Lost Goals in Africa
Content
Lost Goals in Africa Author(s): Arnold Rivkin Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Oct., 1965), pp. 111-126 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20039148 Accessed: 16/10/2010 02:40
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LOST GOALS IN AFRICA
By Arnold Rivkin UNITED
credibility for a large part of the African continent. We have held out hope for more than we have, in the event, been able or willing to deliver. Often the promise of brave words was extravagant and unwise; but what is noticed is that it acts. We have seemed has not been matched by congruent to say one thing and do another. For example, to most of Africa the unqualified and warmly welcomed of the pronouncement U.S. Assistant of State for African Affairs?"The Secretary United States stands for self-determination in Africa"?appears to have been disregarded, even repudiated, in practice, with to what in African eyes is the acid test of our bona fides, respect the "white redoubts" in southern Africa. Again, in promising and growing American aid for a "decade of development" major we declared it to be "a primary necessity, opportunity and respon States" to help make "a historic demon sibility of the United can go stration that economic growth and political democracy hand in hand" in building "free, stable, and self-reliant countries." This hope has now been substantially dissipated by the evolution of the U.S. aid syndrome inAfrica?initial good intentions, objec tive standards, policies of rewarding merit, yielding to the pres sures of the moment, the putting out of fires, the special concern for "bad boys," "problem children" and the crisis-prone, the
needs dollar "containment," etc. drain, of the special interest of allies, the U.S.
STATES policy in Africa has lost much of its
So too, our promise of uncritical support for African aspirations and goals?as if all of Africa shared the same set of aspirations and goals: "What we want for Africa," said the Assistant Secre of State for African Affairs, "is what the Africans want for tary themselves." Its na?vet? was exposed when it came up against the shattering realities of African diversity and division in the renewed Congo crisis. The inability of the Organization of African to cope with the crisis only served to emphasize the lack Unity of agreement in Africa on aspirations and goals. The aftermath of the Congolese "rescue operation" in November 1964 brought to the United this message home States. One part of Africa re Stevenson called an unprece sponded with what Ambassador
112
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
dented
and "hatred" "torrent of abuse," "verbal violence," Another the United States. part against "malign accusations" or openly approved the Belgian-American silently acquiesced
action.
There is a prevalent feeling among Africans that after a brief encounter States has lost interest and is having the United second thoughts about Africa. Have we and are we? Africa more than any other area of the world was to assume a new importance under the Kennedy Administration; Africa was to be a "new frontier" for U.S. foreign policy. This was the action in choosing for promise of the President's unprecedented a prominent to the State Department his very first appointment to be the Assistant Secretary dealing with political personality announcement that in African affairs, and of the accompanying his Administration the new post would be "second to none" in initial promise was quickly reinforced. importance. This its apparent acquiescence First, the United States repudiated to the Portuguese position that its African territories are consti a policy and substituted tutionally integral parts of Portugal, Stev for Angola. Ambassador looking toward self-determination enson's warm support of the resolution calling for a U.N. investi gation of conditions inAngola moved the Liberian representative on the Security Council to declare that Stevenson's words would
"reverberate throughout Africa."
in his first foreign-aid message to Congress, Then the President, to mobilize U.S. and called for a new aid agency, with a mandate in the other free-world resources for a "decade of development" from southern half of the globe. Significantly, underdeveloped new importance, within months of the point of view of Africa's his message could enact new legislation, and before Congress to to Nigeria a special mission President Kennedy dispatched to determine its economy and its new development plan study for a long-term U.S. aid commitment the country's eligibility
under the new criteria?long-term planning, absorptive capacity,
the first any self-help and social justice. The Nigerian mission, new criteria, was soon followed by where in the world under the another to Tunisia. Two unprecedented long-term commitments Six Year Plan and $180 mil resulted: $225 million for Nigeria's lion for Tunisia's Three Year Plan. in Africa by The "revolution of rising expectations" generated was relatively new departures short in American these policy
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
"3
lived. Early in 1963, the Chairman of the State Department's Advisory Council on African Affairs wrote: "By 1962 numerous African leaders who had welcomed Assistant Secretary Williams's visit in 1961 as a portent of great things to come were beginning to wonder whether the New Frontier was all public relations and
no real help."1
when the Administration Disillusion followed disappointment seemed to contradict its dramatic new policy?self-determination for the people of Angola?by continuing to supply arms to Portu the Administration gal. Similar feelings were aroused when seemed to hold back from applying its publicly stated policy of in Africa" to the Republic of South Africa, "self-determination even though the circumstances were different and even though it did eventually support a voluntary prohibition on shipment of arms to South Africa. Disillusion also resulted from the of the finding of apparent acceptance by the Administration the President's committee on U.S. foreign aid, the Clay Com our proclaimed policy of support that, notwithstanding mittee, for the revolutionary transformation under way in Africa from colonial dependency to national independence, Africa was an area of primary interest for the outgoing colonial powers and not for the United States. The Nigerian Ambassador to the United Na find tions, concerned about the implications of the Committee's for his own country and for Africa generally, hurried toWash ing that Africa was indeed still a new ington seeking assurances frontier in U.S. foreign policy. He received assurance only that the Administration would continue honoring its pledge of support for Nigeria's Six Year Plan; nothing more could be said about
future aid.
has since occurred under the Johnson Administration Nothing to reverse the downward spiral of African importance inAmerican Africa now has the lowest priority of policy. In Washington, area. This has always been more or less State Department any practice in making foreign-policy decisions; now it has become a matter of national policy. 11 Africa has come to be an area of residual interest for the United States. It is not merely that former colonial powers are recognized as having the primary Western interest and responsibility; in
1Vemon McKay, "Africa in World Politics." New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 360.
