The Herald of Kosovo and Metohija

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THE HERALD

OF

KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
Content
The Academic West... Kosovo: Lessons... A Foundation of Sand Why India must oppose The Real Lesson for... Washington Gets Kosovar Indepedence... US, Russia: Talks... Geopolitical Diary:... The Strategic Frame... Serbia' s Next Move A System to Enforce... What to about the KLA Wil American Empire... Hillary's Balkan ... Recognizing Kosovo.. Outside View:... Moving NATO Forward
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Publishing blessed by His Grace Artemije, Bishop of Kosovo&Metohija

MONASTERY GRACANICA
YEAR VIII, ISSUE 259 MARCH 2008 ISSN 1451-1266

The review of the most actuel news - Monastery Gracanica

ARE THE EUROPEANS AMERICAN ALLIES OR VASSALS? AMERICAN
Dr. Peter Scholl-Latour (84) is one of the most important German journalists of the second half of the twentieth century — “the legend of German journalism.” A serious discussion of the “Muslim world” would be unthinkable without Scholl-Latour. He was prophetic in foreseeing the rise of Islamic terrorism. Several of his books had international success. His book Death in a Rice Field ("Der Tod im Reisfeld") was translated into many languages and was printed in over 1,100,000 copies. Equally successful were The Sword of Islam ("Das Schwert des Islam") and My Africa. Peter Scholl-Latour was born in Bochum on March 9, 1924. (In a few weeks’ time he will celebrate his 84th birthday.) His is a fascinating biography. According to his memoirs, he thought of joining the Yugoslav partisans, but was arrested by the Gestapo in Styria and held in prison until the end of the war. After the war he joined the French army as a volunteer and served for two years in Indochina in an elite paratroop unit. On his return to Europe in 1947, he studied at the University of Mainz and at the Paris Sorbonne. He continued his studies at the French University of Saint Joseph in Beirut. In addition to political science he took courses in Arabic and Islam. He has French and German citizenship and two native tongues. He got his Ph.D. at the Sorbonne in January 1954; spent a short time in politics as a spokesman of the provincial government of Saarbrucken; reported from Beirut (1956-57) and from Congo (1960); published the most extensive account of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. He spent seven days as a prisoner of Vietnam communist guerillas “who treated him well.” As a journalist he travelled in the same plane with Ayatollah Khomeini (1979) when the latter returned to Iran after several years of exile in France. In 1983, he became editor in chief and one of the publishers of the German magazine Stern. He is a recipient of numerous French and German awards. To this day he remains active and provocative. His standing in the world continues to be high. Last year he was received by Putin. His political position is closest to that of the French “degaullists”. The motto of his last book Between Two Fronts ("Zwischen den Fronten") was taken from Leopold von Ranke: “A historian must live long, because a man can understand great changes only after he has experienced some of them personally.” This great journalist is now the topic of German media stories. On January 8 and 9, the German TV Program 2 aired a documentary on his political views. Two weeks later, The Focus published an extensive biographical interview with him. The NIN reporter from Berlin, Nikola Živković asked him for an interview several months ago. Scholl-Latour received him recently on two occasions. Their conversations lasted about four hours. So the readers of NIN have before them a comprehensive view of the political situation in the world, including analysis and details which only a truly seasoned traveler could gather. The friends of Scholl-Latour call him affectionately Peessel (Pee-Ess- El for Peter SchollLatour). They claim that, except for Greenland, there is no country in the world which Peessel did not visit. Scholl-Latour: That was not quite correct. There were two countries, if I remember correctly, which I had not visited. They were Greenland and East Timor. In the meantime I did visit Greenland and this summer I shall probably visit East Timor. I have been to Serbia several times. I went to Belgrade, Novi Pazar, but also Split, Priština, Mostar… In your book In the Crosshairs of the Mighty, you begin your travels in the Balkans in Mostar in July 1994. Scholl-Latour: Not by accident. At that time all the media were in Sarajevo, and they reported the same thing. So, according to them, the Serbs were

Dr. Peter Scholl-Latour bombarding the city from up in the hills and destroying it. I was never interested in reports in which everybody kept repeating the same thing. Was I going to parrot what others were writing? I was too experienced, particularly as a war reporter, to believe such naïve stories. I have been reporting since the Vietnam War, from the time the French were in Hanoi, and right up to the invasion of Iraq. I immediately found suspicious all that anti-Serb hysteria of the Western media. There is nothing black and white, even in private lives, let alone in politics and civil wars. There has never been a case where only one side was guilty, and that was why I went to Bosnia to see it all with my own eyes. And Mostar presented the most convincing picture of the degree to which the Western politicians and the media were onesided and unconvincing. Here was a city razed to the ground, and Serbs had nothing to do with it. … I, too, happened to be there at the time…

Protesters in Mitrovica...

...and Gracanica.

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
Scholl-Latour: Then you know what the Muslim part of the city on the left bank of the Neretva looked like. It was destroyed by the Croats! That picture simply did not tally with the story told by the leading American and European media. And the destruction of Mostar — this fact is known by very few people in the West — was far greater than that of Sarajevo. The Muslim part of Mostar reminded one of the fate of Jewish ghettos in Poland in World War II. The Croats had much more modern armament and yet they were not able to break the resistance of 50,000 Muslims. They also destroyed the famous Old Bridge. You know, I fell in love with that city when I first visited it 1975. It looked so oriental so unusual, so attractive. How did you get to Mostar in 1994? Scholl-Latour: I took care not to travel with the herd of my colleagues from France and Germany. I wanted to look at the world through my own eyes. The International Red Cross in Split provided me with a jeep made in South Korea and an excellent companion. His name was Branko. He was 26 years old, from Croatia but not a “pure-blooded” Croatian. He came from a mixed marriage. Strong, well-mannered and reliable, he made a pleasant traveling companion and an excellent guide. He didn’t have a particularly high opinion of the military valor or skill of the Croats. I shared his opinion. I was in Bosnia and Herzegovina in October of 1992 also. The Croats strutted around, behaving arrogantly and exaggerating their role and their importance. They provoked and insulted the Muslims. Neither did the German media cover themselves with glory. There was a young member of the Bundestag from the CDU party, for instance, who in all seriousness averred that the Serbian monsters transplanted animal embryos into captured Muslim women. Of course this was untrue, but the atmosphere was such that journalists were constantly under pressure to keep repeating how “shocked they were by Serbian brutality” regardless of the truth or the facts. The journalist who did not write his reports in this vein could not rely on the support of his editors. Who did you rely on? Scholl-Latour: On Leon Davičo whom I knew from the time when he was Politika’s correspondent in Bonn. We have known each other for more than fifty years. In Tito’s time his father was highly placed in the party hierarchy. Leon was well-connected and managed to get a well-paid job with the United Nations. He worked with the refugees. Rusair Čišić spoke very highly of Davičo’s work. In 1994 Leon was 68 years old. (Do you happen to know where he is today?) Willi Brandt and Francois Mitterrand, for instance, were among his friends. During the civil war he maintained good relations with Milošević, Tudjman and Haris Silajdžić (I could ask around at NIN about Davičo.) You stressed the collaboration between Čišić and Davičo … Scholl-Latour: Čišić, who was appointed by his government to look after the Muslim refugees, spoke with great respect of Leon. I was good friends with Rusair. His ancestors go back three hundred years in Mostar. His wife is a Catholic. He asked me: “So, what that makes my daughter? Must I now hate my wife’s brothers?” My meeting with Čišić put a human face on the war for me. It showed me private, family tragedies of hundreds of thousands of people. He kept telling me: “The great powers are responsible for it all. They pull the strings from behind the scenes, and we in Bosnia are like the puppets in a puppet theater. “Rusair used to say: “Taking a long-term view of things I am an optimist. We shall rebuild the city. We Muslims are better educated than the Catholics. That is why they tried to destroy our city and its architecture. They have a deep seated inferiority complex. That is the root of their hatred and aggressiveness.” You also visited the Catholic part of Herzegovina? Scholl-Latour: I was in Medjugorje. The Mother of God recently appeared to some children. The whole story is not very convincing. But clever tradesmen have made good use of it, and pilgrims from the whole world hurry to buy cheap kitschy souvenirs. They’ve built a huge, ugly church. It reminds of Lebanon and its Maronite Catholics. They also built a church, the Lebanese Notre Dame but it was much more lovely than the one in Medjugorje. Don’t forget the Turks ruled there also. Both Beirut and Mostar were ruled for centuries by the same Sultan in Istanbul. Davičo was an important source of information for you? Scholl-Latour: Of course. He told me, among other things, of his interview with Bernard-Henri Levy. They nearly came to blows. And yet,

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both Davičo and Levy are Jewish. Had it come to that, I am sure that Davičo would have come out of it a victor. I don’t have a particularly high opinion of Levy and his followers either. They are not great lovers of truth, nor are their morals anything to boast about. Leon Davičo speaks highly of the American journalist Flora Lewis. She was the first to discover that the US secretly supplied Bosnian Muslims with arms. You were in Belgrade in December 1993… Scholl-Latour: Whenever I am in Belgrade I must go to Kalemegdan and enjoy the unique and beautiful view of the Danube, Sava and the Citadel. The new Church of Saint Sava by its immensity reminds one of Saint Sophia in Istanbul. Belgrade is not a beautiful city, but it has a soul. Travelers from the West are fascinated by its looks and its charm. It is not of the West, but not entirely of the East either. I first visited Belgrade in 1951. It was summer. The presence of Tito’s Secret Police could be felt everywhere. People were very poor, their lives hard. I lived at the Hotel Moskva. I learned my first lessons on Yugoslavia in 1944. I was twenty years old, lying in a prison hospital bed in Graz. Not far from my bed lay a solder of General Milan Nedić. During the war Serbia and Greece were the only Balkan countries under German occupation. Other Balkan countries were German allies. General Nedić was a sort of Serbian Petain; he tried to save the lives of as many Serbs as possible. I was in Belgrade in September 1961 for the conference of the non-aligned nations. December 1993 was the time of sanctions … Scholl-Latour: I flew to Budapest and from there took a train to Belgrade. Hungarian customs officers addressed me in German and the Serbs in English. Both were polite. In Budapest I met Tibor Varadi. He left an excellent impression on me. He spoke several languages perfectly. He told me that the Hungarian government had made a big mistake in allowing Croatia to be supplied with arms through the Hungarian territory. He described the Serbs in these terms: “The Serbs are the strongest and the most dynamic factor in the Balkans. It’s a simple fact. It’s a fact no one can ignore.” When I asked him about Bosnia and the language problem, he said: “I speak Serbo-Croatian as well as my native Hungarian and, believe me, the differences in the dialects you encounter between Split and Niš are not as great as those between Munich and Hamburg. Speaking about Milošević he said tht he was a political realist. Had he been serious about Kosovo, he would have settled all Serbs who had been exiled from Bosnia and Croatia in Kosovo. Yet he did not do it. You also had meetings at the Serbian Academy … Scholl-Latour: Yes, I met with Milorad Ekmečić. Some Germans were surprised. “What? You want to speak with that great Serbian chauvinist? “I had a long, vigorous and interesting talk with him. And I wasn’t sorry. He was lucid and consistent. I asked every Serb I got to know a bit better the following question: If you could choose between Croats and Muslims, whom would you choose for your political ally? Like the majority of the Serbs I asked, Ekmečić member of the Serbian Academy, said: the Croats, of course! As regards the defense of Serbian national interests Professor Ekmečić was clear and uncompromising. Yet, with it all, his explication was attractive, relaxed and witty. Belgrade was not the only city you visited? Scholl-Latour: I also went to Novi Pazar. I had a very long and interesting talk with a monk in the Monastery Studenica. In general, I was surpised to note that although a foreigner I was unbelievably free and could travel without police supervision around entire Serbia. Before my departure for Serbia, my acquaintances had told me quite a different story. Novi Pazar is another world. There are eighteen mosqs in the town and Muslims make up 80% of its population. There was no tension that I could feel. And what were your impressions of Kosovo? Scholl-Latour: From Novin Pazar I went to Priština. Kosovo Albanians did not live in misery as the American journalist Robert Kaplan described them. The presence of Serbian policemen and military personnel was not particularly noticeable. Here also I noticed very clearly that Priština streets were full of people, and mostly young people at that. As is the case of other Muslim countries, the birth-rate of Albanians is very high. Demography is the most deadly weapon of Islam and represents the greatest danger for the West. I was in Kosovo also in June 1999. I

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
watched the behavior of the Albanians towards the isolated Serbian islands. The Serbian rural population was not being entitled to the protection of NATO forces and was left to the tender mercies of brutal Albanian criminal gangs. I don’t have a particularly high opinion of Albanians. The Serbs can expect no good from them. I would advise the Serbian government to try and defend the northern part of Mitrovica at all cost. That can be defended because it abuts on Serbia. As for other, isolated Serbian villages in Kosovo, I am not optimistic. Taking a long-term view, even Israel, which in military terms is a truly great power, woud find it hard to survive in such a hostile environment. You were in Krajina? Scholl-Latour: It was in April 1994. I spoke with the Prime Minister of Krajina Djordje Bjegovich. His English was decent. He was helpful but reticent and placatory in his political prognoses. A well-mannered man. When we crossed to Karlovac, the Croatian army maltreated both me and my television team. They gave me the impression of being insecure and insolent. On that occasion in Knin I also met Sava Štrpac who is now collecting evidence on Croatian crimes against the Serbian civil population. You were in Knin, Karlovac... Scholl-Latour: … I visited also Zagreb in April 1994. I had visited Zagreb before, but briefly. Zagreb remains a small, dull Austro-Hungarian city. It cannot be compared with the luxury and beauty of Budapest. The only impressive building in Zagreb is Hotel Eslpanad. Even Lvov, a former Austro-Hungarian city in the western Ukraine today, is much more attractive and elegant than Zagreb Let’s return to the Belgrade meetings. Scholl-Latour: In December 1993 I had talks in the Patriarchate with a monk called Jovan. He grew up in German, in Ruhr. He said that his true fatherland is Mount Athos where he had spent a few years. You know, before coming to Serbia as I did in 1993, Western journalists would get a list of people it was worthwhile talking to, because they were “reasonable” and, therefore, not “infected with the virus of Serbian nationalism and fascism.” That list, of course, did not contain the names of either academician Ekmečić or the monk Jovan. A glance at that list of names told me that we were dealing always with the same people. They all worked either for the “independent media” or for “non-government organizations.” I had worked for several decades as a journalist and I had never relied on lists, instructions from editors or advice from the German government. I like to sit at a table in a cafe frequented by ordinary people. It is there that I can best catch the mood of the people. You mentioned “non-government organizations”… Scholl-Latour: Let’s understand each other. There are true nongovernment organizations. I met them here and there in the world, and they probably exist in Serbia as well. But the majority of “non-government organizations” are engaged in subversive activities against the states and the governments which are not favored by Washington. Do you know how to tell the difference between non-government organizations and “nongovernment ortganizations?” It’s very simple. Just ask them this short question: Where does your money come from? Who is funding you? You mean who is funding the “non-government ortganizations?” Scholl-Latour: I best understood this problem when I was in Belorussia.Lukashenko is by no means naïve. He had studied carefully the mechanisms which brought about the overturn of Milošević’s regime in Belgrade, the „orange revolution“ in Kiev and the instalattion of Saakashvili’s regime in Tbilisi. The decisive role in all these events was played by these organizations. In English they are called “NGOs.” These organizations have nohing in common with true non-government organizations such as “Bread for the World” or “Miseror.” We are talking

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about professional, mostly young, agitators who, like some traveling circus, wander around the world to teach “half savages” which way to go if they want to save their sinful souls. Their ideology is irresistibly reminiscent of the seventeenth century Christian missionaries in Africa, or among the Indian tribes of South America. They also have similarities with professional Bolshevik revolutionaries from 1917. “Non-government organizations” have special camps in Poland and Lithvania. Their chief instructors are either still active or retired CIA agents. In contrast to Slobodan Milošević, Lukashenko understood exactly where the danger lay. As early as March 1997, he banned all work of Soros Foundation which openly stated that its chief objective was to bring down the government in Minsk. Whoever is well acquainted with the biography of the financial speculator Soros can understand well this move on Lukashenko’s part. What is the guiding idea of an NGO? Scholl-Latour: It is all about the strange behavior of Washington in international politics. Under the guise of “freedom and democracy”, it has created a chain of foundations from which NGOs and the independent media get their funding. At the same time they go about openly breaking international agreements and all norms of behavior by meddling in internal affairs and politics of foreign countries. Publicly and arrogantly they break the laws of other countries. In Belorussia, Serbia, the Ukraine and Georgia they have started numerous “civic initiatives.” The missionaries’ assignment was to Christianize the pagans, while the aim of the “nongovernment organizations” today is to convert the “nationalists” into the believers in the “free market” and “American democracy.” Their only failure is Minsk in spite of the large sums of money which the United States of America, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, OSCE and the World Bank had put at their dkisposal. The European Union, the German government, the German radio Deutsche Welle and the London BBC, they all participated in the campaigne against the Belorussian government. Surely, we can point out a series of regimes in Africa, Asia or Europe which are far from democracies, and yet the West is pointing its finger only at Lukashenko? Scholl-Latour: Of course. Look at Albania, Croatia, or Azerbaijan. The Aliev dynasty rules in Baku with no respect for any rules of democracy. And yet no protests were raised against Azerbaijan by anyone in the European Union or America. Look at the results of the “orange revolution.” For several decades you have worked as a journalist who always used his own head, relied on personal encounters and your own impressions, always reading, always learning. But who has time for that today? Scholl-Latour: There are still people like that. Very few, I admit. And there lies the greatest danger for modern media. You are given, for instance, two minutes in which to explain on camera the substance of and the reasons for the conflict, let’s say, between the Suni and the Shiite in Iraq. Two minutes for Eritrea or Palestine, Kurdistan or Georgia, Quebec or Catalonia, Iraq or Bosnia? Everything is possible, of course, one could do this too. But surely it would be at the cost of solidity and truth. Electronic media and television cameras facilitate to a great extent the work of propaganda and contribute to superficial dissemination of information. It is difficult to see the whole extent of the damage done by that kind of superficiality. Damage certainly was done by the useless attempts of the West to create “secular states and democracies in the Islamic world.” Scholl-Latour: That attempt of the West has completely failed. That applies also to Turkey. Kemalism is nothing but a façade. The Islamic element in Turkey is stronger today than it was in Kemal Ataturk’s time. Instead of turning towards Washington or London, as was expected, the attitude in Muslim countries is: “For us the West is neither the source nor the right way.” Islam, on the other hand, is in the ascendant even in the United States. The media in the West continually point out that there are about twenty million Muslims in Russia. But they forget to tell us how many of them live in London, in Germany, France, Italy and Spain. It is interesting that in spite of all the differences between you two, you support Sarcosy in his opposition to allow Turkey to join the European Union. Scholl-Latour: Naturally. Turkey has no business with the European Union. I hope that he will be able to continue in his opposition because the

