Remedial/Criminal Law Digest

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Department Of Agrarian Reform vs. Trinidad Valley Realty & Devt. Corp. et
al. G.R. No. 173386, February 11, 2014
Facts: Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. are the registered
owners of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental devoted to the
cultivation of sugar cane. A portion of this land was awarded by respondent, DAR to
beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Trinidad opposed this
move in the RTC and alleged that: DAR committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the valuation by Land Bank is not just
compensation, the register of deeds cannot cancel their title without a court order,
and that Land Bank together with the LRA and Register of deeds committed grave
abuse of discretion when they cooperated to commit the act. In its answer, DAR
asserted that jurisdiction over all matters concerning agrarian reform exclusively
belongs to DAR and that the RTC’s jurisdiction in agrarian reform matters is limited
only to the determination of just compensation and prosecution of all criminal
offenses under RA 6657. The RTC ruled in favor of Trinidad claiming that it has
jurisdiction. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court’s decision citing that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the said case hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Held: No. In view of Section 54 of RA 6657; the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in admitting the amended petition as it did not have jurisdiction over both
the petition and amended petition filed by Trinidad et al. which clearly provides that
it is the CA, and not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case. It is a cardinal
principle in remedial law that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of
an action is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint
and the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction is determined exclusively by the
Constitution and the law and cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement
of the parties. It cannot also be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished
by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither
for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being
legislative in character. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once
vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. Section 54 of RA 6657 leaves no room for doubt that
decisions, orders, awards or rulings of the DAR may be brought to the CA by
certiorari and not with the RTC through an ordinary action for cancellation of title.
The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial

evidence. The Court likewise ruled in the similar case of DAR v. Cuenca that "[a]ll
controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in
nature." Given our ruling that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the instant case, we
find no necessity to address the other issues raised in the three consolidated
petitions. The petition is denied.

G.R. No. L-48754 November 26, 1941 EMILIO V. REYES, protestantappellant, vs. APOLONIO R. DIAZ, protestee-appellee.
Facts: This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground
that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. The supposed questions of
jurisdiction are, first, whether or not there is sufficient to show that the protestant
has duly filed his certificate of candidacy, and second, whether the trial court has or
has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the
protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest.
Held: In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above
described. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of
candidacy is proven, the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case.
There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of
the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is
one of fact — whether or not the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly
filed. And not the until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be
determined.
Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal
provisions above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the
issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may
be true that the court by an erroneous ruling on such question my encroach upon
issues completely foreign to those defined in the pleadings, but in such case the
question of jurisdiction that may arise would not be one of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but of jurisdiction over the issue.
Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that
the institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may
examine all the ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine
which are legal and which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any
question as to their illegality.
G.R. No. 185663 June 20, 2012 REMEDIOS ANTONINO, Petitioner, vs. THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY and TAN TIAN SU, Respondents.
Facts: petitioner seeks to enforce the commitment of private respondent to sell his
property in accordance with the terms and conditions of their purported agreement
dated July 7, 2004. By implication, petitioner does not question the ownership of

private respondent over the property nor does she claim, by any color of title, right
to possess the property or to its recovery. The action is simply for the enforcement
of a supposed contract, and thus, unmistakably a personal action.
Petitioner should have filed the case either in Muntinlupa City, where she resides, or
in Manila, where private respondent maintains his residence. Other than filing the
complaint in any of these places, petitioner proceeds with the risk of a possible
dismissal of her case. Unfortunately for petitioner, private respondent forthwith
raised improper venue as an affirmative defense and his stand was sustained by
trial court, thus, resulting to the dismissal of the case.
On April 1, 2005, Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment.
Issue: The propriety of Antonino’s use of the remedy of a petition for annulment of
judgment as against the final and executory orders of the RTC.
Held: Antonino’s recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously flawed and the
reasons are patent. A petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as a
substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal.
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the reliefs provided
for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a
condition sine qua non that one must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal
from, or file a petition for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate
remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of those
cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for
annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction
or negligence
Second, a petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on "extrinsic fraud"
and "lack of jurisdiction" and cannot prosper on the basis of "grave abuse of
discretion".
The RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing Antonino’s
complaint. The RTC was correct in classifying Antonino’s cause of action as personal
and in holding that it was instituted in the wrong venue.
petition is DENIED
G.R. No. 189801 October 23, 2013 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS),
Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BERMELA A. GABUYA, Respondents
Facts: Sometime in December 2003, Angelita Perez-Nengasca (Nengasca) and
Teresita Candar-Bracero (Bracero), representing themselves, as estate agents,
offered to mortgage to Vicente R. Teo (Teo) for the amount of P500,000.00 a parcel
of land purportedly owned by the heirs of Melquiades S. Silva (Silva), covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-29438.5 However, upon verification with the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, Teo learned that the said TCT was already
cancelled, prompting him to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).6

