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Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

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Introduction to

Homeland Defense and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend

Edited by

Bert B. Tussing • Robert McCreight

Introduction to

Homeland Defense and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend

Introduction to

The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend
Edited by

Bert B. Tussing
US Army War College
Center for Strategic Leadership and Development
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, USA

Robert McCreight

Penn State University
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the
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Version Date: 20140908
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To my children and grandchildren, whom I shall ever defend.
And to my wife, my greatest and dearest defender.

BBT

Thanks to my wife Eileen, who patiently stood with me, and for the valuable
support and friendship of colleagues and experts who helped me learn
about national security, homeland security, and homeland defense.
RM

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
About the Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
Bert B. Tussing and Robert McCreight
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiv
Chapter 1 — Homeland Defense and Homeland Security: Distinctions and

Difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

James Jay Carafano
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Heart of the Homeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
After the Towers Fell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Defense and Security—Viva la Différence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
After the Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A Distant Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Whither Homeland Security? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
vii

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Contents

On the Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
State Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Whither the Future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Chapter 2 — Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities:

Philosophy and Ethos, Reality and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Bert B. Tussing
Beginning with Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Outside Expectations—Inside Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logical Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Categories of Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DoD’s Response Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Framing the Issue in Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joint Action Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17
23
25
26
30
32
33
35
35
35

Chapter 3 — Civil–­Military Partnership: Homeland Defense Enterprise . . . . . . . . .

37

Walter Neal Anderson
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
What Changed as a Result of 9/11? Defense Support of Civil Authorities
in Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DoD’s Roles, Missions, and Organization for the Homeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Legal and Policy Foundations of Defense Support of Civil Authorities . . . . . . .
Hurricane Katrina—A Watershed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steps Taken Since Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unity of Effort: Interagency Coordination and Building Trusting
Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Joint Field Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Joint Interagency Coordination Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DoD’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Enterprise . . . . . . . . . .
Recent Developments and the Future of DSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38
39
41
44
47
49
52
54
55
56
58
59
61
62
63

Contents

Chapter 4 — Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime

Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Thomas Arminio and Thomas Hale
Introduction: The Strategic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Legislation and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maritime Domain Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“Operational Trust”: The Operational Synergy of the U.S. Navy and U.S.
Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Navy Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coast Guard Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65
68
70
75
76
81
84
88
93
94
95

Chapter 5 — Likelihood versus Consequence: The Application of the Land

Component in Homeland Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Bert B. Tussing
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Reason Behind the Reticence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
The Threat, Improbable but Consequential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
The Threat from Without . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
The Threat from Within . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
The Military Response to the Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Active Duty Forces—NORTHCOM and ARNORTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
The National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Not Just a Military Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Chapter 6 — The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123

Philip Brown
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Changing and Evolving Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123
124
126
127

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Contents

The Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Process: Before and After 9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

130
132
137
137
137
138

Chapter 7 — Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

139

Gary Mauk, Matthew D. Woolums, and Robert McCreight
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
DoD Support of Civil Authorities and Civil Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Origins of the DoD WMD Protection and Response Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Civilian Leadership of Responses to CBRN Incidents in the Homeland . . . . . 142
Duty Status of National Guard and Federal Military Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Domestic Laws and Regulation Applicability to U.S. Military Forces
during DSCA Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats and Hazards . . . . . . 146
Understanding the Nature and Scope of CBRN Attacks and the Overall
WMD Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Department of Defense CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-­CSTs) . . . . . . . . . 152
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Analytical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Decontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
CBRN-­Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Homeland Response Force (HRF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Command and Control CBRN Response Element A/­B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
The Future Integration of Military Capabilities into a Domestic CBRN
Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Chapter 8 — Homeland Defense—​Emerging Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

167

Bert B. Tussing
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
The Arctic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Contents

The Military and Cyber Security in the Homeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Preparation for and Response to Catastrophe Beyond Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

174
179
186
186
187

xi

Foreword

The president’s question was simple, direct, and intense. As he moved toward
the door of the White House Situation Room he quietly asked, “Is this going to
work?” And in that moment, he captured well the heavy duty of every American
president to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States,
while simultaneously providing for the immediate safety and enduring security
of the American people. As this book makes clear, those are very challenging
tasks. Challenging enough to encourage any president to seek reassurance.
It was early September, 2005. Hurricane Katrina had made landfall a few days
earlier. As much of New Orleans lay beneath 20 feet of water and families struggled to survive, the federal response was, by any professional standard, tragically
disjointed—and quite clearly at that stage, largely ineffective. In a crisis environment laden with uncertainty, the president had just finished meeting with his
most senior advisors.
During the preceding two hours, the president had made a series of crucial
decisions intended to guide and sharpen the ongoing disaster relief operation.
He would not invoke the Insurrection Act. And he would not federalize the
National Guard. But he would deploy approximately 12,000 active duty military
personnel—soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines—to provide humanitarian
assistance and help stabilize the situation in New Orleans—though they would
not engage in law enforcement activities. And he would approve the deployment of almost 8,000 National Guard security personnel to restore order and
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Foreword

public safety—with almost half that number deploying over the course of a single weekend. Ultimately, as a result of the president’s decisions, approximately
72,000 military personnel would deploy to the Gulf Coast within ten days after
Katrina’s landfall.
And so the president asked, “Is this going to work?”
The U.S. Constitution—and the federal system of government it created—
ensures that the response to a domestic catastrophic event will be complex. Our
constitutional system of checks and balances was well designed to protect the liberty of the people from government oppression. It was not designed to efficiently
move many tons of supplies, hundreds of helicopters, thousands of vehicles, and
perhaps 100,000 military personnel into the chaotic environment of a devastating natural disaster, terrorist attack, or nation-state act of aggression upon the
U.S. homeland.
To achieve an effective response under these circumstances, the necessary
capabilities must be identified in advance, equipment must be purchased, training must be completed, and coordination among first responders, the National
Guard, active duty military personnel, and the private sector must be thought
through in detail. And then the planning for that coordinated response must be
rigorously tested during extremely realistic exercises.
In the words of the 9/11 Commission Report, during our national preparation
for a catastrophic event we cannot afford a failure of imagination.
This book is an effort to explore and assess the framework of constitutional
principles, statutory authority, operational capabilities, and intergovernmental relationships which will inevitably empower—and in some ways constrain—a
national response to a domestic catastrophic event.
As you read its text, I encourage you to ask, once again, the question posed by
the president: “Is this going to work?”
Paul McHale
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

About the Editors

Professor Bert B. Tussing is director of the Homeland Defense and Security
Issues Group at the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership and
Development. He joined the Center in October 1999 following nearly 25 years
in the United States Marine Corps. He is a distinguished graduate of both the
Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Naval War College, and holds
a master’s in national security strategy and a master’s in military strategic studies. He has served on three defense science boards, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies’ “Beyond Goldwater–­Nichols Study,” and on the senior
advisory group for the Department of Defense’s “Strategy for Homeland Defense
and Civil Support.”
Tussing is a senior fellow of George Washington University’s Homeland
Security Policy Institute and Long Island University’s Homeland Security
Management Institute. In 2014 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate of
Humane Letters by Northwestern State University for his work in homeland security, homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and educational initiatives connected to those fields. He is a member of the Board of Experts for the
University of California–Irvine’s Center for Unconventional Security Affairs and
a member of the Pennsylvania State University’s Homeland Defense and Security
Council. He serves on the homeland security board of advisors for Kansas State
University and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. In 2009 he

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About the Editors

served on the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Advisory
Council, assisting in the development of the Department’s first Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review, and in 2013 he served on an advisory council for the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
Robert McCreight, PhD, served the United States government at the State
Department and in other federal agencies over the span of a 35-year career, before
retiring in 2004 and serving as a consultant for major homeland security and
national defense contractors. His professional career includes work as an intelligence analyst, treaty negotiator, arms control delegate to the United Nations,
counterterrorism advisor, political–military affairs analyst, and Deputy Director
of Global Scientific Exchanges at the State Department. During his service at
the State Department, he was a senior Soviet military analyst with the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR) and specialized in the assessment of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons programs. Later in his professional career,
Dr. McCreight performed assignments where he either managed or coordinated
international postdisaster relief and humanitarian operations, developed peacekeeping policies, promoted global science and technology cooperation projects,
and helped design treaty verification systems. He also participated in the design
and coordination of White House nuclear readiness command crisis exercises
during the Reagan administration. During his federal career he designed, developed, and coordinated more than 26 cabinet-level strategic nuclear preparedness
exercises, worked on presidential protection and survivability programs, and
directed the operation of several dozen senior-level military exercises involving theoretical force-on-force scenarios between the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Dr. McCreight spent 27 years of combined active and reserve military service
concurrently with his civilian work in U.S. Army Special Operations and has
devoted 12 years to teaching graduate school as an adjunct at Georgetown, George
Mason, and George Washington Universities in subjects as diverse as disaster
and emergency management, strategic intelligence, nonproliferation policy,
homeland security policies, terrorism analysis, intelligence analysis, and assessing WMD threats. He completed his doctoral degree in public administration in
1989 and remains active in graduate education programs in emergency and crisis
management as well as in security studies and terrorism analysis. Dr. McCreight
has also written and published more than 19 articles on chemical weapons use,
disaster management, disaster recovery, post-strike attribution, biological weapons threats to homeland security, WMD scenario development, and collegiate
educational strategies for developing future crisis managers for government service. His textbook, Emergency Exercise Design and Evaluation, was published in
2011 and continues to be a popular resource in graduate schools.

Contributors

Col. Walter Neal Anderson, USA (Ret.)
Homeland Security Management
Institute
Long Island University
Riverhead, New York
Capt. Thomas Arminio, USN (Ret.)
Penn State Harrisburg
Middletown, Pennsylvania

Capt. Thomas Hale, USCG (Ret.)
Penn State Harrisburg
Middletown, Pennsylvania
1SG Gary Mauk
Massachusetts National Guard
Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts
Dr. Robert McCreight
Penn State University
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Dr. Philip Brown
Six Points Consulting
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Bert B. Tussing
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania

James Jay Carafano
The Heritage Foundation
Washington, DC

Lt. Col. Matthew D. Woolums
Massachusetts National Guard
Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts

xvii

Introduction
Bert B. Tussing and Robert McCreight

In addressing a new textbook on nearly any subject, the reader may frequently
wonder what motivated the authors to take on the task. Is the subject not sufficiently covered in existing texts? Have there been changes in the subject matter
that require a whole new text, as opposed to amending or updating earlier venues?
Have the basic premises of earlier publications been disproven, or has the environment surrounding their subject matter evolved so dramatically as to recommend a paradigm shift in thinking? Or can we fairly ask whether this topic has
been overlooked, misunderstood, or underemphasized in most collegiate courses
that claim to cover the full scope of homeland security policy and operations?
Applying the scrutiny more directly, one might wonder if there are not already
enough homeland security publications, designed for both undergraduate and
graduate work, to raise questions as to the real value of a text like this. A quick
glance across the Internet shopping aisle reveals nearly 100 texts at least nominally devoted to homeland security. Why would someone want to try and squeeze
another volume on that bookshelf?
Were those questions to be asked, they would be serving our purpose. This
text is not on homeland security. It is on homeland defense and defense support
of civil authorities. The three topic areas are unquestionably related, but they are
certainly not the same. They are distinct. Homeland defense is not a subset of
homeland security. Defense support of civil authorities is not a subset of homeland defense.
xix

xx

Introduction

Definitions of all three are examined in depth throughout this volume, but
a quick introduction may prove beneficial. Homeland security is defined in the
2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) as “a concerted national
effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism
and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can
thrive” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 13). This we hold to be a
fair depiction of the desired ends of homeland security, but “concerted national
effort” does not provide much in the way of depicting the required ways and
means to achieve those ends. That understanding is better served by the description of homeland security that follows later in the QHSR:
Homeland security describes the intersection of new threats and evolving hazards with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense,
emergency response, customs, border control, law enforcement, and immigration. (p. 14)

The QHSR further describes homeland security as an enterprise, not just a
governmental function. Said enterprise is duly constituted of federal, state, and
local governmental entities, but is also comprised of the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, international partners, communities, faith-­based organizations, families, and individual citizens (p. 12). Reflecting the previously cited
description, the QHSR makes clear that homeland security is a shared responsibility between the government and its citizenry.
In terms of governmental functions designed to support those ends, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is generally the lead federal agency in
charge of coordinating Washington’s functions designed to preserve or, as necessary, restore a secure environment for our citizenry. It coordinates the federal
component—among the other federal agencies (which will perform their functions in support of DHS’s lead)—and with state and local governments as federal
assistance is required. Those support functions provided in support of DHS by
the Department of Defense (DoD)—and by extension, as required, in support of
state and local government—are what DoD refers to as defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA). The department defines this mission as
[S]upport provided … in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities
for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities,
or from qualifying entities for special events. (Department of Defense, 2013b, p. 7)

It should be noted, too, that DoD can support other federal agencies as well;
support to the Department of Justice (DoJ), for instance, is coordinated through a
deliberate subset of the DSCA mission, referred to as Defense Support of Civilian
Law Enforcement Agencies (DSCLEA). But in doing so, interacting with either

Introduction

DoJ or DHS, the Department of Defense is definitively in support, not in charge.
In this role, DoD is a member of the homeland security enterprise.
This is decidedly not the case when DoD is performing its other domestic mission, homeland defense. As defined in Joint Publication 3-27, homeland defense
is “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as
directed by the President” (p. I-1). In this case, wherein the military is applying
force against our adversaries, or threatening the application of force as a matter
of deterrence, the government is the sole responsible entity. Homeland security is
an enterprise shared by the public and its governments. Homeland defense is not.
This does not imply, however, that DoD has sole responsibility for the defense
of the United States. For instance, it may be easy for some to overlook the fact that
our alliances with international partners are a “two-­way street.” By way of illustration, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) invoked Article 5 of its treaty-­charter for the first time in
its history, declaring that an attack against one member of the alliance was an
attack against the entire alliance. Similarly, we forget that while the Department
of Defense may be the lead federal agency in preventing or responding to external aggression, it is not the only federal agency that will contribute to those ends.
Thus, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and
other components of the federal government outside of DoD could be placed in
support of DoD in countering or responding to a threat against our people.
Therefore, while the preponderance of our attention to the military’s missions in recent history may have been drawn to operations overseas, this book
is designed to highlight the two missions that could see its employment within
the United States: homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities.
Likelihood of those missions’ execution would have us address them in reverse
order. Natural disasters, severe destruction, or loss of life due to large-­scale accidents, or even heightened border security concerns are currently more likely to
see our armed forces deployed in the homeland than an actual attack against
the United States. But how those forces are employed, or constrained in their
employment, needs to be understood.
Likewise, should the day arrive when our people have to be protected and our
enemies subdued within the approaches to the United States—or even within the
territorial confines of the United States—that employment should also be understood. The authorities, responsibilities, coordination, and constraints that will
have to define the government’s actions in such an eventuality are not likely to be
wholly automatic or immediately intuitive. The reader, as a student or as a citizen,
needs to understand what should be done, what must be done, and what must
not be done—and why. Rendering unique assistance, personnel, and technology
to deal with catastrophic natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or when ordered by
our president, the DoD support element involved in these situations often brings

xxi

xxii

Introduction

assets and expertise to the crisis that most states and local governments simply do
not possess or control. This book aims to expose the reader to the DoD missions
and operations associated with homeland defense.
The chapters that follow should serve those ends. In Chapter  1, “Homeland
Defense and Homeland Security: Distinctions and Difference,” the author takes
the reader through a historical perspective of the distinctions between homeland
security and homeland defense, and explains why those distinctions are important. From there, he describes the evolution of homeland defense as a concept
within the Pentagon, delineates some of the tasks within the mission, and contrasts that mission against defense support of civil authorities.
In Chapter 2, “Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities:
Philosophy and Ethos, Reality and Constraints,” the author depicts both missions
as DoD’s domestic imperatives. The chapter begins with a detailed examination
of critical definitions, frequently focusing on incongruities that make their practical application difficult. The distinctions between the missions are deliberate,
rather than arbitrary, and reflective of the philosophical underpinnings regulating how, and to what degree, our military is employed among our people.
Chapter 3, “Civil–­Military Partnership: Homeland Defense Enterprise,” takes
a closer look at DSCA, and provides a practical understanding of DoD’s roles,
authorities, and responsibilities in civil support. The author presents a historical perspective of the mission’s progression, followed by an introduction to the
regulations and legal constraints that govern the employment of the armed forces
in the civil environment. In the process, the chapter highlights the military component of domestic operations across all three levels of government response:
federal, state, and local.
Chapter  4, “Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime
Domain,” provides an excellent depiction of the sea components of the military’s
operations, along “the approaches” and within the homeland. The authors identify the individual responsibilities of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard,
and then emphasize the cooperative efforts that make the maritime partnership a gold standard in traversing effectively and efficiently between issues of
law enforcement and defense. The chapter introduces practiced mechanisms that
empower this partnership and the security it provides, from interdepartmental
agreements to national strategies to international compacts.
Chapter  5, “Likelihood versus Consequence: The Application of the Land
Component in Homeland Defense,” addresses the dimension that by design and
desire is the least likely component we should ever see employed on U.S. soil.
Having said that, the author makes clear that failure, or even misapplication,
of the component could have a devastating effect across multiple tiers of consideration, from trust and confidence to lives and property. The chapter, happily, has little if anything to draw from in terms of a modern historical context.
Nevertheless, it defies the blanket notion that “it cannot happen here,” and in

Introduction

doing so outlines the challenges that the military might face in concert and in
cooperation with other government agencies and functions.
Chapter  6, “The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense,” introduces missions born in the midst of the Cold War and traces how they have evolved in the
face of threats far less conventional in nature. The author focuses on the historic
progress of those missions, first through the oversight of the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and then its partner agency, the U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The chapter emphasizes the importance
of our international alliances in deterring and defeating attacks by either airborne platforms or ballistic missiles. In addition, it points to essential cooperative
efforts taken by the U.S. Air Force, the Air National Guard, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and others to ensure against the kinds of asymmetric attacks
that took place on 9/11.
Chapter  7, “Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues,” is somewhat
unique in the text. It departs from a deliberately broad overview of the military’s
domestic missions to focus on a specific concern: the military’s evolving role in
preventing, protecting against, and (if necessary) recovering from a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident. The authors of the chapter
follow the development of the “CBRN enterprise” as one of the most interesting
manifestations of the post–9/11 era. Urgently constructed against a threat background that is at once real and perceived, it has resulted in a niche capability in
every state and region.
Chapter  8, “Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges,” allows the readers
to apply their newfound understanding to a series of emerging dilemmas that
face our military in defending or otherwise contributing to the security of our
nation. From the many challenges that may lie before us, the author has chosen
the evolving nature of the Arctic, the military’s role in cyber security, and the
compounded complexities of a natural catastrophe as domestic security issues
that will demand a military response. Whether in the lead or in support, the
chapter subtly challenges the reader to balance a two-­sided dilemma of what the
military can do against what it should do.
Taken together, the chapters supply the ultimate reason for writing the book:
to help promote understanding on the frequently less than intuitive application
of the U.S. armed forces within the United States. The same kinds of functions
performed by the military outside of the United States are exponentially more
complex when executed within our borders. In concert with other federal agencies, across three tiers of government, and within our communities, the complexities are greater still. But neither complications nor complexities will deter the
military from fulfilling its domestic imperative. Whether protecting our citizens
from attack, or otherwise contributing to ease their duress, the military’s commitment will remain: to support and defend.

xxiii

xxiv

Introduction

Bibliography
Department of Defense. (February 2013a). Defense Support of Civil Law Enforcement Agencies.
Department of Defense Instruction 3025.21.
Department of Defense. (2013b). Joint Publication 3-28, p. 7.
Department of Homeland Security. (February 2010). Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (April 1949). The Washington Treaty. Retrieved from
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

Chapter

1

Homeland Defense
and Homeland
Security

Distinctions and Difference
James Jay Carafano

Chapter Objectives

•• Understand the rationale for differentiating between the concepts of
homeland defense and homeland security.
•• Explain the changes in definition and emphasis of activities following 9/11.
•• Describe the key tasks of homeland defense.

Introduction
Every generation of Americans has, at some point, worried about being murdered in their own beds by the “outside” enemy. How these United States
citizens have chosen to deal with the “external enemy,” the “other,” has been
shaped as much (if not more) by tradition, culture, and politics as by threats,
strategy, and geography.
Though there are notable exceptions, the American way of safeguarding
the homeland has been marked more by continuity than change over the
course of American history. The post-9/11 conception of creating a clear
distinction between homeland security and defending the homeland or the
homeland defense mission reflected an effort to hold to the classic American
conception of national security. Yet, over the last decade, “mission creep”
and a lack of intellectual clarity has muddled important distinctions. This
1

2

James Jay Carafano

drift is mostly the result of bureaucratic “soul-­searching” efforts to define
organizational missions and responsibilities in an era of declining resources
and growing public indifference to the challenges of protecting the homeland. Whether the current malaise significantly alters the traditional structure of domestic security or is merely a passing phase is an open question.

The Heart of the Homeland
Early Americans did not necessarily start out thinking of North American
geography as a distinct homeland. Rather, as recent research on frontier
history argues, the earliest conception of America was a place without
natural external boundaries requiring protection from an external enemy.
The American heartland was a place where Indians, French, British, and
American colonists intermingled, less constrained by formal geographical
or cultural boundaries. “Worlds melted at the edges and merged,” writes
historian Richard White, “whether a particular practice or way of doing
things was … not so clear … they had to arrive at some common conception
of suitable ways of acting; they had to create … a middle ground.”* As in
any community public safety and security were commonplace concerns.
Communities were largely responsible for protecting their members, usually through local militias. This task, however, was seen as a mission distinct
from protecting the land from an outside enemy.
King Phillip’s War (1675–1676), often called the First Indian War, stimulated change in the conception of the American space. During the conflict,
the colonists suffered terrible reversals, almost being driven out of New
England. In response, they looked to England for great guarantees for their
protection and security, solidifying the idea that America was sovereign
space that had to be protected from an external enemy. Conflicts between
colonists and Indians and struggles between the French and British empires
played a principal role in the formulation of an American conception of
national security.†
Not surprisingly, the American conception of protecting borrowed heavily from the European ideas for protecting the nation-­state. The British
concept of security was especially influential. Both before and after the
American Revolution, protecting the homeland remained mostly a matter
of defending towns, borders, and coastline from external attackers. Internal
security remained primarily a local matter. Throughout the 19th century,
drawing on a long-­standing British antiarmy ideology and the colonial
Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–
1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 50.
† Jill Lepore, Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Random
House, 1999), p. xii.
*

Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

experience, Americans generally opposed using federal forces authorities
for domestic internal security issues.* Intervention was acceptable only in
cases of insurrection (the 1791 Whiskey Rebellion), widespread public disorder (1892 Homestead, Pennsylvania, strike), or extreme domestic terrorism (1905 assassination of Idaho Governor Frank Steunenberg). In other
words, dealing with the outside enemy was the responsibility of the federal
government—principally the Department of Defense. Responding to the
“inside” enemy was largely the task of state and local authorities.
As America’s place in the world became more complicated, the clear division of responsibility between the tasks of the War Department and the
Department of the Navy to deal with the outside enemy and responding to
the inside enemy (such as criminals and domestic terrorism) became more
problematic. Engaging in the world increasingly presented the United States
with the challenge of the “inside-­outside enemy,” domestic threats linked to
a transnational source.
Typically, Americans viewed the inside-­
outside enemy as aberration
rather than as a permanent and persistent threat. Thus, the U.S. response
to significant dangers of terrorism, espionage, sabotage, or insurgency to
threats linked to transnational origins was to adapt existing federal institutions for the mission. In some cases, these responses involved unprecedented use of the American military for domestic security. In the cases
of World War I, World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars, military authorities engaged in significant domestic security activities. During
World War I, for example, Army and Navy intelligence participated in an
ad hoc domestic national security network. These actions were intended
to be a natural extension of the military’s constitutional responsibility to
“provide for the common defense,” though in application during each of
these wars the practice violated the Constitution.
On other occasions, the inside-­outside enemy was dealt with by expanding the law enforcement role of federal authorities to respond to crimes
related to national security (such as the increased role the Federal Bureau
of Investigation during World War II). In some cases, the response was an
admixture of both broadened military authority and expanding the role of
other federal agencies. Yet, in each case, even during the long years of the
Cold War, when the United States was concerned about state-­sponsored
espionage and terrorism, the emphasis on the inside-­outside enemy was
seen as temporary response to a particular threat and less as permanent
adaption of the federal government.

*

For explanation of the ideology and its origins, see Lois G. Schwoerer, ‘No Standing Armies!’ The Anti-­
Army Ideology in Seventeenth-­Century England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

3

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James Jay Carafano

After the Towers Fell
Post-9/11 (Figure 1.1) there was an effort to create a permanent and persistent
federal structure to deal with the inside-­outside enemy. The goal was to create federal core competencies in preventing, responding to, and recovering
from terrorist attacks. In the enabling 2002 legislation that established the
Department of Homeland Security, its primary missions were to (1) prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, (2) reduce the vulnerability of
the United States to terrorism, and (3) minimize the damage, and assist in
the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.
Similarly, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation directed that
the primary purpose of the bureau was combating terrorism. Later, both
organizations expanded their activities to encompass material support to
terrorist activities, and “self-­radicalization,” domestic groups or individuals

FIGURE 1.1  Top left: February 26, 1993—Damage to the North Tower of the World
Trade Center from the 1993 bombing. (From U.S. Department of Justice/­ATF.) Top
right: Twin Towers at the World Trade Center prior to 9/11. (From U.S. Library of
Congress Prints and Photographs Division.) Bottom: September  14, 2001—New
York City firefighters conducting response operations at the World Trade Center
site. (From the Federal Emergency Management Agency/­Dana Trytten.)

Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

who undertook terrorist action on behalf of or in sympathy with a foreign
cause. Other federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, designated ancillary missions and activities in support of homeland security. For
many of those agencies, including the Department of Defense, those activities comprised protecting their own critical infrastructure (such as buildings and installations) from terrorist attack.
Early on, there was a sincere effort to distinguish this new mission set,
which was labeled “homeland security,” from the task of defending the
United States as prescribed in the Constitution. One section of the law
that created the Department of Homeland Security (6 USC 456) specifically states:
Nothing in this Act shall confer upon the Secretary [of Homeland Security]
any authority to engage in warfighting, the military defense of the United
States, or other military activities, nor shall anything in this Act limit the
existing authority of the Department of Defense or the Armed Forces to
engage in warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other
military activities.

Clearly, the intent of the law was to draw a distinction between defending
the homeland from external attack and providing for homeland security.
Initially, there was some confusion of how to conceptualize homeland
security in relation to national security. Obviously, defense was a subset
of national security, but just how homeland security fit into the national
picture was not as immediately apparent. This confusion was exacerbated
by the 2002 law, which established a Homeland Security Council separate
and distinct from the National Security Council (created by statute in the
National Security Act of 1947). Further, President George W. Bush established a separate Homeland Security Council staff in the Executive Office
of the president.
The differentiation of duties between the councils did, in part, reflect the
administration’s desire that Americans not see the establishment of a homeland security focus as an effort to create a “garrison” or “national security”
state, a concept abhorrent to the American conception of security and the
Anglo-­American tradition of ordered liberty. On the other hand, there were
practical considerations as well. Homeland security activities were not as
mature as other traditional federal operations, like defense and diplomacy,
and the president determined he needed a separate management structure
for developing and overseeing homeland security policy.
In conceptual terms, however, though the White House had two councils,
homeland security was intended to be a subset of national security. This
was particularly clear when President Barack Obama decided to merge the
staffs into a single National Security Council staff and discussed the use of

5

6

James Jay Carafano

the Homeland Security Council (though the statutory authority to call the
council remains in law).

Defense and Security—
Viva la Différence
The discussion over whether homeland security and defense should both
be seen as subsidiaries of national security was ancillary to the more serious discussion over defining a clear distinction between the missions. Even
though a distinction between the roles of the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security was highlighted in the 2002 legislation, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld moved quickly to reinforce the notion that there
was likewise a clear division of labor. Rumsfeld wanted to emphasize that
the United States was not moving away from a traditional practice of domestic security—that homeland security was not a function of the Defense
Department. Further, he was concerned about the new focus of security
becoming a drain on the resources of the armed forces, which were already
strained in their worldwide commitments to fighting the Global War on
Terrorism. In his memoirs, Rumsfeld wrote:
I knew how slowly the federal bureaucracy moved, even on a good day. A
new cabinet department would need its own facilities and thousands of personnel…. These changes would take a long time—likely years, not weeks or
months. I also knew that despite its charter, the new department would not
have all the resources to meet its new statutory responsibilities.*

By implication, it was apparent that he understood that there could well be
pressure in Washington to look to the armed forces for additional resources.
In response, the Department of Defense introduced the term homeland
defense to distinguish its activities in protecting U.S. territory from those
of the Department of Homeland Security and other federal, state, tribal,
and local entities involved in homeland security operations. The term was
used in a July 2003 report to Congress. In that document, the Pentagon
describes homeland defense as a discrete, distinct subcomponent of homeland security. “Homeland defense is not a new mission for the Department,”
the report asserted, but it then went on to describe the armed forces role in
homeland security as two missions—homeland defense and civil support.†
The 2003 National Defense Authorization Act established the position
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. The assistant
*


Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), p. 617.
Department of Defense, The DoD Role in Homeland Security, Defense Study and Report to the Congress,
July 2003, p. 2.

Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

secretary was charged with providing overall policy guidance in homeland
defense and civil support, which would come to be synonymous with defense
support to civil authorities. In addition, it became routine for the assistant
secretary to represent Secretary Rumsfeld on all policy matters related to
homeland security with other cabinet officials.
The Homeland Defense concept was refined in the Department of Defense
2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. The description of
homeland defense as a subset of homeland security was dropped. In fact,
the strategy contended, homeland defense was a distinctly different mission. Homeland security was described in the strategy as domestic activities
to combat transnational terrorism. The Defense Department, the strategy noted,
does not have the assigned responsibility to stop terrorists from coming
across our borders, to stop terrorists from coming through US ports, or to
stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States
(these responsibilities belong to the Department of Homeland Security). Nor
does DoD have the authority to seek out and arrest terrorists in the United
States (these responsibilities belong to the Department of Justice).*

Therefore, defense was distinct from the homeland security.
The definition of homeland defense in the 2005 strategy was clearly delineated as “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population,
and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or
other threats as directed by the President,” and the document moved immediately to declare, “The Department of Defense is responsible for homeland
defense.” Furthermore, the strategy went on to assert that
Homeland Defense includes missions such as domestic air defense. The
Department recognizes that threats planned or inspired by “external” actors
may materialize internally. The reference to “external threats” does not limit
where or how attacks could be planned and executed. The Department is
prepared to conduct homeland defense missions whenever the President,
exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes
military actions.†

Thus, while the new term was not defined in any federal statute, the missions described were consistent with the traditional missions assigned to the
armed forces that are defined in law.
In 2007, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible for issuing joint doctrinal publications to guide the conduct of military operations, published
*


Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, p. 5.
Ibid.

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James Jay Carafano

its Homeland Defense manual. This document laid out a mission set that
included objectives to









(1) identify the threat;
(2) dissuade adversaries from undertaking programs or conducting actions
that could pose a threat to the US homeland;
(3) ensure defense of the homeland and deny an adversary’s access to the
nation’s sovereign airspace, territory, and territorial seas;
(4) ensure access to space and information;
(5) protect DCI [Defense Critical Infrastructure … e.g., bases, buildings];
(6) deter aggression and coercion by conducting global operations;
(7) decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails; and
(8) recover from any attack or incident.*

The tasks to accomplish these missions would primarily be protecting infrastructure through physical measures and cybersecurity, air interdiction,
maritime interception, and land operations.
Despite the Department of Defense’s effort to create a definitional firewall
between security and defense, misperception and confusion persisted. This
was the result, in part, of the term homeland defense. By including the word
homeland in the descriptor, nonexperts did not readily grasp the distinction
between homeland security and homeland defense. It would have been far
wiser if the Pentagon had just invested more effort in explaining the difference between its traditional defense mission and homeland security, rather
than creating a new, unfamiliar, and confusing term.
Further, even though the armed forces were not responsible for homeland
security per se, part of their traditional missions always included military
support to civil authorities. Some of those activities that the military might
be called on to support civilian authorities could well be homeland security
tasks or other tasks performed by the Department of Homeland Security.
When the American public witnessed National Guard soldiers manning
U.S. airports after 9/11, though these soldiers were operating under civilian
control and supporting others, the distinction was lost on most Americans.
As far as they were concerned, it appeared that the Pentagon was conducting homeland security.

After the Storm
In many respects, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, with devastating winds, rain,
and flooding that ravaged three Gulf Coast states, was a game changer for
the American view of the newborn terms—homeland security and homeland defense. Seen by many as the worst natural disaster to strike the nation
in modern times, the storm came in the wake of an already divisive and
*

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Homeland Defense, Joint Publication 3-27, July 12, 2007, p. viii.

Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

highly partisan political environment following the 2003 invasion of Iraq
and the troubled and bloody occupation that followed. The performance
of the administration and its newly established Department of Homeland
Security (which, in accordance with the law establishing the department
in 2002, was also responsible for overseeing the federal response to natural
disasters) proved a tempting target for condemnation.* One of the major criticisms was that the Department of Homeland Security had overly focused
its resources and attention on combating terrorism and neglected its federal
disaster response role. Exacerbating concerns was that the U.S. military was
perceived as a more important and effective responder than the Department
of Homeland Security.
During and after the disaster, the U.S. military took great pains to retain
the distinction between its legitimate functions and that of Homeland
Security. “For those of us on the active military side,” wrote Lt. Gen. Russel
L. Honoré, who served as the senior U.S. armed forces commander for the
disaster response, in his memoirs, “this issue of dealing with state governments during disasters is almost like a dance. Do we lead or follow? In this
sense the feds, especially the active military, are always the junior partner.”
In short, he argued Katrina changed nothing.†
But Katrina did change everything.
While the U.S. military response was seen as vital, it was also criticized
for initially being too slow. Additionally, with the criticisms leveled at the
Department of Homeland Security, the administration felt under intense
pressure to demonstrate it would more proactively respond to future disasters. As part of this effort, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM),
established after 9/11 to provide a single military joint command for active
duty forces operating within the geography of the United States, adopted
a doctrine of anticipatory response. The Defense Department would later
summarize this approach as “go big, go early, go fast, be smart.”‡ In other
words, in staging for major disasters, rather than wait for requests for support from state and local authorities, NORTHCOM would stage resources
and support even before assessments of needs were made.
A requirement for anticipatory response fueled what the department itself
described as greater expectations “for a decisive, fast, and effective Federal
response to disasters.Ӥ At the same time, however, the more the military services leaned forward, the more their efforts also undermined the traditional
U.S. approach to disaster response, which relied heavily on the principles of
John Brinkerhoff, “In the Wake of the Storm: The National Response to Hurricane Katrina,” in James
Carafano and Richard Weitz, eds., Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), pp. 211–234.
† Russel L. Honore, Survival: How a Culture of Preparedness Can Save You and Your Family from Disaster
(New York: Atria, 2009), pp. 124–162.
‡ Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, February 2013, p. 6.
§ Ibid.
*

9

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James Jay Carafano

federalism and tier response, which emphasized the authority and responsibility of local, state, and tribal authorities to meet the public safety and
emergency response needs of their communities.*
The Department of Defense also drafted plans to greatly expand forces
specifically organized, trained, and equipped to provide civil support in the
event of disasters involving the effects of weapons of mass destruction—
including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-­
explosive
(CBRNE) incidents. The 2005 strategy established a stretch goal of providing
consequence management military forces for multiple, simultaneous, large-­
scale incidents across the United States.† The units would include not just
troops providing technical assistance, such as detection, monitoring, and
decontamination, but also forces that would perform myriad support tasks,
including logistics and security.
Establishing requirements for more robust consequence management
forces was certainly legitimate given contemporary concerns over the potential of large-­scale terrorist attacks on populated areas.‡ In addition, the 2005
strategy was careful to describe these units not as homeland security forces,
but as troops that would be available to support civil authorities, a traditional defense mission.

A Distant Call
As the consequences of 9/11 faded into history, the emerging dual structure
of homeland security and defense began to unravel. A number of factors
influenced the drift in conceptual clarity. A new administration took office
under President Barack Obama in 2008. President Obama deemphasized
the central mission of combating transnational terrorism in national security strategy. Further, as a result of economic recession, there was a renewed
effort to rein in federal spending, including spending on defense and security. Additionally, clearly the United States had become a “harder target” for
transnational terrorism in the years after 9/11, lessening public fears over
threats to the domestic population.§ Finally, the federal government increasingly received less criticism for its response to large-­scale disasters, such
as hurricanes.
Mark A. Sauter and James Jay Carafano, Homeland Security: A Complete Guide (New York, McGraw-­
Hill, 2012), p. 237.
† Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, p. 31.
‡ See, for example, Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, World at
Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (New York:
Vintage Books, 2008).
§ For a list of foiled plots, see James Jay Carafano, Steve Bucci, and Jessica Zuckerman, “Fifty Terror Plots
Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism,” Backgrounder, Heritage
Foundation, April 25, 2012, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/­bg2682.pdf.
*

Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

The Department of Defense showed increasing disinterest in assuming
a robust role in homeland defense. This was most strongly evident in the
department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a periodic mandatory report to Congress projecting the missions, strategies, and requirements for the armed forces. One assessment found that the QDR
cut NORTHCOM’s CBRNE response capability by two-­thirds of its required
technical skills…. After nearly a decade of bureaucratic deliberation and
debate, the department’s progress in achieving a rapid and effective CBRNE
response capability under NORTHCOM command and control would be
significantly degraded. Driven by misguided departmental policy, overseas
stress on the forces, and a continuing prejudice toward the entire DSCA
[defense support of civil authorities] mission set, DoD would soon be back to
“one gold plate.”*

A further sign that DoD had less interest in the civil support mission was
reflected in press reporting that the Department of Defense was considering abolishing the position of Assistant Secretary of Homeland Defense and
returning to the pre-9/11 model where the U.S. Army acted as the executive
agent for DSCA.
In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a research arm
of the Congress, released an assessment of Defense Department homeland
defense measures. It noted that the department’s policies had evolved significantly. It further noted that these changes were not reflected in published
documents. “Reliance on an outdated strategy could hinder DoD’s ability
to effectively plan for and respond to major disasters and emergencies,” the
GAO found.†

Whither Homeland Security?
While the Defense Department appeared to be losing interest in homeland
defense, the Department of Homeland Security was also undergoing a shift
in its thinking. The new department was tasked by Congress to undertake a
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The QHSR was to be similar in concept to the QDR undertaken by the Pentagon. The Department of
Homeland Security delivered its first report in 2010. This report reflected a
distinct shift in emphasis. Following Katrina, the Bush administration in
its 2007 homeland security strategy placed additional emphasis on disaster
Paul McHale, Critical Mismatch: The Dangerous Gap between Rhetoric and Readiness in DoD’s Civil
Support Mission, Special Report, August 13, 2012, p. 19.
† Government Accountability Office, DoD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense and Civil Support
Guidance, GAO-13-128, October 2012, p. 1.
*

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James Jay Carafano

response. The QHSR, prepared under the administration of President Barack
Obama, went further, broadening the concept of homeland security from
a focus on combating terrorism to essentially reflect all the mission areas
of the department. Immigration and border security, for example, were
given much greater prominence in the report, not as tools for counter­
terrorism, but as critical homeland security mission sets in their own right.
Similarly, the department’s cybersecurity responsibilities were given much
greater emphasis.
In 2013, the Department of Defense updated its Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. This document superseded
the 2005 strategy. One primary influence on the new strategy was clearly
outlined in a section labeled “Strategic Context,” which included a discussion of fiscal realities. The discussion of the impact of a downtrend in defense
with the conclusion of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq assumed
future budget austerity. The strategy confirmed the decision made in the
2010 QDR that DoD would not direct “large investments in new equipment
and capabilities.”* Capacity building was no longer an important priority for
the Pentagon.
The strategy reflected a second significant change as well. The 2009 terrorist attack at Fort Hood, Texas, was cited as an event that required the Defense
Department to place greater emphasis on counterterrorism. The strategy
goes on to expand the definition of homeland defense to include “provide
assistance to domestic civil authorities in the event of natural or manmade
disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or catastrophic event.Ӡ
Further, in a diagram detailing the homeland defense mission, the strategy
includes as an objective “prevent terrorist attacks on the homeland through
support to law enforcement.”‡ This framework represented a distinct and
dramatic departure from the 2005 strategy, which explicitly excluded combating terrorism from the definition of homeland defense.
In reality, both the nature of DoD activities and its commitment of
resources are far less significant than suggested by the conceptual changes
outlined in the 2013 defense strategy. The Department of Defense had always
provided some counterterrorism support to domestic law enforcement in
the United States, even before 9/11. Such support was consistent with U.S.
laws restricting the employment of active duty forces in law enforcement
activities.§ In addition, the counterterrorism activities outlined in 2013 are
relatively modest and not an expansion of Defense Department activities in
domestic security.
Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, February 2013, p. 7.
Ibid., p. 1.
‡ Ibid., p. 9.
§ Sauter and Carafano, Homeland Security, pp. 212–219.
*



Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

A third change in the new strategy was the additional emphasis placed
on protecting critical infrastructure. This reflected the federal government’s
growing preoccupation with cybersecurity issues.
These changes, in concert with the broadening of the definition of homeland security in the 2010 QHSR, blur rather than clarify the distinctions
between homeland defense and security. The Department of Defense continues to maintain that homeland defense is a separate enterprise—yet its tasks
now include combating terrorism. Both homeland defense and homeland
security now list cybersecurity as a major mission. Both terms now place
greater emphasis on disaster response. The utility and distinction between
the missions are becoming less, not more, clear.

On the Border
One area that did not receive additional emphasis in the 2013 strategy was
the issue of border security. Since the inception of the homeland defense and
security concepts, the Department of Defense eschewed any emphasis on
including the defense of land borders under its broad responsibilities.
Since 9/11, the armed forces have provided support to the Department of
Homeland Security for safeguarding the border. Most noteworthy, in 2006,
President Bush sent 6,000 National Guard troops to the southern border
through a program called Operation Jump Start. These troops were deployed
under Title 32 (“National Guard”) of the United States Code, which means
they served under the operational control of the governors, and were tasked
with helping Border Patrol agents.*
Following a failed and highly controversial major immigration reform
in 2007, the issues of border security and immigration reform have always
been closely linked together. In order to avoid the criticism of “militarizing”
the border, both the Bush and Obama administrations avoided including
border security under the concept of homeland defense. This practice was
continued in the 2013 strategy.
In 2013, Congress renewed its efforts on comprehensive immigration and
border security reform. Conspicuously absent from the debate or reform
initiative pressed by the administration or the Congress was any discussion of the role of the armed forces on the land border. The administration
continues to classify any border security support activities as part of the
mission of DSCA.

*

Jena Baker McNeill, “15 Steps to Better Border Security: Reducing America’s Southern Exposure,”
Backgrounder 2245, Heritage Foundation, March  9, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/­research/­reports/​
2009/03/15-steps-­to-­better-­border-­security-­reducing-­a mericas-­southern-­exposure#_ftn24.

