People

Title Eight CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS The essence of crime here involves the taking of human life, destruction of the fetus or inflicting injuries. As to the taking of human life, you have: (1) Parricide; (2) Murder; (3) Homicide; (4) Infanticide; and (5) Giving assistance to suicide. Note that parricide is premised on the relationship between the offender and the offended. The victim is three days old or older. A stranger who conspires with the parent is guilty of murder. In infanticide, the victim is younger than three days or 72 hours old; can be committed by a stranger. If a stranger who conspires with parent, both commit the crime of infanticide.

Chapter One DESTRUCTION OF LIFE Section One. — Parricide, murder, homicide ARTICLE 246 PARRICIDE A. Elements 1. That a person is killed 2. That the deceased is killed by the accused 3. That the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse, of the accused. The essential element is relationship! “… or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse”- all of them must be legitimate. Note: Under Art. 246, the child killed must not be less than 3 days old because that would already fall under the crime of Infanticide. Note: In Parricide. Relationship must be alleged in the information because the accused is entitled to know the cause of the accusation against him. Failure to allege relationship in the information modifies the crime to either murder or homicide. Q: When X was born, his father and mother had already separated. X never knew or even saw his father. Celebrating his 21st birthday, X treated his friends to a drinking spree in a nearby club. In the course of their drinking session, X and his friends had an altercation with a group of men in another table. As a result thereof, a fight ensued and X was able to kill one of the men who turned out to be his real father Y. Is X guilty of parricide even if he didn’t know that it was his father whom he killed?

A: Yup, X is still guilty of Parricide under Art 246. Q: X wanted to kill his father B. He sought the help of Y, a close friend. Together, X and Y succeeded in killing B. What was the crime committed? A: X is guilty of parricide while Y is guilty of Murder or Homicide as the case may be. This is a crime committed between people who are related by blood. Between spouses, even though they are not related by blood, it is also parricide. The relationship must be in the direct line and not in the collateral line. The relationship between the offender and the offended party must be legitimate, except when the offender and the offended party are related as parent and child. If the offender and the offended party, although related by blood and in the direct line, are separated by an intervening illegitimate relationship, parricide can no longer be committed. The illegitimate relationship between the child and the parent renders all relatives after the child in the direct line to be illegitimate too. The only illegitimate relationship that can bring about parricide is that between parents and illegitimate children as the offender and the offended parties. Illustration: A is the parent of B, the illegitimate daughter. B married C and they begot a legitimate child D. If D, daughter of B and C, would kill A, the grandmother, the crime cannot be parricide anymore because of the intervening illegitimacy. The relationship between A and D is no longer legitimate. Hence, the crime committed is homicide or murder. Since parricide is a crime of relationship, if a stranger conspired in the commission of the crime, he cannot be held liable for parricide. His participation would make him liable for murder or for homicide, as the case may be. The rule of conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all does not apply here because of the personal relationship of the offender to the offended party. Illustration: A spouse of B conspires with C to kill B. C is the stranger in the relationship. C killed B with treachery. The means employed is made known to A and A agreed that the killing will be done by poisoning. As far as A is concerned, the crime is based on his relationship with B. It is therefore parricide. The treachery that was employed in killing Bong will only be generic aggravating circumstance in the crime of parricide because this is not one crime that requires a qualifying circumstance. But that same treachery, insofar as C is concerned, as a stranger who cooperated in the killing, makes the crime murder; treachery becomes a qualifying circumstance.

In killing a spouse, there must be a valid subsisting marriage at the time of the killing. Also, the information should allege the fact of such valid marriage between the accused and the victim. In a ruling by the Supreme Court, it was held that if the information did not allege that the accused was legally married to the victim, he could not be convicted of parricide even if the marriage was established during the trial. In such cases, relationship shall be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court has also ruled that Muslim husbands with several wives can be convicted of parricide only in case the first wife is killed. There is no parricide if the other wives are killed although their marriage is recognized as valid. This is so because a Catholic man can commit the crime only once. If a Muslim husband could commit this crime more than once, in effect, he is being punished for the marriage which the law itself authorized him to contract. That the mother killed her child in order to conceal her dishonor is not mitigating. This is immaterial to the crime of parricide, unlike in the case of infanticide. If the child is less than three days old when killed, the crime is infanticide and intent to conceal her dishonor is considered mitigating. ARTICLE 247 DEATH OF

PHYSICAL

INJURIES

INFLICTED

UNDER

EXECPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Requisites for the application of Art. 247: 1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person. 2. That he or she kills any or both, of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or immediate thereafter. 3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the spouse. * Take note of Art 11, par 1 Q: A suspected his wife B of having an extra marital affair with the neighbor next door. One day, A told his wife that he will be home late because of a business meeting. However, there was no business meeting at all - A’s intention was merely to let her wife B think that he’s away for work so he can observe from a safe distance in order to confirm his suspicious about his wife. True enough, A watched as the paramour entered his house. After a few minutes, A followed and entered their house and caught his wife and the paramour having carnal knowledge. A immediately got his shotgun and blew the paramour’s head off. Then he turned to his wife and fired the remaining bullets at the latter’s body shredding the skin and shattering the bones of B - killing the latter. Is this a case of Death under exceptional circumstances under Art 247? A: NO, because A did not surprise his spouse. A actually planned all of it - telling B that he will be home late, etc. The crime is murder or homicide as the case maybe. Thus, in order to qualify under the article the innocent spouse with out any advanced planning, must have surprised the guilty spouse and the paramour.

Note: Art 247 applies if the innocent spouse killed or inflicted upon the guilty spouse or the paramour Serious Physical Injuries. But if there was no killing and the injuries inflicted were not serious, the innocent spouse is EXEMPT from any criminal liability. Q: Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 247, must the daughter be legitimate or illegitimate? A: The law does not qualify so we should not qualify also. “Surprise” - to come upon suddenly and unexpectedly. Note: Art 247 is NOT APPLICABLE when the accused did not actually see his/her spouse having sexual intercourse with another. But this is a very restrictive rule. It is believed that it is enough that the circumstance show reasonably that the carnal act is being committed. Q: Does sexual intercourse include preparatory acts? A: In a case, SC held that THERE MUST BE ACTUAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE Note: The killing/ inflicting of serious physical injuries must be done in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Q: Having surprised his wife and the paramour, A killed his wife but the paramour jumped off the window and ran. A gave chase and after a kilometer of running, caught up with the paramour and killed the latter. Is this death under exceptional circumstances. A: Yes, the discovery, the escape, the pursuit and the killing must all form part of one Continuous Act. Q: A, after having surprised his wife in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, got his shotgun and fired at his wife. However, the wife was not hit - instead, their next door neighbor was hit by the bullet and died. Is A criminally liable for the death of the neighbor? A: NO, the accused cannot be held liable for injuries sustained by 3 rd persons because at the time of the firing, the accused was doing a lawful act. Two stages contemplated before the article will apply: (1)

When the offender surprised the other spouse with a paramour or mistress. The attack must take place while the sexual intercourse is going on. If the surprise was before or after the intercourse, no matter how immediate it may be, Article 247 does not apply. The offender in this situation only gets the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, that is, sufficient provocation immediately preceding the act.

(2)

When the offender kills or inflicts serious physical injury upon the other spouse and/or paramour while in the act of intercourse, or immediately thereafter, that is, after surprising.

You have to divide the stages because as far as the first stage is concerned, it does not admit of any situation less than sexual intercourse. So if the surprising took place before any actual sexual intercourse could be done because the parties are only in their preliminaries, the article cannot be invoked anymore.

If the surprising took place after the actual sexual intercourse was finished, even if the act being performed indicates no other conclusion but that sexual intercourse was had, the article does not apply. As long as the surprising took place while the sexual intercourse was going on, the second stage becomes immaterial. It is either killing or inflicting physical injuries while in that act or immediately thereafter. If the killing was done while in that act, no problem. If the killing was done when sexual intercourse is finished, a problem arises. First, were they surprised in actual sexual intercourse? Second, were they killed immediately thereafter? The phrase “immediately thereafter” has been interpreted to mean that between the surprising and the killing of the inflicting of the physical injury, there should be no break of time. In other words, it must be a continuous process. The article presumes that a legally married person who surprises his or her better half in actual sexual intercourse would be overcome by the obfuscation he felt when he saw them in the act that he lost his head. The law, thus, affords protection to a spouse who is considered to have acted in a justified outburst of passion or a state of mental disequilibrium. The offended spouse has no time to regain his self-control. If there was already a break of time between the sexual act and the killing or inflicting of the injury, the law presupposes that the offender regained his reason and therefore, the article will not apply anymore. As long as the act is continuous, the article still applies. Where the accused surprised his wife and his paramour in the act of illicit intercourse, as a result of which he went out to kill the paramour in a fit of passionate outburst. Although about one hour had passed between the time the accused discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually killed, it was held in People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735, that Article 247 was applicable, as the shooting was a continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. Here, the accused, after the discovery of the act of infidelity of his wife, looked for a firearm in Tacloban City. Article 247 does not provide that the victim is to be killed instantly by the accused after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse. What is required is that the killing is the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused upon the discovery of the infidelity of his spouse. The killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse. Illustration: A upon coming home, surprised his wife, B, together with C. The paramour was fast enough to jump out of the window. A got the bolo and chased C but he disappeared among the neighborhood. So A started looking around for about an hour but he could not find the paramour. A gave up and was on his way home. Unfortunately, the paramour, thinking that A was no longer around, came out of hiding and at that moment, A saw him and hacked him to death. There was a break of time and Article 247 does not apply anymore because when he gave up the search, it is a circumstance showing that his anger had already died down.

Article 247, far from defining a felony merely grants a privilege or benefit, more of an exempting circumstance as the penalty is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. Death under exceptional character can not be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In the case of People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735, two persons suffered physical injuries as they were caught in the crossfire when the accused shot the victim. A complex crime of double frustrated murder was not committed as the accused did not have the intent to kill the two victims. Here, the accused did not commit murder when he fired at the paramour of his wife. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. The accused was held liable for negligence under the first part, second paragraph of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple negligence. No aberratio ictus because he was acting lawfully. A person who acts under Article 247 is not committing a crime. Since this is merely an exempting circumstance, the accused must first be charged with: (1)

Parricide – if the spouse is killed;

(2)

Murder or homicide – depending on how the killing was done insofar as the paramour or the mistress is concerned;

(3)

Homicide – through simple negligence, if a third party is killed;

(4)

Physical injuries – through reckless imprudence, if a third party is injured.

