Managing Security Risks

Copyright © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

Managing Security is!s in Ha"ardous Missions# $he Challenges of Securing %nited &ations 'ccess to (ulnerable )roups
Claude Bruderlein[*] Pierre Gassmann[**] Introduction I. The Security Environment of International A encies in the T!enty"#irst Century A. $easons for the Increased Security Threats %. The Gro!in &um'er of #ield ()erations in #ra mented or #ailed States *. The Blurrin of the +istinction Bet!een Civilians and Com'atants ,. The Privati-ation and #ra mentation of Armed #orces and the Increased Availa'ility of .ea)ons /. The Glo'ali-ation of Terror 0ovements and the S)read of $eli ious and #undamentalist Ideolo ies 1. ()erational Inte ration and the Emer ence of &e! ()erational $is2s B. &e! Security $is2s in a 3ar er ()erational Conte4t II. 5nited &ations6 $es)onse to Increasin Security $is2s A. Institutional Chan es B. #rom Basic Trainin to &e! Security 0ana ement Standards and Procedures %. 7ost Governments *. &on"State Armed Grou)s and Civil Society ,. International A encies6 Staff III. Analysis of the Current Strate ic A))roaches to Insecurity A. System"Based A))roach to Security B. Community"Based A))roach to Security C. Current +e'ate I8. +evelo)in &e! Security Strate ies for International A encies9 The Inte rated Security 0ana ement System A. 5nderstandin the +ynamic Character of Insecurity B. Buildin an Inte rated Security 0ana ement System %. $is2 Assessment and Analysis *. Community Information and Threat Prevention ,. Protection 0easures and Crisis 0ana ement /. 0iti ation 0easures C. $es)onsi'ility of 3ine 0ana ers +. Accounta'ility and Institutional $is2 0ana ement Issues E. Institutional and Personal 3ia'ility Issues 8. Conclusions and $ecommendations A. The Centrali-ed +evelo)ment of Security Standards
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B. The Professionali-ation of Security ()erators C. The +evelo)ment of a Common Professional Security Culture *ntroduction (ver the last decade: the 5nited &ations ;<5.&.=> has ta2en a central role in the international community6s res)onse to the conse?uences of disasters and armed conflicts. Increasin ly: international strate ies to co)e !ith insta'ility and armed conflicts rely on the de)loyment of the staff of 5.&. a encies in the midst of armed hostilities to )rovide ur ently needed humanitarian assistance to threatened )o)ulations. #urthermore: reconstruction and develo)ment activities traditionally underta2en in )eaceful environments have also 'ecome an inte ral )art of sta'ili-ation efforts in situations that are far from secure. These frontline activities are not !ithout costs in terms of )ersonnel safety and security.[%] It is estimated that: over the last decade: more than 1@@ humanitarian and develo)ment )ersonnel from the 5.&. and other international a encies have lost their lives in the course of these o)erations ;%,A in the last t!o years alone>.[*] 0any more have 'een inBured or have suffered from e4)osure to unsafe environments. ProBections su est that if current trends )ersist and no ne! measures are ta2en to address the sources of insecurity: over /@@ national and international staff mem'ers !ill lose their lives in the ne4t five years and several hundred more !ill 'e inBured due to increased e4)osure to security ris2s in conflict areas.[,] Parado4ically: international a encies: 'oth of the 5.&. and non"5.&. variety: have 'een slo! to res)ond to this insecurity and have yet to esta'lish a ro'ust security mana ement system.[/] There are: ho!ever: t!o develo)ments of note. (n the one hand: in vie! of the ro!in human costs of recent o)erations: such as those in Ira? and Af hanistan: many a encies s)eciali-in in emer ency res)onse a))ear increasin ly ris2"averse: often in contradiction to their o!n stated mandate to )rovide relief or )rotection a ainst human ri hts a'uses in conflict areas.[1] (n the other hand: reconstruction and develo)ment a encies: under )ressure 'y .estern donors: are often com)elled to increase their )resence in ha-ardous situations !here they are clearly not )re)ared to co)e !ith )revailin insecurity. This latter scenario has often occurred in the conte4t of ne! inte rated a))roaches to conflict mana ement and )ost"conflict )eace"'uildin . As the 5.&. underta2es maBor reforms: )articularly in the field of conflict )revention and )eace" 'uildin : one should consider ho! the or ani-ation and its a encies !ill address the vulnera'ility of its )ersonnel to security threats. (ver the years: the 5.&. has sou ht to fulfill its o!n moral vision 'y attem)tin to 'e a 'eneficent universal institution !hich )romotes human ri hts and )rotects vulnera'le )o)ulations from humanitarian catastro)hes.[C] The or ani-ation has also em'raced transformative a endas: hel)in overnments resha)e the social: )olitical: and economic structures of countries in conflict.[D] Parties to various conflicts: in )articular the non"state armed rou)s: may sometimes )erceive such a endas as 'iased and )olitically motivated. Thus: the universality of the values )romoted 'y the 5.&. no lon er uarantees the security of its access in conflict situations. The 5.&.: much li2e other maBor international a encies involved in reconstruction and )eace"'uildin : must develo) detailed and !ell"tailored security strate ies !hich inte rate the values of trans)arency and com)assion into its missions and address the ne! security realities faced 'y its staff in the field. This Article ar ues that the 5.&.6s res)onse to emer in security threats may 'ear si nificant im)lications for the nature and orientation of the mission of the or ani-ation: for the !ay the mission is )erceived 'y the )arties in situations of armed conflict: and for the ca)acity of the mission to fulfill its o'Bectives. #rom a )urely technical vie!)oint: mana in the security of 5.&. a encies6 )ersonnel seems to 'e strate ically im)ortant in definin the role of the 5nited
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&ations in conflict situations: )articularly in terms of its access to: and the )rotection of: vulnera'le rou)s. At the core of the current de'ate: t!o schools of thou ht are com)etin to assert their influence on the orientation of 5.&. a encies6 security res)onse. The first: !hich this Article shall call the <system"'ased security a))roach:= em)hasi-es the centrali-ation of standards"driven security mana ement as )art of the inte ration of the 5.&.6s humanitarian: develo)mental: )eace2ee)in : and )olitical activities at the field level. This a))roach: )romoted 'y 5.&. security e4)erts: )rovides the 'asis for a scala'le and re)lica'le security system: mirrorin the military de)loyments it is desi ned to accom)any. The other school: referred to here as the <community" 'ased security a))roach:= see2s acce)tance of 5.&. missions 'y the communities that the 5.&. a encies are desi ned to assist at the field level. This a))roach vie!s the communities themselves as uarantors of the security of staff. Culturally and )olitically sensitive: this a))roach essentially )romotes a decentrali-ed and rece)tive a))roach to field security in coordination !ith other local non" overnmental or ani-ations. The future of the 5nited &ation6s a'ility to o)erate in a conflict environment may reside in 'alancin these t!o a))roaches. The de'ate on security mana ement: therefore: constitutes a definin moment for the 5nited &ations as an o)erational or ani-ation in conflict situations. This Article is 'ased on a *@@1 survey ;<S0I survey=> and on research on the security strate ies of humanitarian and develo)ment a encies: underta2en 'y the Pro ram on 7umanitarian Policy and Conflict $esearch ;<7PC$=> at the 7arvard School of Pu'lic 7ealth !ithin the frame!or2 of the Security 0ana ement Initiative ;<S0I=>.[A] Part I revie!s the various sources of insecurity for humanitarian )ersonnel. Part II )resents the latest o'servations of the *@@1 S0I survey re ardin international a encies6 res)onses to the increased insecurity. Part III )resents an analysis of international a encies6 strate ies for dealin !ith insecurity: and Part I8 )ro)oses a common model of security mana ement: as !ell as current )olicy challen es for the esta'lishment of a ro'ust security mana ement system. #inally: Part 8 )rovides a set of o'servations and )ractical recommendations for donor overnments and international a encies on !ays to im)rove the security and safety of their )ersonnel in ha-ardous missions. *+ $he Security ,nviron-ent of *nternational 'gencies in the $wenty.First Century A. Reasons for the Increased Security Threats #irst: a revie! of the ne! sources of insecurity facin the 5nited &ations and other international a encies active in conflict areas is necessary to )rovide a frame!or2 for the analysis of these security threats in a lar er )olitical and social conte4t )ertainin to the domain of international assistance. A 2ey as)ect of the current insecurity is not that conflict situations have 'ecome much more violent in recent years: 'ut: rather: that the staff of international a encies have 'ecome more e4)osed to security ris2s in conflict -ones. This increased e4)osure to ris2s has much to do !ith a encies6 chan in o)erational o'Bectives and methods. The 'lurrin of mandates: es)ecially !ithin the 5.&. environment: and the com)etitive )ressure for o)erational outreach in areas of hi h insecurity: are 2ey causes of this increased insecurity.[E] 0ost international reconstruction and develo)ment a encies no! routinely lay claim to the mantle of humanitarianism and its under)innin )rinci)les of inde)endence: neutrality: and im)artialityF)rinci)les traditionally attached to life"savin assistance )ro rams. #or e4am)le: the 5.&. #ood and A riculture (r ani-ation ;<#A(=> increasin ly refers to its a ricultural )ro rams: such as those in rural 7aiti: as humanitarian activities.[%@] The 5.&. +evelo)ment Pro ramme ;<5&+P=> descri'ed some of its )ost"conflict reconstruction activities as humanitarian: includin its emer ency re)airs to infrastructure and Bo'"creatin reconstruction )ro rams in Ira?.[%%] The mi4in of
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life"savin activities !ith develo)ment and reconstruction )ro rams may have 'linded some of these a encies to ne! vulnera'ilities 'rou ht on 'y the )olitical motives of their s)onsors and financial 'ac2ers !ho often tie their su))ort for assistance to )olitical reforms: ood overnance: or )olitical ali nment. In occu)ied Ira? for instance: the 5nited &ations )ursued vastly different activities !ithin a sin le inte rated mission. These activities included )ro rams as diverse as relief assistance: reconstruction: institution"'uildin : technical assistance: and )olitical reforms: each of !hich has a distinct character and uni?ue security re?uirements.[%*] The humanitarian nature of these activities: as e4)ressed 'y Ser io 8ieira de 0ello: former s)ecial re)resentative of the 5.&. Secretary"General: )artially e4)lains the 5.&. staff6s ne li ent attitude re ardin their o!n security.[%,] This mentality !as 'ased on the )erce)tion that: des)ite the deterioratin security environment: the 5.&. staff all 'elon ed to a <humanitarian community= that !ould not 'e the tar et of attac2s.[%/] Althou h the 5nited &ations and other international a encies have underta2en maBor efforts to im)rove the safety and security a!areness of their )ersonnel: recent surveys: includin the )resent study: sho! that: for the most )art: they remain )oorly )re)ared to ade?uately assess and mana e ris2s in hi hly insecure environments des)ite the fact that many of these a encies em)loy the 'est )rofessional o)erators availa'le. There is an a))arent incon ruity 'et!een the o)erational e4)erience accumulated !ithin each a ency and the lac2 of systemic and standardi-ed a))roaches to security mana ement. The sense of immunity a ainst attac2s that humanitarian a encies have and the voluntary character of the humanitarian )rofessional culture may have limited their a'ility to em)loy security mana ement tools !idely availa'le in other )rivate and security sectors. Interestin ly: one of the main sources of )ressure for security reform a))ears to come not from the staff itself: 'ut from the families of those !ho lost their lives in service of the 5nited &ations. International a encies are no! facin increasin ly liti ious constituencies: amon 'eneficiary )o)ulations and: more nota'ly: amon their )redominantly .estern staff. Such claimants increasin ly see2 com)ensation for dama es incurred in )reventa'le security and safety incidents.[%1] There are no )recise num'ers availa'le on the liti ation: or threats of liti ation: e4erted 'y the families. 7o!ever: interlocutors !e s)o2e !ith in the course of the *@@1 S0I survey e4)ressed the vie! that threats of liti ation may 'e a 2ey factor in )rom)tin the 5.&. a encies6 interest in security mana ement reforms.[%C] The ela'oration and im)lementation of ne! security strate ies and )rocedures to address the o)erational ris2s facin staff may have 'ecome unavoida'le. As this Article !ill descri'e: the )rofessionali-ation of security mana ement is not !ithout maBor conse?uences for the identities and mandates of international a encies: es)ecially iven the emer ence of inte rated missions and the e4)ansion of civil"military relations. A encies !ill have to revie! the 'alance 'et!een <the de)th of their commitment to defendin their o!n institutional interests . . . and the de ree to !hich that commitment influences the !ay they conceive of )rovidin hel) to )eo)le in need.=[%D] Before revie!in current strate ies to address the security challen es faced 'y the 5nited &ations and other international a encies: it is im)ortant to identify some of the factors under)innin the increased e4)osure to insecurity. Accordin to the Inde)endent Panel on the Safety and Security of 5.&. Personnel in Ira?: these factors include the ro!in num'er of field o)erations in fra mented or failed states: the 'lurrin of the distinction 'et!een civilians and com'atants in conflict areas: the )rivati-ation and fra mentation of armed forces and the increased availa'ility of !ea)ons: the lo'ali-ation of terror movements: and the s)read of reli ious and fundamentalist ideolo ies some of !hose adherents o)enly o))ose 2ey 5.&. tenets.[%A]