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James Jay Carafano

State Play
Today, the concept of homeland defense reflects both continuity and
changes. On the one hand, the Defense Department’s core missions for protecting the homeland remain unchanged. These include primary responsibility for interdicting threats aimed at the U.S. homeland land through air,
sea, or space that violate U.S. sovereignty. Missile defense represents the best
example. While many debate the efficacy and need for defense against ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. territory, none question that providing missile
defenses is exclusively the responsibility of the armed forces.
The approaches to America by air and sea are a little more complicated,
but here, too, jurisdiction issues have largely been resolved. The U.S. military is responsible for air and sea sovereignty. There are some terrorist acts
that could also potentially involve homeland security, and in some cases
other federal agencies share maritime and air security duties, most notably the U.S. Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), both components of the Department of Homeland Security.
On the whole, however, the terms homeland defense and homeland
security offer little hindrance to cooperative efforts between the Defense
and Homeland Security Departments. For example, both the Department
of Defense and the U.S. Coast Guard participate in the maritime operational
threat response (MOTR) plan. The plan
was issued in October 2005. The MOTR describes the U.S. government’s plan
to respond to terrorist threats in the maritime domain, including the roles
of various federal agencies, protocols for lead and supporting agencies, and
the need for additional planning. The MOTR assigned the DHS [Department
of Homeland Security], implemented through the Coast Guard, lead agency
responsibility for interdicting maritime threats where it operates….*

In short, at sea, and in the air and space, the terms have allowed for both
sufficient continuity of effort and a coherent division of labor.
Similarly, in conception, the DSCA mission is flexible and robust enough
to allow the Department of Defense to support “whole of government” missions, including those led by the Department of Homeland Security.
On the other hand, significant confusion and debate remain over how
issues such as terrorism, cybersecurity, border security, and disaster response
will be classified and resourced in the future. Domestic politics have caused
significant shifts in how these challenges have been dealt with since 9/11.
They are very much unfinished business for Washington, DC.
*

Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Protect the Nation’s
Seaports, Audit Report 06-26, Office of the Inspector General, March 2006, http://www.justice.gov/­oig/­
reports/­FBI/­a0626/exec.htm.

Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

Whither the Future?
The distinctions between the role of defense and domestic security remain
an important subject of study. America has always struggled with how to
deal with the inside-­outside enemy in a manner that protects individual
freedoms as well as the lives and property of those who live within the
nation’s sovereign boundaries. Maintaining ordered liberty—freedom and
security—is key to retaining the character of the American nation. The danger of definitional drift in terms is that such an exercise could well create
either gaps in security or opportunities to exceed the authority of government and suppress individual rights and freedoms.
Further, the debate over concepts also reflects a war over resources.
Whether justified or not, the government plans to dedicate fewer resources
to protecting the homeland than it has in the past. Additionally, the allocation of those resources is shifting to different priorities.
Thus, the debate over terms remains more than an academic exercise.
The changes in our conception of homeland defense and security reflect a
significant recalibration of how Washington plans to defend the homeland
in the future.

Discussion Questions
1. Cite and explain some of the definitional changes and points of
emphasis in activities following 9/11. In your determination, which,
if any, of these changes to definitions of homeland security and
defense might have occurred anyway had 9/11 never happened?
2. Consider and explain why external wars abroad often lead to broadened military authority and expanding the role of other federal
agencies domestically? How does the military and government reaction to 9/11 compare to actions taken to previous wars?
3. In a DSCA context, how might the notions of “anticipatory response”
and “leaning forward”—organizing, training, and equipping specialized units and troops for response, decision making, and support
efforts—undermine traditional U.S. approaches in emergency management and other areas? What are some drawbacks, if any, to this
way of thinking?
4. Should the military or Homeland Security bear primary responsibility for ensuring against external terrorist threats to the homeland?
Who should take the lead in domestic terrorist threats?

15

Chapter

2

Homeland Defense
and Defense Support
of Civil Authorities
Philosophy and Ethos,
Reality and Constraints*
Bert B. Tussing

Chapter Objectives

•• Discuss the principal features and issues in homeland defense (HD)
•• Review the concept and meaning of defense support to civil
authorities
•• Examine the objectives, boundaries, dilemmas, and challenges of HD

Beginning with Definitions
There is nothing intuitive about the application of the U.S. military within
the United States. Most of our history, especially in the last century, led us
to thinking of defense as being something that takes place well beyond our
nation’s borders. The employment of the military in civil functions, especially anything having to do with law enforcement, is frequently viewed as
somewhere between inadvisable to antithetical in the American ethos. This
is not meant to imply that utilizing the tremendous capabilities and capacities of the military should be entirely restricted to the business of fighting
and winning our nation’s wars. But it does point to a tradition that has carefully prescribed a role to the military that safely secures its status as a servant
*

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the federal
government.

17

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Bert B. Tussing

to our society, never its overseer. Realizing the balance that this implies
(and which the authors of this text will insist must always be maintained),
we may be well served in beginning our studies of homeland defense and
defense support of civil authorities by examining the definitions that will
serve as the foundation of the military’s domestic employment.
We will begin with the definition of homeland security. Since 9/11, that
definition has evolved in the government’s parlance. Understandably at first,
the definition was reflective exclusively of the attacks, and the focus was
squarely upon terrorism. As such, the first National Strategy for Homeland
Security (2002) defined homeland security as
a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. (p. 2)

The immediate problem with the definition, of course, was that it would
fail to represent many of the functions that would fall to the department
charged with leading the governmental component of the effort. Many of
the matters and concerns that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has to face with immigration, customs and border enforcement, and (perhaps most notably) emergency management are entirely separate from the
concerns surrounding terrorism highlighted in this definition.
Curiously, when the strategy was revised in 2007, the definition remained
the same, albeit accompanied by an almost parenthetical acknowledgment
that preparing for “catastrophic natural disasters and man-­made disasters,
while not homeland security per se, can nevertheless increase the security
of the Homeland” (p. 3). But in 2010, the Department issued a new definition of homeland security, via the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
(QHSR). Therein homeland security was redefined as
a concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive. (p. 13)

Figure 2.1 highlights some of the salient definitions when establishing homeland security, homeland defense, and defense support of civil authorities.
Still, for our purposes, this would seem to be more of a desired end state
than a definition. A better portrayal of how that end could be attained was
offered slightly earlier in the document, framed as a description rather than
a definition. There the QHSR held that
homeland security describes the intersection of evolving threats and hazards
with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense,
emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration. (p. 11)

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Homeland Security
Is defined as a concerted national 
effort to ensure a homeland that 
is safe, secure, and resilient 
against terrorism and other 
hazards where American 
interests, aspirations, and way 
of life can thrive. 

Homeland Security
… describes the intersection of 
evolving threats and hazards with
the traditional governmental and
civic responsibilities of civil 
defense, emergency response, 
law enforcement, customs, 
border control, and immigration. 

Homeland Defense
The protection of the United
States sovereignty, territory,
domestic population, and critical
defense infrastructure against 
external threats and aggression
or other threats as directed by
POTUS.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Support provided in response to
requests for assistance from civil
authorities for special events,
domestic emergencies,
designated law enforcement
support, and other domestic
activities. 

FIGURE 2.1  Definitions and descriptions relating to homeland security, homeland
defense, and defense support to civil authorities.

This description, one might suggest, provides a better framework for the
functions that have been assigned within homeland security, for which DHS
bears the lion’s share of federal government accountability.
But the combination of the description and definition highlights some
essential facets that must underscore our examination throughout this
volume. Note that the strategy calls for a “concerted national effort,” not
a governmental effort, and certainly not just a federal government effort.
Indeed, the QHSR makes a point of describing homeland security as an
“enterprise” (p. 12) whose responsibilities are spread throughout the federal interagency; through three tiers of federal, state, and local government;
between the public and private sectors; and on to communities, families,
and individuals. Taken together, the enterprise is expected to prepare for
and, as necessary, respond to evolving threats and hazards—whether those
hazards are natural or man-­made, accidental or deliberate—as a matter of
both governmental and civic responsibility. Figure  2.2 illustrates some of
the components of this enterprise.
At this point the astute student may be wondering why we are focusing
on homeland security when the subject of the text is homeland defense and
defense support of civil authorities. And he or she would be correct to ask.
The distinction between homeland security and homeland defense is pronounced. Too often the casual observer will assume that homeland defense
is a subset of homeland security (or worse, synonymous with homeland
security), rather than recognizing them as distinct, if related, functions.
The difference is very important in the federal government in as much as
responsibility for the former lies overwhelmingly with the Department of
Defense (DoD), and responsibility for the latter with DHS. This becomes

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Bert B. Tussing

Federal 
Government
State, Local,
Tribal, Territorial
Governments

Families and
Individuals

Homeland
Security
Enterprise

Communities/
Faith‐Based
Organizations

International
Partners

Private
Sector

Non‐
Governmental
Organizations

FIGURE 2.2  The homeland security enterprise.

clearer upon examining the definition of homeland defense, delineated in
DoD’s 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support:
Homeland defense is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and
aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. (p. 5)

It may be interesting to note that DoD’s 2013 Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities fails to offer a definition
for homeland defense. In fairness, the strategy does offer a set of mission
descriptions that serve well in our understanding of the responsibilities,
capabilities, and limitations surrounding the use of the military in the
domestic environment (p. 9), but the document fails to either endorse or
amend the definition set forward in the 2005 strategy. In reviewing that
original definition, it may appear that the later writers took an easier path.
The 2005 definition begins with a function one would well expect out of
DoD: “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, [and] domestic population.” But then the definition makes a specific reference to critical defense
infrastructure (emphasis added). This leaves the reader with something of
a dilemma.

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Critical infrastructure is defined as
systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination of those matters. (National Response
Plan, 2004, p. 64)

Critical defense infrastructure, however, is defined as
the composite of DoD and non-­DoD assets essential to project, support,
and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. DCI is a combination of task critical assets and defense critical assets. (DoD Policies and
Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, Department of Defense Directive
3020.40, p. 16)

In turn, a task-­critical asset is defined as
an asset that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation
or destruction would have a serious, debilitating effect on the ability of one or
more DoD Components … to execute the task or mission-­essential task it
supports. (p. 19)

The definition ends with the declaration that
task critical assets are used to identify defense critical assets, which are, in turn,
defined as assets of such extraordinary importance to operations in peace,
crisis, and war that [their] incapacitation or destruction would have a very
serious, debilitating effect on the ability of the Department of Defense to
fulfill its missions. (p. 16)

Beyond the bureaucratic flavor of this descent into definitions, the substance of critical defense infrastructure is generally held to be those assets
or systems that provide the Department of Defense its capability of projecting power, whether by land, air, or sea. The concerns here, while relatively
parochial, are nevertheless understandable to the department’s mission. The
conceptual dilemma behind the concerns, however, may lie in how critical defense infrastructure can be viewed apart from the rest of the nation’s
critical infrastructure. On the most elementary level, the systems are tangibly connected. If, for instance, one is interested in protecting the power
projection capabilities enabled by critical defense infrastructure facilities in
Morehead City, North Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia, can he or she ignore
the road systems that feed into those ports from Camp Lejeune or Fort

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Bert B. Tussing

Benning? And what of the infrastructure in water systems, energy grids,
and cyber systems that feed and connect both civil and military functions?
Can the military “defend its own,” separate and distinct from intrinsically
related systems outside of its immediate control?
Then there is that part of the homeland defense definition that specifically
charges the military to defend against “external threats and aggression.” The
intent behind the deliberately labeled “external” nature of the threat of the
military’s concern is to take on any attacks or threats of attack from a foreign adversary, while leaving internal threats (traditionally associated with
criminal activity) to the purview of federal, state, and local law enforcement
entities. Continuing our traditional appraisal, the military is historically
focused on conventional, nation-­state aggressors. But what if the aggressor is a subnational or transnational actor—characteristic of most terrorist
activities? Countering terrorism is still viewed as a law enforcement function in the United States; where is the military’s role there? And how clear
is the external and internal distinction the definition promotes. If a “homegrown” attack is sponsored or supported by a nation-­state adversary, is that
an external threat? Again, what if the sponsor is not a nation-­state, but a
transnational terrorist organization like al Qaeda? What if the threat to
our citizens’ well-­being is not motivated by religion, ideology, or politics—
but simple criminal greed. Is the military’s lack of clarity in responding to
transnational terrorism murkier still in dealing with transnational criminal organizations?
The point here is not to seek ways to absolve the military of responsibility
in these areas, but to clarify what should be expected of the armed forces as
lines of security, law enforcement, and defense begin to blur. The inability
of the 2005 definition to serve as a foundation for their employment in the
homeland is not so much an indictment against the strategy’s authors as an
indicator of how complex the issues are that face us.
Complexity becomes less of a problem in defining civil support, or what
the Department of Defense now prefers to call defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA). Then again, one should not expect cut-­and-­dried clarity either. In the same 2005 Strategy, DSCA was defined as
DoD support, including Federal military forces, the Department’s career
civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets,
for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other
activities. (p. 5)

In time, an important demarcation would be added to the definition,
as Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (2010), defined DSCA as

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

support provided by US Federal military forces, Department of Defense
civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of
Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary
of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects
and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in
response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from
qualifying entities for special events. (p. 16)

The deliberate addition of the National Guard by name was not necessarily
done to atone for an earlier slight; one could argue that the Guard is a component of the Department of Defense. However, the deliberate discriminator in this definition does pay homage to the political reality that the Guard
may be an asset of the federal government or the separate states’ governments,
depending on the circumstances of its employment. This unique dual status
will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter and in chapters to come.
Beyond the enumeration of who would be providing support to civil authorities, the updated definition took greater pains to prescribe when the support
would be provided: “in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities.” Now one might not find this distinction particularly shocking. Why provide help that hasn’t been asked for? But the insertion of the phrase reminds
us that the military does not impose its will in the domestic environment,
even with an intention to assist. Civil control over military employment, from
mobilization to introduction to withdrawal, is a constant theme in DSCA.
Wrapping up our examination, it is only logical that we follow the who and
when elements of the definition with a bit of the what. In the 2010 definition,
the functions outlined for civil support were very generally “domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from
qualifying entities for special events.” However clumsily worded, the definition conveys the principal functions (domestic emergency, law enforcement
support, and special events) while simultaneously leaving appropriate room
for executive discretion. At the same time, one vestige of the 2005 definition will recommend itself to our thinking. Note that the earlier definition
referred to “designated law enforcement” activities. The pronounced implication therefore is that the military will not support all law enforcement
activities. The conscious restraint reflected in this part of the definition will
be revisited throughout our study.

Outside Expectations—Inside Demands
It might be interesting to assess the average American’s expectations surrounding the role of the military in functions traditionally associated with

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Bert B. Tussing

civil authorities. If they bother to think about it (and let’s be honest, most
involved in the day-­to-­day process of their own existence do not), most
Americans have a pronounced reticence about seeing our military cast in
the role of law enforcement. As will be discussed in detail in other parts
of this text, we expect our soldiers to be soldiers and our policemen to be
policemen. Similarly, we would be surprised to see much of the population
signing on to see our military’s attention wrapped tightly about emergency
management. We have what those who ponder the issue consider the appropriate first responders—firefighters, emergency medical technicians, even
police from the security side of the issue. And, after all, doesn’t the military
have a “day job” that should be demanding their attention—that notion of
fighting and winning the nation’s wars or presenting enough of a deterrent
that they are not obliged to have to demonstrate the capability? Doesn’t that
provide a proper depiction of relative responsibilities?
But what would happen if we were to change the terminology from
emergency management to disaster response. At that point do the expectations change? When the weight of an event, be it natural or man-­made,
exceeds the ability of local first responders; when the progression of expectation ratchets up beyond community endurance to state and federal
assistance, how soon is the public anticipating a uniformed presence? If the
response demands ascend beyond a particular state’s capabilities or capacities to the point that federal help is required, is the introduction or addition
of military assets a foregone conclusion? What then of the concerns of that
military’s readiness in terms of defense?
The truth is that Mr. and Mrs. Public have a right to expect the military
to be a part of their government’s response, both state and federal, when
the traditional tools of emergency/­disaster response have been temporarily overwhelmed. And, while not primarily configured for those emergency
management responsibilities, or institutionally designed for law enforcement, to summarily withhold the strengths of our armed forces when our
citizens are truly in need would be irresponsible at best. Who else holds
the depth and breadth of logistical resources, admittedly designed for combat, but configurable to other demands? Who else can quickly mobilize and
deploy their brand of disciplined force, focused on a range of requirements
from security to transportation to communication—even to supplementing far more sophisticated requirements like medical support or hazardous
material disposition? Finally, given a degree of planning and practiced relationships, who else can provide that degree of relief in as responsive a manner? In the current administration, having learned lessons from Hurricane
Katrina and events that followed (see Figure  2.3), the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has developed an approach to responding to
disaster that is embodied in a new mantra of “Go Big, Go Fast, Go Early.”
Can we go without the military?

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

FIGURE 2.3  August  31, 2005—Commander Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina, U.S.
Army (USA) Lt. Gen. (LGEN) Russel L. Honore, Commanding Gen. (CG), First
U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia, embarks on the U.S. Navy Wasp class amphibious assault ship USS BATAAN (LHD 5) to get a firsthand look at the ship’s disaster
relief operations capabilities. The BATAAN was involved in the humanitarian assistance operations in Katrina, led by the Department of Defense (DoD) in conjunction
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The BATAAN is tasked
as the maritime disaster relief coordinator for the Navy’s role in the relief efforts.
(From U.S. Navy. Photo by Josn Joanne de Vera.)

Logical Limits
We can, of course, with varying degrees of success, and no one in authority
would propose that we risk that success when failure equates to loss of life,
sustained suffering, or greater damage from incidents that could have been
avoided. But experience and tradition have taught us that the final clause of
FEMA’s mantra—“Go Smart”—should also be applied in considering when
and how the military should be introduced in response to civil requirements.
Long-­term repercussions to shortsighted application have led the military to
the vetting criteria examining every request against questions of legality,
lethality, cost, risk, readiness, and appropriateness.
Even more, the tradition of separating the functions of defense and the
law in this society is one that will weigh heavily in any decision to employ
the military in all but the most structured support to law enforcement.
From an ethos established even before the founding of the Republic, our
nation has guarded carefully against the potential of our military ever being
our overseers. Accordingly, legislation and tradition have led our armed
forces away from functions associated with the most kinetic aspects of law
enforcement, from arrests and apprehension to incarceration and interrogation. Fortunately, there is no stronger proponent of the separation between
the functions of the soldier and the police than the military itself. This

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should come as no surprise, because (to paraphrase Lincoln) in the history
of the world there has never been an armed force more “of the people, by the
people,” and emphatically “for the people” than the all-­volunteer force that
currently serves the United States.

Categories of Support
Over time, therefore, the public has come to value, and expect, the military’s
response to domestic crises. Likewise, the military has developed doctrine
to accommodate those expectations within the necessary constraints of its
mission and its place in our society. In the modern evolution of that doctrine the support has variably been referred to as military assistance to civil
authorities (MACA), military support to civil authorities (MSCA), military
support to civil law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA), military assistance for
civil disturbance (MACDIS), and civil support. As we have pointed out, the
latest appellation is defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and in fairness, several of the aforementioned designations could be considered subsets
of DSCA. But whatever the label, the Department of Defense has generally
categorized the military’s support under three main headings: domestic
emergencies, designated law enforcement, and other activities (Department
of Defense, Civil Support, Joint Publication 3-28, 2007, p. III-2).
Domestic emergencies spring most quickly to mind in these discussions,
especially in terms of natural disasters, and we will examine them to some
degree. But in framing our thinking, we would do well to approach the military’s support not just in terms of response and recovery, but across the
spectrum of what we might think of as a homeland security continuum, as
shown in Figure 2.4. That continuum we will delineate as matters of prevention, protection, response, and recovery. The population tends to think of
the military in these regards as assisting after an event has occurred. This is
somewhat ironic, because in nearly every other endeavor where the military
is involved, the institution is far more engaged in preparing for something
to happen rather than responding after it has occurred. Indeed, in dealing
with our enemies (potential or realized), our combatants are far more desirous of deterring or dissuading than being forced to defend and defeat. That
said, the preparations for the battles we hope will never come ensure our
preparedness against an enemy that will not be deterred.
Preparedness
Prevention

Protection

Response

Recovery

Response & Recovery  

FIGURE 2.4  The homeland security continuum.

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

As such, the military’s approach to defense may serve as an excellent
example in the government’s approach to emergency management (federal,
state, and local). Indeed, in the last two administrations, the federal government has begun devoting the same kind of attention to preparing for
disaster as the country has paid to responding to it. In the George W.
Bush administration, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8,
National Preparedness, called for developing a “national domestic all-­hazard
preparedness goal.” Earlier directives (HSPD 5, Management of Domestic
Incidents) focused on coordinating response efforts following a disaster, specifically through the National Response Framework (NRF). HSPD 8 began
the description of how federal departments and agencies would prepare for
such responses.
The Obama administration continued the initiative by reiterating a call
for a “national preparedness goal” to delineate core capabilities necessary
for preparedness, and further calling for a “national preparedness system”
to guide the nation through activities necessary to achieve the goal. In sum,
the national preparedness system will bring with it an obligation to build
frameworks for preparedness to accompany the NRF’s focus on response
and recovery. While this is occurring, one may be sure that considerable
attention is being devoted to how the military will be applied as a part of the
federal response. The federal component is not the only level of government
that should be planning, of course; neither are the federal plans the only
ones to be coordinated with and supported by the military.
The purpose of the plans, of course, is to provide for the most effective
and efficient utilization of assets if and when the time for response and
recovery arrives. The National Response Framework is configured along a
tiered approach that introduces additional states’ assets to supplement local
governments in times of crises, and federal assets to support the states as
their own ability to meet the crisis is overwhelmed. The unique capabilities
and substantial capacities of the armed forces may be a part of that state or
federal response. But note that the military’s efforts beyond preparedness
are focused primarily on immediate response issues of saving lives, preventing human suffering, or mitigating great property damage (Department of
Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, DoD Directive 3025.18, 2010,
p. 4). The military’s focus is not on long-­term recovery operations.
We have already alluded to a national reticence surrounding the employment of the U.S. armed forces in traditional law enforcement functions. The
deliberately worded “designated law enforcement” hints at a spirit of restriction that basically predates the Republic itself. This does not mean that the
military cannot support federal, state, and local law enforcement officials.
Recently, in fact, we have seen substantial support rendered to the Customs
and Border Protection component of the Department of Homeland Security,

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during Operation Jump Start in the Bush administration and Operation
Phalanx during the Obama presidency. But that support came in terms of
things like communications, transportation, intelligence augmentation,
sensor operation, and even training. It did not encompass what we might
consider traditional hard functions of law enforcement, such as arrest,
apprehension, interrogation, or incarceration.
Reticence, however, does not categorically rule out the employment of the
military in a traditional law enforcement role if necessity absolutely dictates.
There have, for instance, been rare occasions in the history of the United
States in which duly constituted state and local law enforcement were unable
to quell civil disturbances, and elements of the active duty component of the
U.S. military were called in to assist those authorities in regaining control.
The most recent example of such an event was the so-­called Rodney King
riots that took place in Los Angeles, California, in 1992. In such an instance,
the military may be directed to action by the president, under the authorities granted in the Insurrection Act of 1807, if he concludes that the state had
denied equal protection under the laws secured by the Constitution, or was
unable to provide such protection. The obvious hesitancy on the part of the
military to take on such a mission is only overcome by direct presidential
direction. Even in these historically rare circumstances, however, the military’s paradigm remains consistent: the temporary mantle of authority is
born only as long as it takes the duly constituted civil authorities to regain
control of the situation at hand. As soon as that occurs, the military resumes
its appropriate role as a supporting agency to civil leader­ship.
The last category of DSCA is not nearly as dramatic, but important for our
consideration and understanding. “Other activities” are generally divided
between National Special Security Events (NSSEs) (Presidential Protection
Act, Title 18 USC § 3056), and “periodic planned support,” conducted to
enhance civil military relations within local communities. NSSEs are generally high-­visibility events that could be lucrative targets for terrorism
or other criminal activity, and include activities like the Republican and
Democratic National Conventions, United Nation General Assembly meetings, and the Super Bowl. Periodic planned support includes activities such
as military training exchanges in support of civilian first responders, community relations, and aerial damage assessment (Department of Defense,
Civil Support, Joint Publication 3-28, 2007, pp. III-7–III-10).
To reiterate, Joint Publication 3-28 designates these three categories of
activities under the heading of what we now call defense support of civil
authorities. The publication goes on to delineate four types of support that
serve as subsets of these, which we have at least alluded to above. Specifically,
the types are activities in response to disasters and declared emergencies,
activities to support or restore public health and services and civil order,

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Defense Support of
Civil Authorities
Domestic
Emergencies

Designated Law
Enforcement

Other
Activities

Disasters and
Declared
Emergencies

Support/Restore
Public Health
and Civil Order

National Special
Security Events

Periodic
Planned Support

Natural
Disasters

Civil
Disturbances

Super Bowl

Military Training
Exchanges

Manmade
Disasters

Border SecurityImmigration
Enforcement Spl

Olympic
Support

Community
Relations

CBRNE
Incidents

Equipment
Support to Law
Enforcement

Inaugural
Support

Military
Laboratory
Support

CounterTerrorism &
Counter Drug

State Funerals

Civilian Critical
Infrastructure
Protection

Disasters and
Declared
Emergencies

National
Conventions

FIGURE 2.5  DSCA categories, types, and examples.

National Special Security Events, and periodic planned support. Examples
of these activities, beyond those addressed here, are included in Figure 2.5.
These categories, types, and examples of support are not likely to be
considered an all-­inclusive list. But they are indicative of the requirements
that the military is likely to face in domestic support activities. The military
is configured to take on these missions, as a matter of routine or a matter of
necessity. In the last 10 years, for instance, the National Guard has adopted
a uniform requirement to possess “10 essential capabilities” in every state
that, to varying degrees, could provide for any of these missions (National
Guard Bureau, White Paper, 2005, p. 11) (Figure 2.6).
But whatever the requirement, whatever the mission, whatever the desire
to respond to crises, stakeholders on all sides should realize that the military’s support must by necessity be measured. The military’s first duty is to
defend the nation, and any additional missions always must be measured
against vetting criteria that include issues of legality, lethality, risk, readiness, cost, and appropriateness (Department of Defense, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities, DoD Directive 3025.18, 2012, p. 4). Beyond these are other
foundational considerations that have evolved over time and experience that
will guide the introduction of military forces in the domestic environment.

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Aviation

Maintenance

Medical Support
Communications

Engineering

Command & Control
Security
Logistics
Ground Transportation
CBRN Response & Recovery

FIGURE 2.6  The National Guard’s 10 essential mission capabilities.

We will refer to these as the Department of Defense’s philosophy in implementing defense support of civil authorities.

DoD’s Response Philosophy
The first pillar of the philosophy (see Figure 2.7) is that the military is,
indeed, in support of the civil authorities. On the one hand, this may sound
simplistic; why bother to call it defense support of civil authorities if that is
not what we mean? On the other hand, this deliberate declaration is meant
to dissuade the citizenry against the frequently intuitive assumption that
when the military arrives, it is in charge. Isn’t that what much, if not most,
of the public expects of its generals and their forces? Across the history of
our military’s successes, do we not celebrate the officer who arrives on site
in a chaotic situation, ceases control of the circumstances at hand, and leads
his charges to victory? If the general falls, do we not expect the colonel, or
The military is in support, not in charge

Civil resources and capabilities should be 
used first

Missions are limited in duration and scope

Response is a “Total Force Effort” – active 
and reserve components; service reserves 
and National Guard
Support should be provided on a cost 
reimbursable  basis, in accordance with the 
economy or Stafford Acts

FIGURE 2.7  The DoD response philosophy.

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

the major, or whoever arrives at the scene of the fall, to rally the forces and
prevail? Isn’t that the military tradition?
Without question, it is on the field of battle. But that is an entirely different kind of crisis. In the domestic environment, those developed tendencies
are deliberately and institutionally suppressed. In disaster response, the role
of the military is to complement the civil capabilities. In designated assistance to law enforcement, its function—across a strictly defined lane—is to
augment capacities that may be strained by either unique or overwhelming
requirements. The underlying message is that the military may be called
upon to supplement or otherwise support the civil requirement, not to supplant the civil authority.
The second pillar of the philosophy is not as altruistic, but necessarily
pragmatic. Before military assets are introduced in support of a domestic
requirement, the existing civil capabilities and resources should be applied.
This card, of course, can be overplayed. Indeed, in the earliest attempts to
frame our approach to military support to civil authorities, the common
view was that the armed forces would be introduced only after the civil
component had been “overwhelmed.” As the concept has matured, however,
we have recognized that awaiting a figurative collapse would not only risk
the armed forces being “late to need” (Jacoby, 2013), but likewise invite a
far longer period for the civil component to recover. However, the importance of this philosophical pillar should be clear; assistance, by definition, is
not a primary function. The military’s primary function is to fight and win
our nation’s wars along a conceptual progression that begins with deterrence and dissuasion and advances (as necessary) to defending against or
defeating our enemies. Defense support of civil authorities, for whatever the
importance of the requirement, will always detract from the day job.
By extension, the third pillar of our philosophy of support attempts
to ensure against the military’s becoming unnecessarily embroiled and
embedded in a long-­term commitment. DSCA missions should be limited
in duration and scope. The impetus behind this attitudinal constraint may
be viewed as twofold. First, this is reflective of a constant in military thinking that warns against committing to a mission without a clear depiction of
a desired outcome. Such an understanding is essential in forming what former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell described as “an exit
strategy” (Powell, 1992). Second, since the very birth of the nation, our leaders have warned against an overreliance on the military. Against the specter
of a quiet abrogation that could devolve to subjugation, Alexander Hamilton
and others like him warned that “the continual necessity for their services
enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably [sic] degrades
the condition of the citizen.” By extension, the forefathers cautioned, “the
military state becomes elevated above the civil.” Even so, in these United

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States, no one is more aware of this specter, or more vehemently opposed to
it, than the country’s military.
Chapter 3 of this text points to the different wells of the military to be
drawn from in responding to domestic requirements, from the federal active
duty forces to the separate services’ reserve component, to the states’ and
territories’ National Guard. DoD embraces all of these in the fourth pillar of
its philosophy, delineating the military’s support in domestic operations as
being a “total force” effort. Reflecting again upon the tiered response concept of the NRF, the military’s response may well begin (and most often end)
with the National Guard, and grow as required with additional resources
from the active component and the Service Reserves. Indeed, as we prepare for the “upper end” of natural and man-­made disaster, the integration
of those forces will be key to attaining the effectiveness and efficiency the
requirements will demand.
The final pillar of the department’s philosophy is probably the least popular: that one which dictates that the commitment of military resources must
be viewed as reimbursable. Whether in support of other federal agencies (as
addressed in the Economy Act) or as a component of the federal response
to states’ call for assistance (as contained in the Stafford Act), the department cannot be expected to simply absorb the costs of a mission that is
unequivocally important, but undeniably tangential to its primary function
of national defense. There is no question of the military’s will to join in support of civil authorities in response to domestic crises, but every expenditure
toward those ends draws against resources primarily devoted to national
defense. And the open secret is that the cost of support provided by our military, when compared to like capabilities outside of those forces, is generally
greater. This is a function of military units deploying and employing as a
total force, rather than as a piecemeal commitment of assorted capabilities.
The total “tooth-­to-­tail” cost of this employment is considered appropriate
in combat situations wherein unit cohesion is an intrinsic requirement for
successful operations. To expect a unit to deploy in pieces sacrificing that
cohesion is antithetical to the mindset.

Framing the Issue in Reality
Whatever the philosophical intent, however, the truth is that the actual
requirement for military defense support of civil authorities, especially as
a component of federal support, is relatively rare. This may be surprising to
some, in that when the uniformed assets are applied in the domestic environment, they are very visible. But visibility and frequency are not the same
things. Retired Maj. Gen. Timothy J. Lowenberg, for 12 years the adjutant
general for the State of Washington, captured this irony in what we think of
as Lowenberg’s Division of Disasters, expressed in three points:

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

1. Ninety-­four percent of all emergencies are handled in communities
and local government.
2. Four percent of the remaining emergencies will rise to a sufficient
degree of severity to require the additional introduction of state assets,
to include the National Guard. (These we might refer to as emergencies, under the federal definition, as delineated in the Stafford Act.)
3. Only 2% of the time does the severity of the emergency rise to the
point that requires the additional capabilities or capacities available through federal government, to include elements of the active
duty military. (These we might refer to as major disasters, as per
the Stafford Act, or catastrophic incidents, as delineated in the
Catastrophic Incident Annex of the National Response Framework.)
This serves to remind us of the sequential introduction of military assets
to support the civil response. It should also serve to emphasize the importance of integrating those assets; as the National Guard weaves its capabilities into the state and local civil response, so should federal military forces
pursue parallel and integrated responses with the Guard. The National
Guard, after all, is the military element most closely aligned with the localities in need of support, and the most familiar with the plans to achieve relief
and restoration, response and recovery.
The impetus behind this kind of integration across all three levels of
government is to provide for the most effective and efficient response to
requirements, while paying due homage to the civil authorities the military
is committed to support. Hearkening back to the homeland security continuum, the authority of governors must be observed as carefully as that of the
president, in that they will bear far more of the responsibility of long-­term
recovery well after response operations have been terminated.

Joint Action Plan
The objective behind these integrated measures, of course, is to attain the
greatest degree of unity of effort as can be achieved under our system of
government. In the process, it is vital to acknowledge the sovereign status
of governors in managing and directing the response to emergencies within
their states, as well as the responsibility of the president (and the Secretary of
Defense that serves him) in “ensuring safe, legal and effective employment
of Federal forces” (White House, 2010) when requested.
In an attempt to achieve this essential balance, the administration
established a Council of Governors “to strengthen further the partnership
between the Federal Government and State Governments to protect our
Nation against all types of hazards.” Established in response to mandates
from the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA 2008 § 1822),

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the council was envisioned to exchange views, information, or advice with
the Department of Defense and other appropriate officials surrounding:





1. Matters involving the National Guard of the various states
2. Homeland defense
3. Civil support
4. Synchronization and integration of state and federal military activities in the United States
5. Other matters of mutual interest pertaining to National Guard,
homeland defense, and civil support activities
The closest association for the council and the Department of Defense
came through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. In coordination with that office, the
governors developed the Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort.
The plan centered on five emphasis areas:






1. The dual status commander (DSC)
2. Shared situational awareness
3. Joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration (JRSOI)
4. Mission assignments/­prescripted mission assignments (PSMAs)
5. Planning

Each area was intended to increase unity of effort in preparing for or
responding to hazards. The dual status command concept intends to best
employ the total force military response under a governor’s authority as the
principal civil authority coordinating a state’s response to disaster. Shared
situational awareness provides for a common operating picture to service
emergency management/­response personnel at all three levels of government. JRSOI borrows from the military’s tradition of orchestration and
movement of capabilities and capacities to best provide for an effective, efficient response in dealing with natural and man-­made disasters. Prescripted
mission assignments allow FEMA to streamline and expedite necessary
bureaucratic processes by identifying resources and capabilities commonly
required in response to disasters, and having requests for the same prepared
for submission at the outset. Finally, planning affords the essential degree
of detailed preparation needed to anticipate and provide for requirements
to save lives, mitigate further human suffering, and prevent greater damage
following an incident. One could argue that of all it brings to serve along the
homeland security continuum, the tradition of meticulous, deliberate planning is the greatest contribution the military has to offer.

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Conclusion
That contribution, along with the many others that it serves to orchestrate,
may provide us with the most appropriate place for concluding this chapter.
It leaves us where we began, resting upon the fundamental notion that the
military, especially in its employment in the domestic security environment,
is first and foremost the servant of the American society. The priorities of its
employment must be observed, especially in the times of fiscal constraints
that lie clearly ahead. But even as it remains focused on its primary function
of defense, the military must remain prepared to turn its tools for battle to
missions of rescue and relief.

Discussion Questions
1. In what ways was Hurricane Katrina a game changer for our defense
elements? What major changes in homeland defense were devised
after that major disaster?
2. What specific events after 2011 seemed to trigger major doctrinal
changes in homeland defense and what were the principal policy
outcomes of those changes? How did the overall homeland defense
mission grow and shift during that time?
3. In what ways has the issue of border security and coastal security
altered the development of homeland defense policy? What are the
major issues involved? What are the cost implications for enhancing
homeland defense policy and programs in the years to come?

Bibliography
Council of Governors. (2011, March 1). Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort.
Defense Authorization Request and Future Years Defense Program, Senate Armed Services
Committee, 110th Congress. (2013). S1957 (testimony of General Charles H.
Jacoby Jr.).
Department of Defense. (2005, June). Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.
Department of Defense. (2007, July 12). Homeland Defense. Joint Publication 3-27.
Department of Defense. (2007, September 14). Civil Support. Joint Publication 3-28.
Department of Defense. (2010, January). DoD Policies and Responsibilities for Critical
Infrastructure. 3020.40, p. 16.
Department of Defense. (2010, November 24). Antiterrorism. Joint Publication 3-07.2.
Department of Defense. (2010, December 29). Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DoD
Directive 3025.18.
Department of Homeland Security. (2004, December). National Response Plan.

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Department of Homeland Security. (2010, February 12). Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland.
Department of Homeland Security. (2013, May). National Response Framework.
Drake, B. (2013, May 24). On Memorial Day, Public Pride in Veterans, but at a Distance.
Retrieved May 26, 2013, from Pew Research Center website: http://www.pewresearch.
org/​fact-­tank/​2013/​05/​24/​on-​­memorial-­day-­public-­pride-­in-­veterans-­but-­at-­a-distance-2/.
Hamilton, Alexander. (1787, November  20). Consequences of Hostilities between the
States. Federalist Papers 8.
National Guard Bureau. (2005, October  11). National Guard Homeland Defense White
Paper: September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina and Beyond.
Powell, Colin L. (1992). U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead. Foreign Affairs 71(5), 32–45.
White House. (2002, July 16). National Strategy for Homeland Security.
White House. (2003, February 28). Management of Domestic Incidents. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5.
White House. (2003, December 17). National Preparedness. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8.
White House. (2007, October 5). National Strategy for Homeland Security.
White House. (2010, January  11). Establishment of the Council of Governors. Executive
Order 13528.
Economy Act. 31 USC § 1535 (1932).
Insurrection Act. 10 USC § 333 (1807).
National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. PL 110-181 (2008).
Posse Comitatus Act. 18 USC § 1385 (1878).
Presidential Protection Act. 18 USC § 3056 (2000).
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. PL 100-707 (1988).

Chapter

3

Civil–­Military
Partnership

Homeland Defense Enterprise
Walter Neal Anderson*

Chapter Objectives

•• Understand the changes precipitated by the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the significance of those changes
in the Department of Defense (DoD) organizations, roles, missions, authorities, and capabilities as part of the homeland security
enterprise.
•• Articulate and substantiate a vision for DoD’s role in the homeland, including its contributions to Homeland Security and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), in light of U.S. laws, values,
culture, and traditions.
•• Analyze and articulate the differences between the active and reserve
components of the U.S. military, command and control protocols,
funding sources, and considerations regarding domestic employment, including the Posse Comitatus Act and its applicability to the
use of the U.S. military in the homeland.
•• Understand the Request for Assistance processes and DoD’s roles
and responsibilities in support of the National Response Framework
and FEMA’s Emergency Support Functions.
*

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of
the federal government. Any errors, factual or otherwise, are solely the author’s responsibility.

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Walter Neal Anderson

•• Evaluate the impacts of Hurricane Katrina on DoD’s conduct of
DSCA operations, both within the department and with non-DoD
partners.
•• Assess the significance of coordinating the efforts of the homeland
security and DSCA enterprise and potential mechanisms or models
to facilitate unity of effort.
•• Understand the Dual Status Commander concept and assess the
potential strengths and limitations of the concept.
•• Understand and evaluate the current organizations and capabilities
that comprise DoD’s CBRN Enterprise.
•• Assess the evolution of the American people’s expectations of DoD
as a member of the homeland security enterprise since 9/11.

Introduction
Military support for civilian authorities in America is not new. “‘Thank
God for the Boys in Blue!’ was the ardent and praiseful exclamation of the
people of San Francisco during and after the terrible days” (Linthicum and
White, 1906, p. 171) of the Great Earthquake of 1906. Prior to September 11,
2001, the U.S. Army continued to lead the Department of Defense’s efforts
to provide assistance to federal, state, and local officials during natural
disasters, wildland firefighting, and other times of national need. The U.S.
military also has a long history of providing other types of support to civilian authorities, including to law enforcement officials, in accordance with
America’s laws, policies, customs, and traditions. To support these activities in the homeland, an extensive legal, policy, and doctrinal foundation
had been established over the years. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on America
caused the Department of Defense to rethink, reorganize, and refine its role
in the homeland, including its support to civil authorities, to ensure that it
can successfully accomplish its missions while, at the same time, conforming to the norms of American society.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide current and future homeland
security and emergency management leaders a practical understanding of
the Defense Department’s (DoD) roles, responsibilities, and capabilities in
providing defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), also referred to in
this chapter as simply civil support. A realistic appreciation of DoD’s role
in the homeland is essential for civilian leaders to establish the no-­nonsense
expectations they should have of DoD as a key partner in the homeland
security and emergency management enterprises. While this chapter does
place DSCA in a homeland defense and homeland security context, the focus
of the chapter is on DSCA and how DoD works with partners at all levels to
accomplish its assigned missions in support of the American people.

Civil– ­Military Partnership

This chapter has four main themes:
•• The impact of 9/11 on how DoD thinks about homeland security,
homeland defense, and DSCA, as well as its roles and missions, doctrine, organization, and capabilities
•• The unique American values, laws, culture, and traditions that guide
the employment of the U.S. military in the homeland
•• How to partner with DoD as it defends the homeland, assists with
homeland security, and provides critical support in response to
an incident
•• Opportunities and challenges that remain regarding the maturation
of the homeland security enterprise and DoD’s place in that enterprise
Finally, by way of introduction, there is much about DoD that cannot
be covered in a single chapter. Moreover, as the U.S. homeland security
and emergency management enterprises continue to evolve and mature, so
too will DoD continue to refine its own policies, organizations, doctrine,
and capabilities to best perform its domestic missions. This chapter is not
intended to make the reader expert in all things DoD, but rather to assist in
asking the right questions, developing essential relationships before the need
arises, and being aware of the resources DoD can contribute to its civilian partners.

