Unquestionable Corruption submitted to Court of Appeals of the First Circuit Case 11-2292 Docketing Statement

Case: 11-2292

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Date Filed: 11/08/2011

Entry ID: 5594091

Case: 11-2292

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Please note that the docket text to Dkt. # 102 dated 10/12/2011 states US District Court Clerk to deliver official record to Court of Appeals by 11/1/2011. An abbreviated electronic record was delivered on 11/2/2011. A call was place to Jeanette Ramos at 5:07 PM on November 2, 2011 requesting that the entire electronic record be delivered to the Court of Appeals as per Local Rule 11.0 Transmission of the Record ( b) In pro se cases, the entire record will be transmitted to the circuit clerk; the request to Ms. Ramos was made again at 9:30 AM on 11/04/2011 along with a request that the entire docket activity report be transmitted to the Court of Appeals as the docket text report transmitted on 11/02/2011 is inadequate for use in fully presenting this Plaintiff’s position. B. Finality of Order or Judgment 2. a & b continued CONTINUATION OF EXPLAINATION: This action in the US District Court of Massachusetts is not under the provisions of 28 U. S. C. 636 (c). Magistrate Judge Sorokin is not the trial judge and Magistrate Judge Sorokin was not the ordering judge as incorrectly noted on the docket in this court for Case No. 11-1668 In re: McGarry. The law is clear regarding consent to the Magistrate‘s jurisdiction. Without a signed consent to jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge, the Magistrate Judge has no authority to write orders regarding contempt under 636(e) and the Magistrate Judge has no authority to write orders on referred matters under 636 (b). Dkt. #61 had ―ORDERS‖ undersigned by the Magistrate Judge that ―DENIED‖ and also excused the Defendants from responding to Plaintiff‘s Contempt Motion (Dkt. #58). Plaintiff‘s Motion for Contempt (Dkt. #58) filed by this Plaintiff on January 30, 2011was written regarding contemptuous behavior by the pro se staff attorney and defense counsel who were noted to be in more than obvious collusion while the case was assigned to the US District Judge; the order of reference to the Magistrate Judge was not entered on the Docket until January 31, 2011. Even if there had been a valid US District Judge order referring the case to the Magistrate for pre trial proceedings and a valid order from the US District Judge referring the contempt motion (Dkt. #58) to the Magistrate in compliance with Magistrate Rules for The District of Massachusetts Rule 8, the Magistrate Judge had no authority beyond a report and recommendation to the US District Judge. A magistrate judge may exercise both civil and criminal contempt authority in certain circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e). These include summary criminal contempt authority for ―misbehavior in the magistrate judge‘s presence so as to obstruct the administration of justice,‖ and criminal and civil contempt authority in misdemeanor cases and civil consent cases. See 28

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U.S.C. § 636(e)(2), (3), (4). In other circumstances, the Federal Magistrate‘s Act provides for a procedure whereby the magistrate judge certifies facts pertaining to contempt to a district judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6); see also Hunter TBA, Inc. v. Triple V Sales, 250 F.R.D. 116, 117-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