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The first three factors identified 'y the Panel are not sur)risin . They reflect the on oin deterioration of the social and security environments in !hich international a encies are called to o)erate.[%E] The last t!o factors: ho!ever: focus on sin ularly ne! threats a ainst the 5nited &ations and other a encies. These factors !ill 'e analy-ed in turn. 1. The Growing Number of Field Operations in Fragmented or Failed States (ver the last decade: international a encies have 'een called to de)loy their humanitarian: reconstruction: and develo)ment activities in a ro!in num'er of ha-ardous locations: from unsta'le )olitical environments to outri ht civil or international !ars. #or instance: the num'er of 5.&. staff de)loyed in ha-ardous missions multi)lied 'y four from %EE% to *@@,: reachin over /@:@@@.[*@] (ther international a encies faced similar increases in staff de)loyment to conflict areas.[*%] 5)on the re?uest of donor overnments to am)lify syner ies 'et!een assistance and )eace efforts ;for instance: in Af hanistan:[**] Sierra 3eone:[*,] or +arfur[*/]>: international a encies also had to e4)and their o)erational en a ement from traditional relief assistance to ri hts"'ased )ro rammin : reconstruction and develo)ment and: ultimately: conflict )revention and resolution activities. This increasin ?ualitative involvement in conflict )revention: mana ement: and resolution has caused a encies to de)loy more staff in a ro!in num'er of conflict situations to underta2e activities more )olitically sensitive than ever 'efore: there'y increasin their vulnera'ility and e4)osure to insecurity. 2. The Blurring of the Distinction Between i!ilians and ombatants Since the Second .orld .ar: conflicts have increasin ly en a ed civilians: 'oth as active )artici)ants in hostilities and direct tar ets of attac2. Tra ically: civilians have also constituted the over!helmin maBority of !ar casualties.[*1] .ith the !anin of the Cold .ar: a )attern of deli'erate !ar a ainst civilians: !a ed 'y lar ely untrained forces !ieldin relatively li ht arms: has )ersisted.[*C] Therefore: assistin civilians may 'e )erceived 'y )arties to a conflict as a esture of )olitical and security si nificance. +es)ite the humanitarian character of their endeavor: international a encies run the inherent ris2 of 'ein )erceived as ta2in sides in the conflict and: thus: 'ecomin the tar et of attac2s sim)ly 'y de)loyin their humanitarian o)erations for the 'enefit of the civilian )o)ulation. The direct tar etin of the 5.&. head?uarters in Ira? in the summer of *@@,: and the tar eted 2illin of staff mem'ers of the 5nited &ations 7i h Commission for $efu ees ;<5&7C$=> in Af hanistan in &ovem'er *@@,: [*D] e4em)lify the deterioratin security conditions that 5.&. a encies face. ". The #ri!ati$ation and Fragmentation of %rmed Forces and the &ncreased %!ailabilit' of (eapons Thou h the overall num'er of traditional international conflicts has decreased since the early %EE@s: the remainin and emer in conflicts often ta2e )lace !ithin failin or colla)sed states. [*A] The fra mentation of states: !ith its various manifestations ;ineffective overnment control over territory and )eo)le: !arlordism: re)ression of minorities: movement of internally dis)laced and refu ee )o)ulations> contri'utes to the com)le4ity of conflicts. International a encies must co)e !ith these ne! uncertainties 'y develo)in strate ies that: ideally: remain im)artial and amena'le to all )arties to the conflict. The a'ility of these a encies to )reserve the inte rity of their )ro rams and maintain the ac?uiescence of the )arties to the conflict amounts: for the most )art: to their security. 0oreover: the )revailin uidin o)erational )rinci)les for humanitarian action in armed conflict !ere develo)ed for a))lication in linear ty)es of !arfare: characteri-ed 'y a de ree of reada'ility of 'oth the 'attlefields and the command structures of contendin forces. Get: humanitarian or ani-ations increasin ly o)erate !ithin the conte4t of <s!irlin tactics= rather
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than <linear tactics.=[*E] Indeed: humanitarian or ani-ations and !or2ers are no! faced !ith <a style of !arfare that is itself ?ualitatively different from almost all !ar that has one 'efore.=[,@] #urthermore: the )roliferation of small arms has had a si nificant im)act on 'oth the )olitical and security environments of contem)orary conflicts. Individuals can no! arm themselves and create an active military rou) for only a fe! hundred dollars.[,%] .ith a minimum of trainin : they can en a e in !arfare !ith other rou)s or overnment forces. This access to !ea)ons has enerated 'oth the s)read of ;criminal and )olitical> violence and the levelin of )olitical rou)s. Private rou)s are a'le to ac?uire su'stantial )o!er and e4ert control over lar e territories and )o)ulations. International a encies6 o)erators have to en a e !ith such rou)s for access to vulnera'le )o)ulations and to o'tain credi'le security uarantees. ). The Globali$ation of Terror *o!ements and the Spread of +eligious and Fundamentalist &deologies The attac2s in Ba hdad on the 5.&. head?uarters in Au ust and Se)tem'er *@@, and on the International Committee of the $ed Cross ;<IC$C=> head office in (cto'er *@@,: as !ell as calls for further attac2s 'y fundamentalist movements:[,*] have forced humanitarian a encies to reconsider their security.[,,] In the )ast: !hen a encies6 )ersonnel !ere tar eted 'y armed rou)s: these attac2s !ere never understood as su'stantial challen es to the modus operandi of these or ani-ations. They !ere )erceived as isolated security incidents demonstratin a lac2 of understandin or trust of the neutral characters of the or ani-ations.[,/] Such e4)lanations a))ear rossly inade?uate: ho!ever: !hen one considers the un)recedented level of )lannin 'ehind the violent attac2s in Ba hdad: )rom)tin the !ithdra!al of most international staff from Ira? and: later: from )arts of Af hanistan. 0ore im)ortantly: the lo'al outreach of the terror or ani-ations involved a))eared to endan er humanitarian o)erations not only in s)ecific conflict settin s: 'ut all over the !orld.[,1] The lo'ali-ation of terror movements and the s)read of reli ious and fundamentalist ideolo ies re?uires si nificantly more than mana erial res)onsesH it reaches to the core of the security dilemmas confrontin international a encies and calls for a reevaluation of their strate ic a))roaches to conflicts. Can international a encies continue to o)erate if they 'ecome e4)licit tar ets of attac2I .hat ty)es of security measures can 'e im)lemented to maintain life"savin activitiesI Can humanitarian or ani-ations )roactively maintain the )erce)tion that the essence of their tas2 is humanitarianFneutral in endeavor: im)artial in method: inde)endent and distinct from 'ac2ersFand continue to see2 acce)tance 'y all the )arties concernedI The e4)licit tar etin of international or ani-ations has finally 'rou ht to the fore essential ?uestions concernin the relationshi) of each or ani-ation !ith the )olitical motives and the strate ic security concerns of their home constituencies: namely their fundin sources.[,C] $elyin on the )rinci)le of inde)endence is increasin ly )ro'lematic considerin the si nificant ro!th of 5.&. and non"5.&. international a encies in recent years: and the )arallel increased de)endency of these a encies on lar e donors: such as the Euro)ean 5nion and the 5nited States !ho: themselves: )ursue )olitical a endas.[,D] #or instance: after the 'om'in of the 5.&. head?uarters in Ba hdad: al Jaeda alle edly claimed res)onsi'ility for the attac2 and declared that the 5nited &ations is <a 'ranch of the American State +e)artment.=[,A] These issues e4)lain in )art !hy humanitarian or ani-ations have had difficulties in addressin the emer ence of ne! threats !ithin the conte4t of their core values and current mandates. ,. Operational &ntegration and the -mergence of New Operational +is.s #ollo!in the 5.S."led interventions in Af hanistan and Ira?: the reality of inte rated missions: !hich com)ound all sectors of international activities in a iven country under one )eace"
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'uildin mission: has emer ed almost naturally. Indeed: +avid $ieff !rites that <it is difficult to see ho! this ne! humanitarian model in !hich military action and humanitarian effort are vie!ed as Boined in one seamless enter)rise !ill easily or soon 'e undone.=[,E] The challen es inherent in re)airin overnment infrastructure and in re'uildin a sustaina'le economy on the remnants of a fra mented state re?uire serious strate ic )lannin and the inte ration of international assistance under one coherent frame!or2.[/@] International assistance is no! clearly lin2ed to security concerns: declared to 'e of <national interest:=[/%] and )romoted as a )reventive res)onse to the lo'al threat )osed 'y e4treme violent rou)s.[/*] These inte rated efforts are often underta2en at the e4)ense of )reviously dominant military rou)s ;e. .: the Tali'an in Af hanistan: Sunni Baathists in Ira?> that may remain militarily active. In vie! of the su)remacy of the 5.S. military and its allies: dis runtled KLfnB/CL hrefKLMfn/CLN[//] demonstrate the e4tent to !hich the lin2 'et!een humanitarian and develo)mental )ro rams and )eace enforcement efforts can endan er the inte rity of the former: !ith little 'enefit to the latter. Some ar ue that these ris2s are even reater !hen military )ersonnel: in lieu of international a encies: en a e actively in the delivery of humanitarian and develo)ment assistance. The decision to allo! military )ersonnel to )rovide humanitarian and develo)mental assistance is ty)ically driven 'y the military6s intention to )rovide <force )rotection= or to collect intelli ence on the activities of insur ent rou)s. (n occasion: the military en a es in the delivery of such services very sim)ly 'ecause the emer ency needs of a iven )o)ulation have remained unmet 'ecause of the serious threats faced 'y international humanitarian a encies.[/1] B. New Securit' +is.s in a /arger Operational onte0t 0ost e4)erts a ree that des)ite the tra ic conse?uences of these attac2s on humanitarian a encies6 staff and the emotional im)act of the loss of life: the monetary cost of security incidents related to attac2s on a encies6 )ersonnel remains relatively lo! com)ared to other sources of ris2 such as road accidents: illnesses: criminal violence: riots: or collateral dama e from hostilities.[/C] #urthermore: the factors that mar2 s)ecifically 5.&. a ency )ersonnel as e4)licit tar ets should not 'e considered im)ortant 'ecause the increase in the )ro'a'ility of tar eted attac2s on 5.&. )ersonnel is nominal. The real cause of concern: instead: is the )olitical and o)erational conse?uences of such attac2s and the reali-ation that some conflict areas or )arties to conflict may effectively 'ecome <off"limits= for international a encies: includin those e4clusively en a ed in emer ency res)onse. **+ %nited &ations/ esponse to *ncreasing Security is!s

A. Institutional Changes 7avin revie!ed the sources of insecurity: the 5.&.6s res)onse to this volatile ne! security environment is underta2en. .hile si nificant investments in security hard!are are 'ein made: includin security infrastructure: e?ui)ment: field trainin : and e4)ertise: it a))ears that the 5nited &ations has not yet develo)ed a )ro)er strate ic a))roach to its security in terms of vision and means. 0oreover: methods for assessin ris2s: mana in crises: communication: and allocation of res)onsi'ilities remain inade?uate. This Part !ill analy-e: in )articular: the reasons that account for the lac2 of co ent security strate ies in the 5nited &ations. In the )ast: the 5.&.6s security strate y has 'een 'ased )rimarily on acce)tance of a 5.&. mission 'y the local )o)ulation and the em'lematic )rotection offered 'y the 5.&. fla . But: as evidenced 'y the *@@, attac2s on 5.&. head?uarters in Ba hdad[/D] and the ro!in num'er of fatalities amon relief !or2ers and elections o'servers in Af hanistan: Ira?: and +emocratic