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FOREIGNAFFAIRS
principle, this may be a quite defensible position. But in practice the principle has been pushed to extremes. It has meant that the interest of the United States comes into play only as "the court
of last resort," when there are no acceptable alternatives avail
able. Thus, it is only where the decolonization process has gone as in the cases of the Congo (Leopoldville) and Guinea, wrong, or where there have been special situations, such as those arising out of the abrupt liquidation of Italy's African Empire, or where there has been no colonial relationship, as in Liberia and Ethio pia, or where the needs were obviously beyond the capacity of the outgoing colonial power, as in Nigeria?it is only then that the United States has stepped in to play a major role. As cir cumstances have permitted, we have encouraged the former or to come back into the picture. colonial power to remain In short, with the exceptions of Nigeria and Tunisia, where assessments of their importance and potential for independent were made, the United States has allowed the quirks development of history and the policies of other Western powers to impose a of special relations in Africa. As a matter of chance, crazy quilt some of these may coincide with a sound U.S. policy for Africa; others seem highly dubious. The incongruity of our position in relations with the Africa has been heightened by our attenuated African states which, not being "special cases," are many other not thrust into the orbit of active U.S. interest. colonial territories, In the remaining and quite inevitably the United States has deferred to the colonial powers, naturally, and Portugal. The problem, however, has the United Kingdom become one of limits. At what juncture do these territories of
"free-world nations" become a matter of direct concern, even
for the leading free-world nation? American policy responsibility, has been equivocal. In State Department practice as well as policy, the notion of residual interest operates. For the most part, major decisions of African policy are determined, not in the African Bureau of the but in the European Bureau and, in so far as State Department, is concerned, in the Near Eastern and the United Arab Republic this is true of U.S. policy toward South Asian Bureau. Certainly But more surprising, policies Africa and Rhodesia. Portuguese states are also shaped in the Euro toward independent African pean Bureau. The sensitivities of President de Gaulle, as judged by the European Bureau, rather than an independent assessment
LOST GOALS IN AFRICA
115
of the U.S. national interest in various French-speaking countries, is likely to be the decisive factor. Thus, for some three years the United States severely limited its relationship with Guinea, even though Guinea had broken with France in achieving its indepen the existence of the very situation which dence. Notwithstanding should have triggered active U.S. interest in Guinea, our respect for French primacy and de Gaulle's wishes prevented our taking from the tightening Soviet action. Only after Guinea withdrew embrace in 1962 did we take an active interest there, partly because the containment policy demanded that we take preemp de tive action to forestall the elements in the Parti D?mocratique were seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Guin?e which or an expanding Union China, relationship with Communist and partly because de Gaulle had relented enough in his attitude toward Guinea to allow the United States to enter the scene. The policy of containment of the Soviet Union and Communist China is indeed a principal reason for retaining even a residual interest in Africa, so as to avoid the possibility of a "dangerous vacuum" where a colonial power has failed to make a reasonable accommodation with a former colony. The desire to deny, in very the Congo, Guinea and Somalia to Soviet different circumstances, or Communist has certainly been a prime Chinese hegemony in our policy toward these three countries. Simi consideration larly, fear that failure of the colonial power to take adequate the Communist powers steps to avoid crisis situations which could exploit has influenced us to go as far as we have in our and Portuguese Africa. policies toward Rhodesia As with any policy depending on the actions of others, the United States has found itself on the horns of more than one dilemma. For example, the policy of residual interest has thrust and the policies of the United States into support of Ethiopia, into support of Somalia, residual interest and containment while the two states are engaged in an undeclared but none the less violent war. Similarly, the policy of containment has led us to provide large-scale agricultural commodity assistance to the and the policies of residual interest and United Arab Republic, in Africa, have led to our principal commitment containment the U.A.R. has long been engaged of the Congo?where support in attempting to overthrow the central government by one means or another. I cite these cases not because our action in either of them was necessarily wrong, but to underscore the difficulties of
ii6 relying too much
our own.
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
on the policies of third countries in determining
The expansion of the policy of containment by word and action im in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic has far-reaching for Africa. Thus, Castroite Cuba's role in the Zanzibar plications revolution of January 1964 not only illustrates the varied char acter of the Communist drive to export revolution to Africa, but that may be re also suggests the scope of the "containment" the abortive but nearly successful quired in Africa. So, too, Communist attempt in the Sudan to capture control of the revo If the lution which ousted the Abboud military government. we have been following elsewhere mean that we tougher policies takeover in Africa either, then we cannot accept a Communist can hardly afford to avoid involvement until the last moment. By an act of self-abnegation, we cannot remain aloof from Africa, at the except as determined by the actions of other powers, and same time be on call to put out fires on a continent where political instability is endemic. to take more initiative in Africa is all the Our unwillingness more remarkable because it is the one area of the world inwhich States has more freedom of action and fewer con the United than in any other. The Ad straints on its foreign policy-making seems to have accepted as applicable to Africa the ministration thesis on the limitations of U.S. capacity to Kennan-Lippmann influence the direction of affairs in distant areas of the world. Yet, remote as it is from Communist China and the Soviet Union, difficulties we find in Africa does not present the geopolitical crises in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and East dealing with ern Europe. We are not limited by regional (and related bi to NATO, alliances CENTO, comparable lateral) military ANZUS and the O.A.S. defense systems. In Africa, also, SEATO, free from pressures arising out of we should be comparatively commercial interests; Africa accounts for less than 5 percent of our total foreign trade and investment. is that the desire One result of our policy of self-abnegation states to widen their relations and of the newly independent is being dilute the influence of their former colonial masters are the conditions for their continuing dependency ignored, and the image of neo-colonialism being nurtured. This promotes and African "stooge governments" ripe for "national liberation," and radical nationalist China as propagated Communist by
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
117
the new African states such as Ghana. The fewer alternatives states are offered to diversify their political and economic rela tions within the free world, the more they are forced either to or to "swing to the Left" preserve old patterns of dependency into Communist orbits. Our experience in Latin America provides
some apposite lessons on what can happen when an outworn
relationship is persisted in too long. In conflict with our traditional policies, we are also contribut ing to the resurrection of the outmoded concept of great-power advanced the view that the French spheres. Walter Lippmann interest inGabon is comparable to the "vital interest" hegemony which he concedes to Communist China in Southeast Asia and to the United States in Latin America. Interestingly enough, the idea of President de Gaulle, while apparently accepting French and Communist Chinese spheres of influence, does not, judging from his tour of South America and his condemnation of seem to accept U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, our sphere in Latin America. Our overall attitude toward Africa has also limited our rela tionship with many of the African states whose foreign policies on the have most often coincided with our own, particularly on other issues of special im recurring Congo crisis, but also China to portance to us, such as the admission of Communist the United Nations. Ever since France's recognition of Com a number of French-speaking states munist African China, the Central African (Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal, Dahomey,
Republic and Mauritania), which we have recognized as re
in the French sphere of influence, have also been re maining versing their position on that issue. Now, with half the population of India, Africa has almost one-third of the membership of the or not, this means that Africa can United Nations. Reasonable influence the balance of world political power. In significantly fact, the U.N. vote, which for the last several years has pivoted on the ballots of the African states, will probably go against us this year or next if this new French-inspired trend continues. so far in her relations with Only Communist China's ineptitude the new African states has stemmed the turning tide. m What could be done to restore the promise and the credibility of U. S. policy in Africa? The point of departure must be to do
ii8
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
and in away with the principal causes for past contradictions consistencies. First, the United States should abandon the policy of having a merely residual interest in Africa and recognize that in existence with 36 independent states (excluding South Africa) can no and another three or four in the offing, the continent interest to the United be viewed as of only derivative longer States. We should make it clear that we have a coherent African policy, and not simply improvised positions deriving from our NATO relationships and our cold-war involvement. This means that we must cease to pose African policy ques tions in terms of a dilemma: pleasing African states or pleasing our NATO allies. Each must be considered, but neither exclu or even preponderantly. allies are no more Our NATO sively in their policies and interests than are the African homogeneous states. On a few issues, however, such as independence for the
Portuguese territories, there is a consensus among African states.
the issues on which Africans Because agree are so few, those issues take on added importance. The question then becomes one of means. If in keeping with our policy of self-determination for in Africa we think it right to support steps in that direction with the how can we take effective steps Africa, Portuguese least damaging effects for Portugal and NATO? Certainly, several of our NATO allies have time and again taken positions and followed policies in conflict with our own with respect to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Viet Nam, Communist China, the test the United ban treaty, trade with the Soviet bloc, etc., without States pulling the NATO house down. So too, in Africa, we have for African colonies without long supported self-determination France or Belgium the United Kingdom, tearing the alliance react differently. That would seem to be apart. Portugal may it is certainly a lesser one than com the risk we must run?but our policy of support for self-determination and promising much of Africa. In any event, NATO's dis present alienating array, centering as it does on France, is so basic that, although in the alliance would be undesirable, the any further dissension seem crucial to the of Portugal would disaffection hardly
alliance's future.
