepare for the future. Hornbeck made a similar move in
the months following the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the subsequent moratorium on
offshore drilling. While other competitors did not significantly increase capital expenditures,
Hornbeck invested heavily in its fifth new build program. This move enabled the Company to
emerge with newer vessels and charge higher dayrates to its customers.
Credit Risk
In September 2015, Moody’s downgraded Hornbeck’s Corporate Family Rating and senior
unsecured notes from B2 to Ba3. Moody’s also downgraded Hornbeck’s outlook from stable
to negative. Moody’s reasoned that commodity prices would stay low for a significant period
of time, creating a downward pressure on rig utilization rates and Hornbeck’s dayrates.
However, rating agencies have downgraded the credit ratings of other energy companies as
well. In 2012, when oil prices were much higher, Moody’s downgraded SEACOR, one of
Hornbeck’s competitors, to Ba1 status, below Hornbeck’s current Ba1 status. The Moody’s
downgrade could impede Hornbeck’s ability to issue additional notes or bonds to raise money
for future capital expenditures. Table 6 illustrates important ratios in determining credit rating
for Hornbeck and several of its competitors.
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Table 6: Competitor’s Liquidity Ratios
Company
Debt/Equity
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Hornbeck
0.75x
4.54x
4.54x
Tidewater
0.62x
1.70x
1.61x
SEACOR
0.62x
3.26x
3.17x
Gulfmark
0.60x
3.54x
3.54x
Source: Bloomberg October 6, 2015
Although Hornbeck’s debt‐to‐equity ratio is larger than its competitors, its financial health is
better. The Company has the highest current and quick ratios of any of its competitors,
meaning that the Company’s current assets have a greater value than its current liabilities. In
addition, Hornbeck has an untapped $300 million revolving credit facility, which will allow it to
finance future capital expenditures if need be.
Hornbeck engages in various long‐term contracts with customers, typically lasting between
one and five years. Although the Company tries to estimate the creditworthiness of its
competitors, it acknowledges that it cannot predict if customers will fulfill long‐term
contracts. Failure of customers to pay on time could decrease Hornbeck’s revenues.
Additionally, Hornbeck grants credit to customers on a short‐term basis but does not
collateralize receivables, reducing customer accountability. The Company uses historical data
to estimate uncollectible accounts; however, these estimates may be inaccurate, especially in
a bear market.
Exchange Risks
Currently, Hornbeck does not hedge against any foreign currency rate fluctuations. With 19
vessels operating in foreign markets, fluctuations can result in a loss in currency exchange.
While most of Hornbeck’s foreign activities are denominated to the U.S. Dollar, it still collects
time charter payments and value added tax payments in local currencies for four of its vessels.
Presently, these losses have not had a material impact on Hornbeck’s profitability. While the
current state of the oil industry is daunting, Hornbeck looks to further its market presence in
both Brazil and Mexico, which can create currency exchange risks going forward.
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND PROJECTIONS
Our team calculated a 12‐month target price of $14.63 for Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. To
determine this target price, we made various assumptions and projections. We analyzed
Hornbeck’s current operations, the offshore exploration and production (E&P) industry, the oil
and gas price environment, Latin American geopolitics, and the global economy as a whole.
This analysis affects the financial performance and projections of Hornbeck’s operating,
investing, and financing activities.
25
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
Operating Activities
To accurately forecast Hornbeck’s operating cash flows, we developed a price/quantity
revenue model. Our model focused on several key drivers, including active fleet size and
composition, oil prices, utilization rates of offshore supply vessels (OSVs) and multi‐purpose
support vessels (MPSVs), and dayrates for OSVs and MPSVs in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico (GoM)
and Latin America. Hornbeck’s revenue directly depends upon the number of vessels in
operation and price, or dayrate, of vessels. Utilization and dayrates vary based on current oil
& gas market conditions and customer demand for Hornbeck’s new generation vessels. In the
current commodity price downturn, offshore E&P companies are trying to cut costs.
The level of offshore drilling activity by E&P companies determines the demand for
Hornbeck’s vessels. In the low commodity price environment, many E&P companies are
halting production and the construction of new wells as the firms struggle to break even on
the sale of crude oil. As a result, these companies decrease rig counts and, therefore, the
demand for marine support vessels such as Hornbeck’s decreases. As vessel demand declines
and E&P firms continue to cut costs, the companies subsequently pressure Hornbeck to lower
its dayrates. Hornbeck’s management stated that the Company would continue stacking
vessels if demand is not present at the Company’s desired price. Our team utilized
management guidance to forecast active and stacked vessel counts as well as utilization rates
for the next year. From 2016 through 2018, we utilized a historical proxy and industry data to
forecast utilization rates and dayrates. After 2018, we used a 3% growth rate for OSV and
MPSV dayrates, consistent with historical data and industry guidance. We considered all
previously mentioned drivers in forming our revenue assumptions.
Figure 11 Hornbeck’s Effective Dayrates Have Declined Over the Past Two Years
$26,000
$24,000
$22,000
$20,000
$18,000
$16,000
$14,000
$12,000
Source: Hornbeck Offshore Quarter 3 2015 10‐Q
26
9/1/2015
8/1/2015
7/1/2015
6/1/2015
5/1/2015
4/1/2015
3/1/2015
2/1/2015
1/1/2015
12/1/2014
11/1/2014
10/1/2014
9/1/2014
8/1/2014
7/1/2014
6/1/2014
5/1/2014
4/1/2014
3/1/2014
2/1/2014
1/1/2014
12/1/2013
11/1/2013
9/1/2013
10/1/2013
$10,000
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
We forecasted operating expenses, depreciation, and amortization based on historical data.
The Company’s operating expenses reflect its current and continued near‐term cost cutting
measures. Depreciation and amortization account for changes in Hornbeck’s fleet size as a
result of the addition or sale of vessels.
Investing Activities
Our assumptions and forecasts for Hornbeck’s investment strategy are predominantly based
on the progress of the Company’s fifth newbuild program. Hornbeck’s management disclosed
the breakdown of the remaining capital expenditures (CAPEX) in the program through the end
of 2016. The Company has already incurred about 90% of all expenses associated with the
program. Because the oil and gas industry is suffering a commodity price downturn likely to
last until at least the end of 2017, we have not forecasted any growth CAPEX for Hornbeck in
the near‐term. Suppressed commodity prices will continue to pressure E&P companies to stop
drilling and, therefore, the Company will likely not increase the size of its fleet. In addition to
CAPEX associated with the newbuild program, Hornbeck has annual maintenance CAPEX
associated with maintaining its current fleet. These expenditures remain consistent with
historical depreciation data.
Financing Activities
Based on management guidance, we determined that Hornbeck will not require any short‐
term financing. Despite the stock price being near its 52‐week low, we do not expect
management to pursue any share repurchase programs in the near‐term. Management is
largely uncertain about its stock price over the next few years of suppressed oil prices and
believes that the stock price may plunge even lower before it rebounds.