The Magistrate Judge denied this Plaintiff her right to bring her contempt motion and the void orders of Dkt. #61 to the attention of a US District Judge; there was no final decision or orders by the US District Judge regarding Plaintiff‘s Contempt Motion (Dkt.. #58) and the Magistrate Judge denying this Plaintiff‘s requested review of his orders in a case where he had no consent to jurisdiction or valid order to act on any matter by a US District Judge is a clear and unquestionable usurpation. The orders of Dkt. #61 are void; there is no legal order that restricted this Plaintiff from filing with the US District Court. All subsequent orders to the aforementioned, more than obvious, void order are also void. The Magistrate Judge by denying this Plaintiff‘s motions and refusing to recuse himself while actively blocking this Plaintiff from Article III oversight was essentially holding this Plaintiff‘s action hostage on his docket as fictitious memorandum that without warrant continually intimidated and threatened this Plaintiff with sanctions and complaint dismissal and bizarre and unjust orders that denied any form of due process. The unauthorized defense counsel were allowed to continue with their fictitious memorandum as they worked toward their goal of complaint dismissal. The Magistrate had no authority to write a Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #80) under the provision of 28 U. S. C. 236 (e) because holding a case hostage while violating legislative authority and constitutional rights when there was no legitimate reference of the case to the Magistrate Judge from a US District Judge to begin with leaves him without jurisdiction over the matter and this Plaintiff. The Magistrate Judge usurped this action from the time he was made aware that Dkt. #61existed knowing full well he never approved of the filing as he sat on the bench and made a blatant false statement by stating he did during a scheduling conference that he had no authority to convene. Let this Plaintiff not leave absent the fact that the unauthorized attorneys filing of the Contempt Motion (Dkt. #71) by local rule and Massachusetts law cannot and should not be a filing recognized by the court; so in actuality there was no motion that required a report and recommendation to the US District Judge. Further, the US District Judge had no idea the contempt motion (Dkt. #71) existed which is demonstrated by the fact that nowhere on the docket was the Contempt Motion (Dkt. #71) referenced to the Magistrate by order of the US District Judge as per Magistrate Rules for The District of Massachusetts –[Rule 8 states that the manner of referral to the magistrate judge of specific matters in a case shall be in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(b); [8(b) Manner of Referral(4) All other civil matters may be referred to the magistrate judges only by order of a district judge. The order must specify the matters to be considered and the action to be taken by the magistrate judge.] This Plaintiff requested case management by an Article III Judge in Dkt. #48, # 51, #58, #64 attachment 1and Dkt. #78. In Plaintiff‘s Motion IMMEDIATE REASSIGNMENT TO A

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DIFFERENT US District Judge and Magistrate Judge (Dkt. # 69) this Plaintiff requested reassignment to an Honorable Judge and protection from further conspiracy; Magistrate Judge Sorokin denied the motion with docket text and terminated the motion from the docket. The motion was never seen by the US District Judge. See the docket at Dates 3/2/2011 and 3/3/2011 where motions for judicial reassignment and vacate void orders are denied by the Magistrate Judge with electronic orders and then the motions immediately terminated from the docket (Deadline/ hearing docket Dkt. #33 attachments 7 & 8); the Magistrate again had no authority beyond a report and recommendation to the US District Judge regarding the vacate void orders motion and this, again, is unquestionable usurpation. Not only did the Magistrate refuse to disqualify himself after clear and unarguable violation of this in forma pauperis disabled Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights to due process and Article III oversight he blocked the filings from the US District Judge. The bizarre orders of Dkt. #57 are also transparently invalid because no honest US District Judge would prohibit a pro se Plaintiff from making reference to docketing information which is a clear violation of the US Constitution‘s First Amendment right; further, no honest US District Judge would have the same person from whom a pro se Plaintiff was seeking relief thru an injunctive motion draft the memorandum and orders to the said motion; partiality in any decision would be without question. The fact that this Plaintiff requested a hearing with a US District Judge in Dkt. #48 that was denied by the pro se staff attorney and that this Plaintiff requested a hearing again in Dkt. #78, #81 and #88 in regards to the bogus contempt the Defendants were unlawfully seeking where this Plaintiff‘s hearing requests were never even addressed in any document from the US District Court is without question a denial of due process and clearly a denial of actual legitimate access to the court; more than apparent the usurpers were blocking this Plaintiff from a hearing in front of a US District Judge knowing the usurpation would be revealed among multiple other improprieties that had occurred throughout the now15 months old case that has had zero legitimate court process.
A decree which has been erroneously rendered must nonetheless be obeyed until overturned, and violators thereof may be punished for criminal contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947); United States v. J. Myer Schine, 260 F.2d 552, 557 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 934 (1959). A possible exception exists where the order is "transparently" unlawful. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967). No. 86-1336 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 820 F.2d 1342; 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 36502; 91 A.L.R. Fed. 245; 13 Media L. Rep.1945 December 31, 1986 Because the order was transparently invalid, the appellants should have been allowed to challenge its constitutionality at the contempt proceedings. A fortiori, the order cannot serve as the basis for a contempt citation. The order of the district court finding the Providence Journal Company and its executive editor, Charles M. Hauser, in criminal contempt is therefore reversed. When, as here, the court order is a transparently invalid prior restraint on pure speech, the delay and expense of an appeal is unnecessary. The dilemma is particularly acute where First Amendment interests are at stake, for even a temporary restraint on expression may constitute irreparable injury. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182, 89 S. Ct. 347, 21 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1968)." In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 184 n.15;; see also Goldblum, 584 F.2d at 907. ("A broadcaster or publisher should not, in circumstances such as those in this case, be required to make a sudden appearance in court and then to take urgent measures to secure appellate relief, all the while weighing the delicate question of whether or not refusal