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
pressure from Wasington is not inconsiderable The Turkish population is growing at an incredible rate. According to many forecasts it will soon reach one hundred million... Scholl-Latour: Today it is no more than 72 milion. But even so, it would pose a danger to Europe if Turkey were to join the Union. Don’t they understand in the United States what the real problem with Islam is? Scholl-Latour: Some of the great Islamists live in America. They are very worried about the Wasington policy towards Muslim countries. And the role of the American press? Scholl-Latour: I find it very bad. The Bush administration is hampering the work of journalists who are critical of it. The same can be seen in Europe. Commercialization and the growth of private television have resulted in a decline of solidity in reporting. The politicians like Bush, of course, salute this trend. If the media’s reporting were of a better quality, such politicians would find it harder to get elected. The effects of wars in Africa and Asia are hardly felt at all by the broad masses in the West. There are no ill effects of such wars for the West. This precisely should be the reason for reporters to go to such places. Only with reporters on the ground can we find out what is actually going on in, say, Iraq. Recent elections in Iraq were described in the West as a victory of American democracy... Scholl-Latour: Many here believe that the United States of America brought freedom to Iraq. That, of course, is ridiculous.The truth is very different. The elections were imposed on the Americans by the Shiite Ayatollah Sistani. He even set the day for the elections. He is fully aware of the fact that the Shiites represent two thirds of the Iraqi population and that there was no doubt whatsoever that they would win the elections. You annoyed many peole by saing that in many ways life was better for the Iraqi under Sadam Hussein than it is today... Scholl-Latour: A great deal better. Look at the number of Iraqis who were killed after they were “liberated” by the American soldiers. The Kurds and the Shiite have a reason to be sorry. The Suni were truly privileged under Sadam Hussein. That is true. But it is also true that people did not live in fear then, there were no numerous bands of criminals which make normal life impossible. How different is today’s reporting from the time when you began working as a journalist? Scholl-Latour: When I was a reporter in Vietnam in 1965, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained about my work. The head of the Westdeutschen Rundfunk was Claus von Bismark. He called me to his office. We talked for three hours. In the end he told me to continue with my work. Today, editors in chief in big media outfits have an aversion to reporters who are not prepared to send “politically correct” reports. How do you see this grave worsening of the relations between Russia and the West. The German media mainly speak of “Russian responsibility” for it? Scholl-Latour: That view is too one-sided. Let me give you an example. NATO decided to hold its summit in Riga. We all know that that city is close to St. Petersburgh. The Russians were right to consider it a provocation. I don’t understand why Germany did not protest against this decision of NATO. The second problem: why must every new member of the Eropean Union, which comes from Eastern Europe, become also a member of NATO? Hasn’t this military alliance enough members already? The situation today is quite different from what it was when NATO was created. All that is conducive to an atmosphere of an imminent new “cold war.” What do you think of German-Russian relations? Scholl-Latour: Economic relations between Germany and Russia are excellent. I support the joint Russo-German project of a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea. But some steps taken by NATO, i.e. Washington, are harmful to German economic interests. The German media also are insisting on Putin’s “undemocratic regime”... Scholl-Latour: At this moment it would not be good for Russia to have

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our type of parliamentary democracy. After all, Gobachev and Yeltsin tried it. And what has the “perestroika” achieved? The result of the reforms of Gorbachev and Yeltsin was that a large part of the Russian population practicaly overnight became abysmally poor; there was chaos; the state virtually ceased to function. Democratic reforms and the free market economy destroyed the Russian state. Russia found herself literally on the edge of the abyss. Yeltsin gave huge natural wealth to a few tycoons, speculators, “oligarchs” as the Russians call them.They still exist today. But today they are not taking the money out of Russia but are investing it in the Russian economy. Those who did not agree to the deal ended up like Kodorkovsky. When one talks about such things one should first put oneself into the position of an ordinary Russian. Ask yourself: How did an average Russian live under Gorbachev and Yeltsin and how does he live today? Many peole believe that Putin was lucky because... C… because right then the price of gas reached record heights. That is a fact. This gave Moscow the resources with which to govern again like a great power and to establish order within the country. But it is a question of not just luck but also of Putin’s ability. I believe he would have succeeded even if gas prices had not risen as they have. In that case, the recovery of Russia would not ave been this fast, but there would certainly have been big changes in foreign and domestic policies of the country. In 2007 I had an occasion to talk with President Putin for fully three hours. One ought to know something about the history of the country. The Tsar was popular because he gave the people a certain measure of protection against the arbitrariness of the boyars. Today Putin gives protection to the broadest masses of the Russian people against the arbitrariness of the oligarchs. He is, if may say so quintessentially Russian. He knows the Russian mentality well. The claims of some Western experts that “the Russians are crazy about democratic reforms” are devoid of all reality. In Moscow, they must have been speaking only to some not particularly significant intellectuals or “non-government organizations” which receive money from the West and tell them what these experts what they want to hear. But it is certain that they do not represent the authentic voice of the Russian people. What is your impression of Putin? Scholl-Latour: There is no president in the West who could compare to Putin. At least 70% of Russians stand behind him. No leader in the West has this sort of backing. Putin introduced order in the country and gave back to the Russians their self-confidence and their pride. No one there would dream of experimenting again with “perestroika.” What were Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s biggest mistakes in foreign policy? Scholl-Latour: When Gorbachev signed the end of the Warsaw Pact and Yeltsin on his part confirmed it when he recognized the independence of former Soviet republics, it never occurred to either of them to make it a condition that NATO can never station its troops on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact. They simply moved their chess pieces as mere dilettantes. It seems that each country should find for itself what the best form of government is in accordance with its traditions. What would be best for Russia? Scholl-Latour: Russia was led by autocrats for centuries. It’s simply the nature of that country. The West will have to part with the idea that the entire world must follow its model of democracy. This applies also to human rights. We can be proud of these achievements, but it is not possible to transplant them blindly, mechanically into other cultures. In any case, these days democracy isn’t faring very well in the West either. It is at risk of turning into plutocracy. Your book, Russia squeezed between NATO, China and her own Muslim Population was published two years ago. Which of these three represents the most serious danger for Russia? Scholl-Latour: At this moment, the United States of America are the greatest danger for Russia. Washington is trying to encircle and isolate Russia, and according to me this policy is entirely senseless and a great mistake. It is proof of a total absence of any grasp of the situation. In fact, America has every reason to make an ally of Russia.Washington and Moscow have so many interests in common!

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
“Violation of human rights” and “undemocratic tendencies” are cited by both Washington and London as the chief obstacle to their good relations with Moscow... Scholl-Latour: Of course, this criticism is a screen behind which to hide the systematic campaign against Russia, and it is more than obvious to what end. To what end? Scholl-Latour: Washington would not like to see the Europeans having close relations with Russia. This refers in the first place to economic relations. Washington is afraid that closer relations with Russia would mean Europe’s greater independence from the United States. Why do the German media support wholeheartedly this anti-Russian policy of America? The only answer is: Germany is not a sovereign state. What is your take on German foreign policy?? Scholl-Latour: It does not existThere is no strategic concept. If you were an adviser to the German government what would you suggest should be changed in foreign policy? Scholl-Latour: I would suggest an increase in Germany’s military budget! I would start training an elite army which would be capable of quick interventions, and, of course, I would not let Germany do it by herself but in cooperation with … With whom? London is out of the question because the British are not following a European policy. They are too closely tied to Washington. So, there is only France. What would be your advice to the German Chancellor? Scholl-Latour: To avoid at all cost supporting American war-mongering manoeuvres against Russia! Already we have German officers in the Ukraine and Georgia. This is our contribution towards preparing these countries to join NATO, which means that we are actively supporting an anti-Russian policy. We are also helping these countries to join the European Union. We forget that Russia is traumatized today in a way that Germany was after WWI. Just as after the Brest-Litowsk Peace Treaty in 1917, Russia has once again lost the Ukraine. The Russians feel this loss as a most profound humiliation. Don’t forget that Kiev is “the mother of all Russian cities.” Helped by the European Union, America almost got away with taking Belorussia also under its control. When you spoke of the threat to Russia posed by the radical Islamists were you thinking of Chechnya? Scholl-Latour: Not only Chechnya. At the moment there is peace in Chechnya. But it is a phony peace. Putin appointed Kadirov to be his representative in Chechnya. Kadirov’s father was killed, but in Yeltsin’s time he had fought against Moscow. His son is now an ally of Russia, but for how long? I do not exclude the possibility of his turning his back on Moscow one day. The problem exists in other parts of Russia, in Dagestan, for instance. It is perhaps an even greater danger. There are twenty million Muslims living in Russia today. Their birth-rate is the highest in the country. I also mentioned Tatarstan. At the moment it is peaceful. Then Bashkortostan. There we have a people which belongs to the Turkish language group. They are Muslims and they live not far from the Kazakhstan border. But of these three which is the greatest threat to Russia? Scholl-Latour: Takking a long view, the greatest challenge for Russia is China. Eastern Siberia is virtually unpopulated. That is Moscow’s weakest point. When I was writing the book on Russia, I visited the Russo-Chinese border. There are only five million Russians living there. On the other side of the border, in China, there are 130 million people. New cities, each with a population of some million people, are popping up along the Russian border. The Chinese are building modern eight-lane highways. There could be a conflict between Russia and China, but not for another 20 years. At the moment the two countries have good relations with each other. Clearly, the Chinese are not in a hurry. It is an intelligent and patient people. Every year, there are 12 million Chinese more in the world. Relations between Russia and China are good and in some cases even very good. ..Scholl-Latour: … greatly due to Wahington’s short-sighted policy. Amerca is continually chiding China for “not respecting human rights.” America is continually taking a hostile stance towards Moscow and

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Peking. This has led to joint Russo-Chinese military manoeuvres. Officially, these are described as a “defense against possible terrorist threat,” but in reality the objective of these manoeuvres is to prevent America from penetrating into the area of Central Asia. What are the prospects for a Moscow-Peking alliance? Scholl-Latour: That will depend almost entirely on Washington’s future policy. As long as Americans, through NATO , keep trying to isolate Russia, as long as they keep spy planes in Estonia — in the immediate vicinity of Saint Petersburgh, so long as they keep trying to get the Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO, the Russians will maintain close relations with the Chinese. One asks oneself: what is the sense of this kind of policy of the United States of America? Is it possible that they want a war with the Russians? Or with the Chinese? But what is catastrophic in all this is the fact that the German policy and the German press wholeheartedly support this fatal course Wash ington has chosen to follow. Our politicians and our journalists see to it that we are in the front line of this anti-Chinese policy. You have only to remember the visit of the Dalai Lama to Berlin. This is another example which shows that after World War II we Germans do whatever Americans want us to do. Do you believe that it was a mere coincidence that the Head of Tibetan Buddhists was received in the White House and by Angela Merkel? Why is this so? Scholl-Latour: Because German foreign policy does not exist, nor do longterm plans for the defense of the country. You have said publicly that you don’t think much of western politicians who warn Peking, whenever they visit China, that it must respect human rights, introduce democratic reforms... Scholl-Latour: I am against this attitude because it is insincere, twofaced, selective and ridiculous. At the same time, people’s heads are cut off in Saudi Arabia in accordance with shariat law, and no one in America, or Europe says a word against it. It is unbelievably hypocritical! The same is true about democratic principles. We had democratic elections in Palestine. And what happened? Hamas won, but the West refused to accept its victory. Or what about Washington’s current efforts to rehabilitate Ghaddafi? It has been proved that Ghaddafi had helped terrorists. But we made a deal with Ghaddafi. Lybia has renounced her nuclear program and agreed to sell oil to the West. How do you see the future of NАТО? Scholl-Latour: That military organization is an anachronism in our times. The Warsaw pact no longer exists. The Soviet Union has disintegrated. As NATO still continues to exist, many members of that military alliance must ask themselves: are we allies or American vassals? Here, too I must repeat my assertion: Germany is not a sovereign state either actually or mentally. One of the most important topics in Europe today is the problem of the installation of American rockets in Poland... Scholl-Latour: Since we are talking about it, people in the West have forgotten that in 1990 the Russians withdrew their rockets to a thousand kilometers east of Europe. And what did they get in return? The ring around Russia is increasingly being tightened by NATO. The Russians have every right to regard the placing of American rockets in Poland as provocation. One simply must ask oneself: what purpose do these rockets serve? When you speak of the tightening circle do you mean Georgia? Scholl-Latour: Exactly. I have in mind what is happening in that country. The media in the West talk about “the democratic revolution” and so forth. Rubbish. America organized a putch and installed Saakashvili, an extremely dubious person. He now rules like a dictator. So nothing has changed in Georgia. One dictator was replaced by another. The only difference is that Saakashvili does American bidding. Washington also organized a putch in Kirghisia and caused a civil war. While Berlin endorses all American moves witout demur. In your last book, Between Two Fronts you criticize the wishywashyness of Europeans, their lack of will to stand up and defend their identity. According to you, this is the fundamental problem in Europe today. That will has simply disappeared in the West; it has withered away.

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
Do I understand you correctly? Scholl-Latour: You understand me very well. Take, for example, Russia. One of the chief advantages and the starting device of Putin’s new Russia is not, as some in the West keep repeating, the sudden increase in gas prices on the world market, but the renaissance, the resurrection of the Russian Orthodox Church. Energy prices are an important factor but not the deciding factor. It is far more important for a man to know who he is, to have a motive to live, to create, to have children. Today’s piety of the Russians is real and profound. I am not talking about a group of Moscow intellectuals mostly from “non-government organizations” who, by the way, use every occasion before American and British cameras to show off their knowledge of English. I am talking about the Russian people whose piety is deep-seated. The Russian Orthodox Church is almost one hundred percent behind Putin. Who of all Russian intellectuals is principally responsible for that? Scholl-Latour: Without a doubt Aleksandr Solzhenitsin. He alone had all the necessary conditions for such an exceptional, such an unrepeatable feat. He is a great writer and historian, a critical spirit, a moral personality. He is pure, a man who walks erect; who was exiled by the Bolsheviks to many years of hard labor in Siberia; he is a cancer survivor who is at the same time deeply devoted to his people and the Russian tradition. Let us return to the European problem. The West talks continually about the danger from “the new, self-confident, strong Russia” and about the danger from “Islamic terrorism.” Are these the biggest problems? Scholl-Latour: Of course not. The problem of the Western Europe is neither the new, strong Russia nor “the revolutionary Islamism.” It is our own weakness. That is why it is high time for us to stop whining and spreading the eternal German fear of Russia. Moscow has no plans for a military attack on the West. Russia is only opposed to NATO’s continued advance towards her borders. When I was in Russia I met not only with Putin but also with the former Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, who described to me in a word the difference between the Soviet Union and today’s Russia. Moscow today has no intention of allocating forty percent of her budget to armament. That was the great mistake of the Soviet Union. Some political commentators talk about the danger of “a new cold war.” Others say that we are already living through “a new cold war.” Which group is closer to the truth? Scholl-Latour: I think the latter. During my recent visit to Moscow I had the opportunity of talking to Valentin Falin and Yevgeni Primakov. The former was ambassador to Bonn, the latter was Russian minister of foreign affairs. Both of them assured me that the cold war had already begun and turned my attention to the American policy towards the Ukraine and Georgia. Washington evidently intends to encircle Russia geopolitically and push her completely out of Europe. I think it is shameful for Germany and the European Union to follow this American policy without a word of protest. We Europeans are truly idiots. We are creating for ourselves a new, mighty and unnecessary enemy in Russia, whereas that country could be a natural friend, in the first place, to Germany. In this context, how do you see the murder of Litvinenko? Scholl-Latour: One must first remember that there have been agents in the past who changed sides, and that some of them were killed. The difference is that this case is widely written about by the Western press. Whereas, in contrast, when a Western agent is killed our media are usually silent. There is another interesting case. I am talking about the cause of Yaser Arafat’s death. French military doctors have not made public the true cause of his death. According to my information he was poisoned by a deadly new substance. Russians most certainly had nothing to do with Arafat’s death. That is possibly why not much was written about the causes of his death in the West. At the same time, we can deduce from this the direction of future assassinations. And that fact should cause us concern and even fear. Americans have concentrated their war efforts against Islamic terrorists on Afghanistan. Is that a good move? Scholl-Latour: Americans have failed to understand that Afghanistan is only a side issue and that the main problem in that area is Pakistan. The Taliban were initially organized in Pakistan, and that with the help of the

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United States of America, so that America could better counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Benazir Buto was recently killed in Pakistan. Where is that country going? Scholl-Latour: Pakistan will remain unstable for a long time. That, of course, was no fault of Benazir Buto. She was a woman of great personal courage, but not the right person for the job. She had already been tried and found guilty of corruption. It was Washington’s intention to bring her into power in order to limit somewhat the power of today’s President Musharaf. Washington had hoped that, with the help of Benazir Buto, Pakistan would be more decisive in its war against Islamic militants. Uder the pressure from the United States of America Musharaf was forced to abandon his post as the commander of the army. He also is a loyal ally of Washington. He began by fighting the radical Muslims very decisively and clla borated closely with America. This made him unpopular both with the broad masses of the population and with the army. Many officers sympathize with the guerilla who are fighting against Americans in Afganistan. In the meantime, the army is the only institution in Pakistan which is holding the country together. Pakistan has an atom bomb. Scholl-Latour: That is a great problem for Wasington. But at the moment it is still under control. Pakistan made its own bomb primarily because of India which is both economically but also militarily far stronger than Pakistan. When speaking about current world crises it is impossible not to mention the Middle East, a topic with which you are very famliar. What is the future of Israel? Scholl-Latour: I also believed for a long time that the creation of a Jewish state would be a successful project. However, after the events which have taken place in recent years, I have become a pessimist. I am not thinking a bout today’s situation. I am taking a long-term view of Israel. Why have you become a pessimist? Scholl-Latour: Israel is surrounded by hosile Muslim states. It must fight on several fronts simultaneously. And another thing. Take a close look at the demographic development. We are witnessing an explosion of population on the Arab side, the Palelstinian side. Even if a Palestinian state were to be created it would consist of a number of enclaves: one on the West Bank and the other is the Gaza strip. Such a state would not be able to offer better living conditions to the numerous young population. The new Palestinian state would simply be forced to demand from Israel to make ever more territorial concessions. So we are in a vicious circle, and I see no way out. If a new Palestinian state were to include significant historical territories, those from before the first Israeli occupation in 1967, that would constitute an existential danger for Israel. Negotiations have just begun. They are at the embryonic stage. There have been no talks yet about the status of Jerusalem and so on. I should add that the last Israeli incursion into Lebanon was not at all successful. The Israeli themselves admit this. Israel paid in heavy human losses for those few kilometers of Lebanese land. This was the first time that an armed Arab formation could successfully resist an Israeli attack, and Israel has one of the best equipped armies in the world. I am talking a bout the Shiite guerrilla fighters. It is very important for the Arab moral. For the first time they showed in action that the Israeli are not invincible. The bombing of Lebanon by the Israeli airforce also failed to bring any military successes. Why did Israel attack Lebanon anyway? Scholl-Latour: The most important reason was the plan to destroy the Shiite guerilla fighters, the Hesbolah. But they were not destroyed. Lebnon is an unusual country. Half of their soldiers are Muslims but Shiite. I see no quick solution for that state. A brief survey of its history would make that clear. A “national agreement” was reached by the principal political parties in 1943. Land was divided along the lines of religious affiliation. At that time Cristians, mostly Maronites, represented one half of the population. The Sunis were the next most numerous and most influential part of the population. Today, the situation is different. The demographic picture has changed. The Shiite constitute nearly fifty percent of Lebanon’s population. The time has come for the country to sign a new agreement and write a new constitution. NIN, January 31, 2008, Belgrade Peter Scholl-Latour