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$e)u'lic of Con o:[/A] the increased e4)osure to security threats has seriously challen ed the security mana ement ca)acity and ca)a'ility of the 5nited &ations. $ecent internal revie!s into the security system of the 5nited &ations hi hli hted serious deficiencies in the mana ement of the security of staff in conflict areas.[/E] The shortcomin s identified 'y these in?uiries included the )oor trainin of security )ersonnel: the lac2 of resources to maintain essential security infrastructure: the culture of indifference amon o)erational staff !ith re ard to security )rocedures: and the dearth of analytical ca)a'ilities for continued ris2 assessments.[1@] These deficiencies have had severe conse?uences for the security of 5.&. staff over the recent years and have limited the a'ility of the 5.&. system to de)loy its )ersonnel in conflict areas. The tra edy in Ba hdad in Au ust *@@, )rovided the necessary im)etus to address these issues in a systemic manner !ith the su))ort of the 5.&. General Assem'ly. 5.&. Secretary"General Oofi Annan res)onded 'y esta'lishin a series of mechanisms to further develo) internal security )olicies. In Pune *@@/: the +e)uty Secretary"General: 3ouise #rQchette: re)orted the launch of several initiatives to stren then the 5.&. security system in eneral and to enhance the ca)acity of the (ffice of the 5nited &ations Security Coordinator ;<5&SEC(($+=> in )articular. These reforms !ere in line !ith )revious )olicy recommendations ado)ted 'y the 5.&. General Assem'ly.[1%] In )articular: a senior chan e mana er !as a))ointed in Panuary *@@/ to advise on !ays to stren then the 5.&. security system and to assist in the im)lementation of a num'er of ne! actions: includin the develo)ment of an enhanced )rocedure for threat and ris2 assessment: the u) radin of o)eratin security standards: the evaluation of systems for com)liance and accounta'ility: and the trainin and career develo)ment of security )ersonnel.[1*] (n +ecem'er *,: *@@/: as )art of a 'road revie! of security: the 5.&. General Assem'ly a))roved the esta'lishment of the +e)artment of Safety and Security.[1,] This ne! de)artment inte rated a num'er of security offices throu hout the 5nited &ations: includin the former 5&SEC(($+: the Safety and Security Services ;<SSS=>: and the civilian security com)onent of the +e)artment of Peace2ee)in ()erations.[1/] (n Panuary %,: *@@1: the Secretary"General a))ointed Sir +avid 8eness: former assistant commissioner for s)ecialist o)erations !ith Scotland Gard: to head the +e)artment of Safety and Security at the 5nder"Secretary"General level.[11] 8eness is the first security )rofessional named at the most senior mana erial level of the 5nited &ations !ith a far"reachin mandate to )rofessionali-e the 5.&. security system.[1C] (ther international a encies have also hired security e4)erts at their head?uarters and the re ional field level to oversee security arran ements.[1D] 5)on the invitation of donor overnments: &G(s such as the 5nited States A ency for International +evelo)ment ;<5SAI+=> and the 7umanitarian Aid +e)artment of the Euro)ean Commission ;<EC7(=> com'ined their efforts to 'uild their o!n security systems and to )ool security e4)ertise.[1A] The international &G( $ed$: for e4am)le: no! runs trainin )ro rams 'oth on individual and institutional security.[1E] InterAction: an alliance of 5.S. humanitarian and international develo)ment &G(s: has esta'lished the )osition of an &G( security coordinator[C@] as !ell as a security advisory rou): !hich develo)s )olicies and )rotocols for the security of &G( staff.[C%] InterAction )lans to )ro)ose a ne! security 'lue)rint to its 'oard of directors 'y the end of *@@1.[C*] At the field level: coo)erative arran ements on security have similarly emer ed. The Af hanistan &G( Security (ffice ;<A&S(=> )rovides humanitarian or ani-ations !or2in in Af hanistan !ith u)dated security re)orts and security mana ement strate ies.[C,] The &G( Coordination Committee in Ira? ;<&CCI=> offers similar security coordination and su))ort as )art of its mission to coordinate the !or2 of the &G(s remainin in Ira?.[C/] #inally: EC7( has recently )roduced a maBor survey of security strate ies and resources for its )artner or ani-ations.[C1]
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As o'served in the *@@1 S0I survey: these investments are 'e innin to have an im)act on the overall culture of humanitarian )ersonnel. Basic security s2ills trainin is no! availa'le to staff in most a encies throu h various in"house trainin courses: or throu h outsourced trainin !ith s)eciali-ed &G(s or )rivate security com)anies.[CC] 3on distance security trainin via video or C+"$(0 is also )ossi'le.[CD] These trainin resources address <)ractical issues encountered in field!or2 ;)assive )rotection: interaction !ith 'elli erents: ne otiation techni?ues: and mine a!areness )ro rams> and )resent each a ency6s s)ecific security re ulations and o)eratin standards.=[CA] This availa'ility of information on security suffers: ho!ever: from t!o serious limitations. #irst: the S0I survey sho!ed that 'asic security trainin is enerally not made availa'le to nationally recruited staff: !ho are increasin ly made res)onsi'le for the security of entire o)erations.[CE] +ue to limited resources: international a encies tend to focus on 'uildin the security ca)a'ilities of international staff as the 'ac2'one of their security res)onse. Such an a))roach must necessarily 'e revie!ed in li ht of the ro!in trend of conductin o)erations in hi hly insecure environments remotely: usin national staff as frontline o)erators. Second: security trainin enerally remains introductory and does not address mana erial issues in terms of: for e4am)le: methodolo y for ris2 assessments and crisis mana ement.[D@] (ne should nevertheless note that efforts are emer in in this domain. The 5&7C$ is at the forefront of such efforts: !ith a com)rehensive security mana ement revie! released in Panuary *@@1.[D%] 7o!ever: all a encies intervie!ed in the course of the *@@1 S0I survey a ree that efforts are ur ently needed to develo) security mana ement ca)a'ilities !ithin international a encies: for 'oth senior security advisors and senior o)erational mana ers.[D*] B. From Basic Training to New Securit' *anagement Standards and #rocedures .hile most o)erational mana ers a ree that the security environment has evolved considera'ly: it a))ears that the increased availa'ility of o)erational trainin has ta2en )lace !ithout a clear understandin of the ty)es or sources of threats international a encies !ill face in the comin decades. In fact: there are fe! discussions addressin lo'al and local threats a ainst international a encies or e4)lorin the role that a encies can )lay to miti ate e4)osure to these ne! ris2s.[D,] 0ore enerally: international a encies e4)ress the vie! that althou h the safety and security of their staff is their foremost concern: strin ent security measures should not dictate o)erational )olicy nor limit their a'ility to fulfill their mandates. Because the a encies fear that o)erational choices may 'e restrained 'y an over"em)hasis on the )rovision of security: security issues are )erceived as )rimarily technical matters and are not considered strate ically im)ortant.[D/] As e4)lained a'ove: there is a dearth of strate ic thin2in in the develo)ment of international a encies6 security res)onses: and this a'sence is one of the most stri2in limitations on the ade?uate )rovision of security. #or the most )art: current a))roaches have 'een ela'orated as a series of technical res)onses to o)erational )ro'lems !ithout meanin ful )olicy de'ates amon international a encies on coherent security strate ies.[D1] #or e4am)le: des)ite the common reco nition that one a ency6s 'ehavior may affect the security of all a encies in a iven theater of o)eration: there is little to no inter"a ency coordination or information"e4chan e mechanisms 'eyond the 5.&. Security 0ana ement Team ;<S0T=> rou)in of the heads of each 5.&. a ency. A&S( in Af hanistan is a rare e4am)le of several a encies )oolin their resources to mana e their e4)osure to ris2s.[DC] At the head?uarters level: a encies rarely discuss ris2 assessment: crisis mana ement: crisis miti ation: or insurance covera e.[DD] (nly recently have the (ffice of the 5.&. Security Coordinator ;<5&+SS=> and the Inter"A ency Security 0ana ement &et!or2
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;<IAS0&=> 'e un reflectin on security )riorities and )rocedures for 5.&. a encies !or2in in ha-ardous environments.[DA] &o other si nificant institutional )olicy mechanisms address: in a coordinated manner: the security ris2s incurred 'y international a encies. This lac2 of de'ate is )articularly sur)risin in li ht of the len thy discussions amon international a encies on other as)ects of mana ement reform: such as the need for reater mana erial accounta'ility and trans)arency: the mainstreamin of human ri hts: and the ne4us 'et!een reha'ilitation and develo)ment. In other !ords: !hile security ca)a'ilities have ro!n into a )rimary strate ic factor in allo!in or )rohi'itin field o)erations: little has 'een discussed or )u'lished amon a encies on this critical to)ic. Sur)risin ly: international a encies have not yet had this much"needed de'ate and discussion in s)ite of their !illin ness to discuss other issues.[DE] The failure of international a encies to develo) co ent security strate ies can 'e traced to the com)etin interests and )riorities that emer e as a encies interact !ith the rou)s discussed 'elo!. 1. 1ost Go!ernments 7ost overnments are: in )rinci)le: res)onsi'le for all security as)ects of international a encies6 o)erations. This res)onsi'ility flo!s from the inherent function of overnment to maintain la! and order. 7o!ever: there are no clear descri)tions of !hat such res)onsi'ility should entail in )ractical terms.[A@] The Convention on the Safety of 5.&. and Associated Personnel: for e4am)le: sim)ly refers to the res)onsi'ility of a host state to <ta2e all a))ro)riate measures to ensure the safety and security of 5nited &ations and associated )ersonnel= and )rovides some le al 'asis for the e4chan e of information )ertainin to the )revention and )rosecution of crimes a ainst 5.&. )ersonnel.[A%] Besides this: there is no indication of the de ree or mode of a host overnment6s involvement in the security and safety of international a encies. (n the other hand: a encies !ould not necessarily !elcome an official security 'lan2et as it may interfere !ith the !arrin )arties6 )erce)tion of the a ency as a neutral 'ody: e4ert un!arranted control over their movements and activities: and limit access to vulnera'le rou)s. Thus: in an effort to 2ee) the host overnments at a distance: most a encies tend to understate their security needs and strate ies.[A*] 2. Non2State %rmed Groups and i!il Societ' International a encies that choose: as a matter of )rinci)le: to stay at arms len th from security forces do so in )art 'ecause they are a!are of the im)ortance of 'ein )erceived as trans)arent and trust!orthy 'y non"state actors and civil society. A))earin concerned a'out staff security 'eyond the acce)ta'le local norms necessary for )rotection a ainst criminal activities can easily 'e )erceived as hidin a more )olitical a enda. A encies in conflict areas tend to model their security arran ements on local )ractices and customs: even thou h they reali-e fully that their security needs differ su'stantially from those of local )rivate actors.[A,] ". &nternational %gencies3 Staff #inally: em)loyment re ulations may render a encies directly lia'le for the security of their )ersonnel.[A/] The determination of security ris2s may !ell tri er incommensura'le conse?uences in terms of an a ency6s relationshi) !ith its o!n staff. In other !ords: the more determinate the security ris2s a))ear in a iven situation: the more definitive the o'li ations of the a ency !ill 'e to )rovide a))ro)riate security arran ements. 0ost a encies no! reco ni-e that contractual !aivers referrin to the strictly volunteer nature of the commitment of
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individual staffers on missions in conflict areas !ill not suffice to limit the a encies6 lia'ility in court.[A1] Althou h a encies understanda'ly cannot )rovide a'solute security to staff in conflict areas: Bust ho! much security they should )rovide remains difficult to determine. In this conte4t: the )rofessionali-ation of security can carry si nificant o)erational and financial lia'ilities for international a encies in terms of security assessment: analysis: )rotection measures: and the )reventive evacuation and relocation of staff. ***+ 'nalysis of the Current Strategic 'pproaches to *nsecurity T!o maBor schools of thou hts com)ete over the orientation of the 5.&. a encies6 security res)onse. This Part !ill )resent these distinct a))roaches and !ill assess the )otential evolution of the de'ate. As discussed a'ove: international a encies have s)ent too little time and too fe! resources on develo)in )ro)er and cohesive security strate ies. Current a))roaches to security com'ine different methods and vary from one a ency to another. These a))roaches may 'e cate ori-ed as <system"'ased strate ies= or <community"'ased strate ies.= %. S'stem2Based %pproach to Securit' 5nder a system"'ased security strate y: all a encies involved in a iven conflict area im)lement strict security standards and )rocedures.[AC] Thus: the security of each mem'er de)ends to a lar e e4tent on the security of all the others. System"'ased security is at the core of the 5.&. security system: in !hich 5&+SS: the IAS0&: and the security a))aratus in the field are desi ned to function as a net!or2 of security officers o)eratin in )arallel to 5.&. o)erations: )rovidin uidance and standards on all security issues.[AD] 5nder this a))roach: security threats are )erceived as a reality a ainst !hich a encies must 'e )rotected. Security e4)erts must: therefore: assess threats and )lan counter"measures. The focus is on the threats and on the )rotection measures to 'e im)lemented: rather than on the sources of: or motives 'ehind: the threats. The security res)onse is 'ased )rimarily on centrali-ed eneric standards such as the 5.&. 0inimum ()erational Security Standards ;<0(SS=>. #ield o)erators are res)onsi'le to their head?uarters for the )ro)er im)lementation of these standards.[AA] There are countless 'enefits to such a security a))roach. The system is rational and scala'le: de)endin on the amount of resources availa'le to ensure each a ency6s com)liance !ith system"!ide standards and )rocedures. Also: security ca)a'ilities can 'e de)loyed in timely fashion )endin the availa'ility of resources. The system is often 'ased on military or security e4)ertise that can readily ada)t lessons learned in military o)erations on the security of )eo)le: )remises: trans)ortation: or communication.[AE] But there are four serious shortcomin s to such systems. #irst: a system"'ased security a))roach de)ends lar ely on the ?uality of ris2 assessments and: therefore: re?uires stron intelli ence ca)a'ilities. 7o!ever: intelli ence ca)a'ilities are limited 'y the )olitical and le al restrictions im)osed 'y host overnments or the international community.[E@] The resultin lac2 of intelli ence information means that military e4)erts are often una'le to ta2e )ro)er )rotection measures. Parado4ically: the im)lementation of ti hter security measures often results in limitin interactions !ith the )o)ulation and !ith )otential sources of threats: there'y further hinderin the a encies6 ca)acity to assess their security environment.[E%] Secondly: system"'ased security res)onses are essentially reactive and amor)hous in that they construe security ris2s as eneric threats such as thefts: 2idna))in : and shootin s. Such res)onses dis)lay little understandin of the social: economic: and )olitical environment of these human"