States must recognize that on a continent Third, the United in the judgment of the world's for revolution" "ripe leading the policy of active containment is neither appro practitioner, Intervention of the type practiced in priate nor feasible.
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
Viet Nam
119
to forestall Communist and the Dominican Republic out of the "wars of national liberation" is obviously inspired Yet this is what the containment question. policy suggests, if France, the United Kingdom or Belgium should falter in their or capacity to preclude Soviet or Communist determination Chinese penetration and takeovers. Our posture in the Congo has not been too far removed from active intervention, and if the situation should deteriorate again, what then? Africa now has a momentum of its own in world affairs which cannot be disregarded. Withdrawal and then sudden thrust by the United States in response to one crisis or another has all the of both policies. Our sudden bursts of energy to disadvantages counter Communist initiatives simply distort our basic interest in the development of the African states themselves by exag cold-war considerations. They also put in question the gerating of our oft-stated interest in the development of credibility and economically viable states, free to politically independent determine their own external policies. it is to the positive Thus, aspects of policy that we must address ourselves. How can we help the new states to consolidate their independence? This is the best sort of containment and, as a practical matter, the only sort conceivable for most of Africa. For all new African countries, the achievement of formal in ternational sovereignty is but the beginning of their travail. They all have to build states, nations, market economies and modern societies. In the words of the Assistant AID Administrator for Africa: "The newly independent countries of Africa are today at a critical stage of development. The courses of action taken now States may profoundly influence their political, by the United to come. It is economic and social structures for generations to help the rela in our interest to seize the opportunity clearly tively new and emerging nations of Africa to develop along
constructive lines."2 The alternative is unacceptable?endemic in
arms races, brush-fire wars, Latin Ameri stability, bush-league despotism, can-style militarism, declining living standards and an ever greater gulf between the developed Western and the African states. underdeveloped In the broad political arena, we should reassert the basic U.S. interest in the emergence and development of stable and viable
1964, 2E. C. Hutchinson, p. 8. "U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 1960-1964," in Africa Report, December
I20
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
states in all of Africa, and affirm our intention to independent in the process. The United States must also redeem its un help in Africa, mak qualified pledge of support for self-determination it clear that we do not draw a line at the Zambezi or Limpopo ing Rivers so as to exclude from this pledge the white-dominated areas in southern Africa. Failure to find an orderly and peaceful route to independence in for the remaining colonial territories and the inevitably ensuing violence, would be?in fact Africa, to U.S. policy, or lack of it. already is being?attributed Finally, the most intractable problem of all?the Republic of South Africa. Here, a determined white government, with the resources of a rapidly de considerable economic and military itself to a policy which despite veloping country, has committed its rationale of separate development for Africans does in fact the non-white majority the right of self-determination. The deny United States can rescind its pledge of support for self-determina tion as inapplicable in the context of an already independent
country. Lenin's ambivalence on the nationality question, favor
in Russia and elsewhere in Europe but ing self-determination comes to its applicability once a "socialist" government denying offers a precedent. Such a tactic on the part of the United power, States would be viewed as skeptically in Africa as Lenin's re versal is in the United States. condemned apartheid and voluntarily Having imposed a ban on arms shipment to South Africa, the United States has accepted the need to bring pressure to bear to induce South Africa to change its policy. The basic decision of principle having been of persuasion, taken, what remains is to find that combination and coercion which would be both effective and inducement This will not be an easy or quick task. An opportunity acceptable. for action may be offered by the World Court in the case now before it, where South Africa is charged with violation of its over South West Africa in applying of Nations mandate League apartheid to the mandated territory. In the event of an adverse South Africa may be confronted with the dilemma of ruling, accepting the decision, with all that would entail for the practice in South Africa of apartheid itself, or defying the Court and a new basis for the U.N. to assume jurisdiction and take laying action. This would leave the United States and other Western less discretion countries with considerably about what their should be to African pressures for applying sanctions. response
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
121
Another problem of concern to the United States is the mount and military mis ing overt and covert flow of arms, munitions as well as for "libera sions to Africa?for national armed forces tion forces." Means must be found to achieve "preventive dis armament" in Africa, not only to increase its internal security but to avoid the increasing diversion of local resources from de to military purposes. In practice, much of the flow velopment of arms for "liberation forces" has been diverted to other destina tions and other ends. The recent incidents in Kenya involving arms are illustrative. On two occasions large Chinese Communist shipments of arms theoretically destined for Congolese and Mo and from Tanzania rebel forces were transshipped zambique in west found hidden or intercepted in suspicious circumstances ern Kenya. These discoveries carried the unmistakable implica tion of a threat by disaffected internal factions to overthrow the Kenyan government with outside support. As a result of Kenya's common in the East African suspicion that her two partners and Uganda, were involved in such a plot, market, Tanzania the common market and expanding the prospects of maintaining it into an East African federation, something which the United In another case, States greatly favors, is vastly diminished. serve as a corridor for Communist to the Sudan's willingness arms shipments to rebel forces in neighboring countries came to a sudden halt because too many shipments were falling into the in the re hands of disaffected Sudanese elements, particularly bellious southern provinces. The increased flow of arms for national forces also presents a danger. Soviet support of a substantial build-up of Somali armed forces has had a direct impact on the two neighboring states with which which Somalia has intermittently been warring?Ethiopia, receives its arms primarily from the United States, and Kenya, from the United Kingdom. which receives its arms primarily the capacity of the three states to make war can only Raising enlarge the already dangerous threat to African peace, drag in cold-war issues and divert scarce resources of three of the poorest
African states.
Would not Africa be a good place to start arms-control and dis armament agreements? It took six years for the military r?gime in the Sudan to be replaced, and then only by extra-constitu tional means. The aftermath has been disorder, violence and po litical instability reminiscent of the very situation that General
122
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
set out to erase with his military Abboud coup in 1958. Does Africa have to repeat the Latin American pattern of successive coups to effect political change? military It seems clear by now that the independent African states are not going to be in a position to "liberate" by force of arms the and Angola. It is also Republic of South Africa or Mozambique cannot supply even limited that the Western powers apparent kinds of arms to South Africa and Portugal which would not be useful for internal repressive purposes. Simple realism suggests on arms for Africa and the the need for an explicit moratorium states. effective policing of it by agreement with the African come to grips with this critical issue makes nonsense Failure to is either of so much external economic aid, which in practice or indirectly diverted to military ends. Unnecessary arms directly also undercuts whatever added political expenditure stability be hoped for as a result of economic development. More might arms control, a total ban on over, in the context of Africa-wide arms and munitions to South Africa and Portugal would become more acceptable. insistence on declaring the In view of African on a "denuclearized continent zone" and urging disarmament seem appropriate the major powers, it would for the African states themselves to initiate steps toward achieving a moratorium on arms shipments to Africa, and by doing so to lend credence to their other disarmament policies. This would put pressure on theWestern powers to agree and considerable leverage could then be brought to bear on the Communist powers. schemes for peace-keeping Whatever by small na relevancy tions or regional organizations may have in some areas of the are it seems clear that in this decade such proposals world, states do not largely irrelevant for Africa. Individual African in being and it seems of doubtful wisdom have the capacity the question has to create it. In any event, whenever deliberately states have been unable to agree on the arisen, the African force. Some fear desirability of creating a regional peace-keeping it would mean interference in their internal affairs; others that it would mean support of the status quo and the preclusion of change; and still others that itwould mean domination by larger
or more
in ferred to look elsewhere than to one another for assistance East Africa, to the United Kingdom, down rebellions?in putting Africa, to France. and, in French-speaking
aggressive
states.