What Changed as a Result of 9/11?
Defense Support of Civil
Authorities in Context
The U.S. military’s defense of the American homeland before 9/11 had been
focused outward, against foreign threats. As the terrorist attacks unfolded
that day, American jets scrambled to intercept potential threats posed not by
enemy bombers, but by hijacked commercial airliners—a task as surreal for
the military to perform as it was for the American people to watch. In the
aftermath of 9/11, the entire U.S. government was compelled to rethink its
concepts of homeland defense (HD), homeland security (HS), and defense
support of civil authorities (DSCA), as well as the organizations that would
perform these roles. In particular, a clear distinction was made between HD
and HS. Homeland defense is “the protection of US sovereignty, territory,
domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external
threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. The
Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense” (DoD, 2005,
p. 5). Homeland security, on the other hand, was defined as “a concerted
national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover

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from attacks that do occur. The Department of Homeland Security is the
lead federal agency for homeland security” (DoD, 2005, p. 5). While the
formal definition of homeland security was broadened during the 2010
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review process, in the earliest days after
9/11, these definitions were important in that they helped answer the questions “who’s in charge?” and “who’s going to pay for it all?”
As the policy and legal foundations for what would become the post-9/11
homeland security enterprise were being established, the president of the
United States also decided to create a military command specifically responsible for two primary missions: homeland defense and DSCA. This new
command, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), was established on
October 1, 2002. While most of DoD’s activities prior to 9/11 were intended
to “defend the homeland,” there was no single, dedicated commander to
fulfill this mission. Similarly, while the military has a long tradition of providing civil support during a time of need, there was no single commander
dedicated to plan for these contingencies and direct active duty forces during domestic response. USNORTHCOM was created to perform both of
these roles, and in doing so, this was the first time there was a single military
commander responsible for domestic defense since George Washington.
Correspondingly, the Joint Staff assumed Pentagon-­
level responsibility for homeland defense and civil support operations, the latter function
having previously belonged to the U.S. Army as DoD’s executive agent.
In addition, in March 2003, the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense was established by Congress to be “responsible for
the supervision of homeland defense activities and defense support of civil
authorities for the Department of Defense.”1 The Department of Homeland
Security was also established in March 2003, placing the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)—and 21 other existing and new entities—
under a single, unified department.
A Homeland Security Council, supported by its own staff and modeled after the National Security Council, was also established by the White
House in 2001 to “ensure coordination of all homeland security-­related
activities among executive departments and agencies and promote the
effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies” (White House, October 29, 2001, p. 1). With these changes, the major
pieces of America’s new homeland security architecture were in place and
the process of growing and learning to work together had begun. Central to
this process were three factors—the authorities, funding, and priorities of
each of these new entities—and developing a mutual understanding of these
factors to enable effective collaboration.2
From the beginning of the creation of USNORTHCOM, a key issue has
been the relationship of the command to DHS. To avoid both the reality

Civil– ­Military Partnership

and perception that USNORTHCOM might become the “military extension of DHS,” senior DoD leaders appropriately were very careful to ensure
the statutory military chain of command was not breached. As a result,
Pentagon policy officials monitored closely the communications between
USNORTHCOM and DHS, particularly at higher-­ranking levels, which
slowed the development of this key relationship. In fact, they were so careful that, arguably, even necessary operational-­level coordination between
the military and DHS was difficult. While this was understandable, and
probably even necessary at the time, it would take several years for the new
homeland security enterprise to grow beyond this state of affairs.

DoD’s Roles, Missions, and
Organization for the Homeland
Homeland security and emergency management leaders are responsible for
planning and preparation for, prevention and mitigation of, response to, and
recovery from natural and man-­made disasters and terrorist attacks.  No
single entity in the homeland security enterprise, government or otherwise, has the wherewithal—be it funds, authorities, or capabilities—to go it
alone. As such, our nation has adopted a “whole of community” approach to
homeland security and emergency response, where each entity in the enterprise, including the military, can be expected to play reliably its appropriate
role. Two words are important here, reliable and appropriate. DoD wants to
be a reliable partner, and to do so, expectations of the department must be
realistic. In addition, there may be support DoD could provide, but to do
so would be inappropriate due to policy, protocol, or perception. A number
of factors shape the expectations civilian counterparts should have of DoD,
and we will examine these issues throughout this chapter.
The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide the military forces
needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country. DoD is a vast,
complex organization. It is critical to keep in mind that by law, policy, custom, and tradition, the American military is always under civilian control.
At the federal level, this is manifested by the president as Commander in
Chief. At the state and territory level, the governor is in charge of his or her
National Guard forces.
Globally, DoD is operationally organized under six regional geographic
combatant commands (GCCs), including U.S. Northern Command. The
areas of responsibility (AORs) for these GCCs are assigned through a document known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP).3 It is also not uncommon for a geographic combatant commander to simultaneously wear
more than one command hat. For example, the commander of European
Command is also the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and as such is

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responsible to NATO’s Military Committee for the conduct of all NATO
military operations. For our purposes, the Commander of USNORTHCOM
is also dual-­hatted as the commander of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD).4
USNORTHCOM’s mission is to defend the homeland within its AOR
and provide support to civil authorities when directed by the president or
Secretary of Defense. Of note, Hawaii is not in the command’s AOR, so U.S.
Pacific Command has homeland defense and civil support responsibilities
for that state. Also, a GCC typically has components from each of the military services and often has subordinate commands that perform specific missions. For USNORTHCOM, in addition to components from each branch of
the armed forces, there are several subordinate commands that include
Joint Task Force North (JTF-­N): Assigned to U.S. Army North,
USNORTHCOM’s Army component, and based at Fort Bliss, Texas,
JTF-­N is tasked to support our nation’s federal law enforcement agencies in the interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and
along the approaches to the continental United States.
Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-­CS): Headquartered at Fort
Eustis, Virginia, JTF-­CS began operations on October 1, 1999. This
task force plans and integrates DoD support of civilian authorities
specifically for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
(CBRN) consequence management operations. When directed,
JTF-­CS deploys to the incident site to command and control military forces in support of civil authorities.
Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region (JFHQ-­NCR):
Based at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, this joint force headquarters is responsible for land-­based homeland defense, DSCA, and
incident management in the National Capital Region (NCR). JFHQ-­
NCR draws together the existing resources of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and NORAD into a single headquarters for planning, coordination, and mission execution specifically in the NCR.
Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-­AK): Located at Elmendorf Air Force
Base, Alaska, JTF-­AK’s mission is to provide homeland defense and
civil support within the Alaska Joint Operations Area, in coordination with other government agencies.
Importantly, USNORTHCOM’s civilian partners may work with one or
more of its components or subordinate headquarters during a DSCA operation. Also, critical to collaborating effectively with DoD, civilian leaders
must understand the military services and their own various components
to know who they are working with at any given time. Each military service,
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,5 has an active and a reserve

Civil– ­Military Partnership

component. In the cases of the Navy and Marine Corps, the reserve forces
are all federal “troops.” The Army and Air Force, in addition to their federal
reserves, each have a National Guard—the Army National Guard and Air
National Guard. The National Guard is the only military component shared
by the president and state governors. Federal forces, active and reserve, are
under the president’s command and control. The National Guard, on the
other hand, may be in one of three duty statuses: state active duty (under
the command and control of the governor and funded by the state), Title 32
(under the command and control of the governor but funded by the federal
government), and Title 10 (a solely federal status, under the command and
control of the president and paid for by the federal government).
Unless federalized, Guardsmen are under the day-­to-­day command and
control of state and territory governors. As described above, while in a state
active duty status, they are called to duty by the governor and compensated
by the state. When the federal and state governments perceive a mutual benefit, Guardsmen can be placed in Title 32 status, where they are under the
command and control of the governor and paid by the federal government.
For example, Guardsmen performing airport security duties after 9/11 and
Guardsmen currently deployed along the Southwest border today in support of DHS are in Title 32 status.6 Also important to know, active duty or
federalized forces are prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act from engaging directly in law enforcement activities, unless the president invokes the
Insurrection Act. “Under the Insurrection Act, federal forces may be used
to restore law and order” (Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011,
p. 69).7 Guardsmen in either state active duty or Title 32 status, however,
may engage directly in law enforcement activities, if so ordered by their
governor. Table 3.1 depicts these statuses, including the applicability of the
Posse Comitatus Act.
Understandably, many Americans are sensitive to the domestic employment of the military. By design, the active duty military is largely the “choice
of last resort” for employment in the homeland. Still, if domestic partners
require a special capability or have insufficient capacity, there is a process by which the Pentagon may be asked to assist. As we will see, those
requests undergo extensive evaluation, including legal review, before they
are approved.
TABLE 3.1  Possible National Guard Duty Statuses
Command and
Control by

Pay and
Allowances from

Posse Comitatus
Applicable?

State active duty

State governor

State

No

Title 32

State governor

Federal government

No

Title 10

President

Federal government

Yes

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Legal and Policy Foundations of
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Defense support of civil authorities is but 1 of 10 primary DoD missions
described in the department’s January 2012 Strategic Guidance (DoD,
January 2012). Nevertheless, DoD does recognize and anticipate the need to
provide that support when directed by the president or Secretary of Defense.
We have already examined the definitions of homeland defense and homeland security. Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities (DSCA), defines DSCA as
Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected
States, elects and requests to use those forces in a Title 32, U.S.C., status) in
response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from
qualifying entities for special events.  Also known as civil support. (DoD,
December 29, 2010, p. 18)

It is vital to be familiar with the broad terms of the laws, policies, customs, and traditions that guide DSCA. DoD Directive 3025.18 is the principal policy document governing this DoD mission. The directive codifies
several overarching policies that are essential to understanding what DoD
can and cannot do in DSCA, including
•• DoD is always in support of civil authorities when performing DSCA
missions.
•• DoD only performs DSCA operations after receiving a request for
assistance (RFA) from civil authorities and that request has been
approved by the appropriate DoD official, normally the Secretary of
Defense, or when directed by the president or Secretary of Defense.
•• Requests for Assistance include a commitment to reimburse DoD
for its support in accordance with the provisions of the Stafford or
Economy Act.
DoD’s authority to provide civil support flows mainly from either the
Robert T. Stafford Act, which governs federal assistance in the performance of disaster relief, or the Economy Act of 1932 (as amended), which
governs support and reimbursement between federal agencies. An example
of DSCA under the provisions of the Stafford Act would include military
support in response to Hurricane Sandy (Figure 3.1). This support is provided at the request of a governor, and the federal government typically pays
75% or more of the cost. An example of DSCA authorized by the Economy

Civil– ­Military Partnership

FIGURE 3.1  Two Coast Guard Dolphin HH-65C helicopters land, November 2, 2012,
aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). The U.S. Navy positioned
forces in the area to assist U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in support of
FEMA and local civil authorities following the destruction caused by Hurricane
Sandy. (From U.S. Navy. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Terah
L. Mollise. Released.)

Act might be support to a civilian law enforcement organization, with
100% reimbursement.
All RFAs to DoD are evaluated in the Pentagon against six criteria:






1. Legality (compliance with laws)
2. Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces)
3. Risk (safety of DoD forces)
4. Cost (including the source of funding and the effect on the DoD budget)
5. Appropriateness (whether providing the requested support is in
DoD’s interest)
6. Readiness (impact on DoD’s ability to perform its other primary
missions)
In some cases, like support for a National Special Security Event (NSSE),
this evaluation process can take weeks. In the case of a true national emergency, authorization to provide support can be done verbally and take only
minutes. While cost is eventually a consideration in all RFAs, in a national
emergency this is not a limiting factor; at the same time, the impact on missions being performed overseas could be. Regardless of urgency, rarely is
DoD support for civil authorities the least expensive option.
It is also important to repeat that, as a matter of both policy and doctrine, the employment of DoD forces in a civil support role is a choice of last

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resort. Short of a true, large-­scale national emergency, the U.S. emergency
response paradigm, codified in the National Response Framework, takes a
bottom-­up approach. Not until the resources and capabilities of localities
and states are exhausted or overwhelmed should there be a request made
for federal assistance.  There are also other members of the federal family
who can potentially render assistance similar to that provided by DoD. An
exception to this general rule might be special capabilities that potentially
reside only in DoD. For example, U.S. Navy divers supported the response to
the I-35 Mississippi River Bridge collapse in Minneapolis in 2007.
An additional consideration is capabilities that might be provided through
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Administered
by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), EMAC is
a congressionally ratified system that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through EMAC, a disaster-­impacted state can request and
receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues up front: liability and reimbursement. All types of support can be shared between states under EMAC, including National Guard
forces and capabilities. EMAC may be used in lieu of a request for federal
assistance and should be considered before a request is made for federal military support.8
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) prohibits “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure,
arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such
member is otherwise authorized by law” (Posse Comitatus Act, 1878, 18
USC 1385). Nevertheless, there are ample precedents for PCA-­compliant
DoD support for civilian law enforcement, as well as specific types of assistance, like support for counternarcotics operations, that are authorized
under their own statute. Additionally, as noted previously, National Guard
troops in either a state active duty or Title 32 status are under the command
and control of a governor and are not subject to PCA restrictions.
Should a situation demand it, federal military commanders are authorized to provide temporary military support at the request of a civil authority. Known as immediate response authority, this is used when time does
not permit the commander to obtain approval through his or her chain
of command and the assistance is necessary “to save lives, prevent human
suffering, or mitigate great property damage … under imminently serious
conditions” (DoD, December 29, 2010, p. 16). By way of example, immediate
response authority would allow a local federal military installation commander to provide lifesaving assistance, in exigent circumstances and at the
request of his local civilian counterpart, without waiting for approval from
the Pentagon.
As noted above, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits federal military forces
from engaging directly in law enforcement activities. This includes quelling

Civil– ­Military Partnership

civil disturbances, which requires the president’s authorization under the
Insurrection Act. Under extreme circumstances, however, where obtaining
the president’s approval is not possible, federal military commanders are
permitted to act with emergency authority. Emergency authority describes
a Federal military commander’s authority, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and
duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, to
engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-­scale, unexpected civil disturbances because 1) such activities are necessary to prevent
significant loss of life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary
to restore governmental function and public order or (2) duly constituted
Federal, State, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate
protection for Federal property or Federal governmental functions. (DoD,
December 29, 2010, p. 16)

The last time that federal military troops were used to assist in curbing a
civil disturbance was during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Ensuing after action
reviews highlighted the fact that this might not have been the best course of
action then, and might not be the best course of action in the future, if sufficient civilian law enforcement and National Guard are available.
In summary, DSCA is well regulated by law, policy, and tradition and routinely is the subject of both congressional oversight and media examination.

Hurricane Katrina—A Watershed
When Hurricane Katrina made its second landfall as a Category 3 hurricane on Monday, August 29, 2005, DHS and USNORTHCOM were still less
than 5 years old. There was a new National Response Plan that was virtually
untested. The storm’s secondary effects, the levee breaches, were unanticipated. Government response to the hurricane, at all levels, was widely criticized. In a speech in New Orleans on September 17, 2005, President Bush
acknowledged mistakes at the federal level, saying:
Four years after the frightening experience of September  11th, Americans
have every right to expect a more effective response in time of emergency.
When the federal government fails to meet such an obligation, I, as President,
am responsible for the problem and the solution. (White House, February
2006, p. 1)

Nearly 8 years later, although some of the lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina are still the subject of debate, two enduring facts are noteworthy. First, domestic emergency response operations that appear to, or do,
go awry are not immune to partisan politics. This political context, then,

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simply becomes a condition in which emergency response professionals
must work. Second, the military is still sensitive to the criticism it endured in
the aftermath of Katrina and does not want to repeat real or perceived mistakes. A section of DoD’s new Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, entitled “Increasing Expectations,” reflects an
awareness that
public expectations for a decisive, fast, and effective Federal response to disasters have grown in the past decade, particularly in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina. Although DoD is always in a support role to civilian authorities
(primarily the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA) for disaster response, the capacity, capabilities, training, and professionalism of the
Armed Forces mean that DoD is often expected to play a prominent supporting role in response efforts. The prevailing “go big, go early, go fast, be smart”
approach to saving lives and protecting property in the homeland—evident
during the preparations for and response to Hurricane Irene in August 2011
and particularly Hurricane Sandy in October 2012—requires DoD to rapidly
and effectively harness resources to quickly respond to civil support requests
in the homeland. (DoD, February 2013, pp. 6–7)

The first and most important lesson learned from Hurricane Katrina is
that not all lessons are learned from Hurricane Katrina. Meaning, a truly
no-­notice disaster would bring with it challenges not revealed by Katrina.
Nevertheless, the observations, lessons learned, and issues that surfaced as a
result of Katrina have formed the basis for much of our national discussion
and preparedness efforts for the past 8 years. Several of these lessons learned
have to do with the military’s role in response to that event. Valid or not,
criticisms of the military response included
•• Active and National Guard forces did not work well together because
of their two separate chains of command.
•• The active military was “late” in arriving to assist.
•• The presence of active duty troops patrolling New Orleans constituted a violation of Posse Comitatus.
•• The bottom-­up process to request assistance from DoD is too bureaucratic and slow to be effective during a large-­scale incident.
The military has worked diligently in the past 7+ years to address these
observations. Some issues have been resolved, while others have not and are
still being worked on. Many of the potential solutions to these issues remain
contentious in that they have to do with laws and policies, roles and missions, funding, and perspective. Nevertheless, it is important to understand
what DoD has done to improve since Katrina, what issues remain and why
they defy easy resolution, and what possible concerns might persist that are

Civil– ­Military Partnership

not being addressed at all (simply because they did not arise during Katrina,
but could during a no-­notice incident). It remains a given that during a
national emergency or disaster, DoD will have an important role to play.
Recall the need to have DoD as a reliable, appropriate partner with clear and
realistic expectations on the part of the civil authorities the department is
directed to support.

Steps Taken Since Hurricane Katrina
Post-­
Katrina “command and control” is compliant with the National
Incident Management and Incident Command (NIMS and ICS) Systems.
All incidents begin and end locally, and as such, local officials are in charge.
Federal, including DoD, assistance is in support of the state incident command structure.
There is now a full-­time defense coordinating officer (DCO) and staff
(defense coordinating element (DCE)) in each of FEMA’s 10 regions, in or
co-­located with the regional headquarters. Before Katrina, being a DCO
was an additional duty for Army colonels who had another full-­time job.
Now, day to day, the DCO and DCE build relationships, plan, prepare, and
identify capability shortfalls among regional, state, local, and tribal officials
within each FEMA region. During an incident, the DCO and DCO’s staff
move to the Joint Field Office and validate requests for military support,
which are known as mission assignments (MAs). By validating an MA, the
DCO is ensuring that a request for Title 10 military support is necessary,
the capability is best provided by federal forces, and the MA is articulated
in terms that DoD can quickly fulfill. A cost estimate of the MA is also prepared. In short, the DCO is the local “face” of the active duty military and
reports to USNORTHCOM.
USNORTHCOM has virtually no permanently assigned military forces.
A request for DoD support, after approval, goes to a Joint Force Provider
that has full visibility of the capabilities and readiness of units in all of the
services and their components. To expeditiously source a capability requirement, the end state or desired effect should be articulated. For example,
rather than ask for a truck company, it is better to state a requirement to
move an amount of commodities from and to particular destinations over
a specified period of time. With this kind of requirement, the most effective
solution might not be a truck company at all, but rather some number of
helicopters with hoists. Many similar capabilities exist in each of the services, so the sourcing solution will be joint. To expedite this entire process,
FEMA and DoD have developed numerous prescripted mission assignments
(PSMAs), which are already “on the shelf” for use during an incident. These

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FIGURE 3.2  Army Gen. Charles Jacoby, NORAD and USNORTHCOM commander,
and FEMA Director Craig Fugate speak at a press conference at NORAD and
USNORTHCOM headquarters on January  23, 2013. Fugate met with Jacoby to
discuss cooperation between FEMA and USNORTHCOM during future complex
catastrophes such as Hurricane Sandy as well as the upcoming wildland fire season. (From U.S. Air Force. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Thomas J. Doscher.)

PSMAs are not preapproved and still must go through the formal approval
process when activated (Figure 3.2).
Under the best circumstances, however, the process of sourcing a federal capability, alerting and deploying the unit to the incident area, and
then moving the unit to the incident and employing it will take time. The
“tyranny of physics” applies. With the possible exception of active duty
forces that may reside on military installations in the jurisdiction in which
they are needed, this time-­distance challenge is what precludes DoD from
being a first responder, even if that were an appropriate and agreed role for
the department.
Nevertheless, several efforts have been and continue to be made to
speed the response of DoD to an incident. In addition to the DCOs and
PSMAs already discussed, standing execution orders (EXORDs) give the
USNORTHCOM commander limited authority to alert, deploy, and employ
certain forces for civil support.
USNORTHCOM also continually monitors threat streams, weather
reports, and domestic events in an attempt to anticipate requirements of
DoD, even before an RFA is rendered. Anticipating a requirement, the
USNORTHCOM commander can request forces or capabilities from the
Pentagon (a request for forces (RFF)) and, with the Defense Secretary’s
approval, even deploy those forces near an area (normally a federal military
installation) where they might be needed. To actually employ those forces,

Civil– ­Military Partnership

however, requires Secretary of Defense approval of an RFA or an order from
the president.
Commensurate with U.S. lawmakers’ appreciation of the significant role
the National Guard plays in the homeland, legislation has recently elevated
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to a four-­star general’s position, and appointed him to membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This
change was intended to allow the NGB to have a fuller voice and give its
views added weight in DoD’s discussions of how best to prepare for and provide civil support. It is critical to note, however, that the NGB chief does not
command and control the states’ National Guard troops under any circumstances, and the bureau is not an operational headquarters. Guard forces not
in a federal status are under the command and control of their respective
governors. When federalized, they fall under the president. A governor loaning Guardsmen to another state under EMAC will relinquish command and
control of those Guardsmen to the receiving governor for the duration of the
support. Also, among the scores of Guardsmen who have been assigned to
USNORTHCOM since its inception, the three-­star deputy commander has
been since 2008 a National Guard officer.
In January 2010 the president issued an executive order establishing a
Council of Governors to exchange views with the Secretary of Defense, the
DHS secretary, the USNORTHCOM commander, the chief of the NGB, and
others on matters related to homeland defense, civil support, and integrating
the efforts of the state and federal militaries (White House, January 11, 2010,
p. 1). Since its creation, the Council of Governors, five Democrats and five
Republicans appointed by the president, has met several times to address the
issues associated with active and reserve military activities in the homeland.
Among its achievements to date is an agreement to implement the concept
of a dual-­status commander (DSC).
The DSC is nominated by his or her governor, trained and certified by
USNORTHCOM, and when activated, has the authority to command both
National Guard (in either a state active duty or Title 32 status) and active
duty, reserve, or National Guard (under Title 10 authority) forces simultaneously. With the approval of the president, or Secretary of Defense on his
behalf, and the affected governor, the DSC concurrently holds both federal
and state commissions. When activated, the DSC would be expected to
command a state-­level Joint Task Force, comprised of both National Guard
and federal troops, in response to a particular incident or mission. This
concept has been used successfully on several occasions involving National
Special Security Events (NSSEs), where there are normally months to plan
the operation in advance. During Hurricanes Irene, Isaac, and Sandy, DSCs
were also activated (Figure 3.3). While there are still issues to be resolved
with the concept, particularly for large-­scale incidents that cross state lines,

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FIGURE 3.3  Riverside, California, November  1, 2012. A fleet of more than 70
Southern California Edison utility trucks is being prepared for transport to the East
Coast to help restore power in areas devastated by Hurricane Sandy. The U.S. Air
Force used six C-5 and eight C-17 aircraft to transport the vehicles from March
Air Reserve Base in Riverside County. (From the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. Photo by Veronica Verde.)

the DSC initiative is being developed as a possible way to achieve federal-­
state military unity of command. As we will discuss in the next section,
unity of command among nonmilitary partners is not an option, and other
collaboration mechanisms must be in place.

Unity of Effort: Interagency
Coordination and Building
Trusting Partnerships
Among its significant developments, the Department of Homeland
Security’s 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review expanded the definition of homeland security and formalized the phrase “homeland security
enterprise.” Homeland security, which previously had been focused nearly
exclusively on preventing terrorist attacks, was recrafted to describe
the intersection of evolving threats and hazards with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense, emergency response, law
enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration. In combining these

Civil– ­Military Partnership

responsibilities under one overarching concept, homeland security breaks
down longstanding stovepipes of activity that have been and could still be
exploited by those seeking to harm America. Homeland security also creates
a greater emphasis on the need for joint actions and efforts across previously
discrete elements of government and society. (DHS, February 2010, p. viii)

The homeland security enterprise is defined as “the collective efforts and
shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-­sector partners—as well as individuals, families, and
communities—to maintain critical homeland security capabilities” (DHS,
February 2010, p. viii). Explicit in this recharacterization of homeland
security and to those who share responsibility for achieving it is a call for
enhanced collaboration among them. This homeland security enterprise
is a loose coalition of sovereign entities—from government at all levels to
individuals and families, with nongovernmental, private sector, and international partners, among others, in between. There is no single person or
entity fully “in charge,” with the authority to direct the actions of all of the
other members of the enterprise.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, Management of
Domestic Incidents, establishes the Secretary of DHS as the nation’s principal domestic incident manager. Arguably, the secretary’s responsibility to
coordinate and manage domestic emergency operations is not accompanied
by the authority to do so (White House, February 28, 2003, p. 1).9 As such,
collaboration among the myriad members of the enterprise is based largely
on two factors: shared self-­interest among the partners and incentivization through the allocation of resources (funding). The challenge for those
responsible for coordinating the enterprise is to harmonize the activities of
this coalition of largely independent actors, at all levels, to achieve unity of
effort (or, as some like to say, unity of results). There are formal and informal
mechanisms, in and out of government, to accomplish this. The focus in this
chapter is largely at the federal level of government, while also acknowledging other collaboration forums and models that have proven to be effective.
To proceed with this discussion, it is also necessary to draw a broad distinction between two types of collaboration: strategic/­policy coordination
on one hand and operational/­tactical on the other. These two spheres of
cooperation should occur in distinct forums, but naturally tend to spill over
from one to the other. They should certainly also inform one another, and
they occur at all levels of government and in independent or private enterprise. Further, to scope what could easily be an indeterminate discussion of
interagency collaboration, we will examine three examples or mechanisms:
(1) the U.S. government’s formal interagency coordination process, (2) the
Joint Field Office, and (3) DoD’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group.

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Federal Interagency Coordination
At the federal level of government, the formal interagency coordination system is framed by a presidential policy directive, typically a president’s first
policy directive, and varies according to the style with which he wants to
manage his national security apparatus. After 9/11, for example, the Bush
administration created the Homeland Security Council (HSC) with its own
staff. The current administration
believes that “homeland security is indistinguishable from national security”
and has been using a single, integrated staff structure to manage both national
security and homeland security crises and policy development and implementation. Although President Obama has determined that the Homeland Security
Council should be retained as the “principal venue for interagency deliberations
on issues that affect the security of the homeland such as terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction, natural disasters, and pandemic influenza,” he also determined that the NSC and HSC should be supported by a single “National Security
Staff” headed by the National Security Advisor. (Whitaker et al., 2011, p. 19)

The formal federal interagency coordination process involves meetings
at the Cabinet (including the president), principal (including department
secretaries without the president, known as the Principals Committee (PC)),
and deputy levels (including department deputy secretaries, known as the
Deputies Committee (DC)). There are also a variety of assistant secretary-­
level forums known as Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs). For the
purposes of homeland security and counterterrorism, two of the key IPCs
are the Domestic Resilience Group (DRG) and Counterterrorism Security
Group (CSG). Taken together, these forums meet regularly and establish
and guide the nation’s strategic and policy direction for homeland security and national preparedness.
It is through this formal federal interagency process that strategic and
policy issues related to homeland defense, homeland security, emergency
management, and civil support are addressed and resolved. Those issues
that cannot be decided at the DRG level, for example, are dealt with by the
Deputies Committee or, if particularly difficult, the Principals Committee.
DoD is represented at each level of this process by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Staff, who also represent the views of both the combatant commanders and the military services.
This formal coordination process is inherently political and, as such, is subject to both the interpersonal and institutional dynamics one would expect
at the federal level. Other members of the homeland security enterprise,
including governors and local officials, corporate executives, professional
emergency managers, and tribal leaders, for example, may also formally
and informally influence national policy and strategy decisions. During an

Civil– ­Military Partnership

actual incident or national disaster, the White House and these interagency
coordination bodies also closely monitor state and local operational/­tactical
responses and may influence activities, for better or worse, at those levels.
Emergency managers should be aware that these dynamics form part of the
context in which they must operate.
Also of significance for homeland security and emergency management
leaders, the processes and dynamics of strategy and policy making are comparable at all levels of government. Critical is the fact that policy decisions
potentially have operational implications, and operational choices potentially have policy implications. As such, homeland security and emergency
response operators will be informed by and, ideally, inform policy making.
In addition, as discussed earlier, homeland security and emergency response
operations take place in a political context. At the very least, the American
people expect prompt, competent operational outcomes. To achieve that,
enterprise stakeholders at all levels must be able to collaborate effectively in
the performance of several functions. These include
••
••
••
••

Planning
Operations and operations support
Training, exercises, and education
Information sharing for the purpose of decision support

A sound policy and strategic foundation must be in place to facilitate
close collaboration in these four key operational-­level functional areas.
After everything is said and done, building trusting partnerships around
these activities before an incident has the greatest potential to lead to operational success. Often, the center of gravity for effective operations is the Joint
Field Office, which we examine next.

The Joint Field Office
In a disaster response situation, requests for DoD assistance are typically
generated through the framework of FEMA’s Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs). Once a request for assistance (RFA) has been approved in the
Pentagon, civil support is provided back to the incident commander through
that same ESF structure. DoD supports all 15 ESFs and leads one—ESF #3—
Public Works and Engineering. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers coordinates this ESF on behalf of DoD but, with its own congressional authorities,
does not require Secretary of Defense approval to provide support. Most
RFAs are generated in the Joint Field Office (JFO).
The JFO is an operational-­level interagency coordination mechanism that
is both multilevel and multifunctional, and provides the interface between
national-­level collaboration that takes place in FEMA’s National Response
Coordination Center (NRCC) and the incident-­level coordination that takes

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place in an incident command post or local emergency operations center.
FEMA’s National Response Framework describes the JFO as
the primary Federal incident management field structure. The JFO is a temporary Federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination
of Federal, State, tribal, and local governments and private-­sector and nongovernmental organizations with primary responsibility for response and
recovery. The JFO structure is organized, staffed, and managed in a manner consistent with NIMS principles and is led by the Unified Coordination
Group. Although the JFO uses an ICS structure, the JFO does not manage
on-­scene operations. Instead, the JFO focuses on providing support to on-­
scene efforts and conducting broader support operations that may extend
beyond the incident site. (FEMA, January 2008, p. 62)

The Department of Defense is represented in the JFO by the defense coordinating officer (DCO). When a capability shortfall is identified, unless it is
clearly unique to DoD, all other possible sources of this capability are examined. Other potential sources include state-­level resources, capabilities that
might be provided under EMAC, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and other federal partners. If it still cannot be filled, the DCO
will work with the appropriate emergency and ESF managers in the JFO to
translate the requirement into terms that can be readily sourced by DoD and
validate the mission assignment (MA). The MA is transmitted to the federal
level, where it is converted into an RFA that can be conveyed to DoD for vetting and approval.
The DCO also has a limited capability to command and control the actual
forces provided by DoD in support of state and local officials. When the
number of forces exceeds the DCO’s ability to direct them, those forces will
be placed under the operational control of a Joint Task Force commander—
either the dual-­status commander when he or she is activated or a separate
JTF commander when that arrangement is warranted. In short, whether
coordinating civil support or commanding the forces performing those
missions, or both, the DCO and his small staff are indispensable partners in
emergency response.

The Joint Interagency
Coordination Groups
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) were created in the combatant commands, by interagency agreement, in 2002 to improve operational-­
level interagency collaboration. Each combatant command has tailored
its JIACG to its unique AOR and mission requirements; USNORTHCOM

Civil– ­Military Partnership

is no different. Operating in and around the homeland, performing its
defense mission or in support of civil authorities leading homeland security and emergency response operations, USNORTHCOM has constructed
a JIACG comprised of more than 60 permanent and part-­time representatives from its key partner organizations. Among the departments or their
components present at USNORTHCOM are DHS Headquarters, Customs
and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FEMA, the
Drug Enforcement Agency, Health and Human Services, the Department of
Energy, the Department of Transportation, the FBI, and the FAA.
During steady-­
state periods, these interagency representatives work
directly with the NORAD and USNORTHCOM staffs on plans, train and
exercise together, and conduct formal JIACG education forums to enhance
mutual understanding of roles, missions, capabilities, and perspectives of
each entity. These interagency partners also work intimately with the commands as they conduct their full range of missions. The JIACG is a model
of interagency collaboration and is complemented by a host of command
liaison officers posted with key partners in Washington, DC.
While none is perfect, three other models of interagency collaboration
bear mention. The first is that suggested by DHS’s National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP’s collaboration forums and processes have
brought exemplary cooperation to the complex public-­private partnerships
that comprise the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resource sectors.
The second model of interagency cooperation is Joint Interagency Task
Force South (JIATF-­South). JIATF-­South was established in the 1980s to
conduct detection and monitoring operations as part of the nation’s war
on drugs. It has evolved and matured over the years to become what many
now consider the “gold standard for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion” (Munsing and Lamb, June 2011, p. 1). Like the NIPP, Evan
Munsing’s and Christopher Lamb’s study of JIATF-­South, Joint Interagency
Task Force—South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success,
is worthy of review for those seeking models and ideas to adapt to their own
interagency collaboration needs.
For its part, DoD also recognizes the challenges associated with interagency collaboration and achieving unity of effort. As such, its doctrinal
publication Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations (Joint
Publication 3-08) is intended to guide interagency coordination in the
context of military operations. Although DHS and other federal agencies
recognize the need for a comparable doctrine and are taking steps in that
direction, none yet exists. Thus, there remains a need for appropriate doctrine at all levels of the homeland security enterprise, and JP 3-08, in both
form and content, might serve as a model or template for homeland security
and emergency management leaders to adapt to this end.

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DoD’s Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Enterprise
Concern by national leaders over domestic weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) events predates 9/11 and is demonstrated by Congress’s creation of
WMD-­CSTs and Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-­CS) in the late 1990s.
Since 9/11, the goal with respect to DoD’s chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities has been the ability to respond to three
geographically separate events in overlapping time frames.10 DoD’s capabilities—its organizations and equipment—are built predominantly for its war
fighting missions. The department’s CBRN enterprise is a notable exception
to this unwritten rule.
The development of DoD’s CBRN enterprise is one area where, during
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, the department made
a conscious decision to invest in this national capability. That decision was
made primarily because (1) DoD already had the nucleus of such a capability and (2) the nation should not have to invest in this capability twice. As
BOX 3.1: DoD’S CBRN ENTERPRISE
State-­Level Units
•• Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-­CSTs)
in 54 states and territories provide identification and assessment of
CBRN hazards and advise first responders and follow-­on forces.
•• CBRN-­Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs) in 17 states
provide regionally focused lifesaving capabilities—for example, emergency medical treatment, search and rescue, and decontamination.
•• Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) in 10 states—one per FEMA
region—provide specialized and rapidly deployable lifesaving capabilities and command and control.

Federal-­Level Units
•• The Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF)—a brigade-­size element with two force packages composed of a mix of active and
reserve personnel—provides extensive lifesaving, logistics, sustainment, and command and control capabilities to respond to incidents that exceed state-­level response capabilities.
•• Command and Control CBRN Response Element (C2CRE) provides command and control for large follow-­on forces, both general
purpose and specialized. DoD has created two of these, and the
C2CREs can assist the DCRF in response to a catastrophic incident
or deploy independently, and they maintain some organic lifesaving capabilities.11

Civil– ­Military Partnership

such, this capability has been under development for several years and was
refined during the 2010 QDR to create a better-­balanced combination of
active duty (Title 10), National Guard (Title 32), and federal reserve units.
This approach reflects “the shared roles and responsibilities of the States
and Federal Government. Its elements are designed to be modular and fully
scalable to provide a simultaneous State and Federal military response to
multiple CBRN incidents” (DoD, February 2013, p. 16). Box 3.1 depicts the
state- and federal-­level CBRN forces with which emergency managers might
expect to collaborate at the scene of a WMD incident.
DoD’s CBRN enterprise is specifically intended to support state and
local officials with the large numbers of specialized capabilities potentially
needed to respond rapidly and effectively to a WMD incident. In addition to
awareness of the CBRN enterprise, this initiative presents DoD’s homeland
security and emergency response partners at all levels the opportunity to
plan, train, and exercise together as the various units progress through their
own readiness activities. Moreover, the fact that the WMD-­CSTs, CERFPs,
and HRFs are distributed around the United States and its territories makes
planning, training, and exercising with the local elements of the enterprise
an attractive proposition.

Recent Developments
and the Future of DSCA
Defense support of civil authorities is a “total force” endeavor for DoD, optimally involving active National Guard and federal reserve formations. This
gives DoD the broadest range of capabilities, sourcing options, and potential
geographic proximity to the scene of an incident. Like the National Guard,
the federal reserve is “forward deployed” around the country, with readiness centers often in the same communities as National Guard armories.
Moreover, the types of units and capabilities found in the federal reserve
are often particularly suitable for civil support operations. Until recently,
however, the federal reserve was inaccessible for civil support missions. A
provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012 changed
this by giving the Secretary of Defense the authority to involuntarily activate federal reserve units for domestic disaster response. DoD is currently in
the process of developing policies and procedures to incorporate seamlessly
the federal reserve into DSCA operations.
Perhaps most significantly, a confluence of circumstances has led
DoD to examine the issue of its response to what it terms a “complex
catastrophe.” DoD received a push in this direction during the FEMA-­led
National Level Exercise 2011 (NLE 11), which featured a scenario involving a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone region

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of the United States. This exercise was a follow-­on to FEMA’s Catastrophic
Planning Initiative and consistent with the FEMA administrator’s national
“whole community”12 approach to emergency management, planning for
a “maximum of maximums”13 scenario, and his then-­emerging theme of
“go big, go fast, go early, be smart.” In the course of the exercise, without a
request for assistance generated in a JFO, FEMA requested “a few hundred
helicopters” from DoD to support the national response.
Later dubbed a “top-­down mission assignment (MA),” this was part of
FEMA’s new proactive approach to disaster response. FEMA suffers from the
same problems as USNORTHCOM. First, it possesses very few capabilities
of its own; its resources are typically either contracted or come from its partners via the 15 Emergency Support Functions. Each of the ESFs is supported
by DoD. Thus, second, DoD’s physics problem becomes FEMA’s problem.
In order to speed the federal response, including DoD’s, FEMA’s approach
is to deploy capabilities to an incident area without an RFA. Experience
tells us generally the kinds of capabilities needed for a particular incident,
and pushing those capabilities forward quickly is the only way FEMA can
hope to make a meaningful difference inside of the 72- to 96-hour “golden
window” for lifesaving response.
In the weeks following NLE 11, even while discussions about this concept were ongoing, Hurricane Irene struck and FEMA applied the technique
in response to this real-­world event. As a result, DoD was compelled to
deploy significant capabilities to areas where requirements were anticipated.
Building on that proactive initiative, DoD has launched an effort to “be prepared to help civilian authorities save and protect lives during a complex
catastrophe” (DoD, February 2013, p. 17), which it defines as
any natural or man-­made incident, including cyberspace attack, power
grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple
interdependent, critical, life-­sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely
affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national
morale, response efforts, and/­or government functions. (DoD, February
2013, p. 17)

As DoD has continued to pursue this initiative in a comprehensive fashion, two additional natural disasters of note have taken place, Hurricanes
Isaac and Sandy. In both cases, DoD deployed capabilities in anticipation
of need rather than waiting for a request for assistance. It is interesting to
note that none of the real-­world disasters in which DoD has taken this top-­
down approach actually rose to the threshold of a complex catastrophe as
DoD currently defines it. Nevertheless, the department is exploring several
methods of speeding its response in a time of need, including

Civil– ­Military Partnership

•• Leveraging immediate response authority. As discussed previously,
this allows federal commanders, when requested by a civilian official,
to act on their own authority to save and sustain lives. As originally
conceived, this has been implemented by the military in the same
or nearby jurisdictions. Expanding the concept geographically, even
potentially hundreds of miles, could make an important contribution during a complex catastrophe.
•• Employing geographically proximate force sourcing. DoD currently
sources RFAs with units at the highest readiness levels, without
regard to their proximity to an incident. Ways are being examined
to identify and provide units that are potentially at a lower readiness
level, but much closer to where they are needed.
•• Rapid access to federal reserve forces. Ways are being developed to
implement the Defense Secretary’s recently legislated authority to involuntarily activate federal reserve forces for domestic response operations.
It remains to be seen how DoD’s complex catastrophe initiative will
evolve; elements of the plan that have budget implications will compete for
resources in a severely constrained environment. Even so, the fact that DoD
continues to advance this concept remains a positive development that is
likely to pay dividends not only during a complex catastrophe, but also for
all of the department’s civil support operations.

Conclusions
This chapter began with four themes, each independently articulated and
provided below for review:
•• The impact of 9/11 on how DoD thinks about homeland security,
homeland defense, and DSCA, as well as its roles and missions, doctrine, organization, and capabilities
•• The unique American values, laws, culture, and traditions that guide
the employment of the U.S. military in the homeland
•• How to partner with DoD as it defends the homeland, assists with
homeland security, and provides critical support in response to
an incident
•• Opportunities and challenges that remain regarding the maturation
of the homeland security enterprise and DoD’s place in that enterprise
Most significantly, this chapter highlights the fact that these four ideas
are key, closely interrelated elements of a single coherent narrative. DoD was
significantly affected by 9/11 and took unprecedented steps in redefining not
only how it thinks about and performs its homeland defense mission, but
also how it supports homeland security and disaster response operations.

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It did and continues to do this in a manner consistent with America’s values, laws, culture, and traditions. Moreover, DoD cannot perform any of
its domestic missions alone—homeland defense and support for both
homeland security and emergency response operations require close collaboration with an enterprise of trusting, and trusted, partners. Finally, the
enterprise continues to evolve and mature, informed by both experience and
ever-­changing conditions and threats. For nearly 240 years, the military has
played an indispensible role in America’s security, safety, and well-­being.
The members of the Department of Defense pledge an oath of office to the
Constitution to keep that faith.

References
Center for Law and Military Operations. (2011). Domestic Operational Law Handbook for
Judge Advocates. The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army
Center for Law and Military Operations. Charlottesville, VA.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2008, January). The National Response
Framework. Washington, DC.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2013, May). The National Response Framework.
Washington, DC.
Lithicum, R., & White, T. (1906). San Francisco Earthquake Horror. Retrieved from http://
books.google.com/books?id=fVgLAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA21&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=
4#v=onepage&q&f=false.
Munsing, E., & Lamb, C. (2011, June). Joint Interagency Task Force—South: The Best Known,
Least Understood Interagency Success. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic
Perspectives No. 5. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
Posse Comitatus Act. (1878). 18 United States Code, Section 1385. Washington, DC.
U.S. Congress. (2002, December 2). Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003. Public Law 107-314. Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2005). Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.
Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2010, December 29). DoD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support
of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2012, January). Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense. Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2013, February). Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities. Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2010, February). Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland. Washington, DC.
White House. (2001, October 29). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-1:
Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council. Washington, DC.
White House. (2003, February 28). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5:
Management of Domestic Incidents. Washington, DC.
White House. (2006, February). The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.
Washington, DC.

Civil– ­Military Partnership

White House. (2010, January 11). Executive Order 13528—Establishment of the Council of
Governors. Washington, DC.
Whittaker, A. G., Brown, S. A., Smith, F. C., & McKune, E. (2011). The National Security
Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System. (Research
Report, August 15, 2011, Annual Update). Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense.

