Second 12

Published on June 2016 | Categories: Documents | Downloads: 39 | Comments: 0 | Views: 208
of 12
Download PDF   Embed   Report

Comments

Content

PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950] Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter. Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court. Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.” This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. PEOPLE VS. MAGSI [124 SCRA 64; G.R. NO.L-32888; 12 AUG 1983] Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the

de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused. Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance. BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977] Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned. Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of the

constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial. Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner. RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV OF TRIAL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA [360 SCRA 248; A.M. NO 01-4-03-SC; 29 JUN 2001] Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court. Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of public’s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is

still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. PEOPLE VS. SALAS [143 SCRA 163; G.R. NO. L-66469; 29 JUL 1986] Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest, an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was the cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00 money; he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to be of human blood; one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping the sum of P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the wake, he asked and was given P50.00 by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat, however, the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00 was no longer to be found when she was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled at the wake; accused had been working for three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana, Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day, he did not anymore report for work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake; the parents of [the] accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender him, but since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was ultimately apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a radio message by the police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat, Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for Robbery with Homicide Issue: Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Whether or Not the appellant’s crime homicide or robbery with homicide. Held:

There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the crime. The facts and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court. The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from said date. Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known to appellant's family and neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the authorities. Appellant was apprehended only a full six months after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized, appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt. Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes. Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim alive. The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's self up are absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police authorities.

Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed." Although there was no witness as to the actual robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered. While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and earrings were missing from her body when found. The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered. US VS. TAN TENG [23 PHIL 145; G.R. NO. 7081; 7 SEP 1912] Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police. Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendant’s rights against self incrimination. Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.

VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920] Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against selfincrimination. Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929] Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the

falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. PASCUAL VS. BME [28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969] Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board. Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the SelfIncrimination Clause. Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a

defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976] Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with “Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff. Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the

time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises. PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987] FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia. Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code. Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance , the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction

or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia. PEOPLE VS. DE LA TORRE [380 SCRA 586; G.R. NOS. 137953-58; 11 MAR 2002] Facts: Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of which is Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father. Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a sudden change in Mary Rose’s behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter. The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father. The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. . Issue: Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. 7659. Held: Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones, it declared that: “while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardy…When the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his decision, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed.” The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves as a

deterrent from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper.

Sponsor Documents

Or use your account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Forgot your password?

Or register your new account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Lost your password? Please enter your email address. You will receive a link to create a new password.

Back to log-in

Close