If death results or the physical injuries are serious, there is criminal liability although the penalty is only destierro. The banishment is intended more for the protection of the offender rather than a penalty. If the crime committed is less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries, there is no criminal liability. The article does not apply where the wife was not surprised in flagrant adultery but was being abused by a man as in this case there will be defense of relation. If the offender surprised a couple in sexual intercourse, and believing the woman to be his wife, killed them, this article may be applied if the mistake of facts is proved. The benefits of this article do not apply to the person who consented to the infidelity of his spouse or who facilitated the prostitution of his wife. The article is also made available to parents who shall surprise their daughter below 18 years of age in actual sexual intercourse while “living with them.” The act should have been committed by the daughter with a seducer. The two stages also apply. The parents cannot invoke this provision if, in a way, they have encouraged the prostitution of the daughter. The phrase “living with them” is understood to be in their own dwelling, because of the embarrassment and humiliation done not only to the parent but also to the parental abode.

If it was done in a motel, the article does not apply. Illustration: A abandoned his wife B for two years. To support their children, A had to accept a relationship with another man. A learned of this, and surprised them in the act of sexual intercourse and killed B. A is not entitled to Article 248. Having abandoned his family for two years, it was natural for her to feel some affection for others, more so of a man who could help her. Homicide committed under exceptional circumstances, although punished with destierro, is within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the MTC because the crime charged is homicide or murder. The exceptional circumstances, not being elements of the crime but a matter of defense, are not pleaded. It practically grants a privilege amounting to an exemption for adequate punishment.

ARTICLE 248 MURDER A. Elements: 1. That a person is killed 2. The accused killed him. 3. That the killing was attended by any of the following qualifying circumstances a. treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, employing means to weaken the defense or means to insure impunity. b. in consideration of prize, reward or promise c. by means of inundation, fire, poison, shipwreck, etc. d. on occasion of any calamity e. with evident premeditation f. with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanely augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging (to commit an extremely vicious or deeply insulting act) or scoffing (to jeer and implies a sharing of irreverence) at the person or corpse of the victim. 4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide. Q: If X burns the house of Y and the latter dies, what’s the crime? A: ARSON is the crime. However, if X burned the house of Y for the purpose of killing Y, the crime is

MURDER.

Note: Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. Furthermore, if you kill a child of tender years, its murder because the child has no means of defense. RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH QUALIFY THE KILLING TO MURDER: 1. Only 1 qualifying circumstance. When more than one of the circumstances described are present, the others must be considered as generic aggravating. 2. That when the circumstances are absorbed or included in one qualifying circumstance, they cannot be considered as generics. 3. Any of the qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information. Failure to allege reduces the crime to Homicide but the prosecution is still allowed to present evidence of aggravating circumstances to increase the penalty.

OUTRAGING - to commit an extremely vicious act e.g. A was killed and his undergarments were stuffed inside his skull. B was killed and his sexual organ was placed in his mouth. SCOFFING - to jeer with irreverence Homicide is qualified to murder if any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 is present. It is the unlawful killing of a person not constituting murder, parricide or infanticide. In murder, any of the following qualifying circumstances is present: (1)

Treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, aid or armed men, or employing means to waken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity; There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. This circumstance involves means, methods, form in the execution of the killing which may actually be an aggravating circumstance also, in which case, the treachery absorbs the same. Illustration: A person who is determined to kill resorted to the cover of darkness at nighttime to insure the killing. Nocturnity becomes a means that constitutes treachery and the killing would be murder. But if the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is considered by itself, it is not one of those which qualify a homicide to murder. One might think the killing is homicide unless nocturnity is considered as constituting treachery, in which case the crime is murder. The essence of treachery is that the offended party was denied the chance to defend himself because of the means, methods, form in executing the crime deliberately adopted by the offender. It is a matter of whether or not the offended party was denied the chance of defending himself. If the offended was denied the chance to defend himself, treachery qualifies the killing to murder. If despite the means resorted to by the offender, the offended was able to put up a defense, although unsuccessful, treachery is not available. Instead, some other circumstance may be present. Consider now whether such other circumstance qualifies the killing or not. Illustration: If the offender used superior strength and the victim was denied the chance to defend himself, there is treachery. The treachery must be alleged in the information. But if the victim was able to put up an unsuccessful resistance, there is no more treachery but the use of superior strength can be alleged and it also qualifies the killing to murder.

One attendant qualifying circumstance is enough. If there are more than one qualifying circumstance alleged in the information for murder, only one circumstance will qualify the killing to murder and the other circumstances will be taken as generic. To be considered qualifying, the particular circumstance must be alleged in the information. If what was alleged was not proven and instead another circumstance, not alleged, was established during the trial, even if the latter constitutes a qualifying circumstance under Article 248, the same can not qualify the killing to murder. The accused can only be convicted of homicide. Generally, murder cannot be committed if at the beginning, the offended had no intent to kill because the qualifying circumstances must be resorted to with a view of killing the offended party. So if the killing were at the “spur of the moment”, even though the victim was denied the chance to defend himself because of the suddenness of the attack, the crime would only be homicide. Treachery contemplates that the means, methods and form in the execution were consciously adopted and deliberately resorted to by the offender, and were not merely incidental to the killing. If the offender may have not intended to kill the victim but he only wanted to commit a crime against him in the beginning, he will still be liable for murder if in the manner of committing the felony there was treachery and as a consequence thereof the victim died. This is based on the rule that a person committing a felony shall be liable for the consequences thereof although different from that which he intended. Illustration: The accused, three young men, resented the fact that the victim continued to visit a girl in their neighborhood despite the warning they gave him. So one evening, after the victim had visited the girl, they seized and tied him to a tree, with both arms and legs around the tree. They thought they would give him a lesson by whipping him with branches of gumamela until the victim fell unconscious. The accused left not knowing that the victim died. The crime committed was murder. The accused deprived the victim of the chance to defend himself when the latter was tied to a tree. Treachery is a circumstance referring to the manner of committing the crime. There was no risk to the accused arising from the defense by the victim. Although what was initially intended was physical injury, the manner adopted by the accused was treacherous and since the victim died as a consequence thereof, the crime is murder -- although originally, there was no intent to kill. When the victim is already dead, intent to kill becomes irrelevant. It is important only if the victim did not die to determine if the felony is physical injury or attempted or frustrated homicide. So long as the means, methods and form in the execution is deliberately adopted, even if there was no intent to kill, there is treachery.

(2)

In consideration of price, reward or promises;

(3)

Inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of a motor vehicle, or with the use of other means involving great waste and ruin; The only problem insofar as the killing by fire is concerned is whether it would be arson with homicide, or murder. When a person is killed by fire, the primordial criminal intent of the offender is considered. If the primordial criminal intent of the offender is to kill and fire was only used as a means to do so, the crime is only murder. If the primordial criminal intent of the offender is to destroy property with the use of pyrotechnics and incidentally, somebody within the premises is killed, the crime is arson with homicide. But this is not a complex crime under Article 48. This is single indivisible crime penalized under Article 326, which is death as a consequence of arson. That somebody died during such fire would not bring about murder because there is no intent to kill in the mind of the offender. He intended only to destroy property. However, a higher penalty will be applied. In People v. Pugay and Samson, 167 SCRA 439, there was a town fiesta and the two accused were at the town plaza with their companions. All were uproariously happy, apparently drenched with drink. Then, the group saw the victim, a 25 year old retard walking nearby and they made him dance by tickling his sides with a piece of wood. The victim and the accused Pugay were friends and, at times, slept in the same place together. Having gotten bored with their form of entertainment, accused Pugay went and got a can of gasoline and poured it all over the retard. Then, the accused Samson lit him up, making him a frenzied, shrieking human torch. The retard died. It was held that Pugay was guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Samson only guilty of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong. There was no animosity between the two accused and the victim such that it cannot be said that they resort to fire to kill him. It was merely a part of their fun making but because their acts were felonious, they are criminally liable.

(4)

On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph c, or an earthquake, eruption of volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or any other public calamity;

(5)

Evident premeditation; and

(6)

Cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. Cruelty includes the situation where the victim is already dead and yet, acts were committed which would decry or scoff the corpse of the victim. The crime becomes murder. Hence, this is not actually limited to cruelty. It goes beyond that because even if the victim is already a corpse when the acts deliberately augmenting the

wrong done to him were committed, the killing is still qualified to murder although the acts done no longer amount to cruelty. Under Article 14, the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty requires that the victim be alive, when the cruel wounds were inflicted and, therefore, must be evidence to that effect. Yet, in murder, aside from cruelty, any act that would amount to scoffing or decrying the corpse of the victim will qualify the killing to murder. Illustration: Two people engaged in a quarrel and they hacked each other, one killing the other. Up to that point, the crime is homicide. However, if the killer tried to dismember the different parts of the body of the victim, indicative of an intention to scoff at or decry or humiliate the corpse of the victim, then what would have murder because this circumstance is recognized under Article 248, even though it was inflicted or was committed when the victim was already dead. The following are holdings of the Supreme Court with respect to the crime of murder: (1) Killing of a child of tender age is murder qualified by treachery because the weakness of the child due to his tender age results in the absence of any danger to the aggressor. (2)

Evident premeditation is absorbed in price, reward or promise, if without the premeditation the inductor would not have induced the other to commit the act but not as regards the one induced.

(3

Abuse of superior strength is inherent in and comprehended by the circumstance of treachery or forms part of treachery.

(4)

Treachery is inherent in poison.

(5)

Where one of the accused, who were charged with murder, was the wife of the deceased but here relationship to the deceased was not alleged in the information, she also should be convicted of murder but the relationship should be appreciated as aggravating.

(6)

Killing of the victims hit by hand grenade thrown at them is murder qualified by explosion not by treachery.

(7)

Where the accused housemaid gagged a three year old boy, son of her master, with stockings, placed him in a box with head down and legs upward and covered the box with some sacks and other boxes, and the child instantly died because of suffocation, and then the accused demanded ransom from the parents, such did not convert the offense into kidnapping with murder. The accused was well aware that the child could be suffocated to death in a few minutes after she left. Ransom was only a part of the diabolical scheme to murder the child, to conceal his body and then demand money before discovery of the body.

The essence of kidnapping or serious illegal detention is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or deprivation of his liberty. If there is no showing that the accused intended to deprive their victims of their liberty for some time and there being no appreciable interval between their being taken and their being shot, murder and not kidnapping with murder is committed. ARTICLE 249 HOMICIDE A. Elements 1. A person is killed 2. The accused killed the person without any justifying circumstance 3. The accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed. 4. The killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder or that of parricide or infanticide Note: In Homicide, intent to kill is conclusively presumed when there is death. However, Intent to kill is important in attempted or frustrated Homicide because if the prosecution fails to prove such intent, the crime may be reduced to physical injuries. Q: X stabbed Y. Instead of seeking medical attention, Y went home and personally treated the stab wound. Later the wound got infected and Y died. Is X liable? A: YES, X is liable for Homicide. Q: X intentionally cut the arm of Y. Y didn’t die immediately. However, because the knife used by X was so rusty, Y suffered from TETANUS and consequently died. Is X still liable? A: YES. The rule is that the assailant is liable for all the NATURAL CONSEQUENCES of his own voluntary act. Note: The killing must not be justified under Art 249. There is no such thing as frustrated homicide thru imprudence because when you say frustrated- there must be intent to kill which is inconsistent with imprudence. Q: A and B stabbed C. The wound inflicted by A was not fatal while the wound inflicted by B was fatal. Are they both liable? A: YES. It is the burden of the defendants to show Homicide is the unlawful killing of a person not constituting murder, parricide or infanticide. Distinction between homicide and physical injuries: In attempted or frustrated homicide, there is intent to kill. In physical injuries, there is none. However, if as a result of the physical injuries inflicted, the victim died, the crime will be homicide because the law punishes the result, and not the intent of the act. The following are holdings of the Supreme Court with respect to the crime of homicide:

(1)

Physical injuries are included as one of the essential elements of frustrated homicide.