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to comply with an apparently invalid order constitutes a contempt."); Goodale, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 509 (Walker does not require a party subject to a transparently invalid prior restraint to seek appellate review.). [**37] Nebraska Press Assoc., 427 U.S. at 558. Rule 60(b)(4) permits a court to grant relief from a "void" judgment. "Void" means the court lacked the power to enter the judgment, usually when it lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. A judgment can also be void if the court violated "due .process of law" or engaged in" a plain usurpation of power. " Matter of WhitneyForbes, 770 F.2d 692,696-97 (7th Cir. 1985); V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220,224-25 (loth Cir. 1979); United States v. Holtzman, 762 F.2d 720,724 (9th Cir. 1985) (a plain misinterpretation of statutorily delegated power is "blatant usurpation‖)

The order for dismissal (Dkt. # 86) was a scanned document to mask the properties of the PDF which if not masked would show the document‘s origin was not from the computer of the Honorable Judge O‘Toole. (Dkt. # 86) was entered into the ECF System by Judge O‘Toole‘s Docket clerk but it was scanned on the Computer used by Magistrates Judge Sorokin‘s Judicial Assistant. See affidavit at Dkt. #100 attachment 1. The document that dismissed this action with prejudice was not scanned on the computer used by either Judge O‘Toole‘s Deputy or Docket Clerk. The document had no hand signature. The dismissal was continued usurpation. This Plaintiff knows the PDF properties of scanned PDFs created on Judge O‘Toole‘s and Magistrate Sorokin‘s clerk staff‘s computers;
11-cv-10563 entered 8/05/2011 by Judge O‘Toole‘s Docket Clerk and scanned on Judge O‘Toole‘s Docket Clerk‘s computer --signed by Judge O‘Toole 10-cv-10443 entered by Judge O‘Toole‘s Deputy Clerk on 9/22/11 and scanned on Judge O‘Toole‘s Deputy Clerk‗s computer signed by both the Deputy Clerk and Judge O'Toole

The only legitimate reason any scanned Document should be coming from the US District Court of Massachusetts would be that the document has the hand signature of a Judge or Clerk.
01-cv-12257 order entered 9 19 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Young 09-cv-10237 order entered 1 05 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Tauro 10-cv-10699 order entered 9 28 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Tauro 10-cv-11009 order entered 9 28 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Gorton 11-cv-10092 order entered 9 20 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Gorton 10-cv-12143 order entered 9 27 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Gorton 08-cv-10051 order entered 9 27 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Chief Judge Wolf

This case No. 10 CA 11343 GAO in the US District Court of Massachusetts is in whole pretense litigation. This action was brought after receiving a ―Notice to Suit Rights‖ from the EEOC where a sham investigation also took place (see Dkt. #29 paragraph 186 or the excerpt of this paragraph from Dkt. #29 at Dkt. 51 attachment 6 and the following supporting exhibits). Dkt. – Attachment No.
15-29 newly purchased home six days before position statement hand delivered to EEOC by attorney 15-30 actual residence 17- 1 actual residence with 12/09 mortgage taken 15-33 Document re: retaliation submitted to EEOC 7/20/2009 no response from EEOC for eight months 15-34 EEOC Charge amended 3/5/2010->retaliation -> no response from the Defendants/ charge not in FOIA file 15- 35 EEOC Bogus Determination Letter signed by investigator not the Director as per legislative authority 15-36 letter to NY requesting FOIA File by EEOC Director with EEOC charge number recorded incorrectly