Endnotes
1. The language describing the responsibilities for this new position is found in the
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-314).
2. The author attributes the authorities-­funding-­priorities paradigm to RDML Fred M.
Midgette, military advisor to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.
3. The most recent UCP gives U.S. Northern Command the responsibility to advocate
for Arctic capabilities. A map of the GCCs’ areas of responsibility is located at http://
www.defense.gov/news/UCP_2011_Map4.pdf. Like other GCCs, NORTHCOM has
responsibility for relations with the foreign militaries in its AOR—Canada, Mexico,
and the Bahamas.
4. NORAD is a binational U.S.-Canada Command established in 1957 and, in this capacity, is responsible to the U.S. and Canadian heads of state (the president and prime
minister, respectively) for aerospace warning and aerospace control in North America.
In 2006, binational maritime warning was added to NORAD’s mission. Also, since
9/11, NORAD provides air defense within the homeland (http://www.norad.mil/).
5. The U.S. Coast Guard is considered a fifth military service but reports to the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security. For the purposes of this discussion and in
the context of domestic operations, it is not treated as a military service.
6. Authorization by the president of the United States to employ National Guard in a
Title 32 status in support of DHS’s border security mission is not uncommon, particularly since 2006. Nevertheless, the decision to do so is a complicated one, and frequently the Defense Secretary limits the tasks the National Guard can perform more
narrowly than the law would otherwise allow. For a good analysis of the advantages
and disadvantages of using the National Guard in this manner, see “Observations on
Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of a Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure
the Southwest Land Border,” statement of Brian J. Lepore before the Subcommittee
on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, April 17, 2012.
7. For an extensive discussion of the Insurrection Act, its legal basis, and the circumstances in which it might be invoked, see Center for Law and Military Operations,
Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge Advocates, Judge Advocate General’s
Legal Center and School, U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operationsm
Charlottesville, VA, 2011.
8. For more information on EMAC see http://www.emacweb.org/.
9. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 (February 28, 2003) states: “The
Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is

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responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government’s resources utilized
in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal
department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of
the Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and
Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities;
(3) more than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in
responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.”
10. For a discussion of the genesis of this goal, see Paul McHale, “Critical Mismatch: The
Dangerous Gap between Rhetoric and Readiness in DoD’s Civil Support Missions,”
Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, August 13, 2012, pp. 8–9.
11. Box 3.1 is adapted from DoD’s February 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and
Civil Support, p. 16.
12. FEMA’s whole community approach to emergency management is based on a recognition that government alone lacks the resources, expertise, and capabilities to respond
effectively to large-­scale incidents. The whole community model underscores the key
roles played by individuals, families, the private sector, and many others in the emergency management enterprise. This concept was reinforced by the updated National
Response Framework published by FEMA in May 2013.
13. FEMA’s “maximum of maximums” approach to emergency management is linked to
the whole community concept and intended to encourage emergency managers at all
levels to plan and prepare for worst case scenarios that, by definition, exceed government resources and capabilities.

Chapter

4

Homeland Security
and Homeland
Defense in the
Maritime Domain

Thomas Arminio and Thomas Hale

He who commands the sea has command of everything.
—Themistocles (514–449 B.C.)
Seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow.
—A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
Chapter Objectives

•• Indicate under what statutory authorities the Coast Guard and Navy
operate.
•• Explain the roles and missions the Sea Services play in homeland
security and homeland defense.
•• Recognize how the Navy’s and Coast Guard’s roles and missions are
similar.
•• Distinguish how the Coast Guard and Navy’s roles and missions
differ.

Introduction: The Strategic Environment
The United States is, and always will be, a maritime nation and maritime
security will remain a vital national interest. “There are few areas of greater
strategic importance than the security of the maritime domain” (MDA,
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FIGURE 4.1  Aircraft assigned to Carrier Air Wing Fourteen (CVW-14) fly in formation above the Nimitz class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) during a
practice air and sea power demonstration on October 27, 2004. (From U.S. Navy.
Photo by Mate 3rd Class Mark J. Rebilas. Released.)

2005, p. 2). Freedom of navigation and the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are essential to the well-­being and economic vitality of
the United States. Since the earliest days of the Republic, the United States
has depended upon the world’s oceans to facilitate free trade and has protected the maritime domain employing all elements of national power* (see
Figure 4.1). In fact, the importance of freedom of navigation has always been
a historic strategic imperative, not only for the United States and our friends
and allies, but for our adversaries as well. Therefore, security of the maritime
domain is not only an issue of vital national interest to the United States, but
it is an issue to all nation-­states of the global maritime community.
Shortly after 9/11, then commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral James
Loy (2001) asked the critical question: “How do we meet the enormous challenge of providing maritime security against terrorism and other potential
threats to the marine transportation system?” The most difficult challenge
facing the maritime transportation system and supply chain is how to
ensure that legitimate global commerce is not unnecessarily hindered or
delayed as the United States and other nations introduce enhanced security
procedures (Loy, 2001).
With the exception of Desert Storm and the initial phase of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, U.S. adversaries have, over the past couple of decades,
employed asymmetric warfare techniques against the United States and our
allies. All indications are that they will continue to do so. These adversaries
*

We define the elements of national power as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

have employed significant levels of violence, coupled with “superior knowledge of their local physical, social, and cultural terrains to fight from a position of maximum relative advantage” (Maddison, 2012, p. 8).
Such adversaries have not yet mastered the maritime domain to the extent
required to challenge modern navies. However, the trend toward improved
capabilities and competence at sea is clearly evident in some notable successes: the suicide attack on the USS Cole in 2000; the attack by al-­Qaeda
on the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002; Hezbollah’s attack on the Israeli
corvette Hanit using a variant of the Silkworm anti-­ship missile in 2006;
and terrorist attacks launched at Mumbai, in 2008, from the sea. (Maddison,
2012, p. 8)

The Navy and Coast Guard share responsibility with other select members of the U.S. government interagency* in protecting the world’s largest
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which includes 95,000 miles of our nation’s
shoreline. Homeland security and homeland defense practitioners must
understand the significant amount of global trade and commerce that
takes place via the maritime transportation system and also understand
the context of the maritime domain in which all relevant operations take
place. For example, to keep the challenges of these operations in perspective
consider: 361 public commercial U.S. ports support $800 billion in freight
per year; ports accommodated 20 million global cruise ship passengers in
2011 (a record); U.S. ports handle over 95% of U.S overseas trade (the total
volume of goods imported and exported through U.S. ports is expected to
dramatically increase over the next decade); in 2011, there were 12,173,935
recreational vessels registered in the United States; and 8,000 foreign vessels
make 50,000 port calls each year in the United States (MTSA, 2002; NSMS,
2005; Cooperative Strategy, 2007, Goward, 2007; Wilson, 2010). Viewed in
this light, the importance of maritime security, for the United States and our
allies, is beyond question.
Shipping is the heart of the global economy, but it is vulnerable to attack
in two key areas. Spread across Asia, North America, and Europe are 30
megaports/­cities that constitute the world’s primary, interdependent trading web. Through a handful of international straits and canals pass 75% of
the world’s maritime trade and half its daily oil consumption. International
commerce is at risk in the major trading hubs as well as at a handful of strategic chokepoints. (NSMS, 2005, p. 2)

The challenges these facts represent are enormous. Along with the federal,
state, and local governments, private sector stakeholders must acknowledge
*

For the purposes of this chapter, the interagency is defined as involving two or more federal departments or agencies, e.g., the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau
of Investigation (Department of Justice), etc.

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accountability for protecting their vital commercial interests. The full force
of the U.S. government will help where it can, but just as the Department of
Defense (DoD) has established a layered defense concept to protect the
homeland, private sector stakeholders must also establish their own layered
defense and security protocols. With their governmental counterparts, they
will develop, implement, and maintain port and vessel security plans; coordinate and collaborate with international, federal, and local law enforcement agencies (including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS));
develop appropriate training and security initiatives with their own internal
organizational stakeholders; and create meaningful and viable exercises and
training events.*
The attacks of 9/11 are not so far removed as to suggest a return to complacency. While the instruments of attack by al-­Qaeda on 9/11 came directly
from the aviation sector, the maritime sector was just as vulnerable and
remains so today. The airliners used on 9/11 were essentially vehicle-­borne
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), but so too were the boats used to
attack the USS Cole and the merchant vessel (M/­V) Limburg. The Navy and
Coast Guard, along with all global shipping stakeholders, must apply the
ways and means necessary to achieve the desired end state of a safe and
secure maritime domain. They must remain ready and vigilant to deter any
potential adversary and defeat any attack that may occur within the maritime domain. All of this will be accomplished consistent with established
international laws and treaties, and in the United States, in accordance with
the Constitution and the rule of law.

Legislation and Policy
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was signed into law by
President Bush on November 25, 2002, to ensure greater security for U.S.
ports and harbors and to maintain uninterrupted free trade. The MTSA
mandated that the executive branch accomplish a number of tasks including, but not limited to, the development of
•• A detailed vulnerability assessment of the facilities and vessels that
may be involved in a transportation security incident
•• A maritime transportation security plan
•• Area maritime transportation security plans
•• Facility and vessel response plans
•• A transportation worker identification card (TWIC) program
•• Maritime safety and security teams
*

Further discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. For additional information see: http://
www.dhs.gov/­national-­i nfrastructure-­protection-­plan#1;  http://www.dhs.gov/​­x library/​­a ssets/​­n ipp-​
­ssp-​­transportation-​­systems-​2010.pdf; http://www.​dhs.​gov/​­critical-​­infrastructure-​­sector-​­partnerships).

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)
13, Maritime Security Policy, on December 21, 2004, outlining his vision for
a “fully coordinated U.S. Government effort to protect U.S. interests in the
maritime domain” (Fact Sheet, n.d., p. 1). HSPD-13 directs the integration
and alignment of all U.S. government “maritime security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector entities” (Fact Sheet, n.d., p. 1).
It defines the maritime domain as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating
to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway,
including all maritime-­related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and
vessels and other conveyances” (HSPD-13, 2004, p. 2). The maritime domain
for the United States includes the Great Lakes and all navigable inland waterways, such as the Mississippi River and the Intracoastal Waterway (NSMS,
2005). Due to its very nature, the maritime domain is a complex and often
uncertain operating environment, which is “susceptible to exploitation and
disruption by individuals, organizations, and States” (NSMS, 2005, p. 2).
Because of its size and complexity, the maritime domain presents inherent
vulnerabilities. Adversaries of the United States, be they individuals, terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), pirates,
or nation-­states, will continue to pursue avenues that take advantage of the
seams and vulnerabilities of the maritime domain (Figure 4.2). Therefore,
the United States will take all necessary actions to enhance the security of
U.S. interests in the maritime domain including:
•• Preventing all attacks or criminal or hostile acts
•• Preventing the unlawful exploitation of the maritime domain, and
reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to such exploitation
•• Enhancing U.S. national security by protecting U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure and key resources, and coastal approaches
•• Expediting recovery and response from attacks
•• Maximizing awareness of security issues to support U.S. forces and
improve U.S. government actions in response to identified threats
•• Enhancing international relationships and promoting the integration of U.S. allies and international and private sector partners into
an improved global maritime security framework to advance common security interests
•• Ensuring seamless, coordinated implementation of authorities and
responsibilities relating to the security of the maritime domain by
and among federal departments and agencies (NSMS, 2005, p. 3)
Actions taken to protect the maritime domain “must be undertaken
in a manner that facilitates global commerce and preserves the freedom
of the seas for legitimate military and commercial navigation and other
legitimate activities” (NSMS, 2005, p. 3). However, the United States must

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FIGURE 4.2  Cargo containers are inspected during a search for illegal contraband and possible al-­
Qaeda members aboard the motor vessel Kota Sejarah.
The boarding and search was conducted in December 2001 in the Arabian Sea
by U.S. Navy SEALs and Marines from aboard the amphibious warfare ship USS
Shreveport (LPD 12). The Shreveport and the Special Warfare (SPECWAR) personnel were deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The ship was
released following the inspection. (From U.S. Navy. Photo by Mate 1st Class Tim
Turner. Released.)

be mindful against establishing a maritime environment that becomes
overly burdensome.

Strategy
Protecting the U.S. homeland is the highest priority of the president and
the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Protecting the U.S.
homeland necessitates an active layered defense, seamlessly integrating
U.S. capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the maritime domain
in the geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the United States
(Strategy for Homeland Defense and DSCA, 2013). To achieve defense in
depth, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (2013) establishes four key objectives:
•• Counter air and maritime threats at a safe distance
•• Prevent terrorist attacks on the homeland through support to law
enforcement

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

•• Maintain defense preparedness for domestic chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks
•• Develop plans and procedures to ensure defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA) during complex catastrophes* (p. 9)
Attainment of these objectives requires coordination and cooperation
within the interagency and the intelligence community (IC), as well as
with civil authorities and the private sector. Thorough risk assessments and
close management of the finite resources of DoD are also necessary. DoD
must also develop and sustain key operational capabilities to achieve these
objectives, for example: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
information sharing; forward-­deployed combat-­ready forces; and coordination, collaboration, and communications within the interagency.
Robust global commerce relies on the uninterrupted flow of goods, services, and people throughout the maritime domain. The security of the
waters and airspace geographically contiguous to the United States is critical
to homeland defense. The U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Navy, other DoD components, Coast Guard, IC, and other domestic and international partners
will seize the initiative from adversaries, detect, deter, and when necessary,
eliminate threats before they reach the homeland (Strategy for Homeland
Defense and DSCA, 2013). Comprehensive threat awareness in the maritime domain is necessary to maintain freedom of navigation and protect
the nation at a safe distance. In the maritime approaches, DoD works with
DHS to integrate U.S. maritime defenses and optimize mutually supporting
capabilities of the Navy and Coast Guard. The Navy has long operated as a
forward-­deployed force and will continue to do so. These forward-­deployed
assets operate jointly and with coalition partners, as well as with the IC, to
identify, track, intercept, and deter threats at the outer portions of the layered defense.
Constantly improving intercept capabilities in the maritime domain
requires an integrated system of adaptable and flexible defenses. The Navy
and Coast Guard conduct routine and frequent maritime interception exercises to ensure a high state of readiness. DoD and DHS have a predetermined
process for ensuring rapid, effective Coast Guard support to the Navy and
vice versa. Although DoD has the lead role in defending the United States
from direct maritime attack, it recognizes and supports the Coast Guard’s
responsibilities for maritime law enforcement and homeland security. Together
*

For policy on DSCA, refer to DoD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, December 29,
2010.

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FIGURE 4.3  Sailors assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit One
Two (EODMU-12) Det 10 prepare to guide the Cerberus Swimmer Detection System
into the water at Naval Station Pascagoula during the Gulf Coast Maritime Domain
Awareness Initiative 2005. The initiative was held at the Port of Pascagoula,
Mississippi, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, along with
federal, state, and local agencies working together to enhance homeland security.
(From U.S. Navy. Photo by Mate 1st Class Michael Moriatis. Released.)

with the Coast Guard, DoD strengthens the security in U.S. ports and
littorals,* expanding maritime defense capabilities further seaward (Strategy
for Homeland Defense and DSCA, 2013) (see Figure 4.3).
“Maritime Security is best achieved by blending public and private
maritime security activities on a global scale into an integrated effort that
addresses all maritime threats” (NSMS, 2005, p. ii). The United States and
its international trading partners have a shared interest to ensure the safety
and security of maritime global commerce and to protect the maritime supply chain against criminal or hostile acts (Caldwell, 2008). All nations benefit from a secure maritime domain and all will suffer from its insecurity.
HSPD-13 directed the coordination of maritime security strategy through
the creation of the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS). The
NSMS aligns and directs the coordination of all federal government maritime security plans, programs, initiatives, and resources into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate federal, state, local,
*

Littoral warfare refers to naval campaigns that take place in shallow coastal areas characterized by
heavy traffic, varying depth, and nearby population centers. The littorals have been a longtime focal
point of 21st-­century naval strategy, culminating with the development of a new class of ship, the littoral combat ship (LCS), designed for these unique environments (Naval Post Graduate School, 2013).

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

and private sector entities. There are eight supporting plans that, when combined with the NSMS, promote global economic stability and help protect
legitimate maritime activities while preventing hostile or illegal acts. The
NSMS outlines the president’s vision for a fully coordinated U.S. government effort to protect U.S. interests in the maritime domain; provides an
overarching plan addressing all of the components of the maritime domain,
including domestic, international, public, and private components; and
incorporates a global, cross-­disciplined approach centered on a layered,
defense-­in-­depth framework that may be adjusted based on the present
threat (JT Pub 3-27, 2007, p. D-6). Three broad principles provide foundational guidance to the NSMS:
1. Preserving the freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The
right of vessels to travel freely in international waters, engage in
innocent and transit passage, and have access to ports is an essential element of national security. The free, continuing, unthreatened
intercourse of nations is an essential global freedom and helps ensure
the smooth operation of the world’s economy.
2. The U.S. government must facilitate and defend commerce to
ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping. The economy, environment, and social fabric of the United States are inextricably linked with
the oceans and their resources. The adoption of a just-­in-­time delivery
approach to shipping by most industries, rather than stockpiling or
maintaining operating reserves of energy, raw materials, and key components, means that a disruption or slowing of the flow of almost any
item can have widespread implications for the national economy.
3. The U.S. government must facilitate the movement of desirable
goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and material. There need not be an inherent conflict
between the demand for security and the need for facilitating the
travel and trade essential to continued economic growth (NSMS,
2005, pp. 7–8).
There are four objectives that support the principles delineated above:
1. Prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts. The sea services prevent adversaries from attacking or committing unlawful acts
in the maritime domain by monitoring and patrolling maritime borders, approaches, EEZs, and other areas, e.g., those near international
straits. The sea services work with other DoD components and the
interagency to detect adversaries before they strike, deny them areas
in which to operate, block their freedom of movement, stop them from
entering the United States, dismantle their financial infrastructure,
and eliminate the threat by stopping related activities (NSMS, 2005).

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2. Protect maritime-­related population centers, critical infrastructure, transportation systems, borders, harbors, ports, and coastal
approaches in the maritime domain. Both the public and private
sectors and most Americans rely on a vast network of infrastructure
and resources, both physical and virtual, to conduct complicated
business and trade. The maritime domain constitutes a vital part of
the complex systems necessary for the well-­being of the public, as
well as economic and national security (NSMS, 2005). That portion
of the maritime domain in/­near the homeland contains ports and
harbors, the vessels that dock there, inland waterways, levees and
locks, military facilities and other defense infrastructure, nuclear
power plants, oil refineries and chemical plants, fuel tanks, pipelines, passenger terminals, bridges and tunnels, intermodal cargo
terminals, etc. “Ports, in particular, have inherent security vulnerabilities: they are sprawling, easily accessible by water and land,
close to crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven with complex
transportation networks” (NSMS, 2005, p. 10). Damage to any one
of these components may have a cascading effect on other critical
infrastructure and would impact the domestic, if not the global,
economy, depending on the extent of the damage. Witness the
havoc wrought by Hurricane Katrina, the resultant oil spill from the
Deepwater Horizon accident, and “super storm” Sandy.
3. Minimize damage and expedite recovery from attacks within
the maritime domain. The impacts of Katrina, Sandy, and the
Deepwater Horizon disaster clearly point to the need for a national
capacity for resilience—to respond, to minimize damage that does
occur from natural or human-­caused disasters, to expedite recovery,
and to put in place mitigation projects that will minimize the damage of the next event. Continuity of operations within the maritime
domain is also essential, which will enable the rapid recovery and
restoration of associated services (NSMS, 2005).
4. Safeguard the ocean and its resources from unlawful exploitation
and intentional critical damage. The maritime domain is vulnerable to hostile exploitation. The intervention of unlawful or hostile
exploitation of the maritime domain requires the attention of all
maritime global trading nations. Unauthorized and illegal incursions by foreign fishing vessels into the U.S. EEZ may have serious
economic consequences, for example. Protecting marine resources
(a Coast Guard primary mission) from unlawful or hostile damage
and exploitation is a matter of national security. The United States,
as well as many other nations, has a substantial economic and security interest in preserving the health and productive capacity of the

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

world’s oceans. The United States will continue to deploy Navy and
Coast Guard assets forward monitoring and patrolling the U.S. EEZs
and certain other global areas of interest (NSMS, 2005).
Assisting friends and allies to maintain the maritime sovereignty of their
territorial seas is a long-­standing mission of U.S. sea services and contributes
directly to the economic development, as well as the ability of those partners to combat threats. “Preventing exploitation of the maritime domain
requires that nations collectively improve their capability to monitor activity throughout the domain … enhance maritime interdiction capacity,
develop effective policing protocols, and build intergovernmental cooperation” (NSMS, 2005, p. 12).
The federal government has primary responsibility for security of the
maritime domain (Caldwell, 2008). The interagency shares this responsibility with state and local governments and private sector stakeholders. DHS,
with the U.S. Coast Guard acting as executive agent, has the lead role in
maritime homeland security; DoD leads efforts to integrate maritime intelligence and maximize maritime domain awareness (MDA); and the State
Department (DOS) informs our embassies of maritime security concerns
and works with our partners on diplomatic efforts that contribute to maritime domain security (Caldwell, 2008).

Maritime Domain Awareness
Today’s complex and ambiguous threats place an even greater premium on
knowledge and a shared understanding of the maritime domain.
—National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (2005)

DoD, DHS, and other members of the interagency collaborated to develop a
cohesive concept of MDA, which links operational units around the world
(O’Rourke, 2004). “MDA is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could affect the security, safety,
economy, or environment of the United States … [and] is a critical component
of the active, layered maritime defense” (MDA, 2005, p. ii). Crucial to MDA
is accurate ISR of all vessels, cargo, and people, extending well beyond U.S.
maritime boundaries (MDA, 2005)—ideally before an adversary’s planning
cycle develops, threats mature, and adversaries depart their base of support.
This ability enhances a shared situational awareness, defined as “a common
perception of the environment and its implications” (MDA, 2005, p. 23).
We need to think first about awareness. The old paradigm of prevention,
response, and consequence management must now become awareness,
prevention, response, and consequence management. Awareness involves

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recognizing the threats well in advance, and anticipating our vulnerabilities.
It also has to do with having access to detailed intelligence about our adversaries, and sharing that information more effectively among federal agencies
and with our international partners. (Loy, 2001)

MDA supports core national security priorities and somewhat simplifies
today’s complex security environment by meeting these objectives:
•• Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to abort threats as
distant from U.S. interests as possible
•• Enable accurate decisions in response to the spectrum of maritime threats
•• Sustain full application of law to ensure freedom of navigation and
flow of commerce
•• Consistently monitor vessels, cargo, crews, and passengers
•• Maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure
•• Collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decision makers
•• Maintain data on MDA-­related mission performance (MDA, 2005,
pp. 2–3)
Achieving these objectives is not the role solely of DoD or DHS. It is
required of any who use the maritime domain for legal trade and commerce.
All stakeholders have a long-­term interest in its security, and collaboration
is in the interest of all parties. As the global maritime community gains a
greater degree of MDA, international security and U.S. homeland security
will improve, and the ability to diminish future threats will be enhanced.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of MDA is that it is not just a system but a state of mind. It is constant, unyielding vigilance…. International
and domestic cooperation, both civil and military is essential in this regard,
because we can’t hope to ensure our security by working alone or by waiting
until the threats have already crossed the thresholds of our ports. (Loy, 2001)

The Threats
The conflicts around the world are “characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and
non-­state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways” (Cooperative Strategy, 2007, p. 3). The increasing number of
TCOs, al-­Qaeda-­affiliated terrorist organizations, pirates, and rogue states,
“emboldened and enabled with unprecedented access to the global stage,
can cause systemic disruptions in an effort to increase their power and
influence” (Cooperative Strategy, 2007, p. 3).

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

Terrorism is not the only threat facing the U.S. government and private
commercial shipping. Piracy, human trafficking, and drug and weapons
smuggling exacerbate the situation because they contribute to illicit movement of people, money, and weapons across land borders (Loy, 2001) and the
maritime domain. Such threats have grown in severity and complexity and
are likely to continue to do so into the foreseeable future; they span oceans,
bringing the problem of breached maritime security much closer to home.
Separately and collectively [security threats] pose dangers to our borders,
our economy, our environment, and our safety. All of them have a distinct
maritime dimension. They can be conveyed towards our shores in ways that
can’t always be countered by traditional naval forces. We can’t launch cruise
missiles or air strikes against them as they approach: they draw near in civilian vessels that look like and mingle with legitimate commercial and recreational traffic. (Loy, 2001)

The oceans are an invaluable resource; they support global commerce,
provide food, and offer recreation. Ironically, they also afford a medium for
potential attacks and illegal activities. The DoD and DHS Secretaries, in consultation with those of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation and
the Attorney General, developed a National Maritime Security Response
Plan to ensure a viable response to maritime threats (NSMS, 2005). The
plan reflects lead agency roles and responsibilities and includes relationship
and coordination protocols governing protection and defense of the United
States against threats to its interests in the maritime domain, and provides
recommendations concerning the designation of an interagency planning
and command and control entity to ensure unity of command for national
execution of maritime security policy (HSPD-13, 2004). Besides potential
for major combat operations at sea between nation-­states, terrorism has
increased the nonmilitary, asymmetric threats that the United States and its
partners must neutralize (NSMS, 2005). “The maritime domain … presents
not only a medium by which these threats can move, but offers a broad array
of potential targets that fit the terrorists’ … objectives” (NSMS, 2005, p. 3).
Certain nation-­states represent a threat to global security. In November
2012, China landed its first jet fighter on its first aircraft carrier. In December
2012, North Korea successfully launched a ballistic missile and placed a
small satellite into orbit; since that time the nation has only become more
strident in its saber rattling, as most recently demonstrated by its third
underground nuclear test conducted on February 12, 2013. Iran possesses
three Soviet-­era Kilo class diesel submarines, and continues to advance its
substantial nuclear ambitions. While the full operational capabilities of
the first two potential threats may be some years off, the threat from even

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the most fundamental application of seamanship and operations of just one
Kilo submarine in the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz is ominous.
With these and other threats from potential nation-­state adversaries, the
Navy and Coast Guard must maintain constant readiness to conduct war
at sea, especially in the littoral environment. For example, antisubmarine
warfare is very challenging in the littoral. North Korean naval and special
operations forces have made numerous excursions south below the demilitarized zone, and a number of Asian nations are in constant dispute over
the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which could easily impact the disposition
of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific theater. Also, 55% of the fleet deployed
during Operation Iraqi Freedom operated predominantly in the littoral
(Spicer, 2003).
In addition to preparing for the direct military threat, an adversarial
nation-­state could support any number of illicit activities or provide weapons of mass destruction (WMD), WMD components and technology, conventional weapons, and the necessary associated personnel expertise “to
another rogue state or a terrorist organization that is willing to conduct
WMD attacks. WMD issues are of the greatest concern since the maritime
domain is the likely avenue by which WMD will be brought into the United
States” (NSMS, 2005, p. 4). An attack in the maritime domain perpetrated
by any extremist group employing WMD would have a significant impact
on the global economy. Adversaries that could potentially employ asymmetric operations are opportunistic and would seek to maximize any advantage generated by seams and vulnerabilities in our defenses, infrastructure,
or operating domain. The vastness of the maritime domain offers potential
adversaries numerous opportunities, while at the same time complicating
the U.S. preparedness measures to prevent, defend against, and respond
to attacks that do occur. Terrorists may use any form of VBIED to affect an
attack. Terrorists and TCOs can also reregister vessels under fictitious names.
It has been reported that more than a dozen commercial cargo vessels are
owned or managed by people with ties to al-­Qaeda (O’Rourke, 2004). Not
only can terrorists employ VBIED, mines, or swimmers to conduct attacks,
but they can also use a vessel’s cargo, e.g., liquefied natural gas (LNG) or oil
(or other petroleum product), as the explosive element of the attack (NSMS,
2005). An attack of this nature in a major port or harbor, such as Long Beach,
Elizabeth, New Orleans, Singapore, Hong Kong, Portsmouth, or Rotterdam,
would be devastating to global maritime commerce.
Piracy* is a scourge. Pirates have threatened seafarers throughout history,
long before the United States became a free and independent nation, and
*

For an international legal definition of piracy and armed robbery see Article 101 of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Resolution A.1025 (26) adopted on
December 2, 2009, at the 26th Assembly Session of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

FIGURE 4.4  U.S. Navy sailors assigned to the guided missile frigate USS Taylor
(FFG 50) visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) team disembark a dhow after completing a routine compliant boarding in the Arabian Sea on March 11, 2012. Taylor
was assigned to commander, NATO Task Force 508, supporting Operation Ocean
Shield, maritime interception operations, and counterpiracy in the U.S. 5th Fleet
area of responsibility (AOR). (From U.S. Navy. Photo by Cryptologic Technician 3rd
Class Michael Tammen. Released.)

they remain a challenge even today (Figure  4.4). You should recall, however, that in the relatively brief history of the United States, one of Thomas
Jefferson’s earliest foreign policy ordeals as president was to battle the Barbary
pirates who had been seizing U.S. and European ships for decades. President
Jefferson, in response to these attacks, asked Congress and received authorization to deploy Navy and Marine forces forward to conduct operations as
necessary to protect American national interests.
Make no mistake, the pirates of today are not the romanticized Hollywood
versions depicted in the movie Pirates of the Caribbean (Verbinski, 2003).
They are violent and brutal and, from their perspective, also successful.
Somali pirates have hijacked hundreds of ships and have amassed hundreds
of millions of dollars from those criminal acts, money that they often reinvest in additional resources to perpetrate their trade. They have attacked
ships as far away as Sri Lanka, more than 2,000  miles from the Horn of
Africa (Shanker, 2012). Studies indicate that with increased insurance premiums, added security, and other protective measures, Somali pirates are
costing the world more than $5 billion per year (NYT, 2012).
There is some good news, however. The International Maritime Bureau
(IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) state that proactive international naval operations from the United States, the European

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Union, China, Japan, Russia, India, and other nations are deterring pirates,
along with the employment of best management practice by ship owners
and operators, including the use of armed guards and other onboard security measures (ICC, 2012). The Navy indicated there were 46 pirate attacks
in the area in 2012, compared with 222 in 2011 and 239 in 2010 (Shanker,
2012). The decreased number of attacks can be credited to aggressive patrolling by international forces and increased vigilance by the commercial shipping industry.
However, this is not the time for complacency. For example, piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea is becoming increasingly dangerous. There were 34 incidents from January to September 2012, up from 30 in 2011 (ICC, 2012).
The IMB reported that attacks are often violent, well planned, and aimed
at stealing refined petroleum products, which can be sold easily. The leader­
ship of international naval forces operating in the area, as well as the ICC
International, have met with and asked commercial shipping stakeholders
to transit the Arabian Sea and surrounding waters via established shipping
lanes (ICC, 2012).
All the acts of piracy and all the successful rescues of hostages and
releases of hijacked merchant vessels notwithstanding, a more frightening and potentially deadly threat may be looming: the potential connection between pirates and terrorists. Although their respective ideological
motivations may not be entirely in sync, there may be some interconnectivity in achieving their ultimate ends. In the spring of 2010, radical Islamist
insurgents seized Xarardheere, one of the most notorious pirate coves on the
central Somali coast. This raised questions about whether extremists with
connections to al-­Qaeda would now have a pipeline to millions of dollars
and a new capability to threaten global trade (Shanker, 2012). The combination of strengthened and increased international resolve to include multi­
national naval patrols, an increase in merchant vessel self-­protection tactics,
techniques, and procedures, as well as prosecutions of perpetrators appears
to be hindering the ability of the pirates to operate successfully (Figure 4.5).
The illegal migration of peoples from and to a number of different countries will be a significant factor affecting maritime domain security for several years. The potential for terrorists, narco-­traffickers, human traffickers,
and TCOs to take advantage of smuggling networks in attempt to circumvent maritime and border security cannot be dismissed. As security measures in U.S. ports of entry, at border crossings, and at airports continue to
strengthen, improve, and evolve, criminals and terrorists will likely examine the relatively undefended, unsecured, and vulnerable coastlines to effect
unlawful entry into the United States (NSMS, 2005).
Despite all the challenges described above, defending the United States
against the widely dispersed and diverse array of threats is and will remain
the primary objective of the Navy and Coast Guard.

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

FIGURE 4.5  A U.S. Navy SH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter provides support to a visit,
board, search, and seizure (VBSS) team in a 7-meter rigid-­hull inflatable boat,
assigned to the guided missile destroyer USS Kidd (DDG 100). The VBSS team
boarded the Iranian-­flagged fishing dhow Al Molai in the Arabian Sea in January
2012 after the dhow’s master claimed he was being held captive by pirates. Kidd’s
VBSS team detained 15 suspected pirates who were reportedly holding the
13-member Iranian crew hostage for the last several weeks. Kidd was conducting counterpiracy and maritime security operations while deployed to the U.S. 5th
Fleet area of responsibility. (From U.S. Navy. Released.)

“Operational Trust”: The Operational
Synergy of the U.S. Navy
and U.S. Coast Guard
Addressing the Naval War College in 2012, Vice Admiral Paul Maddison,
Royal Canadian Navy, used the phrase “strategic trust” to characterize the
sense of cooperation and confidence that permits naval leaders to see past
issues that may divide us as the instruments of national policy that our navies
must always be, to work together on issues of common interest, which in this
globalized era have become crucial to our collective prosperity and security.
(Naval War College Review, 2012, p. 8)

What Admiral Maddison describes at the strategic level between the U.S.
and Canadian Navies applies equally at the operational level between the
U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. The Navy and Coast Guard have developed robust capabilities and operate synergistically on missions of common

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interest to preserve and protect the maritime domain, and therefore enhance
U.S. national interests and prosperity. Since 9/11, U.S. strategic imperatives
have necessitated changes in the size, composition, and disposition of DoD
and DHS forces required for the successful execution of global maritime
operations. Coast Guard assets have deployed under the control of Navy
commands conducting major combat and humanitarian operations in support of a variety of missions (MOA, 2003).
To detect, track, intercept, attack, and defeat transnational threats, DHS
and DoD have developed a mutually agreed upon process for ensuring rapid,
effective support to each other. The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland
Security have jointly signed a number of memoranda of agreement (MOA)
to ensure mutual support for homeland defense and homeland security
missions. These policy documents establish the DoD command and control structure for maritime homeland defense operations that include Coast
Guard forces and identify appropriate roles and missions for the Coast Guard
in support of maritime homeland defense operations (MOA, 2003). The
respective MOA also identify and document appropriate capabilities, roles,
and missions for DoD in support of the Coast Guard when conducting maritime homeland security operations, and facilitate the transfer of DoD forces
to the Coast Guard for support of maritime homeland security operations
(MOA, 2006). Finally, they identify national defense capabilities of the Coast
Guard and improve the process by which the Coast Guard serves as a force
multiplier for DoD missions (MOA, 2008).
The Coast Guard is designated as the lead federal agency (LFA) for maritime homeland security because it is better suited in terms of training, equipment, and its connection to law enforcement organizations. However, it also
retains its identity as an armed force. Maritime homeland defense missions
require flexibility, adaptability, and access to a broad range of diverse capabilities to ensure mission success (MOA, 2003). The Coast Guard and the
Navy have established a steadfast operational working relationship and
command and control structure that enables maritime homeland defense
missions under the command authority of DoD. The Secretaries of Defense
and Homeland Security have agreed that:
•• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), and the commandant of the Coast Guard will jointly review
service capabilities for appropriate Coast Guard missions in support
of maritime homeland defense
•• The Coast Guard shall be included in the maritime homeland defense
command and control structure, ensuring the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander (under USNORTHCOM) will have the

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

forces necessary for the execution of specified maritime homeland
defense missions
•• Navy and Coast Guard commanders will plan, train, and exercise
together for maritime homeland defense missions, and staffs will be
comprised of members from both services (MOA, 2003)
The Navy may support the Coast Guard when conducting maritime
homeland security missions. The Coast Guard may, when authorized, exercise tactical command and control over Navy assets when those assets are
assisting with Coast Guard law enforcement functions or the performance
of other duties. However, Navy assets under such tactical command and
control* “may not participate directly in a search, seizure, arrest, or other
similar activity unless the law … authorizes … such activity and such activity is authorized by the Secretary of Defense” (MOA, 2006, p. A-1).
The Coast Guard exercises its law enforcement authorities on waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, as well as on the high seas, and
is tasked with providing an armed deterrent and response force to criminal
acts and acts of terrorism in the maritime domain (MOA, 2006). The Coast
Guard’s principal role in maritime homeland security notwithstanding, the
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security have identified DoD capabilities that contribute to Coast Guard maritime homeland security operations, which are “necessary to ensure effective … detection, deterrence,
prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities during maritime
homeland security contingencies” (MOA, 2006, p. A-1). DoD has developed
the necessary process for committing Navy forces to support the Coast Guard
when conducting maritime homeland security operations. Both departments
agree that the following DoD capabilities are appropriate and desirable in
support of Coast Guard maritime homeland security missions:
•• Dispose of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in or near U.S. ports
and approaches
•• Conduct mine countermeasures to facilitate commerce in or near
U.S. ports
•• Conduct ISR activities and identify, assess, and share information
on potential threats in the maritime domain
•• Intercept maritime threats to permit Coast Guard assets to conduct
boardings and inspections, including warning shots and disabling fire
*

Tactical control is the authority to provide detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. It is not a type
of command authority. Navy forces operating under Coast Guard tactical control remain under
DoD command.

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•• Provide operational logistics and personnel support
•• Counter chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-­yield
explosive (CBRNE) threats (MOA, 2006)
Whether the assigned missions fall under homeland security or homeland defense, the Navy and Coast Guard will continue to train, deploy, and
operate together to ensure the security of the maritime domain.

Navy Operations
Under Title 10 United States Code (USC), military departments organize,
train, and equip U.S. military forces across numerous operational disciplines, including operations in the maritime domain. U.S. Navy forces
detect, track, deter, interdict, attack, and defeat a broad range of adversaries
across the maritime domain.
The Navy contributes significantly to maritime security through the
employment of several operational disciplines and warfare specialties,
including aviation, surface warfare, subsurface warfare, special operations,
ISR, and information dominance. The Navy will also coordinate with and
operate alongside DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other members of the IC to achieve a common operating picture (COP) and situational
awareness in the maritime domain. The Navy’s expeditionary character
dictates that its missions be executed in a forward environment as part of
the layered defense construct. However, the Navy will also operate closer to
the homeland in concert with Coast Guard forces when necessary in support of civil authorities or in a homeland defense capacity as directed by the
National Command Authorities (the president and Secretary of Defense).
In serving the national interest and supporting the guidance established
in the National Strategy for Maritime Security,* the Navy will maintain
the highest state of readiness to meet a broad range of missions, including maintaining freedom navigation; enabling global commerce; deterring
aggression, but if deterrence fails, fighting war at sea against nation-­state
adversaries; employing forward-­stationed and rotational forces working
with friends and allies in various capacities; supporting humanitarian relief
efforts; and providing support to civil authorities (Greenert, 2012).
The forward-­deployed nature of the Navy has provided all U.S. presidents
with suitable options and the ability to influence events around the world.
The capabilities and versatility of the Navy provide the United States with an
asymmetric advantage of its own where access to a disaster area or area of
crisis or conflict may be restricted or denied (Cooperative Strategy, 2007). In
this way, asymmetric operating capabilities can be seen as a force for good.
*

Military services are also guided by the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and
the National Military Strategy.

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

The Navy contributes to homeland defense by operating forward-­deployed
forces at the outer layers of the defense-­in-­depth construct, identifying and
neutralizing threats as far from the United States and its territories as possible, operating in concert with the Coast Guard and NORTHCOM to defend
against sea and air threats in the vicinity of the continental United States,
and responding to domestic crises by providing naval forces in support of
civil authorities* (O’Rourke, 2004). The Navy also continues to advance
bilateral and multilateral military-­to-­military (also known as mil-­to-­mil)
relationships that enhance the layered defense concept, while at the same
time improving our partners’ security.
Whether projecting power overseas, assisting with humanitarian relief in
other countries, or supporting civil authorities at home, the sea services have
always operated as an integrated force that has been specifically designed
and adapted to meet the mission needs of the fleet commander to which
they are assigned. Homeland defense is a vivid example of the requirement
for operational integration and interoperability. It is not adequate to discuss homeland defense in terms of splitting the roles, missions, functions,
responsibilities, and authorities between the Navy and the Coast Guard
along an artificial boundary. Rather, the Navy and Coast Guard work as one
integrated force wherever they operate to defend the United States. Coast
Guard forces are able to operate as part of a joint task force, and Navy forces
respond to operational tasking close to home when necessary to secure the
homeland and support civil authorities. However, achieving the necessary
level of interoperability and integration does not happen overnight. A rigorous at-­home training cycle of many months and consisting of numerous
readiness evaluation exercises for each unit ensures ships, squadrons, and
submarines are prepared to “answer all bells” when called. For example, after
9/11, the Navy immediately ordered numerous ships to sea and placed them
at strategic locations along the East and West Coasts of the United States.
These included two aircraft carriers, a number of cruisers and destroyers
equipped with the Aegis weapons system, the hospital ship USS Comfort,
and a fast sealift ship. A Navy reserve fighter squadron protected the president’s ranch at Crawford, Texas, and E-2 Hawkeyes provided surveillance of
the airspace (Swartz, 2003). The Navy also assigned a number of patrol craft
to the Coast Guard to conduct coastal patrols and escort duty.
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) identifies
humanitarian assistance and disaster response as a core capability for the
Navy and Coast Guard. On average, military support is requested for less
than 10% of disasters responded to by the United States, and military support can vary from a single transportation request to deployment of several
*

For more policy information on defense support of civil authorities and the Navy Defense Support of
Civil Authorities Program, see DoD Directive 3025.18 and OPNAV Instruction 3440.16D, respectively.

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ships (NWP-29, 2011). The Navy’s primary objective in these scenarios is to
protect and restore Navy mission capabilities and maintain combat readiness. However, with due consideration given to Navy operational mission
priorities, commanders, at all levels, must also be prepared to employ Navy
resources under their authority to support civil authorities, as directed by
relevant DoD and Navy policies. This includes the employment of personnel, equipment, supplies, fuel, communications capabilities, food, water, and
the use of facilities owned or controlled by, or under the jurisdiction of, the
Department of the Navy (NWP-29, 2011). To save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage, Navy commanders are authorized
to respond immediately to requests for assistance from civilian authorities (Figure 4.6). However, that immediate response cannot interfere with
operational mission-­related responsibilities, or the protection and survival
of commanders’ personnel and facilities. All response efforts, including

FIGURE 4.6  U.S. Navy medical personnel provide medical assistance to a simulated patient during exercise Lifesaver 2005 at Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida.
Military personnel joined local, state, and federal agencies in Lifesaver 2005, a
major Homeland Security/­
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) exercise
conducted in eight states. (From U.S. Air Force. Photo by Master Sgt. James M.
Bowman. Released.)

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

immediate response, are provided on a cost-­reimbursable basis, per DoD
policy. However, “immediate response efforts should not be delayed or
denied due to the inability or unwillingness of the requesting civilian organization to commit to reimbursing the Navy” (NWP-29, 2011, p. 3).
Response and recovery operations to major disaster emergencies cannot succeed without mutual assistance/­mutual aid. “Navy commanders
may respond to domestic civil disasters based upon lawful memoranda
of understanding/­
agreement, mutual aid agreements, interservice support agreements, or executive orders. Navy commanders are prepared to
aid civil authorities, as well as request assistance from federal departments
and agencies, other services, and state and local civil authorities” (NWP-29,
2011, p. 4).
Any domestic disaster emergency response normally requires participation from the interagency and is conducted under the leader­ship of local
civil authorities. Navy forces are typically involved in DSCA because the
DoD Secretary has approved deployment of Navy capabilities that address
needs beyond the capacity of local, state, and other federal agency responders, or a preexisting mutual aid response agreement exists with local authorities (NWP-3-29, 2011, p. 6-1). Operational- and strategic-­level commanders
are the primary interface with civilian authorities for emergency planning
activities, and Navy tactical-­level commanders receive direction from their
operational commanders. Navy forces participating in DSCA operations
always remain under military command.
The Navy’s role in DSCA is scalable, flexible, and adaptable and aligns key
functional responsibilities to support the needs of the civilian authorities.
These key concepts guide the Navy’s role in DSCA:
•• The intent of disaster response activities is to save lives and mitigate
human suffering.
•• DoD is never in charge of disaster response efforts.
•• DoD cooperation with the designated lead federal agency is important to ensuring rapid humanitarian assistance in large-­scale disasters, where the military’s transportation, logistics, and engineering
capabilities are critical.
•• Nonmilitary government/­civilian agencies and international organizations are experts on disaster response.
•• Effective response requires knowledge of laws, regulations, local culture, and roles of different resources responding to the disaster.
•• Collegial organizational structures exercise collaborative decision
process; although local civil authorities are usually in charge, there
often is no one person/­entity coordinating disaster response efforts.