(2)

If the deceased received two wounds from two persons acting independently of each other and the wound inflicted by either could have caused death, both of them are liable for the death of the victim and each of them is guilty of homicide.

(3)

If the injuries were mortal but were only due to negligence, the crime committed will be serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence as the element of intent to kill in frustrated homicide is incompatible with negligence or imprudence.

(4)

Where the intent to kill is not manifest, the crime committed has been generally considered as physical injuries and not attempted or frustrated murder or homicide.

(5)

When several assailants not acting in conspiracy inflicted wounds on a victim but it cannot be determined who inflicted which would which caused the death of the victim, all are liable for the victim’s death.

Note that while it is possible to have a crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, it is not possible to have a crime of frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence. ARTICLE 250 PENALTY FOR FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE, MURDER OR HOMICIDE The meaning of “CORPUS DELICTI” in crimes against persons? It means the FACT of the commission of the crime. REQUISITES: a) Person is killed. b) Accused killed the person.

c)

TRUTH of death  proven through DEATH CERTIFICATE or TESTIMONIES of

witnesses who saw the killing. Case: The accused were seen bringing the victim to a sugar cane plantation. Thereafter, gunshots were heard in the area where the victim was brought. After the incident, the victim was never seen again. Thus a case was filed charging the accused with the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER. The prosecution merely relied on the fact that the victim was missing after that incident. Nobody saw the commission of the crime. No blood stains were found in the place where the victim was last seen. RTC convicted the accused for kidnapping with murder. SC reversed RTC’s decision. Prosecution was not able to prove DEATH. Prosecution cannot rely alone on the PRESUMPTION OF DEATH. The accused is guilty only of KIDNAPPING.

ARTICLE 251 DEATH CAUSED IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

or and

identified

A. Elements 1. There are several persons 2. They did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting attacking each other reciprocally 3. That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused tumultuous manner 4. Someone was killed in the course of the affray 5. It cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased 6. The person who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be

“TUMULTUOUS” -- there must be at least four (4) persons in the affray. Example: In an inter-barangay basketball game, the supporters of both teams suddenly quarreled and fought each other using stones, wooden chairs, etc. in the course of the incident, A died. Thus, Art. 251 applies. IMPORTANT: Art. 251 DOES NOT APPLY when the 2 groups are identified and organized. The reason being that if the 2 groups are organized – the principle on CONSPIRACY will apply ACT of one = ACT of all. PEOPLE vs. FERRER. SISON, ET AL G.R. No. 114931-33. November 16, 1995 Marcos loyalists were staging a rally at the Luneta Park when a DIE-HARD “Cory- fan” passed by. Upon seeing the “Cory-fan,” the Marcos loyalists immediately ganged up on him and inflicted wounds which caused the ultimate demise of the “Cory-fan.” LOWER COURT convicted the Marcos loyalists with the crime of HOMICIDE. Marcos loyalists argued with the Supreme Court that the crime is NOT HOMICIDE but DEATH in a TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY. SC held that Art. 251 DOES NOT APPLY because there was ONLY one person vs. the Marcos loyalists. Further more, the Marcos loyalists were identified and organized! x x x For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.

The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident. As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There was a time Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder. Tumultuous affray simply means a commotion in a tumultuous and confused manner, to such an extent that it would not be possible to identify who the killer is if death results, or who inflicted the serious physical injury, but the person or persons who used violence are known. It is not a tumultuous affray which brings about the crime; it is the inability to ascertain actual perpetrator. It is necessary that the very person who caused the death can not be known, not that he can not be identified. Because if he is known but only his identity is not known, then he will be charged for the crime of homicide or murder under a fictitious name and not death in a tumultuous affray. If there is a conspiracy, this crime is not committed. To be considered death in a tumultuous affray, there must be: (1)

a quarrel, a free-for-all, which should not involve organized group; and

(2)

someone who is injured or killed because of the fight.

As long as it cannot be determined who killed the victim, all of those persons who inflicted serious physical injuries will be collectively answerable for the death of that fellow. The Revised Penal Code sets priorities as to who may be liable for the death or physical injury in tumultuous affray: (1)

The persons who inflicted serious physical injury upon the victim;

(2)

If they could not be known, then anyone who may have employed violence on that person will answer for his death.

(3)

If nobody could still be traced to have employed violence upon the victim, nobody will answer. The crimes committed might be disturbance of public

order, or if participants are armed, it could be tumultuous disturbance, or if property was destroyed, it could be malicious mischief. The fight must be tumultuous. The participants must not be members of an organized group. This is different from a rumble which involves organized groups composed of persons who are to attack others. If the fight is between such groups, even if you cannot identify who, in particular, committed the killing, the adverse party composing the organized group will be collectively charged for the death of that person. Illustration: If a fight ensued between 20 Sigue-Sigue Gang men and 20 Bahala-Na- Gang men, and in the course thereof, one from each group was killed, the crime would be homicide or murder; there will be collective responsibility on both sides. Note that the person killed need not be a participant in the fight. ARTICLE 252 PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY A. Elements 1. That there is a tumultuous affray as referred to in the preceding Article 2. That the participant or some participants thereof suffer serious physical injuries or

physical injuries of a less serious nature only 3. That the person responsible therefore cannot be identified

NOTE: There is NO SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES inflicted in a tumultuous affray because such kind of injury is INHERENT in a tumultuous affray. If in the course of the tumultuous affray, only serious or less serious physical injuries are inflicted upon a participant, those who used violence upon the person of the offended party shall be held liable. In physical injuries caused in a tumultuous affray, the conditions are also the same. But you do not have a crime of physical injuries resulting from a tumultuous affray if the physical injury is only slight. The physical injury should be serious or less serious and resulting from a tumultuous affray. So anyone who may have employed violence will answer for such serious or less serious physical injury. If the physical injury sustained is only slight, this is considered as inherent in a tumultuous affray. The offended party cannot complain if he cannot identify who inflicted the slight physical injuries on him. ARTICLE 253 GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE A. Acts Punished 1. By assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is consummated or not 2. By lending his assistance to another to the extent of doing the killing himself

QUERY: Is the one who attempts to commit suicide liable under this article? Interestingly, NO. NOTE: Mercy killing or Euthanasia is ILLEGAL here in the Philippines!!! Giving assistance to suicide means giving means (arms, poison, etc.) or whatever manner of positive and direct cooperation (intellectual aid, suggestions regarding the mode of committing suicide, etc.). In this crime, the intention must be for the person who is asking the assistance of another to commit suicide. If the intention is not to commit suicide, as when he just wanted to have a picture taken of him to impress upon the world that he is committing suicide because he is not satisfied with the government, the crime is held to be inciting to sedition. He becomes a co-conspirator in the crime of inciting to sedition, but not of giving assistance to suicide because the assistance must be given to one who is really determined to commit suicide. If the person does the killing himself, the penalty is similar to that of homicide, which is reclusion temporal. There can be no qualifying circumstance because the determination to die must come from the victim. This does not contemplate euthanasia or mercy killing where the crime is homicide (if without consent; with consent, covered by Article 253). The following are holdings of the Supreme Court with respect to this crime: (1)

The crime is frustrated if the offender gives the assistance by doing the killing himself as firing upon the head of the victim but who did not die due to medical assistance.

(2)

The person attempting to commit suicide is not liable if he survives. The accused is liable if he kills the victim, his sweetheart, because of a suicide pact.

In other penal codes, if the person who wanted to die did not die, there is liability on his part because there is public disturbance committed by him. Our Revised Penal Code is silent but there is no bar against accusing the person of disturbance of public order if indeed serious disturbance of public peace occurred due to his attempt to commit suicide. If he is not prosecuted, this is out of pity and not because he has not violated the Revised Penal Code. In mercy killing, the victim is not in a position to commit suicide. Whoever would heed his advice is not really giving assistance to suicide but doing the killing himself. In giving assistance to suicide, the principal actor is the person committing the suicide.

Both in euthanasia and suicide, the intention to the end life comes from the victim himself; otherwise the article does not apply. The victim must persistently induce the offender to end his life. If there is only slight persuasion to end his life, and the offender readily assented thereto. ARTICLE 254 DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS A. Elements 1. That the offender discharges a firearm against at or another person 2. That the person had no intention to kill that person NOTE: Under this Article, there is NO INTENT TO KILL. IMPORTANT: If you discharge your firearm, without aiming it at another person, in a VERY QUIET PLACE, the crime is NOT DISCHARGE OF FIREARM but ALARM!! QUERY: A, without intent to kill, discharged his firearm. The bullet accidentally hit B in the knee. Crime committed? Complex crime of DISCHARGE OF FIREARM with PHYSICAL INJURIES. QUERY: In the example above, what if A had the intent to kill and the wound sustained by B is not fatal, crime committed? ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE or ATTEMPTED MURDER as the case may be. BUT if the wound is serious or fatal. The crime is FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE or MURDER. IMPORTANT: If the firearm is NOT discharged at the person, there is NO CRIME under Art. 254. : Discharge towards the house of the victim is NOT illegal discharge. : Firing a gun towards a house at RANDOM, not knowing where the people inside were, is ALARM under Art. 155. This crime cannot be committed through imprudence because it requires that the discharge must be directed at another. If the firearm is directed at a person and the trigger was pressed but did not fire, the crime is frustrated discharge of firearm. If the discharge is not directed at a person, the crime may constitute alarm and scandal. The following are holdings of the Supreme Court with respect to this crime: (1)

If serious physical injuries resulted from discharge, the crime committed is the complex crime of serious physical injury with illegal discharge of firearm, or if less serious physical injury, the complex crime of less serious physical injury with illegal discharge of firearm will apply.

(2)

Firing a gun at a person even if merely to frighten him constitutes illegal discharge of firearm.