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made threatsFan understandin that could li2ely )revent their occurrence. Given the a'sence of ade?uate intelli ence and the limited ca)a'ility to en a e in a )reventive dialo ue !ith the sources of the threats: international a encies are easy ;<soft=> tar ets lac2in the ca)a'ility to 'uild their security ca)ital on a system"!ide 'asis. As a result: system"'ased res)onses are enerally uns)ecific: unstructured: and unconvincin . Thirdly: unless military ca)a'ilities are availa'le: system"'ased security can easily 'e out" unned or overrun 'y any armed rou) that finds it advanta eous to chase the international a encies out of the conflict situation. #inally: thou h most a encies tend to e4tend the initially )lanned timeframe of their commitment in an o)erational settin : system"'ased security a))roaches tend to esche! a lon "term vie! of a ency de)loyment. #or the a'ove reasons: relyin e4clusively on system"'ased en a ements !ill li2ely cause the various sta2eholders to vie! the international a ency more ne atively: there'y severely constrainin the further develo)ment of activities. B. ommunit'2Based %pproach to Securit' A community"'ased strate y ado)ts a different a))roach to security. 5nder this formulation: security is defined as the )roduct of a relationshi) !ith the community of 'eneficiaries and actors in the conflict. Thus: the security of staff derives from the acce)tance of the )resence and activities of international a encies 'y all those !ho can affect their security. This a))roach has 'een ado)ted 'y such humanitarian or ani-ations as the IC$C and other &G(s active in conflict areas.[E*] 5nder this a))roach: the security of the staff starts !ith the )revention of threats: 'y directly addressin )otential sources of ris2s and ne otiatin access to vulnera'le )o)ulations. The focus is on the sources of the threats and the means to )revent their emer ence. Consultations !ith the community as !ell as re)resentatives of )arties to the conflict are essential com)onents of this a))roach. Communication and trans)arency are the )rimary tools of this )rocess. In this conte4t: or ani-ations must 'e a'le to articulate a clear and acce)ta'le mandate and e4)lain the )ur)ose of their activities to the communities involved. Their activities should focus on clearly identified humanitarian or develo)mental aims. #ollo!in strict and trans)arent need assessments: the delivery of services must 'e reco ni-ed as im)artial. The community and security"related sta2eholders must have a enuine interest in the services )rovided. 5nder this a))roach the role of the humanitarian o)erators is central. Their e4)ertise in 'uildin trust !ith the relevant )arties and !ithin the )o)ulation )lays a critical role in securin the o)erational round!or2 for the a encies6 activities.[E,] This a))roach also has four im)ortant shortcomin s. #irst and foremost: !hile the community environment )lays a central role in )rovidin secure rounds for a encies to o)erate: it is !ron to consider 5.&. humanitarian a encies li2e the 5&7C$ or 5&ICE# as community"'ased. The a endas of such or ani-ations remain defined )rimarily 'y international entities and their fundin is )rovided lar ely 'y forei n donors. The constant )ressure on these 5.&. a encies to have a distinct mandate and to 'e visi'le often conflicts !ith their desire and a'ility to interact !ith the community. Secondly: communities are in a )osition to uarantee the security of a encies only to the e4tent that they are themselves safe and secure. Glo'al and forei n threats and or ani-ed crime: as !ell as an increasin num'er of <sectarian= armed non"state actors: are often 'eyond the reach of community"'ased security uarantees.[E/] The community"'ased security a))roach leaves international a encies )articularly vulnera'le to e4ternal threats since it fundamentally limits their a'ility to )ut to ether close )rotection measures in community settin s. (nce an a ency turns to the community to ensure its security: it 'e ins sharin the ris2s faced 'y community mem'ers. Thirdly: acce)tance 'y the community is elusive: difficult to measure or test over time: and may also 'e misleadin . Communities of 'eneficiaries may not al!ays have a choice in !hether to acce)t or reBect humanitarian assistance. Similarly: acce)tance 'y the community does not automatically uarantee security. Acce)tance 'y
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overnments and armed rou)s ali2e are also necessarily dictated 'y evolvin )olitical and security strate ies. As a result: acce)tance strate ies are not al!ays useful as lon "term strate ies since acce)tance itself may 'e fleetin . Communication strate ies and ne otiation s2ills are critical tools for enhancin the security of staff in these circumstances: 'ut: alone: they are not enou h. #inally: community"'ased security is not scala'le or re)lica'le !ithout the availa'ility of ?ualified individuals )re)ared to en a e in a dialo ue !ith the )arties to the conflict and a'le to develo) the necessary )ersonal net!or2s. Community"'ased security most often remains centered on individual o)erators !ho are ca)a'le of inte ratin the a encies6 communication: )ro rammin : and security oals in a coherent manner. E4)erienced individuals are difficult to find and de)loy on short notice. In addition: over"reliance on individual )rofessionals may cause a encies to underestimate the need for institutional ris2 evaluation and res)onse strate ies in the face of constantly chan in security ris2s. . urrent Debate As o'served in the *@@1 S0I survey: even humanitarian a encies functionin under a centrali-ed system"'ased a))roach reco ni-e that acce)tance 'y all sta2eholders: as !ell as com)liance !ith the )rinci)les of )olitical neutrality: inde)endence: and im)artiality are the 'est uarantees for the security of their staff.[E1] 7o!ever: in the !a2e of the 'om'in attac2s in Ba hdad and the tar eted attac2s on staff in other o)erations: a encies are 'e innin to reco ni-e that they must adBust their security measures 'ased on a thorou h e4amination of the )erce)tion of sta2eholders and 'ased u)on an assessment of o)erational ris2s.[EC] In this conte4t: community"'ased and system"'ased strate ies may each )rovide useful insi hts on !ays to im)rove the security of staff confronted 'y ne! and evolvin threats. There is also: ho!ever: a continuin de'ate a'out the e4istence of a direct lo'al terrorist threat a ainst .estern humanitarian a encies. The investment of over one hundred million 5.S. dollars: made in the !a2e of the 'om'in s in Ba hdad: to )rotect the head?uarters and field offices of the 5.&. and the IC$C has 'een critici-ed as 'oth e4cessive: iven the a'sence of direct threats a ainst s)ecific locations: and as dis)ro)ortionate to the dearth of resources invested in 'uildin staff ca)acity and analytical ca)a'ility. Critics of this lo'al threat )aradi m )oint out that a encies should ear their security measures to s)ecific and conte4tuali-ed vulnera'ilities that relate to the safety of staff: such as the )revention of road accidents and diseases: rather than to tar eted attac2s a ainst staff and )ro)erty.[ED] #inally: most a encies consider their ca)acity to analy-e the )olitical situation and to assess the threats and ris2s of their environment to 'e ham)ered 'y a lac2 of institutional familiarity !ith the lan ua e: culture: and )olitical nuances of the location !here they o)erate. They are also seriously limited 'y the scarcity of seasoned eneralist mana ers: hi h staff turnover: deficiencies in the transmission of 2ey information: and arm6s"len th )olicies !ith re ard to national or international security forces )rovidin 2ey information on security issues.[EA] The )rocess of transformin international a encies6 a))roach to security is far from linear. The increased a!areness of 5.&. a ency staff a'out security and safety challen es: resultin from a recent and ro!in availa'ility of 'asic trainin : demonstrates 'oth the !ill and ca)a'ility of 5.&. or ani-ations to address increasin security ris2s. 7o!ever: the lac2 of a cohesive strate y has seriously hindered the develo)ment of )ro)er security standards and )rocedures necessary for further im)rovements. *(+ 0eveloping &ew Security Strategies for *nternational 'gencies# $he *ntegrated Security Manage-ent SysteIn vie! of the increased )ressure on a encies to im)rove their security res)onse at 'oth the systemic and community levels: international a encies must loo2 for ne! strate ies to 'etter
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)rotect their em)loyees. In recent years: interhou h this method )rovides a encies !ith much" needed fle4i'ility: it remains unsatisfactory as a lon "term solution since it does not yield a coherent and re)lica'le security strate y. 5ltimately: the system"'ased a))roach and the community"'ased a))roach to security are contradictory. Essentially reactive in nature: system"'ased security relies on e4ternal security resources: focuses on the military as)ects of security: and )rovides a centrali-ed and coordinated system of )rotection. Community"'ased security: !hich may offer the 'est"2no!n method of )reventin threats: remains difficult to scale or re)licate and enerates confusion re ardin security standards in any iven situation. Strate ies devised to encoura e the )artici)ation of local communities in )ro rammin and enhancin security mana ement are not systemati-ed: leavin limited o))ortunities to evaluate their im)act on the security of staff over time and amon a encies. A'ove and 'eyond these contradictions: these strate ies reflect the t!o distinct o)erational identities of the 5nited &ations. Its first identity is as a state"'ased multilateral or ani-ation assistin its mem'er states in fulfillin their national )olicy a enda. Its second role is as a civil society or ani-ation servin s)ecific constituencies such as refu ees: children: and victims of !ar. +e'ates 'et!een the t!o security a))roaches conceal the inherent )olitical tensions 'et!een overnmental and non" overnmental institutions 'oth in terms of o)erational end oals and the means of achieve them. Security mana ement is: in this conte4t: no different from other areas of o)erational and strate ic )lannin . The conse?uences of the tensions: ho!ever: are more dramatic as com)ared to: for e4am)le: the )lannin of a vaccination cam)ai n or measures to eradicate locust infestation. &either the system"'ased nor community"'ased a))roach offers a definite solution to the security needs of international a encies: and the im)rovised vacillation 'et!een the t!o is not a lon "term solution. An inte rated security mana ement system that can )rovide common )rofessional and cultural rounds for the develo)ment of sound security strate ies is needed. This common security culture must 'e 'ased on an understandin of the com)osite nature of international a encies6 missions. International a enciesFhumanitar"ian: develo)mental: or )oliticalFare all driven 'y an internationalist a enda eared to!ard assistin local communities in times of conflict. The security of their o)erations de)ends as much on a standardi-ed and !ell"inte rated system"!ide security strate y as on the su))ort and )artici)ation of communities.[%@@] Based on the )recedin analysis: this Article su ests a ne! model for the creation of an inte rated security mana ement system ;<IS0S=>. Such a system could 'e )ut into )lace !ithin each a ency to serve the needs of each a ency for tailored security strate ies and also to )rovide a common )rofessional round for the esta'lishment of a concerted security frame!or2 amon international a encies. %. 4nderstanding the D'namic haracter of &nsecurit' An IS0S 'e ins 'y inte ratin all elements of the security res)onses of international a encies into a defined model: from the mana ement of ris2s to the miti ation of dama es. This inte rated a))roach res)onds to the dynamic se?uence of factors and events that ive rise to insecurity. 5nder the IS0S a))roach: an or ani-ation must first consider its s)ecific vulnera'ilities in any iven conte4t since these vulnera'ilities !ill li2ely com)ound other ris2 factors. E4am)les of such vulnera'ilities include the a ency6s history: its )ositionin vis"R"vis other actors and sta2eholders in the conflict: the !ay that it is )erceived 'y the )arties to the conflict: and the