On December 10, 2003, the NBI set an entrapment operation at Teo’s residence. In
the process, Mario Padigos (Padigos) who posed as one of the heirs of Silva, and one
Gwendolyn A. Bascon (Bascon) were arrested in the act of counting the marked
money representing the proceeds of the mortgage. The NBI also accosted Nengasca
and Bracero who were stationed outside Teo’s house.7
During the investigation, Padigos, Bascon, Nengasca and Bracero confessed that
they acted under the instructions of Gabuya. Thus, the NBI hatched a second
entrapment operation at the La Fortuna Bakery whereat Gabuya, after receiving
from Nengasca a plastic bag with the marked money, was arrested.8 At that time,
Gabuya was a government employee, holding the position of Administrative Officer
II in the Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center. Hence, following her
arrest, the NBI filed an administrative complaint against Gabuya for grave
misconduct before the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-V-A-03-0736-L.
For her part, Gabuya maintained her innocence claiming that: (a) she did not
conspire to defraud Teo; (b) Teo never mentioned her in his affidavit;10 (c) she was
found negative of yellow fluorescent powder;11 (d) Padigos attested that she
(Gabuya) had no participation in the conspiracy;12 and (e) she cannot be held
administratively liable for the subject acts since they are not related to the functions
of her office and her apprehension occurred during lunch break.
in a Decision14 dated February 28, 2006 (February 28, 2006 Decision), the
Ombudsman found Gabuya guilty of grave misconduct and ordered her dismissal
from service with the accessory penalties cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the
government service.
the CA found that Gabuya has a pending motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s February 28, 2006 Decision which was not disclosed in the certificate
of non-forum shopping attached to the CA Petition. As such, the CA remanded the
case to the Ombudsman so that it may decide the motion with dispatch.19
Nevertheless, the CA granted Gabuya’s application for the issuance of a writ
preliminary injunction, temporarily enjoining the immediate implementation of her
dismissal from service. It cited as basis the Court’s Decision dated September 11,
2008 in G.R. No. 175573, entitled
Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego20 (2008 Samaniego ruling), where it was
held that the mere filing of an appeal is sufficient to stay the execution of the
Ombudsman’s adverse decision involving disciplinary cases.21
Dissatisfied, the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion.
Issue: The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA gravely abused its
discretion in: (a) remanding the case to the Ombudsman; and (b) issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction notwithstanding such remand.
Held: The petition is partly granted.