Section Two --- Infanticide and abortion ARTICLE 255 INFANTICIDE A. Elements 1. A child was killed 2. That the deceased was less than 3 days of age 3. The accused killed the child NOTE: If the child is killed by the PATERNAL grandparents for the purpose of concealing dishonor -- NO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE Concealing dishonor -- not an element of infanticide; used for purpose only of availing of mitigating circumstance. NOTE: It is always INFANTICIDE, regardless of whether the killer is related to the victim or not – as long as the child is LESS THAN 3 DAYS OF AGE. This is a crime based on the age of the victim. The victim should be less than three days old. The offender may actually be the parent of the child. But you call the crime infanticide, not parricide, if the age of the victim is less than three days old. If the victim is three days old or above, the crime is parricide. Illustration: An unmarried woman, A, gave birth to a child, B. To conceal her dishonor, A conspired with C to dispose of the child. C agreed and killed the child B by burying the child somewhere. If the child was killed when the age of the child was three days old and above already, the crime of A is parricide. The fact that the killing was done to conceal her dishonor will not mitigate the criminal liability anymore because concealment of dishonor in killing the child is not mitigating in parricide. If the crime committed by A is parricide because the age of the child is three days old or above, the crime of the co-conspirator C is murder. It is not parricide because he is not related to the victim. If the child is less than three days old when killed, both the mother and the stranger commits infanticide because infanticide is not predicated on the relation of the offender to the offended party but on the age of the child. In such a case, concealment of dishonor as a motive for the mother to have the child killed is mitigating. Concealment of dishonor is not an element of infanticide. It merely lowers the penalty. If the child is abandoned without any intent to kill and death results as a consequence, the crime committed is not infanticide but abandonment under Article 276.

If the purpose of the mother is to conceal her dishonor, infanticide through imprudence is not committed because the purpose of concealing the dishonor is incompatible with the absence of malice in culpable felonies. If the child is born dead, or if the child is already dead, infanticide is not committed. ARTICLE 256 INTENTIONAL ABORTION A. Elements 1. There is a pregnant woman 2. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the accused otherwise acts upon the pregnant woman 3. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, the fetus dies in the womb or after having expelled therefrom Abortion – the killing of the foetus in the uterus or the violent expulsion of the foetus from the maternal womb, which results in the death of the foetus. NOTE: In abortion, the foetus must be capable of sustaining an independent life. : Abortion is not a crime against the pregnant woman – rather it is a crime against a FOETUS which may be over or less than 6 months. Distinguish Abortion from Infanticide. NOTE: The crime is INFANTICIDE if the foetus: 1) Could sustain an independent life, after its separation from the maternal womb, and 2) It is killed. Abortion is the violent expulsion of a fetus from the maternal womb. If the fetus has been delivered but it could not subsist by itself, it is still a fetus and not a person. Thus, if it is killed, the crime committed is abortion not infanticide. Distinction between infanticide and abortion It is infanticide if the victim is already a person less that three days old or 72 hours and is viable or capable of living separately from the mother’s womb. It is abortion if the victim is not viable but remains to be a fetus. Abortion is not a crime against the woman but against the fetus. If mother as a consequence of abortion suffers death or physical injuries, you have a complex crime of murder or physical injuries and abortion. In intentional abortion, the offender must know of the pregnancy because the particular criminal intention is to cause an abortion. Therefore, the offender must have known of the pregnancy for otherwise, he would not try an abortion. If the woman turns out not to be pregnant and someone performs an abortion upon her, he is liable for an impossible crime if the woman suffers no physical injury. If she does, the crime will be homicide, serious physical injuries, etc.

Under the Article 40 of the Civil Code, birth determines personality. A person is considered born at the time when the umbilical cord is cut. He then acquires a personality separate from the mother. But even though the umbilical cord has been cut, Article 41 of the Civil Code provides that if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it must survive at least 24 hours after the umbilical cord is cut for it to be considered born. Illustration: A mother delivered an offspring which had an intra-uterine life of seven months. Before the umbilical cord is cut, the child was killed. If it could be shown that had the umbilical cord been cut, that child, if not killed, would have survived beyond 24 hours, the crime is infanticide because that conceived child is already considered born. If it could be shown that the child, if not killed, would not have survived beyond 24 hours, the crime is abortion because what was killed was a fetus only. In abortion, the concealment of dishonor as a motive of the mother to commit the abortion upon herself is mitigating. It will also mitigate the liability of the maternal grandparent of the victim – the mother of the pregnant woman – if the abortion was done with the consent of the pregnant woman. If the abortion was done by the mother of the pregnant woman without the consent of the woman herself, even if it was done to conceal dishonor, that circumstance will not mitigate her criminal liability. But if those who performed the abortion are the parents of the pregnant woman, or either of them, and the pregnant woman consented for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the penalty is the same as that imposed upon the woman who practiced the abortion upon herself . Frustrated abortion is committed if the fetus that is expelled is viable and, therefore, not dead as abortion did not result despite the employment of adequate and sufficient means to make the pregnant woman abort. If the means are not sufficient or adequate, the crime would be an impossible crime of abortion. In consummated abortion, the fetus must be dead. One who persuades her sister to abort is a co-principal, and one who looks for a physician to make his sweetheart abort is an accomplice. The physician will be punished under Article 259 of the Revised Penal Code. ARTICLE 257 UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION A. Elements 1. There is a pregnant woman 2. Violence is used upon the pregnant woman without intending an abortion 3, The violence is intentionally exerted

expelled

4. The result of the violence, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having therefrom

NOTE: The violence must be INTENTIONALLY exerted. Example: In the heat of a n argument, H boxed his pregnant wife, W. W was hit in the stomach and consequently, the child was aborted. H is guilty of UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION. Q: Is the accused liable for ABORTION even if he did not know that the woman was pregnant? A: YES. NOTE: There is a complex crime of HOMICIDE with UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION and PARRICIDE with ABORTION. Distinction between intentional abortion and unintentional abortion: In INtentional Abortion, there is INTENT TO ABORT. In UNintentional Abortion, NO INTENT TO ABORT but violence is inflicted. Unintentional abortion requires physical violence inflicted deliberately and voluntarily by a third person upon the person of the pregnant woman. Mere intimidation is not enough unless the degree of intimidation already approximates violence. If the pregnant woman aborted because of intimidation, the crime committed is not unintentional abortion because there is no violence; the crime committed is light threats. If the pregnant woman was killed by violence by her husband, the crime committed is the complex crime of parricide with unlawful abortion. Unintentional abortion may be committed through negligence as it is enough that the use of violence be voluntary. Illustration: A quarrel ensued between A, husband, and B, wife. A became so angry that he struck B, who was then pregnant, with a soft drink bottle on the hip. Abortion resulted and B died. In US v. Jeffry, 15 Phil. 391, the Supreme Court said that knowledge of pregnancy of the offended party is not necessary. In People v. Carnaso, decided on April 7, 1964, however, the Supreme Court held that knowledge of pregnancy is required in unintentional abortion. Criticism: Under Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, any person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the direct, natural, and logical consequences of his felonious acts although it may be different from that which is intended. The act of employing violence or physical force upon the woman is already a felony. It is not material if offender knew about the woman being pregnant or not.

If the act of violence is not felonious, that is, act of self-defense, and there is no knowledge of the woman’s pregnancy, there is no liability. If the act of violence is not felonious, but there is knowledge of the woman’s pregnancy, the offender is liable for unintentional abortion. Illustration: The act of pushing another causing her to fall is a felonious act and could result in physical injuries. Correspondingly, if not only physical injuries were sustained but abortion also resulted, the felonious act of pushing is the proximate cause of the unintentional abortion.

Questions & Answers 1. A pregnant woman decided to commit suicide. She jumped out of a window of a building but she landed on a passerby. She did not die but an abortion followed. Is she liable for unintentional abortion? No. What is contemplated in unintentional abortion is that the force or violence must come from another. If it was the woman doing the violence upon herself, it must be to bring about an abortion, and therefore, the crime will be intentional abortion. In this case, where the woman tried to commit suicide, the act of trying to commit suicide is not a felony under the Revised Penal Code. The one penalized in suicide is the one giving assistance and not the person trying to commit suicide. 2. If the abortive drug used in abortion is a prohibited drug or regulated drug under Presidential Decree No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, what are the crimes committed? The crimes committed are (1) intentional abortion; and (2) violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

ARTICLE 258 ABORTION PRACTICED BY THE WOMAN HERSELF OR BY HER PARENTS

dishonor

A. Elements 1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion 2. The abortion is intended 3. That the abortion is caused by: a. the pregnant woman herself b. any other person with her consent c. any of her parents, with her consent for the purpose of concealing her

NOTE: Abortion – maternal grandparents can only claim mitigating circumstance if the MOTHER CONSENTED!!

ARTICLE 259 ABORTION PRACTICED BY A PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE AND DISPENSING OF ABORTIVES A. Elements 1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion 2. The abortion is intended 3. The offender, who must be a physician or midwife, causes or assists in the causing the abortion 4. The physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific knowledge or skill QUERY: Will the article apply if a NURSE assisted the doctor? The nurse will be held liable but the penalty will not be the same. Reason why maximum penalties are imposed: This is because of the use of scientific knowledge for the destruction of human life. Take note: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4729 AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE, DISPENSATION, AND/OR DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACEPTIVE DRUGS AND DEVICES Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, UNLESS such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company AND with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

If the abortion is produced by a physician to save the life of the mother, there is no liability. This is known as a therapeutic abortion. But abortion without medical necessity to warrant it is punishable even with the consent of the woman or her husband. Illustration: A woman who is pregnant got sick. The doctor administered a medicine which resulted in Abortion. The crime committed was unintentional abortion through negligence or imprudence.

Question & Answer What is the liability of a physician who aborts the fetus to save the life of the mother? None. This is a case of therapeutic abortion which is done out of a state of necessity. Therefore, the requisites under Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code must be present. There must be no other practical or less harmful means of saving the life of the mother to make the killing justified.