Hornbeck secured its three senior notes outstanding at attractive interest rates. The nearest
maturity is a 1.500% convertible senior note due in 2019 with a balance of $248.5 million as of
December 31, 2014. The second nearest maturity is a 5.875% senior note due in 2020 with a
balance of $375 million. The latest maturity is a 5.000% senior note due in 2021 with a
balance of $450 million. The Company has a $300 million revolver maturing in 2020. As of
November 12, 2015 the revolver is undrawn and management expects it to remain undrawn.
Favorable long‐term debt terms and maturities along with the undrawn revolver signify that
Hornbeck has good liquidity and will not need to raise any additional capital in the near‐term.
27
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
SITE VISIT
On Friday, October 2, 2015, Burkenroad Reports analysts covering Hornbeck Offshore
Services Inc. met with management at the Company’s headquarters in Covington, Louisiana.
Jim Harp, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Potter Adams, Director of Corporate Finance, and Erica
Babycos, Senior Analyst, led us through Hornbeck’s investor relations presentation. Mr. Harp
and Mr. Adams explained that they are bearish on oil prices for the next year. However, the
overarching theme of the meeting was that Hornbeck is prepared to weather the unfavorable
E&P environment.
As market conditions remain depressed, Hornbeck is stacking vessels, or essentially taking
vessels out of service and into storage, to cut down on drydock fees associated with non‐
utilization. Stacking an uncontracted vessel saves on average $7,500 per day in costs. The
stacked vessels increase the Company’s utilization rates, preventing wasteful spending on
unused vessels. To survive in the down market, the Company is also reducing operating costs
through salary cuts, layoffs, and the suspension of its 401k matching program.
28
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE RESEARCH
To gain a further understanding of Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc.’s strategy and the
industry in which it operates, our group consulted with industry experts. We first talked with
the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of one of Hornbeck’s largest competitors. The night
before we spoke with this CEO, he had been at an oil and gas industry conference in Houston,
led by two industry experts. He claimed that these experts laid out a very compelling
argument as to why oil will increase to $80 per barrel by the end of 2016. The industry leaders
believe supply and demand will catch up with one another and the energy industry will
rebound by the beginning of 2017. In the meantime, this CEO is concerned with Hornbeck’s
strategy of keeping dayrates higher than market price. He was faced with a similar situation of
low oil prices in 2002 when he became CEO of his company. He made the decision to keep
high dayrates instead of cutting prices and maintaining market share. This choice turned out
to be a costly mistake for that company until he had realized his error two years later.
Although Hornbeck is recognized as the premiere vessel provider that deserves higher rates,
this CEO believes Hornbeck is making the same mistake he did 13 years ago.
Our team also interviewed Ken Carroll, a Tulane professor who has 15 years of experience as a
sell side analyst for the exploration and production (E&P) sector. Carroll agreed with
Pickering’s forecast that oil prices will rise soon enough, specifically citing the decline curve as
the reason why. This decline curve means that when a drill begins to pump oil and gas,
production naturally begins to decrease as the life of a well runs its course. He believes that
the industry is not drilling enough wells to offset this natural decline rate and that there will
be a “snapback” in prices. Carroll also did not agree with Hornbeck’s strategy of keeping high
dayrates, but he was more concerned with the stacking of vessels. While taking excess supply
out of the market certainly helps business in the short run, Hornbeck has had to fire the crews
who manned those vessels. Once oil prices bounce back, Carroll is concerned that Hornbeck
will be hard pressed to find experienced mariners for the previously stacked vessels. This
notion is taking into account the fact that these vessels need to be manned by American
employees in order to be Jones Act certified. Both industry experts we interviewed seemed
concerned for Hornbeck’s future and we have included their opinions in our analysis.
29
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
ANOTHER WAY TO LOOK AT IT
ALTMAN Z‐SCORE
The Altman Z‐Score formula was developed by New York University professor Edward Altman
to measure a company’s likelihood of going bankrupt. Altman selected five key variables to
include in his formula: working capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets,
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets, market value of equity to book value
of total liabilities, and sales to total assets. Having a Z‐Score below 1.80 indicates that a
company has a “very high” probability of going bankrupt and is in the “distress zone”. A
company with a Z‐Score between 1.80 and 2.99 is considered to be in the “gray area”. A Z‐
Score over 3.0 indicates that a company is “safe” from bankruptcy and financial risk.
As seen in Table 7, Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. had a Z‐score below 1.80 in every year
from 2011 to 2015, signifying that the Company is at a very high risk of bankruptcy and in
distress. Particularly notable is the 36% drop in Hornbeck’s Z‐Score from 2014 to 2015. This
large drop indicates that Hornbeck’s probability of bankruptcy has grown significantly over
the past year. The decline in Hornbeck’s vessel utilization rates and dayrates has significantly
decreased the Company’s market value of equity and earnings before interest and taxes,
therefore decreasing the contributing value of two of the five key variables to the Company’s
Z‐Score. As oil prices remain low over the next few years, Hornbeck will continue to be at
high risk of bankruptcy. However, as seen in Table 7, Hornbeck’s Z‐Score is nearly equal to its
public peer average in 2015, despite being well below it in the previous four years. While the
Company is at high risk of bankruptcy, in terms of relative financial health, it has cushioned
the low oil prices better than its peers.
Table 7: Altman Z‐Score Analysis
Company
2011 2012 2013
2014
2015
Hornbeck
1.38
1.24
1.56
1.18
0.85
Gulfmark
2.45
1.70
2.07
1.58
0.39
SEACOR
1.54
1.53
1.81
1.81
0.94
Tidewater
2.97
2.43
1.99
1.93
1.29
Peer Average
2.09 1.73
1.86
1.63
Source: Bloomberg November 12, 2015
0.87
30
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
PETER LYNCH EARNINGS MULTIPLE VALUATION
Peter Lynch, a successful investor and author of One Up on Wall Street, developed a useful
charting tool for making investment decisions. Mr. Lynch compares the price of a security to
the theoretical price of 15X the stock’s earnings per share (EPS). He would buy stocks that
traded well below the 15X EPS line, and sell stocks that traded well above the line.
As of November 12, 2015, Hornbeck Offshore Services trades at $12.44, which is
approximately 5X EPS. Since the price of Hornbeck plots well below the 15X EPS line, Mr.
Lynch would purchase the Company’s shares.
Figure 12: Hornbeck Passes Peter Lynch’s Valuation Method
Source: Bloomberg November 12, 2015
31
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
WWBD?
What Would Ben (Graham) Do?
Ben Graham developed a system of picking of stocks that practiced value investing. As
outlined in his book Security Analysis, Graham sought to ascertain the true, intrinsic value of
companies and purchase stocks that the market undervalued. In particular, Graham believed
in buying stocks with a sufficient margin of safety, which is the difference between a
company’s intrinsic value and its share price. Graham employed ten different hurdles to
determine which stocks to purchase, but we only use eight of his hurdles in our report.