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)otential conse?uences of it activities. Any o)eration faces a series of ris2s: from the most 'eni n ;e. .: desert environment> to the most serious ;e. .: )roliferation of small !ea)ons>. These factors must 'e continuously analy-ed to )rovide o)erational mana ers !ith information on the conflict environments in !hich their staffs !ill o)erate. These ris2 factors must 'e considered seriously 'y security mana ers 'ecause they contri'ute to the emer ence of actual o)erational threats a ainst international a encies. The true o)erational dan er is in the reali-ation and conver ence of several such ris2 factors at a iven time and location. ()erators enerally a ree that threats are most often communicated to the a encies 'efore a security incident occurs.[%@%] 7ence: it is im)ortant to 'e a'le to accurately inter)ret and effectively react to these communications in a timely manner. 0any of the threats communicated to a encies are not carried out and very fe! result in security incidents.[%@*] Thus: a 2ey as)ect of security analysis is to evaluate the credi'ility of the threats received and the ca)acity and !illin ness of individuals or rou)s to carry out such attac2s. In some situations: )rotective measures may successfully )revent the occurrence of any su'stantial dama es.[%@,] A 2ey as)ect of insecurity is the interde)endence 'et!een the various se?uences of factors and events. &ot all ris2 factors !ill result in a security incident. 7o!ever: all losses and dama es resultin from a security incident can 'e traced to an actual threat and to a series of ris2 factors. This interde)endence is at the core of an IS0S as individual elements of the security res)onse 'uild on one another to create a common security strate y. B. Building an &ntegrated Securit' *anagement S'stem Creatin an inte rated security mana ement system does not re?uire su'stantial ne! resources. $ather: it focuses on ma2in current resources and e4)ertise !or2 to ether. At the core of an IS0S is a standards"'ased: centrali-ed )lannin and )olicy structure that )rovides uidance re ardin a set of security sectors located at the )eri)hery. The central or an 'ears the res)onsi'ility of evaluatin the )erformance of each security sector and: if need 'e: investi atin )otential failures of the security system. The central IS0S should 'e staffed 'y security e4)erts !ho can )rovide the necessary uidance and trainin to security and o)erational staff in the field. This rou) of e4)erts should 'e com)osed of 'oth individuals !ith a military or la! enforcement 'ac2 round as !ell as e4)erienced o)erators from the humanitarian and develo)mental community. In any )articular IS0S: the res)onsi'ility for im)lementation of the security measures may 'e located at the field level and im)lemented 'y field o)erators: !ho should 'e trained to fulfill security res)onsi'ilities. 7o!ever: field o)erators need not have military or security 'ac2 rounds. Since a)s in any sector endan er the inte rity and efficacy of the !hole system: each security sector has an e?ual value in terms of )riority. The res)onsi'ilities and com)etence of each sector are outlined 'elo!. 1. +is. %ssessment and %nal'sis Security and o)erational mana ers should 'e entrusted !ith the res)onsi'ility of assessin and analy-in a series of identified ris2 factors accordin to )olicy uidelines from head?uarters. Their analyses should )rovide )ractical recommendations to o)erational mana ers at the local and re ional levels to address the sources of insecurity throu h threat )revention or )rotection measures. These assessments should 'e conducted as )art of the a ency6s re ular )ro rammatic assessments and should not rely on covert intelli ence atherin methods. The results of these assessments should 'e shared !ith other security sectors and or ani-ations. 2. ommunit' &nformation and Threat #re!ention #ollo!in the community"'ased a))roach and e4)erience: o)erational mana ers should 'e iven clear o'Bectives and should offer clear messa es to the community re ardin their
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o)erations. The results of these e4chan es should 'e documented and shared !ith other security sectors. ". #rotection *easures and risis *anagement Based on the ris2 assessments and e4chan es !ith community re)resentatives: a))ro)riate )rotection measures should 'e )ut in )lace to ensure the security of staff: )remises: trans)ortation: and communication. #or each of these measures: s)ecific standardi-ed )olicies should 'e im)lemented 'ased on the IS0S uidelines )roduced at head?uarters. In times of crisis: such as !hen security incidents occur: contin ency )lannin should 'e im)lemented for the )reservation of critical assets. Trainin and drill e4ercises should 'e 2ey com)onents of security )re)aredness. ). *itigation *easures The res)onsi'ility of a security system does not end !ith the conclusion of a security incident. The system must also address all the lo istical as)ects of the miti ation measures so as to minimi-e the conse?uences of the incident. In terms of human resources: these res)onsi'ilities may include emer ency medical treatment: )ost"traumatic stress consultations: and evacuation. In terms of )hysical assets: it may include collection of residual assets: u) radin of )rotection measures and security res)onses: and evaluation and investi ation of a security incident. Evaluation and investi ation of a security incident is of )articular im)ortance 'oth for com)ensatin the inBured )arties and for evaluatin the security la)ses that may have occurred. The IS0S model mer es system"'ased and community"'ased methodolo ies into a common security strate y for international a encies. 5nder an IS0S: o)erational security needs are divided into the aforementioned four discrete fields of activities: from ris2 assessment to miti ation measures. Each field has its o!n )olicies and strate ies. The res)ective activities of a iven field allo! for the esta'lishment of a clear: credi'le: and )rofessional security system 'ased on scala'le and re)lica'le strate ies. As !ith other security a))roaches: an IS0S is unli2ely to )rovide a'solute security: 'ut it !ill )rovide a coherent and inte rated method to reduce the e4)osure of staff to security ris2s across a encies and situations. . +esponsibilit' of /ine *anagers A central assum)tion of the IS0S model outlined a'ove is that o)erational mana ers should 'e )rimarily res)onsi'le for the mana ement of the security of )ersonnel in ha-ardous missions. These mana ers should 'e trained and e?ui))ed !ith the necessary tools to underta2e these res)onsi'ilities. Security e4)erts should )rovide advice to the mana ers on s)ecific security functions. 0ost of the e4)erts that )artici)ated in the *@@1 S0I survey a ree that o)erational decisions should 'e made 'y o)erational line mana ers and that security e4)erts should 'e confined to an advisory role.[%@/] A encies ac2no!led e that security e4)erts tend to o)timi-e the a))lication of security re ulations and enhance ris2 miti ation to an e4tent that often forces a encies to 'un2eri-e their o)erations: )rohi'itin access to 'eneficiaries or forcin the or ani-ations to !ithdra! entirely from o)erational theaters.[%@1] Conse?uently: a encies are com)elled to develo) alternative a))roaches: such as o)eratin at a distance: that diminish the e4)osure of their international staff. A encies reco ni-e: ho!ever: that many of their o)erational mana ers do not have the security mana ement ca)a'ilities to evaluate or overrule technical recommendations made 'y their security e4)erts.[%@C] The selection )rocess for assi nin mana erial staff to ha-ardous missions often does not ta2e into account a candidate6s a'ilities as a leader: a coordinator: or a crisis mana er. &or do clear tools e4ist to assess the s2ills and
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com)etency of mana ers in matters dealin !ith the security of staff. To su))ort the )rofessional develo)ment of their senior mana ement staff in the security domain: 5.&. a encies should therefore )rovide tailored trainin : monitorin : and evaluation. D. %ccountabilit' and &nstitutional +is. *anagement &ssues As noted: a 2ey as)ect of the IS0S is the ac2no!led ment of the role and res)onsi'ility of the line mana ers for the security of staff. This ne! res)onsi'ility must 'e em'edded in a ne! frame!or2 of accounta'ility in !hich mana ers are a!are of the sco)e and limits of their critical res)onsi'ilities. Based on these res)onsi'ilities: mana ers !ill 'e in a )osition to re?uest 'etter tools and )re)aration to address ne! security challen es. Currently: accounta'ility frame!or2s of a encies ran e from the com)le4: static: and hierarchical system found in the 5nited &ations[%@D] to almost non"e4istent in some &G(s. [%@A] .ithin the 5.&. system: a encies are reluctant to acce)t further centrali-ation of the security mana ement frame!or2: as they fear that the )rocess !ill not sufficiently ta2e their s)ecific methods of !or2 or their uni?ue mandates into account.[%@E] 0ost a encies favor the dele ation of decision"ma2in re ardin com)liance !ith security re ulations to the mana ers closest to and most familiar !ith the immediate sta2eholders. Get: in hi hly com)le4 security environments: accounta'ility frame!or2s are enerally disre arded in favor of micro" mana ement 'y head?uarters: includin interference from a ency heads such as )residents: 'oard mem'ers: or donor overnments.[%%@] $ather than )rovidin decision"ma2ers !ith )ro)er mechanisms to address ne! challen es: current accounta'ility frame!or2s serve as Bustifications for 'oth referrin decisions u)!ard and for ris2"averse attitudes. 0ore im)ortantly: most a encies have no clear and trans)arent ris2 threshold. A ency ris2" mana ement systems are not 'ased on a )redicta'le calculus of ris2s a ainst com)ellin emer encies and im)erative institutional mandates. $eactions to security incidents are often dealt !ith in an emotional manner rather than throu h )re"esta'lished: trans)arent )rocesses !ith clear rules for e4aminin decision"ma2ers in the field and at head?uarters. -. &nstitutional and #ersonal /iabilit' &ssues The final issue to arise from the *@@1 S0I survey is the lia'ility of or ani-ations and mana ers for dama es and com)ensation due to ne li ence.[%%%] The e4)osure of or ani-ations to financial ris2s )lays an im)ortant role in mo'ili-in interest in ne! security mana ement ca)a'ilities.[%%*] Particularly in the aftermath of the Ba hdad 'om'in s: most aid a encies affirm that the security and health of their staff is their foremost concern: and that they are seriously concerned a'out their ina'ility to co)e ade?uately !ith the institutional ;and )ossi'ly individual> lia'ilities arisin from security incidents.[%%,] As !ith any other industry6s security mana ement: the insurance system can 'e used to mana e and assi n security res)onsi'ilities. Insurance )olicies are devised: in )art: 'y evaluatin each a ency6s e4)osure to security ris2 and its )rocedures and standards for handlin these ris2s. #or this reason: insurance covera e can offer more than mere financial com)ensation for the deaths or inBuries of staff"mem'ersH it can )rovide an e4ce)tional o))ortunity to esta'lish a )ro)er security mana ement system under a coherent: rational: and economical frame!or2. 3ar e a encies: such as the 5nited &ations or the IC$C: have almost all contracted out their insurance )olicies at hi h costs.[%%/] These )olicies are 'ased on the im)lementation of: and res)ect for: clear security rules and )rocedures. The failure of an or ani-ation to im)lement these rules in a iven incident nullifies the com)ensation claim a ainst the insurer.[%%1] Smaller a encies face considera'le difficulties in o'tainin )ro)er insurance covera e for !ar"related ris2s in eneral: and for terrorist acts in )articular.[%%C] Because of their small si-e and their lac2 of standardi-ed
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security )rocedures: these a encies enerally cannot afford the cost of o)en insurance covera e. Therefore: they have no choice 'ut to ho)e for the 'est. 0oreover: many &G(s !ith limited assets cannot offer si nificant aid to staff"victims or their families: 'eyond traditional )ension" )lan ty)es of covera e.[%%D] As a result: !ealthy donor overnments are increasin ly concerned that field victims6 families may turn to them for com)ensation: es)ecially !hen there is a close o)erational relationshi) 'et!een donor overnments and their <)artner= or ani-ation.[%%A] (+ Conclusions and eco--endations

This Article has )resented a first set of o'servations re ardin the increased security threats affectin the 5nited &ations and other international a encies !or2in in conflict environments. It has aimed to 'e in a de'ate on common security strate ies that !ill enerate the necessary )ros)ective thin2in to effectively address emer in threats to the security of a ency staff. It )ro)oses a model for an inte rated security mana ement system dra!in from 'oth the system" 'ased and community"'ased strate ies. In the final analysis: emer in security ris2s )resent uni?ue challen es that not only endan er the staff and o)erations at the various 5.&. and non"5.&. a encies: 'ut also affect their historical e4istence as inde)endent or ani-ations. It may 'e ar ued that the ultimate test of o)erational relevance resides !ith each or ani-ation6s institutional ca)acity to )rotect its )ersonnel and remain fully o)erational. Political relevance and o)erational sustaina'ility !ill: thus: re?uire that international a encies commit to develo)in their security ca)a'ilities and their strate ies to address the sources of insecurity. But 5.&. a encies !ill need to )roceed cautiously in security mana ement reform !ithin the 5.&. system 'ecause en a in in such reform may limit their a'ility to develo) field"'ased and mission"s)ecific security mana ement. .hile the standardi-ation of ris2 assessment and crisis mana ement methods is very much !arranted: the e4)erience of 5.&. staff !ill differ amon a encies. Security mana ement: therefore: cannot 'e isolated from other o)erational )rocesses. Security tools should serve these differences rather than attem)t to reduce them. 5ltimately: one can e4)ect that lar e or ani-ations such as the 5nited &ations and its a encies !ill stri2e the )ro)er 'alance 'et!een system"'ased and community"'ased a))roaches on !hich to develo) more ade?uate security strate ies. Smaller and more traditional or ani-ations: such as 0Qdecins Sans #rontiSres or the IC$C: are more at ris2 of 'ein una'le to develo) co ent security strate ies and: thus: remainin entan led in the contradictory needs to )rofessionali-e their security re?uirements and to maintain the 'enevolent nature of their o)erations. The ca)acity of these civil society a encies to resist the increasin ly liti ious character of their constituencies !ill determine ho! lon they can avoid 'ein driven out of conflict areas. The esta'lishment of a coherent and inte rated security system is a lon "term and demandin oal for international a encies. The follo!in are some 'asic recommendations to orient the efforts of senior mana ement on the develo)ment of necessary strate ic ca)a'ilities. %. The entrali$ed De!elopment of Securit' Standards (ne of the stren ths of the system"'ased security strate y is the rational: scala'le: and re)lica'le character of systemic security arran ements. Althou h these systems use immense resources: they have offered demonstra'le results over time and have )rovided solid rounds for the develo)ment of a )ro)er security culture. It is im)erative that a encies allocate the necessary resources to the develo)ment of a set of ro'ust security )olicies as !ell as to the trainin of their )ersonnel not only on security techni?ues 'ut also security mana ement s2ills.

