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Mumbai High North Platform Fire

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MUMBAI HIGH NOR NORTH TH PLATFORM FIRE, 27th JULY 2005 MADE BY BY:: KAMAL PANDEY 

THE ONGC MHN PLATFORM 











The Mumbai Mumbai (or Bombay) Bo mbay) High field is India's largest l argest offshore oil and gas field. The Mumbai Mumbai High Basin is 75 km long and 25 km wide, located in the  Arabian Sea about 160 km west of the Mumbai coast. The oil and gas field is divided into the north and and south blocks blo cks and and has been operating by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) since 1974. The Mumbai High North (MHN) platform, a 30 years old 7-storey steel structure, was was an oil and natural gas processing complex complex which had a capacity of 80,000 barrels per day day of crude cr ude production. It was was connected to an unmanned NA drilling platform, the BHF platform  with residential quarters and and the WIN platform also with residential quarters. All these were interconnected by bridges. The MHN facility separated oil and gas carried by risers from the nearby   wells, below the NA and BHF platforms, and sent them onshore by separate undersea pipelines.

SEQUENCE SEQ UENCE OF EVENTS 

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MSV Samudra Suraksha carrying out diving operations at N-7 Jack Jacket et of Mumbai High.  At about 1400 hours on 27 July 2005, cook was injured. For evacuation of injured in jured cook, the Master ordered ordered the recall of the divers and recovery of the bell. ONGC representative requested MHN radio room for evacuation by  a helicopter and assistance of a medical doctor, as desired by the Captain.  At about 1445-1500 hours, OIM received a request for the transfer of  the injured cook from Suraksha through MHN radio room. Due to bad weather MI-172 helicopter parked at MHN was not allowed to land on Suraksha.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 











MSV captain requested MHN for a basket transfer transfer of victim through th rough the MHN crane. Samudra Suraksha was advised to call later as platform was busy   with an OSV. Platform NQO was requested for doctor s assistance, doctor was not available on NQO NQO..  A jack up drilling rig Aban5 requested by MSV for transfer of  injured person. Rig expressed inability to accommodate accommodate the injured person overnight. OIM, MHN discussed the matter internally and agreed for basket transfer by the south crane.  Weather around MHN on 27th July: sea was rough with parameters of Wind 22 to 25 knots, Current 1.8 to 2 Knots and Swell 4 to 5m.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS  







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Controls on MSV for Dynamic Positioning  Joystick DP : Maneuvering through single integrated joystick  via Computer. Manual : Maneuvering of individual thruster using lever control. Emergency control control : By-passing By-pass ing controls & directly controlling controlling thrusters using push buttons. On wa wayy to MHN platform, platform, at 1530 1530 hours - observed that starboard azimuth thruster pitch was sluggish. Chief engineer engine er asked for some time for repairs. repairs. Master decided to operate the thrusters on emergency mode. mo de.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 











Master tried to move the vessel away from platform, but he was unable to move. The vessel scrapped against the platform and slammed on the risers. The vessel vessel was moving out ou t when it hit MHN South-W South-West est corner at approximately approximately 1605 16 05 hrs. The moment vessel vessel hit the platform, there was a strong hissing hiss ing sound and the fire broke out. Flames came onto the bridge of vessel. The burning burni ng debris  were falling all over the ship. Persons at platform felt jerk, j erk, heard a banging bangin g sound followed fo llowed by hissing sound. A large flame followed.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 



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 At 16.10 hrs radio operator heard sound, came out of radio room saw fire on south side of MHN platform and Samudra Suraksha. He immediately called all stations for help, 384 persons were on board platform complex including drilling rig and MSV.  A number of explosions took place at MHN.  A general alert went went out on the SOS sent se nt by MHN and all al l the vessels from Mumbai High North and south so uth converged converged on MHN. Prompt response by OSVs and MSVs operating near MHN Complex saved sav ed maximum valuable lives. 15 Offshore Supply and multipurpose support vessels spontaneously participated in the operation. Their convergence on the scene, in quick time, was of great assistance in locating & rescuing the large number of personnel who  were drifting in the rough waters. waters.

ESCAPE AND RESCUE RESCUE

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POB of the co comple mplexx & MSV - 384 Rescued Rescue d (over (over next 15 hrs) - 362 Dead Dea d and and missing missing - 11+1 11+111

 WHA  WH AT WEN WENT T WRONG WRONG??

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 Adverse weather weather conditions. conditi ons.  Absence of joint procedures procedures for vessel- platform interface interface operations. Maneuvering misjudgment or operating error with possible machinery failure.  Absence of interaction between an inexperienced OIM of  MHN and over confident master of MSV. Operating alongside alongsi de the platform with unprotected unprotected risers. rise rs.

INVESTIGATION INVESTIGA TION FINDINGS



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Only two of eight ei ght lifeboats and one of ten life rafts at the complex were were launched. launche d. Inadequacyy of collision avoidance practices Inadequac practices and procedures. Location and vulnerability vulnerabi lity of the risers in the jacket relative relative to platform loading zones. Some riser protection guards were in place just above sea level, but these were were only suitable suitabl e for smaller offshore offsho re supply vessels and were were not considered suitable for larger multi-purpose multi-pu rpose supportt vessels. suppor

UK HSE RECOMMENDATIONS ON RISER PROTECTION   





Installation of fender. Installing Install ing risers riser s within caissons, well conductors and J Tubes. Tubes. Not allowing risers to be located inside platform loading zones. Risers routed away from hazards such as fire, explosion explosio n and impact.  Vessel loading/offloading/mooring not undertaken at riser locations.









External risers not located on prevailing prevailin g weather weather side of platform. Other operational procedural safety controls and permit. Other marine operation and safety controls in the  vicinity of offshore installations. Provision of subsea isolation iso lation valves (SSIVs) (SSIVs) to limit the consequences of any a ny riser damage.

POST ACCIDENT DEVELOPMENTS

EMPOWERMENT TO OISD OISD





No regulatory agency for safety in offshore offs hore operations. OISD was given the mandate of offshore of fshore safety after the accident accident by Petroleum Ministry Minis try,, Government of  India.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE  ACCIDENT   



Safety awareness awareness in companies. Mandate to OISD for Offshore Safety. Safety Management System strengthened in Organizations. Regulatory Regul atory mechanismmechanism- under appro approval val by  Government.

LEARNING

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Even a small error can escalate Even e scalate and go totally out ou t of control!  Always be aware aware of the hazards and safety s afety issues issu es involved involved in every activity performed. FPSO / Platform collisions may be rare but they can happen. If it does happen, usually with catastrophic consequences. No safety system can mitigate in case of catastrophic catas trophic accidents such as a riser failure and resulting jet fire!!  We should ensure that these events do not occur at all (reduce the event event probability probabili ty to AL ALARP!) ARP!)

THANK THAN K YOU! YOU!

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