Based on the Ben Graham analysis, Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. is an extremely attractive
investment. Hornbeck passes seven of the eight hurdles outlined by Mr. Graham (see Figure
13). Hornbeck’s earnings to price (E/P) ratio is approximately 20%, while the yield on the Ten‐
Year U.S. Treasury Bond multiplied by 2 is only 4.20%. Since Hornbeck’s E/P ratio is greater
than twice the yield on the Ten‐Year U.S. Treasury Bond, it passes the first hurdle. Hornbeck
passes the second hurdle, as its price to earnings (P/E) ratio is currently 33.8, which is less
than half the stock’s highest year‐ending P/E ratio, 208.8. Hurdle three states that the stock’s
dividend yield must be at least half of the yield on the Ten‐Year U.S. Treasury Bond. Hornbeck
does not pay a dividend, and fails this hurdle.
To pass the fourth hurdle, Hornbeck’s stock price must be less than 1.50X its book value. As of
November 12, 2015, Hornbeck trades at $12.44, far less than $60.48, or 1.50X its book value
per share. Hornbeck’s total debt is approximately $1.07 billion, which is less than its book
value of $1.4 billion. Therefore, Hornbeck passes the fifth hurdle. The Company’s current
ratio, or current assets divided by current liabilities, is 5.08, which is greater than the value of
2.00 needed to pass the sixth hurdle. Hornbeck’s compound annual growth rate (CAGR) over
the past five years is 32%. The seventh hurdle requires companies to have at least a 7%
earnings growth over the past five years, and Hornbeck clearly surpasses this benchmark.
Hornbeck has only one decline in earnings of five percent or more in the past five years.
Therefore, the Company has stable earnings growth, and passes the eighth hurdle.
Figure 13: Ben Graham Analysis
32
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
November 12, 2015
HORNBECK OFFSHORE SERVICES INC. (HOS)
Ben Graham Analysis
Hurdle # 1: An Earnings to Price Yield of 2X the Yield on 10 Year Treasury
Earnings per share (ttm) $ 2.44
Earnings to Price Yield
20%
10 Year Treasury (2X)
4.20%
Price:
$ 12.44
Yes
Hurdle # 2: A P/E Ratio Down to 1/2 of the Stocks Highest in 5 Yrs
P/E ratio as of
P/E ratio as of
P/E ratio as of
P/E ratio as of
P/E ratio as of
12/31/10
12/31/11
12/31/12
12/31/13
208.8
68.9
110.8
80.7
12/31/14 47.1
Current P/E Ratio 33.8
Yes
Hurdle # 3: A Dividend Yield of 1/2 the Yield on 10 Year Treasury
Dividends per share (ttm) $ ‐
Price: $ 12.44
Dividend Yield
N/A
Nil
1/2 Yield on 10 Year Treasury
1.05%
No
Hurdle # 4: A Stock Price less than 1.5 BV
Stock Price
$12.44
$ 12.44
Book Value per share as of
9/30/15
$ 40.32
150% of book Value per share as of
9/30/15
$ 60.48
Yes
Hurdle # 5: Total Debt less than Book Value
Interest‐bearing debt as of
9/30/15
$ 1,073,472
Book value as of
9/30/15
$ 1,445,371
Yes
Hurdle # 6: Current Ratio of Two or More
Current assets as of
9/30/15
$ 410,183
Current liabilities as of
9/30/15
$ 80,686
Current ratio as of
9/30/15
5.08
Yes
Hurdle # 7: Earnings Growth of 7% or Higher over past 5 years
EPS for year ended
12/31/14
$ 0.53
EPS for year ended
12/31/13
$ 0.61
EPS for year ended
12/31/12
$ 0.45
EPS for year ended
12/31/11
$ 0.10
EPS for year ended
12/31/10
$ 0.10
Yes
Hurdle # 8: Stability in Growth of Earnings
EPS for year ended
12/31/14
$ 0.53
EPS for year ended
12/31/13
$ 0.61
36%
EPS for year ended
12/31/12
$ 0.45
350%
EPS for year ended
12/31/11
$ 0.10
0%
EPS for year ended
12/31/10
$ 0.10
Yes
Stock price data as of November 12, 2015
33
13%
54,245
466,195
822
169,420
53,428
378,629
1,587
171,103
2,515
(25,776)
(47,352)
(92)
100,398
36,320
64,078
47,315
$ 111,393
2,167
(6,048)
(57,869)
185
56,079
21,384
34,695
2,322
$ 37,017
$ 0.98
$ 0.07
$ (0.17)
$ 1.22
Ea rni ngs per s ha re:
Ba s i c ea rni ngs per s ha re from conti nui ng opera ti ons
Ba s i c ea rni ngs pe r s ha re from di s conti nued opera ti ons
Non‐recurri ng i tems
Ba s i c ea rni ngs per common s ha re
Di l uted ea rni ngs per s ha re from conti nui ng opera ti ons
Di l uted ea rni ngs per s ha re from di s conti nued opera ti ons
Non‐recurri ng i tems
Di l uted ea rni ngs per common s ha re
Wei ghted a vera ge s ha res of common s tock:
Ba s i c
Di l uted
SELECTED COMMON SIZE AMOUNTS (% of opera ti ng revenue)
Opera ti ng expens es
Genera l a nd a dmi ni s tra ti ve expens es
Tota l opera ti ng cos ts
Opera ti ng i ncome
Income ta x expens e
Income ta x expens e / Income before i ncome ta xes
Net i ncome
YEAR‐TO‐YEAR CHANGES
Revenues
Opera ti ng expens es
Genera l a nd a dmi ni s tra ti ve expens es
Opera ti ng i ncome
Interes t i ncome
Interes t expens e