And
so
far, African
states
have
pre
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
m
is structurally The Organization of African Unity incapable of such a role at present or in the foreseeable future. With playing its members deeply divided on fundamental principles, such as in one the sanctity of inherited boundaries and non-interference another's internal affairs, the organization has not been in a posi tion to play any military role at all. In the Congo affair, ever since the withdrawal of the U.N. forces, the O.A.U. has not a peace-keeping role; it has also only been unable to carry out been unable to prevent its minority faction of radical nationalist states and their sometime associates from providing active sup the O.A.U. has been port and bases for rebel groups. Equally, unable to face up to the problems of guerrilla warfare in the southern Sudan, the Watusi and ?migr?s and their refugees the continuing quarrels and periodic incursions into Rwanda, intermittent violence between Dahomey and Niger, Ghana and Ghana and Togo, Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia Upper Volta, etc. To wish upon the O.A.U. tasks it is not yet and Kenya, ready to assume ismerely to impair further its limited effective ness. Our expectations we should for it have been unrealistic?as have known from our experience with peace-keeping in Latin
America. IV
In the economic field must do away with the our economic assistance consistent and effective
outset, we need to
in the political arena we incongruities which have characterized programs in Africa if these are to play a role in support of U.S. policies. At the
the size and composition of our
no less than
reassess
to Africa. As the continent economic assistance receiving the smallest segment of our aid (less than 10 percent), Africa de serves more ifwe are to give credence to our policy of support for A higher proportion of aid for economic African development. needs to be (as opposed to "political" purposes) development with a renewed attempt to apply the Kennedy aid con coupled the conscious provision and programming of cepts, including technical assistance so as to enlarge the capacity of the African states to absorb external aid effectively. We should also renew our attempts to achieve the mobilization and coordination of aid to Africa from the free world, to make such aid more effective, increase its availability and improve the terms on which it ismade available. Free-world aid to Africa, hav
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FOREIGNAFFAIRS
ing reached a plateau, has in the last two years actually started to decline. Our own economic aid (excluding surplus food) reflects this downward trend. The appropriation requested by the Presi dent for the fiscal year 1966 is almost $100 million less than was obligated in 1962, the high-water mark of U.S. aid to Africa. The decline has set in just as Africa has begun to move for ward and to increase its capacity to absorb capital. There are interest in rationalizing and co signs, too, of growing African of the Eco ordinating the flow of external aid. At the meeting nomic Commission for Africa late in 1964, Mr. Robert Gardiner, the Executive Plan, Colombo Secretary, called for "a Marshall or Alliance for Progress" for Africa, and suggested the pos Plan sibility of the founding of an African Council for Economic Co Bank, which came into operation. The new African Development this year with a nominal capitalization of $250,000,000, operation will also undoubtedly be seeking outside resources. In view of our contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank and our proffered offers to the proposed Asian Development Bank, it is difficult to see how we can refrain from making significant to the African Development contributions Bank. It would be in the interest of both the United States and of their respective "client states" Europe if the heavy dependence in Latin America and Africa could be progressively diversified and shared. Then, a change in the relationship to a former colonial power would not be felt as a wrenching divorce but as a tolerable if regrettable separation. We also need to rationalize our aid programs and to adhere to objective criteria, thus eliminating the anomalies which make us seem to reward the trouble-makers and take friends for granted. If aid is to flow to the U.A.R., Algeria, Guinea and others in the form of surplus agricultural assist commodities, "supporting
ance" nomic and "emergency and aid"?without heavy allocation reference of to their to eco non performance resources
development compensate
to should be made purposes?then provision the states deserving of aid by objective economic
against, rather
or at any rate not discriminate and to reward, standards, are pro-Western in their those which "non-alignment" or than pro-Soviet Chinese. pro-Communist
the receiving country's point of view, all American aid, of the particular pocket it comes from, has the effect regardless
of enlarging that country's total resources. If a country needs
From
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
it receives little difference whether food, it makes dollars" which enable it to buy food?or, velopment
ary straits, it receives "supporting assistance" or
125 food or "de if in budget
"development
dollars." It can always shift its resources around as economic conditions require. Africans have not been slow (and political) to grasp this point. Nigeria, which is frequently cited by Ameri can officials as the largest African recipient of U.S. economic aid, has felt compelled to point out that, measured in either aggregate
or per capita terms, are any taken number into of African account. countries have re
ceived
U.S.
greater
assistance Mali,
whose are
if contributions Algeria
economic prone to
emanating all
from all radical
to
aid pockets
Ghana,
nationalist be desired
Guinea,
states and who
and
the U.A.R.,
leaves
performance resources allocate
much
to non-pro
ductive prestige purposes and questionable foreign adventures, more economic aid than have each received disproportionately the country we have singled out as one of the two most Nigeria, countries under the Kennedy economic de deserving African criteria. During U.S. fiscal years 1960-1964, Ghana, velopment of 7.4 million, 10.8 Algeria and the U.A.R., with populations million and 28.7 million respectively, each received as much or more U.S. economic aid (without regard for which U.S. aid pocket it came from) than Nigeria, whose population of 55.5 million is than the combined population of the three. During the larger same period, Guinea and Mali, with a combined population of 8
million, received about one-half as much economic assistance as
In addition, such special cases as Morocco, Nigeria. Ethiopia, Liberia and the Congo, with a combined population considerably smaller than Nigeria's, have each received as much or more U.S. economic aid (to say nothing of military) than Nigeria. Yet none of these states has been singled out by the United States as aid. specially deserving of "development" The U.A.R. has received its large share of our economic as own judg sistance to Africa in the face of the U.S. Government's ment that that country "has followed a number of political policies which are not to our liking and contrary to our interests": for example, diverting its resources to aid the Congolese rebels, 50,000 troops in Yemen, maintaining conducting campaigns to coerce Libya into ousting the U.S. airbase, and evidencing hos for proposing negotiations in the Arab tility toward Tunisia Israeli dispute.
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In contrast, the 13 original members of The Common Organi States (O.C.A.M.), which have zation of African and Malagasy on the whole been most vigorous in their support of the O.A.U. and most articulate in condemning principle of non-interference external interference in their internal affairs by Ghana "and other less economic aid than the states," have received considerably states. Indeed, since i960 Ghana alone five most interventionist has received more U.S. aid than the combined total going to all states. Guinea has received more during this period 13 O.C.A.M. than the combined total going to the two most important the Ivory Coast and Senegal. And almost as if O.C.A.M. states, to add insult to injury, the United States over the last two years has withdrawn from the O.C.A.M. states and ad its aid missions ministers aid to them, such as it is, from Washington. In sum, then, the United States must redress the imbalance in interests its foreign policies by refocusing its view of American in Africa, not by downgrading our traditional interest in Europe or by denying the reality of the cold war, but rather by upgrading to the importance of Africa, formulating policies responsive realities and striking a reasonable balance among our African interests. The United States also needs to ra multiple national tionalize its political and economic policies in Africa, to make to our na and credible and thus responsive them consistent of stable and viable African tional interest in the development
states.