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•• FEMA is the lead federal agency (LFA) for domestic disasters; the
LFA, not the military, leads and coordinates overall U.S. government
disaster response activities.
•• With few limited exceptions, e.g., doctors and nurses, Navy resources
should endeavor to avoid direct contact with the affected population.
•• Effective disaster response requires open/­unclassified communication protocols.
•• The internationally recognized lexicon of disaster response is established, and Navy participants need to adopt it when communicating
with non-­DoD participants in the disaster response effort. (NWP
3-29, 2011, EX-1)
In conclusion, the Navy will always deploy and operate forward to advance
and protect U.S. national interests in an era of ongoing volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Forward presence will remain a bedrock
tenet of U.S. naval operations. Absence is not an option. The Navy’s leader­
ship argues that “forward offensive deployments are a far more effective use
of the nation’s naval forces in homeland defense…. The Navy has consistently
argued for the primacy of forward offensive and defensive missions since its
very beginnings” (Swartz, 2003, pp.  13–14). When ground forces redeploy
from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of conflict, the Navy will remain forward deployed. And given the number of diverse threats that now exist, the
Navy will also be positioned to secure the homeland and protect it from direct
attack. “The demands of an uncertain world and the enduring interests of the
American people require nothing less” (Cooperative Strategy, 2007, p. 5).

Coast Guard Operations
What makes the Coast Guard unique is that in executing our diverse missions we harmonize seemingly contradictory mandates. We are charged at
once to be police officers, sailors, warriors, humanitarians, regulators, stewards of the environment, diplomats, and guardians of the coast. Thus, we are
military, multi-­mission, and maritime.
—Coast Guard Pub 1, 2009, p. 1

Following the United States war for independence, the nation found its coffers empty and those sailors that had smuggled goods into the colonies continued this practice against the fledgling Republic. As a result, no tax revenue
was being raised. In Federalist Paper 12, Alexander Hamilton (1787) stated
that “a few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports,
might at small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws.” Subsequent to
Alexander Hamilton’s recommendation, President Washington directed the
establishment of the Revenue Marine on August 4, 1790—this is the date

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

that the U.S. Coast Guard considers to be its birthday. As the nation’s fifth
and smallest service of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Coast Guard is in fact
the oldest continuous military seagoing service, and it has been involved in
all the wars that the nation has fought since the country was founded. “The
Coast Guard is, at all times, a military, multimission, maritime service”
(CG Pub 1, 2009, p. 63).
In The Masks of War, Carl Builder (1989) notes “that like all individuals and durable groups, the military services have acquired personalities
of their own that are shaped by their experiences and that, in turn, shape
their behavior” (p. 7). Nowhere is this truer than with the Coast Guard. The
missions, duties, and responsibilities of the Coast Guard have changed and
grown since its beginning in 1790. What makes the Coast Guard unique
from its four sister services is that the Coast Guard is an armed force with
domestic responsibilities and authority. According to Title 14 USC, it is a
military service and a branch of the Armed Forces, but also operates in the
IC and interagency environments. It maintains mission readiness “to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war, and is specifically
authorized to work cooperatively with the Navy during peacetime” (MOA,
2003, p. 1). Because of Titles 10 and 14 USC, the Coast Guard can simultaneously engage in national defense missions and federal law enforcement.
From customs enforcement to search and rescue to homeland security
to defense, the Coast Guard provides unique benefits to the United States
through its blend of humanitarian, law enforcement, diplomatic, military, and intelligence capabilities. While reporting to the DHS Secretary,
the Commandant of the Coast Guard has a unique relationship with the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. Although the commandant is
not a full member of the Joint Chiefs in statute, the commandant is a non­
voting member invited to all “tank sessions.”* By protocol, the commandant
is always present at discussions of major issues. Additionally, the commandant attends all geographic combatant commander conferences and meets
regularly with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, thus maintaining ties with the nation’s war fighters and leaders of the sea services.
Today’s Coast Guard protects the American public, environment, and
security in U.S. waterways and in maritime regions where U.S. interests are
at risk. It does so through exercise of 11 statutorily mandated Coast Guard
missions. Many of these fulfill more than one role, but each directly supports
safety, security, and stewardship. The 11 missions are
*

The tank sessions (a Pentagon colloquialism) are deliberative meetings of the chairman and the vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs and all Service Chiefs, or designated representatives. For the Service Chiefs,
tank sessions and other Joint Chiefs’ obligations have priority over individual service Title 10 responsibilities. Tank sessions often result in recommendations forwarded directly to the DoD Secretary.

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••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

Search and rescue
Marine safety
Ports, waterways, and coastal security
Drug interdiction
Migrant interdiction
Other law enforcement
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations
Aids to navigation
Marine environmental protection
Living marine resources
Defense readiness (CG Pub, 2009, 1, p. 4)

As the primary U.S. maritime law enforcement agency, the Coast Guard is
the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction, and therefore is a key
player in stemming the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. Its mission is
to reduce the supply of drugs (Figure 4.7) from the source by denying smugglers use of maritime routes in the transit zone, a 6-million-­square-­mile area,
including the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Eastern Pacific. In meeting
the challenge of patrolling this vast area, the Coast Guard coordinates with
DoD, other federal agencies, and countries in the region. Of equal importance, the Coast Guard enforces immigration law at sea. The Coast Guard
patrols and coordinates with other federal agencies and foreign countries to
interdict undocumented migrants, denying them entry via maritime routes

FIGURE 4.7  Crewmembers from the Coast Guard cutter Northland offload 3,500
pounds of cocaine at Base Miami Beach, Florida, March 16, 2012. The Northland
crew seized the cocaine from a 35-foot go-­
fast vessel in the Caribbean Sea
on March  3, 2012. (From U.S. Coast Guard. Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class
Nick Ameen.)

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

to the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also, the Coast Guard
is the lead federal agency for at-­sea enforcement of U.S. fisheries laws and
protects 3.36 million square miles of the U.S. EEZs. The Coast Guard’s fisheries law enforcement mission maintains a balance between conservation and
commerce to ensure resources are enjoyed by all—indefinitely.
The Coast Guard’s national defense role to support the Department
of Defense was explicitly outlined in a MOA signed by the Secretaries of
Defense and Transportation in 1995. It was modified in a MOA signed by
the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security in 2008. Eight specific
national defense missions in support of the national military strategy that
were assigned to the Coast Guard include
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

Maritime interception/­interdiction operations
Military environmental response operations
Port operations, security, and defense
Theater security operations
Coastal sea control operations
Rotary wing air intercept operations
Combating terrorism operations
Maritime operational threat response (MOTR) operations (MOA
between DoD and DHS, 2008)

Many of the world’s navies and maritime forces today are more closely
aligned with the U.S. Coast Guard than the U.S. Navy—from vessel size to
missions. As a result, the Coast Guard is a logical fit for many geographic
combatant commanders’ needs in war and peace. From operations to training
to international engagement, the white-­hulled cutters may be more acceptable to foreign nations than the Navy’s gray-­hulled vessels (see Figure 4.8).
The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and
Stewardship (2007) describes how the Coast Guard will work to safeguard
the nation against all challenges in the maritime domain. This strategy identifies six crosscutting priorities for improving the nation’s preparedness and
advancing U.S. maritime interests in maritime safety, security, and stewardship. The priorities are as follows:
•• Strengthening regimes for the U.S. maritime domain. The nation
needs a set of coordinated and interlocking domestic and international regimes that increase transparency of activity, reduce risk,
and balance competing uses.
•• Achieving maritime domain awareness. The nation needs a greater
awareness and effective understanding of maritime activity.
•• Enhancing unity of effort in maritime planning and operations. The
nation must better integrate its operational capabilities and efforts
across government and with private sector partners.

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FIGURE 4.8  Freetown, Sierra Leone—Coast Guard Cmdr. Michael Stewart talks
with key maritime law enforcement personnel in the Sierra Leone government during an operational familiarization meeting aboard the Coast Guard cutter Forward
in Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 22, 2011. The Forward is on a scheduled deployment in West Africa supporting the Africa Partnership Station (APS), which aims to
increase resident host nation capabilities and contribute to the development, economic prosperity, and security on- and offshore of West Africa. (From U.S. Coast
Guard. Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Annie R.B. Elis.)

•• Integrating Coast Guard capabilities for national defense. The
nation needs both U.S. Navy and Coast Guard capabilities along its
own coasts, on the high seas, and deployed abroad in support of U.S.
national security interests.
•• Developing a national capacity for marine transportation system
(MTS) recovery. The nation needs a coordinated, integrated approach
to planning for and responding to major disruptions in the MTS.
•• Focusing international engagement on improving maritime governance. The nation benefits from strong maritime relationships and
capacities around the world because today’s global maritime system
ties U.S. interests and welfare to the effective maritime governance
of all nations and the global commons. (Coast Guard Strategy for
Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, 2007, pp. 6–7)
The challenge the Coast Guard faces is implementing this strategy, not
only within the Coast Guard itself because of competing missions and
limited resources, but also nationally with the other sea services, the interagency, the U.S. private sector, and internationally.
Security of the maritime domain can be accomplished only by coordinating all elements of national power. The Coast Guard, because of its unique
place in homeland security and defense, is the one organization that straddles

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

the divide between these complementary areas. As a full-­fledged member of
the interagency, it brings unique authorities, law enforcement competencies,
IC experience, and military functions to deal with maritime threats. The
Coast Guard works hand in hand with the other armed services, state and
local governments, and the private sector. The men and women of the Coast
Guard do noble work in dangerous places and situations; they are warriors,
constables, environmentalists, regulators, and lifesavers. It stood the watch
prior to 9/11, and it stands today in the spirit of its motto—Semper Paratus
… Always Ready.

Conclusion
To sustain prosperity we open the gates. To ensure security we close the gates.
Prosperity and security should not be competing interests when they serve
the transcending national interest.
—James M. Loy, 2001

Given the inherent overlap in maritime homeland security and maritime
homeland defense, scenarios involving terrorist or other attacks in the maritime domain could raise the question of whether DHS or DoD should be the
lead. In such situations or in time-­sensitive situations on-­scene Navy and
Coast Guard commanders are authorized to act in accordance with set policies until the president, in consultation with the DoD and DHS Secretaries,
determines whether the situation is a homeland security or defense event
(O’Rourke, 2005) (Figure 4.9).
The Navy and Coast Guard stand ready to protect the maritime domain to
ensure freedom of navigation and facilitate legal global commerce. They are
committed to protect SLOCs, international straits, the U.S. EEZs, and ports
at home, as well as aid partners abroad in doing the same. But the maritime domain is too vast for one nation to protect. A partnership of nations
must make a combined effort to ensure its security. Since all nations benefit from maritime security, they must share responsibility for maintaining
it by countering threats (NSMS, 2005). Entities and initiatives such as the
International Maritime Organization, the World Customs Organization,
the U.S. Container Security Initiative, Proliferation Security Initiative, and
Customs-­Trade Partnership against Terrorism complement one another in
ensuring maritime security. Defending against adversaries is the primary
objective of those in uniform. As Vice Admiral Paul Maddsion noted,
“Navies will … continue to play a crucial role in helping build trust and confidence among states to prevent conflicts” (2012, p. 14). Security of the maritime domain is critical to freedom of the seas, navigation, and commerce,
and protection of the oceans’ resources. Nations have a common interest

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FIGURE 4.9  Onboard the USS Mahan (DDG 72) Commanding Officer Cmdr.
Frank Olmo, USN, and Chief of Response Enforcement for Coast Guard Atlantic
Area Captain Bradley Jacobs, USCG, stand side by side on the guided missile destroyer’s bridge moments before starting Exercise Frontier Sentinel on
June  13, 2006. Frontier Sentinel marks the first time a Navy surface combatant
ship operated under the tactical control of the Coast Guard for a maritime homeland security mission. (From U.S. Navy. Photo by Journalist 3rd Class Matthew D.
Leistikow. Released.)

in achieving two complementary ends: facilitating maritime commerce at
the heart of economic security and protecting against terrorist, hostile, and
criminal acts from the sea (NSMS, 2005). The U.S. sea services will stand
the watch—patrol maritime approaches and operate forward to protect the
maritime domain. A motto espoused by the sea services for years is relevant
now more than ever: eternal vigilance is the price of safety (Watch Officer’s
Guide, 1985).

Discussion Questions
1. What is the role of the Sea Services in homeland defense and homeland security? Are the Sea Services organized, trained, and equipped
sufficiently to conduct homeland defense and homeland security
missions?
2. What is maritime domain awareness (MDA) and what is its importance in homeland defense and homeland security? How does it
affect the development of homeland defense and homeland security
policy in the maritime domain?
3. Why is maritime domain awareness critical to ensuring the safety
and security of international maritime commerce? How can our
maritime security interests be balanced against the need to keep our
commercial ports open and available for trade and shipping?

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

4. How do the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security interact during mission transition from a homeland defense mission to a
homeland security mission?

References
Associated Press. (2012, October 5). Piracy at sea. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/p/piracy_at_sea/
index.html.
Builder, C. H. (1989). The masks of war: American military styles in strategy and analysis.
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bush, G. W. (2004, December 21). Maritime Security Policy (NSPD-41/HSPD-13). Retrieved
from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf.
Caldwell, S. (2008, June 20). Maritime security: National strategy and supporting plans
were generally well-developed and are being implemented (Report No. GAO08-672). Retrieved from U.S. Government Accessibility Office, http://gao.gov/
assets/280/277003 .html.
Elsea, J., & Grimmet, R. (2007, March 17). Declarations of war and authorizations for the
use of military force: Historical background and legal implications (CRS Report No.
RL31133). Retrieved from Congressional Research Office: http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf.
Fears, D. M. (2012, August). International waters, illicit traffic. Proceedings, 138(8), 44–49.
Goward, D. A. (2007, October). Maritime domain awareness: National CONOPS
[Presentation slides]. Presented at Maritime Domain Awareness Day, New
Orleans, LA. Retrieved from http://www.ndia.org/Resources/OnlineProceedings/
Documents/8100/Maritime DomainAwarenessIntergrationChallenges.pdf.
Hamilton, A. (1787, November 27). The utility of the union in respect to revenue. New York
Packet. Retrieved from http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_12.html.
International Chamber of Commerce. (2012, October). IBM reported drop in Somali
piracy, but warns against complacency. Retrieved from http://www.icc-ccs.org/
news/811-imb-reports-drop-in-somali-piracy-but-warns-against-complacency.
International Chamber of Commerce. (2012, October). Unprecedented rise in piratical attacks. Retrieved from http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article &id=352:pira.
Jacobsen, K. (1985). Watch Officer’s Guide (11th ed.). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2007). Homeland defense (Joint Publication No. 3-27). Retrieved from
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_27.pdf.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2012). Department of defense dictionary of military and associated
terms (Joint Publication No. 1-02). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
new_pubs/ jp1_02.pdf.
Longshore, D. (2005). American naval power and the prevention of terror. Homeland
Security Affairs,1(1), 1–12. Retrieved from http://www.hsaj.org/hsa.
Loy, J. M. (2001, October 31). The unique challenges of maritime security. Speech presented
to the Propeller Club of the United States, Washington, DC.
Maddison, P. A. (2012). Strategic trust and cooperation. Naval War College Review, 65(4),
7–15. Retrieved from http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/e8137568-4a11-4ed2a3f3-013ff6360f91/Download-the-entire-issue-in-pdf-for-your-e-reader.aspx.

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Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, § 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2013). The exclusive economic is in
the zone where the U.S. and other nations have jurisdiction over economic and resource
management. Retrieved from http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/eez.html.
The New York Times. (2013, January 28). Daily report: Pentagon expanding online
defenses [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/
daily-report-pentagon-expanding-online-defenses.
Obama, B. (2010). The national security strategy. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.
gov/ sites/ default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
O’Rourke, R. (2004, May 17). Homeland security: Navy operations—background and issues
for congress (CRS Report No. RS21230). Retrieved from Congressional Research
Service: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21230.pdf.
Shanker, T. (2012, August 28). U.S. reports that piracy off Africa has plunged. The New York
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/world/africa/piracyaround-horn-of-africa-has-plunged-us-says.html?_r=0.
Spicer, R. (2003, October). Sea shield: Assured access in the littoral [Presentation slides].
Retrieved from www.dtic.mil/ndia/2003war/spices.ppt.
Swartz, P. M. (2003). Forward—from the start: The U.S. Navy & homeland defense: 1775–
2003. Alexandria, VA: Computer Network Assurance Corporation.
U.S. Coast Guard. (2007). United States Coast Guard strategy for maritime safety, security, and stewardship. Retrieved from http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps79050/
USCGS2007 Final.pdf.
U.S. Coast Guard. (2009). U.S. Coast Guard: America’s maritime guardian: Coast Guard publication 1. Retrieved from http://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/Pub_1.pdf.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2013). Strategy for homeland defense and defense support of
civil authorities. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/homelanddefensestrategy.pdf.
U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. (2003). Memorandum of agreement
between the department of defense and department of homeland security for the inclusion of the U.S. coast guard in support of maritime homeland defense. Washington, DC:
Author.
U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. (2005). The national strategy for maritime security. Retrieved from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/ maritime-security.html.
U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. (2006). Memorandum of agreement
between the department of defense and department of homeland security for department of defense support to the United States coast guard for maritime homeland security. Washington, DC: Author.
U.S. Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. (2008). Memorandum of agreement
between the department of defense and department of homeland security on the use of
U.S. coast guard capabilities and resources in support of the national military strategy.
Washington, DC: Author.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2006, October 16). Critical infrastructure protection: Progress coordinating government and private sector efforts varies by sectors’
characteristics (Report No. GAO-07-39). Retrieved from www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/
getrpt?GAO-07-39.
U.S. Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee. (2005). National strategy for maritime security: National plan to achieve maritime domain awareness. Retrieved from
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf.

Homeland Security and Homeland Defense in the Maritime Domain

U.S. Navy. (2009). Navy defense support of civil authorities program (OPNAV
Instruction No. 3440.16D). Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/
opnavinst/3440_16d.pdf.
U.S. Navy. (2011). Disaster response operations (Navy Warfare Publication No. 3-29).
Norfork, VA: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Development
Command.
U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. (2007). A cooperative strategy for 21st century
seapower. Retrieved from Author: http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritime strategy.
pdf.
Verbinski, G. (Director). (2003). Pirates of the Caribbean [Film]. Los Angeles: Walt Disney.
Wilson, S. G., & Fischetti, T. (2010). Coastline population trends in the United States: 1960–
2008. Retrieved from U.S. Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/
p25-1139.pdf.

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Chapter

5

Likelihood versus
Consequence
The Application of the Land
Component in Homeland Defense
Bert B. Tussing*

Chapter Objectives

•• Discuss the significance, objectives, and purpose of land component
homeland defense (HD)
•• Examine the elements and primary functions of land component HD
•• Review the legal and policy issues associated with the land component HD

Introduction
The U.S. military has taken fairly deliberate steps to remind itself (and the
American people) that the defense of the homeland is “job 1.” In the Defense
Strategic Guidance (DSG) issued in January 2012, “defend the homeland
and provide support to civil authorities” is listed as the seventh of the 10 primary missions of the U.S. armed forces (Department of Defense, p. 5) (see
Figure 5.1). While there were some minor concerns raised over signals of prioritization via the listings order, the Department of Defense (DoD) assured
its critics that the sequence was not meant to signal relative importance. The
following year, DoD issued a revised Strategy for Homeland Defense and
*

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the federal
government.

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Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces

• Counter terrorism and
irregular warfare
• Deter and defeat
aggression
• Project power despite
anti-access/area denial
challenges
• Counter weapons of
mass destruction
• Operate effectively in
cyberspace and space

• Maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent
• Defend the homeland and
provide support to civil
authorities
• Provide a stabilizing presence
• Conduct stability and
counterinsurgency
operations
• Conduct humanitarian,
disaster relief, and other
operations

FIGURE 5.1  Primary missions of the U.S. armed forces.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (2013a) that was more direct in asserting domestic primacy in the military’s mission sets:
Defending U.S. territory and the people of the United States is the highest
priority of the Department of Defense (DoD), and providing appropriate
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is one of the Department’s primary missions. (p. 1)

Recently, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contributed to the reassuring rhetoric when he said, “The homeland is actually achieving greater
prominence in our discussions of future strategy than at any time in my
forty years [of service], as it should” (Gaskell, 2013).
It would appear, therefore, that the defense of the homeland has garnered
the lion’s share of the department’s leader­ship’s attention, both uniformed
and civilian. Moreover, depending upon the definitions and perspectives
through which the commitment is viewed, these declarations are generally
unchallenged—unless by “homeland defense” one means the actual, on-­
site, territorial defense of the homeland. In that case, there may be room
for debate and further discernment as pointed out by Dr. Richard K. Betts
(2002), formerly of the National Security Council and currently the director
of Columbia University’s International Security Policy Program:
The services preferred to define the active forces’ mission as fighting and winning the nations wars—as if wars were naturally something that happened
abroad—and homeland defense involved no more than law enforcement,
managing relief operations in natural disasters, or intercepting ballistic missiles outside U.S. airspace…. Only in America could the nation’s armed forces
think of direct defense of the national territory as a distraction. (p. 429)

Reason Behind the Reticence?
In fairness, the active component’s predilection to providing homeland
defense by meeting the enemy “over there” is part and parcel of an active,

Likelihood versus Consequence

layered defense in depth called for in the nation’s first Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support (Department of Defense, 2005, pp. 10–12), and
reiterated in 2013’s revision of the same (Department of Defense, 2013a, p. 2).
Both strategies address the notion of meeting threats to the United States
as far as possible from its citizens and territory, temporally and spatially.
This process of deterrence and defense begins conceptually in the “forward
regions,” continues through the “approaches,” and proceeds (if all else fails)
to the homeland itself. Dr. Betts’s (2002) tongue-­in-­cheek appraisal, and the
focus of this chapter, is directed at the military land component’s predilection, and preparedness, to execute its penultimate mission within the final
layer of the nation’s defense.
If there is a reticence to taking on the land component’s defense mission
within the domestic environment, it is certainly understandable. In the first
place, the requirement would signal a failure, of one degree or another, in
intercepting an enemy force before it became a clear and present danger to
the sovereignty, territory, and domestic population of the United States.
In the event defeating threats in the forward regions fails, DoD must be postured to take immediate, decisive action to defend against and defeat the
threat in the homeland. (Department of Defense, 2013c, p. x)

Second, the likelihood of such an attack occurring in the homeland,
from a force that could overpower the combined capabilities of federal, state,
and local law enforcement, is remarkably remote. While never described
as impossible, nothing in the 2013 World Threat Assessment of the United
States Intelligence Community (Clapper, 2013) would suggest such an attack
is anything approaching an imminent probability. In the same vein, the
Department of Defense deems the likelihood of a “conventional military
attack” against the United States as “very low” (DoD, 2013a, p. 7).
Finally, the complexity of executing combat operations among citizens
under attack would be mind-­boggling. The kinetic element of homeland
defense is only a part of the challenges facing localities; emergency response
and recovery operations could have the Joint Force commander simultaneously facing missions of homeland defense, homeland security, and defense
support of civil authorities (Department of Defense, 2011, p. III-4).

The Threat, Improbable
but Consequential
Likely or not, neither the military nor the intelligence community that
serves it would be wise or willing to dismiss categorically any threat to the
United States that would necessitate the introduction of land forces in a
defense mission. A failure in its duty to protect the American people in spite

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of due diligence would be one thing, but to tabulate loss of life and preventable destruction of critical, life-­sustaining infrastructure due to negligence
is an accountability beneath the tradition and ethos of our armed forces.
The failure that would be borne by those forces would likely be accompanied
by an equally devastating loss of trust and confidence in an institution that
habitually rates among the most admired by the American people (Brooks,
2005). Accordingly, application of the land component of homeland defense
must be planned for in a perpetual balance of likelihood and consequences,
realizing that among those consequences dwell loss of life, injuries, economic impacts, psychological consequences, environmental degradation, and
inability to execute essential missions (Department of Homeland Security,
2010b, p. 10).
DoD (2013c) defines homeland defense as
the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other
threats as directed by the President. (p. I-1)

This can present something of a conceptual dilemma if one envisions the
threat as originating and functioning exclusively outside of the United States.
But what if (for instance) a threat is located physically within the United
States, but sponsored or directed from outside of its borders? Perhaps, in
order to broaden the aperture of our concern, DoD (2013c) has defined an
“external threat” as
an action, event, or circumstance that originates from outside the boundaries of the homeland. Threats planned, prompted, promoted, caused, or executed by external actors may develop or take place inside the boundaries of
the homeland. The reference to external threats does not limit where or how
attacks may be planned and executed. (p. I-1)

For our purposes, therefore, we will consider threats to the United States
both from abroad and from within our borders.

The Threat from Without
Returning to the stance of likelihood, we may reiterate the position that
the chance of a conventional land attack against the United States by an
adversarial nation state is very low. But this does not remove the potential
of an adversary launching (or supporting) an asymmetric attack against us,
within our territorial confines. The 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities, in fact, acknowledges this possibility:

Likelihood versus Consequence

Potential nation-­state adversaries will continue to refine asymmetric attack
plans against the homeland as part of their concepts of operation and broader
military strategies of confrontation with the United States. (Department of
Defense, 2013a, p. 7)

As with all discussions of the threat in this chapter, this is not meant to
imply an immediate, or even highly probable, danger in these regards. But
it should remind us that any aspects of the remaining discussion should
be viewed against the potential of nation-­state contribution as a factor
of consideration.
In addition to threats from nation-­states, research indicates a threat to
U.S. territory and citizenry could emanate from either transnational terrorist organizations or transnational organized criminal organizations.
Arguably, of course, one could claim that either threat was the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the Department of
Justice (DOJ). So being, the military is more appropriately employed in a
supporting role, specifically in its Defense Support of Civil Law Enforcement
mission set, rather than as the lead federal agency (LFA). However, one could
equally contend that these threats could reach a magnitude as to transcend
the traditional criminal or enforcement concerns normally overseen by
DHS/­DOJ to the point that they jeopardize the overall security of the country. This ambiguity shared between the law enforcement and defense guarantors of the nation’s security is addressed in the Department of Defense’s
Joint Operating Concept for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Thomas
Goss (2006) specifically framed the dilemma as a “seam of ambiguity”
(see Figure  5.2) bordered clearly by authorities and responsibilities of law
Seam of Ambiguity
Spectrum of Threats to the Homeland
National
Security
Threats
“WAR”
Clearly military operations
e.g., missile, air, or
maritime interdictions

Law
Enforcement
Threats
“THE SEAM”
Not clearly military
not clearly law enforcement
e.g., maritime security, border security

“CRIME”
Clearly law enforcement
e.g., drug smuggling,
human trafficking

Responsibilities

Department of Defense (DoD)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Department of Justice (DoJ)
The Seam between HD and HS

FIGURE 5.2  The seam of ambiguity between homeland defense and homeland
security.

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enforcement (as matters pertain to crime) and the military (as matters pertain to war). At the seam, however, jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility
could fluctuate based on the nature of the threat and the chosen response
to the same. This seam will continue to challenge HLS and HLD planning unless policies, procedures, statutes, and legal authorities are clarified
through legislative or executive action. Nevertheless, in spite of the lack
of clarity this ambiguity may produce, DoD—and its land component in
particular—must be capable of operating against adversaries in the seam
should the president so direct.
The conceptual manifestation of these kinds of threats may be elusive for
some. For instance, analysts may contend that the likelihood of a foreign
based or supported terrorist organization could not establish enough of a
foothold in the United States to offer a genuine security threat of the kind
envisioned here. But there has certainly been enough going on “around
us” to inspire prudent concern. In a 500-page indictment in 2013, Alberto
Nisman, an Argentine prosecutor investigating a 1994 bombing in Buenos
Aires, accused Iran of setting up an “intelligence and terrorist network” that
ranged through much of South America (Nejamkis, 2013). During a television interview in September of 2007, then National Intelligence Director
Mike McConnell stated that U.S. authorities are concerned about “sleeper
cells” of Islamic terrorists inside the United States, and admitted that since
9/11, several plots against the United States have been thwarted (Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). In May 2001, Adolfo Aguilar
Zinser, former Mexican National security adviser and ambassador to the
United Nations, reported that “Spanish and Islamic terrorist groups are
using Mexico as a refuge” (Miro, 2003, p. 43).
Meanwhile, from the north, the Canadian border has been a security concern in the United States since well before 9/11. The thwarted “millennium
bomber” and 1993 World Trade Center attack conspirators organized and
developed their plans in Canada, and entered the United States via the northern border (Hataley, 2007). Dr. Todd Hataley (2007) of the Royal Military
College of Canada believes this has left U.S. security officials believing that
our neighbors have become a home to terrorist sleeper cells, as well as a
favored route for illegal immigrants, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists. And in 1999, the Canadian Senate’s Special Committee on Security and
Intelligence itself labeled the country as “a venue of opportunity for terrorist groups”:
A place where they may raise funds, purchase arms, and conduct other activities to support their organizations and their terrorist activities elsewhere.
Most of the international terrorist organizations have a presence in Canada.
Our geographic location also makes Canada a favorite conduit for terrorists

Likelihood versus Consequence

wishing to enter the United States, which remains the principal target for terrorist attacks worldwide. (Parliament of Canada, 1999, chap. I)

Further research does not suggest that any of the threat delineated above
is anecdotal.
The security threat connoted by transnational organized crime (TOC)
may not be as immediately pronounced as that of terrorism, but it still
merits our attention. In his testimony surrounding the 2013 World Threat
Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community, James R. Clapper
(2013), current Director of National Intelligence, candidly noted that TOC
threatens “U.S. interests” in a number of ways, including drug activity, facilitating terrorist activity, corruption, money laundering, human trafficking,
and environmental crime, but stopped short of declaring it a direct threat to
our security (p. 5).
Still, the degree of paramilitary violence among cartels in Latin America
over the last two decades, brazenly pitting criminal elements against governments’ law enforcement and their militaries, may drive the United States to a
closer examination of the danger they hold for the security of the region and
the homeland. The association between the drug cartels and insurgents in
Colombia in the 1990s has been widely studied (Department of Justice, 1994)
and could be viewed as precursors to a migration of violence that has seen
its way to Central America. In that more recent theater, the United States has
provided aid to address “drug wars” that have resulted in death tolls greater
than the Cold War-­era civil wars in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador
(Booth, 2011). Former Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton signaled that the
destructive migration may have continued north when she declared,
We face an increasing threat from a well-­organized network, drug-­trafficking
threat that is, in some cases, morphing into or making common cause with
what we would consider an insurgency, in Mexico and in Central America.
It’s looking more and more like Colombia looked 20 years ago. (Peter, 2010)

The “insurgency” Secretary Clinton referred to—and to which labeling
the Mexican government vigorously objected—is frequently characterized
by paramilitary capabilities meted out in incredible displays of violence
(Cardash et al., 2011, p. 8). The carnage is perpetuated by criminal organizations that have grown so daring that the former president of Mexico labeled
them as both a “defiance to the state” and an “attempt to replace the state”
(Wilkinson, 2010).
This has resulted in a concern that the cartels’ bravado, and violence,
may seep into the United States. Understandable trepidation has developed among local law enforcement officials, as illustrated in the testimony

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delivered before the House Homeland Security Committee by the director
of the Texas Department of Public Safety (McCraw, 2011):
They use military and terrorist tactics and weaponry killing over 36,000 people since 2006 and there is no limit to their depravity….
The Mexican Cartels use a mature decision-­making process that incorporates reconnaissance networks, techniques and capabilities normally
associated with military organizations such as communication intercepts,
interrogations, trend analysis, secure communications, coordinated military-­
style tactical operations, GPS, thermal imagery and military armaments
including fully automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades and hand grenades. (p. 1)

No wonder then that in March 2006 the House Judicial Committee’s
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims voiced official
concern over law enforcement agents literally being “outmanned and outgunned” by these criminal elements (Congress, 2006).

The Threat from Within
Along with these external threats, let us consider threats from within. Here
too, there is a temptation to dismiss the notion out of hand, relegating any
real concern as a product of conspiracy theories and other brands of over­
reaction. But consider the warning against Al Qaeda affiliates, as well as
those inspired by Al Qaeda outside of those affiliations, contained in the
Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) annual threat assessment:
Attacks on US soil will remain part of AQAP’s (Al Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula) transnational strategy; the group continues to adjust its tactics,
techniques and procedures for targeting the West….
Al-­Qa’ida-­Inspired Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs)—whom we
assess will continue to be involved in fewer than 10 domestic plots per year—
will be motivated to engage in violent action by global jihadist propaganda,
including English-­language material, such as AQAP’s Inspire magazine.
(Clapper, 2013, p. 4)

“Fewer than 10 domestic plots per year” might suggest that the current
level of preparation across the country’s homeland security and defense
enterprises is sufficient. Then again, only one plot was required to bring
about the infamous degree of death and destruction on 9/11.
While the preponderance of the discussion surrounding homegrown
violent extremists is currently focused on associations with Islamist fundamentalists, another homegrown threat should command our attention

Likelihood versus Consequence

in these discussions. In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there
has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-­identify with the far right of
American politics. Spotlighted in a report from the Combating Terrorism
Center (CTC) at West Point, Challengers from the Sidelines, the incidents
cause many to “wonder whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing
trend, part of increasing societal violence, or attributable to some other condition” (Perlinger, 2012, Executive Summary).
The attacks are of concern, of course, but the means of the attacks, potentially as well as realized, give the violent far-right a more ominous tone. Arie
Perlinger, author of the aforementioned report, offers research that indicates
right-­wing extremist militias are growing in both number and size (p. 135).
Perlinger’s work points to an intersection of armament, organization, and
antifederal ideology that merits scrutiny at every level of government.
Examined in isolation, these warnings do not do much to raise our collective level of apprehension, but a fair assessment of potential alongside probability, of capability alongside consequence, should challenge our thinking
and stimulate our vigilance.

The Military Response
to the Requirement
If we accept, then, the notion that there is a reasonable chance of an attack
taking place in the United States that would necessitate a military response
on U.S. soil, our next task is to understand how that response will occur.
It is not the intent of this chapter to delve into details describing tactics,
techniques, and procedures that would be applied to defend against such an
attack, or to defeat the forces conducting it. Rather, it will examine the chief
elements of the land component’s envisioned response, and some of the concepts surrounding their application. Following that, we will examine that
application in light of the other elements of the government’s responsibility
in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from such attacks.

Active Duty Forces—NORTHCOM
and ARNORTH
Given the active, layered defense-­in-­depth approach that the United States
ascribes to its philosophy of homeland defense, one is safe in describing defense
of the homeland as the responsibility of all of our geographic commands (see
Figure  5.3) as well as the functional commands that serve alongside them
(Feickert, 2013). When we bring the challenge home, however, the primary

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FIGURE 5.3  The geographic combatant commanders.

responsibility for territorial, domestic defense resides with the U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) and the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).
Established in the aftermath of 9/11, NORTHCOM provides command
and control of the U.S. armed forces active component throughout the
Continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters
out to approximately 500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and
the Straits of Florida (U.S. Northern Command, 2013). PACOM has parallel authorities and responsibilities for domestic operations, both homeland
defense and defense support of civil authorities, in Hawaii and the territories of Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands. In addition, PACOM fulfills the military function of
the U.S. protectorate obligations with the Federated States of Micronesia, the
Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau (U.S. Pacific Command, 2013).
The Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) for NORTHCOM
is U.S. Army North (ARNORTH), and will, in all likelihood, contain both
U.S. Army and Marine forces in times of crises (Figure 5.4). The commanding general (CG), U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), assumes functional component commander responsibilities as the land component commander for
the USPACOM portion of the United States and its territories. USARPAC
is dual-­hatted as the commander of Joint Task Force Homeland Defense
(JTF-­HD) and is responsible for working closely with applicable federal,

Likelihood versus Consequence

FIGURE 5.4  U.S. Army North seal.

state, tribal, and local agencies when orchestrating DoD operations. All
homeland defense activities are coordinated with USNORTHCOM, the U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and others across area of responsibility (AOR) boundaries (Department of Defense, 2013c, p. II-10).
U.S. Army North’s functions include homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and theater security cooperation with Mexico and
Canada. Serving as the Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC)
for NORTHCOM, ARNORTH maintains a deployable command post that,
when directed, provides for command, control, and unity of effort for all
active duty forces assigned or attached to the U.S. Northern Command
for either homeland defense or defense support of civil authority missions
(U.S. Army North, 2011).
ARNORTH retains operational control of the Joint Task Force Civil
Support (JTF-­
CS). As the title implies, the primary focus of JTF-­
CS
(Figure 5.5) is devoted to defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions, and particularly those devoted to chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weaponry hazards. The unit’s
mission set includes responsibilities toward:
•• Anticipating, planning, and integrating U.S. Northern Command’s
CBRN consequence management operations
•• When directed, commanding and controlling designated DoD
forces to assist federal, state, local, and tribal partners
•• Coordinating efforts to save lives, prevent further injury, and provide temporary critical life support to enable community recovery
in times of crisis (Barber, 2008)
ARNORTH continues to serve its DSCA function in serving as the
training center of excellence for civil support operations and Homeland

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FIGURE 5.5  Joint Task Force Civil Support seal.

Response Forces. Similarly, when directed and requested, the command
provides Title 10 (Service Active Component) support to DSCA operations
in response to (U.S. Army North, 2011):
••
••
••
••
••

National Special Security Events
Natural and man-­made disasters
Civil disturbance
Illicit drug activities
Transnational threats

Descriptions of these kinds of activities can be found elsewhere in this text and
in Joint Publication 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Department of
Defense, 2013d).
Another key constituency under ARNORTH’s command is the U.S.
Army’s 10 defense coordinating officers (DCOs). Assigned to each Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region, the DCO and his nine-­
member defense coordinating element (DCE) are primarily associated
with serving as the chief conduit between state and FEMA officials and the
Department of Defense in coordinating requirements and responses. The
DCO is the “interagency expert” for the department and works to assure
DoD assets are most effectively and efficiently applied to complement and
supplement the capabilities and capacities of the civil response elements.
DCOs stand as the “subject matter experts” to DoD for their regions, and
continually build upon that expertise through full integration and constant
association with state and regional emergency management (U.S. Army
North, 2011).
Even acknowledging this significant contribution does not give us any
insight as to how the defense coordinating officer and his or her staff can be

Likelihood versus Consequence

applied to a bona fide homeland defense requirement. The mission statement of the defense coordinating element, however, may offer us a venue:
To coordinate Department of Defense activities with other agencies conducting Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations in order to protect the
American people and their way of life. (Manning, 2013)

The distinction here is subtle, but important. The DCO serves as a conduit
for DoD support to other agencies in civil support activities, from national
security events to disaster response to carefully detailed military support to
civil law enforcement functions. But, he or she may also serve as a conduit
for interagency support to DoD when it is the lead federal agency (LFA) for
defense missions in the domestic environment. This partnership is examined in greater depth in the next section of the chapter.
In addition to the specialized Joint Task Forces that serve as a part of
NORTHCOM, the Department of Defense can attach units from the U.S.
Army and the U.S. Marine Corps to ARNORTH, as required. This is not
significantly different from the way forces are apportioned to the other combatant commanders (the United States European Command, the United
States Central Command et al.). What is significantly different for the U.S.
Northern Command (and PACOM, surrounding its homeland defense mission) is the nature of the operational environment. Far more than overseas,
offensive and defensive missions conducted within the United States will
be executed under intense, persistent analysis. Prof. Ivan Luke of the U.S.
Naval War College framed the challenge in comparing war fighting operations overseas to potential operations in the homeland:
One can reasonably conclude that any similar use of military power in the
homeland, no matter how legitimate the threat, would come under very close
scrutiny. Consider the challenge of crafting rules declaring enemy forces
hostile even though they would be intermingled with U.S. citizens. The
threshold for positive identification would have to be extraordinarily high.
(Luke, 2013, p. 18)

Without question, large-­scale operations involving fire and maneuver
would involve extraordinary decisions made by the president of the United
States. Land defense activities could run the gamut of military operations,
to include movement and maneuver, lethal and nonlethal fires, closing with
and destroying a determined enemy, sustaining a joint force, and setting
conditions for a return to peace. The approach our forces would be forced
to take surrounding these operations in the domestic environment would
be “framed by complex legal limitations and significant interagency coordination” (Department of Defense, 2013c, p. xii–xiii). Beyond legalities and

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regulations, however, the ethos behind the military’s distinction between
overseas operations and operations in the homeland is captured in the Army
Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations:
In unified land operations, commanders seek to seize, retain, and exploit
the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects
possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories
simultaneously combine three elements—offense, defense, and stability.
Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines the
elements of defense support of civil authorities and, as required, offense
and defense to support homeland defense. (Department of the Army,
2012, p. 2-2)

The National Guard
Interagency coordination, however, only addresses the challenges of civil-­
military orchestration at the federal level of government. If the president
were to commit forces to a domestic defense mission, at least equal attention would have to be paid to the affected state/­territorial governments. The
federalist balance of authorities would hardly suggest any automatic solutions, but experience in disaster response would not suggest that a governor
would be any more inclined to abandon his or her traditional responsibility
in the face of a man-­made disaster as before a natural disaster. Conversely,
a single state would never be considered as coming under attack. An attack
on a state is an attack on the union. The president, as the United States commander in chief, would exercise his authority, in fulfillment of his responsibilities, by committing the nation’s military to a response.
This is not to imply that National Guard forces would be excluded from
homeland defense missions. In the most likely approach to a still unlikely
scenario, the Guard would be “federalized”—that is, placed under the
authority of the president, and committed under the command and control
of ARNORTH, as illustrated in Figure 5.6 (D’Agostino, 2008a, p. 10). This
does not, however, absolutely preclude the employment of National Guard
forces in homeland defense while still under the authority of their governor. “In exceptional circumstances and in accordance with established DoD
policies, NG forces may conduct HD activities while in state active duty
status” (Department of Defense, 2013c, p. x). In fact, Department of Defense
Directive 3160.01, Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National
Guard, delineates authorities by which the states may be reimbursed by DoD
for expenditures incurred in employing the Guard under the control of the
governor, for “deliberate planned activities” or “exceptional circumstances”
(Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2). These activities could take form in
any number of venues in times of crises, to include additional measures to

Likelihood versus Consequence

Attack Occurs

DoD
As Lead Federal Agency
Commands the Operation

USNORTHCOM
Commands Military Efforts

President
May Federalize National
Guard troops

Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps Units, and
Federalized Guard Units
Assigned to NORTHCOM
Command

NGB
Coordinates Use of
National Guard forces

Other DoD
Commands/Agencies
Support NORTHCOM
Operations

FIGURE 5.6  Mobilization and employment of the military following attacks on the
United States.

safeguard vital transportation hubs, increased border security, or enhanced
protection of other critical infrastructure.
Whatever the defense requirement, it is important to apply the best force
available to the task based on the assessment of the combatant commander.
To summarily dismiss the idea of command being assigned to either an
active component or National Guard general officer would amount to deliberately ignoring the best potential for a given situation. An inherent familiarity and established relationships with state and local public and private
sector officials most frequently make the Guard the force of choice for leading the military’s support in times of natural disasters, hence the successful employment of the National Guard officers as dual-­status commanders
during response and recovery operations following Hurricane Sandy (Miles,
2013). The same advantages could serve well in the complex civil-­military
interactions that would have to take place in a military response in the
domestic environment. Conversely, as pointed out by Prof. Ivan Luke, dual-­
status commanders are currently limited to working within one, and only
one, state (Luke, 2013, p. 9). In the event of a series of attacks against multiple sites, even within a single region, placing forces under the command and
control of an active component task force commander might prove the better path in ensuring the most effective and efficient response. The Defense
Strategic Guidance may well have been addressing specific challenges with a
general observation in these regards when it noted:

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The Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC)
and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy. Over
the past decade, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to
national security. (Department of Defense, 2012, p. 7)

To assume this observation applies only to Guard units, overseas, under
federal authority, would border on disingenuous. To assume, domestically,
that the observation could only apply to defense support of civil authority
missions, and not homeland defense, would be shortsighted. Neither should
we ever forget that an attack against a state is an attack against the nation,
demanding the best military response the nation has to offer.