Income before i ncome ta xes
Net i ncome
61,420
19,984
7,486
296,500
71,301
44,149
239,239
55,332
30,630
226,462
52,005
21,670
73,675
45,178
345,315
(350)
117,644
35,895
36,548
43.65%
9.75%
69.07%
31.21%
6.63%
36.18%
20.32%
18.3%
5.6%
18.3%
45.4%
16.1%
‐18.2%
79.0%
200.9%
35,311
36,080
48.88%
9.75%
74.53%
25.39%
4.62%
38.13%
7.99%
40.0%
27.3%
39.8%
119.0%
161.4%
‐3.0%
‐1249.6%
‐1545.4%
15.8%
23.9%
1.5%
‐1.0%
‐56.8%
‐35.1%
39.7%
‐20.5%
46.71%
8.55%
73.44%
26.69%
8.25%
37.33%
13.95%
36,172
36,692
$ 1.79 $ 2.40
$ 1.29 $ 0.01
$ (1.30)
$ 4.38 $ 2.41
$ 0.97
$ 0.06
$ (1.60)
$ 2.63
$ 1.79 $ 2.43
$ 1.31 $ 0.02
$ (0.72)
$ 3.82 $ 2.45
$ 0.54
$ 19,215
$ 0.53
‐1.4%
‐10.4%
‐13.1%
167.3%
‐41.2%
41.9%
216.8%
204.7%
45.62%
8.83%
74.86%
49.69%
15.92%
37.42%
26.63%
35,630
36,116
34
‐20.3%
‐19.4%
‐15.7%
‐30.7%
38.9%
41.4%
‐39.5%
‐38.5%
42.17%
9.57%
71.16%
28.84%
8.13%
36.60%
14.08%
35,706
36,253
$ (0.57)
$ 0.42 $ 0.53
$ 0.99
$ (0.57)
$ 0.44 $ 0.54
$ 1.01
$ 35,853
393
1,188
200
$ 0.51
$ 18,301
$ 0.50
‐30.3%
‐28.1%
8.6%
‐34.7%
63.5%
24.4%
‐44.8%
‐45.3%
47.25%
10.48%
81.25%
28.22%
7.87%
38.81%
12.40%
35,832
36,383
‐31.3%
‐31.3%
‐20.6%
8.8%
‐2.9%
36.6%
‐1.3%
‐4.5%
50.00%
10.00%
73.00%
37.00%
9.77%
37.00%
16.64%
35,920
36,448
$ (0.19)
$ 0.21 $ 0.50
$ 0.40
$ (0.19)
$ 0.21 $ 0.51
$ 0.40
$ 14,424
381
250
28,600
9,859
69,993
45,757
14,377
31‐Ma r E
$ 98,593
250
29,875
10,162
71,748
47,163
14,422
250
29,140
10,004
70,901
46,429
14,468
2016 E
30‐Jun E
30‐Sep E
$ 101,623 $ 100,040
250
32,244
10,726
75,021
49,781
14,513
31‐Dec E
$ 107,264
1,000
119,858
40,752
287,662
189,130
57,780
2016 E
$ 407,520
$ 0.26
$ 9,329
$ 0.26
‐21.7%
‐22.8%
‐11.2%
6.1%
9.4%
35.8%
0.0%
‐0.8%
46.02%
9.68%
74.93%
36.14%
10.54%
37.39%
17.65%
35,920
36,448
‐26.8%
‐25.5%
‐17.1%
‐57.2%
16.8%
37.4%
‐74.2%
‐74.0%
46.41%
10.00%
70.99%
29.01%
5.56%
37.00%
9.46%
35,920
36,448
$ (0.76)
$ 1.65 $ 0.26
$ 2.41
$ (0.76)
$ 1.68 $ 0.26
$ 2.44
$ 87,793
‐25.5%
‐18.0%
‐22.2%
‐24.1%
‐36.4%
42.1%
‐46.9%
‐47.3%
46.41%
10.00%
70.60%
29.40%
5.86%
37.00%
9.97%
35,920
36,448
$ 0.28
$ 0.28
$ 0.28
$ 0.28
$ 10,133
‐14.0%
‐15.5%
‐17.9%
‐11.2%
‐34.4%
45.2%
‐34.9%
‐33.0%
46.41%
10.00%
70.87%
29.13%
5.68%
37.00%
9.67%
35,920
36,448
$ 0.27
$ 0.27
$ 0.27
$ 0.27
$ 9,669
‐2.5%
‐9.5%
‐2.5%
‐20.8%
25.0%
19.0%
‐36.5%
‐36.5%
46.41%
10.00%
69.94%
30.06%
6.36%
37.00%
10.84%
35,920
36,448
$ 0.32
$ 0.32
$ 0.32
$ 0.32
$ 11,625
‐18.1%
‐17.4%
‐15.4%
‐33.3%
‐15.8%
35.1%
‐53.9%
‐53.6%
46.41%
10.00%
70.59%
29.41%
5.87%
37.00%
10.00%
35,920
36,448
$ 1.12
$ 1.12
$ 1.13
$ 1.13
$ 40,756
214
48,143
372,655
55,060
179,761
228,902
75,417
20,192
11,000
80,306
11,000
40,699
55,002
14,303
2015 E
$ 497,356
(10,262) (9,921) (9,712) (11,850) (41,745) (14,100) (14,100) (14,100) (14,100) (56,400)
440
482
94
‐
1,016
58
58
58
58
234
57,290 30,309 23,572 29,049 140,220 14,808 16,083 15,348 18,452 64,692
21,437 11,094 9,148 10,748 52,427 5,479 5,951 5,679 6,827 23,936
35,853 19,215 14,424 18,301 87,793 9,329 10,133 9,669 11,625 40,756
12,188
94,476
11,004
32,809
54,938
20,958
6,392
31‐Dec E
$ 110,005
1,086
39,355
13,063
97,091
57,542
20,172
6,314
2015 E
30‐Jun A
30‐Sep A
$ 136,446 $ 116,281
November 12, 2015
(30,733)
501
140,274
52,367
87,907
618
$ 88,525
11,892
100,782
33,056
66,898
31‐Ma r A
$ 134,624
2014 A
$ 634,793
2013 A
$ 548,145
2012 A
$ 463,309
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
For the peri od ended
Revenues
Cos ts a nd expens es :
Opera ti ng expens es
Depreci a ti on
Amorti za ti on
Depreci a ti on a nd a morti za ti on
Genera l a nd a dmi ni s tra ti ve expens es
Tota l opera ti ng cos ts
Ga i n on s a l e of a s s ets
Opera ti ng i ncome
Other i ncome (expens e):
Interes t i ncome
Los s on ea rl y exti ngui s hment of debt
Interes t expens e
Other i ncome (expens e), net
Income before i ncome ta xes
Income ta x expens e
Income from conti nui ng opera ti ons
Income from di s conti nued opera ti ons , net of ta x
Ne t i ncome
In thous a nds
Annual and Quarterly Income Statements
HORNBECK OFFSHORE SERVICES INC. (HOS)
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
As of
31‐De c‐12 A
As s ets
Curre nt a s s e ts :
Ca s h a nd ca s h e qui va l ents
$ 576,678
Accounts rece i va bl e, ne t of a l l owa nce
103,265
Deferre d ta x a s s e ts , ne t
28,720
Curre nt a s s e ts from di s conti nue d opera ti ons
2,447
As s ets hel d for s a l e
Other curre nt a s s ets
20,399
Tota l curre nt a s s e ts
731,509
Property, pl a nt a nd equi pme nt, net
1,643,623
68,154
Deferre d cha rge s , net
Other a s s ets
14,615
Long te rm a s s e ts from di s conti nue d opera ti ons
173,830
Tota l a s s e ts