Section Three. -- Duel ARTICLE 260 RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTICIPANTS IN A DUEL NOTE: Persons liable and the acts punishable. Q: Who are liable? 1) The person who killed or inflicted physical injuries upon his adversary, or both combatants in any other case, as principals. 2) The seconds, as accomplices. Acts punishable: 1) By killing one’s adversary in a duel. 2) By inflicting upon such adversary physical injuries. 3) By making a combat although no physical injuries have been inflicted. ARTICLE 261 CHALLENGING TO A DUEL A. Acts Punishable 1. Challenging another to a duel 2. Inciting another to give or accept a challenge to a duel 3. By scoffing at or decrying another publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel

 Note: both Arts. 260 and 261 are almost obsolete!! There is no such crime nowadays because people hit each other even without entering into any pre-conceived agreement. This is an obsolete provision. A duel may be defined as a formal or regular combat previously consented to by two parties in the presence of two or more seconds of lawful age on each side, who make the selection of arms and fix all the other conditions of the fight to settle some antecedent quarrel. If these are not the conditions of the fight, it is not a duel in the sense contemplated in the Revised Penal Code. It will be a quarrel and anyone who killed the other will be liable for homicide or murder, as the case may be. The concept of duel under the Revised Penal Code is a classical one. SECTION 3 DEFINITION OF TERMS “PUBLIC OFFICIALS” – 6713: elective, appointive, permanent, temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation regardless of amount. : the public officer may be receiving compensation or not receiving any at all. 3019: the public officer must at least receive NOMINAL compensation. “GIFT” – refers to a thing or a right disposed of gratuitously or any act of liberality in favor of another who accepts it. It shall NOT include unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of or in exchange for, a favor from a public officer or employee. (RA 6713) NOTE: In indirect bribery, a person gives gift to a public officer, he ACCEPTS it because the giver is anticipating a favor in the future. NOTE: The gift is UNSOLICITED. It is not even necessary for acceptance to exist in the second sentence of the term GIFT. NOTE: “Receiving a gift” distinguish from RA 3019 RECEIVING ANY GIFT -- includes the act of accepting, directly or indirectly, a gift from a person other than a member of his family or relative, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas is the value of the gift neither nominal nor insignificant, o r the gift is given in the anticipation of, or in exchange for a favor. (RA 6713)

3019: find the word manifestly excessive. 6713: value of gift is neither nominal or insignificant. FAMILY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES -- means their spouses and unmarried children under 18 years of age. CONFLICT INTEREST [important definition unique u cannot find this any other penal law] -- arises when a public official or employee is a member of a board, an officer, or a substantial stockholder of a private corporation or owner or has a substantial interest in a business and the interest of such corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein , may be opposed to or affected by the faithful performance of official duty. NOTE: Private interest in conflict with your public position or duty. RELATIVES [peculiar definition] -- Refers to any and all persons related to a public official or employee within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, including bilas, inso, and balae. Bilas – in law Inso – related through baptism etc. (godparents) Balae – parents of husband and wife SECTION 4 NORMS OF CONDUCT OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES NOTE: NOT necessary to concentrate so much time on this. Never been asked in the BAR but just familiarize, enumerate. a) Commitment to public interest

b)

Professionalism – they shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as

dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

c)

Justness and sincerity – you shall not discriminate against anyone especially the poor

and underprivileged. They shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety, public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their offices to their relatives, whether by consanguinity or affinity, except the following:  appointment of such relatives to positions strictly confidential.  members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs d) Political neutrality e) Responsiveness to the public

f)

Nationalism and patriotism – loyalty to the Republic and to the Filipino

people, promote the use of locally produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people.

g)

Commitment to democracy – commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values,

maintain the principle of public accountability, uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to person.

h)

Simple living – they shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth.

SECTION 5 DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES. (a) Act promptly on letters and requests. NOTE: Par (a) is very important! Answer or reply is essential or else you will be brought before the ombudsman. (b) Submit annual performance reports. Rationale: There is SYSTEM OF REWARDS that is why there is rating on public officers – merit system. (c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. (d) Act immediately on the public’s personal transactions. (e) Make documents more accessible to the public. ALL public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours. NOTE: Pursuant to constitutional provisions on access to public records. NOTE: READ!! SECTION 6 SYSTEM OF INCENTIVES AND REWARDS NOTE: Outstanding merits on the basis of standards set forth on the act. SECTION 7 PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS

In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office. (b)

Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or (3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official transaction with their office. These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply. (c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either: (1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or (2) To prejudice the public interest. (d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office. As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to: (i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy; (ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or (iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interests of the Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to which he belongs. The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or cultural exchange programs subject to national security requirements.

NOTE: DO not be confused. There are parallel provisions in 3019 as well as the RPC. IMPORTANT: What are the prohibited acts and transactions? (see provision) READ: Sec 3(h) of RA 3019!! This is a parallel provision! x

x

x

x

x

x

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

QUERY: Teaching of law will it be in conflict with the function of a member of the judiciary? NO, because it is allowed by law. You have to ask permit from the office of the court administrator. This is private practice but NOT in conflict with a judge’s public duties. NOTE: Under the Local Government Code, there are some local government officials who cannot practice law. NOTE: Prejudice to public or private interest SECTION 8 STATEMENTS AND DISCLOSURES

NOTE: Of assets and liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests. [A] NOTE: Prohibited acts. [D]

SECTION 9 DIVESTMENT IMPORTANT: What to do in case Conflict of Interest arises? 1) RESIGN from his position in any private business enterprise within 3o days from his assumption of office, or 2) DIVEST himself of shareholdings or interest within 60 days from such assumption. NOTE: Requirement of divestment. When not applied? 1) Those who serve the government in an honorary capacity. 2) To laborers and casual or temporary workers. SECTION 11 PENALTIES NOTE: Ombudsman can dismiss employees even without criminal proceedings. Is it possible? YES. Under Sec. 11 (b) of RA 6713. QUERY: May private individuals be held liable for violation of RA 6713? YES. Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accessories or accomplices.

ARTICLE 262 MUTILATION A. Elements 1. That there be a castration, that is: mutilation of organs necessary for regeneration, such as the penis or ovarium 2. That the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction Mutilation - the lopping or clipping off of some parts of the body NOTABENE: THIS CRIME IS ALWAYS INTENTIONAL In RA 7610 section 10 thereof= if the victim is below 12 years old, the penalty is higher If there is a duel (tinigbasay) between two men and the “you know what” of the other was hit, there is no mutilation. It is only serious physical injuries because it was accidental. Mutilation is the lopping or clipping off of some part of the body. The intent to deliberately cut off the particular part of the body that was removed from the offended party must be established. If there is no intent to deprive victim of particular part of body, the crime is only serious physical injury.

The common mistake is to associate this with the reproductive organs only. Mutilation includes any part of the human body that is not susceptible to grow again. If what was cut off was a reproductive organ, the penalty is much higher than that for homicide. This cannot be committed through criminal negligence. ARTICLE 263 SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES Q: how is the crime of serious physical injuries committed? A: It is committed by: 1. by wounding 2. by beating 3. by assaulting (article 263) or 4. by administering injurious substance (article 264) Q: what are serious physical injuries? A: they are: 1. when the injured person becomes insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted 2. when the injured person:

a. loses the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or loses an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg b. loses the use of any such member

c.

becomes incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore

habitually engaged, in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted 3. when the person injured a. becomes deformed b. loses any member of his body c. loses the use thereof

d.

becomes ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in

which he was habitually engaged for more than 90 days, in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted

4.

When the injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more

than 30 days (but must not be more than 90 days) as a result of the physical injuries inflicted. NOTA BENE: if the injury incapacitated the person for 15 days but requires medical attendance for 90 days the crime committed is NOT serious physical injuries because nowhere in the paragraphs under article 263 which requires medical attendance. The crime committed is LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES because in this case, the requirement for medical attendance is present. Q: if the physical injuries were inflicted during the time of hazing what is the crime committed? A: the crime is hazing. Deformity = physical ugliness, permanent and definite abnormality. It must be conspicuous and visible. illustration: if a person already suffering from physical deformity (hiwi iyang nawong) he was in a fist fight. When he was hit with a punch, the deformity was gone and his face was normal. Is there deformity within the meaning of Physical Injuries? A: None, Because there was no physical ugliness. And so if it heals, not deformity also. Furthermore, if the deformity is not conspicuous like it is found in the stomach, no deformity. QUALIFIED SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES If the offense is committed: 1. Against any of the persons enumerated in the article defining the crime of parricide (article 246) OR 2. With attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in the article defining the crime of murder (article 248) In one case, the accused, while conversing with the offended party, drew the latter’s bolo from its scabbard. The offended party caught hold of the edge of the blade of his bolo and wounded himself. It was held that since the accused did not wound, beat or assault the offended party, he can not be guilty of serious physical injuries.

The crime of physical injuries is a crime of result because under our laws the crime of physical injuries is based on the gravity of the injury sustained. So this crime is always consummated, notwithstanding the opinion of Spanish commentators like Cuello Calon, Viada, etc., that it can be committed in the attempted or frustrated stage. If the act does not give rise to injuries, you will not be able to say whether it is attempted slight physical injuries, attempted less serious physical injuries, or attempted serious physical injuries unless the result is there. The reason why there is no attempted or frustrated physical injuries is because the crime of physical injuries is determined on the gravity of the injury. As long as the injury is not there, there can be no attempted or frustrated stage thereof. Classification of physical injuries: (1)

Between slight physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, you have a duration of one to nine days if slight physical injuries; or 10 days to 20 days if less serious physical injuries. Consider the duration of healing and treatment. The significant part here is between slight physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. You will consider not only the healing duration of the injury but also the medical attendance required to treat the injury. So the healing duration may be one to nine days, but if the medical treatment continues beyond nine days, the physical injuries would already qualify as less serious physical injuries. The medical treatment may have lasted for nine days, but if the offended party is still incapacitated for labor beyond nine days, the physical injuries are already considered less serious physical injuries.

(2)

Between less serious physical injuries and serious physical injuries, you do not consider the period of medical treatment. You only consider the period when the offended party is rendered incapacitated for labor. If the offended party is incapacitated to work for less than 30 days, even though the treatment continued beyond 30 days, the physical injuries are only considered less serious because for purposes of classifying the physical injuries as serious, you do not consider the period of medical treatment. You only consider the period of incapacity from work.

(3)

When the injury created a deformity upon the offended party, you disregard the healing duration or the period of medical treatment involved. At once, it is considered serious physical injuries. So even though the deformity may not have incapacitated the offended party from work, or even though the medical treatment did not go beyond nine days, that deformity will bring about the crime of serious physical injuries. Deformity requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) The injury must produce ugliness; (2)

It must be visible;

(3)

The ugliness will not disappear through natural healing process.

Illustration: Loss of molar tooth – This is not deformity as it is not visible. Loss of permanent front tooth – This is deformity as it is visible and permanent. Loss of milk front tooth – This is not deformity as it is visible but will be naturally replaced.