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LOST GOALS IN AFRICA
By Arnold Rivkin UNITED
credibility for a large part of the African continent. We have held out hope for more than we have, in the event, been able or willing to deliver. Often the promise of brave words was extravagant and unwise; but what is noticed is that it acts. We have seemed has not been matched by congruent to say one thing and do another. For example, to most of Africa the unqualified and warmly welcomed of the pronouncement U.S. Assistant of State for African Affairs?"The Secretary United States stands for self-determination in Africa"?appears to have been disregarded, even repudiated, in practice, with to what in African eyes is the acid test of our bona fides, respect the "white redoubts" in southern Africa. Again, in promising and growing American aid for a "decade of development" major we declared it to be "a primary necessity, opportunity and respon States" to help make "a historic demon sibility of the United can go stration that economic growth and political democracy hand in hand" in building "free, stable, and self-reliant countries." This hope has now been substantially dissipated by the evolution of the U.S. aid syndrome inAfrica?initial good intentions, objec tive standards, policies of rewarding merit, yielding to the pres sures of the moment, the putting out of fires, the special concern for "bad boys," "problem children" and the crisis-prone, the
needs dollar "containment," etc. drain, of the special interest of allies, the U.S.
STATES policy in Africa has lost much of its
So too, our promise of uncritical support for African aspirations and goals?as if all of Africa shared the same set of aspirations and goals: "What we want for Africa," said the Assistant Secre of State for African Affairs, "is what the Africans want for tary themselves." Its na?vet? was exposed when it came up against the shattering realities of African diversity and division in the renewed Congo crisis. The inability of the Organization of African to cope with the crisis only served to emphasize the lack Unity of agreement in Africa on aspirations and goals. The aftermath of the Congolese "rescue operation" in November 1964 brought to the United this message home States. One part of Africa re Stevenson called an unprece sponded with what Ambassador
112
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
dented
and "hatred" "torrent of abuse," "verbal violence," Another the United States. part against "malign accusations" or openly approved the Belgian-American silently acquiesced
action.
There is a prevalent feeling among Africans that after a brief encounter States has lost interest and is having the United second thoughts about Africa. Have we and are we? Africa more than any other area of the world was to assume a new importance under the Kennedy Administration; Africa was to be a "new frontier" for U.S. foreign policy. This was the action in choosing for promise of the President's unprecedented a prominent to the State Department his very first appointment to be the Assistant Secretary dealing with political personality announcement that in African affairs, and of the accompanying his Administration the new post would be "second to none" in initial promise was quickly reinforced. importance. This its apparent acquiescence First, the United States repudiated to the Portuguese position that its African territories are consti a policy and substituted tutionally integral parts of Portugal, Stev for Angola. Ambassador looking toward self-determination enson's warm support of the resolution calling for a U.N. investi gation of conditions inAngola moved the Liberian representative on the Security Council to declare that Stevenson's words would
"reverberate throughout Africa."
in his first foreign-aid message to Congress, Then the President, to mobilize U.S. and called for a new aid agency, with a mandate in the other free-world resources for a "decade of development" from southern half of the globe. Significantly, underdeveloped new importance, within months of the point of view of Africa's his message could enact new legislation, and before Congress to to Nigeria a special mission President Kennedy dispatched to determine its economy and its new development plan study for a long-term U.S. aid commitment the country's eligibility
under the new criteria?long-term planning, absorptive capacity,
the first any self-help and social justice. The Nigerian mission, new criteria, was soon followed by where in the world under the another to Tunisia. Two unprecedented long-term commitments Six Year Plan and $180 mil resulted: $225 million for Nigeria's lion for Tunisia's Three Year Plan. in Africa by The "revolution of rising expectations" generated was relatively new departures short in American these policy
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
"3
lived. Early in 1963, the Chairman of the State Department's Advisory Council on African Affairs wrote: "By 1962 numerous African leaders who had welcomed Assistant Secretary Williams's visit in 1961 as a portent of great things to come were beginning to wonder whether the New Frontier was all public relations and
no real help."1
when the Administration Disillusion followed disappointment seemed to contradict its dramatic new policy?self-determination for the people of Angola?by continuing to supply arms to Portu the Administration gal. Similar feelings were aroused when seemed to hold back from applying its publicly stated policy of in Africa" to the Republic of South Africa, "self-determination even though the circumstances were different and even though it did eventually support a voluntary prohibition on shipment of arms to South Africa. Disillusion also resulted from the of the finding of apparent acceptance by the Administration the President's committee on U.S. foreign aid, the Clay Com our proclaimed policy of support that, notwithstanding mittee, for the revolutionary transformation under way in Africa from colonial dependency to national independence, Africa was an area of primary interest for the outgoing colonial powers and not for the United States. The Nigerian Ambassador to the United Na find tions, concerned about the implications of the Committee's for his own country and for Africa generally, hurried toWash ing that Africa was indeed still a new ington seeking assurances frontier in U.S. foreign policy. He received assurance only that the Administration would continue honoring its pledge of support for Nigeria's Six Year Plan; nothing more could be said about
future aid.
has since occurred under the Johnson Administration Nothing to reverse the downward spiral of African importance inAmerican Africa now has the lowest priority of policy. In Washington, area. This has always been more or less State Department any practice in making foreign-policy decisions; now it has become a matter of national policy. 11 Africa has come to be an area of residual interest for the United States. It is not merely that former colonial powers are recognized as having the primary Western interest and responsibility; in
1Vemon McKay, "Africa in World Politics." New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 360.