the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in remanding the
case to the Ombudsman for resolution of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
absent any showing that it exercised its discretion in a whimsical, capricious, and
arbitrary manner.32 In this respect, the instant petition for certiorari lacks merit33
and the remand of the case must stand. This is in addition to the fact that the
nullification of the remand would only serve to unduly delay the proceedings in this
case.
The petition, however, is partly granted insofar as it prays for the lifting of the writ
of preliminary injunction.
Verily, it is a standing rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is merely provisional
in nature and is integrally linked to the subsistence of the proceedings in the main
case.34 Stated differently, the ancillary remedy of preliminary i{\junction cannot
exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.35
Thus, since the CA already remanded the case to the Ombudsman for the purpose
of resolving Gabuya's pending motion for reconsideration, the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by it, absent any countervailing justification therefor, must be
dissolved.
The petition is GRANTED
EDITHA PADLAN vs. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN G.R.
NO. 180321, MARCH 20, 2013 PERALTA, J:
FACTS:
Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land which is
covered by TCT. While on board a jeepney, Elenita’s mother, Lilia, had a
conversation with one Maura Passion
regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate
agent, Lilia borrowed the
owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided
the property into several lots under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo
Dinglasan. Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita
and her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. On
April 26, 1990, Maura sold one of the lots to Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later sold the
lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus, TCT issued under the former’s
name was cancelled and
another TCT was issued in the name of Editha Padlan. Respondents filed a case
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was,
thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. The RTC rendered
a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently,
dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse before the CA.
CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the CA reversed
and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT issued
in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondents’ own title.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not

only did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case
RULING:
No. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege
the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value
alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of
P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of
the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’ counsel informed
the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next
hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor’s
Office.
However, they did not present such copy. To reiterate, where the ultimate objective
of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof .
Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is
only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore,
all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
Samar II Electric Cooperative Inc. (SAMELCO II) et al. vs. Ananias Seludo Jr.
G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012
FACTS
: Respondent Seludo is a member of SAMELCO II’s BOD. A board resolution was
issued disallowing respondent from attending meetings of the BOD effective
February 2005 until the end of his term as directed and disqualified him for one
term to run as candidate for director in the upcoming district elections. Respondent
then filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against SAMELCO II with the RTC in
Calbiga, Samar. RTC granted a TRO in favour of Seludo effective for 72 hours and
later extended for another 17 days. Petitioners then raised an affirmative defense of
lack of lack of jurisdiction of RTC over subject matter, the same being with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA). RTC sustained its jurisdiction over the
matter, motion for reconsideration was denied. CA affirmed the RTC. .
ISSUE
: Does the NEA have primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the
Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II?
RULING
: Yes, pursuant to Subsection (a), Sec. 24, Chapter III of PD 269 as amended by Sec.
7, PD 1645 clearly shows that, pursuant to its power of supervision and control, NEA
is granted the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well
as to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric
cooperatives. In addition, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition, the NEA, in its exercise of its power of supervision and control, has
primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution.
Petition granted.

LUCIA BARRAMEDA VDA. DE BALLESTEROS, vs RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN
INC., represented by its Liquidator, THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondent.G.R. No. 176260 (2010)
Facts: It appears from the records that on March 17, 2000, petitioner Lucia
Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction against her children, Roy, Rito, Amy, Arabel, Rico, Abe, Ponce Rex and
Adden, all surnamed Ballesteros, and the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch
(RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. IR-3128.
In her complaint, Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left two (2)
parcels of land located in San Nicolas, Baao, Camarines Sur, each with an area of
357 square meters; that on March 6, 1995, without her knowledge and consent, her
children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver of the estate of her
husband wherein all the heirs, including Lucia, agreed to allot the two parcels to
Rico Ballesteros (Rico); that, still, without her knowledge and consent, Rico
mortgaged Parcel B of the estate in favor of RBCI which mortgage was being
foreclosed for failure to settle the loan secured by the lot; and that Lucia was
occupying Parcel B and had no other place to live. She prayed that the deed of
extrajudicial partition and waiver, and the subsequent mortgage in favor of RBCI be
declared null and void having been executed without her knowledge and consent.
She also prayed for damages.
In its Answer, RBCI claimed that in 1979, Lucia sold one of the two parcels to Rico
which represented her share in the estate of her husband. The extrajudicial
partition, waiver and mortgage were all executed with the knowledge and consent
of Lucia although she was not able to sign the document. RBCI further claimed that
Parcel B had already been foreclosed way back in 1999 which fact was known to
Lucia through the auctioning notary public. Attorney’s fees were pleaded as
counterclaim.
The case was then set for pre-trial conference. During the pre-trial, RBCIs counsel
filed a motion to withdraw after being informed that Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) would handle the case as RBCI had already been closed and
placed under the receivership of the PDIC. Consequently, on February 4, 2002, the
lawyers of PDIC took over the case of RBCI.
On May 9, 2003, RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the RTC-Iriga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. RBCI stated
that pursuant to Section 30, Republic Act No. 7653 (RA No. 7653), otherwise known
as the New Central Bank Act, the RTC-Makati, already constituted itself, per its Order
dated August 10, 2001, as the liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the
liquidation of RBCI. Thus, the subject matter of Civil Case No. IR-3128 fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of such liquidation court. Lucia opposed the motion.
On July 29, 2003, the RTC-Iriga issued an order[2] granting the Motion to Dismiss.