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA

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THE ACADEMIC WEST AND THE BALKAN TEST
“A territorial dispute as subtle and ill humored as those forestalled by international law brought him up against Paul Kelly, the famous leader of another gang. The boundary line had been established by bullets and border patrol skirmishes. Eastman crossed the line late one night and was set upon by five of Kelly's men.” Jorge Luis Borges, “Monk Eastman, Purveyor of Iniquities” Sabrina P. Ramet, a professor of political science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, has written a book which is most impressive in its scope. Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates About the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo is a discussion of more than 130 books, mostl y in English but also in the languages of former Yugoslavia and few in German and Italian, all listed at the beginning. It is divided into 13 chapters with titles that are meant to attract the attention not only of scholars but of all interested in former Yugoslavia, such as “ Who's to blame, and for what? Rival accounts of the war ”or “Milošević's place in history” or “Debates about intervention.” Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates About the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005; 328 pp.; ISBN-10 0521-61690-5, price ? (pbk) John R. Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006; 338 pp.; ISBN-10: 0-333-79347-1, price ? (pbk) The question that instantly and inevitably springs to mind is, of course, whether Sabrina Ramet has really read all these books or is Thinking About Yugoslavia just a spectacular example of that dark academic craft of reviewing a book after only leafing through it or reading other reviews? (Perhaps in the not too distant future we may have a New York or London Review of Reviews of Books?) Whether or not one believes that Ramet has read 40 000 pages or 16 million words (my rough calculations), her knowledge is considerable. Yet hers is not a book that can be recommended. Its bane is not to be found in ignorance but, alas, in the author's profound bias, which causes her to evade difficulties and conceal complexities. Professor Michael Mann, America's leading historical sociologist, published in 2005 The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing , which soon won international acclaim for its powerful insights into some of the most murderous conflicts of the last century. Mann convincingly rejects any attempt to chastise entire ethnic groups as perpetrators of expulsions and genocide. While such simplistic accounts are characteristic of popular media and everday conversation, they can also be found in scholarly works. Concentrating on recent sholarship, Mann, for example, criticizes Daniel Jonah Goldhagen for trying to prove in his Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust that the whole German nation was imbued with “exterminist antiSemitism,” and Vahakn N. Dadrian for asserting in his The History of the Armenian Genocide that Turks, as fierce warriors and intolerant Muslims, were predisposed to mass murder of Christian Armenians. Mann's third example is Norman Cigar's Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing , in which the author “makes his view of the Yugoslav ethnic wars clear with subheads like `The Serbs' Sense of Superiority.'” Mann then proceeds to describe the views of Goldhagen, Dadrian and Cigar as nationalist “since it is nationalists who claim that the nation is a singular actor” and because they condemn German, Turkish and Serbian nationalism “in ways that reproduce the categories of nationalist thought.” (p. 20) Sabrina Ramet, nonetheless, perceives Norman Cigar, professor of Security Studies at the U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and a member of the Croatian Academy of America, completely differently. To her, h e is a “meticulous scholar” (p. 269) and Genocide in Bosnia a “brilliantly executed book.” ( p. 16) Indeed, Cigar is one of the heroes of her book and is extensively and approvingly quoted on dozens of its pages. But not only is Michael Mann correct about Cigar (and Goldhagen and Dadrian) – what he says about them applies even more so to Ramet. The title of her book postulates thoughtful and learned discussion, yet in the text she proceeds to viciosly attack true scholars while heaping compliments on authors whose scholarly credentials is questionable. On the one hand, well-known professors who have devoted their lives to Yugoslav studies, like Paul Shoup, Susan Woodward, Steven Burg and Robert Hayden, are accused of nothing less than moral relativism. But it is precisely their successful avoidance of media hype and resistance to political pressures while providing a complete picture and balanced analysis of the wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration that earned them respect of their peers. On the other hand, Ramet is full of admiration for Croatian nationalists like Branimir Anzulovic, Stjepan G. Meštrović, Ivo Žanić, Branka Magaš and her son Marko Attila Hoare, or politically involved academics like James Gow (his book is “classic” p. 80), who served as an adviser to two British ministers of defense, or Western journalists like Viktor Meier (his “expostulation” is “brilliant;” p. 90 his “defence” of Croatia's president Tudjman “spirited” p.7), and whose work for the right-wing Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung earned him a decoration from the president of Slovenia. At the end of Thinking About Yugoslavia , Ramet presents us with the list of authors and their works that are her “personal favourites.” (p. 310) In my opinion the vast majority of scholars in the field would consider these books to be among the most biased on the Yugoslav conflict. There are exceptions, of course, such as Jasna Dragović-Soso's excellent account of the role of Serbia's intellectuals in the revival of nationalism with the fine, ironic title “Saviours of the Nation,” or works by Ivo Banac who succeeds miracoulosly in being both a Croatian nationalist with political ambitions as well as a prominent historian. After reading Ramet's book – and, yes, I did read it carefully – I was left with the odd yet indelible impression that for her the realm of the unexplored is either non-existent or irrelevant and elusive truth is obvious – so there is no need to search for it; it is enough simply to struggle against those who refuse to acknowledge her concept of it. Those who doubt this truth ally themselves with evil, and to dispute Ramet's dogmatic conclusions is to stand in the way of justice. What Ramet clearly wants in Yugoslav studies are polemical, agressive books advocating miltary intervention against the Serbs (in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as well as in Serbia) and swift and merciless punishment of defeated Serbian leaders. No wonder then that if one disagrees with her, one is not entitled to the least respect. Susan Woodward's Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War , with its 536 pages and plentiful endnotes, could easily be the most thoroughly researched book on the Yugoslav conflicts until 1995. It pays particular attention to the broader international context of the tragedy and includes a courageous exposition of the complicity of international factors, from the pro-separatist Germany , Austria and Vatican , to the unprincipled European Union and State Department. It also gives an in-depth analysis of the economic causes, such as IMF's policies of demand-repression that “led to conditions that could not easily foster a political culture of tolerance and compromise.” (Woodward, p. 383) Ramet scarcely utters a word of criticism of the globally dominant Western countries and institutions – Germany supported Slovenia and Croatia because of “the suffering of innocents” (p. 91) and NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999 was “generally surgical” (p. 172) – yet she accuses Woodward of subscribing to the view “that justice is what the rulers say it is.” (p. 2) And how did Woodward earn such disapprobation? She invoked the well-known precept of international law that minorities do not have the right to independent statehood while Ramet, in contrast, supports an

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
independent Kosovo. Woodward's account of the Yugoslav tragedy is also “obscurantist,” and since she supposedly does not point out individual people as “causative agents” but presents only “blind historical forces,” Woodward is like those who believe that the world stands on the back of an elephant which stands on the back of a giant turtle which stands on the back of another turtle and so on “all the way down” ad infinitum. (p. 89) Ramet mentions numerous individuals she holds responsible for the Yugoslav civil war and almost all are Serbian politicians, officers and intellectuals. But she also considers historical forces to be important, though I presume they are not blind since they are to be found within culture, religion and political tradition. For example, Ramet quotes extensively Branimir Anzulovic's Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide and we hear of a “Serbian tradition of violence fostered by ecclesiastical elites and cultural artifacts,” (p. 4) Serbs' “proclivity towards genocide” (p. 61) and “the destructive ethos … in Serbian culture.” (p. 61) But it is not only tendentious interpretations and open political sympathies and antipathies that make Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates About the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo such an unacceptable book. There is a myriad of factual errors and were known to be such, or at least were highly suspect at the time of Ramet's writing. Moreover, there are crucial and well-know facts which Ramet simply does not mention, for whatever reason. It is a significant error to state, for example, that Macedonia was partitioned after the two Balkan Wars (p. 281), since it simply did not exist as a political unit inside the Ottoman empire. Likewise, Noel Malcolm is wrong to state that within a year and a half after the end of the Second World War, Tito's Partisans murdered a quarter of a million people (p. 250). Nor did over 200 000 people die in Bosnia in the civil war of 19921995, as Ramet repeats on several occasions – according to the internationally-funded Research and Documentation Centre in Sarajevo it is actually under 100 000: Bosniaks (Muslims) 66 per cent, Serbs 26 per cent, Croats 8 per cent. (p. 22) There was no “Serbian hegemonism” in the early 1980's (p. 71), nor was Slovenia's move towards independence primarily a reaction to Milošević's Serbia. (p. 116) “Serbian intellectuals” did not draw up a “nationalist memorandum” in 1986 but some members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences made a draft proposal for a memorandum. Admittedly, it was “self-pitying” and “aggressive.” (p. 71) Further, Greece did not stand fast at Milošević's side – it accepted the bombing of Serbia by NATO. (p. 95) Finally, how odd to believe that Yugoslavia under Tito tried “for a long time” to develop nuclear weapons (p. 131) and that Milošević compared himself to Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. (p. 160) Ramet's sins of omission are also numerous. Why did she leave out that all Bosnian Muslims, and not only Serbs, opposed the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, fearing it would destabilize Bosnia? And would it not be important to mention that many Albanians in Kosovo often pointed out to the self-proclaimed Serbian autonomous unit in Croatia as something closely resembling what they wanted to achieve? In the spring of 2006, the Bosnian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Sarajevo, which is run mostly by Muslims, came out with the figure of between 500 and 600 Serbian civilians murdered by Muslim forces in Sarajevo during the war. At the same time, Slobodna Bosna [Free Bosnia], a moderate Muslim weekly also in Sarajevo, maintained that there had been as many as 850 Serbian victims. Not only does Ramet not mention any figures for Serbian victims, but there is nothing in her book that even suggests such killings. There are now not many Serbs, Croats or Jews left in Sarajevo, but for Ramet the city's aura of multi-ethnic tolerance is untouched and undiminished. The Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje [Liberation ] received more international awards than any newspaper in history for its alleged truthfulness and opposition to nationalism; but today even the editors do not deny that at the beginning of the war they made a decision to support Bosnia's president and Muslim leader Izetbegović and went to his office to offer their services. But again, Ramet is silent. Professor Sabrina P. Ramet sees herself not only as a political scientist and historian but also as a philosopher with an unassailable moral position. She invokes Universal Reason and Natural Law, quotes from

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Plato, supports neo-Kantianism and follows Jürgen Habermas. Now m y philosophical knowledge is rusty but is it not somewhat difficult to reconcile Kant with Marxism? Or is Habermas perhaps admired because he belongs to “idealist-interventionists”? (p. 221) Ramet believes that even Jean Bodin is on her side when she attacks Serbia as an ilegitimate state since the sixteenth century French jurist held that “there is no such thing as sovereignty except where the authority acts in accord with Natural Law and Divine Law.” (p. 222)

Aleksa Djilas Ramet's random not to mention bizzare eclecticism in matters philosophical is so great that it makes her position not only vague but ridden with contradictions. Nor does she clearly demonstrate how her historical and political analyses are aided by philosophical exegesis . Weirdly they hover above historical and political reality, their only recognizable purpose being to confer an aura of authority upon Ramet's strident and unfair judgements. At the same time, her style of writing could be defined as post-modern rococo. No, not because it is gentle and pretty but because of its boundless artificiality, unseemly levity and its absence of earnestness. At one point, Ramet suddenly and most unexpectedly dons the robes of Miss Manners and chastises Sumantra Bose, professor of International and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, for being in his book Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, published in 2002, “unacquainted with customary rules of etiquette in academic debate” and for writing parts of it “in a state of uncontrollable anger.” (p. 191) She then quotes the expressions he uses when criticizing the work of other scholars: “ludicrous,” “academic ivory tower,” “dogmatism,” “breezy,” “tendentious,” “superficial.” Sumantra Bose has written several books on sovereignty and selfdetermination. He is a comparativist who roams freely from India to Ireland and from Pakistan to Bosnia, and he argues that while a unified Bosnia might be preferable, the integrationists' insistence on it being reassembled as soon as possible is dogmatic. It simply does not take into account that the overwhelming majority of Bosnia's Serbs and Croats reject such instant unity. Such “moral righteousness” actually harms the prospects of reconciliation among Bosnia's three constituent groups. Needless to say, Sabrina Ramet is for “ the directive approach to statebuilding in Bosnia, ” that is, for the Western powers simply to abolish the federal structure agreed at Dayton. I wonder if it is because of her radical integrationism that she sanctimoniously reproaches Bose for his “proclivity towards name-calling” (p. 192) Noel Malcolm shares her commitment to complete revision of Dayton, as well as most of her other political sentiments, disguised and undisguised, and is probably the most quoted author in her book. So naturally, he receives praise for offense s similar to

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
Bose's though his are far worse. Malcom, along with Quintin Hoare edited Books on Bosnia and Ramet finds it an “invaluable collection of short reviews” (p. 25) which are “often witty” and with “generally reliable” (p. 26) judgments. She admires and shares the “contempt” of “polyglot reviewers” and quotes them with glee: “half-baked populism,” “dumbing down,” “facts are few and far between,” “dismally unintelligent,” “rag-bag of a book,” “picture-book, apparently produced for schoolchildren or dim students.” Sabrina Ramet not only admires Books on Bosnia but is obviously inspired by it, and her writing, though less eloquent, seems to be modeled on this and other products of Malcolm's vitriolic pen. To paraphrase Ramet's story about the elephant and turtles, Thinking About Yugoslavia stands on Malcolm's back . And i t is infinite Malcolms all the way down. But what i f someone wanted to read a recent book on Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav tragedy that is the exact opposite to Sabrina Ramet's? Is there an antipode (and also an antidote) to Thinking About Yugoslavia ? Unfortunate ly, there is not. However, until such a book appears, one could recommend John R. Lampe's Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country , published i n 1996, whose revised and updated edition appeared in 2000. Mercifully, i t is free of extremism and excess, respectful of alternative views, and above all, to use again the quote from Michael Mann, does not “reproduce the categories of nationalist thought.” W ell-researched and accessible, it has become a standard textbook for university history courses. Curiously, Ramet does not mention it. John R. Lampe is a professor of history at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a former foreign service officer who was stationed in Belgrade in the mid-1960s. Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations, a book of over 700 pages he co-authored with Marvin R. Jackson, was published i n 1982 and immediately established him as a leading authority on the region's economics, past and present, as well as a competent general historian. (From today's perspective, a more f oretelling subtitle would have been: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations to Underdeveloped Imperial Periphery .) Now Lampe has given us a new examination of this part of the world. Published last year, his Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition is a welcome book. Not only students but general readers need an updated one volume history of the Balkans in the last century, for reference and also to p rovide us with a unified picture of the region . Stevan K. Pavlowitch's A History of the Balkans, 1804-1945, published in 1999, sets high a standard of impartiality in presenting the various nationalist conflicts and probing their causes, and i s in general an authoritative work. But the portion of the book dealing with the twentieth century represents onl y about half the total volume and only goes up to the end of the Second World War. Balkans into Southeastern Europe begins by providing us with a much needed foundation in examining the geography of the region. We learn about its rivers and mountain ranges, climate and access to the sea, arable land and ore deposits. All this is skillfully connected to economics and finance, imperial conquest and domination, plus the formation of nation states. Lampe underlines the individuality of the Balkans but also points out that it is not fundamentally different from the rest of Europe whose culture and institutions it craves while occasionally vehementl y protesting against them. T he role of the great powers and their rivalry is

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also critically presented, from financial loans and weapons sales to diplomatic intrigues. Lampe further explains that during the twentieth century progress in the Balkans was limited but real, and that the influence of Europe, while mostly beneficial, was sometimes harmful, not least in exacerbating nationalist conflicts. Nor were Balkan national ideologies in their essential characteristics un-European. Emil Cioran, P arisian philosopher of Romanian descent, announced with typical Balkan modesty that through his metaphysics he wanted to ask God questions which God would not be able to answer. Cioran died in 1995 and may now know how successful he was in his endeavor. Students of the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, whether from the Balkans or not, are much less ambitious. But we do know that these wars posed to the Europeans questions to which they had no answer. And still do not. How do you prevent or halt ethnic wars and ethnic cleansings? Who, and under what conditions, has a right to separate and create a state? How should we decide where to draw borders and how to protect minorities? These and many other only slightly less important questions, about religion and culture, language and identity remain unresolved after our recent bloodletting. Europeans are further embarrassed by their ignorance because many regions of the world encounter similar problems and look to them for advice and guidance. Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition is a step forward in the search for answers, regional and global. It provides us with a rich and sophisticated narrative as well as important insights and mature judgments. Although quite realistic, it successfully avoids frequent depictions of violence and cruelty, so typical of Western writing about the Balkans, which is in general permeated with its own breed of “Orientalism” in the sense of Edward Said's eponymous book. We should also be grateful to Lampe for his enlightened attitude and optimistic tone. Lampe is a dedicated comparativist and he juxtaposes and contrasts Balkan countries whether discussing u rban planning or literacy levels, f reedom of the press or the growth of fascist movements, the struggle for women's right to vote or military strategy and tactics. It will probably shock many Serbs to learn that there was a period before the Second World war when Bulgaria was freer than the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and all Balkan nations should draw inspiration from the ascent of Greece which was often the poorest and is now the richest country of the region. It is most likely of no general relevance but still stirs my imagination that Balkan undemocratic régime s had a propensity to put political prisoners on islands. Lampe mentions Bulgaria's Danube island Belene, (p. 186) (p. 199) Yugoslavia's Goli otok (Barren Island), (p. 201), and Greece's “island camps. ” (p. 194) One could expand this list. Were islands merely the easiest practical solution to achieve high security or did the governments feel so unsure of themselves that they had to take extraordinary measures to isolate prisoners? After the Second World War, Greece was the only Balkan country under the direct influence of the West, in particular the United States. Academic contacts were also considerable and Lampe's treatment of Greece is therefore especially knowledgeable. It is also comprehensive with nothing painful or unpleasant omitted. We see that during the three postwar decades Greece became neither democratic nor prosperous nor was it able to point to other successes. Slav Macedonians were repressed, and both the expansion of universities and the emancipation of women were slower than in neighboring communist countries. Lampe elaborates on the internal causes of the less than satisfactory development. But what about the external ones? Should they not receive at least part of the blame? Lampe's account of the British role in Greece towards the end of the Second World War and immediately afterwards disregards British traditional naval and commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and C hurchill's instinctive imperialism and simplistic anti-communism. (p. 173-5) So we are left wondering about the motives of General Ronald Scobie when in late 1944 he used “the larger part of the Security Battalions recruited by the Rallis occupation regime” (p. 174) to disarm the communist-led ELAS which had been by far the largest resistance force to Germans with whom Ioannis Rallis' government collaborated. Nor is our curiosity satisfied about the real causes for the British support of the regency under the Archbishop of Athens, whom Churchill himself had

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
previously called, as Lampe fails to mention, a “pestilent priest” and a “survivor of the Middle Ages.” Lampe also tries to soften all criticism of America, and not only in connection with Greece. Sometimes his method is to point out that a particular critical argument is wrong and then abruptly drop the issue altogether. Thus we learn that the United States “did not share the British interest in postwar Greece…” (p. 175) True, but one wants to know how much attention Americans did pay? Lampe is perhaps right when he reproaches Greek scholars for having insisted for so long that the American intervention in the Greek civil war was “decisive.” (p. 194) Yet what was its exact significance? In the parliamentary elections of 1950, the American Embassy was “supposedly all-powerful.” (p. 204) However, stating that it was not omnipotent does not explain its political influence and control. “American officials” did not “initially” approve the coup d'état by the colonels in 1967; their reluctant acceptance “came later, after a countercoup by the King and several senior Generals, that would have been an acceptable alternative, failed in December 1967.” (p. 225) But a royal-military countercoup is also a coup d'état, and what is the evidence that it would have benefited the Greek people? And should any coup d'état be acceptable to the world's leading democracy? Finally, does not the United States' entire post-war policy towards Greece resemble America's disastrous contemporaneous policies in Latin America? Lampe gives a rather uncritical account of the role of the United States in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars. This is in stark contrast to his balanced presentation of the conflict and war between Croats and Serbs. For example, he correctly portrays both Croatia's Tudjman and Serbia's Milošević as essentially similar authoritarian nationalists. However, Lampe seems unable to inform us that retired American generals with a nod from the State Department trained the Croatian army that expelled Serbs from Croatia. To mention another characteristic omission, we learn that Croatia's minister of defence Gojko Šušak was “a returned emigré from Canada but proud of his Herzegovina family and its world-war allegiance to the Ustaša” (p. 271) but not of the medical treatment he received at the Walter Reed Army hospital in Washington or of the funeral oration given by former U.S secretary of defense William J. Perry. Similarly tendentious is Lampe's account of the NATO war with Serbia in 1999. (p. 266) Nothing there even suggests that the United States gave aid to the Kosovo Liberation Army (whose tactics Lampe rightly describes as “terrorist,” p. 265), nor is it mentioned that after the Serbian forces left Kosovo, the KLA expelled the large majority of all minorities – under the noses of the American-led NATO troops. Lampe is particularly severe with Aleksandar (misspelled Alexandar on page 203) Ranković, a leading Serbian communist, the Yugoslav party's pre-war and wartime organisational secretary, and the head of the communist secret police, which Tito founded in 1944. Lampe calls the secret police “Ranković's” (p. 201) and considers it to have been “Serbdominated” (p. 203). Yet loyal and disciplined Ranković never made a major decision without consulting Tito first, while Tito, true to his autocratic instincts, would not put all his eggs in one basket and kept Croatian and Slovene security agencies outside the command and control of Ranković's Belgrade headquarters. Lampe tells us that Ranković fell from power in 1966 because his agents planted concealed microphones in Tito 's private residence and in the homes of several other party leaders. However, no such bugging ever took place. It was simply a stratagem contrived to topple Ranković, which was sanctioned by Tito. Behind it was Tito's fear of a potential rival, along with a succession struggle among the top tier of politicians, efforts of the bureaucracies of the republics to gain more power at the expense of federal institutions in Belgrade which Ranković protected, and an alliance of economic reformists and party liberals against entrenched conservatives represented by Ranković. While correcting these misconceptions about Ranković – in the eyes of some, I may even appear to be “defending” him – I feel both discomfort and amusement, for at the time of the security chief's dismissal my father Milovan Djilas had been in jail for nine years. Lampe believes that Djilas was imprisoned in 1956 for publishing The New Class, a critical analyisis of the communist system and ideology, but he actually went to jail for criticizing Tito's support of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. The publication

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of The New Class and the trial for it took place in 1957. After Ranković's fall, Tito hinted that he might have planned a coup d'état, and the official media increased its slanderous attacks on him. B ut no juridical proceedings took place. Western journalists and academics began publicly asking questions about Tito's peculiar logic of giving Ranković-the-conspirator and his collaborators clemency and pension, while keeping Djilas-the-critic in jail. On the very last day of 1966, Djilas was released but prohibited from publishing or making any public statements for five years. He would not observe this ban. With the purge of 1966 Yugoslavia entered a period of general liberalization with the exception of the cult of Tito that continued to grow. Lampe wrongly states that Tito became the president f or life in 1953. (p. 203) Such formal conferring of absolute power would have presuppose d a personality cult which at that time neither existed nor was possible – indeed, it was inconceivable. In 1974, however, Yugoslavia's fourth constitution promulgated the country as an eight-unit confederation in all but name, and its article 333 conferred upon the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the right to elect Josip Broz Tito president of the republic “for an unlimited term of office.” This is what the Assembly soon proceeded to do. The party congress immediately followed and elected Tito president for life of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The official West and especially the United States did not object to the cult of Tito. Perhaps it even welcomed it. American presidents, for example Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, were not embarassed to publicly flatter Tito, who was supposedly a wise statesman and a symbol of freedom. Nor was Britain's Margaret Thatcher parsimonious when giving him compliments. Western governments never gave open encouragement to Yugoslavia's reform-oriented communists, or its critical intellectuals and dissidents, and they rarely protested when Tito dismissed, persecuted or imprisoned them. Tito's Yugoslavia was independent from the Soviet Union and this was in the interest of the West. All else was of little importance. Am I wrong to consider such policies of Western countries to have been nationalistic? John R. Lampe's Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition is a good book which could have been better while Sabrina Ramet's book is… Well, I have said enough about it already. But in spite of the enormous difference between them in approach and quality, they are both written from a distinctly Western, and in particular American, point of view. Lampe and Ramet sometimes even resemble a g ood cop-bad cop routine – she attacking mercilessly, he all softness and diplomacy. Like most Americans, however, they are completely unaware of their nationalism. We in the Balkans may be more nationalistic than Americans but we also have fewer illusions about ourselves. On the 6 th of September 1943, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave a speech at Harvard University, stating famously that the “empires of the future are the empires of the mind.” One can ask, of course, why, after the Second World War, Churchill did not practice what he preached. I also think that at the time of his speech it was already too late for any kind of empire and I am certain that no imperialism has a future in the twenty first century. But I do believe that today a country or a group of countries can lead globally only if they firmly embrace high intellectual, moral, and perhaps even spiritual values. Further, I am convinced that the West and especially the United States has a right and a duty to struggle for the global triumph of liberal democracy and that this includes playing an active role in the resolution of nationalist conflicts. Finally, scholars and academics who study nationalism should be at the forefront of all such undertakings. But they cannot intellectually combat nationalist conflicts all over the world, including of course those in the Balkans, if they do not first suppress their own nationalism. Western scholars and academics – and we in the Balkans too – should remember a noble dictum attributed to Aristotle, another Balkan philosopher: “Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.” Instead of “Plato,” we all should put “patria.” Is it too much to expect that one day the truth will become to scholars and academics, West and East, South and North, a closer friend than their country? Let me think about it. Aleksa Djilas, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9 , No. 3, December 2007.