114
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
principle, this may be a quite defensible position. But in practice the principle has been pushed to extremes. It has meant that the interest of the United States comes into play only as "the court
of last resort," when there are no acceptable alternatives avail
able. Thus, it is only where the decolonization process has gone as in the cases of the Congo (Leopoldville) and Guinea, wrong, or where there have been special situations, such as those arising out of the abrupt liquidation of Italy's African Empire, or where there has been no colonial relationship, as in Liberia and Ethio pia, or where the needs were obviously beyond the capacity of the outgoing colonial power, as in Nigeria?it is only then that the United States has stepped in to play a major role. As cir cumstances have permitted, we have encouraged the former or to come back into the picture. colonial power to remain In short, with the exceptions of Nigeria and Tunisia, where assessments of their importance and potential for independent were made, the United States has allowed the quirks development of history and the policies of other Western powers to impose a of special relations in Africa. As a matter of chance, crazy quilt some of these may coincide with a sound U.S. policy for Africa; others seem highly dubious. The incongruity of our position in relations with the Africa has been heightened by our attenuated African states which, not being "special cases," are many other not thrust into the orbit of active U.S. interest. colonial territories, In the remaining and quite inevitably the United States has deferred to the colonial powers, naturally, and Portugal. The problem, however, has the United Kingdom become one of limits. At what juncture do these territories of
"free-world nations" become a matter of direct concern, even
for the leading free-world nation? American policy responsibility, has been equivocal. In State Department practice as well as policy, the notion of residual interest operates. For the most part, major decisions of African policy are determined, not in the African Bureau of the but in the European Bureau and, in so far as State Department, is concerned, in the Near Eastern and the United Arab Republic this is true of U.S. policy toward South Asian Bureau. Certainly But more surprising, policies Africa and Rhodesia. Portuguese states are also shaped in the Euro toward independent African pean Bureau. The sensitivities of President de Gaulle, as judged by the European Bureau, rather than an independent assessment
LOST GOALS IN AFRICA
115
of the U.S. national interest in various French-speaking countries, is likely to be the decisive factor. Thus, for some three years the United States severely limited its relationship with Guinea, even though Guinea had broken with France in achieving its indepen the existence of the very situation which dence. Notwithstanding should have triggered active U.S. interest in Guinea, our respect for French primacy and de Gaulle's wishes prevented our taking from the tightening Soviet action. Only after Guinea withdrew embrace in 1962 did we take an active interest there, partly because the containment policy demanded that we take preemp de tive action to forestall the elements in the Parti D?mocratique were seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Guin?e which or an expanding Union China, relationship with Communist and partly because de Gaulle had relented enough in his attitude toward Guinea to allow the United States to enter the scene. The policy of containment of the Soviet Union and Communist China is indeed a principal reason for retaining even a residual interest in Africa, so as to avoid the possibility of a "dangerous vacuum" where a colonial power has failed to make a reasonable accommodation with a former colony. The desire to deny, in very the Congo, Guinea and Somalia to Soviet different circumstances, or Communist has certainly been a prime Chinese hegemony in our policy toward these three countries. Simi consideration larly, fear that failure of the colonial power to take adequate the Communist powers steps to avoid crisis situations which could exploit has influenced us to go as far as we have in our and Portuguese Africa. policies toward Rhodesia As with any policy depending on the actions of others, the United States has found itself on the horns of more than one dilemma. For example, the policy of residual interest has thrust and the policies of the United States into support of Ethiopia, into support of Somalia, residual interest and containment while the two states are engaged in an undeclared but none the less violent war. Similarly, the policy of containment has led us to provide large-scale agricultural commodity assistance to the and the policies of residual interest and United Arab Republic, in Africa, have led to our principal commitment containment the U.A.R. has long been engaged of the Congo?where support in attempting to overthrow the central government by one means or another. I cite these cases not because our action in either of them was necessarily wrong, but to underscore the difficulties of
ii6 relying too much
our own.
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
on the policies of third countries in determining
The expansion of the policy of containment by word and action im in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic has far-reaching for Africa. Thus, Castroite Cuba's role in the Zanzibar plications revolution of January 1964 not only illustrates the varied char acter of the Communist drive to export revolution to Africa, but that may be re also suggests the scope of the "containment" the abortive but nearly successful quired in Africa. So, too, Communist attempt in the Sudan to capture control of the revo If the lution which ousted the Abboud military government. we have been following elsewhere mean that we tougher policies takeover in Africa either, then we cannot accept a Communist can hardly afford to avoid involvement until the last moment. By an act of self-abnegation, we cannot remain aloof from Africa, at the except as determined by the actions of other powers, and same time be on call to put out fires on a continent where political instability is endemic. to take more initiative in Africa is all the Our unwillingness more remarkable because it is the one area of the world inwhich States has more freedom of action and fewer con the United than in any other. The Ad straints on its foreign policy-making seems to have accepted as applicable to Africa the ministration thesis on the limitations of U.S. capacity to Kennan-Lippmann influence the direction of affairs in distant areas of the world. Yet, remote as it is from Communist China and the Soviet Union, difficulties we find in Africa does not present the geopolitical crises in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and East dealing with ern Europe. We are not limited by regional (and related bi to NATO, alliances CENTO, comparable lateral) military ANZUS and the O.A.S. defense systems. In Africa, also, SEATO, free from pressures arising out of we should be comparatively commercial interests; Africa accounts for less than 5 percent of our total foreign trade and investment. is that the desire One result of our policy of self-abnegation states to widen their relations and of the newly independent is being dilute the influence of their former colonial masters are the conditions for their continuing dependency ignored, and the image of neo-colonialism being nurtured. This promotes and African "stooge governments" ripe for "national liberation," and radical nationalist China as propagated Communist by
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
117
the new African states such as Ghana. The fewer alternatives states are offered to diversify their political and economic rela tions within the free world, the more they are forced either to or to "swing to the Left" preserve old patterns of dependency into Communist orbits. Our experience in Latin America provides
some apposite lessons on what can happen when an outworn
relationship is persisted in too long. In conflict with our traditional policies, we are also contribut ing to the resurrection of the outmoded concept of great-power advanced the view that the French spheres. Walter Lippmann interest inGabon is comparable to the "vital interest" hegemony which he concedes to Communist China in Southeast Asia and to the United States in Latin America. Interestingly enough, the idea of President de Gaulle, while apparently accepting French and Communist Chinese spheres of influence, does not, judging from his tour of South America and his condemnation of seem to accept U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, our sphere in Latin America. Our overall attitude toward Africa has also limited our rela tionship with many of the African states whose foreign policies on the have most often coincided with our own, particularly on other issues of special im recurring Congo crisis, but also China to portance to us, such as the admission of Communist the United Nations. Ever since France's recognition of Com a number of French-speaking states munist African China, the Central African (Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal, Dahomey,
Republic and Mauritania), which we have recognized as re
in the French sphere of influence, have also been re maining versing their position on that issue. Now, with half the population of India, Africa has almost one-third of the membership of the or not, this means that Africa can United Nations. Reasonable influence the balance of world political power. In significantly fact, the U.N. vote, which for the last several years has pivoted on the ballots of the African states, will probably go against us this year or next if this new French-inspired trend continues. so far in her relations with Only Communist China's ineptitude the new African states has stemmed the turning tide. m What could be done to restore the promise and the credibility of U. S. policy in Africa? The point of departure must be to do
ii8
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
and in away with the principal causes for past contradictions consistencies. First, the United States should abandon the policy of having a merely residual interest in Africa and recognize that in existence with 36 independent states (excluding South Africa) can no and another three or four in the offing, the continent interest to the United be viewed as of only derivative longer States. We should make it clear that we have a coherent African policy, and not simply improvised positions deriving from our NATO relationships and our cold-war involvement. This means that we must cease to pose African policy ques tions in terms of a dilemma: pleasing African states or pleasing our NATO allies. Each must be considered, but neither exclu or even preponderantly. allies are no more Our NATO sively in their policies and interests than are the African homogeneous states. On a few issues, however, such as independence for the
Portuguese territories, there is a consensus among African states.
the issues on which Africans Because agree are so few, those issues take on added importance. The question then becomes one of means. If in keeping with our policy of self-determination for in Africa we think it right to support steps in that direction with the how can we take effective steps Africa, Portuguese least damaging effects for Portugal and NATO? Certainly, several of our NATO allies have time and again taken positions and followed policies in conflict with our own with respect to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Viet Nam, Communist China, the test the United ban treaty, trade with the Soviet bloc, etc., without States pulling the NATO house down. So too, in Africa, we have for African colonies without long supported self-determination France or Belgium the United Kingdom, tearing the alliance react differently. That would seem to be apart. Portugal may it is certainly a lesser one than com the risk we must run?but our policy of support for self-determination and promising much of Africa. In any event, NATO's dis present alienating array, centering as it does on France, is so basic that, although in the alliance would be undesirable, the any further dissension seem crucial to the of Portugal would disaffection hardly
alliance's future.