$ 2,631,731
Curre nt l i a bi l i ti es :
Accounts pa ya bl e
$ 48,286
Accrued i nteres t
14,790
Accrued pa yrol l a nd benefi ts
12,441
Deferre d reve nue
16,854
Curre nt l i a bi l i ti es from di s conti nue d opera ti ons
4,197
Other a ccrue d l i a bi l i ti es
8,030
Tota l curre nt l i a bi l i ti es
343,505
Long‐term de bt, net of ori gi na l i s s ue di s count
850,530
Deferre d ta x l i a bi l i ti es , ne t
270,478
Long‐term l i a bi l i ti e s from di s conti nued ope ra ti ons
Other l i a bi l i ti e s
1,373
Tota l l i a bi l i ti es
1,465,886
Sha rehol de rs ' equi ty:
Common s tock, $.01 pa r va l ue
355
Addi ti ona l pa i d‐i n ca pi ta l
705,658
460,090
Reta i ned e a rni ngs
Accumul a te d othe r compre hens i ve i ncome
(258)
Tota l s tockhol ders ' equi ty
1,165,845
Tota l l i a bi l i ti es a nd s tockhol de rs ' equi ty
$ 2,631,731
SELECTED COMMON SIZE AMOUNTS (a s a % of opera ti ng reve nue)
Accounts rece i va bl e, ne t of a l l owa nce
22.29%
Property, pl a nt a nd equi pme nt, net
354.76%
Deferre d cha rge s , net
14.71%
Accounts pa ya bl e
10.42%
Accrued pa yrol l a nd benefi ts
2.69%
Other a ccrue d l i a bi l i ti es
1.73%
SELECTED COMMON SI ZE AMOUNTS (a s a % of tota l a s s e ts )
Tota l curre nt a s s e ts
27.80%
Property, pl a nt a nd equi pme nt, net
62.45%
Deferre d cha rge s , net
2.59%
Tota l curre nt l i a bi l i ti es
13.05%
Long‐term de bt, net of ori gi na l i s s ue di s count
32.32%
Deferre d ta x l i a bi l i ti es , ne t
10.28%
Tota l l i a bi l i ti es
55.70%
Tota l s tockhol ders ' equi ty
44.30%
In thous a nds
Annual and Quarterly Balance Sheets
HORNBECK OFFSHORE SERVICES INC. (HOS)
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
$ 42,404
14,890
14,830
1,561
1
9,359
83,045
1,073,472
392,492
1,560
1,117
1,551,686
1,573
1,581,702
16,225
97,512
1,078,366
404,251
17,262
83,841
1,075,896
404,756
2,465
1,566,958
$ 55,846
14,886
10,056
499
$ 40,800
13,490
11,232
1,057
1,260
1,552,325
15,378
80,686
1,080,859
389,520
$ 37,028
13,591
14,097
592
$ 2,997,696
15,762
410,183
2,516,894
55,318
15,301
1,260
1,553,483
11,121
79,011
1,080,859
392,353
$ 43,316
13,591
10,131
852
$ 3,019,542
15,762
412,351
2,533,791
58,098
15,301
$ 307,214
83,699
5,676
31‐Dec E
1,260
1,553,483
11,121
79,011
1,080,859
392,353
$ 43,316
13,591
10,131
852
$ 3,019,542
15,762
412,351
2,533,791
58,098
15,301
$ 307,214
83,699
5,676
31‐Dec‐15 E
1,260
1,553,599
9,579
69,941
1,080,859
401,539
$ 37,311
13,591
8,727
734
$ 3,031,375
15,762
412,955
2,541,415
61,704
15,301
$ 314,834
76,683
5,676
31‐Ma r E
1,260
1,563,249
9,765
71,035
1,080,859
410,095
$ 38,035
13,591
8,896
748
$ 3,053,544
15,762
423,942
2,548,992
65,309
15,301
30‐Sep E
10,195
73,565
1,080,859
425,738
1,260
1,581,422
9,508
69,526
1,080,859
418,186
1,260
1,569,830
$ 39,710
13,591
9,288
781
$ 3,097,785
$ 3,072,182
$ 37,035
13,591
8,662
729
15,762
445,953
2,564,012
72,519
15,301
$ 342,901
81,614
5,676
31‐Dec E
15,762
431,442
2,556,525
68,914
15,301
$ 333,886
76,118
5,676
2016 E
$ 324,332
78,171
5,676
30‐Jun E
1,260
1,581,422
10,195
73,565
1,080,859
425,738
$ 39,710
13,591
9,288
781
$ 3,097,785
15,762
445,953
2,564,012
72,519
15,301
$ 342,901
81,614
5,676
31‐Dec‐16 E
November 12, 2015
20.63%
387.45%
10.86%
6.68%
2.34%
1.47%
13.08%
84.16%
2.36%
2.84%
36.73%
13.43%
53.10%
46.90%
17.06%
387.74%
13.51%
9.66%
2.45%
2.10%
21.90%
74.99%
2.61%
3.59%
37.54%
13.00%
54.29%
45.71%
16.15%
81.41%
2.04%
2.82%
36.18%
13.61%
52.69%
47.31%
82.91%
1798.36%
45.05%
30.31%
8.34%
12.82%
35
14.68%
82.93%
2.00%
3.24%
35.80%
13.42%
52.51%
47.49%
77.09%
1830.80%
44.14%
40.93%
7.37%
11.89%
13.68%
83.96%
1.85%
2.69%
36.06%
12.99%
51.78%
48.22%
74.35%
2164.49%
47.57%
31.84%
12.12%
13.22%
13.66%
83.91%
1.92%
2.62%
35.80%
12.99%
51.45%
48.55%
76.09%
2303.35%
52.81%
39.38%
9.21%
10.11%
13.66%
83.91%
1.92%
2.62%
35.80%
12.99%
51.45%
48.55%
16.83%
509.45%
11.68%
8.71%
2.04%
2.24%
13.62%
83.84%
2.04%
2.31%
35.66%
13.25%
51.25%
48.75%
77.78%
2577.69%
62.58%
37.84%
8.85%
9.72%
13.88%
83.48%
2.14%
2.33%
35.40%
13.43%
51.19%
48.81%
76.92%
2508.29%
64.27%
37.43%
8.75%
9.61%
14.04%
83.22%
2.24%
2.26%
35.18%
13.61%
51.10%
48.90%
76.09%
2555.49%
68.89%
37.02%
8.66%
9.50%
14.40%
82.77%
2.34%
2.37%
34.89%
13.74%
51.05%
48.95%
76.09%
2390.37%
67.61%
37.02%
8.66%
9.50%
14.40%
82.77%
2.34%
2.37%
34.89%
13.74%
51.05%
48.95%
20.03%
629.17%
17.80%
9.74%
2.28%
2.50%
361
356
357
358
358
358
358
358
358
358
358
358
724,379
736,294
736,813
741,412
744,526
746,913
746,913
749,300
751,687
754,074
756,461
756,461
571,483
635,017
670,870
690,085
704,509
722,810
722,810
732,139
742,272
751,941