Not Just a Military Problem
If there is one thing that the last 10 years at war in Iraq and Afghanistan
has taught us, it is that lasting peace and stability are not products that can
be bought by the military alone. In an examination of the complexities that
lie beyond a “mission accomplished” for the military land component, then
Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis observed:
From an organizational perspective, the Army has successfully created the
most modern, effective set of systems for rapid execution of combat operations on the planet. We can achieve immediate effects through command
and control of our organic systems. What we have not been able to do is create the systems and processes to execute the nonlethal side as effortlessly as
combat operations. (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005, p. 15)

In their article “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-­Spectrum
Operations,” Chiarelli and Michaelis noted that the ultimate objective in
Baghdad was
a secure and stable environment for Iraqis, maintained by indigenous police
and security forces under the direction of a legitimate national government
that is freely elected and accepts economic pluralism. (p. 7)

But the route to that objective was not just combat operations. Rather,
Chiarelli and Michaelis suggested “five equally balanced interconnected
lines of operation” would have to be pursued in order to attain the desired
end: successful combat operations, the training and employment of security
forces, the restoration or improvement of essential services (sewage, water,
electricity, waste removal, etc.), the promotion of the legitimacy and capacity of local governance, and the establishment of economic pluralism to

Likelihood versus Consequence

Combat Operations
Train and Employ Security Forces
Essential Services
Promote Governance
Economic Pluralism

L
E
G
I
T
I
M
A
C
Y

End State:
A secure
and stable
environment
for Iraqis,
maintained
by
indigenous
police and
security
forces under
the direction
of a
legitimate
national
government
that is freely
elected and
accepts
economic
pluralism.

FIGURE 5.7  The five lines of operation to achieve legitimacy.

sustain and build upon these foundational gains (pp. 7–14). Accompanied
by an “information campaign” that emphasized the direction and intent
of the extended campaign, Task Force Baghdad gained and transferred the
degree of legitimacy for a duly constituted government to step in and sustain the progress that had been achieved (see Figure 5.7).
One of the challenges the task force had to overcome in its institutional
thinking, however, was the traditional “sequencing mindset” applied by the
military in its operations. At one point the authors observed:
What also became clear was that the traditional phased approach,
grounded in U.S. doctrine, might not be the answer; rather, an event-­driven
“transitional” approach might be more appropriate based on a robust set of
metrics and analysis. (p. 7)

And again:
Our joint doctrine requires phased operations, which leads us to believe
there is and always will be a distinct demarcation between major combat
operations and stability operations…. We should consider paraphrasing
Clausewitz: full-­spectrum operations are the continuation of major combat
operations by other means. (p. 16)

The military frequently takes an understandable and defendable position
that security must be established before further progress can be introduced
in the aftermath of battle. But Chiarelli and Michaelis seem to caution
against overplaying that stance:

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The reality is that there are cultural mechanisms at play that demand a more
integrated plan. No longer is it acceptable to think sequentially through stability operations and support operations by believing that if you first establish the security environment, you can work sequentially toward establishing
critical infrastructure and governmental legitimacy then drive toward economic independence. (p. 15)

With even greater candor, they charged, “It is easy to advocate a lopsided
approach of physical security before infusing projects, economic incentives,
and governance for short-­term political gain or bureaucratic positioning”
(p. 17).
The lessons to be drawn here for a land component executing defense missions in the United States might not be perfectly direct, but are still worthy
of consideration. Homeland defense operations, and particularly those associated with the land domain, must move beyond the enlightened military
approach of “full-­spectrum operations” to “whole of government” operations. While the primary responsibility for the kinetic element of returning
to normalcy will remain with the military, it must be viewed toward the
end of facilitating other governmental functions designed to see our people
through crises.
Even following a deliberate attack by an external aggressor, the way that
land forces assume their mission in the domestic environment can either
strengthen or erode civil-­military relations. Taking cues from the nation’s
overseas experience, and magnifying them through a lens of American
scrutiny of its military, the various task force commanders must be ever
mindful that theirs will not be the only mission underway were the country
to come under attack. Our doctrine notes: “Homeland Defense and Civil
Support operations may occur in parallel and require extensive integration and synchronization. In addition, operations may also transition from
homeland defense to civil support to homeland security or vice versa …
with the lead depending on the situation and the [government’s] desired
outcome (Department of Defense, 2011, p. III-4). Emergency response, law
enforcement, critical infrastructure protection and restoration, and a host
of other activities will be ongoing, all in an attempt to mitigate the effects of
the enemy attack and return our people to a state of stability.
The idea of the military’s mission assuming primacy is not one that will
be long tolerated by the population. One might speculate, in fact, that the
greater the military’s success, the less likely its mission will be considered the
“most important thing.” Indeed, the military itself would be well served to
recall that security is not the end—it is a means toward the end. The desired
end will be the quickest, safest return to normalcy. Whatever the military
can do to support the other means toward that end (e.g., reinforcing law
enforcement, restoring essential services, facilitating the restoration of duly

Likelihood versus Consequence

End State:
Restoration and
preservation of
stability and
normalcy
throughout the
public and
private sectors,
facilitated by
the
maintenance of
the trust and
confidence of
the people in
their
communities
and the federal,
state, and local
governments
which serve
them.

C
O
M
M
U
N
I
C
A
T
I
O
N
S

Combat Operations
Restore and Reinforce Law Enforcement
Essential Services
Promote Governance

FIGURE 5.8  Other military support—reinforcing law enforcement, restoring
essential services, facilitating the restoration of duly constituted authorities, etc.—
concurrent with a mission of security and defense.

constituted authorities) will be a mission concurrent with, not separate
from, security and defense (see Figure 5.8).
Here too, the importance of framing our intentions with a public information campaign cannot be overstated. Good works are important, but in
today’s 24/7 news cycle, along with social media of every description, the
opportunities for a story to be misreported, or deliberately misrepresented,
are staggering. Prof. Dennis Murphy of the U.S. Army War College makes
this case vividly in his article “Fighting Back: New Media and Military
Operations” (Murphy, 2008). The Joint Task Force commander’s strategic
communications plan for partners in the federal interagency, state and local
government officials, key stakeholders in the private sector, and our allies,
may be among the best means we have of retaining our society’s trust and
confidence in times of crisis.
Beyond its planning and association with the states’ National Guard,
a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report indicated that
NORTHCOM should develop and establish a thorough process to guide its
coordination with states’ emergency management,
including provisions for involving the states in NORTHCOM’s planning
processes, obtaining information on state emergency response plans and
capabilities, and using such information to improve the development and
execution of its concept plans. (D’Agostino, 2008a, p. 34)

Another GAO report suggests NORTHCOM develop a training plan
for its headquarters’ staff on state emergency management structures and

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relative issues related to working with their officials (D’Agostino, 2009,
p. 60). On the surface, this recommendation could appear irksome given the
diversity of states, territories, staff, and requirements. But the dual-­status
commanders program has been deliberately designed by NORTHCOM and
the National Guard Bureau to have 10 active duty deputies trained and available at NORTHCOM to serve the states’ task force commanders as required.
Each of these 10 will specifically prepare to serve as deputy commanders for
five or six states (all from separate FEMA regions), familiarizing themselves
with requirements, infrastructure, state emergency management systems,
and so forth (Department of Defense, 2013d, p. C-7). Hence, NORTHCOM
contains in-­house expertise on the individual states. Equally important, the
active component deputy is afforded the opportunity to establish key personal relationships with not only the dual-­status commander he or she may
be serving with, but also the appropriate federal, state, and local emergency
management officials.
In concentrating on interaction with the federal government (emergency
management and otherwise), there is a growing recognition of a requirement to integrate NORTHCOM and other DoD planning processes into
the interagency and national preparedness structure. To facilitate the same,
GAO suggests that NORTHCOM should develop clear guidance and procedures for interagency planning efforts, including appropriate memoranda of
understanding and charters for interagency planning groups (D’Agostino,
2008b, p. 45). DoD seems to have accepted the validity of the recommendation. In the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, one suggested means of strengthening the “national planning
enterprise” is through “integrated interagency planning and capability
development” (Department of Defense, 2013a, p. 23).
There are other lessons from the military’s support to civil authorities in
disaster response that can be applied to defense of the homeland. Shared situational awareness and the “common operational picture” have been proven
to be essential elements for effective civil-­military interaction (Department of
Defense, 2013a, p. 21). Synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating military
homeland defense operations with the activities of interagency partners and
the private sector will facilitate unity of effort (Department of Defense, 2013c,
p. II-2). The point to be made, again, is that the luxury of sequential operations, beginning with security and proceeding through restoration of critical
infrastructure sectors one by one, may be unattainable, or even undesirable.

Conclusion
An exhaustive examination of the coordination requirements between the
military and its civil partners, public and private, is beyond the scope of this

Likelihood versus Consequence

chapter. Planning, shared situational awareness, and unified actions have
already been mentioned. Interoperable communications could be added to
the list, as could exercise development and execution, or cooperative training and education endeavors. The point to retain is this: in the spectrum
of concerns between defense, law enforcement, emergency management,
and other functions that will be demanded and stressed in the scenarios
envisioned here, all elements of interagency activity along all three tiers of
federal, state, and local government will be stressed. And every level of government will be tasked to support the preservation or restoration of what
the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review reminds us is the ultimate
goal of our endeavors: “a homeland that is safe, secure and resilient … where
American interests, aspirations and way of life can thrive” (Department of
Homeland Security, 2010a, p. 13).
Most frequently, when the land forces of the active and reserve components of the U.S. military are called to tasks in the domestic environment,
they are performing their mission in support of civil authorities. Potentially,
however unlikely, the military may find itself involved in defending the
homeland within the borders of the homeland. At that time, in pursuit
of security for our people, the agencies the armed forces would traditionally support may well be in support, until the enemy is subdued and the
threat passes. Then again, the military would, in all likelihood, find itself
in the preferred position of providing for our people’s welfare without fearing for our people’s lives.
Between these civil support missions lies a stark responsibility that our
armed forces would never welcome, but for which they must be prepared.
Readiness must prevail over likelihood. The consequences are too dear.

Discussion Questions
1. This chapter seeks to clarify the difference between the threat from
without and the threat from within. What are the major characteristics and issues that distinguish internal versus external threats covered
in this extensive discussion? What special demands does each make?
2. What is the central mission that ARNORTH performs as part of the
land component of homeland defense? What are the major issues—
challenges—and constraints affecting ARNORTH’s ability to carry
out that mission?
3. Clearly NORTHCOM grasps that interagency planning is crucial
for future operational success—this is true in many areas where
NORTHCOM support is essential. What are the principal reasons
why such planning is vital? Explain.

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Hataley, T.S. (2007). Catastrophic Terrorism at the Border: The Case of the Canada–­United
States Border. Homeland Security Affairs, Suppl. 1, 4. Retrieved from https://www.
hsaj.org/?special:article=0.1.2.
Luke, I. (2013, July). DoD Operations in the Homeland: Context and Issues for the Commander.
Newport, RI: United States Naval War College.

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Manning, E. (2013, June 5). Defense Coordinating Officer and Defense Coordinating Element:
DSCA Phase II. Presented at the 2013 National Homeland Security Conference, Los
Angeles, CA. Retrieved from http://2013.nationaluasi.com/files/pdf/Role%20of%20
the%20Defense%20Coordinating%20Office%206.5.13.pdf.
McCraw, S.C. (2011, May 11). On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforcement,
Homeland Security, and Drug Cartel Violence. Hearing before the House Homeland
Security Committee Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management,
112th Congress, Session, May 11, 2011. Retrieved from http://homeland.house.gov/
sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20McCraw.pdf.
Miles, D. (2013, January 11). Sandy Response Reaffirms Value of Dual-­Status Commander.
American Forces Press Service. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=118975.
Miro, R.J. (2003). Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999–2002. Washington,
DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. Retrieved from http://www.
loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-­files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf.
Murphy, D.M. (2008, November). Fighting Back: New Media and Military Operations.
DIME: Information as Power. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College. Retrieved from
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Fighting%20Back%20(Murphy).pdf.
Nejamkis, G. (2013, May  29). Iran Set Up Terrorist Networks in Latin America:
Argentine Prosecutor. MSN News. Retrieved from http://news.msn.com/world/
iran-­set-­up-­terrorist-­networks-­in-­latin-­america-­argentine-­prosecutor.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2007, September  11). Speeches and
Interviews. DNI ABC Good Morning America interview with Mike McConnell,
Director of National Intelligence. Retrieved from http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20070911_interview.pdf.
Parliament of Canada. (1999, January). The Report of the Special Committee on Security and
Intelligence. Retrieved from http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/361/
secu/rep/repsecintjan99part1-e.htm.
Perlinger, A. (2012). Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far
Right. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
Peter, T.A. (2010, September 9). Mexico Denies Hillary Clinton’s ‘Insurgency’ Comparison.
Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/​World/t​​ errorism-​
­security/​2010/​0909/​Mexico-​­denies-​­Hillary-​­Clinton-​­s-​insurgency-​­comparison.
U.S. Army North. (2011, July 7). U.S. Army North Command Brief: America’s Insurance
Policy. Retrieved from http://www.arnorth.army.mil.
U.S. Northern Command. (2013, January). Welcome Newcomers. Retrieved from http://
www.northcom.mil/Newcomers.aspx.
U.S. Pacific Command. (2013). USPACOM History. Retrieved from http://www.pacom.
mil/about-­uspacom/history.shtml.
Wilkinson, T. (2010, August  4). Calderon Delivers Blunt View of Drug Cartels’ Sway in
Mexico. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/​2010/​aug/​04/​
world/​la-​­fg-​­mexico-​­calderon-​20100805.

Chapter

6

The Airspace
Domain in
Homeland Defense
Philip Brown

With our trusted partners, we will defend North America by outpacing all
threats, maintaining faith with our people and supporting them in their
times of greatest need.
—NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission
Chapter Objectives

•• Discuss the scope, objectives, and mission of airspace homeland
defense (HD)
•• Demonstrate an appreciation of the organizations responsible for
the defense of the aerospace domain
•• Understand the interactions between the organizations involved
•• Learn what are some of the current and emergent threats
•• Examine the major issues impinging on the airspace HD mission
•• Review the existing and onward program elements of the airspace
HD mission

Introduction
The history of the defense of the U.S. and North American airspace dates
back to the earliest days of manned flight and continues uninterrupted into
the 21st century. The days during and immediately following World War I
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saw assets from nascent aircraft and balloons performing the primary protection role. The interwar years yielded advancements and innovations with
respect to air defense with major ground and air studies accomplished at
Langley Field, Virginia, and Maxwell Field, Alabama. The changes to aerial
capabilities and resultant threats changed throughout World War II and the
Korean conflict. The birth of an independent Air Force in 1947 resulted in
many specific changes, to include the development of Air Defense Command.
Conversations between Canada and the United States that started prior
to the U.S. entry into World War II culminated in an agreement to establish the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in 1953.
In the ensuing 48 years, no one had anticipated an air attack on the United
States of any description. Accordingly, the attack on September  11, 2001,
using commercial aircraft as manned missiles of destruction, was doubly
shocking (Figure 6.1).
This event changed the landscape and perspective for NORAD, and was
the catalyst to form the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)—a
new combatant command for homeland defense (HD) and defense support
of civil authorities (DSCA) (Figure 6.2). This also changed the landscape of
defending within the aerospace domain. The purpose of this chapter is to
provide a platform for discussion about the aerospace domain. An overarching intent is to show how many agencies are involved in the defense of the air
domain of North America and to build the case for the activities required
for this significant team sport. Specifically, this conversation includes the
strategy setting the requirement for this capability, the changing and evolving threat within the aerospace domain, the organizations responsible for
executing this policy and their resources, and the process for maintaining
the defense of the North American aerospace.

The Strategy
The National Security Strategy (U.S. Government, 2010) states that the
“administration has no greater responsibility than the safety and security of
the American people” (p. 4). The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013) lists missions, objectives, and core capabilities to achieve this objective. Mission 1 is
“defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-­state actors” with a
supporting objective of “counter air and maritime threats at a safe distance”
(p. 9). Additional core capabilities supporting this mission are “persistent
air domain awareness” and “capable, responsive air defense forces” (p. 9).
Further, the Department of Defense is the principal entity “for protecting
the United States from air threats—including manned aircraft, unmanned
aircraft, and cruise missiles—whether in the approaches or within U.S. airspace” (pp. 9–10). Moreover, “while DoD has sole responsibility for defeating

The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense

FIGURE 6.1  Flight paths of the four hijacked planes on 9/11. (From the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.)

air threats, it receives assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assets for early identification of anomalous air activity which may ultimately threaten the United
States” (p. 10). Moreover, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013) states:
The air domain presents both challenges and partnership opportunities. DoD
has expanded domain awareness since 9/11 by coordinating with interagency
partners, improving radar surveillance, and expanding information sharing.
DoD will emphasize collaboration with the FAA and DHS to ensure that
military air defense and security capabilities are integrated…. Such collaboration is also needed to reduce the number of unintentional civilian intrusions into restricted airspace. (p. 10)

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FIGURE 6.2  NORAD aircraft intercepting a Russian bomber. A 90th Fighter
Squadron F-22A Raptor escorts a Russian TU-95 Bear flying near the Alaskan
NORAD Region airspace on November 22, 2007. This marked the first time a Raptor
was called upon to support the ANR mission. (From U.S. Air Force.)

The Changing and Evolving Threat
The events following World War II and the geopolitics between the Soviet
Union and the United States set the stage for military friction between
the two superpowers. This friction remained, and at times escalated due
to the technological advances made in the aviation and missile capabilities.
In addition, the potential number of adversaries has also changed since the
earliest days of air defense. This evolution as viewed through the NORAD
lens began in the mid-1950s and continues today. Of note, the type and
numbers of aircraft and missiles discussed below in general terms are interesting, although beyond the scope of this introductory chapter.1
The earliest threats to the air domain consisted of assets from the Soviet
strategic forces. The earliest days of NORAD focused on the long-­range strategic bomber aircraft and the formidable intercontinental ballistic missiles
home based in the Soviet Union. This threat remained fairly consistent until
the 1980s with the advent and deployment of cruise missiles. The landscape
for NORAD as the “eyes” and “ears” of the air defense mission changed
with this technological advancement. Air defenders were now concerned
with the physical location of a Soviet bomber aircraft and whether or not
cruise missiles comprised part of their onboard armament. The complexity of analysis increased dramatically if the cruise missiles were launched.
The questions examined may have included, What type of cruise missile?
What was the launch point? What is the approximate range? What is its
altitude and airspeed? Can it be seen by radar? Can it be seen by a pilot in a
chasing aircraft? What are potential targets? What are the options to defeat,

The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense

deflect, or destroy this inbound missile? While these questions are similar and potentially useful regardless of an inbound threat, the dynamics of
maneuvering and nonmaneuvering missiles increased the challenges associated with the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
The TTPs established during this period served NORAD well while looking outward for air threats to the continent. In sum, NORAD’s focus prior
to September 11, 2001, concentrated on the former Soviet Union and then
on Russia’s manned aircraft, its complement of air-­launched cruise missiles,
and peripherally on emergent unmanned and remotely piloted vehicles.
That focus took on new dimensions on September 11, 2001.
The terrorist attacks of September  11, 2001, demonstrated that a new
threat had emerged—a threat requiring the ability to anticipate and look for
attacks from within national airspace. The concept of dealing with hijacked
commercial airliners was part of the TTPs; however, scenarios centered on
a hijack event well outside North American airspace, and as a result, there
would be significant time to work the challenges associated with the incident. The concept of an adversary using a commercial airliner as a guided
or cruise missile had not entered into the conversation. As a result, NORAD
thinking and action had to accommodate this new type of nonconventional
or asymmetric threat.
The addition of the nonconventional further opened the door to broader
considerations of the challenging and emerging threat. This 21st-­century discussion includes an appreciation of who would and can do harm in concert
with what assets they possess to do harm. As a result, an adversary’s threat
to the North American continent must be measured in terms of their stated
intent within the realm of their possible capability. For example, large nations
with stable governments possess military assets with significant capability,
but a lack of intent to attack North America places the threat of an attack at
the lowest ends of the scales of consideration. However, terrorist organizations and nonstate actors (e.g., al-­Qaeda) have demonstrated and stated their
intent. These groups and individuals seek ways to then hijack general and
commercial aviation, obtain the skills to fly, and use smaller aviation assets
from the general aviation pool, or even use balloons and airships to deploy
some type of weapon or attack from inside Canada or the United States.

The Organizations
The complexities of the air domain over North America in the 21st century
present myriad challenges across the spectrum of conflict from adversaries
equipped with time, resources, and the ability to project presence in both
asymmetric and traditional fashions. The intricacies of this arena require a
basic appreciation of the commands performing these missions before moving deeper into the conversation.

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FIGURE 6.3  NORAD and USNORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base,
Colorado. Army Gen. Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., commander of NORAD and U.S.
Northern Command, and Adm. Mariano Saynez, Secretary of the Navy, Mexico,
pause briefly at the NORAD and USNORTHCOM September 11 memorial during the
admiral’s visit on November 26, 2012. (From U.S. Department of Defense. Photo by
Tech. Sgt. Thomas J. Doscher.)

The military organizations involved are NORAD and USNORTHCOM,
located in Colorado Springs, Colorado (Figure 6.3). These two military organizations share a single dual-­hatted commander selected by and reporting
to both the president of the United States and the prime minister of Canada.
These organizations are served by nearly 1,500 uniformed military from both
nations, government civilians, and contractor personnel. The history and missions of both are complementary and intertwined.2
Created in 1958, NORAD’s motto—“Deter, Detect, Defend”—provides
the watchwords for the protection and defense of the aerospace domain. The
earliest deterrence (i.e., against the Soviet threat) came from the fundamental alliance between Canada and the United States. Technology, as represented through the radar fence developed across the northern extremities
of the continent, supplied the detection capability. Concurrently, defense
resources were made readily available through the teaming of both nations’
uniquely identified fighter aircraft force with expert ground controllers.
Article I of the NORAD Agreement (U.S. Department of State, n.d.)
delineates aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for
North America as primary missions for the command. Article I proceeds
to define aerospace warning and aerospace control with greater specificity.
Aerospace warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating
intelligence and information related to man-­made objects in the aerospace
domain and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North

The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense

America whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies. An integral part of
aerospace warning shall continue to entail monitoring of global aerospace
activities and related developments. NORAD’s aerospace warning mission
for North America shall include aerospace warning, as defined in this paragraph, in support of United States national commands responsible for missile
defense. (p. 2)
Aerospace control consists of providing surveillance and exercising operational control of the airspace of the United States and Canada. Operational
control is the authority to direct, coordinate, and control the operational
activities of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available to
NORAD. (p. 2)

The subtext and nuances of each portion of these two missions merit further examination to better comprehend the scope of NORAD responsibilities. A detailed examination of the same, however, is beyond the scope and
intention of this text. Students are invited to delve deeply into the core documents to move closer to comprehension of this area in order to function
as practitioners. It is important to note, however, that the NORAD commander serves the governments of Canada and the United States. To that
end, each commander provided the leader­ship for the not so subtle evolutionary changes demanded by changes in the aerospace domain threats.
The last 55  years presented changes in strategy, policy, and technology
requiring adaptation of NORAD in order to ensure the sovereignty and
defense of the air and space above the two nations. Recently, the leader­
ship of both countries added maritime warning to the mission set, calling
for situational awareness and information sharing of potential threats from
the sea, coastal approaches, and inland waterways of Canada and the United
States. NORAD accomplishes all of these missions through an integrated
network of space-­based, airborne, and ground-­based assets.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the days following, revalidated the significance of NORAD’s role in homeland defense and provided a catalyst for the
creation of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM is a U.S. national combatant
command, created on October 1, 2002, to provide control of Department
of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA). The stated mission of the command is straightforward
and definitive: to “defend and secure the United States and its interests”
(USNORTHCOM website). Further, USNORTHCOM consolidated efforts
previously conducted by several and disparate DoD organizations. This
unification had not been in place since George Washington commanded
the Continental Army and has been critical to mission success. While there
are aerospace domain responsibilities resting with USNORTHCOM, the

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primary role rests with NORAD. In addition to traditional core military
tasks that may be required over the breadth of the northern part of the western hemisphere, USNORTHCOM’s focus on DSCA includes development of
strategy, policy, plans, and operations in concert with myriad government
agencies at the federal, state, and local levels.

The Resources
The resources required for the defense of the air domain of the United States
and the North American continent include a wide array of equipment and
personnel. The equipment incorporates ground-, air-, and space-­
based
assets that are manned and managed by a cadre of dedicated and highly
trained professionals. Obviously, each element has evolved over the history
of the command.
The capabilities of the early days of air defense rested with development
of the post–­World War II radar systems and the jet aircraft of the time.
The cooperation between Canada and the United States led to a forward-­
deployed strategy of building the eyes and ears for the continent across the
northern-­most reaches of Canada. These included the Mid-­Canada Line,
the Pinetree Line, and the DEW Line (North American Aerospace Defense
Command, 2012). The data gleaned from these radar systems provided early
warning to the operators who manned their stations all day, every day, to
protect against the Soviet threat. They in turn communicated with the pilots
sitting alert at disparate locations across Canada and the United States who
would scramble from their waiting areas and launch toward the inbound
threat—most likely a manned, long-­range bomber.
Fundamentally, the process remains similar to this day with changes
through the past decades based upon technological advances. For example,
the radar sites have become automated and the data streams are linked via a
computer network to central locations. The addition of space-­based systems
increases the range and scope of the eyes and ears of the air defense system
and provides better response times to an adversarial threat. Further technological advances allow for increased discernment of the potential threat,
which allows for better reactions and better use of resources to engage
potential threats to Canada and the United States. Moreover, advances in
aircraft design produced superior air defense aircraft, some designed specifically for the air defense and air superiority missions, which increased
the range and capabilities against the threat arrays that may be brought to
bear by those who would attempt to do harm against the North American
continent. Of note, operational practices even included tethered balloons
with onboard radars on and near the borders of the United States to provide
advance warning of inbound aircraft and missiles. While a seemingly lower
technological solution, it provided a solution within resource-­constrained

The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense

environments. Regardless, every change was the result of strategic, operational, and tactical thinking by the men and women charged with the air
defense mission set. The human in the loop consistently presents the glue for
the sustainment of the system.
Today, the command and control network lays within the confines of the
NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center. Therein, the command
center director has immediate connectivity with the NORAD commander
or his designated representative, the National Military Command Center,
and the full range of interagency partners in Canada and the United States.
This connectivity is vital to allow for appropriate decision making in the
event of a threat to the North American continent. The watch standers in
Colorado are always connected with the three regional headquarters. A
brief description of each follows.
The Continental NORAD Region (CONR) Headquarters is located at
Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and is commanded by a U.S. Air National
Guard general officer. Appropriately, a Canadian Forces general officer serves
as the deputy. CONR “provides airspace surveillance and control and directs
air sovereignty activities for the continental United States.” The headquarters controls two defense sectors, with one at Joint Base Lewis-­McChord,
Washington, and the other at Rome, New York. In concert with the co-­located
air component headquarters for USNORTHCOM, CONR plans, conducts,
controls, and coordinates all Air Force forces for the execution of their mission set. Further, CONR is aligned with Headquarters First Air Force, which
gains its primary manpower source from the U.S. Air National Guard and is
comprised of 10 Air National Guard fighter wings, which provide the aircraft
for their air defense mission. In addition, CONR works together with Joint
Force Headquarters National Capital Region in order to provide assets and
air defense protection over the critical airspace of Washington, D.C. (North
American Aerospace Defense Command, n.d.).
The Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) Headquarters is located at Joint Base
Elmendorf-­Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska, and is commanded, once again,
by a binational team: a U.S. Air Force general officer in command and a
Canadian Forces deputy. ANR “provides an ongoing capability to detect, validate, and warn of any aircraft and/­or cruise missile threat in its area of operations that could threaten North American security.” Due to its geographic
location, it assumes a pivotal defense role against any Soviet Union approaches
or attacks in the past. Today, it continues a mission to provide the continuous
“capability to detect, validate, and warn of any aircraft and/­or cruise missile
threat in its area of operations that could threaten North American security.”
The manpower for this mission comes from U.S. Air Force active duty,
Canadian forces, and U.S. National Guard forces. The active Canadian and
U.S. forces work at the Alaskan Air and Space Operations Center, while the
National Guard forces supply manpower for the Alaskan Air Defense Sector

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to maintain watch of the airspace through the radar array (North American
Aerospace Defense Command, n.d.).
The Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) Headquarters is located in
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, and is commanded by a Canadian Forces
general officer, with a U.S. Air Force general officer serving as his deputy.
CANR provides “aerospace surveillance, identification, control and warning for the defence of Canada and North America.” Fundamentally aligned
for the protection of Canadian airspace, CANR identifies and monitors aircraft within that airspace and exercises “operational command and control
of all air defence forces in CANR and operations in support of other government departments and agencies.” The manpower for this headquarters
is a mix of Canadian and U.S. Air Force active duty personnel with the air
defense assets provided by Canada (North American Aerospace Defense
Command, n.d.).
Ultimately, each region can function with and for the other as an integrated system of command and control, as management of the security system requires more than multiple organizations creating independent ways
of doing business. This marks significant progress to carry out a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks,
2004) and “take into consideration the full array of possible enemy tactics,
such as use of insiders, suicide terrorism, or standoff attack. Each layer must
be effective in its own right. Each must be supported by other layers that are
redundant and coordinated” (p. 392).

The Process: Before and After 9/11
The strong relationship between NORAD and the FAA provided the backbone for the aerospace defense of the North American continent. Other
than exercises, “the most recent hijacking that involved U.S. air traffic
controllers, FAA management, and military coordination had occurred
in 1993” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 14). The
exercises that followed to ensure operational readiness included exercises
focused on Russian attacks and hijackings that occurred well outside North
American airspace.
The analysis of the threat in the pre-9/11 environment led to a reduced
concern of a Soviet or Russian bomber incursion. As a result, “the number
of NORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold War high of 26” (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 16) to fewer than 10 alert sites,
with two fighter aircraft on alert at each location. Some advocates argued
that the threat was so low, within the context of capability versus intent, that
the requirement for traditional air defense sites had been eliminated and
all locations should be closed. A differing view argued that the threat was
in fact greater than just the Russian bomber force, and they “advocated the

The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense

importance of air sovereignty against emerging ‘asymmetric threats’ to the
United States: drug smuggling, ‘non-­state and state-­sponsored terrorists,’
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 17).
This dialogue within the defense establishment included the relationship
with their primary interagency partner, the FAA, in the event of an aircraft hijacking.
The procedures existing prior to and on 9/11 allowed the FAA to “obtain
military assistance from NORAD”; however, this “required multiple levels
of notification and approval at the highest levels of government” (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 17). FAA controllers anticipated
by-­the-­book actions from the pilot of a hijacked aircraft. Again, since the
last hijacking took place in 1993, local controllers advised their supervisory
chain in sequential fashion up to FAA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
where the FAA’s hijack coordinator would be advised. Once verified, the
coordinator contacted
the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) to ask for a
military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and
aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then
seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down
NORAD’s chain of command. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks,
2004, p. 18)

The NMCC then coordinated with the FAA and NORAD to connect
the dots for an air defense aircraft to “be discreet, ‘vectored to a position
five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft,’ where it could perform its
mission to monitor the aircraft’s flight path” (National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 18). Procedures did not call for the fighters to
conduct an intercept. Ultimately, “the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA
and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that:
•• The hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not
attempt to disappear.
•• There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate
FAA and NORAD chains of command.
•• The hijacking would take the traditional form; that is, it would not be a
suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 18)
The attacks of September  11, 2001, changed the landscape of thinking for the North American continent. Students of the events will benefit from a review of the chronology of the day, available transcripts, and

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subsequent initial reviews and recollections (e.g., National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The events of this day presented “a new kind of
war” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 46), as the idea
of a suicide hijacking had been absent from thinking and planning. As a
result, changes in thinking and operations occurred as observations were
catalogued and reviewed, lessons were learned, and changes to TTPs introduced. These changes took place within the broader governmental agencies,
the airline industry, and NORAD. Essentially, the partnerships between
these three levels seek to create a need for a layered approach to security
with NORAD as the final layer of defense.
The formation of the DHS, with the newly created Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and myriad agencies transferred to DHS, set
the stage for a “layered defense”3 and for further interagency/­multiagency
cooperation and collaboration. In other words, there are steps (i.e., layers of
actions) that can be taken to deter crises long before they develop in general
and commercial aviation, as well as steps that can be taken just before they
occur. For example, customs and immigration knowledge and intelligence
awareness feed into the system in order to deter or prevent individuals who
may have intent to do harm from entering the United States or Canada.
They may also deter or prevent them from boarding national or international aircraft through the interconnection of national and international
intelligence networks to create, maintain, and disseminate “no-­fly lists.”
Training for TSA inspectors continues to improve so that they can both
protect individual travelers and maintain the flow through airport security.
Even the newest airline passenger is aware of the multiple stages of inspection, visual and mechanical, endured prior to boarding a commercial plane,
to include swipes for explosive objects, limitations on amounts of liquids,
and specifically prohibited items for carry-­on luggage (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, n.d.).
The follow-­on layer of protection is a combination of efforts between federal agencies and the airlines. For example, armed federal air marshals are
deployed both routinely and in an irregular fashion aboard commercial aircraft flights. Further, aircraft cockpit doors are fortified against incursion,
and in some instances, pilots have received training on and carry side arms
with them in the cockpit. In addition, aircrews and FAA controllers have
discussed and received training on various hijacking scenarios so that they
are better prepared to deter and prevent another suicide hijacking event.
Moreover, there is a stronger relationship between the FAA, Transport
Canada, and NORAD as melded through the NORAD Agreement. Finally,
passengers are more alert, aware, and potentially ready to react to a situation
onboard a commercial aircraft.
Initiated on the day of the terrorist attacks on North America, Operation
Noble Eagle (ONE), under the command and control of NORAD, has been

The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense

the instrument of aerospace defense of the North American continent. As
stated in an Air Force History Office Fact Sheet (U.S. Air Force Historical
Studies Office, 2012), ONE is a “permanent defense requirement and major
force commitment involving thousands [of personnel]; hundreds of fighters,
tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft; and components of the other
armed services and various civilian departments and agencies.” Further,
it has provided “air cover support for special security events such as the
Winter Olympics in Utah, the World Series, the Super Bowl, space shuttle
launches, United Nations general assemblies, presidential inaugurations,
state funerals, and State of the Union addresses” (U.S. Air Force Historical
Studies Office, 2012). Supporting this real-­world operational construct is a
multilayered exercise program.
A quick look at the NORAD News page (North American Aerospace
Defense Command, 2013) provides a glimpse into the numbers and various geographic locations for these exercises to train for the air defense mission. For example, as of late April 2013, there were eight exercises described
that included the airspace over Washington, D.C., Northern California, and
Massachusetts. The overall purpose of the exercises is to practice the procedures and processes for identification and intercept of various airborne
threats. As discussed in the April 2013 article concerning the Massachusetts
exercise, responses and equipment were tested within various situations to
include airspace violations, hijackings, and responses to a variety of aircraft.
On a larger scale, NORAD annually conducts Exercise Vigilant Eagle in
concert with the Russian Air Force. This exercise “is designed to build and
strengthen cooperation between U.S., Canadian and Russian military forces
during a terrorist hijacking where the aircraft” (Doscher, 2012) transits the
participating nations’ airspace. This exercise series allows the three governments “to jointly pursue the transformation of their relations from Cold
War confrontation to 21st Century cooperation in air security” (Doscher,
2012). Ultimately, this annual event complements the daily NORAD air
defense exercises and increases the confidence and capabilities of the nations
involved to detect, deter, and prevent these types of attacks.
On an even larger scale, NORAD and USNORTHCOM conduct Exercise
Vigilant Shield, where naval-, air-, and ground-­based assets combine to
train for the air defense mission. Scenarios include the full range of potential threats: from large nation-­state military attacks to terrorist air threats.
This exercise is further linked with exercises at the federal level to provide
training with the interagency and to work the command and control issues
necessary in this time-­sensitive exercise (Miles, 2011). In the words of the
NORAD commander, “Homeland defense is our most important mission,
and it’s a sacred trust we share with the citizens of the United States and
Canada. Vigilant Shield … will make us better and, most importantly, make
our countries safer in the long run” (Miles, 2011).

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In addition to improvements in the exercise program and interaction
with interagency partners, NORAD instituted improvements to TTPs that
enhance the ability to serve as the holders of the aerospace warning and
aerospace control mission sets. As discussed with a senior NORAD operations officer (personal communication, April 2013), the ability to maintain
close watch on the airspace of North America improved through increased
and enhanced FAA radar systems at both the perimeter and the interior of
the continent. Fundamentally, this level of inspection and analysis of air
traffic increases awareness. As a result, more data are available for scrutiny
and allow for better identification and tracking of airborne vehicles. In
addition, since September  11, 2001, a Domestic Events Network has been
operational on a continuous 24 hours per day/7 days a week status, allowing up to 150 agency representatives to immediately interact over any air
traffic of concern. Consequently, known and routine traffic can be separated from unknown or illegal/­unlawful traffic, which eases the burden on
identification and tracking potential threats. Moreover, there are additional
airspace protection enhancements. For example, no-­fly zones may include
permanent exclusion areas such as over the White House, or temporary
exclusion areas such as those over venues used during the Olympic Games.
Similar aerial cordons can be activated in the skies in the wake of a disaster,
or following an attack, such as the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings.
Aviators know where these areas exist: permanent zones are clearly annotated on aviation maps and charts; temporary zones are identified in daily
aviation notes. Thus, pilots are conditioned to avoid these areas, as a matter
of routine.
Conversely, when an aircraft is observed over these kinds of restricted
airspace, and fails to respond to FAA controllers, a telephone conference call is established in order to share information between the FAA,
NORAD, and other appropriate decision makers. If there is a return to
normal operations (e.g., the pilot communicates accurately and properly
with FAA or acts in an appropriate manner within the rules of aviation),
then the phone conference is terminated. If not, procedures call for alert
fighter aircraft to “scramble” in order to make a positive identification of
the errant aircraft, and allow the pilot the opportunity to respond to airborne signals. A failure to return to normal behavior at this time results in
an increasing level of response up to and including shooting the aircraft to
prevent a recurrence of the tragedy of 9/11. These terminal steps demand
adherence to the strictest rules of engagement, and require the approval
at the highest levels of the Canadian and U.S. governments. The system,
however, is regimented—not rigid; and its strong, well-­practiced, and disciplined structure preserves a powerful protection mechanism against
determined terrorist adversaries.

The Airspace Domain in Homeland Defense

Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction and reinforced within the text of this
introductory chapter, the defense of the North American aerospace domain
is the ultimate team sport. The rules are set through the cooperative strength
of the international partnerships between the Canadian and U.S. governments. The collaboration between interagency and military entities creates a
robust and well-­trained system with NORAD playing a key role. Every day,
each of the team members engages in training individually and collectively
in order to maintain skills at the highest levels of readiness. Unfortunately,
adversaries adapt quickly, ignore the rules, and seek to capitalize on perceived
weaknesses. Awareness of these challenges and the realities of the changing
scope of threats drive NORAD and all partners toward better defense postures. The overarching intent is to deter, prevent, and defeat any planned or
realized airborne incursion. Given the playbook and the players, our goal is
to dissuade the opponent from ever taking the field.

Discussion Questions
1. What are the benefits and challenges of international collaboration
and cooperation with respect to the air domain?
2. Describe the benefits and challenges of interagency collaboration
and cooperation with respect to the air domain?
3. How do NORTHCOM and NORAD fulfill the air defense mission
as part of homeland defense?
4. What are some specific examples of traditional and asymmetric threats in the airspace domain that are included in this area of
homeland defense? How would NORAD and NORTHCOM propose
to nullify or respond to these threats?
5. How does an annual exercise like Noble Eagle demonstrate how
NORAD and NORTHCOM perform their homeland defense missions?

Endnotes


1. Students interested in specific details on visual aspects and each platform’s specific
capabilities could delve deeply into numerous aviation and space resources. Jane’s All
the World’s Aircraft (www.janes.com) may provide a significant starting point.
2. Further details are available on the NORAD and USNORTHCOM public websites.
3. A more familiar way to consider the concept of layered defense is in the context
of protecting one’s home against unwanted intruders. In this scenario, you would
have the approach to your neighborhood accessible by guarded gates or the ability
to open the gates by a personal identification number. Inside the gate would be signs
that advise that there is a neighborhood watch, and there would be visible patrols of

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neighbors throughout the streets. In front of the home would be a sign that signals
the presence of an alarm system, and there would actually be an alarm system inside
that is connected to the police and fire departments. In addition to an alarm system,
you may have a large, loud, and very protective dog that alerts to unwanted visitors.
Finally, you may have weapons as a last line of defense should everything else fail to
protect you and your property. The overall intent is to stop unwanted intruders at the
gate, or in other words, convince them to go elsewhere. However, there are additional
layers available, visible, and meaningful to provide protection.

References
Doscher, T.J. (2012). NORAD, Russian Federation Wrap Up Vigilant Eagle 12. NORAD
News. Retrieved April 21, 2013, from http://www.norad.mil/news/2012/083012.html.
Miles, D. (2011). Vigilant Shield Tests Homeland Defense Processes. American Forces Press
Service. Retrieved April  21, 2013, from http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=65963.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved April 20, 2013, from
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/content-­detail.html.
North American Aerospace Defense Command. (2012). A Brief History of NORAD (Office
of History). Retrieved March  5, 2013, from http://www.norad.mil/about/A%20
Brief%20History%20of%20NORAD.pdf.
North American Aerospace Defense Command. (n.d.). NORAD Home Page. Retrieved
March 5, 2013, from http://www.norad.mil/Home.html.
North American Aerospace Defense Command. (2013). NORAD News Service. Retrieved
April 21, 2013, from http://www.norad.mil/news/index.html.
U.S. Air Force Historical Studies Office. (2012). Operation Noble Eagle Fact Sheet.
Retrieved April  21, 2013, from http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/factsheets/factsheet.
asp?id=18593.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2013). Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of
Civil Authorities. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (n.d.). The Transportation Security Administration
Home Page. Retrieved April 21, 2013, from http://www.tsa.gov/.
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Agreement between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Canada on the North American Aerospace
Defense Command. Retrieved March 6, 2013, from http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/69727.pdf.
U.S. Government. (2010). National Security Strategy. Retrieved May 6, 2013, from http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

Chapter

7

Homeland
Security and WMD
Protection Issues
Gary Mauk, Matthew D. Woolums,
and Robert McCreight

Sooner or later, jihadist-­style terror and WMD are going to come together
and the consequences could be horrendous.
—Noam Chomsky (2006)
This government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. We are going
to review every action and make necessary changes so that we are better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could threaten
our people.
—President George W. Bush (2005)
Chapter Objectives

•• Examine the roles and functions assigned to various DoD CBRN
Response Enterprise forces during a WMD incident response
•• Discuss the specific mission and tasks levied on CERFP, HRF, CST,
CERFP, DCRF, and CZCRE A/B, and other WMD response forces
•• Review the operational and organizational issues involved with federal and National Guard deployments during a WMD incident in
the homeland

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Introduction
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) refers to the range or
specific type of manmade hazards that by their inherent lethality to humans
have the potential to cause mass destruction (e.g., loss of life or property
or both). The historical development and employment of theses hazards as
legitimate military weapons has led to the generally accepted terminology
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when referring to CBRN hazards in a
domestic environment (Mauroni, 2010). Within the United States the term
WMD has also taken on a legalistic meaning when used for the prosecution
of individuals involved with production, dissemination, and use of CBRN
hazards to achieve terrorist goals (Mauroni, 2010). For the purposes of this
chapter, whenever WMD is used, it is essentially equivalent to the range of
CBRN hazards discussed here.