States must recognize that on a continent Third, the United in the judgment of the world's for revolution" "ripe leading the policy of active containment is neither appro practitioner, Intervention of the type practiced in priate nor feasible.
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
Viet Nam
119
to forestall Communist and the Dominican Republic out of the "wars of national liberation" is obviously inspired Yet this is what the containment question. policy suggests, if France, the United Kingdom or Belgium should falter in their or capacity to preclude Soviet or Communist determination Chinese penetration and takeovers. Our posture in the Congo has not been too far removed from active intervention, and if the situation should deteriorate again, what then? Africa now has a momentum of its own in world affairs which cannot be disregarded. Withdrawal and then sudden thrust by the United States in response to one crisis or another has all the of both policies. Our sudden bursts of energy to disadvantages counter Communist initiatives simply distort our basic interest in the development of the African states themselves by exag cold-war considerations. They also put in question the gerating of our oft-stated interest in the development of credibility and economically viable states, free to politically independent determine their own external policies. it is to the positive Thus, aspects of policy that we must address ourselves. How can we help the new states to consolidate their independence? This is the best sort of containment and, as a practical matter, the only sort conceivable for most of Africa. For all new African countries, the achievement of formal in ternational sovereignty is but the beginning of their travail. They all have to build states, nations, market economies and modern societies. In the words of the Assistant AID Administrator for Africa: "The newly independent countries of Africa are today at a critical stage of development. The courses of action taken now States may profoundly influence their political, by the United to come. It is economic and social structures for generations to help the rela in our interest to seize the opportunity clearly tively new and emerging nations of Africa to develop along
constructive lines."2 The alternative is unacceptable?endemic in
arms races, brush-fire wars, Latin Ameri stability, bush-league despotism, can-style militarism, declining living standards and an ever greater gulf between the developed Western and the African states. underdeveloped In the broad political arena, we should reassert the basic U.S. interest in the emergence and development of stable and viable
1964, 2E. C. Hutchinson, p. 8. "U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 1960-1964," in Africa Report, December
I20
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
states in all of Africa, and affirm our intention to independent in the process. The United States must also redeem its un help in Africa, mak qualified pledge of support for self-determination it clear that we do not draw a line at the Zambezi or Limpopo ing Rivers so as to exclude from this pledge the white-dominated areas in southern Africa. Failure to find an orderly and peaceful route to independence in for the remaining colonial territories and the inevitably ensuing violence, would be?in fact Africa, to U.S. policy, or lack of it. already is being?attributed Finally, the most intractable problem of all?the Republic of South Africa. Here, a determined white government, with the resources of a rapidly de considerable economic and military itself to a policy which despite veloping country, has committed its rationale of separate development for Africans does in fact the non-white majority the right of self-determination. The deny United States can rescind its pledge of support for self-determina tion as inapplicable in the context of an already independent
country. Lenin's ambivalence on the nationality question, favor
in Russia and elsewhere in Europe but ing self-determination comes to its applicability once a "socialist" government denying offers a precedent. Such a tactic on the part of the United power, States would be viewed as skeptically in Africa as Lenin's re versal is in the United States. condemned apartheid and voluntarily Having imposed a ban on arms shipment to South Africa, the United States has accepted the need to bring pressure to bear to induce South Africa to change its policy. The basic decision of principle having been of persuasion, taken, what remains is to find that combination and coercion which would be both effective and inducement This will not be an easy or quick task. An opportunity acceptable. for action may be offered by the World Court in the case now before it, where South Africa is charged with violation of its over South West Africa in applying of Nations mandate League apartheid to the mandated territory. In the event of an adverse South Africa may be confronted with the dilemma of ruling, accepting the decision, with all that would entail for the practice in South Africa of apartheid itself, or defying the Court and a new basis for the U.N. to assume jurisdiction and take laying action. This would leave the United States and other Western less discretion countries with considerably about what their should be to African pressures for applying sanctions. response
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
121
Another problem of concern to the United States is the mount and military mis ing overt and covert flow of arms, munitions as well as for "libera sions to Africa?for national armed forces tion forces." Means must be found to achieve "preventive dis armament" in Africa, not only to increase its internal security but to avoid the increasing diversion of local resources from de to military purposes. In practice, much of the flow velopment of arms for "liberation forces" has been diverted to other destina tions and other ends. The recent incidents in Kenya involving arms are illustrative. On two occasions large Chinese Communist shipments of arms theoretically destined for Congolese and Mo and from Tanzania rebel forces were transshipped zambique in west found hidden or intercepted in suspicious circumstances ern Kenya. These discoveries carried the unmistakable implica tion of a threat by disaffected internal factions to overthrow the Kenyan government with outside support. As a result of Kenya's common in the East African suspicion that her two partners and Uganda, were involved in such a plot, market, Tanzania the common market and expanding the prospects of maintaining it into an East African federation, something which the United In another case, States greatly favors, is vastly diminished. serve as a corridor for Communist to the Sudan's willingness arms shipments to rebel forces in neighboring countries came to a sudden halt because too many shipments were falling into the in the re hands of disaffected Sudanese elements, particularly bellious southern provinces. The increased flow of arms for national forces also presents a danger. Soviet support of a substantial build-up of Somali armed forces has had a direct impact on the two neighboring states with which which Somalia has intermittently been warring?Ethiopia, receives its arms primarily from the United States, and Kenya, from the United Kingdom. which receives its arms primarily the capacity of the three states to make war can only Raising enlarge the already dangerous threat to African peace, drag in cold-war issues and divert scarce resources of three of the poorest
African states.
Would not Africa be a good place to start arms-control and dis armament agreements? It took six years for the military r?gime in the Sudan to be replaced, and then only by extra-constitu tional means. The aftermath has been disorder, violence and po litical instability reminiscent of the very situation that General
122
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
set out to erase with his military Abboud coup in 1958. Does Africa have to repeat the Latin American pattern of successive coups to effect political change? military It seems clear by now that the independent African states are not going to be in a position to "liberate" by force of arms the and Angola. It is also Republic of South Africa or Mozambique cannot supply even limited that the Western powers apparent kinds of arms to South Africa and Portugal which would not be useful for internal repressive purposes. Simple realism suggests on arms for Africa and the the need for an explicit moratorium states. effective policing of it by agreement with the African come to grips with this critical issue makes nonsense Failure to is either of so much external economic aid, which in practice or indirectly diverted to military ends. Unnecessary arms directly also undercuts whatever added political expenditure stability be hoped for as a result of economic development. More might arms control, a total ban on over, in the context of Africa-wide arms and munitions to South Africa and Portugal would become more acceptable. insistence on declaring the In view of African on a "denuclearized continent zone" and urging disarmament seem appropriate the major powers, it would for the African states themselves to initiate steps toward achieving a moratorium on arms shipments to Africa, and by doing so to lend credence to their other disarmament policies. This would put pressure on theWestern powers to agree and considerable leverage could then be brought to bear on the Communist powers. schemes for peace-keeping Whatever by small na relevancy tions or regional organizations may have in some areas of the are it seems clear that in this decade such proposals world, states do not largely irrelevant for Africa. Individual African in being and it seems of doubtful wisdom have the capacity the question has to create it. In any event, whenever deliberately states have been unable to agree on the arisen, the African force. Some fear desirability of creating a regional peace-keeping it would mean interference in their internal affairs; others that it would mean support of the status quo and the preclusion of change; and still others that itwould mean domination by larger
or more
in ferred to look elsewhere than to one another for assistance East Africa, to the United Kingdom, down rebellions?in putting Africa, to France. and, in French-speaking
aggressive
states.