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To)ics for further )olicy research include communication and ne otiation techni?ues: strate ies for see2in secured access: the role of outsourcin and local )artici)ation in )ro rammin and security 'uildin : the si-e and )attern of de)loyment as )art of a security strate y: alternative methods for community"'ased security assessments: the use of information technolo y in ris2 assessment and analysis: the sharin of security res)onsi'ilities 'et!een head?uarters and the field: and staff mana ement in hi h"ris2 environments. Security )olicies should 'e develo)ed in an o'Bective and critical manner and 'e com)ared !ith )olicies of other a encies. In addition: these )olicies should 'e evaluated 'y e4ternal authoritative e4)erts from various fields of e4)ertise includin the military: )olice: intelli ence: )rivate security firms: and insurance com)anies. To stimulate scholarly research on these issues as they )ertain to humanitarian o)erations in conflict environments: a encies should also )romote a scientific de'ate on security issues as they relate to other fields of security studies. B. The #rofessionali$ation of Securit' Operators Successful security reform relies lar ely on the creation of a )rofessional security net!or2 that en a es o)erational )lanners and mana ers 'oth at head?uarters and in the field. All staff should: of course: 'e trained in security techni?ues such as res)onse to attac2s: survivin hosta e"ta2in s: and emer ency )rocedures. Additionally: senior mana ers !ith security res)onsi'ilities should 'e trained in security mana ement. These mana ement s2ills should include situation analysis and ris2 assessment: develo)ment of )reventive security strate ies: desi n and im)lementation of security re ulations: )rovision of )hysical and )sycholo ical )rotection to staff: 'uildin crisis mana ement ca)a'ilities: monitorin and re)ortin of security incidents: and mana in the effects and conse?uences of security incidents. To )romote inter"a ency coo)eration in this area: senior mana ement should consider su'mittin their trainin curricula for certification 'y an inde)endent 'oard of e4)erts that !ould revie! and advise a encies on the )rofessionali-ation of their security system and activities. +onors can also )lay a role in )romotin com)liance of international a encies !ith the certification )rocess. . The De!elopment of a ommon #rofessional Securit' ulture #inally: efforts should 'e devoted to )romotin a ne! security culture amon all )rofessionals involved in conflict areas: so as to facilitate the inte ration of security considerations into the )ro rammin of the a encies6 activities. $e ardless of the nature or sco)e of activities of the international a ency involved in the conflict area: the security of one a ency is more than ever de)endent on the security of all a encies. International a encies must discard the assum)tion that some or ani-ations are safer or even immune from attac2s 'ecause they carry a distinct em'lem or 'elon to a s)ecific reli ion: ideolo y: or national ori in. +ifferent ty)es of activities may !arrant different security and o)erational strate ies. #or e4am)le: IC$C frontline o)erations may re?uire more strin ent confidentiality rules than human ri hts o'servers in the country. 7o!ever: the overall success of these strate ies ultimately de)ends on the )rofessionali-ation of their mana ement: the common reco nition of their interde)endence: and the res)ect for core security standards in terms of trainin and staff 'ehavior in the field. Professional trainin at all levels of 5.&. and non"5.&. a encies should incor)orate these ne! security conce)ts and encoura e a dialo ue on the security of staff and its im)lications for all those concerned.
[*] 3ecturer on International 7ealth: +e)artment of Po)ulation and International 7ealth: 7arvard School of Pu'lic 7ealthH +irector: Pro ram on 7umanitarian Policy and Conflict $esearch at 7arvard 5niversityH 3.3.0.: 7arvard 3a! School: %EECH P.+.: 5niversity of Geneva 3a! School: %EEE. [**] Advisor to the Pro ram on 7umanitarian Policy and Conflict $esearch at 7arvard 5niversityH 7ead of - 19 -

+ele ation in Ba hdad for the International Committee of the $ed Cross: Puly *@@,TPune *@@/. [%]. Ooenraad 8an Bra'ant defines )ersonnel safety as referrin <to Uaccidents6 caused 'y nature ;e. .: avalanche> or non"violent circumstances ;e. .: fire: road accidents> and to illness: inBury and death resultin from medical conditions not 'rou ht a'out 'y violence: or due to la4 safety uidelines and )rocedures in the !or2)lace= and uses the term security of )ersonnel <to indicate the )rotection of aid )ersonnel and aid a ency assets from violence.= Ooenraad 8an Bra'ant: Operational Securit' *anagement in 5iolent -n!ironments6 % Field *anual for %id %gencies: in A Good Prac. $ev.: at iii: 4iii ;$achel 7ou hton ed.: 7umanitarian Prac. &et!or2 at the (verseas +ev. Inst. *@@@>: a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.odih)n.or V)u'list )rA.as). [*]. These estimates !ere develo)ed 'y the Pro ram of 7umanitarian Policy and Conflict $esearch at the 7arvard School of Pu'lic 7ealth ;<7PC$=> 'ased on a chronolo y of security incidents com)iled and enerously shared 'y +ennis Oin . See +ennis Oin : 5.S. +e)6t of State: The Gear of 3ivin +an erously9 Attac2s on 7umanitarian Aid .or2ers in *@@, ;*@@/>. [,]. 7PC$ estimates that: assumin there is a constant num'er of humanitarian staff de)loyed to the field: there !ill 'e /@@ national and international staff casualties in the ne4t five years. This )roBection is 'ased on 5.&. 'aseline data and on +ennis Oin 6s data. Cate Buchanan W $o'ert 0u ah: &o $elief9 Surveyin the Effects of Gun 8iolence on 7umanitarian and +evelo)ment Personnel D1 ;Ctr. for 7umanitarian +ialo ue *@@1> a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.relief!e'.intVli'raryVdocumentsV*@@1Vhdc" en"*%Bun.)dfH see Oin : supra note *. [/]. International a encies are understood here as those or ani-ations involved in international efforts to )rovide assistance ;develo)mental: humanitarian: technical: or )olitical> to overnments: civil societies: and )o)ulations affected 'y an armed conflict. These include 5.&. and non"5.&. a encies: the International Committee of the $ed Cross [hereinafter <IC$C=]: non" overnmental or ani-ations [hereinafter <&G(s=]: and charita'le rou)s and foundations that o)erate internationally and en a e actively in conflict environments. Althou h these or ani-ations may function under s)ecific and diver ent mandates: their staff and activities often face similar security challen es. The a encies addressed here do not include )eace2ee)in : )eace enforcement: or other military"ty)e o)erators. [1]. See %fghanistan6 *SF #ulls Out of ountr': International $e ional Information &et!or2s: Puly *A: *@@/: htt)9VV!!!.irinne!s.or Vre)ort.as)I $e)ortI+K/*/@AWSelect$e ionKCentralXAsiaWSelectCountryKA#G7A&ISTA& ;re)ortin 0Qdecins Sans #rontiSres6 ;<0S#=> decision to !ithdra! from Af hanistan after t!enty"four years of o)erational )resenceFa )eriod includin t!o maBor civil !ars: the Soviet occu)ation: and the Tali'an"led overnmentFcitin lac2 of security for its staff>H +ed ross to ut &ra7 Staff: BBC &e!s: (ct. *E: *@@,: htt)9VVne!s.''c.co.u2V%VhiV!orldVmiddleXeastV,**/D*,.stm ;announcin that the IC$C !ould reduce its staff in Ira? in res)onse to the 'om'in of its Ba hdad head?uarters>. [C]. See 5.&. Charter )m'l. [D]. See8 e.g.: The Secretary"General: #re!ention of %rmed onflict: deli!ered to the Securit' ouncil and the General %ssembl': 5.&. +oc. SV*@@%V1D/: AV11VEA1 ;Pune D: *@@%> ;revie!in the 5.&.6s role in conflict )revention and )eace"'uildin >H see also G.A. $es. C@V3.%: YY D,TDA: EDT%@1: 5.&. +oc. AVC@V3.% ;Se)t. *@: *@@1> ;descri'in the ne! mandate of the )eace"'uildin commission and various as)ects of the 5.&.6s conflict )revention and )eace"'uildin strate ies: includin develo)mental assistance: human ri hts )rotection: humanitarian relief: and ender e?uality and )olitical reforms>. [A]. See generall' Pro ram on 7umanitarian Pol6y and Conflict $es. at 7arv. 5.: Security 0ana ement Initiative9 Pro ress $e)ort * ;*@@1>: htt)9VV!!!.h)cr.or V)dfsVS0IXPro ressX$e)ortX"X0archX*@@1.)df [hereinafter S0I Pro ress $e)ort] ;descri'in the S0I )roBect>. [E]. See 0einrad Studer: The & + and i!il2*ilitar' +elations in %rmed onflict: A, Int6l $ev. $ed Cross ,CD: ,CDTE% ;*@@%> ;addressin com)laints a'out increasin ly 'lurred mandates>H Ponas Gahr StZre: Sec6y Gen.: &or!e ian $ed Cross: The $ole of a 7umanitarian (r ani-ation in an Interee $elief.e': 7aiti9 5.&. #ood and A riculture (r ani-ation ;#A(> 7umanitarian Assistance ProBect for A ricultural Producers in the Gona[ves $e ion ;0ay *D: *@@1>: htt)9VV!!!.relief!e'.intVr!V$.B.&S#Vd'E@@SI+VACI("CCSJ8.I()en+ocument. [%%]. See 5nited &ations +evelo)ment Pro ramme: Briefing Notes on #ost2 onflict &ra76 % 4ND# 1umanitarian %ction #lan ;0ar. *A: *@@,>: htt)9VV!!!.und).or Vd)aVBournalistsVIra?flash)reser*A0arch.)df. [%*]. See S.C. $es. %/A,: Y A: 5.&. +oc. SV$ESV%/A, ;0ay **: *@@,>. [%,]. See 5.&. SC($: 1Ath Sess.: /DE%st )len. mt . at 1: 5.&. +oc. SVP8./DE% ;Puly **: *@@,> ;<The 5nited &ations )resence in Ira? remains vulnera'le to any !ho !ould see2 to tar et our (r ani-ation . . . . (ur security continues to rely si nificantly on the re)utation of the 5nited &ations: our a'ility to demonstrate: meanin fully: that !e are in Ira? to assist its )eo)le: and our inde)endence.= This statement !as recorded a month 'efore the 'om'in of the 5.&. head?uarters in Ba hdad that 2illed 8ieira de 0ello and t!enty"one other staff.>. [%/]. See Inde). Panel on the Safety and Security of the 5nited &ations Personnel in Ira?: $e)ort of the Inde)endent Panel on the Safety and Security of 5.&. Personnel in Ira? , ;*@@,>: htt)9VV!!!.un.or V&e!sVdhVira?Vsafety"security"un")ersonnel"ira?.)df [hereinafter Inde)endent Panel $e)ort] ;statin that <[t]he o'servance and im)lementation of security re ulations and )rocedures !ere slo))y and non" com)liance !ith security rules common)lace=>H (liver &orth: Baghdad Blues: .ash. Times: Au . *,: *@@,: htt)9VV!!!.!ashtimes.comVcommentaryV*@@,@A*,"%%*D/C"C%%/r.htm ;?uotin 5.&. s)o2esman Salim 3ome as sayin : <!e didn6t e4)ect to have to !orry so much [after all]: !e are humanitarians=>. [%1]. See Ooenraad 8an Bra'ant: 1#G Briefing6 *ainstreaming Safet' and Securit' *anagement in %id %gencies : * 7umanitarian Pol. Grou) Briefin % ;*@@%>: htt)9VV!!!.odi.or .u2Vh) V)a)ersVh) 'rief*.)df. [%C]. Intervie! !ith Alan +re!: +ir.: 7ealth and Sec. +e)6t: Euro)ean Ban2 for $econstruction and +ev.: in - 20 -