Question & Answer The offender threw acid on the face of the offended party. Were it not for timely medical attention, a deformity would have been produced on the face of the victim. After the plastic surgery, the offended party was more handsome than before the injury. What crime was committed? In what stage was it committed? The crime is serious physical injuries because the problem itself states that the injury would have produced a deformity. The fact that the plastic surgery removed the deformity is immaterial because in law what is considered is not the artificial treatment but the natural healing process. In a case decided by the Supreme Court, accused was charged with serious physical injuries because the injuries produced a scar. He was convicted under Article 263 (4). He appealed because, in the course of the trial, the scar disappeared. It was held that accused can not be convicted of serious physical injuries. He is liable only for slight physical injuries because the victim was not incapacitated, and there was no evidence that the medical treatment lasted for more than nine days. Serious physical injuries is punished with higher penalties in the following cases: (1)

If it is committed against any of the persons referred to in the crime of parricide under Article 246;

(2)

If any of the circumstances qualifying murder attended its commission. Thus, a

father who inflicts serious physical injuries upon his son will be liable for qualified serious physical injuries. ARTICLE 264 ADMINISTERINGINJURIOUS SUBSTANCES OR BEVERAGES A. Elements 1. That the offender inflicted upon another any serious physical injury 2. That it was done by knowingly administering to him any injurious substances or beverages or by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity 3. That he had no intent to kill - if there is intent to kill then it is frustrated murder/murder

ARTICLE 265 LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES NOTA BENE: here, the element of MEDICAL ATTENDANCE is present. 1. That the offended party is incapacitated for labor for 10 to 30 days OR needs Medical Attendance for the same period of time. 2. That the physical injuries must not be those described in the preceding articles Q: When Qualified A: 1. The Penalty of arresto mayor, and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed. a. When there is a manifest intent to kill or offend the injured person, b. There are circumstances adding ignominy to the offense 2. When the victim is: a. the offender's parents, ascendants, guardians, or curators b. teachers, persons of rank, or persons in authority(provided the crime is not direct assault) If the physical injuries do not incapacitate the offended party nor necessitate medical attendance, slight physical injuries is committed. But if the physical injuries heal after 30 days, serious physical injuries is committed under Article 263, paragraph 4. Article 265 is an exception to Article 48 in relation to complex crimes as the latter only takes place in cases where the Revised Penal Code has no specific provision penalizing the same with a definite, specific penalty. Hence, there is no complex crime of slander by deed with less serious physical injuries but only less serious physical injuries if the act which was committed produced the less serious physical injuries with the manifest intent to insult or offend the offended party, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense. ARTICLE 266 SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT A. Three Kinds: 1. Physical injuries which incapacitated the offended party for labor from 1 to 9 days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period. 2. Physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical assistance. 3. Ill-treatment of another by deed without causing any injury. NOTA BENE: Incapacity of injured party lasted for 9 days or shall require medical attendance during the same period. Or even if such injury does not prevent the offended party form engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance. Punished also is the act of ill-treating another by deed without causing injury. This involves even ill-treatment where there is no sign of injury requiring medical treatment. Slapping the offended party is a form of ill-treatment which is a form of slight physical injuries.

But if the slapping is done to cast dishonor upon the person slapped, the crime is slander by deed. If the slapping was done without the intention of casting dishonor, or to humiliate or embarrass the offended party out of a quarrel or anger, the crime is still ill-treatment or slight physical injuries. Illustration: If Hillary slaps Monica and told her “You choose your seconds . Let us meet behind the Quirino Grandstand and see who is the better and more beautiful between the two of us”, the crime is not ill-treatment, slight physical injuries or slander by deed; it is a form of challenging to a duel. The criminal intent is to challenge a person to a duel. The crime is slight physical injury if there is no proof as to the period of the offended party’s incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance. Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), in relation to murder, mutilation or injuries to a child The last paragraph of Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, provides: “For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262 (2) and 263 (1) of Act No 3815, as amended of the Revised Penal Code for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve years of age.” The provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 modified the provisions of the Revised Penal Code in so far as the victim of the felonies referred to is under 12 years of age. The clear intention is to punish the said crimes with a higher penalty when the victim is a child of tender age. Incidentally, the reference to Article 249 of the Code which defines and penalizes the crime of homicide were the victim is under 12 years old is an error. Killing a child under 12 is murder, not homicide, because the victim is under no position to defend himself as held in the case of People v. Ganohon, 196 SCRA 431. For murder, the penalty provided by the Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death – higher than what Republic Act no. 7610 provides. Accordingly, insofar as the crime is murder, Article 248 of the Code, as amended, shall govern even if the victim was under 12 years of age. It is only in respect of the crimes of intentional mutilation in paragraph 2 of Article 262 and of serious physical injuries in paragraph 1 of Article 263 of the Code that the quoted provision of Republic Act No. 7160 may be applied for the higher penalty when the victim is under 12 years old.

Jurisprudential Trend in PHYSICAL INJURIES (2000-2007) Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that, at the time of their execution, are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by adequate means. We cannot infer intent to kill from the appellant's act of hitting Piamonte in the head with a lead pipe. In the first place, wounds were not shown to have been inflicted because of the act. Secondly, absent proof of circumstances to show the intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, this Court cannot declare that the same was attendant.

o

When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury, and without causing dishonor, the offense is

Maltreatment under Article 266, 98 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. It was beyond reasonable doubt that by hitting Piamonte, appellant ill-treated the latter, without causing any injury. As we have earlier stated, no proof of injury was offered. Maltreatment is necessarily included in Murder, which is the offense charged in the Information. o We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailant's intent to take the life of the person attacked. 93 Such intent must be proved clearly and convincingly, so as to exclude reasonable doubt thereof. 94 Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim. The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victim’s right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victim’s supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries. However, we are not convinced that appellants should be held liable for frustrated murder. The evidence presented by the prosecution failed to show conclusively that the wounds inflicted on Anthony were fatal or serious. Dr. Jose Aladin Bongco, the doctor who had attended to Anthony at the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center, opined that all of the latter's wounds "can be fatal," 32 implying that the former was not sure of their gravity. The extent of the medical treatment Dr. Bongco gave the victim was limited to first aid — stopping the flow of blood from the wounds — as the latter had refused further medical examination and treatment. o In the absence of more convincing evidence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove that appellants had fatally wounded Anthony Villanueva. Thus, they should be held liable only for slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. 35 This is because his injuries lasted less than nine days.

ARTICLE 266-A

RAPE RA 8353 AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS 1) circumstances:

Rape)

By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Statutory

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting: a. his penis (man) into another person's (man or woman) mouth or anal orifice, OR b. any instrument or object (by a man or woman) , into the genital or anal orifice of another person(man or woman) NOTA BENE:

In the crime of rape, any circumstances which qualifies the crime of rape must be allege, otherwise, court will not impose the death penalty because the crime shall be treated only as simple rape. death?

Q: when is rape qualified so that the court shall impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua to A:

1. whenever it is committed with the use of a deadly weapon OR by two or more persons (here the weapon must be used to consummate rape)

2. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane (people vs. cesar guy (1950’s) === he raped antonietta cabahug, the woman became insane) 3. when the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason of or on the occasion thereof (US vs Mangulabnan regarding robbery with homicide === homicide on the occasion of robbery. The robber went inside the house and the owner of the house went up to the ceiling to hide. The robber fired shots in the air hitting the owner so killed. Is this robbery with homicide? Yes, because on the occasion of robbery a person died. Still another case decided by the SC, robber went inside the house and the owner had a heart attack and died, this is robbery with homicide. Still another case, robber went inside the house, the owner was about to shout for help when the robber place a bread PANDESAL in the mouth of the owner, which cause the latter to choke to death. This is robbery with homicide. In homicide it does not matter if the death is accidental, as long as it occurred on the occasion of robbery. BAR: robbery was actually committed, then there occurred an exchange of bullets. One of the companions of the culprits was hit and killed. The crime is robbery with homicide because it does not matter who was shot or killed, even if the person killed was one of the robbers. If a person dies in the occasion of robbery, the crime is robbery with homicide. SO APPLY THE SAME PRINCIPLES IN THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED RAPE AND HOMICIDE === example: the would-be rapist entered in the room of the woman, attempted to rape her, but she escaped by jumping out of the window which killed her. The crime is attempted rape with homicide. Another example: a person attempted to rape the woman, the latter shouted. So he shot her but she wasn’t hit, the bullet hit someone else. The crime is attempted rape with homicide.)

4. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed NOTA BENE: Relationship of the victim and the culprit, and age of woman must be allege in the information, otherwise, death will not be imposed. According to the SC, the accused is entitled to know the cause and accusation against him. he pleaded not guilty to the allegation which constitutes simple rape, not qualified rape. So even if proven, if not allege, the crime is simple rape. (mentioned in cases decided by SC year 1999-2000) Under the new rape law, a husband can be charged of rape by a wife. NOTA BENE: In rape cases the victim is entitled to moral damages as an additional award to the victim aside from the indemnity as the court may deem as just without the need of pleading (allegation) or proof. Indeed the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil law should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein since no appropriate pleadings have been filed wherein such allegations can be made. SEE RA 7610 if the victim is a minor

CASES: People vs. Joven de la Cuesta (1999) Definition of guardian = it is restrictive since it refers to a legal or judicial guardian. This must be construed as such in order for the death penalty to be imposed in compliance with RA 7659. The mere fact that the mother of the victim asked Joven to look after her child while she is away did not constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by the law. He was allowed to stay in the rented room for free of charge. At most he was a mere custodian or caretaker of the child on whom he exercise limited authority for a temporary period. People vs. Lorenzo Andaya Use of a deadly weapon = the victim here is deprived of reason, suffering from mental abnormality. The accused here offered marriage. The offer of marriage is an implied admission of guilt. People vs. Ffelixberto Fraga y Failon (2000) Use of a deadly weapon = it must be used to commit rape. Andal vs. People (1999) SC rejected argument about DNA test as a means of identification. DNA testing of semen of the accused to test whether it matched with that found in the victim’s vagina is not necessary. Presence of positive identification is there. People versus Vicente Valle (2000) Res gestae in rape = accused asked for forgiveness, an admission of guilt. People vs. Juan Mangasen Rape by Common law = People vs. Sharif Ali (1999) Iranian national who brought a woman to his apartment and he used a weapon. He didn’t want the woman to leave the apartment. SC said forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim. Appellant used the knife NOT to consummate the crime the crime of rape but to threaten Gina (victim) not to leave the bedroom where she was locked up. SC held that behavioral psychology teaches us that people in similar situations react dissimilarly. There is no standard human behavior when confronted with shocking experiences/ incidents. The workings of the human mind when place under emotional stress are unpredictable. This court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances. Thus, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether or not a woman involuntary succumb to the hands of the accused particularly when the accused employed drugs in order to rape the victim in an unconscious state. PEOPLE vs. ESTEBAN VICTOR y PENIS G.R. No. 127903. July 9, 1998 Furthermore, it is a reputable precept that testimonies of rape victims who are young or of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit. Courts usually lend credence to the testimony of a young girl especially where the facts point to her having been a victim of sexual assault. For sure, the victim would not make public the offense, undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she had not in fact been raped, for no decent Filipina would publicly admit she had been raped unless it was the truth. As a rule, a victim of rape will not come out in the open if her motives were not to obtain justice. The willingness of the complainant to face police investigators and to submit to physical examination is a mute but eloquent testimony, of the truth of her complaint. People vs. Restituto Manghuyog

Execution of an affidavit of desistance filed after the institution of a criminal action of crimes against chastity, even if done in an express pardon cannot be a ground to dismiss it. PEOPLE vs. FERMIN IGAT G.R. No. 122097. June 22, 1998 Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the victim and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear — fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would happen to her at that moment. Where such intimidation existed and the victim was cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be the height of unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victim's submission to the sexual act voluntary. In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as in this case, the former's moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. People vs. Samuel Burse Rape with mutilation = the accused struck the victim with a bolo three times on the face and left her for dead. The victim sustained her wounds only as a result of a clear attempt of the accused to kill her and cover up his misdeed. The injury thus suffered by the complainant should not be taken as a circumstance ( the mutilation) which would cause to raise the penalty to death but should rightly be taken up unabsorbed in the crime of frustrated murder. No specific description having been given by the law to the word mutilation. Therefore it should be understood in its ordinary and generic usage. Webster dictionary defines mutilation as ‘cutting off or permanently destroying an essential part of the body. Black defines mutilation in its criminal law concept as one that would deprive a person of the use of any lose of those limbs which may be useful to him. PEOPLE vs. JOSE DELEVERIO G.R. Nos. 118937-38. April 24, 1998 The mandatory death penalty is imposed under the first case, immediately above, when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is "a parent, ascendant, step parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." The trial court has thus held incorrectly in considering appellant, who is legally married to Roxan's natural grandmother, as among those named in the enumeration. Appellant is merely a step-grandparent who obviously is neither an "ascendant" nor a "stepparent" of the victim. Therefore, the crime of rape is not qualified. ALONTE vs. SAVELLANO JR., NBI and PEOPLE G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998 Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the socalled "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. People vs. Honorable Lorenzo Veneracion Rape with homicide is punished with the mandatory penalty of death but the judge here refuse to impose it because it was contrary to his religious belief. SC said You must impose the supreme penalty of death regardless of religious belief.