Not in conformity, Lucia appealed the RTC ruling to the CA on the ground that the
RTC-Iriga erred in dismissing the case because it had jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
IR-3128 under the rule on adherence of jurisdiction.
On August 15, 2006, the CA rendered the questioned decision ordering the
consolidation of Civil Case No. IR-3128 and the liquidation case pending before RTCMakati.
Lucia filed a motion for reconsideration[4] but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated December 14, 2006.[5]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: whether a liquidation court can take cognizance of a case wherein the main
cause of action is not a simple money claim against a bank ordered closed, placed
under receivership of the PDIC, and undergoing a liquidation proceeding.
RULING:
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the
Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against
the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims
are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard
separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said
claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and
distinct from the others. x x x
It is clear, therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over all claims,
including that of Lucia against the insolvent bank.
It is clear, therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over all claims,
including that of Lucia against the insolvent bank. As declared in Miranda v.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation,[14] regular courts do not have jurisdiction
over actions filed by claimants against an insolvent bank, unless there is a clear
showing that the action taken by the BSP, through the Monetary Board, in the
closure of financial institutions was in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. The same is not obtaining in this present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

CRIM
Efren L. Alvarez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192591, June 29,
2011.

FACTS: On August 10, 2006, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (SB-06-CRM-0389), under the following
Information:
That on or about 12 September 1996, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the then Municipality (now Science City) of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EFREN L. ALVAREZ, a
high ranking public official, being then the Mayor of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, taking
advantage of his official position and while in the discharge of his official or
administrative functions, and committing the offense in relation to his office, acting
with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give the Australian-Professional
Incorporated (API) unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, by awarding to
the latter the contract for the construction of Wag-Wag Shopping Mall in the amount
of Two Hundred Forty Million Pesos (Php 240,000,000.00) under a Buil[d]-OperateTransfer Agreement, notwithstanding the fact that API was and is not a duly-licensed
construction company as per records of the Philippine Construction Accreditation
Board (PCAB), which construction license is a pre-requisite for API to engage in
construction of works for the said municipal government and that API does not have
the experience and financial qualifications to undertake such costly project among
others, to the damage and prejudice of the public service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan utterly failed to appreciate
that there was no damage on the then Municipality of Muñoz as contemplated by
law, to warrant the conviction of the Accused-Petitioner.
RULING: The term “undue injury” in the context of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act punishing the act of “causing undue injury to any party,” has a
meaning akin to that civil law concept of “actual damage.” Actual damage, in the
context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. Article 2199 of the Civil Code
provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by a party as he has
duly proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
People v. Sandiganbayan
164185July 23, 2008

and

ALEJANDRO

A.

VILLAPANDOG.R.