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KOSOVO: LESSONS LEARNED LEARNED
There is a double standard for Serbia. In its conclusions from 18 February, the EU's Council of Ministers made official a double standard for Serbia, by recognizing the right to territorial integrity of all nations of the world – except Serbia. It has explained this exception by the “uniqueness” of the Kosovo case: a conflict in the 1990s followed by a prolonged international administration. However, the Ploughshares Fund, a foundation that finances peacemaking efforts, found that at the time of the Kosovo conflict in 1998-99, 40 armed conflicts were being waged in the world. None, except Kosovo, led to unilateral secession. There have also been many international administrations in the world, including in Eastern Slavonia after the war in Croatia, where the UN mission left after several years having aided the peaceful reintegration of that area into Croatia, and not to a secession of the Croatian Serbs. Kosovo is a dangerous precedent. The droning about “Kosovo's uniqueness” was silenced moments after Kosovo's unilateral declaration of secession. Immediately after the unilateral act, the Basque separatists in Spain welcomed the path, followed by Corsican, Kashmiri, Chechen, Transdniestrian, Taiwanese, Flemish, Scottish, Tamil, Kurdish and dozens of other independence movements. Within three weeks, Abkhazia and South Ossetia called for their own international recognition, while the Azeri government said the Kosovo precedent prompted its readiness to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by force. As one official said last year, “the EU and the US can write in a million documents that Kosovo is a unique case, the facts on the ground worldwide will prove that mantra to be a farce.” Serbia faces “Ukrainization.” “The EU is applying a sticks and carrots policy towards Serbia. First, it beats Serbia with a stick, and then with a carrot.” This new Serbian aphorism, and particularly the collapse of the Serbian government on 8 March over disagreements on whether to condition any future moves in the European integration process with Brussels' recognition of Serbia's territorial integrity, show the deep impact of EU's decision. Two opposing political blocks have formed in Serbia: those who believe the fight for Kosovo precedes European integration and those who believe these two processes are equally important and achievable. The first bloc believes the diplomatic battle for Kosovo would be better fought through pragmatic relations with both Brussels and Moscow, while the second believes that in the fight for Kosovo and despite Brussels' position, there is no alternative to quick EU membership. No matter who wins in Serbia's snap parliamentary elections scheduled for 11 May, the deep division and the small overall difference between the two camps presents the risk of a “Ukrainization” of Serbia. Like Ukraine, Serbia could face a long-term domestic political divide and frequent change of power between two strategically-opposed blocks – one closer to Moscow, the other closer to Brussels and Washington. Russia is back in the Balkans. Just as Pristina coordinated its secession with Brussels and Washington, Belgrade is now coordinating its response and diplomatic initiative with Moscow. Brussels has not only lost its appeal and diplomatic leverage in Belgrade, it has also pushed Serbia closer to Russia. In a recent poll, some 60 percent of Serbs said they were in favor of “the closest possible ties” with Moscow. During the presidential race earlier this year, neither of the candidates – the victor, Boris Tadic, and Tomislav Nikolic – went to Brussels during the campaign, but both heavily publicized their visits to Moscow. EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn can warn Serbia as much as he wants about the “danger of being suffocated by the friendly Big Bear” –

Aleksandar Mitic is he Brussels-based director of the Kosovo compromise project. Kosovo's recent unilateral separation from Serbia set off a firestorm of reaction from Belgrade and its allies, notably Moscow. Serbia withdrew its ambassadors from countries that jumped to recognize Kosovo's independence, while angry protesters sacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. Meantime, there has been debate about what this means for other regional tension zones, where ethnic groups may use Kosovo as a textbook for their own independence impulses. Here is a look at some of the lessons of Pristina's 17 February independence declaration: The United Nations is ignored … Western recognition of Kosovo's secession is not only about the UN Charter being broken, about the UN Security Council resolution on the province's status being “creatively interpreted,” or about the Helsinki Final Act being violated. It is also about the West deciding to take justice into its own hands by “coordinating” the declaration of independence. This “coordination” was nothing more than a series of arrogant, unilateral acts decided by the United States, NATO, the European Union and instructed to alltoo-happy Pristina. These acts were sarcastically taken outside of the Security Council and imposed against the will of Serbia, a sovereign, democratic member of the United Nations. … but it still matters. Start counting. The United States has recognized Kosovo, Russia will not. EU members Britain and Germany have recognized, Spain and Romania will not. Tiny Luxembourg did, tiny Cyprus will not. Neighboring Macedonia might, neighboring Bosnia cannot. Afghanistan did, Indonesia did not. Senegal said “oui,” South Africa said “no.” Peru and Costa Rica said “si,” Brazil and Argentina said “no.” Australia OKed, New Zealand refused. The stakes are high: the side that goes over the psychological barrier and wins recognition from the majority of the 192 UN member states will be well placed to fight ultimately for international legitimacy. Serbia and Russia have pledged not to allow Kosovo to become a UN member, and for good reason. Without UN membership, Kosovo's international legitimacy will remain in limbo. It is not only about abstract symbols, it is also about practicalities: no UN means no membership in most international institutions. The UN still matters.

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
as he did in June 2007 at the time of Moscow's rejection of the Martti Ahtisaari plan for internationally supervised independence for Kosovo – but one thing is clear: Russia is back in the Balkans. And it has taken Gazprom with it, through its move to acquire the Serbian state-owned NIS petroleum company. Paradoxically, by ignoring and then trying to humiliate Russia over Kosovo, the United States and the EU have pulled Moscow's interest in defending international law and its political and economic interests deep into the EU's front yard. Russia is no longer defending its strategic interests only in its immediate neighborhood. Its forceful return to the Balkans should not be underestimated. De-facto works when de-jure rules are ignored. There will never be a de-jure partition of Kosovo, and not only because it violates one of the principles of the province's international monitors. Pristina insists on an integral Kosovo, while the Kosovo Serbs do not want to have their community split in two – north and south of the Ibar River. As far as Belgrade is concerned, since it has declared Kosovo's secession

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null, the equation is the following: “a part of nil is nil, a quarter or a 10th of nil is still nil.” There has always been a de-facto partition of Kosovo. It is the irrefutable reality on the ground. Just like the Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s, the Kosovo Serbs have established a parallel system in Kosovo. They feel no loyalty to Pristina's Albanian authorities and they will neither cooperate with an independent Kosovo nor with the EU mission they consider illegal. The intent of Serbia's policy is to help them continue to live in the Serbian system by providing Serbian education, investments and local administration. Coercing them under Pristina's authority would likely result in severe riots in the north, and a probable exodus from the south. If there is one lesson that Serbs should have learned from the Kosovo Albanians, it is that a fait accompli is much more irreversible than an illegal act. Aleksandar Mitic is the Brussels-based director of the Kosovo Compromise project. . http://www.tol.cz/look/ Albanians against the Serbs in the aftermath of the NATO bombing campaign and wonder why it was allowed to occur and why nothing has yet been done to bring the perpetrators to justice. They despise the Kosovo Albanians as criminals, actual terrorists or supporters of terrorism, and treacherous ingrates. -The same U.S. foreign policy establishment views Slobodan Milosevic and the extremist Serbs he encouraged and supported as the major incendiary factor leading to the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia . It supports strongly the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and wants all the indicted war criminals, particularly Mladic and Karadzic, to be brought to The Hague. It has no sympathy for ethnic Serb efforts in Bosnia and Croatia to set up "independent" entities, believing that this was the beginning of "ethnic cleansing" during those conflicts. It finds incomprehensible that individuals such as Arkan were treated in Serbia as national heroes. The Serbian people remember that Abraham Lincoln was considered one of our greatest Presidents in large part because he fought a bloody Civil War to keep the United States together against the wishes of many states determined to secede. They feel that the Serbs were the principal victims of the breakup of Yugoslavia and that they were provoked by other ethnic groups into establishing their breakaway regions. Crimes against Serbs were consistently ignored in their view, while crimes committed by Serbs were exaggerated. The ICTY is seen as a deeply flawed and politicized body consistently prejudiced against the Serbs. Zoran Djindjic and other democratic political leaders were well aware of the gap between these viewpoints. They wanted to keep focused on the future. The problem, however, was that the past in the Balkans kept intruding on both the present and the future. Prime Minister Djindjic faced a Red Beret revolt an d ultimately was killed at least in large part because he tried to satisfy Western demands to turn Serbian war crimes indictees over to The Hague. This issue, plus Kosovo, has significantly strengthened - and emboldened - extremist, nationalistic forces in Serbia . In sum, the era of good feeling ushered in by the fall of the Milosevic government was probably doomed to fail. It is hard to see when or how this downward spiral will end or be reversed. The situation will get far worse before it gets better. Many say that the anti-American atmosphere in Serbia today is even worse than during the Kosovo bombing campaign. At least at that time, the Serbs could partially blame Milosevic.The pity is that there are a great many Serbs, probably a majority, who are watching this exercise in deja vu with a mixture of despair and frustration. But at least as of this moment, there is no one speaking for them. The political figures of moderation are conspicuous by their silence and ineffectual approach. Nationalist forces, willing and seemingly eager to forsake the European path for proud isolation (and condemning the Serbian people to a second class status in Europe) are in the ascendancy. The West takes no joy in this development, but what it should take is its fair share of the responsibility for bringing it about. William Montgomery , 2 March 2008

A FOUNDATION OF SAND
As I watched rioters attacking the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade and burning the flag hanging from its balcony, I remembered raising that same flag a little over seven years ago as we re-established the diplomatic relations broken during the Milosevic regime. In fact, as I write this column, I am staring at a "mouse pad" for my computer that we sent out by the hundreds with exactly that flag-waving image. It was a time of hope and optimism. I thought of all the work done by so many Serbs, beginning with Zoran Djindjić, to re-connect Serbia with Europe and to lead the country and its citizens to a better life. And it seemed to me that all of this effort was literally going up in smoke. It was always clear that one of the major casualties of Kosovo Independence would be the bilateral relationship between the United States and Serbia . The United States of America was the driving force behind the initial NATO bombing campaign in 1999 and now the coordinated recognition of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Kosovo Albanians. But more that that, both the tone and content of the continuous public statements made by senior American officials in support of that independence even touched a nerve in many Serbs who were strong supporters of a democratic, pro-European policy. Most Serbs cannot understand why this is happening now, so long after the fall of Milosevic, when the succeeding governments have done so much to move Serbia in the right direction. The fundamental problem, however, is that the post-Milosevic relationship between the two countries has been based on a foundation of sand. The United States erroneously interpreted the fall of Milosevic as a total repudiation by the Serbian people of his policies. It assumed this meant that a majority of the Serbian people, therefore, subscribed to the American view of Balkan history. Nothing could be further from the truth. -Almost the whole foreign policy establishment (in government, Congress and the private sector) in the United States sees the Kosovo Albanians as having been treated for decades as second-class citizens, increasingly persecuted by the Milosevic regime. It sees the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army, after years of non-violent protest led by Ibrahim Rugova, as an inevitable consequence of Serbian human rights abuses. It views the Serbian military and police response to the KLA to be massive, indiscriminant overkill. The CNN images of hundreds of thousands of fleeing Kosovo Albanians arriving in hastily erected refugee camps in Macedonia , Albania , and Montenegro was the "final straw" which sealed American opinion that independence for Kosovo for the only answer. The Serbs view Kosovo as the cradle of their civilization, which has been stolen from them through a combination of the abuse of international power and clever Kosovo Albanian distortions. They see the Kosovo Serb refugees in their midst and view them and the Serbian people as a whole as the true victims. They cite the numerous human rights abuses, including murder, destruction of churches, ethnic cleansing, and kidnapping by the Kosovo

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WHY INDIA MUST OPPOSE KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE OPPOSE
Maloy Krishna Dhar started life off as a junior reporter for Amrita Bazaar Patrika in Calcutta and a part-time lecturer. He joined the Indian Police Service in 1964 and was permanently seconded to the Intelligence Bureau. During his long stint in the Bureau, Dhar saw action in almost all Northeastern states, Sikkim, Punjab and Kashmir. He also handled delicate internal political and several counterintelligence assignments. After retiring in 1996 as joint director, he took to freelance journalism and writing books. Titles credited to him are Open Secrets-India' s Intelligence Unveiled, Fulcrum of Evil - ISI, CIA, al-Qaeda Nexus, and Mission to Pakistan. Maloy is considered a top security analyst and a social scientist who tries to portray Indian society through his writings. I am not sowing a new idea. I am just sharing the concerns and apprehensions expressed in several world capitals over the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, a breakaway Albanian Muslim majority province of Serbia. Normally a distant Muslim province of two million people of which 10 percent are Orthodox Christian Serbs should not bother us. So far, it has certainly not bothered the government of India and our Great Political Parties. However, history has put the Balkan people, especially the Serbs, at the cruces of civilisations. The Turks finally defeated the patriotic Serbs at the battle of Kosovo in 1389 and began its advance into European heartland. The Serbs have never got over it, as most patriotic Indians cannot forget the dubious defeat of Prithwiraj Chauhan at the Second Battle of Tarain. Serbia was the most advanced segment of Eastern Europe. The Turks patronised the pliable Bosnians and converted them to Islam and persecuted the Orthodox Christians in Serbia. The last gasps of the Cold War initiated the disintegration of Yugoslavia: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia-1991; Bosnia-Herzegovina- 1992; Montenegro-2006 and now the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo on February 18, 2008, when the territory is still under UN administration. The proud Serbs are yet to forget the bloody bites of history. European historiographers agree: the Serbs do not forget their history. The US has probably seeded another poison-tree that might lead to the Third World War. Sarajevo in Bosnia had sparked off the First World War. Sarajevo was the scene of several important battles between Allied resistance fighters and the Germans in World War II. These new ethnoreligious states are somewhat like the creation of Israel after unplanned withdrawal of British mandate in 1948, and the creation of Pakistan after their planned escape from India in 1747. Creation of new nations based on religion and redrawing national boundaries of several states had started after the First World War. After the Second World Order, the Big Powers assumed this task as a matter of international policing privilege. Kosovo had been on the boil since 1989. The turmoil during the last decade in which the NATO assumed the role of Big Protector of Islamic minority in the Balkans paving the way for creation of Bosnia had encouraged the Kosovar Albanians to wage a jihad-type struggle with Turkish, Iranian, Pakistani and Al Qaeda backing. These very pro-jihad forces had also interfered in Bosnia. Kosovo has not only committed a crime against Serbia by unilaterally breaking away; it has also committed a crime against the UN by flouting its mandate under transparent encouragement of the US and its major allies, France, Britain and Germany. These countries have already recognised the illegitimate country and its illegal government. Serbia has lodged a complaint with the Security Council, where China and Russia are likely oppose the US and EU action. Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic has said Kosovo's declaration of independence was illegal and illegitimate. Speaking at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, he said those who had recognised Kosovo had set a dangerous precedent. Condemning the positioning of a EU Mission in Kosovo as an act of flagrant violation international law, he said: "By the actions of some European member-states, every would-be ethnic or religious separatist across Europe and around the world has been provided with a tool kit on how to achieve recognition." It is clear that Pristina's declaration of independence has divided the world capitals. The UN has again been proved to be an ineffective international mechanism for conflict resolution. Russia has reacted with reasonable alarm. It described Kosovo's proclamation of independence as a "gross violation" of international law and criticised the European Union's sending of a "Rule of Law Mission" intended to help stabilise Kosovo. The mission comprises some 2,000 people who would train and mentor police, judges and customs officials. Kosovo's move appeared as a litmus test of attitudes in Asia and elsewhere toward secession from mother countries. Russian concerns have been echoed by China, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. China criticised Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia while Taiwan welcomed it. China is worried about similar action by Taiwan, which has recognised Kosovo. China is also concerned about its western Xinziang area, where Uyghur Muslim rebels are fighting a 'liberation war' for over three decades. The Tibet issue too has the potential of troubling Beijing again. Sri Lanka has voiced concern out of fear that the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) might follow the Kosovo example and might even be recognised by some world capitals. Indonesia has already lost East Timor and is worried about the Aceh province, where rebels want to secede from the mainland regime. Thailand is involved in fighting the Muslim minorities in the three southern

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran (C) with members of his new air wing which carried out an attack against Sri Lanka's main military airbase near Colombo provinces. International Islamic Jihad is patronising the Thai Muslim rebels. These are not the only areas where the seemingly affected ethnoreligious groups can take Kosovo style action. Similar situations exist in Darfur region of Sudan and the Shan, Kachin and Rakhine (Arakan) provinces of Myanmar. What would the US and UN reaction be if these ethno-religious groups break away and declare independence? Would they come to their help, send an EU Mission, establish embassies and open up UN aid missions? This may sound filmy, but after Kosovo everything appears to be possible. If this policy of the US and its allies is accepted as part of the new global political order, the Chechens, Dagestanis and Ingusetians should also have solid international support to breakaway from Russia. Russia has already indicated that the Kosovo principle can be applied to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh of Georgia and Armenia. These