PEOPLE vs. SILVINO SALARZA, JR. G.R. No. 117682. August 18, 1997 The complainant here is a british stage and television actress. She took her vacation in palawan. The son of the owner (ricky) of the beach house became her boyfriend. The tourist guide (salarsa) who is the friend of the boyfriend-owner fell in love. One night there was a beach party, they drank. Afterwards, the woman went to her cottage, took a shower. The accused entered the woman’s room and began to undress the woman, the woman slightly spread her legs as she was half asleep. Then servino mounted, then he whispered ‘saril, this is not ricky( the boyfriend)’ … People v. Almasin Rape of a mental retardee. SC, she is qualified if he can make known her perception to others as long as he can communicate.

Prior to the amendment of the law on rape, a complaint must be filed by the offended woman. The persons who may file the same in behalf of the offended woman if she is a minor or if she was incapacitated to file, were as follows: a parent; in default of parents, a grandparent; in default or grandparent, the judicial guardian. Since rape is not a private crime anymore, it can be prosecuted even if the woman does not file a complaint. If carnal knowledge was made possible because of fraudulent machinations and grave abuse of authority, the crime is rape. This absorbs the crime of qualified and simple seduction when no force or violence was used, but the offender abused his authority to rape the victim. Under Article 266-C, the offended woman may pardon the offender through a subsequent valid marriage, the effect of which would be the extinction of the offender’s liability. Similarly, the legal husband may be pardoned by forgiveness of the wife provided that the marriage is not void ab initio. Obviously, under the new law, the husband may be liable for rape if his wife does not want to have sex with him. It is enough that there is indication of any amount of resistance as to make it rape. Incestuous rape was coined in Supreme Court decisions. It refers to rape committed by an ascendant of the offended woman. In such cases, the force and intimidation need not be of such nature as would be required in rape cases had the accused been a stranger. Conversely, the Supreme Court expected that if the offender is not known to woman, it is necessary that there be evidence of affirmative resistance put up by the offended woman. Mere “no, no” is not enough if the offender is a stranger, although if the rape is incestuous, this is enough. The new rape law also requires that there be a physical overt act manifesting resistance, if the offended party was in a situation where he or she is incapable of giving valid consent, this is admissible in evidence to show that carnal knowledge was against his or her will. When the victim is below 12 years old, mere sexual intercourse with her is already rape. Even if it was she who wanted the sexual intercourse, the crime will be rape. This is referred to as statutory rape.

In other cases, there must be force, intimidation, or violence proven to have been exerted to bring about carnal knowledge or the woman must have been deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. Where the victim is over 12 years old, it must be shown that the carnal knowledge with her was obtained against her will. It is necessary that there be evidence of some resistance put up by the offended woman. It is not, however, necessary that the offended party should exert all her efforts to prevent the carnal intercourse. It is enough that from her resistance, it would appear that the carnal intercourse is against her will. Mere initial resistance, which does not indicate refusal on the part of the offended party to the sexual intercourse, will not be enough to bring about the crime of rape. Note that it has been held that in the crime of rape, conviction does not require medicolegal finding of any penetration on the part of the woman. A medico-legal certificate is not necessary or indispensable to convict the accused of the crime of rape. It has also been held that although the offended woman who is the victim of the rape failed to adduce evidence regarding the damages to her by reason of the rape, the court may take judicial notice that there is such damage in crimes against chastity. The standard amount given now is P 30,000.00, with or without evidence of any moral damage. But there are some cases where the court awarded only P 20,000.00. An accused may be convicted of rape on the sole testimony of the offended woman. It does not require that testimony be corroborated before a conviction may stand. This is particularly true if the commission of the rape is such that the narration of the offended woman would lead to no other conclusion except that the rape was committed. Illustration: Daughter accuses her own father of having raped her. Allegation of several accused that the woman consented to their sexual intercourse with her is a proposition which is revolting to reason that a woman would allow more than one man to have sexual intercourse with her in the presence of the others. It has also been ruled that rape can be committed in a standing position because complete penetration is not necessary. The slightest penetration – contact with the labia – will consummate the rape. On the other hand, as long as there is an intent to effect sexual cohesion, although unsuccessful, the crime becomes attempted rape. However, if that intention is not proven, the offender can only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness. The main distinction between the crime of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the intent to lie with the offended woman. In a case where the accused jumped upon a woman and threw her to the ground, although the accused raised her skirts, the accused did not make any effort to remove her underwear. Instead, he removed his own underwear and placed himself on top of

the woman and started performing sexual movements. Thereafter, when he was finished, he stood up and left. The crime committed is only acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape. The fact that he did not remove the underwear of the victim indicates that he does not have a real intention to effect a penetration. It was only to satisfy a lewd design. Is there a complex crime under Article 48 of kidnapping with rape? Read kidnapping.

Jurisprudential Trend in RAPE (2000-2007) On the degree of force as an element of rape, this Court finds it "not necessary to show that irresistible force or intimidation accompanied the crime of rape; it suffices to show that force or intimidation was present and did result in the accused copulating with the offended woman against her will." o [T]he victim's character in rape is immaterial. Even the fact that the offended party may have been of unchaste character constitutes no defense to the charge of rape, provided that it is proved that the illicit relations described in the complaint was committed with force and violence. o The defense goes on to harp on AAA's delay in reporting the incidents. 41 The oft-repeated observation of this Court that it is not unusual for a rape victim to conceal the incident at least momentarily should address this. The appellants point to the unusual manner of commission of the crime, involving as it did not only the sexual assault by the man but also the participation of his wife, to discredit the complainant's testimony. Under the Revised Penal Code, 29 however, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. This is true in a charge of rape against a woman, provided of course a man is charged together with her. Thus, in two cases this Court convicted the woman as a principal by direct participation since it was proven that she held down the complainant in order to help her co-accused spouse consummate the offense. o In People v. Villamala, 30 the Court found the husband and wife guilty for raping their neighbor and "kumare" in this factual setting, viz: the wife visited the victim at her home on the pretext of inquiring as to the whereabouts of her husband. Once inside, she whistled for her husband and he immediately appeared at the doorstep. The wife then suddenly pinned her "kumare" to the floor. The husband forcefully removed the victim's skirt and panties, removed his shorts, placed himself on top of the victim and consummated the rape. In the more recent People v. Saba, 31 the accused married couple victimized a fourteen (14) year-old epileptic who stayed at their home for treatment by the wife who was a reputed healer. On the pretext of conducting a healing session, the wife ordered the victim to lie down on the floor then pinned the victim's hands to the floor and covered her mouth while her husband removed his pants and briefs and the victim's panties and raped the young girl. These two cases show not only the possibility but the reality of rape committed by a woman together with a man. o The appellants argue that the prosecution failed to present any evidence of aberrant sexual behavior on their part that would justify the trial court's conclusion that the rape occurred as described by the complainant. This argument must fail since the sexual habits of the appellant-spouses do not constitute an essential element of the offense of rape. The prosecution only has to prove that there was carnal knowledge of the complainant and that it was done against her will. The trial court's evaluation of the evidence resulted in the appellants' conviction and a close scrutiny of its judgment leads us to affirm it. o Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime; hence, each of the eight other rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is required to establish, by the necessary quantum of proof, the elements of rape for each charge. Baby Jane's testimony on the first rape charge was explicit, detailing the participation of each appellant in the offense and clearly illustrating all the elements of the offense of rape. However her simple assertion that the subsequent rapes occurred in exactly the same manner as in previous incidents is clearly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish to a degree of moral certainty the guilt of the appellants insofar as the eight rape charges are concerned. Her testimony was too general as it failed to focus on material details as to how each of the subsequent acts was committed. Even her testimony on cross-examination did not add anything to support her accusations of subsequent rape. Thus, only the rape alleged to have been committed on September 1992 was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants may be penalized only for this offense. o Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The use by the appellants of a bladed weapon, alleged in the Amended Complaint and sufficiently proven in this case, qualifies the rape. In

the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty that the appellants shall suffer is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. o In rape cases, the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The medical certificate is presented merely to corroborate the victim's declaration that she was sexually molested. In fact, what is more telling in the medical findings proffered in evidence by the prosecution is the presence of hymenal lacerations in different positions in the victim's genitalia which is the best physical evidence of her forcible defloration. o A rape victim can easily identify her assailant especially if he is known to her because during the rape, she is physically close to her assailant, enabling her to have a good look at the latter's physical features. The doctrine consistently upheld by this Court is that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. It is inherently a weak defense; and unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim. o In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in evidence to prove Rachel's age. The only evidence of the victim's age is her testimony 57 and that of her mother's (Sally de Guzman's) Sinumpaang Salaysay, 58 which was adopted as part of the latter's direct testimony, 59 attesting to the fact that her five-year-old daughter was raped. o Sally's testimony regarding Rachel's age was insufficient, since Rachel was alleged to be already five years old at the time of the rape, and what is sought to be proved is that she was then less than seven years old. Her testimony will suffice only if it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. There is no such express and clear declaration and admission of the appellant that Rachel was less than seven years old when he raped her. Moreover, the trial court made no finding as to the victim's age. o It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. 60 Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Rachel's minority, the appellant cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. o However, Sally's testimony that her daughter was five years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding the appellant liable for statutory rape, or the rape of a girl below twelve years of age. Under the second paragraph of Article 266-B, in relation to Article 266-A(1) (d), carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, and not the death penalty. The elements of rape under the above provisions are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. o We find, however, that the trial court erred in concluding that the crime committed by appellant is statutory rape. While the Information alleges that Imee was 10 years old when the crime was committed on February 6, 1994, the prosecution failed to present her Certificate of Live Birth or any other evidence to prove her age. o As regards appellant's second assigned error, we agree with his contention that the trial court erred in imposing upon him the penalty of death. The trial court considered the use of a piece of wood as a deadly weapon and, therefore, a qualifying circumstance. Suffice it to state that, as a rule, in order that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance may be appreciated, it must be alleged in the Information and proven during trial. 39 Here, no such circumstance has been alleged in the Information which justifies the imposition of death. Thus, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua as provided in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, quoted earlier. The gravamen in the crime of rape is carnal knowledge. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had sexual contact with the alleged victim. This, the prosecution failed to do in this case. While the complainant testified that appellant forced her into sexual intercourse on two occasions, the physical evidence clouds her testimony. Records show that the complainant was examined by several doctors. However, only the reports of the last two doctors who examined her were offered as evidence. The report of Dr. Annabel Soliman, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI shows that there were no signs of injury in complainant's genitalia. In a later examination, however, conducted by Dr. Manuel Aves of the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, a healed superficial hymenal laceration at 12:00 position was found. Dr. Aves explained that the location of the