3ondon: En . ;#e'. E: *@@1>. [%D]. +avid $ieff: A Bed for the &i ht A1 ;*@@/>. [%A]. Inde)endent Panel $e)ort: supra note %/: at %E. [%E]. See generall' Euro)ean Comm6n +irectorate"Gen. for 7umanitarian Aid: $e)ort on Security of 7umanitarian Personnel9 Standards and Practices for the Security of 7umanitarian Personnel and Advocacy for 7umanitarian S)ace ;*@@/>: htt)9VV!!!.relief!e'.intVr!Vli'.nsfVd'E@@SI+V37(&" CC8ECAV\#I3EVsecurityXre)ortXechoX*@@/.)dfI()enElementH Pierre Or]hen'^hl: The & + 3s %pproach to ontemporar' Securit' hallenges6 % Future for &ndependent and Neutral 1umanitarian %ction : AC Int6l $ev. $ed Cross 1@1: 1@1T%, ;*@@/>. [*@]. See Inde)endent Panel $e)ort: supra note %/: at %E. The 5.&. considers a mission ha-ardous !hen )revailin security conditions re?uire the a))lication of security measures under 5.&. security )hases. &d. [*%]. The num'er of IC$C )ersonnel in the field re! from C*CC in %EE/ to %*:/1@ in *@@/. See Int6l Comm. of the $ed Cross: Annual $e)ort % ;%EE/>: a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.icrc.or V!e'Ven Vsiteen @.nsfVi!)3ist%/@V#C+1#1CAC@C11AC+C%*1CBCC@@1E%%C+H Int6l Comm. of the $ed Cross: Annual $e)ort /1 ;*@@/>: a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.icrc.or V.e'VEn Vsiteen @.nsfVhtmlallVsectionXannualXre)ortX*@@/. [**]. See Alan Orec-2o: The %fghan -0periment6 The %fghan Support Group8 #rincipled ommon #rogramming8 and the Strategic Framewor.: *D P. +isaster Stud.: Pol6y W 0 mt. *,E ;*@@,>: a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.'lac2!ell" syner y.comVdoiVa'sV%@.%%%%V%/CD"DD%D.@@*,%. [*,]. See 5.&. SC($: C@th Sess.: 1*%Eth )len. mt .: 5.&. +oc. SV$ESV%C%@ ;Pune ,@: *@@1> ;e4tendin the 5.&. mission in Sierra 3eone for si4 months>. [*/]. See 5.&. SC($: C@th Sess.: 1%1%st )len. mt .: 5.&. +oc. SV$ESV%1E@ ;0ar. */: *@@1> ;esta'lishin the 5.&. mission in Sudan>. [*1]. See $. 3. Sivard: .orld 0ilitary and Social E4)enditures ;%EEC>. [*C]. The Secretary"General: (e the #eoples6 The +ole of the 4nited Nations in the Twent'2First entur' : at ,,: deli!ered to the General %ssembl': 5.&. +oc. AV1/V*@@@ ;A)r. ,: *@@@>: a!ailable at htt)9VVdocuments"dds" ny.un.or VdocV5&+(CVGE&V&@@V,AAVEDVim V&@@,AAED.)dfI()enElement. #or a ?uantitative analysis of the transformation of !arfare: see 7uman Sec. Ctr.: 7uman Security $e)ort *@@19 .ar and Peace in the *%st Century %1 ;*@@1>: a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.humansecurityre)ort.infoVinde4.)h)I o)tionKcontentWtas2Kvie!WidK*AWItemidKC,. [*D]. See Cris)in Thorold: %fghanistan3s Fearful %id ommunit': BBC &e!s: htt)9VVne!s!!!.''c.net.u2V*VhiVsouthXasiaV,*DA*DE.stm ;last visited #e'. */: *@@C> ;re)ortin the 2illin of 5.&. staff mem'er Bettina Goislard in Af hanistan>. [*A]. See 0onty G. 0arshall W Ted $o'ert Gurr: Peace and Conflict *@@19 A Glo'al Survey of Armed Conflicts: Self" +etermination 0ovements: and +emocracy %T, ;*@@1> ;statin that althou h <the decline in the lo'al ma nitude of armed conflict . . . has )ersisted[:]= thirty"one of the remainin countries in conflict are iven <red fla s= 'ecause they are <at serious ris2 of mismana in societal crises and succum'in to civil !ar or overnmental colla)se=>. [*E]. <S!irlin tactics= are defined 'y the ne! characteristics of the modern 'attlefield. <Armies must no! )lan to fi ht three 'attles at once. Com'at doctrines re?uire that units 'e a'le to fi ht the Udirect6 'attleFthat is: to en a e units directly to their front. But doctrine also re?uires that armies 'e a'le to fi ht the Udee)6 'attle: to reach out and stri2e dee)ly 'ehind the enemy6s lines !ith lar e com'at forces to disru)t timeta'les: su))lies: and reinforcements.= The <rear= 'attle re?uires <that armies must )lan to deal !ith si-ea'le enemy forces en a ed in attac2in the rear . . . . Accordin ly: the entire 'attlefield is hi hly unsta'le: a !ar not of fi4ed lines: 'ut of s!irlin com'at in !hich units !ill 'e e4)ected to fi ht isolated from )arent units. 5nits !ill 'e tra))ed: decimated: 'y)assed: isolated: and often e4)ected to fi ht until they can no lon er do so. In short: modern !ar is not a !ar of offense and defense as in .orld .ar II: 'ut a !ar of meetin en a ements in !hich all units are e4)ected to conduct a continuous offensive.= $ichard A. Ga'riel W Oaren S. 0et-: A Short 7istory of .ar9 The Evolution of .arfare and .ea)ons ch. 1 ;0arianne P. Co!lin ed.: 5.S. Army .ar Colle e Strate ic Stud. Inst. %EE*>: htt)9VV!!!.au.af.milVauVa!cVa!c ateV a'rmet-V a'r@@*@.htm. [,@]. &d. [,%]. It !as )ossi'le: in *@@%: to 'uy a sin le used AO"/D for Bust ten dollars in Af hanistan6s 'lac2 mar2et. Indeed: over fifty"nine )ercent of the total lo'al firearms stoc2)ile is o!ned 'y civilians. Aaron Oar): +ed Flags and Buic.s6 Global Firearm Stoc.piles: in Small Arms Survey *@@*9 Countin the 7uman Cost CC: DE ;*@@*>. [,*]. See Scott Baldauf: %id Groups in %fghanistan (eigh Good Deeds 5s. Safet': Christian Sci. 0onitor: (ct. *A: *@@,: htt)9VV!!!.csmonitor.comV*@@,V%@*AV)@Ds@%"!osc.html ;discussin a statement 'y Tali'an threatenin &G(s 'elieved to 'e !or2in in the interests of the 5nited States>H C7I&Adaily: Al Jaeda .e' Site Claims 5.&. Bom'in in Ba hdad ;Au . *C: *@@,>: htt)9VV!!!*.chinadaily.com.cnVenVdocV*@@,"@AV*CVcontentX*1A*CC.htm ;re)ortin that Bri ades of A'u 7afs al 0asri claimed res)onsi'ility for the *@@, 'om'in of the 5.&. office in Ba hdad>H 3aura $o-en: 1ate Speech6 &s an %l29aeda2/in.ed Group Behind the %ugust 1: Truc. Bombing of the 4.N. 1ead7uarters in Baghdad8 and the Frida' %ttac. on the Na;af *os7ue< .ar and Piece9 $e)orts on &ational Security and #orei n Policy Issues from .ashin ton: +.C.: Au . ,@: *@@,: htt)9VV!!!.!arand)iece.comV'lo dirsV@@@@/%.html ;?uotin Bri ades of A'u 7afs al 0asri6s statement of res)onsi'ility for the *@@, 'om'in of the 5.&. office in Ba hdad>. [,,]. See Ian #isher W Eli-a'eth Bec2er: The Struggle for &ra76 The +econstructionH %id (or.ers /ea!ing &ra78 Fearing The' are Targets: &.G. Times: (ct. %*: *@@,: at %AH +aniel B. Schneider: Dri!en from &ra78 %id Groups - 21 -

+eflect on (or. 1alf Begun: &.G. Times: &ov. %1: *@@/: at A%,H Press $elease: 0Qdecins Sans #rontiSres: 0S# Sto)s Activities in Ira? ;&ov. /: *@@/>. [,/]. See An elo Gnaedin er: +ir."Gen.: IC$C: 7umanitarian Action9 <Today6s &e! Security Environment has #orced 5s Bac2 to Basics= ;#e'. *D: *@@/>: htt)9VV!!!.icrc.or V.e'VEn Vsiteen @.nsfVi!)3istAAV*@%C1CBBA*A%1CBEC%*1CE1A@@,E,+D%H see also Pierre Gassmann: +ethin.ing 1umanitarian Securit': 7umanitarian E4chan e: Pune *@@1: at ,*: htt)9VV!!!.odih)n.or Vre)ort.as)II+K*D*%. [,1]. See Inde)endent Panel $e)ort: supra note %/: at ,%H 0ohammad"mahmoud (uld 0ohamedou: &on"3inearity of En a ement9 Transnational Armed Grou)s: International 3a!: and the Conflict Bet!een Al Jaeda and the 5nited States ;*@@1>: a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.h)cr.or V)dfsV&on"3inearityXofXEn a ement.)df . [,C]. See8 e.g.: 3etter from 0ary E. 0cClymont: President and Chief E4ecutive (fficer: InterAction: to Andre! &atsios: Adm6r: 5.S. A ency for Int6l +ev. ;Puly */: *@@,>: htt)9VV!!!.interaction.or Vfiles.c iV*%A@X$es)onseXtoX&atsiosXS)eechX"X#inal.doc ;res)ondin to &atsios6 re)orted statement that 5.S. overnment"funded &G(s !ere <to 'e considered an arm of the 5S overnment=>H Colin Po!ell: Sec6y of State: 5.S. +e)6t of State: $emar2s to the &ational #orei n Policy Conference for 3eaders of &on overnmental (r ani-ations at Gale 3a! School9 Se)tem'er %%: *@@%9 Attac2 on America ;(ct. *C: *@@%>: htt)9VV!!!.yale.eduVla!!e'VavalonVse)tX%%V)o!ellX'rief,%.htm ;statin <I am serious a'out ma2in sure !e have the 'est relationshi) !ith the &G(s !ho are such a force multi)lier for us: such an im)ortant )art of our com'at team=>. [,D]. See8 e.g.: Pudy Aita: De!elopment +e7uires %id #lus Good Go!ernance8 4S%&D hief Sa's : The .ashin ton #ile: Pune *D: *@@1: a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.usem'assy.or .u2Vfor)oD/1.html ;?uotin Andre! &atsios as sayin : at a Pune *D: *@@1 s)ecial meetin of the 5.&. General Assem'ly: that <develo)ment )ro ress is: first and foremost: a function of country commitment and )olitical !ill to rule Bustly: )romote economic freedom and invest in )eo)le=>. [,A]. C7I&Adaily: supra note ,*. [,E]. $ieff: supra note %D: at ,,E. [/@]. See 5.&. Gen. Assem'ly W Sec. Council: Panel on 5.&. Peace ()erations: +eport of the #anel on 4nited Nations #eace Operations: 5.&. +oc. SV*@@@VA@E: AV11V,@1 ;Au . *%: *@@@>. [/%]. 5.S. A ency for Int6l +ev.: #orei n Aid in the &ational Interest9 Promotin #reedom: Security: and ())ortunity ;*@@*>: htt)9VV!!!.usaid. ovVfaniV#ullX$e)ort#orei nXAidXinXtheX&ationalXInterest.)df [/*]. See Pavier Solana: A Secure Euro)e in a Better .orld ;*@@,>: htt)9VVue.eu.intVue+ocsVcmsX+ataVdocsV)ressdataVE&Vre)ortsVDC*11.)df. [/,]. See $euters Alert&et #oundation: 7assan 0urder En enders Soul"Searchin ;+ec. %,: *@@/>: htt)9VV!!!.alertnet.or VthefactsVreliefresourcesV%%@*E/*1E*,/.htm. [//]. #(_&e!s.com: Alle ed Tali'an 3eaders Arrested in Af hanistan ;Pune 1: *@@1>: htt)9VV!!!.fo4ne!s.comVstoryV@:*E,,:%1AC,@:@@.html. [/1]. Gerard 0c7u h W 3ola Gostelo!: Provincial $econstruction Teams and 7umanitarian"0ilitary $elations in Af hanistan ;Save the Child. *@@/>: htt)9VV!!!*.a)an"info.netVm)atVdocumentsVP$Ts`*@and`*@7uman"0il `*@$elations`*@In`*@Af hanistan.)dfH see also Paul (6Brien: #+Ts=Guaranteeing or 4ndermining a Secure Future in %fghanistan<: 1 #orced 0i ration $ev. ,A: ,AT,E ;*@@,>. [/C]. Intervie! !ith Alan +re!: +ir.: +e)6t of 7ealth and Safety: Euro)ean +evelo)ment Ban2: in 3ondon: En . ;A)r. 1: *@@1>H Intervie! !ith (livier Ga'us: A ent GQnQral: GE& Assurances: in &euchatel: S!it-. ;0ay *: *@@1>H see S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A. [/D]. <In Ira? the 5nited &ations and &G(s ?uic2ly learned to their dismay and horror that their humanitarian fla s and sym'ols are no lon er enou h to )rovide for their )rotection or for the )rotection of civilians cau ht in the crossfire of conflict.= Gil 3oescher: Threatened %re the #eacema.ers: &otre +ame 0a . (nline: S)rin *@@1: htt)9VV!!!.nd.eduVandma Vs)*@@1Vloescher.html. [/A]. Aita: supra note ,D: Y ,. [/E]. &d. YY /T1. [1@]. See The Secretary"General: +eport of the Secretar'2General on Strengthening the Securit' and Safet' of 4nited Nations Operations8 Staff and #remises: Y *: deli!ered to the General %ssembl': 5.&. +oc. AV1AVD1C ;A)r. 1: *@@/> [hereinafter +eport on Strengthening Securit']. [1%]. See Press $elease: +e)uty Sec6y"Gen.: +e)uty Secretary"General +escri'es #undamental Chan es In Thin2in : A))roach to 5.&. Security: In &e! Gor2 Address: 5.&. +oc. +SGVS0V**C ;Pune D: *@@/>: a!ailable at htt)9VV!!!.un.or V&e!sVPressVdocsV*@@/Vds sm**C.doc.htm. [1*]. +eport on Strengthening Securit': supra note 1@. [1,]. See G.A. $es. 1EV*DC: 5.&. +oc. AV$ESV1EV*DC ;+ec. *,: *@@/>. [1/]. See Press $elease: The Sec6y"Gen.: Accounta'ility for Crimes A ainst 5.&.: Associated Personnel U.oefully Inade?uate:6 Secretary"General Says in 0essa e on +ay of Solidarity !ith 0issin Staff: 5.&. +oc. SGVS0VEDA, ;0ar. *A: *@@1>: htt)9VV!!!.un.or V&e!sVPressVdocsV*@@1Vs smEDA,.doc.htm. [11]. 3ouise #rQchette: The +e)uty Sec6y"Gen.: 5.&.: Press Conference 'y +e)uty Secretary"General 3ouise #rQchette at 5nited &ations 7ead?uarters ;Pan. %,: *@@1>: htt)9VV!!!.unis.unvienna.or VunisV)ressrelsV*@@1Vds sm*/*.html >. [1C]. &d. [1D]. Security"related o)enin s are re ularly )osted on $elief.e': a !e' )ortal for the humanitarian community - 22 -