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
regions are already trying to merge with Russia. They might as well declare unilateral independence. Would the US and its allies now go for three separate nations in Iraq Sunni, Shia and Kurdish? Would the UK agree to create a separate Northern Ireland and give full political rights to the Catholic Irish community? Can the US and the EU recognise the unilateral declaration of sovereignty by Balochistan and Balawaristan (the Northern Areas of Pakistan-part of greater Kashmir)? If they do, what would remain of Pakistan? Washington should not aid Islamabad to suppress the Balochis and Balawaris while it abets secession by Kosovo. India exists as a nation as all ethno-religious and linguistic subnationalities have mutually agreed to make it a nation-state, rising above narrow considerations. However, Pakistan continues to incite and abate sections of misdirected Kashmiri and mainland Muslims for seceding from India. The Kashmir Media Service (February 20, 2008), a pro-separatist website, quoted the pro-liberation leaders like Syed Ali Gilani and Shabbir Ahmad Shah of the All Party Hurriyat Conference and chairman of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front Muhammad Yasin Malik as saying that the sacrifices of the Kashmiris would not be allowed to go waste. They cited Kosovo as a ray of hope and urged the international community to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Would the US and EU now accept a unilateral declaration of independence by the pro-Pakistani Kashmir leaders? Can New Delhi prevent them? Western media like the International Herald Tribune, New York Times,

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Los Angeles Times, The Moscow Times, and The Jerusalem Times etc have highlighted that besides Kashmir, disaffected Sikh groups, ethnic and tribal groups in the northeast are also keen to secede from India. Can India afford to cope with these insurgencies, separatist movements in addition to fighting the 'proxy war' launched by Pakistan and the marauding guerrilla actions by the Maoist groups? Would the US and EU come forward to support the NSCN, ULFA and PREPAK etc in the northeast? Why not? Kosovo has written new international laws for all the simmering separatist movements. The government of India has so far remained silent about the Kosovo developments basically out of fear that any opposing statement would erode its 'secular' image, annoy its targeted vote banks and displease its supposed friends in the comity of Muslim nations. It is time for India to stridently oppose unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, while under UN administration. India should openly support Russia and China in the UN and ask Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to explain to the world body as to how the US and allies could bury the UN mandate and agree to the creation of another nation on ethno-religious considerations. Kosovo would not be the last, in case the Big Brothers are allowed to use the NATO as a mandated force of the neo-imperialists. Who could prevent the NATO to frog-leap to Kashmir from Afghanistan? This new world order is likely to lead to greater world-disorder. Wednesday, 05 March, 2008, SIFY (INDIA) http://sify. com/news/ fullstory. php?id=14617538

THE REAL LESSON FOR CHINA
BEIJING-Despite the reiterated warnings from Russia, grave concerns from China, and outright opposition from Serbia, Kosovo finally declared independence unilaterally and was recognized by all the major Western powers. The world has one more new independent sovereign state. Until today Serbia still vowed to fight tooth and nail to have it overturned, though the chances are very, very slim. Europe and the US declared on different occasions that the independence of Kosovo was a sui generis case and set no precedent for any other country in the world, trying to discourage other secessionists to follow suit and downplay its implications, although the actual effect is waiting to been seen. What can be easily determined now, however, is that the pro-independence community in Taiwan at least is greatly excited and encouraged by the newly independent Kosovo. Dr. Trong R. Chai, a legislator of the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party in the Taiwanese parliament, claimed that Kosovo's independence is an exemplary model for Taiwan and adds more legitimacy for Taiwan's referendum on UN membership. Mr. Shieh Jhy-wei, the spokesman for Taiwan's cabinet, while expressing his blessings for Kosovo, also called for "the nations of the world to support the wish of 23 million people of Taiwan to have its own state." One Editorial in the Liberty Times hoped that the people of Taiwan can gain more wisdom, encouragement and determination from Kosovo. If Taiwan learns from the successful declaration of independence by Kosovo, what are the lessons of Serbia's failed policy for China? Contrary to the lesson advocated by Drew Thompson and Nikolas Gvosdev in their Op-ed piece published in the International Herald Tribune on the 18th of this month, which called for China to follow Serbia's example by renouncing the use of force, the real lesson for China is that China must maintain its determination to keep all options available, particularly the military one, at its disposal as the last resort to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence unilaterally. The final outcome of Serbia's willing or unwilling renunciation of the use of force to keep Kosovo part of its territory is now apparent. It is hard to predict with certainty whether Kosovo would have unilaterally declared independence if Serbia had pledged to use all means necessary to prevent it. It may or may not have served to postpone Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. But what can be concluded with certainty from the Kosovo case is all other measures short of the military one that Serbia vowed to use to prevent Kosovo from becoming independent did not work. If there is one single lesson that China can learn from the Kosovo case, it is this. In retrospect, it is probably true to assert that given "the usual combinations of factors found in the Kosovo situation," as US Secretary of State Rice put it, whatever Serbia chooses to do may make no difference to Kosovo's final status as an independent sovereign state in the end. But that is not the scenario that China has faced over time with Taiwan. As the history of the past 20 years has shown, the threat to use force is the only deterrent ruling out the possibility of Taiwan acquiring de jure independence. If China were to renounce the use of force in its Taiwan policy today, what is certain is that there would be another independent sovereign state in the world tomorrow. The sad truth is there is no hope of any chance for successful resolution for Taiwan for what has failed in Kosovo. If the threat to use force has failed to serve to prevent Taiwan's steady press for independence, as Drew Thompson and Nikolas Gvosdev rightly points out, it will be impossible for China to do so with weaker options. For China, by keeping the option of using everything at China's disposal to crush any of Taiwan's unilateral moves to change the current status quo, China has left Taiwan with only two choices: maintaining the status quo or becoming independent and causing a war. It is not hard for Taiwan to figure out which scenario better suits its interests. In the end the independence of Kosovo illustrates once again what fails for anti-secessionists and what works for secessionists. It is those failures which China needs to pay particular to attention and from which China needs to learn. Wu Yun is an editor for international news at the People's Daily in Beijing.http://www.national interest. org/Article. aspx?id=16972 NATIONAL INTEREST (USA) , "Published by the Nixon Center" 02.28.08

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WASHINGTON GETS A NEW COLONY IN THE BALKANS NEW
In evaluating the recent "declaration of independence" by Kosovo, a province of Serbia, and its immediate recognition as a state by the U.S., Germany, Britain and France, it is important to know three things. First, Kosovo is not gaining independence or even minimal selfgovernment. It will be run by an appointed High Representative and bodies appointed by the U.S. , European Union and NATO. An old-style colonial viceroy and imperialist administrators will have control over foreign and domestic policy. U.S. Imperialism has merely consolidated its direct control of a totally dependent colony in the heart of the Balkans. Second, Washington 's immediate recognition of Kosovo confirms once again that U.S. Imperialism will break any and every treaty or international agreement it has ever signed, including agreements it drafted and imposed by force and violence on others. The recognition of Kosovo is in direct violation of such law?specifically U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which the leaders of Yugoslavia were forced to sign to end the 78 days of NATO bombing of their country in 1999. Even this imposed agreement affirmed the "commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Serbia, a republic of Yugoslavia . This week's illegal recognition of Kosovo was condemned by Serbia, Russia, China and Spain. Thirdly, U.S. Imperialist domination does not benefit the occupied people. Kosovo after nine years of direct NATO military occupation has a staggering 60 percent unemployment rate. It has become a center of the international drug trade and of prostitution rings in Europe. The once humming mines, mills, smelters, refining centers and railroads of this small resource-rich industrial area all sit silent. The resources of Kosovo under NATO occupation were forcibly privatized and sold to giant Western multinational corporations. Now almost the only employment is working for the U.S./NATO army of occupation or U.N. Agencies. The only major construction in Kosovo is of Camp Bondsteel, the largest U.S. Base built in Europe in a generation.Halliburton, of course, got the contract. Camp Bondsteel guards the strategic oil and transportation lines of the entire region. Over 250,000 Serbian, Romani and other nationalities have been driven out of this Serbian province since it came under U.S./NATO control. Almost a quarter of the Albanian population has been forced to leave in order to find work. Establishing a colonial administration Consider the plan under which Kosovo's "independence" is to happen. Not only does it violate U.N. Resolutions but it is also a total colonial structure. It is similar to the absolute power held by L. Paul Bremer in the first two years of the U.S. Occupation of Iraq. How did this colonial plan come about? It was proposed by the same forces responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the NATO bombing and occupation of Kosovo. In June of 2005, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari as his special envoy to lead the negotiations on Kosovo's final status. Ahtisaari is hardly a neutral arbitrator when it comes to U.S. Intervention in Kosovo. He is chairman emeritus of the International Crisis Group (ICG), an organization funded by multibillionaire George Soros that promotes NATO expansion and intervention along with open markets for U.S. And E.U. Investment. The board of the ICG includes two key U.S. Officials responsible for the bombing of Kosovo: Gen. Wesley Clark and Zbigniew Brzezinski. In March 2007, Ahtisaari gave his Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement to the new U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. The documents setting out the new government for Kosovo are available at unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.HTML. A summary is available on the U.S. State Department's Web site at state.gov/p/eur/rls/ fs/100058.htm An International Civilian Representative (ICR) will be appointed by U.S. And E.U. Officials to oversee Kosovo. This appointed official can overrule any measures, annul any laws and remove anyone from office in Kosovo. The ICR will have full and final control over the departments of Customs, Taxation, Treasury and Banking. The E.U. Will establish a European Security and Defense Policy Mission (ESDP) and NATO will establish an International Military Presence. Both these appointed bodies will have control over foreign policy, security, police, judiciary, all courts and prisons. They are guaranteed immediate and complete access to any activity, proceeding or document in Kosovo. These bodies and the ICR will have final say over what crimes can be prosecuted and against whom; they can reverse or annul any decision made. The largest prison in Kosovo is at the U.S. Base, Camp Bondsteel, where prisoners are held without charges, judicial overview or representation. The recognition of Kosovo's "independence" is just the latest step in a U.S. war of reconquest that has been relentlessly pursued for decades. Divide and rule The Balkans has been a vibrant patchwork of many oppressed nationalities, cultures and religions. The Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia, formed after World War II, contained six republics, none of which had a majority. Yugoslavia was born with a heritage of antagonisms that had been endlessly exploited by the Ottoman Turks, the AustroHungarian Empire, and interference by British and French imperialism, followed by Nazi German and Italian Fascist occupation in World War II. The Jewish and Serbian peoples suffered the greatest losses in that war. A powerful communist-led resistance movement made up of all the nationalities, which had suffered in different ways, was forged against Nazi occupation and all outside intervention. After the liberation, all the nationalities cooperated and compromised in building the new socialist federation. In 45 years the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia developed from an impoverished, underdeveloped, feuding region into a stable country with an industrial base, full literacy and health care for the whole population. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Pentagon immediately laid plans for the aggressive expansion of NATO into the East. Divide and rule became U.S. policy throughout the entire region. Everywhere right-wing, pro-capitalist forces were financed and encouraged. As the Soviet Union was broken up into separate, weakened, unstable and feuding republics, the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia tried to resist this reactionary wave. In 1991, while world attention was focused on the devastating U.S. bombing of Iraq , Washington encouraged, financed and armed right-wing separatist movements in the Croatian, Slovenian and Bosnian republics of the Yugoslav Federation. In violation of international agreements Germany and the U.S. gave quick recognition to these secessionist movements and approved the creation of several capitalist ministates. At the same time U.S. finance capital imposed severe economic sanctions on Yugoslavia to bankrupt its economy. Washington then promoted NATO as the only force able to bring stability to the region. The arming and financing of the right-wing UCK movement in the Serbian province of Kosovo began in this same period. Kosovo was not a distinct republic within the Yugoslav Federation but a province in the Serbian Republic . Historically, it had been a center of Serbian national identity, but with a growing Albanian population. Washington initiated a wild propaganda campaign claiming that Serbia was carrying out a campaign of massive genocide against the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The Western media was full of stories of mass graves and brutal rapes. U.S. officials claimed that from 100,000 up to 500,000 Albanians had been massacred. U.S./NATO officials under the Clinton administration issued an outrageous ultimatum that Serbia immediately accept military occupation and surrender all sovereignty or face NATO bombardment of its cities, towns and infrastructure. When, at a negotiation session in Rambouillet , France , the Serbian Parliament voted to refuse NATO's demands, the bombing began.

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
In 78 days the Pentagon dropped 35,000 cluster bombs, used thousands of rounds of radioactive depleted-uranium rounds, along with bunker busters and cruise missiles. The bombing destroyed more than 480 schools, 33 hospitals, numerous health clinics, 60 bridges, along with industrial, chemical and heating plants, and the electrical grid. Kosovo, the region that Washington was supposedly determined to liberate, received the greatest destruction. Finally on June 3, 1999, Yugoslavia was forced to agree to a ceasefire and the occupation of Kosovo. Expecting to find bodies everywhere, forensic teams from 17 NATO countries organized by the Hague Tribunal on War Crimes searched occupied Kosovo all summer of 1999 but found a total of only 2,108 bodies, of all nationalities. Some had been killed by NATO bombing and some in the war between the UCK and the Serbian police and military. They found not one mass grave and could produce no evidence of massacres or of "genocide." This stunning rebuttal of the imperialist propaganda comes from a report released by the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia , Carla Del Ponte. It was covered, but without fanfare, in the New York Times of Nov. 11, 1999.

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The wild propaganda of genocide and tales of mass graves were as false as the later claims that Iraq had and was preparing to use "weapons of mass destruction." Through war, assassinations, coups and economic strangulation, Washington has succeeded for now in imposing neoliberal economic policies on all of the six former Yugoslav republics and breaking them into unstable and impoverished ministates. The very instability and wrenching poverty that imperialism has brought to the region will in the long run be the seeds of its undoing. The history of the achievements made when Yugoslavia enjoyed real independence and sovereignty through unity and socialist development will assert itself in the future. * Sara Flounders, co-director of the International Action Center , traveled to Yugoslavia during the 1999 U.S. bombing and reported on the extent of the U.S. attacks on civilian targets. She is a co-author and editor of the books: "Hidden Agenda?U.S./NATO Takeover of Yugoslavia" and "NATO in the Balkans." Homepage: http://www.iacenter.org/balkans/kosovo022308/ www.indymedia.org.uk ( original location here ) 01.03.08

KOSOVAR INDEPENDENCE AND THE RUSSIAN REACTION REACTION
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on Sunday. The United States and many, but not all, European countries recognized it. The Serbian government did not impose an economic blockade on — or take any military action against — Kosovo, although it declared the Albanian leadership of Kosovo traitors to Serbia. The Russians vehemently repeated their objection to an independent Kosovo but did not take any overt action. An informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was announced last week; it will take place in Moscow on Feb. 22. With Kosovo’s declaration, a river was crossed. We will now see whether that river was the Rubicon. Kosovo’s independence declaration is an important event for two main reasons. First, it potentially creates a precedent that could lead to redrawn borders in Europe and around the world. Second, it puts the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany in the position of challenging what Russia has defined as a fundamental national interest — and this at a time when the Russians have been seeking to assert their power and authority. Taken together, each of these makes this a geopolitically significant event. Begin with the precedent. Kosovo historically has been part of Serbia; indeed, Serbs consider it the cradle of their country. Over the course of the 20th century, it has become predominantly Albanian and Muslim (though the Albanian version of Islam is about as secular as one can get). The Serbian Orthodox Christian community has become a minority. During the 1990s, Serbia — then the heart of the now-defunct Yugoslavia — carried out a program of repression against the Albanians. Whether the repression rose to the level of genocide has been debated. In any case, the United States and other members of NATO conducted an air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 until the Yugoslavians capitulated, allowing the entry of NATO troops into the province of Kosovo. Since then, Kosovo, for all practical purposes, has been a protectorate of a consortium of NATO countries but has formally remained a province of Serbia. After the Kosovo war, wartime Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Milosevic died in The Hague in the course of his trial for war crimes; a new leadership took over; and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia itself ultimately dissolved, giving way to a new Republic of Serbia. The United Nations did not sanction the war in Kosovo. Russian opposition in the U.N. Security Council prevented any U.N. diplomatic cover for the Western military action. Following the war — in a similar process to what happened with regard to Iraq — the Security Council authorized the administration of Kosovo by the occupying powers, but it never clearly authorized independence for Kosovo. The powers administering Kosovo included the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and other European states, organized as the Kosovo Force (KFOR). While the logic of the situation pointed toward an independent Kosovo, the mechanism envisioned for the province’s independence was a negotiated agreement with Serbia. The general view was that the new government and personalities in Belgrade would be far more interested in the benefits of EU membership than they would be in retaining control of Kosovo. Over nearly a decade, the expectation therefore was that the Serbian government would accede to an independent Kosovo in exchange for being put on a course for EU membership. As frequently happens — and amazes people for reasons we have never understood — nationalism trumped economic interests. The majority of Serbs never accepted secession. The United States and the Europeans, therefore, decided to create an independent Kosovo without Serbian acquiescence. The military and ethnic reality thus was converted into a political reality. Those recognizing Kosovo’s independence have gone out of their way specifically to argue that this decision in no way constitutes a precedent. They argue that the Serbian oppression of the late 1990s, which necessitated intervention by outside military forces to protect the Kosovars, made returning Kosovo to Serbian rule impossible. The argument therefore goes that Kosovo’s independence must be viewed as an idiosyncratic event related to the behavior of the Serbs, not as a model for the future. Other European countries, including Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus, have expressly rejected this reasoning. So have Russia and China. Each of these countries has a specific, well-defined area dominated by a specific ethnic minority group. In these countries and others like them, these ethnic groups have demanded, are demanding or potentially will demand autonomy, secession or integration with a neighboring country. Such ethnic groups could claim, and have claimed, oppression by the majority group. And each country facing this scenario fears that if Kosovo can be taken from Serbia, a precedent for secession will be created. The Spanish have Basque separatists. Romania and Slovakia each contain large numbers of Hungarians concentrated in certain areas. The Cypriots — backed by the Greeks — are worried that the Turkish region of Cyprus, which already is under a separate government, might proclaim formal independence. The Chinese are concerned about potential separatist movements in Muslim Xinjiang and, above all, fear potential Taiwanese independence. And the Russians are concerned about independence movements in Chechnya and elsewhere. All of these countries see the Kosovo decision as setting a precedent, and they

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
therefore oppose it. Europe is a case in point. Prior to World War II, Europe’s borders constantly remained in violent flux. One of the principles of a stable Europe has been the inviolability of borders from outside interference, as