laceration excludes sexual intercourse as possible cause thereof. Dr. Aves explained that lacerations found on the upper portion of the hymen are normally caused by instrumentation but not by sexual contact. o We are not unmindful of the Court's ruling that the absence of laceration in the hymen does not preclude the existence of rape and that when a woman states that she has been raped, she states all that is necessary to prove the offense. These principles, however, do not in themselves support a conviction. They must be weighed with the presumption of innocence of the accused. To support a finding of guilt, it is necessary that the complainant's story be believable in itself. o In rape cases, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its case with clarity and persuasion to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required. Although the law does not demand absolute certainty of guilt, it nonetheless requires moral certainty to support a judgment of conviction. Where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fails to meet the test of moral certainty and it becomes the constitutional duty of the Court to acquit the accused. As the trial court ruled, the evidence for the prosecution has clearly established that Marietta, in all three instances, was forced to submit to appellant's bestial desires, the latter employing force and intimidation. In all the three (3) rape incidents, the appellant used physical violence upon the person of Marietta to consummate his purpose of copulating with the latter. Marietta put up a struggle every time the accused forced himself upon her, but in all instances, she was inevitably subdued by his strength. As we held in People vs. Baltazar, 14 nowhere is it required in law or jurisprudence that a woman must offer tenacious resistance to a sexual assault. The law does not impose on the rape victim the burden of proving resistance. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. 15 Not all offended parties in the crime of rape react the same way. There are those who even freeze because of fright and shock, unable to move nor shout. We cannot fault the latter for not putting up a "tenacious" resistance. In the case at bar, we find that Marietta put up a good fight, but because of her mature age and the disparity between her and appellant's physical strength, she was easily subdued by her attacker. o It is settled that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim if the trial court finds said testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. o On the other hand, evidence for the defense was anchored solely on the claim of the appellant that he and Merly were sweethearts. He alleged that the several incidents of sexual intercourse between him and Marietta, twice a week on the average, were consensual. We agree with the finding of the trial court that this "sweetheart defense" put up by the appellant was preposterous and concocted merely as an afterthought. No other evidence than the self-serving testimony of the appellant was presented to support such a defense, like love letters, pictures, mementos, etc. The supposedly corroborative testimony of Leticia dela Cruz did not say much. All she stated was that Marietta always gave money to the appellant since 1998, that Marietta always asked her to call the appellant, and that Marietta got angry with the appellant when the latter lived in with her friend Dory. 18 None of the latter statements could prove that Marietta and the appellant were sweethearts. As the trial court correctly observed, if the appellant were really her boyfriend, then Marietta would not have gone to the extent of bringing to court this criminal action which inevitably exposed her to the humiliation of recounting in public how she was abused. Unless truly wronged, she would not have instituted these cases. That she was already fifty-one (51) years old rendered her exposure to a public trial of rape all the more embarrassing and painful. o The prosecution, through Marietta's testimony, has clearly established that on at least three (3) occasions — August 16, 1998, October 3, 1998, and March 15, 1999 the appellant Eduardo Fabian y Mari forced himself on Marietta and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her. He employed physical force and intimidation, and even threatened her that he would kill her and her son if she reports to the police. The foregoing satisfy all the elements of rape as defined and penalized in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8353, and warrant the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua upon the accused for each of the three (3) counts of rape. Time and again, we stress the verity that in incestuous rape where the father/stepfather exercises moral dominance over his daughter/stepdaughter, the victim by the sheer force of this moral influence is reduced to a docile creature, vulnerable and submissive to the sexual depredations of her tormentor. o In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the father's parental authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the children's duty to obey and to observe reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are

o

o

recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughter's will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants. Appellant scrapes the bottom of the barrel in making much of Gemma's statement that he was on top of her for an hour. Indeed, it is too much to expect of a minor rape victim to give a precise recollection of the rape incident when at the time of the sexual assault her tender mind was not only bombarded by a mishmash of confusing emotions but, more so, every sinew of her young body was committed to ward off her attacker in a vain attempt to defend her purity and honor. Understandably, Gemma might have lost all bearings of time for the few harrowing minutes in the hands of her father seemed eternity to her. The rule is that when a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross- examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit. 20 It is simply too improbable for the minor victims, who are guileless and innocent in the ways of the world, to brazenly impute a crime as serious as rape to the man, they call their father, if it were not true.

In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential ingredient of the crime charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. Jenny's simple declaration that she was raped is not evidence but simply a conclusion. The principle that "when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped," no longer holds. This means that the prosecution must still prove the elements of the crime of rape, and it is not enough for a woman to claim she was raped without showing how the crime was specifically committed. o In the earlier case of People v. Mendoza, 21 the accused was acquitted by virtue of the victim's plain statement that she was "raped" on 11 August 1995 without offering further details on how the alleged incident was carried out. This Court declared therein that "(w)hether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine based on the evidence offered. Testimony to that effect is not evidence, but simply a conclusion, the proof of which is the very purpose of the trial . . . It is not competent for a witness [in this case Michelle] to express an opinion, conclusion or judgment thereon." o The certificates of live birth 22 prove that at the time of the rape incidents Gemma, Jean and Jenny were minors. With the concurrence of their minority and relationship 23 with appellant, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape. Well-settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and punished. A young girl's revelation that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and her willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as a mere concoction. 22 Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. o In rape trials, the issue, more often than not, is the credibility of the victim. But when a rape victim's testimony is straightforward, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, then it deserves full faith and credit. If found credible, the declaration of facts given by the offended party alone would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. o Conspiracy was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the individual acts of the accused when taken together as a whole showed that they acted in concert and cooperated to achieve the same unlawful objective. 27 The evidence clearly shows that conspiracy existed between the three accused shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime of rape. 28 It was established during the trial that while accused-appellant raped the victim, his co-accused covered the latter's mouth or restrained her hands. We have repeatedly held that in cases of multiple rape, each of the defendants is responsible not only for the rape committed by him but also for those committed by the others. 29 Accused-appellant, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the two other counts of rape committed by his co-accused. o Similarly, it is highly inconceivable that complainant would file rape charges against accused-appellant just because her father will scold her for failing to go home one night. No motive was given for her to falsely impute a heinous crime against accusedappellant. As held in the case of People v. Dimailig: 33 "Where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so actuated and her testimony is entitled to full faith. It has been repeatedly held that no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless the same were true, for it would be instinctive on her part to protect her honor and obtain justice for the wicked acts committed upon her." o We cannot sustain the accused-appellant's claim that the absence of lacerations and contusions in the victim's genitalia negate the commission of rape. We have consistently held that the rupture of the

hymen or laceration of the vagina is not an essential element of rape, for mere knocking at the door of the pudenda by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape. 37 Penile invasion, as it has often been held, necessarily entails contact with the labia where even the briefest of contact under circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our jurisprudence. Hence, neither the penetration of the penis beyond the lips of the vagina nor the rupture of the hymen is indispensable to justify conviction. 38 A medical examination is not even indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Republic Act 8505 “Rape Shield Law” Providing assistance to rape victim and establishing rape crisis center in every province. A. Salient features of this law: If the victim of rape is a woman, the investigator should be woman also. If it reaches the fiscal/prosecutor, the same must also be a woman. If possible, the judge should also be a woman. Q: Who are qualified to run the center? A: DILG, NGO and those expert in cases in handling rape cases B. Purpose of the center; 1. To provide victims with psychological counseling; medical services and medical attention; provided with lawyer and ensuring the privacy of the victim 2. Duty of the police officer to refer the rape case to the prosecutor 3. If the victim is a woman, the one who will examine her must also be a woman 4. Women desk in every police precinct in the country C. Protective Measure: 1. Complainant’s right to privacy 2. Identity of the parties shall not be disclosed Republic Act 7877 SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT Q: Who are liable? A: employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person: 1. Who having authority, influence and moral ascendancy - it is taking advantage of superiority. It is an abuse of power. 2. Demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other e.g.; Manager and Employee to have a date - it could be sexual intercourse or fondling of body parts 3. Regardless if the demand is accepted How Committed: A. Work-related or employment environment (1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee; (2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

B. Education OR Training environment (1) Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender; (2) Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender; (3) When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors and scholarships or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges, or considerations; or (4) When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. A. Scope of RA 7877 a. work, b. education and c. training related activities B. Sexual Harassment can be committed by a man against a woman, woman against a man - Its all about power!!! C. In rape, abuse of authority must be grave if acquitted he can still be prosecuted under Sexual Harassment. D. Rape v. Sexual Harassment

1)

Rape ( c ) there must be grave abuse of authority, while in SH only use of authority

2) 3)

SH limited to work, educational and training related while in rape it is not. Rape as a general rule must be consummated. No sexual intercourse no rape. In

SH if a

woman declines the demand there is still consummated SH.

4)

SH there is demand or request while in rape there is none. (Diretso hansak  ) E. See RA

7610 if the victim is a minor Q: May an Employee be charged with Sexual Harassment by another Employee? A: Yes, as long as there is moral ascendancy. Q: May a person not having sexual intercourse with a woman be held guilty of Sexual Harassment? A: Yes, because in Sexual Harassment there is a principal by direct participation & principal by induction. “Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined, or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been committed, shall also be held liable under this Act.”

Q: What is the liability of the Employer or the head officer in an education and training institution? A: If there is Sexual Harassment and no immediate action is taken, he is SOLIDARILY liable for damages. This refers to civil liability.

prescribed for the crime threatened to be committed. But if the purpose is not attained, the penalty lower by two degrees is imposed. The maximum period of the penalty is imposed if the threats are made in writing or through a middleman as they manifest evident premeditation. Distinction between threat and coercion: The essence of coercion is violence or intimidation. There is no condition involved; hence, there is no futurity in the harm or wrong done. In threat, the wrong or harm done is future and conditional. In coercion, it is direct and personal. Distinction between threat and robbery: (1)

As to intimidation – In robbery, the intimidation is actual and immediate; in threat, the intimidation is future and conditional.

(2)

As to nature of intimidation – In robbery, the intimidation is personal; in threats, it may be through an intermediary.