No.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman towardsthe
decision of the Sandiganbayan, granting private respondent Alejandro A.
Villapando’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful
appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.Mayor Villapando was the
duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente,Palawan when the alleged crime was
committed. On July 1998, the accusedappointed Orlando Tiape, who lost in May
1998 election, as MunicipalAdministrator of the said municipality. However,
respondents contend that the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in
Article 244 of theRevised Penal Code.On the other hand, petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Divisionacted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Codedoes not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in
the1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RULING
The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basicrules
of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. The legalmaxim ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule instatutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courtsshould not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of alaw where none is
indicated. The legal disqualification in Article 244 of theRevised Penal Code where
“any public officer who shall knowingly nominateor appoint to any public office any
person lacking the legalqualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos ”simply means disqualification under
the law. Clearly,Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of
the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year
aftersuch election to be appointed to any office in the government or
anygovernment-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.A
judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process isvoid,
and thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.The petition is granted. The assailed
judgment is hereby declared null andvoid. The Court ordered the record of the case
to be remanded toSandiganbayan for further proceedings.
Judge adoracion angeles vs HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 176596:March 23, 2011.
FACTS:
It appears that sometime in June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her
grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. The preliminary investigation of the complaint
was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco) of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Resolution dated June 20, 1999, respondent
Velasco filed a case against petitioner for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic
Act (RA) No. 7610. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary who,
in a Resolution dated April 4, 2000, ordered the withdrawal of the Information
against petitioner. On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed with the DOJ an administrative
complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and
Manifest Bad Faith against respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently
dismissed. On reconsideration, Velasco submitted a comment which contained
statements pertaining to Judge Velascos sexuality.
On the basis of the above statements which petitioner claimed to be a direct attack
on her character and reputation as a public servant, she filed a Complaint for four
counts of libel against respondent Velasco before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. It was dismissed. Petitioner Judge was clearly undaunted, as she filed a
petition for review with the DOJ of the dismissal. The petition was, again, dismissed,
even upon reconsideration.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Reviewbefore the OP questioning the DOJ
Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP dismissed the Petition for Review,
stating that under Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 dated29 May 2003, no appeal
from or petition for review of the decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the
President, except those involving offenses punishable byreclusion perpetuato death.
Petitioner thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 assailing
the OP order. In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down inCarpio
v. Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President over all
executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified
political agency. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed
petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or
overturn the DOJ Secretarys resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the
DOJ Secretary, being her alter ego.
The CA also held that the OP's outright dismissal of petitioner's Petition for Review
was valid and binding, and was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It found
that the DOJ resolutions dismissing petitioner's petition for review became final and
executoryafter petitioner failed to elevate the said DOJ resolutions directly with the
CA in a petition forcertiorariwithin the 60-dayreglementary period provided for
under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition before the CA was filed on time
RULING: Prohibited petitions before the OP.
Second issue: Filing an action with the OP was fatal to the petitioners case, since MC
No. 58 prohibits the filing of such petition with the OP. Petitioner's filing of the
petition for review with the OP, which is prohibited, did not toll the running of the
reglementaryperiod for filing a petition with the CA.Accordingly, the DOJ resolutions
became final and executory after the lapse of the period for assailing the same in
the CA.
Rodolfo llamas VS EXEC SEC. OSCAR ORBOS GR NO. 99031 OCTOBER 15,
1991
Facts: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some
other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for
office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than
30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned
hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed
upon him.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.
HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does
not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the

President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.
People v. Pedro Intong GR No. 145034-35 February 5, 2004
FACTS: In Crim. Case No. 36-05 for rape, the accusatory information read:
That on or about the 23rd day of November, 1997, at or about 10:00 oclock in the
evening, in barangay Bunawan, municipality of Calamba, province of Misamis
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, entered the bedroom in the dwelling of
the offended party, and by means of force and intimidation, with the use of a
hunting knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the offended party Genalyn Camporedondo, a 10-year-old girl who is
the step granddaughter of said accused, without her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance that the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age and the offender is a stepgrandfather of the victim, and the use of
a deadly weapon, and the aggravating circumstance that the offense was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party.[2]
In Crim. Case No. 36-09 for statutory rape, the accusation was to the following
effect, viz:
That on or about November 23, 1997, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, more or
less, in the kitchen of their house, at barangay Bunawan, municipality of Calamba,
province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, and with the used
(sic) of a hunting knife, with violence, force, and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with GENALYN
CAMPOREDONDO, a minor 10 years old, without her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the presence of the qualifying circumstance of minority
and the aggravating circumstance of relationship the accused being the step-father
of the mother of the victim.
ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF RAPE WHEN THE LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
RULING: The crime of rape is thus committed either (a) by carnal knowledge or (b)
by the insertion of the penis into the mouth or anal orifice of the victim or by the
insertion of any object or instrument into the genital or anal orifice of a person. The
sexual congress and the insertion of appellants fingers into the sex organ of the
victim, twice committed, have been sufficiently established. Unexplainably,
appellant has not been additionally charged in the information under the second
mode of committing rape.