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Kosovo, Serbia: Russia, the EU and Independence
EU leaders meeting in Portugal on Dec. 14 are fine-tuning plans to recognize the independence of the Serb province of Kosovo and then take over full administration of the province. At present, only one EU state — Cyprus — objects to the plan because it fears it will legitimize the 1974 secession of the northern third of the Mediterranean island. Three other EU states — Romania, Slovakia and Greece — have related, but more subdued, objections as well. Still, diplomatically, politically, economically and militarily, all the cards are in the Europeans’ hands. Formally, the Serbs can do nothing to stop Kosovar independence. Anyone wishing to derail the independence train will have to convince the Europeans that Kosovar independence is not in the best interests of the European Union. The only power with the will and means of doing that is Serbia’s only ally, Russia. The Kremlin has clearly and firmly opposed Kosovar independence ever since the issue first popped up in the mid1990s. By now Moscow has invested so much time in opposing independence for Kosovo that a loss would not just embarrass Moscow, but deeply impact perceptions of Russian power throughout Eurasia. Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot afford the stigma of simply being ignored. Moscow’s influence in Europe has atrophied recently, however. The admission of Russia’s former Warsaw Pact satellites as NATO and EU members has institutionalized anti-Russian sentiment within European institutions. Government changes in France and Germany have made Paris and Berlin far less willing to consult with the Kremlin. And Moscow’s energy policy has made most of Europe outright hostile to Russia. Among the only players still willing to consider the Russian view are those European politicians who like the idea of a unified European superpower in strong partnership with Russia. France under Jacques Chirac and Germany under Gerhard Schroeder used to champion this view, but both of them are gone. The strongest supporter of this vision today is JeanClaude Juncker, the prime minister of diminutive Luxembourg — but he said at the EU summit that “We have a duty to deliver as far as Kosovo is concerned and we cannot be blocked by a kind of Russian veto.” If the Russians are going to get their way on Kosovo, they therefore need to radically shift European perceptions. That means doing something dramatic. Unexpected. Risky. The real Kosovo drama will not be played out in Brussels and Pristina, but inside the walls of the Kremlin. Stratfor, Jean-Claude Juncker, December 14, 2007 well as the principle that borders cannot be redefined except with mutual agreement. This principle repeatedly was reinforced by international consensus, most notably at Yalta in 1945 and Helsinki in 1973. Thus, the Czech Republic and Slovakia could agree to separate, and the Soviet Union could dissolve itself into its component republics, but the Germans cannot demand the return of Silesia from Poland; outsiders cannot demand a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland; and the Russians cannot be forced to give up Chechnya. The principle that outside powers can’t redefine boundaries, and that secessionist movements can’t create new nations unilaterally, has been a pillar of European stability. The critics of Kosovo’s independence believe that larger powers can’t

redraw the boundaries of smaller ones without recourse to the United Nations. They view the claim that Yugoslavia’s crimes in Kosovo justify doing so as unreasonable; Yugoslavia has dissolved, and the Serbian state is run by different people. The Russians view the major European powers and the Americans as arrogating rights that international law does not grant them, and they see the West as setting itself up as judge and jury without right of appeal. This debate is not trivial. But there is a more immediate geopolitical issue that we have discussed before: the Russian response. The Russians have turned Kosovo into a significant issue. Moscow has objected to Kosovo’s independence on all of the diplomatic and legal grounds discussed. But behind that is a significant challenge to Russia’s strategic position. Russia wants to be seen as a great power and the dominant power in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Serbia is a Russian ally. Russia is trying to convince countries in the FSU, such as Ukraine, that looking to the West for help is futile because Russian power can block Western power. It wants to make the Russian return to great power status seem irresistible. The decision to recognize Kosovo’s independence in the face of Russian opposition undermines Russian credibility. That is doubly the case because Russia can make a credible argument that the Western decision flies in the face of international law — and certainly of the conventions that have governed Europe for decades. Moscow also is asking for something that would not be difficult for the Americans and Europeans to give. The resources being devoted to Kosovo are not going to decline dramatically because of independence. Putting off independence until the last possible moment — which is to say forever, considering the utter inability of Kosovo to care for itself — thus certainly would have been something the West could have done with little effort. But it didn’t. The reason for this is unclear. It does not appear that anyone was intent on challenging the Russians. The Kosovo situation was embedded in a process in which the endgame was going to be independence, and all of the military force and the bureaucratic inertia of the European Union was committed to this process. Russian displeasure was noted, but in the end, it was not taken seriously. This was simply because no one believed the Russians could or would do anything about Kosovar independence beyond issuing impotent protestations. Simply put, the nations that decided to recognize Kosovo were aware of Russian objections but viewed Moscow as they did in 1999: a weak power whose wishes are heard but discarded as irrelevant. Serbia was an ally of Russia. Russia intervened diplomatically on its behalf. Russia was ignored. If Russia simply walks away from this, its growing reputation as a great power will be badly hurt in the one arena that matters to Moscow the most: the FSU. A Europe that dismisses Russian power is one that has little compunction about working with the Americans to whittle away at Russian power in Russia’s own backyard. Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko — who, in many ways, is more anti-Western than Russian President Vladimir Putin and is highly critical of Putin as well — has said it is too late to “sing songs” about Kosovo. He maintains that the time to stop the partition of Kosovo was in 1999, in effect arguing that Putin’s attempts to stop it were ineffective because it was a lost cause. Translation: Putin and Russia are not the powers they pretend to be. That is not something that Putin in particular can easily tolerate. Russian grand strategy calls for Russia to base its economy on the export of primary commodities. To succeed at this, Russia must align its production and exports with those of other FSU countries. For reasons of both national security and economics, being the regional hegemon in the FSU is crucial to Russia’s strategy and to Putin’s personal credibility. He is giving up the presidency on the assumption that his personal power will remain intact. That assumption is based on his effectiveness and decisiveness. The way he deals with the West — and the way the West deals with him — is a measure of his personal power. Being completely disregarded by the West will cost him. He needs to react. The Russians are therefore hosting an “informal” CIS summit in Moscow on Friday. This is not the first such summit, by any means, and one was supposed to be held before this but was postponed. On Feb. 11,

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
however, after it became clear that Kosovo would declare independence, the decision to hold the summit was announced. If Putin has a response to the West on Kosovo, it should reveal itself at the summit. There are three basic strategies the Russians can pursue. One is to try to create a coalition of CIS countries to aid Serbia. This is complex in that Serbia may have no appetite for this move, and the other CIS countries may not even symbolically want to play. The second option is opening the wider issue of altering borders. This could be aimed at sticking it to the Europeans by backing Serbian secessionist efforts in bifurcated Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also could involve announcing Russia’s plans to annex Russian-friendly separatist regions on its borders — most notably the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and perhaps even eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. (Annexation would be preferred over recognizing independence, since it would reduce the chances of Russia’s own separatist regions agitating for secession.) Russia thus would argue that Kosovo’s independence opens the door for Russia to shift its borders, too. That would make the summit exciting, particularly with regard to the Georgians, who are allied with the United States and at odds with Russia on Abkhazia and other issues. The third option involves creating problems for the West elsewhere. An Iranian delegation will be attending the summit as “observers.” That

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creates the option for Russia to signal to Washington that the price it will pay for Kosovo will be extracted elsewhere. Apart from increased Russian support for Iran — which would complicate matters in Iraq for Washington — there are issues concerning Azerbaijan, which is sandwiched between Russia and Iran. In the course of discussions with Iranians, the Russians could create problems for Azerbaijan. The Russians also could increase pressure on the Baltic states, which recognized Kosovo and whose NATO membership is a challenge to the Russians. During the Cold War, the Russians were masters of linkage. They responded not where they were weak but where the West was weak. There are many venues for that. What is the hardest to believe — but is, of course, possible — is that Putin simply will allow the Kosovo issue to pass. He clearly knew this was coming. He maintained vocal opposition to it beforehand and reiterated his opposition afterward. The more he talks and the less he does, the weaker he appears to be. He personally can’t afford that, and neither can Russia. He had opportunities to cut his losses before Kosovo’s independence was declared. He didn’t. That means either he has blundered badly or he has something on his mind. Our experience with Putin is that the latter is more likely, and this suddenly called summit may be where we see his plans play out. George Friedman, Stratfor, February 20, 2008

U.S., RUSSIA: TALKS ON KOSOVO AND NATO'S EXPANSION PLANS
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates arrived in Moscow on March 17 for two days of talks with their Russian counterparts, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. The talks are aimed at gaining ground on key issues that could lead to an agreement on U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe. However, both sides know that talks on BMD will go nowhere, which makes NATO expansion and the familiar topic of Kosovo the main issues on the table. knows it. The United States is moving forward with its plans, and any threat from the Kremlin is not going to stop that. This was the case when Russian and U.S. officials met last year, but at those meetings there were other large topics to discuss. The prior meetings were focused on the lead-up to Kosovar independence, with Russia staunchly against the move. This topic will be visited once again, though the issue is not about Kosovar independence (since that has already happened), but how Russia will The talks will be very similar to those held between presidents George W. respond. The Serbia-Kosovo issue may have fallen off the radar in much Bush and Vladimir Putin in July 2007 and among Rice, Gates, Lavrov and of Europe, but not in Russia. Moscow is still very focused on the Balkans Serdyukov in October 2007. During each meeting, the participants have — where there have been acts of violence against the West — and is holding continual talks with Belgrade. Russia has already shown its anger at being ignored by the West over Kosovo by lashing out at Ukraine and Georgia, shutting off natural gas going to Europe via the former and stirring up secessionist fears in the latter. The United States knows that Russia can still create a dangerous situation and will want to attempt to deal with Moscow on the issue. The NATO issue is one of Washington’s bargaining tools. The meeting comes just two weeks before the large NATO heads of state summit on April 2 in Bucharest, where many countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union — or at least behind the Iron Curtain — are vying for NATO membership. Most likely, Russia has realized that it has lost the Balkans to NATO and is not too interested in Macedonia, Albania and Croatia’s membership bids — but Moscow is ready to fight over Ukraine and Georgia. For Moscow, the meeting between U.S. and Russian officials is to ensure that both sides are on the same page — or at least to allow the countries to test each other’s limits — before Russia makes a more dangerous move in the Balkans and before the NATO summit. Moscow wants to make it clear that Ukraine and Georgia are off limits to the West. For the most part, Washington is fine with Moscow’s wishes for now, as long as tensions do not increase in Serbia. The United States does not need to push the issue for two countries NATO is not really ready to accept anyway, since neither country is in much of a position to make a meaningful contribution to the alliance and their membership would be mostly political. NATO can begin looking at Ukraine and Georgia down the road when Moscow is not looking for a fight as much and when the

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov
tried to focus on BMD, specifically Washington’s plans to build BMD installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. The United States’ plans seem all but guaranteed to proceed, especially after a meeting between Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Bush on March 10 during which Tusk publicly signed off on the plans if the United States agreed to help Warsaw upgrade its military. Though the United States maintains that the BMD installations have nothing to do with Russia, they will push the West further up on Moscow’s doorstep. But any meaningful discussion on the BMD issue is dead, and each side

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
United States has a freer hand to counter a more aggressive Russia. U.N. police raided the headquarters of the U.N. court in Mitrovica, Kosovo, on March 17, which Serbs had taken over March 14 by protests. The police drove out the Serbian occupiers with tear gas, but protests continued outside the building. Shortly thereafter, a separate group of Serbs ambushed a U.N. convoy carrying prisoners from the raid, freeing many of them. The violence highlights continued chaos in Serbia after Kosovo declared independence Feb. 17, as well as the Serb bid to detach the Mitrovica district from Kosovo. Mitrovica, the major city in the district of the same name in northern Kosovo, has become the focal point of the conflict because it is divided between ethnic Serbs and Albanians. The Serbian government has sworn never to recognize Kosovo’s independence and has moved to protect Kosovo’s 70,000 Serbian inhabitants; but Albanian Kosovars see the northern territory as their own. NATO — and soon EU peacekeepers — maintain security and provisional government in the area, much to the chagrin of Serbia and its allies. These include Russia, which sees the shift to EU peacekeepers as an attempt to bypass Moscow’s veto power at the United Nations.

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The second tactic is attacking civil and judicial institutions that legitimize the current status, which is seen as favoring Kosovo. Burning the U.S. Embassy in Serbia was one example of this tactic, though not the most effective use of it. Targeting U.N. or EU institutions with direct jurisdiction over Mitrovica is much more likely to have the desired effect. The Serbs recognize the need to strike at the symbols of law and order in Kosovo, as revealed by the recent incidents at the U.N. court in Mitrovica. Serb demonstrators can claim to have won this battle, since peacekeepers were not able to detain many of them. The incident also gives insight into how future sabotages of the same kind could be carried out. The Serbs who orchestrated the takeover of the U.N. court had been employees and clerks in the court before the 1999 NATO war. While civil institutions are vulnerable to plots by those familiar with their inner workings, insiders are not necessary for Serbia to continue to succeed on this front.

The third tactic for the Serbs to achieve the partition of Kosovo is to disrupt Mitrovica’s borders. Just after Kosovo declared independence, about 1,000 Serb Kosovars lashed out at two border crossings March 19. But the Kosovar Albanian police force was not strong enough to block the action. Border posts are sparse along Mitrovica’s borders, making it easier for Serbs to claim this area. Also, the natural border formed by the Iber The Serbs want to wrest the Mitrovica district from Kosovo and bring it River means Serbia’s control of the Mitrovica district seems inevitable. back into Serbia proper. This would create a new Serbian-Kosovar border Closing off the major bridge across the river would alone accomplish a de along ethnic boundaries. Recovering Mitrovica would serve as a facto partition. consolation prize for Belgrade after losing Kosovo. It would deliver an NATO and EU forces would have to institute draconian measures to early blow to Kosovo’s pride over independence and demonstrate to the preserve this territory for Kosovo and block Serb ambitions, something Kosovars that Serbia is still calling some of the shots. Losing Mitrovica they are not willing to do. But to fully achieve the partitioning of Mitrovica also would harm Kosovo economically, since the region’s mines are the from Kosovo, the Serbs will have to sustain these tactics. Otherwise their fledgling state’s only source of income other than foreign aid. small and sporadic victories will easily be reversed over time, as Western To this end, the Serbs have employed three tactics, all leading to initial influence strengthens the status quo and as Serb fury over Kosovar successes. The first is civil disobedience, a natural response to the recent secession gradually ebbs. While partition seems like a natural outcome, events that have so angered many Serbs. The persistence of massive the Serbs will have to work to make it happen. protests has further energized popular resistance and could lead to Stratfor. March 17, 2008 material changes in the Kosovo situation.

GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: NATO EXPANSION, BMD AND THE U.S. FLUSH
With less than two days to go before a much-anticipated NATO summit in Further complicating matters for the United States, all this NATO Romania, U.S. President George W. Bush stopped in Kiev for meetings talk is exposing a major rift in Europe over how to manage with the Ukrainian leadership. The big issue on the table is how to get Ukraine’s highly polarized population on board with a roadmap to NATO membership. No one is more worried about the prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership than Russia. Moscow previously received a taste of U.S. provocations on what Russia considers its turf during Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution. Since then, Russia has remained on high alert for any other bold moves by Washington and its European allies to push up against the periphery of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is the linchpin to Russia’s buffer strategy. If Kiev were to fall to NATO, Russia’s western flank would be at the mercy of its Western rivals, with only Belarus left to fend for Russian interests on Russia’s highly strategic western frontier. The United States now essentially is telling the Russians the game is on in Ukraine. But while Ukraine’s ruling coalition -- led by President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko -- is all for putting Ukraine on the NATO map, the roughly half of the country on the east side of the Dnieper River remains intensely loyal to its former Soviet comrades, and is ready and willing to scuttle any push toward NATO membership.

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
relations with Russia. While the United States has the geographic distance and bandwidth to get more aggressive with Moscow, the Europeans have a much more complicated game to play. Germany, for one, is the first major Western European power to feel the brunt of any Russian backlash. Berlin openly has voiced its opposition to rushing any membership plans for Ukraine and Georgia. France, which is readying itself to take the EU leadership, also is not looking to exchange blows with the Russians -especially when it has a host of other issues it wants to pursue in the coming months. On the other side of the spectrum, countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania -- which are all too familiar with the sight of Russian tanks rolling down the Eurasian steppes - are rallying behind the United States. But the United States needs a unanimous NATO decision to get Ukraine and Georgia on the road to NATO membership. Thus, Russia can take some comfort in knowing there is still enough division within Europe for Moscow to be able to throw a wrench into U.S. plans to challenge Russia along its periphery.

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Despite these obstacles, during his visits to Kiev and Bucharest Bush intendsto throw a Hail Mary in the game over Ukraine not only against Russia, but large swathes of Europe. Bush is not likely to make significant headway in bringing Ukraine and Georgia into NATO in the long term, but there is another big issue in play that worries Moscow -- namely, U.S. plans to install ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Central Europe. And Russia can do little about this U.S. move. The Czechs already are confirming details on where and when to sign the treaty for installing the defense system, while the Poles are looking to see if the United States will throw in any last-minute sweeteners before finalizing the deal. Much to Russia’s chagrin, the BMD plan is now down to a matter of dotting Is and crossing Ts. While the NATO discussions continue to drag out beyond the upcoming NATO summit, the United States will be installing hardware behind the old Iron Curtain to hedge in the Russians -and that alone is a decent outcome from the U.S. perspective. Washington may not be headed for a royal flush as far as beating back the Russians on NATO expansion, but it still has a flush in hand with BMD. Stratfor, 1 Apr 2008

“The interests of the United States are obviously different from those of Europe. We are increasingly coming to the conclusion that the events in the Balkans developed in such a way so that Washington could establish a dominant presence in the region, which was not the case after 1945. We should not lose sight of the fact that it was precisely Germany that started this unfortunate game, championing ethnically-based national states in the region. We should remember that Germany was the first to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. What still remains to be solved is why the Americans subsequently took up the German ethnic strategy. I might say that, in the case of Germany, there was a sort of an aggressive laziness to genuinely deal with the situation in Yugoslavia and the Balkans. The cause probably lies in the simple fact that, in this way, without truly delving into the genuine state of affairs, people were able to, quite easily, without much effort, establish who was friend and who was foe. In addition, there is no doubt at all that the United States decided very early on to support the Albanian side. This is also born out by the fact that Washington established its Information Office in Pristina [the provincial capital of Kosovo – trans. note] in 1997, contrary to the will of Belgrade. Here we should also remember the long years of activity on the part of Republican senator Bob Dole….

THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK OF THE BALKAN CONFLICT FRAMEWORK
aircraft or ships alone. Second point. I am surprised that the American side is discussing issues of European security, as evidenced by the example of Bratislava, in the tone of: “God is with us.” The consequence of such a relationship is that any attempt at a European, autonomous thinking is criticized or even labeled as anti-American. As a European, I must ask myself the following question: am I supposed to accept the Bratislava conclusions as the Laws of Moses or do I still have a right to think about my own interests. Third point. The Americans see themselves as the successors of the Roman Empire. Their motto is: The Romans saw the Mediterranean as Mare nostrum. We Americans see the Atlantic as our own Mediterranean, as our own sea. For this reason we must draw a line of our interests, which is to extend from the Baltic Sea by Leningrad [present-day St. Petersburg – trans. note] to Odessa on the Black Sea, and on to Istanbul and Anatolia. Everything lying east of that line – these are now my own words – does not interest us. We must possess and secure a land communication on our own [sic!] territory, extending from Anatolia, i.e. Turkey, to Poland. There are many indications that, for the Americans, the situation in the Balkans is a sort of compensation for the Middle East. They use the Balkans to compensate for failures in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Washington 's motto goes: the Israeli and the Palestine side will not be able to achieve a peace agreement. And, so as not to ruin chances at accord with the Islamic world, the Americans are now trying to offer concessions to the Muslims in the Balkans, the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo. In a word, to Washington the Balkans are serving as a reserve territory or a testing ground where, they believe, they might still be able to reach agreement with the Islamic world. Whatever “Big Brother” says must be carried out unconditionally. I took this gathering in Bratislava seriously enough to inform Chancellor Schröder about it in a letter. My main motive was to prevent any future breech of international law. May the case of Serbia be the last such case. For, if I believe that I can ignore international law whenever it stands as an obstacle to my interests, then I am leaving the door wide open to a new war in Europe.

At the end of April 2000, I personally attended a conference in Bratislava, where the highest American officials discussed their future strategy in the Balkans. The conference organizers were the American State Department and the Republican Party's elite American Enterprise Institute. Among the conference participants were prime ministers, foreign ministers and defense ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and the personal representative of the NATO commander. Among these was a future American Assistant Secretary of State [Daniel Fried – trans. note]. The following was clearly stated there: First point. The reason why we are in the Balkans today lies in our missed opportunity after 1945, when General Eisenhower made a mistake and did not station American land troops in that part of Europe. Now we must correct that error at all cost. Why? The reason lies in the very nature of land troops. The complete control of a territory is possible only if our land troops are present. Full control cannot be established with

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
After Serbia, i.e. Kosovo, we had clashes in Macedonia. Until then, we were constantly showering Skoplje [the capital of the FYR Macedonia – trans. note] with praises. They disciplinedly carried out all our demands. And then the West suddenly changed its policy and extended support to the Albanian armed rebellion. What message were we sending to the Macedonian government? That violence pays off. Let us return to Kosovo. As both member and Vice President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, I can claim with full responsibility that, in the summer of 1998, 90% of us were against the use of any kind of military force against Belgrade outside the provisions of the UN. What remains for us after the bombing of Serbia? To choose: either to bring down the edifice that has secured the peace for us in Europe since 1945 – which is precisely what the Americans are doing, either alone or with the help of the British, or to say: my dear good people, we must seek to return to the rules of behavior provided by the UN. In a word, it occasionally appears to me that the Americans are now acting in the same way that the German statesman Bismarck did. On one occasion he said that Balkan unrest and conflict were in the German interest, as this kept German adversaries in a constant state of tension. Is

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not Washington 's present aim identical, namely, to interfere with European efforts at creating an autonomous, independent European policy? Finally, some mention should be made here of the relations between Western Europe and Russia. In the case they are normal and good, then that would raise the question of NATO's continued existence. The Americans invented the conflict in the Balkans in order to prevent the Europeans from thinking that NATO is no longer needed. There are people at important positions in the EU who think that there is a constant in American, and possibly British, policy, that, within the European Union – as well as Turkey – power must never come into the hands of people who might bring into question Washington's direct influence on Europe….” Former member of the German Bundestag, ex-German Deputy Defense Secretary and ex-Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Interview with Willy Wimmer * (excerpt) The Americans are Recommending Themselves as the Successors of Rome
(Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik),September, 2001 integrity is best protected by signing an SAA with the EU; a stance that was reaffirmed throughout the recent Presidential campaign. These elections will provide another stern test for the European perspective in the western Balkans. Though much was made of Tadic's re-election as a clear choice for a European future, early elections are likely to provide a clearer picture of Serbia's current national sentiment.