DoD Support of Civil Authorities
and Civil Support Operations
Under the National Response Framework (NRF) the responsibility to
respond to domestic emergencies, including CBRN-­related incidents, resides
initially within the affected local community (Department of Homeland
Security, 2013). If and when additional response resources are required,
the incident commander (or unified command) requests those resources
through local mutual aid agreements, state regional compacts, or the state’s
emergency management agency. Requests for federal assistance, including
Department of Defense support, are intended to be reserved for instances
when the affected states’ capabilities have been or are reasonably expected to
become overwhelmed or, in some cases, where the response capability does
not exist within the states’ civilian response resource pool (Department of
Homeland Security, 2013).
When discussing military domestic operations in the United States, it is
important to understand the distinction between homeland security and
homeland defense, two related terms that are frequently used interchangeably even though they have distinct differences in meaning and in implementation. The Department of Defense 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense
and Defense Support of Civil Authorities outlines the department’s objectives
and strategic approaches to enhance domestic security and resiliency.
Homeland defense is a specific mission that the Department of Defense
has a clearly defined constitutional responsibility for the protection of the
United States and territories from traditional (military) threats in the land,
air, sea, space, and cyber domains (McAteer, 2002). These war fighting capabilities are generally not duplicated by other civilian agencies. Since 2002
the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has been the principal

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

military command, part of the Department of Defense Unified Command
Plan (UCP), responsible to conduct homeland defense operations in the
North American area of responsibility. These defense-­related missions look
outward from the country for external threats, such as missile defense and
enemy aircraft or vessels (Knight, 2008).
Homeland security, as defined in the National Preparedness Goal of 2005,
is the combined national effort of all levels of government, the private sector, and citizens to detect and prevent, respond to, and recover from the
variety of natural and man-­made hazards that threaten the United States.
The Department of Homeland Security, since its creation in 2001, has been
the lead federal agency for the creation and implementation of the homeland
security strategy for the nation. At the individual state and territory levels
there are corresponding civilian agencies that coordinate and execute the
preparedness and recovery efforts for homeland security during emergencies.
The Department of Defense supports domestic civilian authorities in
the accomplishment of their homeland security mission by providing special resources and capabilities not generally found in the civilian sectors.
Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities is officially known as
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). Since 2001, DSCA has evolved
to become one of the primary missions for the department, as stated in strategic guidance documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(QDR, 2010), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense (2012), Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (2012), and reaffirmed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
(2014). The military role in a DSCA response includes the necessary actions
to save lives, minimize human suffering, and the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. During DSCA missions the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), part of the DHS, is usually the lead coordinating federal agency (JP 3-41 CBRN CM, 2012). In incidents that involve
terrorism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the designated lead
federal agency. Incidents that do not have the scale or scope requiring a full
federal response will remain at the state or local government level and under
the control of the appropriate level of incident command according to the
National Incident Management System (NIMS). In some cases the DSCA
resources (personnel and equipment) will be mission assigned under the
Incident Command System (ICS) to the local civil authority, however, in
all cases military personnel (federal and National Guard) remain under the
command and control of military leadership (ADRP 3-28 Defense Support
of Civil Authorities, 2013). In cases of a suspected CBRN attack, one prominent Department of Defense planning assumption is that most local civilian
capabilities will be rapidly overwhelmed in terms of agent identification,
mitigation of effects, managing the consequences of a CBRN attack, and
cleanup/­decontamination after an attack.

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Origins of the DoD WMD Protection
and Response Mission
In response to a series of terrorist (foreign and domestic) attacks in the 1990s
and intelligence suggesting such attacks were more likely to occur, legislative measures were undertaken to bolster the domestic defense and response
capabilities against CBRN hazards. The Nunn–­Lugar–­Domenici Act of
1997 specified that the Department of Defense prepare to provide domestic
civilian agencies with the expertise to develop effective response capabilities
against so-­called weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Homeland Security
National Preparedness Task Force, 2006). Today the Department of Defense
specifically refers to DSCA missions in the CBRN/­WMD realm as CBRN
Consequence Management (CBRN-­CM) operations (JP 3-41 CBRN CM,
2012). CBRN-­CM is divided between preparedness and response activities
(JP 3-41 CBRN CM, 2012).

Civilian Leadership of Responses
to CBRN Incidents in the Homeland
In a catastrophic-­
scale CBRN incident the president could order the
Department of Defense (Title 10 USC forces) to assume the lead agency
role for the immediate response and recovery efforts (ADRP 3-28 Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, 2013). However, unified coordination is a preferred management structure to facilitate the multijurisdictional support
to the on-­scene recovery efforts (Department of Homeland Security, 2013).
Regardless of the scale and scope of a DSCA response, the Department of
Defense’s goal is to return response and recovery responsibilities to the
civilian authorities as soon as reasonably possible. Depending on the nature
of the WMD event, such as a large-­scale biological, radiological, or nuclear
CBRN preparedness is the accumulation of knowledge, plans, materials, equipment, and training necessary to affect a response to a potential
CBRN incident.
CBRN response is the efforts to detect and identify CBRN hazards
and mitigate the impacts of a CBRN incident by taking those necessary
actions that save lives, reduce suffering, protect critical infrastructure/­key
resources, and mitigate environmental impacts. It includes foreign CM and
DSCA/­CS operations for federal Title 10 forces.
Catastrophic CBRN incident results in extraordinary levels of mass
casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions
(NRF, 2013).

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

attack, the involvement of specialized federal and National Guard CBRN
forces as well as traditional military forces could last for many months
to years.
It is important to note that decisions associated with life safety, security, evacuation, and future disposition of citizens, businesses, and schools
located in the affected area require close coordination between deployed
military forces and civilian incident command. While the response, rescue,
and relocation tasks related to evacuating citizens from the CBRN impacted
area are significant, actual instructions will be entirely based on the specific scenario. Is the attack in a densely populated urban area? Is the CBRN
attack proximate to other inherently hazardous commercial or industrial
facilities? Is the attack proximate to ports, airports, or major transportation
systems? These are important questions to resolve, which in turn will shape
the kind of response that best fits the situation.

Duty Status of National Guard
and Federal Military Forces
When conducting DSCA missions the distinction of duty status between federal Title 10 USC and National Guard Title 32 USC forces is essential because
of constitutional restrictions on the types of mission assignments each
duty status can perform (JP 3-28 Civil Support, 2007). (Note: Officially the
Department of Defense makes a doctrinal distinction between the domestic
support provided by federal Title 10 USC forces and National Guard Title 32.
Federal Title 10 forces provide defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)
and National Guard forces in Title 32 or state active duty (SAD) provide civil
support (CS). For the purposes of this chapter, the term DSCA will mean
domestic military support provided to civil authorities by both the National
Guard Title 32 and federal Title 10 forces.) National Guard forces in Title 32
USC status are deployed under the command and control of the respective
state’s governor and the adjutant general (TAG) and are available for various state support missions under the provisions of 32 USC § 502(f)(1) (NGR
500-1, 2008). Title 32 USC forces are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act,
which restricts federal Title 10 forces from conducting domestic law enforcement duties. Governors may order National Guard members to duty in order
to perform training, other operational support duties, and conduct homeland defense or homeland security missions (ADRP 3-28 Defense Support of
Civil Authorities, 2013). Additionally, National Guard soldiers and airmen
may be deployed by their respective governors in Title 32 USC status across
state lines when requested by another state’s governor through Emergency

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National Guard soldiers in Title 32 status are under the command and control of the state governor and TAG; the cost of the soldiers and equipment
is provided for by the federal government. Generally, National Guard forces
in Title 32 status conduct training to prepare those units and individuals
to perform federalized war fighting (i.e., homeland defense missions). This
training takes place during weekend drill assemblies and annual training (AT)
periods. When requested by a governor, the president may make a disaster
declaration that clears the way for the use of federal dollars in the response.
State active duty (SAD) is a duty status where the governor has called up
state National Guard soldiers but there is no reimbursement from the federal government; C2 remains with the governor and TAG. This may happen
during limited emergencies like localized storms and flooding when there
has not been a request by the governor for a disaster declaration.
Duty status was an important issue during the Hurricane Katrina response
where there was debate whether all responding National Guardsmen should
be federalized and put under the control of the president. It caused situations
where Title 10 soldiers were on one side of a street without bullets in their
weapons and National Guardsmen on the other side with loaded weapons.
Immediate response authority (IRA) allows a Title 10 military commander or state official to take immediate action with military personnel
(to include National Guard) and equipment to prevent suffering and mitigate property damage without prior approval. IRA ends when the necessity for the response is no longer needed or not later than 72 hours (DoDI
3025.18, 2012).

Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) or other agreements without
violating constitutional restrictions.
The federal government is constitutionally restrained from automatically
responding to domestic natural and man-­made disasters and generally defers
to the responsibilities of the state and local governments. However, federal
law does permit the utilization of federal resources, including Department
of Defense forces, when the capabilities of the local governments are saturated. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
42 USC § 5121 (Stafford Act) provides the disaster declaration process for
a governor to request federal assistance or, in dire circumstances, for the
president to make a unilateral declaration (Homeland Security National
Preparedness Task Force, 2006). Other federal law limits the types of assistance that can be provided; for example, Department of Defense forces
in Title 10 USC federal status are restricted from performing civilian law
enforcement functions in accordance with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC
§ 1385 (Doyle and Elsea, 2012). Additionally, when federal military forces
are given DSCA mission assignments, the Economy Act of 1932, 31 USC
§ 1535 requires that the missions are validated against six criteria: legality,

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness (Secretary of Defense,
2013). While these validation criteria make good fiscal sense and must be
applied in most DSCA situations, it is important to note that the exigency of
the circumstances expected within and adjacent to a CBRN attack are quite
different than a slowly expanding emergency such as a hurricane or severe
winter storm. The anticipated deployment times for the various Department
of Defense CBRN response forces allow for reasonable adherence to these
procedures without needlessly slowing the overall response effort.
As mentioned previously, requests for federal assistance, including
Department of Defense support, are intended to be reserved for instances
when the affected states’ capabilities have been or are reasonably expected
to become overwhelmed. The same is true when determining whether to
utilize Title 32 National Guard or Title 10 federal military personnel during
a CBRN incident. The National Guard will generally have the more prominent role in domestic response, as it keeps those military resources under
the state’s and governor’s command and control. An additional benefit is the
proximity of the National Guard forces to the incident location allows for
more rapid assembly and response.
If a CBRN response is of a scale and enduring nature to require Department
of Defense resources under Title 10, the command and control of those military forces must maintain a military chain of command from the soldier
through the leaders of the unit to the president. A recent development to
improve unity of effort and synchronization between National Guard and
Title 10 forces has led to the establishment of dual-­status commanders.
These specifically designated and trained officers are simultaneously members of the National Guard and the Title 10 force; this dual status allows a
single military commander to lead both federal and state military resources
while maintaining constitutional restrictions on the types of duty each status can perform.

Domestic Laws and Regulation
Applicability to U.S. Military
Forces during DSCA Missions
When responding to domestic incidents, including CBRN-­related incidents,
U.S. military forces must conduct missions in accordance with applicable
federal and state laws that subordinate military war-fighting doctrine and
authorities (ADRP 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2013). Federal
laws such as Title 29 CFR Part 1910.120, Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, and the National Fire Protection Association Standard 472, as
adopted by the DHS, establish the competencies and equipment requirements

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for individuals operating in hazardous materials and CBRN environments
(ADRP 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2013; DoDI 3020.52,
2012). In some instances these health- and safety-­driven restrictions for personnel in domestic operations are more limiting than risk-­based/­mission
accomplishment-­driven guidelines for military operations during the traditional Department of Defense mission of homeland defense. For example,
DoD-­permissible radiation exposure limits for military personnel during a
domestic DSCA mission are 60% less than those during a military operation involving nuclear war (National Security Staff, 2010). For any specific
response to a CBRN incident the responsible civilian incident commander
will be accountable for following established exposure limits for all civilians
and military personnel assigned to the effort.
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is the doctrinal
framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels (Department
of Homeland Security, 2008b). It includes the foundational set of concepts,
terminology, and principles covering incident command, multiagency coordination, unified command, training, and the classification of the various
types of response resources. The Incident Command System (ICS) is the
command and management component of NIMS (Department of Homeland
Security, 2008b). Under ICS, incident command can expand and contract
depending on the nature and scope of the incident. For a small, localized
incident, there may be one incident commander with overall authority and
incident command may shift depending on what phase the incident is at.
For example, in the initial life safety phase of a response, the fire chief may
be the incident commander, but once that phase is complete, incident command may shift to the police chief in instances when there is a follow-­on
criminal investigation. Department of Defense Instruction 3025.18 directs
that DSCA plans will be compatible with NIMS and emphasizes unity of
effort between DoD resources and civil authorities. In larger, more dynamic
incidents, a unified and area command may be established where multiple
leaders from local, state, and federal agencies will share decision-­making
authority and incident oversight. This is the more likely incident command
scenario during a CBRN-­related incident.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Threats and Hazards
The perceived threat of attack against the United States using a WMD has
been a growing concern over the last few decades. Information proliferation
across the cyber domain has increased our enemies’ ability to collaborate, gain
knowledge about, and develop access to resources that could be employed in

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

order to achieve their malevolent goals and objectives. Historical incidents
such as the Tokyo subway sarin attack (1995), the Oklahoma City Murrah
Federal Building bombing (1995), both World Trade Center attacks (1993,
2001), the anthrax letters (2001), and more recently, the attempt to detonate
a vehicle-­borne improvised explosive device in Times Square and the successful detonation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) near the finish
line of the Boston Marathon all demonstrate an intent to do harm to innocent civilians, and if possible, using deadly chemical and biological materials. The use of CBRN hazards or the intentional release of toxic industrial
chemicals or toxic industrial materials as a WMD on the public is a realistic
threat that public officials must plan for. Terrorist groups have demonstrated
the ability to manufacture chemical and biological materials without the
support of state-­sponsored weapons programs, and they are not constrained
by international agreements or conventional moral arguments against their
use. What is of paramount significance is that despite the WMD grouping
in terminological sense, each of these distinct hazards requires a distinct
response. It is important for emergency response planners to avoid the erroneous use of a general term of reference indicating a single type of hazard
rather than the four distinct physical hazards each poses. The recognition
of each independent CBRN hazard requires unique planning considerations
when developing response capabilities (NDU, 2009) (see Table 7.1).

TABLE 7.1  CBRN THREATS
Categories

Types

Decontamination
Precedence

Persistence

Treatments

Chemical

Blood, blister,
nerve

Immediate
(seconds–­
minutes)

Minutes–­days

Antidotes/­
supportive
care

Biological

Bacterial, virus,
toxins

Hours–­days

Minutes–­years

Antibiotics,
antiviral drugs,
avoidance

Radiological

Alpha, beta,
gamma, and
neutron

Minutes–­days

Months–­years

Source
specific,
supportive
care

Nuclear
detonation,
1–10 kt

Blast, thermal,
As soon as
radiological,
practical does
electromagnetic not delay
pulse (EMP)
evacuation

Months–
decades

Supportive
care, long-­
term
evacuation

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Understanding the Nature
and Scope of CBRN Attacks
and the Overall WMD Threat
Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) are chemical substances designed to incapacitate or kill the targeted population. Chemical warfare agents are generally classified by their physical state (gas, liquid, or solid), the resulting
physiological effect (nerve, blood, blister, or choking), and the persistency of
the agent in the environment (persistent, nonpersistent) (JP3-11 CBRN Ops,
2008). The severity of the resulting injuries depends on the type of chemical
agent, the amount or dose, and the duration of the exposure (Nelson, 2012).
For chemical hazards rapid decontamination and medical treatment are the
proscribed measures to reduce injuries and minimize cross-­contamination.
The U.S. Army CBRN School recommendations to civilian first responders for mass decontamination call for the rapid removal of contaminated
clothing and high volumes of water at low pressure for 30 seconds to 3 minutes for initial decontamination, depending on contributing factors such as
weather (ECBC-­SP-024, 2009).
Biological warfare agents (BWAs) are grouped broadly into two categories:
pathogens and toxins. Pathogens are micro­organ­isms that can produce diseases in humans, animals, and plants. Toxins are the poisonous by-­products
of biological organisms (JP3-11 CBRN Ops, 2008). Biological hazards are
naturally occurring substances that have the potential to be weaponized to
enhance their lethality and improve their dissemination potential or communicability among the targeted population (humans or animals). For
biological hazards decontamination, isolation and pre- and post-­exposure
treatment with prophylaxis or inoculations are some of the proscribed measures to reduce injuries and minimize cross-­contamination. The current
recommendations from the U.S. Army CBRN School for biological decontamination are similar to those for chemical hazards: removal of contaminated clothing and high volumes of water at low pressure for 30 seconds to
3 minutes for initial decontamination, depending on contributing factors
such as weather (ECBC-­SP-024, 2009).
A covert biological attack may not be detected for several days to weeks
after the initial attack because of the delayed onset of symptoms from the
exposure (JP3-11 CBRN Ops, 2008). Medical detection of the attack may
occur through several different pathways, such as individual diagnosis, hospital surveillance networks, or through the BioWatch program.* With certain
contagious biological agents there is a potential to spread the disease person
to person, further increasing the scale of the attack. A secondary impact
of the biological attack is for “worried well” public to overwhelm hospital
*

BioWatch is a DHS program of biosurveillance systems deployed in selected communities designed to
detect the release of selected biological agents.

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

resources. The National Defense University CBR Coping Guide recommends
that individuals should stay at home, listen for instructions through media,
and avoid going to hospitals unless directed to do so for all types of biological agents (Coomber and Armstrong, n.d.). In the case of large population
exposure to biological agents, current national plans call for the distribution of strategic national stockpile medications through civilian agencies
at points of dispensing (PODs) or through U.S. Postal Service deliveries to
individual residences (Executive Order 13527, 2009). Depending on the scale
of the attack and the persistency of the biological agent in the environment,
long-­term evacuation of a large geographical area may be necessary (JP3-11
CBRN Ops, 2008).
Radiological hazards principally occur from the ionizing radiation caused
by unstable molecular isotopes. These isotopes can be man-­made or naturally occurring and emit energy in the form of subatomic particles or waves.
Examples of these include alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, and
neutron particles (JP3-11 CBRN Ops, 2008). Each form has specific physical
properties that determine how it behaves and affects living cells and other
materials. Generally, the energy from ionizing radiation has the capability
to damage or destroy tissues, which can lead to physical injuries, cancers,
and death (JP3-11 CBRN Ops, 2008). Fear of the potential adverse health
effects of radiation also has the capacity to cause psychological injuries to
individuals in areas perceived to be contaminated with radiation (IAEA,
2006). It should be noted that individuals are constantly exposed to naturally occurring radiation sources, such as solar rays, decaying rock, or radon
gas. This background radiation exposure has a cumulative effect on living
cells and must be considered when planning response operations at a radiological incident.
In addition to ionizing radiation, the detonation of a nuclear weapon produces energy in other states: blast wave, thermal, residual radiation, initial
radiation, and EMP. These energy outputs are referred to as nuclear effects
(National Security Staff, 2010). The extent of the nuclear effects is determined by the type and amount of nuclear material used in the weapon and
elevation of the detonation (JP3-11 CBRN Ops, 2008). The yield of a nuclear
detonation refers to the amount of energy released during the detonation
and is measured in tons of TNT explosives.
The basic method for protection from radiological hazards is limiting the
physical exposure to the radioactive source materials. The rule of time, distance, and shielding is used to manage and account for the cumulative dose
of radiation a response worker could receive while in a radiologically hazardous environment (JP3-11 CBRN Ops, 2008). The total dose of radiation
response workers can receive is set as the Operational Exposure Guidance
(OEG). The OEG is established to avoid response workers receiving radiation doses that could cause injuries (immediate and long term) (National

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Security Staff, 2010). Personal protective equipment and dosimeters are integral to the management of exposure limits for responders (FEMA Region 1
Incident Annex–­IND Hazards, 2011). By limiting a responder’s radiation
accumulated dose, the incident commander can allow the responder to
continue to serve the overall response effort outside of the radiological
impact area. Ultimately, this can reduce future burdens on medical and
other national resources years and decades after the recovery is completed
(National Security Staff, 2010).
One area of emerging concern is the degree to which global advances in
technology related to dual-­use chemical and biological materials research
over the next decade may inadvertently, or deliberately, result in discoveries
of new agents that exceed current response and defensive capabilities. Global
advances in biochemistry, robotics, synthetic biology, and cybernetics pose
new risks that future CBRN hazards could expand beyond our conventional
understanding of WMD as it is today. We cannot yet forecast what the entire
array of CBRN hazards could look like after 2020, as it may include novel
agents as yet unknown.
The following section will provide an overview of the current Department
of Defense and National Guard forces available to contribute to domestic CBRN protection and response. While there have been many exercises
designed to train and evaluate federal and National Guard CBRN response
capabilities, legitimate questions remain as to how an actual CBRN attack,
and the toxic aftereffects, may unfold. The results of an attack may range
from benign and controllable to lethally unbounded and resistant to decontamination. Our national preparedness must rest on a solid understanding of the CBRN hazard spectrum along with the development of practical
and fiscally sustainable measures to overcome threats. Experts continue
to disagree on the means and methods to accomplish this homeland security posture.

Department of Defense CBRN
Response Enterprise (CRE)
The CBRN Response Enterprise is a flexible, tiered approach to providing
military CBRN response resources as required by the civilian incident command structure. Through the CBRN Response Enterprise, National Guard
or federal military forces can be brought to bear, if comparable resources
through local mutual aid agreements, state regional compacts, or the state’s
emergency management agency have been or are reasonably expected to
become overwhelmed or in cases where the response capability does not
exist at the state or local level. A central Department of Defense CBRN-­CM
planning assumption is that the speed of the response effort is congruent

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

with the number of lives saved and minimization of the hazard impacts
(JP 3-41 CBRN CM, 2012). This reasoning was used as partial justification
for the realignment of consequence management roles for both Title 10 and
Title 32 CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE) forces in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report (QDR, 2010). This line of reasoning holds that if
Department of Defense forces, both National Guard and federal, are arrayed
across the United States in proximity to the various communities where
they may be needed, they will be better able to respond quickly enough to
positively affect the outcome of a CBRN incident.
Within the current Department of Defense CBRN Response Enterprise
(CRE) force allocations have been divided 55% National Guard and 45% federal forces (NGB, 2010). The available National Guard forces are Weapons of
Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-­CSTs), 57 teams; CBRNE-­
Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP), 17 teams; and Homeland
Response Force (HRF), 10 units. These three echelons represent a National
Guard contribution to the CRE of nearly 10,500 personnel (NGB, 2010).
The available federal forces are the Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF)
(formerly the CCMRF) and two Command and Control CBRN Response
Elements (C2CREs A/­B), for an approximate total of 8,200 personnel (JP 3-41
CBRN CM, 2012). Additional DoD assets with specialized CBRN training,
such as the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response
Force (CBIRF) battalion, may be brought to bare if required to support allocated CRE forces. The tiered capability and response times of the CRE forces
allow for an expanding, scalable response to domestic CBRN incidents of
local, state, regional, and national scope and impact. Figure 7.1 illustrates
the tiered approach DoD has taken with the CBRN Response Enterprise.
During exigent circumstances or preplanned special events, some or all
of the CRE elements may be placed on short-­notice recall status or predeployed in standby status, thus reducing response times (JP 3-41 CBRN CM,
2012). Types of events include designated National Special Security Events
(NSSEs) such as presidential inaugurations and national sporting events
such as league championships and the Olympics (HRF CONOPS V8.6,
2011). Current planning for a large-­scale CBRN attack, such as a nuclear
detonation or biological attack against a major urban area or equivalently
sensitive sites, would require a significant CRE response. In the event of
a large CBRN event of national significance, the size of the impacted area
will extend beyond the immediate geographic areas due to secondary and
tertiary impacts on national commerce, morale, and the environment. The
mobilization of response forces will take an “all of nation” effort, including specialized and traditional military forces to facilitate the response and
recovery. It is unlikely that the entire CRE forces would converge on the
single event immediately; however, it is likely that much of the allocated

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Gary Mauk, Matthew D. Woolums, and Robert McCreight

CBRN Response Enterprise
Title-32
State Response 55%
Total Force
10,373

National Gaurd
Civil Support
Team
WMD-CST
(57 teams)
1254 personnel
-22 personnel
-Detection
-Identification

National Guard
CBRNE Enhanced
Response Force
Package (CERFP)
CERFP
(17 units)
3349 personnel

Follow-on

Total Force
~8,200
National Guard
Homeland
Response Force
HRF
(10 units)
5770 personnel
- 577 personnnel

-Search/Extraction
-Decontamination
- Emergency Med
-Search/Extraction -CBRN Assistance
-Decontamination Support Element
- Emergency Med
-Logistic Support
-Fatality Search
-C2
and Recovery
-FSRT
Team (FSRT)
-197 personnel

Title-10
Federal Response 45%

Defense CBRNE Response
Force
DCRF 1
5200 personnel
-CBRN Assessment
-Search/Rescue
-Decontamination
-Emergency Med
-Security
-Logistics Support
-C2
-FP1 -2000 personnel, 24 hrs
-FP2/3-3200 personnel, 48 hrs
C2CREs A/B
1500 personnel each 96 hrs
3000 personnel total

Follow-up
General
Purpose
Forces
General
Purpose
Forces
-Aviation
-Security
-Medical
-Logistics

FIGURE 7.1  CBRN Response Enterprise. (From Reyes, H.C., CBRN Response
Enterprise: Briefing 14 March 2012, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia,
2012, J39.)

CRE would rotate through the impacted area. Additionally, conservation
of specialized response capabilities would dictate that some of the forces be
held in reserve for other potential follow-­on attacks.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Teams (WMD-­C STs)
“In a commencement address at the United States Naval Academy in May
1998, President Bill Clinton announced that the nation would do more to
protect its citizens against the growing threat of chemical and biological terrorism. As part of this effort, he said, the Department of Defense would form
10 teams to support state and local authorities in the event of an incident
involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)” (Global Security, 2013).
By 2001, those 10 teams had been formed, trained, and certified to respond
to emergencies involving WMD. Later, the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2007 broadened the teams’ mission to respond to not only WMD, but
all hazards, such as support for natural disasters and other events (H.R. 5122
(109th), 2007).
According to National Guard Regulation 500-3, “the mission of the
WMD-­CST is to support civil authorities at the direction of the Governor, at
domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incident

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

sites by identifying CBRN agents/­substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with
requests for additional support.” The National Defense Authorization Act
of 2007 expanded the operational incidents a WMD-­CST could be used at
to include the “intentional or unintentional release of CBRN and natural or
man-­made disasters in the United States that result, or could result, in the
catastrophic loss of life or property” (NGR 500-3, 2011).
The original idea behind the establishment of 10 teams was that each team
would be aligned with 1 of the 10 respective Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regions. Each team would then be responsible for responding to WMD events anywhere in its assigned region. However, WMD-­CSTs
are National Guard Title 32 organizations, and therefore they report to the
governor of the state in which they are assigned. The notion that a governor
without a WMD-­CST would have to request support from a governor who
has a WMD-­CST did not rest well with those governors who did not have
such a unit, which was one of the driving factors behind the addition of
many more WMD-­CSTs. Today, there are 57 teams in total. Each state and
territory has at least one team, and California, Florida, and New York have
two teams.
Each of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams is similarly manned and equipped. However, from team to team there may be
slight variations in equipment and training; for example, some teams have
a maritime responsibility because of their geographic location, while others
do not. Each team is staffed with 22 full-­time National Guard Title 32 soldiers or airmen, with a variety of skill sets. Each team is commanded by a
major or lieutenant colonel, and the organizational structure is as illustrated
in Figure 7.2.
The equipment and capabilities a WMD-­CST (Figure  7.2) can provide
are extensive, and discussing each piece of equipment at the team’s disposal
would not be practical, but the following outline is provided to explain
WMD-­CST equipment and capability in general terms.

Command
Section
3 Personnel
Operations
Section
3 Personnel

Survey Section
8 Personnel

Medical Section
4 Personnel

Communications
Section
2 Personnel

Logistics Section
2 Personnel

FIGURE 7.2  WMD CST organization chart. (From NGR 500-3, Weapons of Mass
Destruction Civil Support Team Management, National Guard Regulation 500-3/Air
National Guard Instruction 10-2503, Departments of the Army and the Air Force,
National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia, 2011.)

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Communications
The Unified Command Suite (UCS) provides secure and unsecure data, voice,
fax, and video teleconference capability. The UCS is capable of establishing
a local area network and extending that network for several miles. Also, the
UCS brings a full suite of radio communications capable of operating on
a full range of frequencies. It has the ability to cross-­band multiple agency
radios to produce interagency connectivity.
The advance echelon (ADVON) vehicle is equipped with a satellite dish
and international maritime satellite (INMARSAT). It is capable of providing both stationary and mobile Internet connectivity for both voice-­over IP
and data connectivity. The ADVON also has the ability to provide secure
voice communications. The ADVON can operate on a wide range of radio
frequencies and provide interagency radio cross-­banding capability. The
ADVON vehicle is the initial military vehicle to arrive at the incident site
and can provide an incident commander and the CST commander with
immediate enhanced communications connectivity until the UCS arrives
to the incident site.

Analytical
The Analytical Laboratory Suite (ALS) brings a broad range of advanced
presumptive analysis capability to assist an incident commander in making
public safety decisions much faster than he or she could waiting for state or
other laboratory definitive results. The ALS has the ability to analyze a wide
array of chemical, biological, and radiological threats and provide rapid, on-­
site answers. It is equipped with technology identical to what is typically
found in a stationary laboratory, such as a negative-­pressure glove box for
sample preparation, gas chromatography mass spectrometer (GCMS), polymerase chain reaction (PCR), Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) spectroscopy, microscope, and handheld assays.

Medical
The medical response vehicle (MRV) is essentially an ambulance and is
fully equipped to handle the immediate care and transportation of injured
team members. In most cases the team would rely on local emergency medical services (EMS), but the MRV serves as an excellent medical evacuation
vehicle in emergencies when local resources are unavailable or overwhelmed.
Additionally, the team’s physician assistant carries a formulary of chemical
and biological medical countermeasures for team members.

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

Decontamination
The WMD-­CST has a full technical decontamination line intended for the
decontamination of the WMD-­CST team members and other first responders. However, the decontamination line on the WMD-­CST cannot perform
mass casualty decontamination. These functions can be performed by civilian fire departments or National Guard or Title 10 assets, such as the CERFP
and DCRF, if the incident is beyond local capabilities.

Survey
Each WMD-­CST survey team vehicle carries an array of mutually supporting and redundant chemical, biological, and radiological detection equipment as well as a full range of personal protective equipment. This suite of
detection equipment and personal protective equipment allows the team to
conduct multiple entries into a hazardous environment, or “hot zone,” survey the atmosphere for hazards, and collect samples for the ALS and other
laboratory analysis. The survey section is also equipped with an all-­terrain
vehicle to help facilitate large-­area survey operations or personnel medical
evacuations when necessary.
Collectively, the WMD-­CST can use this equipment and the unique
skills and training of its military personnel to assist in filling civilian capability gaps at the local, state, and federal levels. While the organization
is small, there is a broad spectrum of capability within it. The teams can
deploy within 90 minutes, 24 hours a day, or can be pre-­positioned during
significant public events at the request of civil authorities. In many cases,
civil authorities do not have the luxury of training or equipping civilian
first responder personnel to perform specialized duties in a CBRN hazard
environment, and in those cases the WMD-­CST can be a tremendous asset
to the first responder community. This was recently demonstrated during
the Massachusetts 1st WMD-­CST’s response to the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombing, where the unit was predeployed to conduct hazard monitoring
alongside first responder agencies. In the aftermath of the bombing, the
WMD-­CST immediately deployed personnel to the blast site to conduct
monitoring for chemical and radiological materials, a critical step in ensuring contaminated personnel and patients were not leaving the incident site
without decontamination.
Since 2001 the National Guard WMD-­CSTs have performed thousands
of no-­notice and short-­notice deployments in support of local community
first responders during suspected CBRN incidents, natural disasters, and
other hazardous material-­related incidents across the United States. WMD-­
CSTs have been incorporated into CBRN protection planning for National

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Special Security Events (NSSEs) such as presidential inaugurations, political conventions, and most major sporting events. Additionally, WMD-­CST
personnel regularly conduct specialized CBRN training with civilian first
responder organizations. This level of interoperability saves fiscal resources
and ultimately improves the quality of the overall CBRN response capability.

CBRN-­E nhanced Response
Force Package (CERFP)
The National Guard CERFP units were formed in 2003 by the Director
of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Blum (Van Alstyne,
2011). The goal of the new CERFP was to bridge the capabilities gap between
what local civilian responders could initially provide during a CBRN incident and the arrival of federal capabilities, including DoD Title 10 consequence management forces (Van Alstyne, 2011). The planned deployment
time of the CERFP is 6–12 hours from notification with a capability for continuous operations, with augmentation up to 72 hours (ADRP 3-28 Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, 2013).
The CERFPs are formed from the existing National Guard force structure
within a state or states (regional CERFP). Because the CERFP is formed
from traditional National Guard units, the assigned personnel are not readily available for no-­notice call-­ups; the estimated response time is 6–12 hours
from notification (GAO-12-114, 2012). The manning of the CERFP elements
is not specific to specific Army military occupational specialty (MOS) or
Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) except for the medical triage element. All
CERFP personnel are trained to specific tasks using the training matrix
found in the NGB CERFP Joint Training Plan (JTP) (GAO-12-114, 2012). The
bulk of the unit individual and collective training is based on Occupational
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) and National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) training standards with a goal of all personal trained
to the NFPA standard of hazardous materials operations (HAZMAT Ops).
This standard allows for properly trained and equipped individuals to operate in known hazardous material environments under the control of a qualified hazardous material technician (NFPA 472, 2013).
As is illustrated in Figure 7.3, the CERFP is comprised of five elements:
search and extraction (S&E), decontamination, medical triage, fatality search and recovery teams (FSRT), and command and control (C2)
(CERFP CONOPS, 2009). The C2 element directs the overall activities of
the CERFP and coordinates with the incident commander and WMD-­CST,
if present, and establishes communications with higher headquarters. The
S&E element conducts victim searches, rope extractions, and lifting operations in confined spaces and known CBRN hazard environments. The

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

Command &
Control

Search &
Extraction

Decon

(50 Personnel)

(75 Personnel)

Total Personnel = 197

Medical
(45 Personnel)

Fatality
Search &
Recovery
(FSRT)
(11 Personnel)

FIGURE 7.3  CERFP organization chart. (From Reyes, H.C., CBRN Response
Enterprise: Briefing 14 March 2012, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia,
2012, J39. Retrieved November 6, 2013, from http://www.dtic.mil/­ndia/2012CBRN/­
Reyes.pdf.)

decontamination element establishes technical decontamination lines for
ambulatory and nonambulatory victims and civilian first responders, conducts decontamination of CERFP personnel and limited downrange equipment, and can establish a hazardous materials waste collection site. The
medical triage element is assigned to an Air National Guard medical group
(NGB, 2007). The medical triage element conducts triage and stabilization
of victims, civilian first responders, and military personnel. The medical
triage element does not have any patient holding or transportation capability. Additionally, CERFP formulary does not carry antidotes or prophylaxis (nerve agent or antibiological treatments) for civilian victims or first
responders. The FSRT element conducts search and recovery of deceased
victims in known CBRN hazard environments. The FSRT is comprised of
Air National Guard personnel selected and trained for the FSRT mission
(NGR 500-1, 2008).

Homeland Response Force (HRF)
The National Guard Homeland Response Force builds upon the organizational structure and technical capabilities of the National Guard CERFP
with the addition of a brigade-­sized command and control (C2) element and
a security force named the CBRN Assistance and Support Element (CASE).
The 10 regional HRFs are to be sourced from existing National Guard end
strengths utilizing traditional Army and Air National Guard personnel
(NGB, 2010). A primary task for the HRF is to provide C2 of National Guard
CRE elements responding to the civilian support request (HRF CONOPS
V8.6, 2011). With the HRFs’ substantial logistical coordination capabilities the HRFs are anticipated to provide joint reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration (JRSOI) for any follow-­on CRE forces during
an expanding CBRN response (NGB, 2011). Under the current CRE construct the HRF has a planned response time of 6–12 hours after notification.

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This response time frame is similar to that of the National Guard regional
CERFP elements.
The 10 Homeland Response Force elements were established in Ohio and
Washington in 2011 and in California, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah in 2012 (NGB, 2011). The HRF elements are aligned with the corresponding FEMA regions and have between
four and eight states or territories per regional area. The intent is to facilitate
and improve intraregional preincident planning, training, and coordination
with civilian emergency management agencies (HRF CONOPS V8.6, 2011).
The robust HRF, brigade-­level, planning, and logistical staffs have capabilities not available in other National Guard CRE units (WMD-­CST and
regional CERFP). The regional HRF planners network with civilian agencies
to coordinate and synchronize multiagency CBRN incident response plans
within their respective region. Civilian stakeholders include federal agencies (e.g., FBI, FEMA), each National Guard state headquarters, the various regional state agencies (e.g., public safety, departments of fire services,
departments of public health), and even individual communities (HRF
CONOPS V8.6, 2011).
The regional HRFs are manned with existing National Guard personnel
without adding to overall end strength of the National Guard. Therefore, it
is more accurate to think of the HRF not as a unit per se, but as a mission
to be assigned to existing units (Van Camp, 2012). The National Guard
Bureau has recommended that the HRF C2 element to be sourced from a
variety of brigade-­sized units such as troop commands, maneuver enhancement brigades, or brigade combat teams (HRF CONOPS V8.6, 2011). The
current HRF implementation plan calls for units and headquarter staffs to
be assigned for periods of up to 3 years before rotating out of the mission
responsibilities. During this time, assigned units/­personnel are not “fenced”
from the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) deployment cycles for possible contingency missions (federalized overseas deployments) performing
their primary war fighting missions (Gault, 2011).
The units tasked with the HRF mission remain under the control of the
governor from the sourced state. The authority to deploy an HRF remains
with the state governor who has command of the assigned forces with the
understanding that HRF capabilities are intended to be a regional and
national CBRN response capability (JP 3-41 CBRN CM, 2012). If necessary,
HRFs may be federalized, by the president, along with other National Guard
CRE forces to respond to nationally significant incidents.
The HRF force structure, illustrated in Figure 7.4, includes command and
control (C2), CBRN Task Force, and CBRN Assistance and Support Element.
The overall size of each HRF is approximately 577 personnel (NGB, 2013).

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

Regional C2
CBRN TF
Same as CERFP

Brigade
(180 personnel)

Total personnel = 577

(16 personnel)

C2

CBRN
Assistance and
Support Element

Search &
Extraction

DECON

Medical

Fatality Search &
Recovery
(FSRT)

(200 personnel)

(50 personnel)

(75 personnel)

(45 personnel)

(11 personnel)

FIGURE 7.4  HRF organization chart. (From Reyes, H.C., CBRN Response
Enterprise: Briefing 14 March 2012, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia,
2012, J39.)

Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF)
In 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the Consequence
Management Response Force (CCMRF) with approximately 5,200 personnel to provide DoD CBRN follow-­on forces for a national-­level CBRN incident. Following the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Title 10
CCMRF was restructured and renamed the Defense CBRN Response Force
(DCRF). The DCRF consists of 5,200 personnel, 2,100 of which can deploy
within 24 hours and the remaining 3,100 within 48 hours (JTF-­CS, 2013)
(Figure 7.5).
The DCRF consists of four task forces: Operations, Medical, Aviation,
and Logistics. Task Force Operations further divides into three battalion-­
sized task force elements with similar capabilities of CBRN assessment,
search and extraction, decontamination, emergency medical, security,
engineering, transportation, and medical evacuation. These battalion task
forces are capable of employing, deploying, and operating independently or
in a mutually supporting role. Operational metrics for each element allow
JTF-CS

DCRF with
JTF-CS personnel = 5,400

DCRF
Task Force
OPS

Task Force
Aviation

Task Force
Medical

Task Force
Logistics

BN TF-1

FIGURE 7.5  JTF-­
CS DCRF organization chart. (Developed by Mauk, G., using
information retrieved from http://www.jtfcs.northcom.mil/­
Documents/­
JTFCS​
%20101​%20Brief%20v1.9%20(30%20Sep%202013).pdf.)

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for self-­supporting operations up to 72 hours in the CBRN-­impacted area
before needing to be resupplied (JTF-­CS, 2013).
Like the National Guard Homeland Response Force, the DCRF is a mission that is assigned on a rotational basis to Title 10 units without increasing
the end strength of the active duty military. To assign this temporary responsibility to existing Title 10 forces, the current DCRF mission (Fiscal Year
2014) is assigned to more than 50 separate units with personnel and equipment drawn from installations across more than 18 states (JTF-­CS, 2013).
Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-­CS) is a dedicated command and
control headquarters for units assigned to the DCRF mission. JTF-­CS principle missions are to conduct operations-­based planning for Title 10 CBRN
responses and assume control of Title 10 forces responding to the CBRN incident (ADRP 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2013).

Command and Control CBRN
Response Element A/­B
The final tier to the DoD CRE are two Command and Control CBRN Response
Elements, named A and B (C2CRE A/­B). The planned mobilization and
response time for the two additional Title 10 Command and Control CBRN
Response Elements (C2CREs) is 96 hours after the outset of the incident. Each
C2CRE has an additional 1,500 personnel each with similar capabilities as the
DCRF (JP 3-41 CBRN CM, 2012). The military forces assigned the C2CRE
A/­B mission largely come from the Army Reserves (Title 10) and National
Guard forces that have been federalized to Title 10 status; i.e., they have been
removed from control of the respective governor and placed on to active duty
service. For these federalized National Guard forces the constitutional restrictions on other Title 10 forces would apply. It is anticipated that WMD-­CSTs,
regional CERFPs, and HRFs from outside of the affected region would provide the necessary CBRN specialized forces to round out the requirements of
the C2CREs (JP 3-41 CBRN CM, 2012). Combined, the DCRF and the two
C2CREs bring approximately 8,200 Title 10 personnel and a broad range of
capabilities to a CBRN incident (Collins, 2012) (Figure 7.6).