And
so
far, African
states
have
pre
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
m
is structurally The Organization of African Unity incapable of such a role at present or in the foreseeable future. With playing its members deeply divided on fundamental principles, such as in one the sanctity of inherited boundaries and non-interference another's internal affairs, the organization has not been in a posi tion to play any military role at all. In the Congo affair, ever since the withdrawal of the U.N. forces, the O.A.U. has not a peace-keeping role; it has also only been unable to carry out been unable to prevent its minority faction of radical nationalist states and their sometime associates from providing active sup the O.A.U. has been port and bases for rebel groups. Equally, unable to face up to the problems of guerrilla warfare in the southern Sudan, the Watusi and ?migr?s and their refugees the continuing quarrels and periodic incursions into Rwanda, intermittent violence between Dahomey and Niger, Ghana and Ghana and Togo, Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia Upper Volta, etc. To wish upon the O.A.U. tasks it is not yet and Kenya, ready to assume ismerely to impair further its limited effective ness. Our expectations we should for it have been unrealistic?as have known from our experience with peace-keeping in Latin
America. IV
In the economic field must do away with the our economic assistance consistent and effective
outset, we need to
in the political arena we incongruities which have characterized programs in Africa if these are to play a role in support of U.S. policies. At the
the size and composition of our
no less than
reassess
to Africa. As the continent economic assistance receiving the smallest segment of our aid (less than 10 percent), Africa de serves more ifwe are to give credence to our policy of support for A higher proportion of aid for economic African development. needs to be (as opposed to "political" purposes) development with a renewed attempt to apply the Kennedy aid con coupled the conscious provision and programming of cepts, including technical assistance so as to enlarge the capacity of the African states to absorb external aid effectively. We should also renew our attempts to achieve the mobilization and coordination of aid to Africa from the free world, to make such aid more effective, increase its availability and improve the terms on which it ismade available. Free-world aid to Africa, hav
124
FOREIGNAFFAIRS
ing reached a plateau, has in the last two years actually started to decline. Our own economic aid (excluding surplus food) reflects this downward trend. The appropriation requested by the Presi dent for the fiscal year 1966 is almost $100 million less than was obligated in 1962, the high-water mark of U.S. aid to Africa. The decline has set in just as Africa has begun to move for ward and to increase its capacity to absorb capital. There are interest in rationalizing and co signs, too, of growing African of the Eco ordinating the flow of external aid. At the meeting nomic Commission for Africa late in 1964, Mr. Robert Gardiner, the Executive Plan, Colombo Secretary, called for "a Marshall or Alliance for Progress" for Africa, and suggested the pos Plan sibility of the founding of an African Council for Economic Co Bank, which came into operation. The new African Development this year with a nominal capitalization of $250,000,000, operation will also undoubtedly be seeking outside resources. In view of our contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank and our proffered offers to the proposed Asian Development Bank, it is difficult to see how we can refrain from making significant to the African Development contributions Bank. It would be in the interest of both the United States and of their respective "client states" Europe if the heavy dependence in Latin America and Africa could be progressively diversified and shared. Then, a change in the relationship to a former colonial power would not be felt as a wrenching divorce but as a tolerable if regrettable separation. We also need to rationalize our aid programs and to adhere to objective criteria, thus eliminating the anomalies which make us seem to reward the trouble-makers and take friends for granted. If aid is to flow to the U.A.R., Algeria, Guinea and others in the form of surplus agricultural assist commodities, "supporting
ance" nomic and "emergency and aid"?without heavy allocation reference of to their to eco non performance resources
development compensate
to should be made purposes?then provision the states deserving of aid by objective economic
against, rather
or at any rate not discriminate and to reward, standards, are pro-Western in their those which "non-alignment" or than pro-Soviet Chinese. pro-Communist
the receiving country's point of view, all American aid, of the particular pocket it comes from, has the effect regardless
of enlarging that country's total resources. If a country needs
From
LOSTGOALS IN AFRICA
it receives little difference whether food, it makes dollars" which enable it to buy food?or, velopment
ary straits, it receives "supporting assistance" or
125 food or "de if in budget
"development
dollars." It can always shift its resources around as economic conditions require. Africans have not been slow (and political) to grasp this point. Nigeria, which is frequently cited by Ameri can officials as the largest African recipient of U.S. economic aid, has felt compelled to point out that, measured in either aggregate
or per capita terms, are any taken number into of African account. countries have re
ceived
U.S.
greater
assistance Mali,
whose are
if contributions Algeria
economic prone to
emanating all
from all radical
to
aid pockets
Ghana,
nationalist be desired
Guinea,
states and who
and
the U.A.R.,
leaves
performance resources allocate
much
to non-pro
ductive prestige purposes and questionable foreign adventures, more economic aid than have each received disproportionately the country we have singled out as one of the two most Nigeria, countries under the Kennedy economic de deserving African criteria. During U.S. fiscal years 1960-1964, Ghana, velopment of 7.4 million, 10.8 Algeria and the U.A.R., with populations million and 28.7 million respectively, each received as much or more U.S. economic aid (without regard for which U.S. aid pocket it came from) than Nigeria, whose population of 55.5 million is than the combined population of the three. During the larger same period, Guinea and Mali, with a combined population of 8
million, received about one-half as much economic assistance as
In addition, such special cases as Morocco, Nigeria. Ethiopia, Liberia and the Congo, with a combined population considerably smaller than Nigeria's, have each received as much or more U.S. economic aid (to say nothing of military) than Nigeria. Yet none of these states has been singled out by the United States as aid. specially deserving of "development" The U.A.R. has received its large share of our economic as own judg sistance to Africa in the face of the U.S. Government's ment that that country "has followed a number of political policies which are not to our liking and contrary to our interests": for example, diverting its resources to aid the Congolese rebels, 50,000 troops in Yemen, maintaining conducting campaigns to coerce Libya into ousting the U.S. airbase, and evidencing hos for proposing negotiations in the Arab tility toward Tunisia Israeli dispute.
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FOREIGNAFFAIRS
In contrast, the 13 original members of The Common Organi States (O.C.A.M.), which have zation of African and Malagasy on the whole been most vigorous in their support of the O.A.U. and most articulate in condemning principle of non-interference external interference in their internal affairs by Ghana "and other less economic aid than the states," have received considerably states. Indeed, since i960 Ghana alone five most interventionist has received more U.S. aid than the combined total going to all states. Guinea has received more during this period 13 O.C.A.M. than the combined total going to the two most important the Ivory Coast and Senegal. And almost as if O.C.A.M. states, to add insult to injury, the United States over the last two years has withdrawn from the O.C.A.M. states and ad its aid missions ministers aid to them, such as it is, from Washington. In sum, then, the United States must redress the imbalance in interests its foreign policies by refocusing its view of American in Africa, not by downgrading our traditional interest in Europe or by denying the reality of the cold war, but rather by upgrading to the importance of Africa, formulating policies responsive realities and striking a reasonable balance among our African interests. The United States also needs to ra multiple national tionalize its political and economic policies in Africa, to make to our na and credible and thus responsive them consistent of stable and viable African tional interest in the development
states.