SERBIA'S NEXT MOVE
The Serbian government has collapsed in the face of widening divisions over the country's future ties with the EU. A parliamentary resolution tabled by the Serb Radical party (SRS), the largest party in the Serbian parliament, and publicly supported by Prime Minister Kostunica, calling on the EU to "clearly and unequivocally" confirm Serbia's territorial integrity before further accession negotiations begin has further split an already dysfunctional governing coalition. Though ministers rejected the motion by 15 votes to seven, Kostunica insisted that the government could no longer function because "there was no united will to clearly and loudly state that Serbia can continue its path toward the EU only with Kosovo" and because he "no longer had confidence in the sincerity of our coalition partners, the Democratic Party (DS) and G17 Plus, to battle to preserve Kosovo".

IAN BANCROFT

While Olli Rehn, the EU's commissioner for enlargement, continues to insist that, "a great majority of Serbian people consistently support EU membership" and that "it should be a realistic expectation that the Serbian government listens to this silent majority", a recent opinion poll shows that although 67% of Serbian citizens support EU integration, 74% would not trade further integration for recognition of In response, the Serbian president, Boris Tadic, has agreed to call an Kosovo's independence. It is therefore highly questionable as to whether early general election, scheduled to take place on May 11 alongside the "silent majority" of which Rehn speaks actually exists in light of the municipal elections, as the most "democratic way to overcome the political widespread recognition of Kosovo's independence by EU member states. crisis". Serbia's education minister, Zoran Loncar, recently called on Rehn to Tadic has consistently reiterated that Serbia can "best defend our Kosovo from independence precisely with membership in the European Union" and therefore confirmed that he would "sign the stabilization and association agreement (SAA) with the EU immediately if offered". clarify whether or not the EU observes Serbia's "internationally recognized borders", which would include Kosovo. Instead, the EU has merely acknowledged Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence and left individual member states to decide on recognition in line with their own national procedures. The EU's functional incapacity to recognise states, combined with the lack of a unified stance on Kosovo's status among member states, means that Rehn cannot possibly provide the clarification demanded.

For Kostunica, however, "all parties want Serbia to join the EU, but the question is how - with or without Kosovo". With respect to the SAA that Serbia initialled in November, Kostunica queries how EU member states that have recognized Kosovo's independence can possibly accept an agreement whose text reaffirms that " Serbia is a whole state with Kosovo On the basis of parliamentary election results from January 2007 and in its borders". political developments since then, the SRS will likely benefit most from The forthcoming election battle will be primarily framed around this key new elections. Tadic and the Democratic party face the formidable issue and articulations of Serbia's future direction. The DS, G17 Plus and challenge of convincing the Serbian electorate that their dual approach of the Liberal Democrats (LDP), the main advocates of EU membership, EU integration and opposition to Kosovo's independence is not beset by believe that the issues of Kosovo and further EU integration are unrelated, inherent contradictions, but instead constitutes the strongest path for Serbia to follow. In the prevailing political climate, however, such a and have therefore vehemently opposed the SRS's resolution. strategy and discourse will be severely tested. If the EU again chooses to In an attempt to articulate this dual course of deeper EU ties whilst implicitly support Tadic and Serbia's more pro-European voices, as it did upholding Serbia's territorial integrity, Tadic has speculated how, as an EU prior to February's presidential run-off, then it should tread extremely member, Serbia could possibly prevent other countries from becoming carefully. members, i.e. "we could prevent Kosovo from joining". Such remarks are consistent with the Democratic Party's stance that Serbia's territorial http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ian_bancroft/2008/03/ serbias_next_move.html

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A SYSTEM TO ENFORCE IMPERIAL POWER WILL ONLY BE RESISTED
It might have been expected that the catastrophe of Iraq and the bloody failure of Afghanistan would have at least dampened the enthusiasm among western politicians for invading other people's countries in the name of democracy and human rights. But the signs are instead of a determined drive to rehabilitate the idea of liberal interventionism so comprehensively discredited in the killing fields of Fallujah and Samarra . First there was the appointment of the committed interventionist Bernard Kouchner as French foreign minister. Then, late last year, the supposedly reluctant warrior Gordon Brown used the lord mayor's banquet to reassert the west's right to intervene across state borders. This month the foreign secretary David Miliband argued that "mistakes" in Iraq and Afghanistan should not weaken the moral impulse to intervene around the world in support of democracy, "economic freedoms" and humanitarianism, whether peacefully or by force. Meanwhile in the US , both contenders for the Democratic party nomination have signed up longstanding liberal interventionists as foreign policy advisers: the academic Samantha Power in the case of Barack Obama; and the 1990s administration veterans Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright in Hillary Clinton's. The interventionists, it seems, are back in business. And now Kosovo's declaration of independence has given them a banner to rally the disillusioned to a cause that gripped the imagination of many western liberals in the 90s. John Williams, the foreign office spin doctor who drafted the infamous Iraq war dossier in 2002, wrote last week that the Kosovo war had convinced him to follow Tony Blair over Iraq - and it would be a "tragedy" if Iraq made future Kosovos impossible. The Independent on Sunday went further, calling Kosovo's new status a "triumph of liberal interventionism". But it's hard to see much triumph in the grim saga of Kosovo. Nato's 1999 bombing campaign, unleashed without UN support and widely regarded as a violation of international law, was supposed to halt repression and ethnic cleansing, but triggered a massive increase in both; secured a Serbian withdrawal only through Russian pressure; and led to mass reverse ethnic cleansing of Serbs and Roma, including almost the entire Serb population of Pristina. After nine years of Nato occupation under a nominal UN administration, crime-ridden Kosovo is more ethnically divided than ever, boasts 50% unemployment and hosts a US military base described by the EU's human rights envoy as a "smaller version of Guantánamo". Its independence - declared in defiance of the UN security council and damned by Russia , China and EU states such as Spain as illegal - is a fraud and will remain so as an EU protectorate controlled by Nato troops. By encouraging a unilateral breakaway from Serbia , without negotiation and outside the UN framework, the US , Britain and France have given the green light to secessionist movements from Abkhazia to Kurdistan . The claim that Kosovo sets no precedent because it suffered under Serbian rule is absurd. Haven't the Kurds or Chechens suffered? The difference boils down to power and who is supporting whom, not justice. Of course the Kosovans have the right to self-determination, but they certainly won't get it as a Nato colony, nor at the expense of other nationalities in the Balkans, where the impact of Kosovo's declaration on Bosnia and Macedonia could be conflagrationary. The significance of the breakaway has meanwhile not been lost on the Muslim world, which has long been urged to see American support for Muslim Kosovo and Bosnia as proof of US good intentions, but has been notably slow to recognise the breakaway province. As Yasser az-Za'atra wrote in the Jordanian daily al-Dustour this week: "Besieging Russia is the main reason that led Bush to support Kosovo's independence. The rise of "doctrine of international community", a catechism for liberal interventionists much admired by the Washington neoconservatives who followed them. Arguably, only one of the five was met in Iraq . What's more, both the US and Britain not only committed military aggression on the basis of falsehoods, they have been responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of refugees in Iraq and Afghanistan : a humanitarian crisis that dwarfs anything that happened in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Between them, they have also been responsible for torture, kidnapping and mass detentions without trial. The latest allegations of beatings, killings and mutilations of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers at Camp Abu Naji near Amara in 2004 are only the most extreme of a series that include the unpunished beating to death of Baha Mousa in custody in Basra . But there is of course not the slightest prospect of any humanitarian intervention against the occupiers of Iraq for the obvious reason that they are the most powerful states in the world who act in the certain knowledge that they will never be subject to any such violent sanction for their own violations of humanitarian and international law. But it is exactly that widely understood reality that undermines the chances of a genuine multilateral basis for humanitarian intervention. As the ability of the US to dictate to the UN weakens, it's not surprising that pressure to revive unilateral liberal interventionism has grown. But any rules-based system of international relations has to apply to the powerful as well as the weak, allies as well as enemies, or it isn't a system of rules at all - it's a system of imperial power enforcement which will never be accepted. This article appeared in the Guardian on Thursday February 28 2008 on p33 of the Comment & debate section. It was last updated at 00:15 on February 28 2008. Russia and China provides a balance to the US and is undoubtedly in the Muslims' interest. It is not in the Muslims' interest to secede - not in Kosovo, nor in Chechnya , nor even in China ." Far from helping to rehabilitate liberal interventionism, the Kosovo experience highlights the fatal flaws at its heart. By supporting one side in a civil war, bypassing the UN and acting as judge and jury in their own case, the western powers exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, bequeathed a legacy of impoverished occupation and failed to resolve the underlying conflict. They also laid the ground for the lawless devastation of Iraq : the bitter fruit of the Kosovo war. At the height of the 1999 Nato bombing campaign, Blair set out five tests for intervention as part of his

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WHAT TO ABOUT THE KLA?
Tensions are high, violence is flaring and bombs have exploded in the aftermath of Kosovo's declaration of independence on Sunday. But as Kosovo leaders and NATO peacekeepers worry about the Serbs' volatile short-term response to their historic province being stripped away, they are ignoring an even bigger security threat at stake in the region: what to do about the country's 30,000 ex-KLA fighters, most of whom are jobless, poor, disillusioned- -and armed to the teeth. I have just returned from a reporting trip to Kosovo where I saw a "nation" not only unprepared to stand on its own two feet, but very far from such status. In environmental standards Kosovo is a disaster, choking on pollution levels 40 times above the European Union limit and an unrestrained housing boom (much of it carried out illegally on Serbian lands) that is gobbling up precious agricultural space. Corruption is through the roof. Schools are overcrowded and in shambles (in a population where 70 per cent are Greater Albania under 30). Journalists and independent watchdog groups operate at great personal risk. Funny that a recent Gallup poll showed Kosovo Albanians to be the second most optimistic people in the world-mainly, it would seem, because the only direction they have to go is up. No less than 60 per centof the country is unemployed, with special implications on the tens of thousands of dispirited guerilla fighters who still haven't found their way back into society, and who have access to some 400,000 illegal guns that are reportedly still floating around the 2 million population. If the situation with Serbs in northern Kosovo worsens, or if Prime Minister Hashim Thaci's government fails to enact policies that quickly improve living conditions at home, this could spell trouble. As Krenar Gashi, editor of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, told me:"There is a fear that at some point they'll grab their weapons. The last thing these guys knew how to do was fight." It was a week before the Albanians in the province decared independence when I stepped into a third floor office overlooking the gray buildings and washed-out streets of downtown Pristina and shook hands with Faton Klinaku, secretary general of the Organization of KLA War Veterans. Like every interview it seemed in Kosovo, our conversation began with the customary offering of cigarettes and macchiato; and as the bare-walled room filled with smoke, Klinaku, who was dressed in a gray turtleneck and gray suit, sitting forward a bit anxiously on the sofa seat opposite me, laid out a scenario forecasting ominous times ahead. Around 40 years old, with sleepy brown eyes and a long drawn face awash in gray-black stubble, Klinaku fought in the 1998-9 Kosovo Liberation Army insurgency against the Serb military-the last Balkan bloodbath of the 1990s. Some 2,300 of Klinaku's comrades died in the fighting. Among those who survived, some ascended to power-like Thaci, and the supremely corrupt former PM Ramush Haradinaj, who's now facing war crimes charges in the Hague. Some, on the other hand, committed suicide. About 2,500 got retrained and redeployed in the protomilitary Kosovo Protection Corps. For the vast majority, however, the road to recovery and restitution has been a slogging mess, as the numbers reeled off by Klinaku indicate: 230

euros paid to the families of "martyrs" (families with more than one martyr receive 40 per cent more per martyr); one-time payments of 40 euros to injured veterans; and free hospital services with no other benefits to speak of, for the rest. That, at least, is what the veterans' compensation law promises, though only 70 per cent of the funds have been paid out to date-leaving more than 15,000 ex-fighters in Kosovo without work, without money and in many cases without homes. What they do have, said Klinaku, is a sense of betrayal and anger that what they fought and died for won neither the absolute sovereignty they craved nor the Greater Albania that they ultimately seek, but rather an Ahtisaari compromise called supervised independence- which, to hell with what the Serbs say, doesn't go far enough. "We fought for freedom and independence of Kosovo. But now a new EU mission is on its way in to replace the UN one. You can give it the name independence, but independence it is not," he said. "Independence is when you have an army, when you have a seat at the UN, when you have guarantees of your security." At the end of the day it is "an Albania for all Albanians"- that eventual fusion of Kosovo with Albania and parts of Montenegro and Macedonia-that the KLA hardliners seek. And judging by Klinaku's cool, almost sinister tone, the willingness of Kosovo's retired rebels to return to battle isn't such a far-off fantasy. "We're not afraid of Serbia. If we have to fight them again, we're ready," he said and smiled knowingly. "Weapons aren't hard to find. Albania is close by." In the new world order that is a U.S.- and a partially EU-recognized independent Kosovo, the current disruptions coming out of Belgrade which withdrew ambassadors from the U.S. and elsewhere - and from the raucous Kosovo Serbs in the street, who have already exploded bombs and destroyed UN border installations, is nothing to sneer at. Indeed, things could get a lot worse on the Serb side in the coming days. Not to mention Russia, which hasn't even taken its gloves off. But looking ahead-if such a thing is even possible in this part of the world, at this chaotic time-the deeper challenge facing Thaci and his nascent government will be to not get too bogged down in the coming months (as many expect he will) resolving a range of delicate, internationally supervised post-status issues, that he forgets about the poverty and desperation brewing in his own backyard. Yes, he needs to work on building stable institutions, decentralizing power throughout Kosovo's 30 municipalities, complying with U.S./EU demands for inter-ethnic safety measures and reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs, and the like. But let the ex-KLA leadership that is now steering an "independent" though still an overwhelmingly dependent - Kosovo not forget where it came from, and the threats from inside that it faces. This is a nation of clan law where mobsters and men with guns rule the roost. If those men with guns, and the experience of using them, don't get delivered out of their economic misery soon, they could become the powder keg which, with enough Serb pushing, destabilizes and devolves this region into violence once again. There's a lot of work ahead - not only in lifting war veterans out of unemployment and poverty, but in providing enough opportunities to prevent the next generation of street-side warriors from developing. "Young people here today need opportunities and they're lacking them. They're sitting all day in the cafes doing nothing," said the journalist Gashi. He told me about a running joke in Kosovo these days: "Contribute something to the country-emigrate. " Not all that funny, he said, when you think of the reality of this place. "If we fail to educate our young people properly-to engage them, to integrate them-they'll be the biggest problem. If they remain uneducated they'll remain jobless. And that's quite dangerous." http://www.counterp unch.org/ levitin02212008. html COUNTERPUNCH (USA) Feb 21, 2008 Michael Levitin is a freelance journalist living in Berlin. He has written for Newsweek, The Financial Times, Los Angeles Times and other publications and can be reached at malevitin@yahoo. com

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WILL AMERICAN EMPIRE END BEFORE IT ENDS THE WORLD?
The hypocrisy of US government officials is boundless. On February 18, the US government inflamed Serbians by recognizing Muslim separatists in Kosovo, a historic province of Serbia, as an independent country. Two hundred thousand Serbs marched in protest and the US embassy in Belgrade was damaged. Is this surprising? No, not unless you are an official in the American Empire. The notorious Empire Neocon Counsel, Azlmay Khalilzad, Bush's representative to the UN, declared: "I'm outraged by the mob attack." What's an embassy building compared to a province of Serbia, a province that stirs nationalist sentiments associated with the Serbs' long military struggles with the Turks? Had it not been for the Serbs, Europeans would probably be Turks. To neocon Khalilzad a province of Serbia is nothing. It is merely real estate to be given away by US recognition bestowed on a break-away movement led by what some consider to be a gang of Muslim drug runners. Secretary of State Condi Rice also found the Serbian response to the US giving away part of their country to be "intolerable. " Former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke also sees no reason for the Serbs to be upset that America gave away part of their country. He explained away the Serbian protests by declaring: "The Russians are behind this." We can understand why US diplomacy is a failure when we see our diplomats explaining that, had it not been for the Russians stirring them up, Serbians wouldn't have noticed the loss of a historic part of their country. Perhaps Kosovo should have its independence. However, the US government could not have handled the issue in a more provocative way. Washington has been interfering in Serbian internal affairs since the Clinton administration. Told that Americans had to prevent genocide, few paid enough attention to Washington's facilitation of the breakup of the Yugoslav state during the 1990s and to the Clinton administration' s bombing and murder of Serbian civilians in order to support Muslim separatists in Kosovo in 1999. Clinton used NATO as cover, but the bombing campaign was not backed by the UN Security Council. Bombs fell on Serbia for 78 days, taking out public infrastructure, bridges, factories, power stations, petrochemical plants, telecommunications facilities, markets, refugees, the Chinese Embassy and a passenger train. "Sorry honey, tell the kids I won't be home tonight. President Clinton decided to bomb my train." Cluster bombs and depleted uranium were used. Clearly, the US government and its NATO puppets were guilty of war crimes under the Nuremberg standard. Americans were told by an obedient media that the bombings were necessary in order to prevent Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic, from committing war crimes against the separatists who were stealing part of his country. After Clinton's bombings intimidated the Serbian political establishment, Milosevic was turned out of office and handed over to the Americans for a payment of several hundred million dollars and delivered to the Hague for trial as a war criminal. Milosevic represented himself at his trial and was more than a match for the trumped up charges. Unfortunately, he died in prison. Many believe he was helped on his way by an embarrassed American Empire unable to convict him. What is the US government's secret agenda in the Balkans? Why is the US government on the side of Muslims intent on severing Kosovo from Serbia? What is being served by creating a new Muslim state closer to Europe? Whose interests are being served by Washington? Clearly, not our own. Or Europe's. And, please, none of that BS about "building freedom and democracy." As one of England's most famous conservatives, Peregrine Worsthorne, wrote on February 20, America's reputation as "the West's conscience is fatally weakened." Supposedly our time is the era of globalism and one worldism. Ancient European nationalities are dissolving into the European Union, a new super state. US corporations now have transnational interests devoid of any national loyalties. Yet, the US is hard at work dissolving a small Balkan state into even smaller constituent parts. Why is this happening? Why did Bush order US puppets in Britain, France and Germany to instantly recognize the historic Serbian province as a new Muslim state? Is the new state of Kosovo, as rumors would have it, Richard Perle's payoff to the Turks, or is the explanation that Serbia, like Palestine, Iraq, and Iran, lacking any international media reach, was easy for Empire Neocons to demonize in order to establish the precedent that Washington decides what territory belongs to who and who rules it. Clinton's bombing of Serbia was a precedent for Bush's bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq and now Africa and tomorrow Iran and Syria. The day the Empire Crazies bomb Russia or China, we are all fried. Be a macho super patriot, believe your government, help to fry the world. It's the American way. Paul Craig Roberts [ email him ] was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury during President Reagan's first term. He was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal . He has held numerous academic appointments, including the William E. Simon Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He was awarded the Legion of Honor by French President Francois Mitterrand. He is the author of Supply-Side Revolution : An Insider's Account of Policymaking in Washington ; Alienation and the Soviet Economy and Meltdown: Inside the Soviet Economy , and is the co-author with Lawrence M. Stratton of The Tyranny of Good Intentions : How Prosecutors and Bureaucrats Are Trampling the Constitution in the Name of Justice .