hosted 'y the 5.&. (ffice for the Coordination of 7umanitarian Affairs. See $elief.e': 8acancies: htt)9VV!!!.relief!e'.intVvacancies ;last visited #e'. %@: *@@C>. [1A]. See Euro)ean Commission6s +irectorate"Gen. for 7umanitarian Aid: Generic Security Guide for 7umanitarian ( ranisations %1 ;*@@/>: htt)9VVeuro)a.eu.intVcommVechoV)dfXfilesVsecurityVechoX enericXsecurityX uideXen.)df. [1E]. $ed$: $ed$ Trainin : htt)9VV!!!.redr.or VredrVtrainin Vinde4.htm ;last visited #e'. %@: *@@C>. [C@]. InterAction: Po's at Interaction: htt)9VV!!!.interaction.or VBo'sVBo'ads.html ;last visited #e'. %,: *@@C>. [C%]. See generall' InterAction: InterAction Security Plannin Guidelines: htt)9VV!!!.interaction.or Vfiles.c iVCADXSecurityXPlannin XGuidelines.)df ;last visited #e'. %@: *@@C>. [C*]. Intervie! !ith Pames Bisho): +ir. of 7umanitarian Policy and Practice: InterAction: in .ashin ton: +.C. ;(ct. %,: *@@1>. [C,]. +ainbo Nation: I$C Circular ;Int6l $escue Comm. 5.O.: 3ondon: En .>: .inter *@@,V*@@/: at *: htt)9VVD*.%/.*@D.%@/VsearchI?Kcache9eCOP72,J++/P9!!!.theirc.or VresourcesVCI$C53A$"*@ISS5E" *@1.)dfbA&S(bandbI$CWhlKenW lKusWctKcln2WcdK,. [C/]. See generall' &G( Coordination Committee in Ira?: htt)9VV!!!.nccira?.or V ;last visited #e'. %,: *@@C>. [C1]. Euro)ean Commission6s +irectorate"Gen. for 7umanitarian Aid: $e)ort on Security of 7umanitarian Personnel9 Standards and Practices for the Security of 7umanitarian Personnel and Advocacy for 7umanitarian S)ace ;*@@/>: htt)9VV!!!.relief!e'.intVr!Vli'.nsfVd'E@@SI+V37(&" CC8ECAV\#I3EVsecurityXre)ortXechoX*@@/.)dfI()enElement. [CC]. S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at *. [CD]. &d. [CA]. &d. [CE]. &d. [D@]. See Graham .hite: Security Trainin +irectory for 7umanitarian ( ranisations %1 ;*@@/>: htt)9VVeuro)a.eu.intVcommVechoV)dfXfilesVsecurityVechoXsecurityXtrainin XdirectoryXen.)dfH see also Ooenraad 8an Bra'ant: Securit' Training6 (here %re (e Now<: #orced 0i ration $ev. D ;A)r. %EEE>. [D%]. See 5nited &ations 7i h Comm6r for $efu ees: A $evie! of 5&7C$6s Security Policy and Policy Im)lementation9 The $e)ort of the Steerin Committee on Security Policy and Policy Im)lementation *@ ;*@@/> ;<The lar er frame!or2 of the 5& Security 0ana ement System is currently also under revie!: and si nificant chan es are e4)ected. The assum)tion of the .or2in Grou) in )re)arin this re)ort is that in addition to its mem'ershi) in and commitment to an effective 5& Security 0ana ement System: 5&7C$ must have its o!n security )olicy and a))roach not least 'ecause the security and safety of staff mem'ers is an or ani-ational and mana erial accounta'ility.=>. [D*]. S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at D. [D,]. See The Secretary"General: +eport of the Secretar' General on Strengthened and 4nified Securit' *anagement S'stem for the 4nited Nations: deli!ered to the General %ssembl': 5.&. +oc. AV1EV,C1 ;(ct. %%: *@@/>H Press $elease: General Assem'ly: Bud et Committee +e'ates Secretary"General6s Plan for Stren thened: 5nified 5& Security: 5.&. +oc. GAVABV,C// ;&ov. /: *@@/>: htt)9VV!!!.unis.unvienna.or VunisV)ressrelsV*@@/V aa',C//.html. [D/]. See generall' S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A. [D1]. See8 e.g.: Antonio +onini et al.: 0a))in the Security Environment9 5nderstandin the Perce)tions of 3ocal Communities: Peace Su))ort ()erations: and Assistance A encies ;*@@1>: htt)9VV!!!. cs).chVeVmeetin sV$esearchXSeminarsVE5"PeaceX()sV*@@1V+onini.)df. The re)ort e4amines 2ey as)ects of the different )erce)tions of international a encies: local )o)ulations: and )eace su))ort forces on security and on im)lementation of related security attitudes and measures in three common o)erational locations ;Af hanistan: Sierra 3eone: and Oosovo>. The re)ort: !hich does not ma2e any strate ic recommendations to a encies: demonstrates that the security environment is defined: a'ove all: 'y local constraints. [DC]. +ainbo Nation: supra note C,: at * ;)rovidin information on A&S(>. [DD]. See S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at ,. Tele)hone Intervie! !ith Guy 0alon: Bro2er: 0arsh Inc. ;Pune %@: *@@1>H Intervie! !ith Ed 0c3au hlin: 0ana in +ir. $is2 Consultin Practice: 0arsh Inc.: in 3ondon: En . ;Pune *D: *@@1>. [DA]. See The Secretary"General: Safet' and Securit' of 1umanitarian #ersonnel and #rotection of 4nited Nations #ersonnel: Y ,/: deli!ered to the General %ssembl': 5.&. +oc. AVC@V**, ;Au . %*: *@@1>. [DE]. See generall' 8an Bra'ant: supra note %H #rancois Grune!ald: Securite du Personnel en 0ission 7umanitaire9 Entre Com)rehension: Protection: +issuasion et Acce)ta'ilite: Juel?ues Elements de Strate ie ;Aoct %EEE>: htt)9VV!!!.urd.or VfichiersXurdV)oleXdactivitesVrechercheVsecuriteVcom)reh%.)dfH 7umanitarian Policy Grou) $e)ort %/: 7umanitarian Action and the UGlo'al .ar on Terror69 A $evie! of Trends and Issues ;Poanna 0acrae W Adele 7armer eds.: *@@,>: htt)9VV!!!.odi.or .u2Vh) V)a)ersVh) re)ort%/.)dfH 5nited &ations (ffice for the Coordination of 7umanitarian Affairs: %ddressing the hallenges to 1umanitarian Securit' ;Geneva: 0ar. *@@/> ;)re)ared in consultation !ith the Inter"A ency Standin Committee Tas2 #orce on Colla'orative A))roaches to 7umanitarian Security>. [A@]. A re)resentative of the Grou) of DD ;the lar est Third .orld coalition in the 5.&.> and China stated that they are <of the vie! that the )rimary res)onsi'ility for the safety and security of the 5nited &ations and its )ersonnel lie !ith the host overnment. The Grou) shares the concerns raised 'y the [Advisory Committee on Administrative and Bud etary Juestions] !ith re ard to the inade?uate !or2in arran ements !ith host overnments !ith re ard - 23 -

to their res)onsi'ility and o'li ations for 5& security and safety. The Grou) is also concerned that these res)onsi'ilities and o'li ations are not al!ays finali-ed in le ally 'indin !ritten documents.= 0ishal 0ohammed Al"Ansari: Statement on Behalf of the Grou) of DD and China 'y 0r. 0ishal 0ohammed Al"Ansari: State of Jatar: (n Stren thened and 5nified Security 0ana ement System of the 5nited &ations ;&ov. /: *@@/>: htt)9VV!!!. DD.or VS)eechesV%%@/@/'.htm. [A%]. Convention on the Safety of 5nited &ations and Associated Personnel: G.A. $es. /EV1E: art. D: /E 5.&. GA($ Su)). ;&o. /E>: 5.&. +oc. AV/EV/E ;%EE/>: htt)9VV!!!.un.or Vla!VcodVsafety.htm. [A*]. Supra note DD. [A,]. &d. [A/]. S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at 1H see The Secretary"General: The Secretar'2General3s Bulletin6 Staff +egulations: $e s. %.*;c> and C.*: 5.&. +oc. STVSGBV*@@,V1 ;#e'. D: *@@,>: htt)9VVdocuments"dds" ny.un.or VdocV5&+(CVGE&V&@,V*/1VCDV)dfV&@,*/1CD.)dfI()enElement. [A1]. Supra note DD. [AC]. See 5nited &ations 7i h Comm6r for $efu ees: Security in the #ield9 Information for Staff 0em'ers of the 5nited &ations System ;%EEA>: htt)9VV!!!.relief!e'.intVr!Vli'.nsfVd'E@@SI+V3GE3"1CGOD+V\fileVsecurity.)dfI ()enElement. [AD]. &d. [AA]. 5nited &ations Security Coordinator ;5&SEC(($+>: *inimum Operating Securit' Standards >*OSS? #olic' Document ;Puly %: *@@/> ;descri'in a 0inimum ()erational Security Standards ;0(SS> standard>. [AE]. See 5nited &ations 7i h Comm6r for $efu ees: supra note AC. [E@]. 3ouise #rQchette: 5.&. +e)uty Sec6y"Gen.: Press Conference at 5nited &ations 7ead?uarters: supra note 11. ;The +e)uty Secretary"General introduced Sir +avid 8eness: 5nder"Secretary"General for Safety and Security: !ho e4)lained: amon other thin s: the need for coo)eration !ith host overnments re ardin intelli ence atherin .>. [E%]. See #einstein International #amine Center: The #uture of 7umanitarian Action9 Im)lications of Ira? and (ther $ecent Crises C ;*@@,>: htt)9VVh!)roBect.tufts.eduV)dfVira?XissuesX*@@,%@**.)dfH see also +an 0ur)hy: &n &ra78 %id Group Fa!ors Tal. O!er Barbed (ire: Christian Sci. 0onitor: +ec. %A: *@@,: htt)9VV!!!. lo'al)olicy.or Vn osVaidV*@@,V%*%A'ar'ed.htm. [E*]. See Grune!ald: supra note DEH see also Phili))e +ind: Securit' in & + Field Operations: ,*, Int6l $ev. $ed Cross ,,1 ;%EEA>: htt)9VV!!!.icrc.or V.e'VEn Vsiteen @.nsfVi!)3ist%CDV###A,@AEE,@C@1EAC%*1CBCC@@1C@B%CH Pierre Or]hen'^hl: 7umanitarian Security9 <A 0atter of Acce)tance: Perce)tion: Behavior . . . .= ;0ar. ,%: *@@/>: htt)9VV!!!.icrc.or V.e'VEn Vsiteen @.nsfVhtmlV1_SG.E. [E,]. See8 e.g.: Or]hen'^hl: supra note E*. [E/]. See 0a4 Glaser: 1umanitarian -ngagement with %rmed Non2State %ctors6 The #arameters for Negotiated %ccess: 1% 7umanitarian Prac. &et!or2 %% ;*@@1>. [E1]. S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at ,. [EC]. See #einstein International #amine Center: supra note E%. [ED]. See S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at %,H Press $elease: Bud et Committee +e'ates Secretary"General6s Plan for Stren thened: 5nified 5& Security: supra note D,. [EA]. Supra note DD. [EE]. &d. [%@@]. This com'ination is a2in to the !or2 and strate ies of )u'lic health or ani-ations. 3i2e security strate ies: )u'lic health strate ies are aimed at the mana ement of )u'lic health ha-ards and focus on the reduction of the vulnera'ility of a )o)ulation to health threats. Threats to )u'lic health are not )erceived as stand"alone ris2s 'ut as the )roduct of 'oth e4ternal a ents and communal 'ehaviors that allo! the ha-ardous a ent to )ros)er and threaten the health of individuals. 5nified 'y a )rofessional character: the )u'lic health domain is 'ased on solid and re)lica'le system"'ased strate ies ;e.g.: )u'lic health as a scientific and )rofessional field> as !ell as community"'ased interventions ;community health )ro rams> !hich are ultimately sustaina'le in the lon run. See Claude Bruderlein W Pennifer 3eanin : New hallenges for 1umanitarian #rotection: ,%E Brit. 0ed. P. /,@: /,@T,1 ;%EEE>. [%@%]. Supra note DDH see Buchanan W 0u ah: supra note ,. [%@*]. Supra note DD. [%@,]. &d. [%@/]. S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at /. [%@1]. &d. [%@C]. &d. [%@D]. See The Secretary"General: &nter2Organi$ational Securit' *easures6 Framewor. for %ccountabilit' for the 4nited Nations Field Securit' *anagement S'stem: deli!ered to the General %ssembl': 5.&. +oc. AV1DV,C1 ;Au . *A: *@@*>. [%@A]. S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at /. [%@E]. 5nited &ations 7i h Comm6r for $efu ees: supra note D%: at *@. [%%@]. S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at 1. [%%%]. &d. [%%*]. &d. [%%,]. &d. - 24 -

[%%/]. See Inde)endent Panel $e)ort: supra note %/: at ,CT,A. [%%1]. &d. Y 1 ;statin that <claims !ill only 'e acce)ted under this )olicy if the or ani-ation andVor the Insured Person concerned has demonstrated to 5&SEC(($+ that it has com)lied !ith all 5&SEC(($+ security uidelines=>. [%%C]. S0I Pro ress $e)ort: supra note A: at 1. [%%D]. Supra note DD. [%%A]. &d.

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