The crime of rape is penalized with reclusion perpetua; the penalty becomes
reclusion perpetua to death when committed with the use of a deadly weapon and
the attendance of other circumstances therein stated. When the rape is attended by
the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and of her relationship with
the culprit, the imposable penalty is death.
The victim did not testify on the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the
crime. It was her 9-year-old brother Gino but who merely testified that appellant had
or held a knife.
The informations alleged that the victim was a minor, and that appellant was her
step-grandfather. The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, if
indeed in attendance, could elevate the penalty to one of death.
The minority of the victim at the time of commission of the rape incidents was
sufficiently established. The victims relationship with appellant, however, is not
among the qualifying circumstances of relationships covered by the law. Article 266B requires that the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. Conformably with the principle of exclusio unius est
exclusio alterius, the relationship of the offender, as being just a step-grandfather of
the victim, cannot be deemed embraced by the enumeration.[27] Furthermore,
there is no evidence submitted that appellant is legally married to the victims
grandmother.
Absent one of the twin qualifying circumstances heretofore discussed, the rape
committed may only be subject to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The crime has been witnessed by the nine-year-old brother of the victim. Under
Article 266-B(3), the penalty of death may be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with the qualifying circumstance of the crime having been witnessed in
full view by any of the victims relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity.
While Gino is a full-blood brother of the victim, or a relative within the second
degree, this qualifying circumstance, however, has not been alleged in the
Information so as to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Misamis
Occidental, Branch 36, is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATIONS
Benjamin romualdez VS Hon. Simeon marcelo GR No. 165510-33 july 28,
2006
Facts: Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were
previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004;
that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and
thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court

a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment,[3] the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter
exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the
Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the
Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid
period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment[4] that, in accordance with the 1987
Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman
need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering
that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of
Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether
prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines,
the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
ISSUE: whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already
prescribed.
RULING: We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan[20] that:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the
period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the
accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus,
the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in
enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the
Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.

People v. Victoriano abesamis gr no. 140985 August 28, 2007
FACTS: This is a story of a game of billiards with a tragic ending.
An information7 for murder was filed against the brothers accused-appellant and
Rodel in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41. It read:
That on or about September 18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating…and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one RAMON
VILLO y MANGALINDAN… thrice with a butcher’s knife, hitting him on the different
parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.8
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. During the trial, he admitted
stabbing Ramon with a butcher’s knife but claimed that he did so only to defend
himself.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of homicide. On appeal, accusedappellant’s conviction was affirmed with modification by the CA.
In a letter dated June 12, 2007, Julio Arciaga, assistant director for prisons and
security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that accused-appellant
was granted parole by the Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) on March 5, 2003
and released from the custody of the Bureau of Corrections on March 20, 2003.
ISSUE: whether the grant of parole rendered this case moot
RULING: Accused-Appellant’s Release on Parole Did Not Render the Case Moot
The appeal was not mooted by accused-appellant’s release on parole. His release
only meant that, according to the Board, he had already served the minimum
penalty imposed on him14 and that he was "fitted by his training for release, that
there [was] reasonable probability that [he would] live and remain at liberty without
violating the law and that such release [would] not be incompatible with the welfare
of society."15 Should he violate the conditions of his parole, accused-appellant may
be ordered rearrested, to serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence.16
Parole refers to the conditional release of an offender from a correctional institution
after he serves the minimum term of his prison sentence.17 The grant thereof does
not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender. Parole is not one of the modes of
totally extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.18
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
The grant of parole to accused-appellant by the Board of Pardons and Parole is
hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of legal and factual basis.

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