The Future Integration of Military
Capabilities into a Domestic
CBRN Incident
While all of the special military units described in this chapter are deployable
against a range of CBRN attack scenarios facing us for the foreseeable future,
the years following the attacks on 9/11 have seen a demonstrated increase
in the capabilities of civilian first responders to deal with the hazards and

Staging
Area

Remote
Site

HRF
C2

CST

CST

CST

CERFP

Incident
CP

Cold Zone

CERFP

CERFP

CBRN
TF

Medical

FSRT

Medical

FSRT

Medical

FSRT

Class 2 PAPR
(<IDLH)

Decon Lane 3

Decon Lane 2

Class 3 PAPR
(<IDLH)

Search
Extraction

Search
Extraction

T
r
i
a
g
e

T
r
i
a
g
e

Decon Lane 1

Decon Lane 3

Decon Lane 2

Decon Lane 1

Decon Lane 3

Decon Lane 2

T
r
Search
i
a Extraction
g
e

CST

CST

Hot Zone

Total Force
~10,373

Decon Lane 1

Title-32
National Guard 55%
Warm
Zone

Class 1 SCBA
(IDLH)

FIGURE 7.6  Title 32 and 10 footprint. (From Reyes, H.C., CBRN Response Enterprise: Briefing 14 March 2012, National Guard Bureau,
Arlington, Virginia, 2012, J39.)

C2CREs A/B
1500 personnel each 96 hrs
3000 personnel total

- CBRN assessment
- Search/rescue
- Decontamination
- Emergency med
- Security
- Logistics support
- C2
- FP1 - 2000 personnel, 24 hrs
- FP 2/3 - 3200 personnel, 48 hrs

DCRF 1
5200 personnel

Defense CBRNE response
force (DCRF)

Total Force
~8,200

Title-10
Federal Response 45%

and at the direction of the president

incident at the request of the governor

Title 10 forces deploy in support of the

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues
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Gary Mauk, Matthew D. Woolums, and Robert McCreight

impacts of a CBRN attack. Billions of taxpayer dollars have been directed
toward the advancement of local, state, and federal civilian agencies’ abilities to detect, identify, and respond to the range of CBRN/­HAZMAT hazards. These civilian capabilities are based upon the decades of experience
of fire services, transportation, and the private industry’s commercial interaction with a multitude of extremely hazardous materials on a daily basis.
Understandably, the malevolent nature of terrorist use of CBRN hazards as a
weapon against the public has required a paradigm shift for these personnel
to adapt existing techniques and procedures to the increased threat.
At the same time, the public has a realistic expectation that CBRN capabilities derived from war fighting capabilities of the Department of Defense
should be brought to bear if they can prevent a domestic attack or save lives
and reduce suffering in the aftermath of a CBRN incident. The challenge
for the Department of Defense will be the balancing of the traditional mission of homeland defense, fighting and winning wars, and meeting the
growing expectations to provide resources for DSCA support. Because the
Department of Defense is postured to be a supporting agency during DSCA
incidents, it is critical that an accurate understanding of the civilian capabilities and the corresponding capabilities gap, specifically during CBRN
incidents, is developed and maintained. This capabilities gap-­based knowledge will improve the future developments of DoD CRE capabilities.
Finally, the technical complexity of the CBRN response in its entirety,
along with the range of political and social implications arising from a
CBRN attack, means that national leadership and resources will be necessary to support the regional, state, and local response using the guidance
of the National Response Framework. Recognizing the magnitude of incidents of this nature the federal government created the National Disaster
Recovery Framework (NDRF) to support the long-term recovery efforts at
the lowest level (communities and families). The NDRF is intended to align
federal, state, local and non-governmental organizations’ resources, capabilities, and best practices in order to facilitate the recovery from disasters
of all scales (FEMA, 2011). The NDRF recovery efforts are scalable to the
nature and scope of the disaster. For CBRN related events this could require
small portions of the DoD CBRN Response Enterprise to mitigate contamination effects through large scale military force deployments to support
missions involving long term resettlement of displaced civilians.

Discussion Questions
1. State governors play a crucial role in homeland security, especially in ordering
National Guard units to prepare for, and respond to, a suspected WMD attack. What
powers do the various state governors have in such situations? Does it seem there are
gaps or shortfalls?

Homeland Security and WMD Protection Issues

2. The CBRN threat is complex and difficult, and to respond to domestic incidents,
selected elements of our military are trained for rapid response to identify, assess consequences, and assist in mitigation of these hazards. What are the main differences
between CST, CERFP, HRF, DCRF, and C2CRE A/B elements of the DoD CBRN
Response Enterprise?
3. What are some of the specific challenges associated with the various CBRN hazards
today versus how they may evolve and become more difficult to detect and mitigate
in the future?

References
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Collins, C.M. (2012, March 12–14). 2012 Joint CBRN Conference–­Joint Task Force CS and
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GAO-12-114. (2012). Homeland Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Steps
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Gault, P.T. (2011). Enhancing Domestic Response: The Implementation of the Homeland
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NGB. (2011). National Guard Homeland Response Force: Fact Sheet. Arlington, VA: National
Guard Bureau.
NGB. (2014). National Guard Bureau Posture Statement: Sustaining an Operational Force.
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the Army and the Air Force, National Guard Bureau.
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National Guard Bureau, J39.
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Authorities. Washington, DC: Department of Defense.
Van Alstyne, C.M. (2011). Potential Standards and Methods for the National Guard’s
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Van Camp, B.C. (2012). Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Enterprise:
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Chapter

8

Homeland Defense—​
Emerging Challenges
Bert B. Tussing*

Chapter Objectives

•• Examine staffing, training, and equipping the future homeland
defense (HD) enterprise
•• Discuss policy issues and constraints affecting future HD operations
•• Review specific challenges that will compel changes in HD mission operations

Introduction
If the preceding chapters have left any impression, it should be that the
practical implementation of the concepts of homeland defense and defense
support of civil authorities is neither clean nor automatic. The reader is left
with an inkling of the government’s dilemma, trying to align and define
conceptual groundwork that will, in turn, translate to authorities, responsibilities, ways, and means to provide for the protection and sustainment
of the American way of life. At the same moment, we are faced with the
challenges borne by our forefathers, in ensuring the “common defense and
general welfare” while preserving “the blessings of liberty for ourselves
*

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the federal
government.

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and our posterity.” Security and defense must be viewed in balance with
those liberties—never as trade-­offs.
The distinction in responsibilities of governance in these affairs is born
of a combination of American ethic and pragmatism. The jealously guarded
divide between law enforcement and defense not only reiterates the subservience of the military in domestic security operations, but also delineates
the primary responsibility of the constabulary in guarding our people. This
includes those rare and unfortunate times when the threat to our people
emanates from within our numbers. The authority, responsibility, capabilities, and capacities of the federal government, to include the active duty
military, are held in deliberate reserve behind the primary governmental
responsibility borne by state and local governments to provide for “daily
emergencies” and “routine disasters;” but when those tiers of government
have reached their limit, the federal assets frequently earmarked for other
national priorities are applied to the immediate ends of saving lives, reducing further suffering, and preventing greater property damage. The handoff
is hardly automatic, but a clear understanding as to when and how it must
occur cannot be left to chance.
Even defending the nation within and adjacent to its borders must be
approached in a manner of deference born of a free people’s experience
in watching others who have never known freedom. Intelligence gathered
against our enemies on the field of battle, or in the shadowy realm of espionage, is an appropriate tool to safeguard our security. If drawn and applied
in the same fashion regarding our people, the tool of security has been levied
against the ethos it is designed to protect. Thus, rules of engagement must be
held in no higher esteem than due process, and the merits of enforcement,
security, and defense must be kept in balanced reverence.
In this text we have seen the importance of land, sea, and air missions in
homeland defense; we have looked briefly at the legal and intelligence issues
associated with this emerging field of public policy; and we have reflected
on the scope and scale of civil support missions. Still, this has only served
as an overview of areas that merit further study and deeper understanding.
The cost of defense, at home or abroad, is and shall remain demanding.
The requirement to equip and sustain the array of civil support missions,
tasks, and functions that the Department of Defense (DoD) must execute as
part of its civil support mission is compelling, even in the darkening face of
fiscal austerity. Balancing the current problem set and our proposed solutions against emerging challenges further complicates the issue, without
divesting us of the responsibility to be prepared and responsive stewards of
the public trust.
Whole volumes could be devoted to the depth and breadth of emerging
challenges facing (or emanating from) the homeland, but three are chosen here as illustrative of both urgency and complexity. Two of the issues

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

are focused primarily on defense and one on civil support. No claims are
made as to relative importance of the issues, balanced against themselves or
weighed against a host of other potential dilemmas. But they are, nonetheless, appropriate examples of the peculiar requirements faced by the military
in conducting operations within the territorial confines of the United States.

The Arctic
The National Security Strategy (2010) introduces both defense and civil support issues surrounding the military’s real and potential role in the Arctic
when it declares:
The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests
in the Arctic Region, where we seek to meet our national security needs,
protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international
cooperation on a wide range of issues. (White House, 2010, p. 10)

The Arctic is transforming at a remarkable pace. Viewed in the recent past
as impregnable on the one hand and impassible on the other, climate change
has the region opening in the 21st century in a way that will bring almost
immediate repercussions in trade, access to oil and natural gas reservoirs,
and strategic transit. In its report National Security Implications of Climate
Change for U.S. Naval Forces (National Research Council of the National
Academies, 2011), the National Research Council opined that cross-­Arctic
transits could be accomplished by trade vessels in “ice-­free” stretches by
the summer of 2030 (p. 2-11). As shown in Figure 8.1, this relative ease of
passage could routinely cut transportation time and fuel costs by 40% for
traffic going east to west, as compared to shipping through the Suez Canal
(Palmer, 2013). Moreover, the region lays claim to 30% of the untapped oil
Hammerfest
Rotterdam

Northern
Sea Route
Arctic Ocean

Bering
Strait
Japan

Pacific
Ocean

Suez Canal

Singapore

Suez Route
Indian Ocean

FIGURE 8.1  Northern versus Suez sea routes.

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Bert B. Tussing

FIGURE 8.2  Russian-­flagged tanker Renda follows U.S. Coast Guard cutter
Healy (WAGB-20), foreground, as the Seattle-­based cutter makes a path through
the ice in the Bering Sea about 155  miles south of Nome, Alaska, on January  8,
2012. Healy was escorting the tanker on its mission to deliver more than 1.3 million gallons of fuel to Nome. (From U.S. Coast Guard. Photo by Seaman Benjamin
Nocerini. Released.)

reserves in the world today, and nearly a third of its undiscovered natural
gas (Bowermaster, 2013).
As seems to most often be the case, these potential economic gains come
at a cost to both the environment and the indigenous populations of the
region (Bowermaster, 2013; Palmer, 2013). The U.S. National Strategy for the
Arctic Region recognizes this potential imbalance in the “emergence of a
new Arctic environment” (p. 2) as a factor in the U.S. national interests—in
terms of security, the economy, and the environment. As such, the strategy
identifies pursuit of “responsible Arctic region stewardship” (see Figure 8.2)
as one of its three lines of effort, accompanied by predictable albeit immutable calls to “advance United States security interests” and “strengthen international cooperation” (pp. 6–10).
In terms of strengthening that cooperation, the main device for collaboration in the region at this time seems to be the Arctic Council. Composed of
eight member states (the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark,
Iceland, Finland, and Sweden), the specific purpose of the council is to provide “a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction
among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous
communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in
the Arctic” (Arctic Council Secretariat, 1996, p. 2).

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

Beyond this body, however, the United States shows no inclination to
establish any other international body or regulation to cover extant or
emerging challenges. Indeed, in reviewing the aforementioned strategy, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy noted the department’s
predilection to use existing mechanisms within the framework of existing
international law, including addressing issues such as resource development
and preserving the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea as reflected in the
Convention on the Law of the Sea (CLOS) (United Nations, 1996). Beyond
the cooperative atmosphere of the Arctic Council, this United Nations
Convention governs transit through and resource protection within the
Arctic. A binding agreement ratified by 161 countries, the CLOS generally
regulates order in international waters through regional agreements negotiated by stakeholder countries:
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with
due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and
oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote
the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the
study, protection and preservation of the marine environment. (p. 25)

Curiously perhaps, of the eight member countries of the Arctic Council,
only the United States has refused to sign the convention (Ohotnicky et al.,
2012). Nevertheless, the National Strategy for the Arctic Region explicitly
calls for acceding to the CLOS (p. 9). This call for acquiescence is no doubt
a reflection of a desire to see traditional right of transit passage and similar
accords preserved in the Northwest Passage as its ice melts and its waters
become more navigable (Ohotnicky et al., 2012).
The charter of the Arctic Council calls for “cooperation, coordination
and interaction among the Arctic States … particularly surrounding issues
of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”
Pointedly absent is discussion of traditional security between or among
the participants in the region. Hence, the only definitive steps taken by the
Arctic Council’s militaries are supportive of functions outside of the traditional military realm. The U.S. initiative to build a greater capability to
conduct search and rescue operations across millions of square miles of
ocean is indicative of this trend; likewise, the Army’s acquisition of medical evacuation aircraft specifically earmarked for the region (Ohotnicky
et al., 2012). The Russian military, in the meantime, is increasing its air and
naval patrols in the region, has contracted for a new fleet of icebreakers,
and is training specialized brigades to be stationed in the Arctic (Alaska
Dispatch, 2011).
Not much analysis is required to see how such dual-­mission capabilities
applied to civil ends could be returned to traditional military missions. And

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Bert B. Tussing

while the likelihood of conflict in the region is deemed low (Department of
Defense, 2011b, p. 13), a legitimate concern surrounding “strategic spillover”
in the Arctic from events taking place in other parts of the world (Perera,
2011) should raise traditional security concerns surrounding the changing
face of the Arctic.
Whether pertaining to more traditional military missions or the application of the military’s power in support of civil functions, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) raises concerns that the Department of Defense
may not be taking adequate steps to “anticipate and prepare for Arctic operations in the future.” The previously cited DoD report to Congress on Arctic
operations was undertaken in response to tasking from the House Armed
Services Committee in 2010 (111th Congress, 2010, p. 337). In that tasking
(included in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011), Congress
called for the Department of Defense to prepare an assessment of
1. The strategic national security objectives and restrictions in the
Arctic region
2. Mission capabilities required to support the strategic national security objectives and a timeline to obtain such capabilities
3. An amended Unified Command Plan that addresses opportunities
of obtaining continuity of effort in the Arctic Ocean by a single combatant commander
4. The basing infrastructure required to support Arctic strategic objectives, including the need for a deep-­water port in the Arctic
5. The status of and need for icebreakers to determine whether icebreakers provide important or required mission capabilities to
support Arctic strategic national security objectives, as well as an
assessment of the minimum and optimal number of icebreakers that
may be needed
In tracking progress on those assessments, the GAO report concluded
that the department’s Arctic report to Congress addressed three fully (1, 3,
and 4) and two partially (2 and 5). With regard to the first partial assessment, GAO noted that the timeline requirement had gone unfulfilled. With
regard to the second, the office noted that the department had failed to offer
a minimum and optimal number of icebreakers required to fulfill the strategy (p. 2). Both shortcomings pointed to either an inability or reticence on
the part of the department to establish a risk-­based investment strategy to
address both near- and long-­term needs. Thus, the dilemmas that could
develop against the ambiguous backdrop being conveyed in the Arctic’s climate change are exacerbated by the current capacity of the department to
contain those developments in an anticipatory framework. GAO acknowledges that DoD has made preliminary efforts to identify Arctic capability
gaps and assess strategic objectives, constraints, and risks in the Arctic;

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

FIGURE 8.3  Arctic region combatant command responsibilities. (From U.S.
Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov.)

however, it also notes that the department has not evaluated, selected, or
implemented alternatives for prioritizing and addressing needs.
As delineated above, Congress’s questions for the department went
beyond considerations over plans, programming, and budgeting for the
region. Of equal concern was the question of the military’s overall command and control of forces in the Arctic. Until recently, the area of operations was divided between three different combatant commands: the Pacific
Command (USPACOM), the Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and
the European Command (USEUCOM) (Department of Defense, 2011a).
In keeping with the call by Congress to assess merits of placing the region
under a single combatant command, the 2011 Unified Command Plan
(UCP) removed areas of responsibility from the Pacific Command, leaving shared responsibility for the region between the U.S. Northern and U.S.
European Commands (see Figure 8.3). The U.S. Northern Command will
be the designated advocate for military capabilities required in the Arctic;
as such, the command will be responsible for Arctic planning, identification
of future capabilities, and requirements or engagement with other relevant
national or international agencies and governing bodies. The DoD report to
Congress noted, however:
For the Arctic area, an approach based on coordination and cooperation toward
a common objective is more effective in achieving the strategic end state of a stable and secure Arctic region. CCDRs build long-­term relationships with counterparts in their AORs based on a history of frequent interaction that includes
high-­level personal contacts, international training exercises, conferences, and

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personnel exchanges to facilitate dialogue and understanding between stakeholders on regional issues. These relationships are the foundation of the CCDRs’
ability to work effectively with other nations in their AORs to address emerging
regional challenges and opportunities. (Department of Defense, 2011b, p. 20)

Accordingly, USEUCOM’s retention of shared responsibility for the
Arctic region carries the advantage of theater security cooperation achieved
over decades of dialogue and confidence building with European stakeholders, just as NORTHCOM is well suited to the role due to its historic relationships with Canada. In addition, NORTHCOM’s habitual relationship with
the Department of Homeland Security, especially as played out through its
interaction with the U.S. Coast Guard, provides a nexus for immediate interagency cooperation that is far more likely to be exercised in the region than
the command’s defense responsibilities (Department of Defense, 2011b).
Nevertheless, one must still note that the prevailing U.S. military clout
in the region still resides with PACOM. In spite of the nominal removal
of the Arctic from PACOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), the command
still retains control over the Alaska Command (ALCOM) joint headquarters (Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-­AK)), as well as the major operational
forces stationed in Alaska (11th Air Force and U.S. Army, Alaska). As long
as this remains the case, USNORTHCOM’s real authority in the region will
be questionable, at best.
In order to align NORTHCOM’s authorities with its responsibilities,
therefore, a simplification of the joint command relationships in the region
may be merited. One concept toward achieving this end would be to dissolve
JTF-­AK and place ALCOM completely under the U.S. Northern Command
(Ohotnicky et al., 2012). Such an alignment would be more in keeping with
existing doctrine, which holds JTFs as appropriate mechanisms for “specific,
limited missions” and subunified commands, which exist to “conduct operations on a continuing basis” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations,
2011). Whatever direction is eventually chosen, the combatant commands
will have to address the region with an equal eye toward interagency cooperation for civil missions, and efficacy in command and control for their
defense function.

The Military and Cyber Security
in the Homeland
The complexity of the military’s responsibility surrounding cyber security
in the homeland plays out on at least two levels. First, one has to wonder
how the military’s cyber space concerns are substantially different in the
homeland and overseas. Next, one has to consider how the military’s cyber
concerns over its critical infrastructure can be separated from the rest of

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

the government’s, or indeed, organizations outside of the government. With
regard to the first, the best approach for differentiation should follow all others associated with U.S. military operations in the domestic environment,
to wit: additional considerations will always be called for surrounding the
rights of the institutions and citizens of the United States, even as they pertain to protecting the institutions and citizens of the United States. With
regard to the second, the military’s plans for protecting its own infrastructure must be coordinated with those plans of the rest of the interagency
and the private sector, in deference to the fact that the infrastructures are
either closely related or inseparably integrated. As suggested by a former
Director of National Intelligence, trying to sustain distinguishable dimensions between national security (to include defense) and economic security
may be counterproductive, as their critical infrastructures—and the information systems supporting them—are interconnected. Moreover, the threat
has not shown any tendency toward separating the targets. The U.S. cyber
adversaries have a corporate goal of disrupting the nation’s critical civilian
and military infrastructures (McConnell, 2011).
The nature of that threat, for the military and its civil counterparts, can
be described in terms of source and categories. The source of the cyber
threat may generally be thought of as nation-­states, organizations, and individuals (McConnell, 2011). The categories have been designated as cyber
war, economic espionage, cyber crime, and cyber terrorism (Nye, 2011).
To date, cyber crime and cyber terrorism appear to be chiefly the realm
of nonstate actors, spanning from sophisticated organizations dedicated to
trans­national criminal gains to individuals whose goals and expertise range
from novice to hacker to hacktivist to cyber terrorist. Cyber war and economic espionage, on the other hand, require a greater degree of expertise
and intelligence support. The damage these categories can inflict range from
the spreading of misinformation, to intelligence gathering, to small- and
large-­scale attacks on critical infrastructure (McConnell, 2011).
Nation-­states’ activities in these regards have been fairly limited, at least
on the surface. The frequently cited cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, targeting government, banking, and media outlets, were purportedly launched
by Russian nationalists outraged by Estonian slights against a Russian war
memorial. More pronounced, and more severe, were the cyber attacks that
shut down the Georgian Internet just prior to the Russian invasion of that
country in 2008. Nye notes that in both cases the Russian government
assisted the hackers, while maintaining “plausible deniability” surrounding
its actions (p. 11). In another example of nation-­state activity, cyber intrusion by China has been felt across both the government and economic sectors of the United States. These actions included electronic espionage against
defense contractors, raising questions of interpretation as to whether the
attacks were against the private sector or what could be considered “military

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targets” (Gorman and Yadron, 2013). But the concerns surrounding threats
are hardly limited to global power brokers. Reports indicate that by the end
of 2008, roughly 140 countries were developing cyber weapons arsenals
(McConnell, 2011, p. 29).
In spite of the previously cited commonality of concerns between the
military and the civil elements of cyber space, cyber warfare is an area of
singular focus for the Department of Defense. In spite of the fact that it is
very much man-­made in origin, the cyber domain has risen to equal prominence beside the land, air, sea, and space domains of the military’s defense
considerations. The single greatest testimony to this fact is the creation of
the U.S. Cyber Command, a subunified command responsible
for planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, and directing activities to operate and defend the Department of Defense information networks
and when directed, conducts full-­spectrum military cyberspace operations
(in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations) in order to ensure
U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while denying the same to
our adversaries. (U.S. Strategic Command, 2013)

While keeping with the theme of cooperation and coordination with
the civil component (the command’s website espouses a focus that includes
close cooperation “with interagency and international partners in executing
the cyber mission”), its defense mission is clearly the most compelling. As
the world’s cyber arsenals develop, so do the strategies to use the domain
independently to “disrupt/­destroy critical cyber systems, assets or functions” (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.d.), or to use them as
“force multipliers” with other elements of military power. Integration of this
sort has been both rumored, and demonstrated, on the part of the Russians
and the Israelis. As early as 1999, China espoused that “internet warfare is of
equal significance to land, sea and air power” (McConnell, 2011, pp. 29–30).
Moreover, it is clear that other actors, to include nonstate adversaries, may
be tempted to develop and use cyber means against stronger opponents
(Mahnke, p. 61). Taken together, failure to plan against the eventuality of
these attacks would be foolhardy.
“Strategic thought regarding cyber power is noticeable by its paucity”
(Mahnke, p. 58). Nevertheless, there have been initiatives taken by the
United States and its military that are, in various fashions, designed to
establish a strategic foundation for our actions in cyber space. In 2011,
two documents of strategic significance to the cyber issue were published:
International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in
a Networked World and the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating
in Cyberspace. The first, issued by the White House in May of that year,
was interesting in that it proposed an international strategy before marking

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

a national position. On the other hand, there are some who contend this
was concurrently a national strategy, meant to fill a void that had not been
addressed since the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, issued in 2003.
Closely following the tone set by the National Security Strategy of 2010,
the International Strategy for Cyberspace was constructed on three pillars:
diplomacy, defense, and development (pp. 11–14). The diplomatic objective
of the strategy was focused on facilitating “an international environment
in which states—recognizing the intrinsic value of an open, interoperable,
secure, and reliable cyberspace—work together and act as responsible stakeholders” (p. 11). The developmental objective sought to facilitate increased
cyber capabilities throughout the world, “so that each country has the
means to protect its digital infrastructure, strengthen global networks, and
build closer partnerships in the consensus for open, interoperable, secure,
and reliable networks” (p. 14).
The center pillar of the strategy, however, recognizes that cooperation
and collaboration throughout the world community is seldom as universal
as one might hope. The defense pillar is pointedly labeled “dissuading and
deterring.” It’s pronounced objective is to “encourage responsible behavior
and oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems, dissuading and deterring malicious actors, and reserving the right to defend
these vital national assets as necessary and appropriate” (p. 12). Against the
carrot-­and-­stick intonation of the strategy as a whole, the defense pillar is a
clear forecast of the stick. In a direct depiction of intent, the document advises:
All states possess an inherent right to self-­defense, and we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under
the commitments we have with our military treaty partners. We reserve the
right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in
order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests. (p. 14)

The strategy for guiding those military means would be released 2 months
later.
In the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, the
department offers five strategic initiatives as a “roadmap” for its efforts to
operate effectively in cyber space, defend national interests, and achieve
national security objectives (pp. 5–10):
Strategic Initiative 1: DoD will treat cyber space as an operational
domain to organize, train, and equip so that DoD can take full
advantage of cyber space’s potential. As previously described, the
importance of this man-­made domain has already engendered significant thought and planning toward its use, both independently
and as a force multiplier.

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Strategic Initiative 2: DoD will employ new defense operating concepts
to protect DoD networks and systems. Four immediate steps are
called for in supporting this initiative:

1. Enhance best practices to improve cyber security. The role of
individual responsibility in this regard is paramount.

2. Deter and mitigate insider threats by strengthening workforce
communications, workforce accountability, internal monitoring,
and information management capabilities.

3. Employ an active cyber defense capability to prevent intrusions
onto DoD networks and systems.
4. Develop new defense operating concepts and computing
architectures.
Strategic Initiative 3: DoD will partner with other U.S. government
departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-­
of-­government cyber security strategy. In order to enable a whole-­of-­
government approach, the department has committed to continue
to work closely with its interagency partners on new and innovative
ways to increase national cyber security. An example of one critical
initiative is the 2010 memorandum of agreement signed by the
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security to align
and enhance cyber security collaboration.
Strategic Initiative 4: DoD will build robust relationships with U.S.
allies and international partners to strengthen collective cyber security. In addition to the obvious defense implications of the initiative,
this segment of the strategy may be seen as also facilitating the diplomatic and developmental directions promoted in the International
Strategy for Cyberspace. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review notes:
“Through its foreign defense relationships, the United States not only
helps avert crises but also improves its effectiveness in responding to
them” (p. xiii). Beyond this, the department is committed in this
initiative to assisting in “the development and promotion of international cyberspace norms and principles that promote openness,
interoperability, security, and reliability” (Department of Defense
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, p. 10).
Strategic Initiative 5: DoD will leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an
exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation. The
requirement to build and retain a pool of talented civilian and military
personnel to operate in cyber space is pressing, made all the more so
for the department due to the competition for this talent throughout
the public and private sector. Perhaps more than any other domain,
technological innovation in cyber space is at the forefront of national
security. This will demand that DoD directs the strength of its acquisition processes to ensure effective cyber space operations.

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

Taken together, the five strategic initiatives outline the direction the
Department of Defense will take in fulfilling the military element of the White
House’s International Strategy for Cyberspace. In its own words,
by pursuing the activities in this strategy, DoD will capitalize on the opportunities afforded to the Department by cyberspace; defend DoD networks
and systems against intrusions and malicious activity; support efforts to
strengthen cybersecurity for interagency, international, and critical industry
partners; and develop robust cyberspace capabilities and partnerships. (p. 13)

Preparation for and Response
to Catastrophe Beyond Disaster
The military’s support to civil authorities following crises, paralleling the
tiered approach of the rest of the federal interagency response laid out in the
National Response Framework (NRF) (Department of Homeland Security,
2008), is supplied at the request of those authorities as requirements progress
from emergency to major disaster to catastrophic response. The terminology
is deliberate, and important in its distinctions. An emergency, as delineated
in the Robert T. Stafford Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, refers to
any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President,
Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or
to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.
(42 USC 5122, § 102)

In these circumstances, the assumption is that the capabilities or capacities of the state and local governments to effectively deal with the consequences of an incident have been exceeded, and that supplemental or
complementary assistance is required from the federal government, to
include (as necessary) federal military assets. Note (as detailed earlier in the
text) that state and local efforts could, and most likely would, have included
their National Guard. Note, too, that prior to the introduction of federal
assets, states may have elected to execute assistance arrangements delineated
in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) (Public Law
104-321), which could also include National Guard assets from responding states. Note, finally, that state EMAC resources could be requested and
introduced concurrent with the federal response.
If federal military assistance could be introduced in response to emergencies, it would almost certainly be introduced following a presidential
declaration of a major disaster. Referring again to the Stafford Act, a major
disaster is defined as

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Bert B. Tussing

any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high
water, wind-­driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause,
any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the
determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the
efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief
organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused
thereby. (42 USC 5122, § 102)

Ultimately, the only difference between the definitions of emergency and
major disaster is that the description of events precipitating the president’s
action is more defined (i.e., from “any occasion or incident” to the events
listed above). Behind the definitions, however, is the implication of urgency
born of a greater degree of destruction, a lesser or lessened ability or capacity to respond to that destruction, or a combination of the two. The need for
federal assistance, by the president’s assessment, is more pronounced and
immediate due to the threat that has been levied by the incident against the
safety and well-­being of the citizenry.
As contradictory as it sounds, response to major disasters on the part of
the federal government has become relatively routine over the years (as illustrated in Figure 8.4). The Congressional Research Service report Stafford Act
Declarations 1953–2011: Trends and Analyses, and Implications for Congress
(Lindsay and McCarthy, 2012) notes that
100

Number of Disaster Declarations

180

80

60

40

20

0
'53 '56 '59 '62 '65 '68 '71 '74 '77 '80 '83 '86 '89 '92 '95 '98 '01 '04 '07 '10

FIGURE 8.4  Major disaster declarations: 1953–2011. Congressional Research
Service analysis based on data by FEMA. (From Lindsay, B., and McCarthy, F.,
Stafford Act Declarations 1953–2011: Trends and Analyses, and Implications
for Congress, Congressional Research Service, August  31, 2012, retrieved from
https://s3.amazonaws.com/­s 3.documentcloud.org/­d ocuments/712230/stafford-­
act-­declarations-1953-2011.pdf.)

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

from 1953 to 2011 major disaster declarations averaged roughly 35 per year.
However, the number of declarations being issued each decade has been
increasing, particularly in last two decades [sic]. From 1990 to 1999 there was
an average of 46 major disasters declared each year, and from 2000 to 2009,
there was an average of 64 per year. (Summary)

The knowledge that the combined assets and expertise of federal, state,
and local governments have been applied routinely and successfully in
support of our people in times of crises may be comforting. But recent
events have led to concern over our preparedness to respond to a tier of
destruction that transcends our experience in major disasters. The National
Response Framework, for instance, is designed along the aforementioned
tiered approach (local, state, federal) that is somewhat defined by political
boundaries. From the strict perspective of governmental jurisdictions, when
a locality (city, township, borough, county, etc.) has been victimized by an
incident that exceeds its capabilities to reasonably respond to its citizenry’s
needs, it requests assistance from its state. When the state’s ability to provide
for that locality and (as required) other localities in its proximity is also in
extremis, a call for assistance is delivered to the federal branch.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina challenged this relatively measured approach
to disaster, largely due to its severity and immensity. The disaster was spread
across multiple states’ borders, immediately overwhelming hundreds of
local jurisdictions and, indeed, taxing much of the combined response and
recovery mechanisms of the states that contained them. As pointed out in
the Bush administration’s White House report, The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, “Individual local and State plans, as
well as relatively new plans created by the Federal government since the
terrorist attacks on September  11, 2001, failed to adequately account for
widespread or simultaneous catastrophes” (2006, p. 1). Similarly, in 2012,
Hurricane Sandy struck with another reminder that systematic planning
around defined structures and political divisions can be quickly overturned
by events that ignore their boundaries. The hurricane’s widespread effects
led to federal disaster declarations in the states of New York, New Jersey,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia,
and New Hampshire (Fisher, 2013). Rather than responding to a state’s crisis, the federal government was forced to address regional crises wherein
prioritization and apportionment went well beyond the one-­to-­one considerations of federal-­to-­state coordination and cooperation.
In spite of the devastation levied by Katrina and Sandy, response and
recovery efforts resulted in saved lives, reduction of human suffering,
and restoration of vital life-­sustaining infrastructure—in relatively short
order. The governmental component of the homeland security enterprise,
while far from perfect (if perfection could be identified and measured in

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these issues), was capable and responsive, arguments to the contrary notwithstanding (109th Congress, 2006). The fact, for instance, that 85% of the
affected population that fell under Katrina had their power restored within
2 weeks of the event should not be dismissed. Compare that to estimates
concerning the New Madrid fault in the United States Midwest. If an earthquake registering 7 points on the Richter scale were to strike along the fault,
predictions are that power could not be restored in multiple states throughout the affected region for months (Stockton, 2012). The cascading effects of
this power loss could include massive disruptions in transportation, incapacitation of municipal water systems (resulting in the loss of both drinking
water and water pressure for firefighting), damage to or destruction of vital
telecommunication nodes, and other accumulated shortcomings that would
dwarf the effects of the two hurricanes.
In fact, Katrina and Sandy may have approached, but failed to attain, the
widespread destruction that is reflected in what the government envisions as
a catastrophic incident. In the NRF, catastrophe is defined as “any natural or
manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels
of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population,
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/­or government functions” (p. 42). This definition may denote an increased degree of
destruction and urgency beyond those of “emergency” and “major disaster,”
but on its own fails to provide a discernible measure to justify (or indeed
inform) a presidential declaration.
Nevertheless, efforts are being made to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate the effects of catastrophes. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) has attempted to raise awareness over the potential devastation
that could accompany these events, referring to them as the “maximum of
maximum” (MoM) of destructive incidents. In contrast to the innocuous
definition applied to catastrophes, FEMA has been bold in its delineation of
the size, scope, and destruction that would accompany a MoM event:
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••

Affects about 7 million people
Covers 25,000 square miles
Affects several states and FEMA regions
190,000 fatalities in initial hours
265,000 citizens require emergency medical attention
Severe damage to critical infrastructure
Severe damage to essential transportation infrastructure
Ingress/­egress options limited (Kish, 2011)

The Department of Defense (DoD) has begun conceptualizing its role in
preparing for and responding to catastrophic events of this size and severity.
In trying to frame its approach, the department has dedicated a new focus
toward addressing “complex catastrophes,” defined as

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

any natural or manmade incident, including cyber attack, power grid failure
and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, inter­dependent,
critical life-­saving sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties,
damage or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts/­government functions.
(Department of Defense, 2013a)

The department envisions the scope of requirements for this kind of
event as beyond anything encountered to date. In a July 2012 memorandum issued by the Secretary of Defense, he declared, “In a domestic complex
catastrophe, with effects that would qualitatively and quantitatively exceed
those experienced to date, the demand for Defense support of civil authorities would be unprecedented” (p. 1).
In order to provide for these unprecedented requirements, the department, led by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD-­HDASA), presented recommendations subsequently mandated in the Secretary of Defense’s July 2012
memorandum. The recommendations fell into three categories:
•• The efficient use of the “total force” (i.e., the active component, the
services’ reserve components, and the National Guard) in responding to civil authorities
•• Plans, policies, and systems to help DoD focus and prioritize its
efforts in preparing for and responding to complex catastrophes
•• Recommendations to strengthen unity of effort between DoD
and its partners in responding to complex catastrophes (Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
America’s Security Affairs, Improving Defense Support in Complex
Catastrophes, 2012, Table B, p. 3)
The Department of Defense assumes that in an actual catastrophic
event, the magnitude of prevention, consequence management, and mitigation requirements may temporarily exceed civil authorities’ capabilities to
respond—potentially from the outset (Department of Defense, 2013b, p. ix).
Procedural obstacles that have encumbered defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations in response to emergencies and disasters therefore
would be all the more costly. Accordingly, DoD is seeking means of expediting access to forces and resources to close the gap between requirements
and response. One means toward this end would be to expedite access to
the service reserve components for domestic incident response (Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 2012, Table A,
p. 6). These resources have always been available for response and recovery
operations following terrorist attacks, but it was not until implementation
of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 that reserve forces were

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authorized for employment in response to natural disaster or major accidents
(112th Congress, 2011). The ready access to the personnel and resources in
the reserves, which include a significant portion of the logistic, transportation, and communications functions that would be in greatest demand in
responding to these events, may prove essential if catastrophe were to strike.
So too would access and support from Department of Defense installations across the United States. Installation commanders have long exercised
“immediate response authority” (Department of Defense, 2013b, p. 11-5),
allowing them to employ assets and personnel ahead of higher headquarters
authorization in order to save lives and preclude greater property damage.
The new defense support in complex catastrophe initiative calls for steps
to enhance that capability, “including by clarifying time and geographic
limitations pertaining to DoD officials’ exercise of the immediate response
authority” (Table A, p. 2). The impetus behind this enhancement, of course,
is to maximize opportunities for provision of assistance from assets “closest to need,” especially given the expanded geographic scope that complex
catastrophes may encompass.
The second category of recommendations surrounding the Department
of Defense’s role in preparing for and responding to genuine catastrophes
focuses on the development of plans, policies, and force management tools for
those events. The report of recommendations for improving DoD’s support
in complex catastrophes outlined three basic planning challenges. First, the
Department must account for the risk that all lifesaving and life-­sustaining
capabilities in the civil sector may be immediately overwhelmed. In a presentation provided to the U.S. Army War College, a representative from
ASD-­HDASA noted that the department could well receive a directive from
the president to “give me everything you’ve got, right away” (Department
of Defense, 2012). What is more, the department could anticipate receiving
direction from the president or the Secretary of Defense before a request from
civil authorities or the primary Federal Department or Agency is received.
The department’s customary Stafford Act response, following a measured
progression of receiving, validating, and finally approving requests for assistance, even taking into account the advantages accrued through prescripted
mission assignments, will not suffice in a complex catastrophe environment
where the need to anticipate will match, if not exceed, the need to respond.
Second, the need for risk-­based planning against the threats that may
lead to catastrophic incidents was found wanting in the department’s self-­
assessment (Table B, p. 11). Given the demands of planning through both its
domestic and international duties, it is essential that DoD, its agencies, and
the armed forces prioritize their combined planning assets for the potential
challenges of complex catastrophes. Moreover, the department should strive
to incorporate those assets into the planning cycles and scenarios of the civil
authorities they will support. In the last administration, ASD-­HDASA, the

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

Department of Homeland Security, and the National Guard Bureau devised
a pilot program, the Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER), “to support and strengthen the catastrophic disaster emergency planning capacity of individual states” (Federal Emergency Management Institute, 2008).
Planning partnerships of this kind, for the states and the regions, will be
essential in DoD’s efforts to effectively prioritize for events that will largely
defy our efforts to predict, prepare for, and mitigate their destruction.
The final planning challenge will nevertheless tie the department and its
fellow stakeholders inescapably to the demands of mitigation. The recommendations for improving defense support in complex catastrophes noted
a compelling requirement for greater understanding in anticipating and
responding to the compounded trials associated with catastrophic events.
DoD and its Federal, State, and local partners are still developing a comprehensive understanding of how natural and manmade events might lead
to large-­scale failures in critical infrastructure, and how the cascading
effects of those failures would magnify threats to public health and safety.
(Table B, p. 12)

The Fukushima Dai-­ichi accident following the Great East Japan earthquake of March 11, 2011 (World Nuclear Association, 2013), the 2011 National
Level Exercise focused on the New Madrid fault, and large-­scale solar events
that could debilitate whole sectors of the nation’s power grid (Cogan, 2011)
all stand as warnings against a degree of devastation that could erase critical
life-­sustaining infrastructure for weeks, even months, across entire regions
of the United States. The department has charged its agencies and combatant
commanders (especially the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Pacific
Command) with planning around and through these eventualities, but the
recommendations are equally clear that it must integrate and synchronize
those plans with federal, regional, and state partners (Table B, pp. 13–15).
Cooperation and collaboration in planning is just one element (albeit
a vital one) contained in the last category of recommendations from the
report. Those recommendations centered on steps that need to be taken to
strengthen the unity of effort that must exist between DoD and its partners
in responding to catastrophe. This administration has made great progress in
strengthening those partnerships through initiatives like the Joint Action
Plan for Unity of Effort developed between the Department of Defense and
the Council of Governors (see Chapters 2 and 3 of this text). But every element of that agreement—from planning to shared situational awareness to
coordination across joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) arrangements to prescripted mission assignments—will be
magnified in its importance, if the destruction heaped against our citizenry
were to rise from disastrous to catastrophic. From preparations through

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execution, the shared responsibility of DoD and its federal, state, and local
partners to meet these unprecedented challenges cannot be overstated.

Conclusion
These three challenges—the Arctic, cyber security, and defense support
in the wake of catastrophic incidents—are hardly the end of the domestic
security story for the Department of Defense. Any number of other subjects
could have been chosen in their stead. One could examine the question of
the military’s role in the evolving perplexities of border security, or the role
of the military in providing for the people’s needs in facing a pandemic illness, or the human and institutional intricacies in providing federal military
support in a society wherein “powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people” (Constitution of the United States, 1791). In
every case, however, the homeland security enterprise as a whole, and the
Department of Defense in particular, would have been presented a set of
challenges far better served in prevention, protection, and preparedness than
reaction, response, and recovery. The 2011 Department of Defense Strategy
for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities starkly notes:
Defending U.S. territory and the people of the United States is the highest
priority of the Department of Defense (DoD), and providing appropriate
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is one of the Department’s primary missions. (p. 1)

Priority—or privilege—the tasks will require equal measures of commitment and cooperation. There is arguably no place on earth where promoting and defending the people, values, and interests is more complicated than
within the United States. Even viewed against the persistent demands of our
international responsibilities, even cast against the growing austerity of fiscal
constraints, the military’s plans to fulfill its part of domestic security requirements must be carefully drawn, sufficiently resourced, and amply manned.

Discussion Questions
1. The Arctic and cyber security are two of the major future challenges
that were discussed as we contemplate how homeland defense must
change to adapt and become effective in these domains. What are the
principal issues in these areas? How could they affect other ongoing
mission areas?

Homeland Defense—Emerging Challenges

2. Homeland defense must prepare for all emergencies, including
extremely complex catastrophes that the book refers to as maximum
of maximum events. How does this alter and shape the level at which
homeland defense is expected to operate?
3. Defense support assets are intended to supplement and reinforce those
special response resources that states and local governments, along
with select federal agencies, provide in major emergencies, but what are
the best ways for homeland defense and civil support staff to prepare
for emergencies, ranging from the challenging to the catastrophic?

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189

FORENSICS & CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Introduction to

Homeland Defense and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend

The application of our armed forces within the states and territories of the United States is far
from intuitive. The challenges of defending the country against assaults within the homeland are
much more complex than engaging our enemies on foreign soil. Likewise, the introduction of the
military’s appreciable capabilities in response to disasters, be they natural or manmade, comes
with authorities and restrictions reflective of an American ethos that will always hold those forces
as the servants of the people, never their overseers. Introduction to Homeland Defense and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and
Defend examines the requirements and regulations that guide the utilization of our forces in the
domestic environment.
Topics include:
• The importance of the distinctions between homeland security, homeland defense,
and Defense Support of Civil Authorities as they pertain to both authorities and
responsibilities
• The deliberately subservient position of the military to civil authorities when engaged
in response and recovery operations following a disaster
• The unique relationship between the United States Navy and the United States Coast Guard
in a mutually supportive effort that bridges requirements between defense on the high seas
and law enforcement in territorial waters
• The air defense mission over the United States, orchestrating manned aircraft, unmanned
aircraft, and cruise missiles against threats of the same nature
• The exceptional challenges that would be associated with the application of land forces in a
defense mission on American soil
• The development of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) Enterprise as a
function of the nation’s focus on preventing, responding to and recovering from a weapons
of mass destruction attack
• New challenges emerging in the domestic environment that will call for the application
of military resources, to include the opening of the Arctic, complex catastrophes, and
cybersecurity

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