763,566
763,566
(795)
(902)
(1,205)
(1,156)
(4,022)
(4,022)
(4,022)
(4,022)
(4,022)
(4,022)
(4,022)
(4,022)
1,295,428 1,370,765 1,406,835 1,430,699 1,445,371 1,466,059 1,466,059 1,477,775 1,490,295 1,502,351 1,516,363 1,516,363
$ 2,834,280 $ 2,922,451 $ 2,973,793 $ 3,012,401 $ 2,997,696 $ 3,019,542 $ 3,019,542 $ 3,031,375 $ 3,053,544 $ 3,072,182 $ 3,097,785 $ 3,097,785
4,673
1,538,852
$ 52,930
14,890
13,451
8,786
117
11,497
101,671
1,064,092
368,416
$ 2,973,793
$ 2,922,451
$ 3,012,401
26,894
19,290
442,274
2,498,056
60,221
11,850
26,894
24,838
480,190
2,421,026
60,651
11,926
30‐Se p A
$ 302,618
86,456
5,347
2015 E
20,049
382,142
2,459,486
68,953
11,870
13,779
620,630
2,125,374
74,075
13,442
759
$ 2,834,280
30‐Jun A
$ 263,405
105,180
27,505
31‐Ma r A
$ 279,458
111,613
37,387
$ 185,123
130,969
45,531
470
31‐De c‐14 A
$ 439,291
93,512
72,470
1,578
31‐De c‐13 A
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
For the peri od ended
Ca s h Fl ow From Opera ti ons :
Net i ncome from conti nui ng opera ti ons
Adjus tments :
Depreci a ti on
Amorti za ti on
Stock‐ba s ed compens a ti on expens e
Provi s i on for ba d debts
Deferred ta x expens e
Amorti za ti on of deferred fi na nci ng cos ts
Ga i n on s a l e of a s s ets
Los s on ea rl y exti ngui s hment of debt
Cha nges i n opera ti ng a s s ets a nd l i a bi l i ti es :
Accounts recei va bl e
Other recei va bl es a nd current a s s ets
Deferred drydocki ng cha rges
Accounts pa ya bl e
Accrued l i a bi l i ti es a nd other l i a bi l i ti es
Accrued i nteres t
Net ca s h provi ded by opera ti ng a cti vi ti es
Ca s h fl ows from i nves ti ng a cti vi ti es :
Cos ts i ncurred for newbui l d progra ms
Net proceeds from s a l e of a s s ets
Ves s el ca pi ta l expendi tures
Non‐ves s el ca pi ta l expendi tures
Net ca s h us ed i n i nves ti ng a cti vi ti es
Ca s h fl ows from fi na nci ng a cti vi ti es :
Ta x Benefi t (Shortfa l l ) from Sha re‐Ba s ed pa yments
Proceeds from i s s ua nce of s eni or notes , net
Proceeds from the i s s ua nce of Seni or Converti bl e Notes
Redempti on Premi um on the Reti rement of Debt
Repurcha s e of common s tock
Pa yments for Publ i c Offeri ngs of Common Stock
Pa yment for purcha s e of converti bl e note hedge
Proceeds from s a l e of common s tock wa rra nts
Repa yment of s eni or notes
Deferred fi na nci ng cos ts
Net ca s h proceeds from s ha res i s s ued
Net ca s h us ed i n fi na nci ng a cti vi ti es
Effect of excha nge ra te cha nges on ca s h
Net ca s h provi ded by di s conti nued opera ti ons
Net i ncrea s e (decrea s e) i n ca s h
Ca s h a nd ca s h equi va l ents a t begi nni ng of peri od
Ca s h a nd ca s h equi va l ents a t end of peri od
Suppl ementa l ca s h fl ow i nforma ti on:
Interes t pa i d
Income ta xes pa i d
Opera ti ng ca s h fl ow per s ha re
excl udi ng cha nges i n worki ng ca pi ta l
Opera ti ng ca s h fl ow per s ha re
i ncl udi ng cha nges i n worki ng ca pi ta l
In thous a nds
Annual and Quarterly Statements of Cash Flows
2012 A
71,301
44,149
10,324
282
50,440
8,154
(822)
$ 87,907
2014 A
19,984
7,486
1,972
(660)
21,450
2,444
(33,056)
$ 35,853
31‐Ma r A
20,172
6,314
2,802
(260)
11,085
2,406
30‐Sep A
20,958
6,392
3,183
223
8,981
2,417
(11,004)
$ 14,424
2015 E
$ 19,215
30‐Jun A
2,387
(209)
2,504
970
14,303
$ 18,301
31‐Dec E
75,417
20,192
10,344
(906)
44,020
8,237
(44,060)
$ 87,793
2015 E
2,387
(187)
9,186
970
14,377
$ 9,329
31‐Ma r E
2,387
(193)
8,556
970
14,422
30‐Sep E
2,387
(190)
8,091
970
14,468
$ 9,669
2016 E
$ 10,133
30‐Jun E
2,387
(204)
7,552
970
14,513
$ 11,625
31‐Dec E
9,548
(774)
33,385
3,879
57,780
$ 40,756
2016 E
November 12, 2015
$ 4.51
$ 1.72
$ 1.72
36
$ 2.05
$ 2.17
$ 1.39
$ 1.38
$ 1.00
$ 1.22
8,244
$ 6.13
$ 6.47
$ 4.90
167
$ 5.77
14,032
11,240
(13) 9
$ 6.12
(2,089)
1,966
(123)
(3,120)
$ 3.65
292
$ 3.09
25,272
8,407
(17,658)
4,501
450,000
30,733
1,927
57,869
47,352
(14,220) 4,000
122,091
185,123
307,214
375,000
300,000
(3,692)
(25,000)
(180)
(73,032)
48,237
(300,000) (500,000)
(16,186)
(7,807)
(1,953)
(44)
(92)
4,244
9,620
5,044
1,966
334,391 (61,344) (19,664) (1,953) 1,922 (92) ‐
(179)
(537)
(107)
(302)
48
(2,866)
12,075
244,057
4,012
219,829 (137,387) (254,168) 94,335 (16,053) 39,213 4,596
356,849
576,678
439,291
185,123
279,458
263,405
302,618
576,678
439,291
185,123
279,458
263,405
302,618
307,214
9,498
314,834
324,332
‐
9,554
324,332
333,886
‐
9,014
333,886
342,901
‐
35,686
307,214
342,901
‐
$ 0.82
$ 0.91
$ 0.88
$ 0.87
$ 0.88
$ 0.89
$ 0.86
$ 0.83
$ 3.44
$ 3.49
(3,707) (2,605) (2,412) (725) (9,449)
7,620
307,214
314,834
‐
(240,526)
(465,165)
(343,989)
(52,617)