February 24, 2008

HILLARY'S BALKAN “EXPERIENCE” “EXPERIENCE”
Hillary Clinton's claim to be the most qualified Democrat to run for president is largely based on her self-proclaimed foreign-policy “experience.” Much of this experience would logically come from her days in the White House when events in the Balkans were the focus of so much U.S. attention. As her husband said in January 1993, Bosnia was “the most frustrating and complex foreign policy issue in the world” that he had to deal with at the time. Senator Clinton herself has claimed that she was sent to Bosnia when it was “too dangerous” for the president to travel there himself, although she omitted the fact that the singer Sheryl Crow and the comedian Sinbad were part of the same dangerous “mission.” Clinton has also claimed credit for negotiating a deal with the Macedonian government to allow Albanian refugees to enter the country after the Kosovo war broke out, although diplomats and government officials involved in the process, such as Robert Gelbard and Ivo Daalder, don't quite remember it that way. Another somewhat dubious aspect of Senator Clinton's record in the Balkans has been her claim that she urged her husband to launch the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999; however, there is no record of her taking responsibility for such things as the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, or the numerous attacks on targets throughout Serbia that Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have both characterized as illegitimate attacks on civilian targets, if not outright war crimes. All of this brings to mind the problems with U.S. Balkan policy in the

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
1990s, the counterproductive and dysfunctional nature of the Clinton Administration's policies in the region and, ultimately, their numerous tragic consequences. The Clinton Administration came into office in January 1993, when an agreement to end the Bosnian war (then less than a year old) was on the table. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) was negotiated by former

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U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (by anyone's measure one of this country's most experienced diplomats and most honorable public servants) and his British colleague, Lord David Owen. Upon taking office, however, many members of the Clinton Administration immediately began criticizing the VOPP for allegedly “rewarding aggression” and for not providing suitable guarantees for Bosnia 's survival. The reality was quite different; in fact, the Clinton Administration's own agreement ending the Bosnian war some two and a half years later, the Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995, left Bosnia far weaker than it would have been under the VOPP. In the interim, tens of thousands of people had been killed, including the thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys executed by Serb forces in the Srebrenica massacres of July 1995. Hundreds of thousand of others were driven from their homes. As Owen notes, It is rare for history to show within a few years the folly of government's decisions, but by August 1995 it was painfully apparent how damaging the US decision to ditch the VOPP in May 1993 had been. The Bosnian Muslims had now been ethnically cleansed from Zepa and Srebrenica and the Croatian Serbs from the Krajina. There was no longer any talk, or hope, of reversing ethnic cleansing. Former NATO deputy commander Charles G. Boyd took a similar view, noting that the contradictory nature of U.S. policy in the Balkans actually prolonged the war in Bosnia rather than ending it. Current Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt, one of Europe's most experienced Balkan hands, likewise argued that confusion in Washington significantly hurt the search for peace in Bosnia . Unfortunately, by the time the United States changed course and agreed to compromises in Bosnia already accepted by the Europeans and Russia , Srebrenica had already happened. Such a dysfunctional and counterproductive Balkan policy was again in

evidence in the mismanagement of the Kosovo war in 1999. The Clinton Administration went into the war thinking it would be over in a matter of days. On the first day of the bombing campaign (March 24) Madeleine Albright said "I don't see this as a long-term operation." Just eleven days later, however, Albright would say "We never expected this to be over quickly." Moreover, far from preventing the mass expulsion of tens of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo, the NATO bombing campaign in many ways provoked it; as Balkan historian Misha Glenny has noted, "Instead of preventing a h u m a n i t a r i a n catastrophe, NATO's decision [to bomb Serbia] contributed to a flood of biblical proportions." And as the war dragged on, the Clinton team appeared increasingly disengaged from reality; Clinton 's appointment as NATO Supreme Commander, Wesley Clark, ordered his British subordinate General Sir Michael Jackson to confront the Russians at Pristina airport. Jackson calmly refused a direct order from his immediate superior in the chain of command, telling Clark “I'm not going to start WWIII.” ( Clark was essentially fired from his job some three months later.) And, of course, the Clinton Administration did nothing to prevent the reverse forced expulsions of tens of thousands of Serbs, Roma and other ethnic minorities from Kosovo after NATO and the Kosovo Liberation Army moved in. In both the U.S. involvement in the Balkans and the subsequent tragedy in Iraq , the basic process by which so much of American foreign policy is formulated is evident: interest groups and ethnic lobbies, often led by Ahmad Chalabi–type charlatans, forge alliances with ideologues in government, be they neocons or liberal interventionists. These are then joined by journalists eager for sensational headlines and “sympathetic” (but by no means objective, balanced, well-informed or independent) academics who lend their “scholarly” support to their own preferred policy. And just as often, individuals who know the true costs of war and who have put their lives on the line for their country, such as Colin Powell, Eric Shinseki or William Fallon, get marginalized or forced out of office for questioning whether such political and military adventurism is worth American blood and treasure. If Hillary Clinton claims U.S. Balkan policy in the 1990s as a positive line on her CV, it does not bode well for U.S. foreign policy in a potential second Clinton administration. Both the Balkans and Iraq show that many aspects of the way in which U.S. foreign policy is formulated are clearly broken. Whether a President Obama or a President McCain would have the courage, intelligence and strength to fix them remains to be seen. But it is hard to imagine that a second President Clinton would. Gordon N. Bardos is assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University 's School of International and Public Affairs. 13.03.2008 The National Interest

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RECOGNIZING KOSOVO LEAST BAD OPTION FOR UNITED STATES LEAST
• CFR Senior Fellow Charles A. Kupchan says he is disappointed by the lack of UN backing for Kosovo's independence, and its “shaky” legal standing. Since Kosovo declared independence in February, thirty-three countries have recognized the country or stated their intention to do so, with another twenty or so trying to decide. Kupchan says that pragmatically, recognizing Kosovo was the best solution for the United States. “It was the best of a whole set of very bad options,” he says. • It's been about three weeks since Kosovo announced its independence from Serbia, a move that led to fairly quick recognition by the United States and several major European countries. As of this date, about how many countries have now recognized Kosovo? • If you include countries that have stated their intent to do so, and are working the recognition through a legal or parliamentary procedure, you get roughly thirty-two, thirty-three countries thus far. And then there are another twenty or so that have said that they are in the midst of deliberations, and they are making up their minds about whether to recognize the state. And then another twenty that have actually come out and said: “We oppose the separation of Kosovo from Serbia; we will not recognize the new state.” There are many, many countries that simply have said nothing. • And of the major powers, Russia we know has said, “Never.” Has China said anything? • China has come out on the record as opposed. • In general, the countries that have opposed Kosovo's independence are either those that side with Russia diplomatically; they would generally be countries of the former Soviet Union. Also in this group are those that have some kind of ethnic secessionist movement inside them, such as Sri Lanka, Cyprus, China, Spain. These are countries that are worried about the integrity of their own territory. • What about Georgia? • Georgia, to the best of my knowledge has actually sided with Russia on this issue. Not because of its great love for Moscow —on the contrary. Relations between the two states are very tense. It is because the Georgians are worried about the possible impact of Kosovo's secession on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They worry that the Abkhaz and the South Osessetians will say, “Well if Kosovo can leave Serbia, then we can leave Georgia.” • Of course we've had a new president elected in Moscow, and he takes office in May, but President Putin has given him some of the authority already. Can we expect anything different out of Moscow, you think, under President Dmitri Medvedev? • The one data point that we have thus far is that Medvedev has already visited Belgrade. • And when he was there, he supported Belgrade's rejection of Kosovo's independence and presided over the planning to build a pipeline that would run through Serbia. So in that sense, his first act as president-to-be was to do something that was quite provocative in terms of relations with the West. • In terms of where Medvedev will take Russian foreign policy, there are two alternative ways to see things. On the one hand, he is someone who doesn't bring to the office a background as a KGB officer in the security services. He has a business background and a law background, and he has spoken over the last several months about his desire to strengthen rule of law, and to try to bring back a level of liberalism to Russian politics that disappeared under Putin. And so his natural instincts may be toward a domestic policy and a foreign policy that loses the sharp edges of Putin's rule. • On the other hand, it's clear that there will be some jockeying for position once the new government takes office. Putin and Medvedev have to figure out their relationship. There will be factional infighting in the Kremlin as Putin insiders are threatened by those people that Medvedev brings in. And in general, when democratizing states go through periods of political instability, nationalism and hard-line policies tend to win out because they're the ones who are taking advantage of chaos and the political uncertainly to rally support. That would argue that even if Medvedev's instincts might be more liberal, he will have a hard time bringing them to bear on Russian foreign policy given the political landscape inside Russia . • Serbia's an interesting case of a country torn by what it wants to do: whether it wants to be part of the European Union or wants to remain Serbian nationalist to the end. How do you think this could resolve itself? • The separation of Kosovo from Serbia has been a body blow to Serbs both inside Serbia and in the diaspora. And so there really isn't much of a divide on that question. But the fundamental issue going forward is how should Serbia react to what it sees as a grievous injustice and an illegal act. The Serb prime minister, Vojislav Towards the Independence: Kostunica, is basically Fatmir Sejdiu and Hashim Thaci arguing that European and American support for Kosovo's independence should be seen as a reason for Serbia to break off its westward orientation. The president, Boris Tadic, who was reelected just before Kosovo's declaration of independence, is equally opposed to the secession of Kosovo, but argues that Serbia should continue its westward orientation nonetheless. • Right now, those two views are competing for predominance within the elite in Belgrade and the Serb electorate. It's too soon to tell who will win out. It's safe to say, however, that if Serbia does break off its negotiations with the European Union about eventual entry, it is principally Serbia and its population that will suffer. And ultimately, because of that reality, it's a question of when, rather than if, when it comes to Serbia 's attachment and integration into Europe . • Now, alongside this question of European membership is the effort of Serbs in northern Kosovo to secede and make it part of Serbia — as it was when all of Kosovo was part of Serbia . Where do you think that issue is going to go? • The issue of northern Kosovo has been in play quietly for several years. There were reports dating back several years ago that discussions about Kosovo's potential separation from Serbia included or could potentially include a deal whereby the north would stay with Serbia and Kosovo would be partitioned. That prospect was rejected by the international community and by Pristina. As a result, Kosovo's secession occurred and the territory includes northern Kosovo, which represents about 15 percent of the territory. That part of the country is predominantly Serb and even during the period of UN trusteeship between 1999 and 2008, it remained attached to Serbia in a de facto sense, spiritually and politically. It's going to be quite difficult to bring northern Kosovo into the new state because, at least for now, the people that live there want no part of that new state and continue to direct their loyalties to Belgrade. The question now is what happens on the ground. Can NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the EU, and the UN succeed in creating sufficient inducement and putting enough pressure on the north to ensure that over time, it gradually integrates with the rest of Kosovo? • On the other hand, I suppose the Kosovo government could just

THE HERALD OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
decide to say “Go to Serbia.” • There are several different problems that would emerge should that happen—should the north secede. The Serbs that remain in the rest of Kosovo would find themselves increasingly isolated because the Serb population inside Kosovo would drop by a third. And it might then become more difficult to encourage those Serbs who live in the south, who live in small enclaves, to stay put. • There are significant Albanian populations in Serbia that do not live in Kosovo. Just to the east of Kosovo's border with Serbia is an area called the Presevo Valley, which is heavily populated by Albanians. And there is concern that if northern Kosovo were to secede and reattach itself to Serbia, there would be a drive to attach the Presevo Valley to the new Kosovo. And then that could open a Pandora's box in which small ethnic enclaves throughout the Balkans then stand up and say, “Well, what about us?” • So it's really a very messy situation right now. • It's a very messy and very dangerous situation. I have to say that I'm somewhat surprised that the situation on the ground has remained as quiet as it has in the past few days. • There have been reports of the railroad workers and the police in northern Kosovo saying they no longer worked for the Kosovo government but for Serbia . This is a de facto secession, right? • I would say that spiritually and politically, the north does not recognize that it is now part of a new state. That's one of the reasons that there have been attacks on the border between northern Kosovo and Serbia, because Serbs living to the north and to the south of that border don't

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recognize it as a border. • There's no easily negotiable solution, is there? • No, there's no easily negotiable solution. For the last year, year and a half, the international community brokered negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, and it became quite apparent that there was no common ground whatsoever. And that's why we came on February 17 to a unilateral declaration of independence despite Belgrade 's opposition. And therefore, it's quite hard to imagine that some kind of consensual agreement is going to emerge after Belgrade has been dealt this blow. It's possible that, were the north to secede from the rest of Kosovo, Belgrade would take some satisfaction in that development. But that development is more likely to occur come what may than because there is a negotiated move in that direction. • But overall, you think this was a good move by the international community to go ahead with the independence of Kosovo? • It was the best of a whole set of very bad options. And I'm troubled by the fact that there was no UN support and that, as a result, this separation occurs in a legally shaky way. But I do think that, from the perspective of pragmatism—that is to say, what scenario is most likely to bring lasting peace to the Balkans?—it makes more sense to separate Kosovo from Serbia, and to try to bring a close to the continuing dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, than to leave Kosovo inside Serbia and wait for what would probably be yet another round of ethnic conflict. http://www.cfr.org/publication/15688/pragmatism_on_kosovo.html? breadcrumb=/ Charles A. Kupchan March 10, 2008

OUTSIDE VIEW: BUSH'S FAILED KOSOVO POLICY POLICY
PITTSBURGH, March 20 (UPI) -- Fighting in northern Kosovo this week between Serbs and NATO-led troops shows that the independence engineered by the Bush administration for the breakaway Balkan province is not going according to plan. When U.S. officials encouraged the unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia by Kosovo's Albanians Feb. 17, we were told that an EU mission would replace the United Nations in Kosovo, and everyone would then build a multiethnic, democratic society with respect for rights of the Serbs, a minority in the province as a whole. That is not happening. The Serbs of northern Kosovo, where they are a majority, believe that they have little future in an Albanian state. They have resisted its imposition on them, mainly through peaceful means, except for destroying the control posts on the border that they do not recognize despite U.S. insistence that they must. The protests turned violent when U.N. police with NATO backing forcibly broke up the peaceful occupation of a government building Monday -- and the ensuing fighting left hundreds of Serb civilians, U.N. police and NATOled troops injured, some critically, and one U.N. policeman dead. The EU mission cannot enter northern Kosovo and the United Nations was forced to pull out, leaving NATO troops to guard a border that has no status under international law and that is rejected by the people living on both sides of it. The problem is not that "Serb nationalists" are resisting "the West," as it is put by those U.S. journalists who honor the First Amendment by parroting the State Department, but rather that the Bush administration has attempted to force a military solution to a political problem, in violation of the U.N. charter and the most basic principles of international law. This is not the first time they have done so, of course, and if the scale of violence in Kosovo is less than that in Iraq, the possibility of destabilizing another region -- this time the Balkans -- is just as grave. Kosovo really was the birthplace of the Serbian nation 800 years ago, and was included in Serbia after the Ottoman Empire was forced out in 1912. But Albanians also always lived there. Demographic changes in the 20th century (some caused by ethnic cleansing of Serbs from the region during Italian occupation in World War II) led to a heavy ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo by the 1980s, and Serbia's continued control over the province required a police state. ut the Serbian hand in Kosovo was no heavier than Britain's rule of Ireland in the decades before Irish independence in 1923, or Israel's occupation of the West Bank until the Oslo accords, or Turkey's continuing control over the Kurdish-majority regions in eastern Turkey. And these situations usually end when the governing state realizes that maintaining control is too costly, in financial, political and even moral terms, and seeks a deal to permit withdrawal. Such a deal could have been reached with Serbia, but neither the Clinton administration nor that of George W. Bush wanted one. Both saw Kosovo as an opportunity for isolating Russia from the Balkans for the first time in more than a century, since Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic, never one of the world's great strategic thinkers, had chosen to ally Serbia with, first, the Soviet Union and then with Russia. Further, with the apparent end of the Cold War, NATO needed a job, since the alliance had been formed to keep the Soviet Union from invading West Germany. Attacking Serbia to "liberate" Kosovo was meant to transform NATO from a purely defensive alliance into a more proactive or offensive one, contrary to NATO's own charter, but responding to a certain realpolitik. The most basic principle of international law since World War II, however, and the most fundamental principle of the U.N. system, is that aggressive wars are banned -- that was the justification the first George Bush gave for attacking Iraq after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the whole world except for North Korea agreed with him. But attacking a sovereign state in order to occupy part of its territory and ultimately change its borders is another story. Unfortunately for international law and international stability, NATO's action against Serbia in 1999 was just such a war of aggression, waged without U.N. Security Council approval. And it did not go as planned. As the State Department itself admitted in May 1999, once NATO attacked Serbia, Milosevic's forces turned what had been "selective targeting of towns and regions" suspected of armed Albanian resistance into a campaign

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to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of Albanians. This is worth repeating -- the 1999 NATO war against Serbia was not in response to ethnic cleansing but rather provoked it, which then made it necessary to carry the war on for three months in order to reverse the consequences of the NATO attacks themselves. The 1999 war only ended when the Clinton administration went back to the U.N. Security Council that it had ignored in starting it. The resulting U.N. resolution recognized Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Since Russia does not feel obligated to assist the United States in isolating it from the Balkans, that resolution cannot be changed. And rather than try to negotiate a solution, the Bush administration chose to try to impose one, in part to show the weakness of Russia. But Kosovo is not recognized by most countries, or by the United

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peace in Kosovo and stability in the Balkans. Kosovo can be settled if the Bush administration returns to the United Natios and engages in honest negotiation with the Serbs and the Russians. More fundamentally, stability in the international system can only be restored when the United States once again honors the fundamental principles of international law that it violated by attacking Iraq in 2003, and in recognizing Kosovo in 2008. (Robert M. Hayden is professor of anthropology, law and public & international affairs and director of the Center for Russian & East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh.) http://www.upi. com/Internationa l_Security/ Emerging_ Threats/ Analysis /2008/03/ 20/outside_ view_bushs_ failed_kosovo_ policy/6106/ print_view/

MOVING NATO FORWARD
NATO's Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is a man with a problem. Actually, several overlapping ones. The NATO mission in Afghanistan, which was supposed to demonstrate the alliance's ability to transcend its cold-war limitations and to highlight NATO's capabilities to both effectively fight a ground war and engage in post-conflict reconstruction, is faltering. Instead of bringing the alliance together in service of a common cause, Afghanistan is exposing that the vaunted “transformation” NATO has supposedly been engaged in has largely been for show. Pakistan 's election results have brought to power national and regional governments that may be less inclined to cooperate with NATO's Afghan operations—and could require the alliance to find a new way to direct troops and supplies. The only other feasible route runs via the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A number of European countries want to decrease tensions with Russia—and the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State are currently in Moscow engaged in a series of negotiations on issues such as a missile defense shield for Europe that could US President George Bush and NATO produce positive breakthroughs—but Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Russia has also made meet during the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, 2 Apr 2008 it quite clear that its cooperation with the West is tied to slowing down or halting altogether NATO's eastward expansion. The governments of Georgia and Ukraine , however, want to be given their membership action plans (MAPs) at this summit, so they can begin the process that, in four years or so, would culminate in joining the alliance. The March 6 th ministerial meeting in Brussels adjourned with no clear signals. No country outright opposes the IDEA of Ukraine or Georgia joining the alliance at some point, but no decision was taken on whether to offer the MAP to either country. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner even declared that the alliance should “take into account Russia 's sensitivity and the important role it plays” in reaching its decision. Several days later, German chancellor Angela Merkel gave her opinions about the criteria the alliance should use in assessing future members, namely that "A country should become a NATO member not only when its temporary political leadership is in favour but when a significant percentage of the population supports membership" and "Countries that are themselves entangled in regional conflicts, can in my opinion not become members." The first criterion would rule out Ukraine , where a majority of the population opposes or is ambivalent about NATO membership. The second seems to encompass both Georgia (with its ongoing separatist problems) and Macedonia (with its continuing dispute over its name with Greece )—and any delay in extending membership to Macedonia might cause the alliance to decide to postpone any plans for including the states of the Western Balkans. Beyond this, the concerns of France , Germany and some other European states such as Spain and Belgium , is that there should be growing symmetry between membership in NATO and likely prospects for joining the European Union. Nothing can be done at this point about Turkey, a long-standing NATO member and a candidate for EU membership—but Paris, Berlin and other capitals are uneasy about expanding NATO further to the east and creating precedents for new NATO members making the case that inclusion in the alliance implies the right to be considered for the EU. To finalize the stew, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili visits the United States—where politicians from both parties will overwhelmingly endorse his bid to join NATO—and President George W. Bush will travel to Ukraine ahead of the Bucharest summit, and is expected when in Kyiv to endorse Ukraine's bid to receive a MAP. So the task before the Secretary-General is to come up with a “solution” that keeps open the prospects of increased cooperation with Russia , avoids any semblance of a major split within the ranks of the alliance, yet is not an outright refusal for the aspirant states. I think he will be up to the task. After all, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe came up with a unique formulation to describe the recent Russian presidential elections as both being “not free and not fair” but also “representative of the popular will.” De Hoop Scheffer has already suggested that Tbilisi and Kyiv “will see results of Bucharest as an inspiration for them to proceed on their Euro-Atlantic track. In what form that will exactly be, it is honestly quite early to tell.” Whether this attempt mollifies all sides also remains to be seen. Nikolas Gvosdev is editor of The National Interest. 03.18.2008

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