(66,715)
(33,083)
(20,900)
(173,315)
(13,725)
(13,725)
(13,725)
(13,725)
(54,900)
3,002
16,021
7,178
114,000
38,000
152,000
(14,549)
(73,593)
(55,089)
(21,843)
(14,402)
(11,215)
(8,400)
(55,860)
(7,275)
(7,275)
(7,275)
(7,275)
(29,100)
(3,250)
(3,893)
(9,615)
(4,388)
(10,217)
(1,250)
(1,900)
(17,755)
(1,000)
(1,000)
(1,000)
(1,000)
(4,000)
(255,323) (526,630) (401,515) 35,152 (91,334) (7,548) (31,200) (94,930) (22,000) (22,000) (22,000) (22,000) (88,000)
55,332
30,630
11,888
383
32,320
16,826
(1,587)
25,776
$ 64,078
2013 A
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
(18,830)
9,793
(38,500)
19,704
6,757
18,449
2,966
47,876
7,203
(1,295)
2,244
(5,293)
2,859
(110)
8,956
(8,393)
(4,422)
5,576
31
1,185
(39,211)
(35,875)
(43,609)
(2,553)
(3,756)
(5,725)
(3,750)
(15,784)
(4,575)
(4,575)
(4,575)
(4,575)
(18,300)
2,230
1,073
(4,146)
(6,767)
7,207
(8,711)
6,288
(1,983)
(6,005)
724
(999)
2,674
(3,606)
14,043
(12,626)
(13,981)
1,403
(5,603)
1,396
(7,963)
(10,767)
(3,065)
369
(510)
1,365
(1,840)
5,835
100
(1,400)
1,396
(1,295)
(1,299)
128,865 207,067 163,106 61,438 73,311 49,719 35,796 220,264 29,620 31,498 31,554 31,014 123,686
52,005
21,670
10,805
1,775
20,368
17,192
350
6,048
$ 34,695
HORNBECK OFFSHORE SERVICES INC. (HOS)
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
1.26
1.03
0.96
0.73
1.97
1.60
0.56
0.51
51.12%
25.39%
1.41%
3.31%
7.99%
40.50%
7.85%
Profi ta bi l i ty/Va l ua ti on Mea s ures
Gros s profi t ma rgi n
Opera ti ng profi t ma rgi n
Return on a s s ets
Return on equi ty
Ea rni ngs before i nteres t a nd ta xes ma rgi n
EBITDA ma rgi n
EBITDA/As s ets
2.13
1.98
1.98
0.38
388,004
4.78
0.94
0.28
0.19
81
92
2012 A
Fi na nci a l Ri s k (Levera ge) Ra ti os
Tota l debt/equi ty ra ti o
Debt/equi ty ra ti o (excl udi ng deferred ta xes )
Tota l LT debt/equi ty ra ti o
LT debt/equi ty (excl udi ng deferred ta xes )
Interes t covera ge ra ti o (Ea rni ngs = EBIT)
Interes t covera ge ra ti o (Ea rni ngs = EBI)
Tota l debt ra ti o
Debt ra ti o (excudi ng deferred ta xes )
Li qui di ty mea s ures
Current ra ti o
Qui ck ra ti o
Ca s h ra ti o
Ca s h fl ow from opera ti ons ra ti o
Worki ng ca pi ta l
Producti vi ty Ra ti os
Recei va bl es turnover
Worki ng ca pi ta l turnover
Net fi xed a s s et turnover
Tota l a s s et turnover
# of da ys Sa l es i n A/R
# of da ys ca s h‐ba s ed expens es i n pa ya bl es
Ratios
HORNBECK OFFSHORE SERVICES INC. (HOS)
Hornbeck Offshore Services (HOS)
56.35%
31.21%
4.08%
9.05%
20.32%
42.64%
8.55%
1.19
0.90
1.11
0.83
3.12
2.35
0.54
0.47
6.10
5.24
5.24
2.04
518,959
5.57
1.21
0.38
0.20
62
97
2013 A
53.29%
26.69%
3.08%
6.64%
13.95%
45.13%
9.95%
1.13
0.85
1.07
0.79
5.56
3.86
0.53
0.46
4.60
3.81
3.81
1.96
299,097
5.66
1.55
0.32
0.22
75
69
2014 A
37
54.38%
49.69%
1.22%
2.58%
26.63%
70.58%
3.22%
1.11
0.83
1.05
0.77
6.58
4.49
0.53
0.45
5.73
4.66
4.66
0.73
396,349
1.11
0.39
0.06
0.05
75
85
31‐Ma r A
57.83%
28.84%
0.64%
1.35%
14.08%
48.90%
2.23%
1.11
0.82
1.04
0.75
4.06
2.94
0.53
0.45
4.54
3.78
3.78
0.75
344,762
1.26
0.37
0.07
0.05
70
106
52.75%
28.22%
0.48%
1.00%
12.40%
52.14%
2.02%
1.07
0.80
1.02
0.75
3.43
2.49
0.52
0.45
5.08
4.82
4.82
0.62
329,497
1.21
0.34
0.06
0.04
68
91
2015 E
30‐Jun A
30‐Sep A
50.00%
37.00%
0.61%
1.26%
16.64%
50.18%
1.83%
1.06
0.79
1.01
0.74
3.45
2.54
0.51
0.44
5.22
4.95
4.95
0.45
333,340
1.29
0.33
0.06
0.04
70
90
31‐Dec E
53.98%
36.14%
2.95%
6.19%
17.65%
55.81%
9.34%
1.06
0.79
1.01
0.74
4.36
3.10
0.51
0.44
5.22
4.95
4.95
2.79
333,340
4.63
1.57
0.20
0.17
61
85
2015 E
BURKENROAD REPORTS (www.burkenroad.org)
53.59%
29.01%
0.31%
0.63%
9.46%
43.90%
1.43%
1.05
0.78
1.00
0.73
2.05
1.66
0.51
0.44
5.90
5.60
5.60
0.42
343,014
1.23
0.29
0.04
0.03
70
90
31‐Ma r E
53.59%
29.40%
0.33%
0.68%
9.97%
43.89%
1.47%
1.05
0.77
1.00
0.73
2.14
1.72
0.51
0.44
5.97
5.67
5.67
0.44
352,907
1.31
0.29
0.05
0.03
70
90
53.59%
29.13%
0.32%
0.65%
9.67%
43.90%
1.43%
1.04
0.77
1.00
0.72
2.09
1.69
0.51
0.43
6.21
5.90
5.90
0.45
361,916
1.30
0.28
0.05
0.03
70
90
2016 E
30‐Jun E
30‐Sep E
53.59%
30.06%
0.38%
0.77%
10.84%
43.88%
1.53%
1.04
0.76
0.99
0.71
2.31
1.82
0.51
0.43
6.06
5.77
5.77
0.42
372,388
1.36
0.29
0.05
0.03
70
90
31‐Dec E
53.59%
29.41%
1.33%
2.73%
10.00%
43.89%
5.85%
1.04
0.76
0.99
0.71
2.15
1.72
0.51
0.43
6.06
5.77
5.77
1.68
372,388
4.93
1.15
0.16
0.13
73
94
2016 E
November 12, 2015
THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
BURKENROAD REPORTS RATING SYSTEM
MARKET OUTPERFORM: This rating indicates that we believe forces are in place that would enable this
company's stock to produce returns in excess of the stock market averages over the next 12 months.
MARKET PERFORM: This rating indicates that we believe the investment returns from this company's stock
will be in line with those produced by the stock market averages over the next 12 months.
MARKET UNDERPERFORM: This rating indicates that while this investment may have positive attributes, we
believe an investment in this company will produce subpar returns over the next 12 months.
BURKENROAD REPORTS CALCULATIONS
CPFS is calculated using operating cash flows excluding working capital changes.
All amounts are as of the date of the report as reported by Bloomberg or Yahoo Finance unless
otherwise noted. Betas are collected from Bloomberg.
Enterprise value is based on the equity market cap as of the report date, adjusted for long‐term
debt, cash, & short‐term investments reported on the most recent quarterly report date.
12‐month Stock Performance is calculated using an ending price as of the report date.
The stock performance includes the 12‐month dividend yield.
2015‐2016 COVERAGE UNIVERSE
Amerisafe Inc. (AMSF)
Marine Products Corp. (MPX)
Bristow Group Inc. (BRS)
MidSouth Bancorp Inc. (MSL)
CalIon Petroleum Company (CPE)
Newpark Resources Inc. (NR)
Cal‐Maine Foods Inc. (CALM)
PetroQuest Energy Inc. (PQ)
Carbo Ceramics Inc. (CRR)
Pool Corporation (POOL)
Cash America International Inc. (CSH)
Powell Industries Inc. (POWL)
Conn's Inc. (CONN)
Rollins Incorporated (ROL)
Crown Crafts Inc. (CRWS)
RPC Incorporated (RES)
Denbury Resources Inc. (DNR)
Ruth’s Hospitality Group Inc. (RUTH)
Sanderson Farms Inc. (SAFM)
EastGroup Properties Inc. (EGP)
SEACOR Holdings Inc. (CKH)
Era Group Inc. (ERA)
Sharps Compliance Inc. (SMED)
Evolution Petroleum Corp. (EPM)
Spark Energy Inc. (SPKE)
The First Bancshares (FBMS)
Globalstar (GSAT)
Stone Energy Corp. (SGY)
Gulf Island Fabrication Inc. (GIFI)
Sunoco LP (SUN)
Hibbett Sports (HIBB)
Superior Energy Services Inc. (SPN)
Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. (HOS)
Superior Uniform Group Inc. (SGC)
IBERIABANK Corp. (IBKC)
Team Incorporated (TISI)
ION Geophysical Corp. (IO)
Vaalco Energy Inc. (EGY)
Key Energy Services (KEG)
Willbros Group Inc. (WG)
DANIEL BROWNFIELD
PETER RICCHIUTI
BURKENROAD REPORTS
Director of Research
GRACE CAMMACK
Tulane University
ALAN POSNER
Founder of Burkenroad Reports
New Orleans, LA 70118‐5669
[email protected]
RUBEN FLORES DELGADO
(504) 862‐8489
Associate Directors of Research
(504) 865‐5430 Fax
ANTHONY WOOD
Senior Director of Accounting
[email protected]
Named in honor of William B. Burkenroad Jr., an alumnus and a longtime supporter
of Tulane’s business school, and funded through contributions from his family and
friends, BURKENROAD REPORTS is a nationally recognized program, publishing
objective, investment research reports on public companies in our region. Students
at Tulane University’s Freeman School of Business prepare these reports.
Alumni of the BURKENROAD REPORTS program are employed at a number of
highly respected financial institutions including:
ABN AMRO Bank · Aegis Value Fund · Invesco/AIM Capital Management · Alpha
Omega Capital Partners · American General Investment Management · Ameriprise
Financial · Atlas Capital · Banc of America Securities · Bank of Montreal ·
Bancomer · Barclays Capital · Barings PLC · Bearing Point · Bessemer Trust ·
Black Gold Capital· Bloomberg · Brookfield Asset Management · Brown Brothers
Harriman Capital · Blackrock Financial Management · Boston Consulting Group
· Buckingham Research · California Board of Regents · Cambridge Associates·
Canaccord Genuity · Cantor Fitzgerald · Chaffe & Associates · Citadel Investment
Group · Citibank · Citigroup Private Bank · City National Bank · Cornerstone
Resources · Credit Suisse · D. A. Davidson & Co. · Deutsche Banc · Duquesne
Capital Management · Equitas Capital Advisors· Factset Research · Financial
Models · First Albany · Fiduciary Trust · Fitch Investors Services · Forex Trading
· Franklin Templeton · Friedman Billings Ramsay · Fulcrum Global Partners ·
Gintel Asset Management · Global Hunter Securities · Goldman Sachs · Grosever
Funds · Gruntal & Co. · Guggenheim Securities , LLC · Hancock Investment
Services · Healthcare Markets Group · Capital One Southcoast · Howard Weil
Labouisse Friedrichs · IBERIABANK Capital Markets · J.P. Morgan Securities
· Janney Montgomery Scott · Jefferies & Co. · Johnson Rice & Co. · KBC
Financial · KDI Capital Partners · Key Investments · Keystone Investments ·
Legacy Capital · Liberty Mutual · Lowenhaupt Global Advisors · Mackay Shields
· Manulife/John Hancock Investments · Marsh & McLennan · Mercer Partners
· Merrill Lynch · Miramar Asset Management · Moodys Investor Services ·
Morgan Keegan · Morgan Stanley · New York Stock Exchange · Perkins Wolf
McDonnell · Piper Jaffray & Co. · Professional Advisory Services · Quarterdeck
Investment Services · RBC · Raymond James · Restoration Capital · Rice Voelker,
LLC · Royal Bank of Scotland· Sandler O'Neill & Partners · Sanford Bernstein
& Co. · Scotia Capital · Scottrade · Second City Trading LLC · Sequent Energy
· Sidoti & Co · Simmons & Co. · Southwest Securities · Stephens & Co. · Sterne
Agee · Stewart Capital LLC · Stifel Nicolaus · Sun-Trust Capital Markets ·
Susquehanna Investment Group · Thomas Weisel Partners · TD Waterhouse
Securities · Texas Employee Retirement System · Texas Teachers Retirement
System · ThirtyNorth Investments · Thornburg Investment Management · Tivoli
Partners · Tudor Pickering & Co. · Tulane University Endowment Fund · Turner
Investment Partners · UBS · Value Line Investments · Vaughan Nelson Investment
Management · Wells Fargo Capital Management · Whitney National Bank ·
William Blair & Co. · Zephyr Management
To receive complete reports on any of the companies we follow, contact:
Peter Ricchiuti, Founder & Director of Research
Tulane University
Freeman School of Business
BURKENROAD REPORTS
Phone: (504) 862-8489
Fax: (504) 865-5430
E-mail:
[email protected]
Please visit our web site at www.BURKENROAD.org
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