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15-38 letter requesting section 83 from EEOC ignored / frustrated into asking for the FOIA file 15-44 EEOC July news letter excerpts that describe legitimate processing of charges and section 83 process 50-2 EEOC Charge-the EEOC Completely ignored the hostility described in this charge

This Plaintiff alleges that the US District Court‘s general court order 09-4 May 1, 2009 [{In order to facilitate the appointment of pro bono counsel for indigent pro se parties in civil cases when such appointment has been authorized by a judicial officer, the Judges of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts have approved the Plan for the Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Parties in Certain Civil Cases in the form attached hereto.} {The objective of this Plan for the Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Parties in Certain Civil Cases (Plan) is to facilitate the appointment of pro bono counsel for indigent pro se parties in civil cases when such appointment has been authorized by a judicial officer. This Plan does not apply to the appointment of counsel for pro se plaintiffs who assert employment-related claims against current or former employers…}] is in violation of legislative authority and promotes, as alleged in the instant case, retaliation as a defensive tactic which promoted this Plaintiff‘s indigent status. Highly unethical high priced civil defense attorneys in collusion with court staff have been running planned pretense litigation where this unrepresented disabled Pro Se Plaintiff has been forced to do an insurmountable amount of legal work in an action she was set up to loose from the start. The docket, now with 101 entries, would not have required even one filing by this Plaintiff past the initial complaint where the bogus ANSWER submitted by unauthorized Defense Attorneys who intentionally did not file a Notice of Appearance would have raised the eyebrows of any honest judge. Title 28 § 1915. Proceedings in forma pauperis (e)(1) The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel. Even Disability Law Center here in Massachusetts stated they could not assist disabled litigants in employment related litigation yet Disability Pro Bono entities in other states list available assistance in employment discrimination matters on their web sites. This Plaintiff has researched multiple pro bono programs and sees, thus far, no other Pro Bono Program that excludes Plaintiff‘s in employment related litigation in other US District Courts. The US District Court of Massachusetts‘ Pro Bono Plan FAQs PDF added to a Pro Bono page on their web site reads, “However, it is not rare for the Court to seek pro bono counsel for non-prisoner litigants in a variety of cases, including housing and employment discrimination actions.” The FAQ PDF was first created on 4/27/11 and modified on 5/5/2011; the aforementioned allegations were first raised by this Plaintiff‘s in documentation to the court January 19, 2011(Dkt. #51 and #52) and at that time lingering motions where the word emergency appeared on the docket no less than ten times turned to abusive court process with more than obvious extra measures taken to ensure this Plaintiff remained blocked from a US District Judge as purposeful violation of legislative authority and court established procedure occurred with even more bogus documentation coming from, both, the court and the unauthorized defense attorneys. The only Pro Bono assistance approved in employment cases noted by this Plaintiff has been short term for ADR only. CORRECTION Dkt. #51 paragraph 2 at line 3 should read [believe that the decision was not that of a U S District Judge.]

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The aforementioned is an open avenue to corruption for unethical civil defense attorneys who handle employment cases for corporations such as in the instant case where these Jackson Lewis Attorneys have clearly been handed a free reign by the US District Court staff to violate multiple model rules of professional conduct while in more than obvious collusion as they cover each other with bogus documentation while ignoring fact, law, rule, constitutional rights and criminal federal law. The unauthorized Defense Attorneys and staff involved in this usurpation deny the aforementioned allegation through their bogus documentation but the actual court record, material evidence and the law support this Plaintiff‘s allegations. Dkt. # 64 is a Notice of Intent to file Mandamus with exhibit 1 the language of a Mandamus. The language of the Mandamus describes the method used to effectuate a pretense litigation which included placing on the docket ―Notice for Social Security and Immigration Cases‖ (this will show on the docket activity report 8/10/2010 first entry) which by local rule are exempt from scheduling conferences; the category sheet that this Plaintiff filed with her complaint was never entered on the docket. The pro se staff attorney intentionally did not comply with the courts General Order (09-3)authorizing the assignment of civil cases to the Magistrate Judges so that she could control the case from the US District Judge's docket. PROCEDURES AND OTHER INFORMATION FOR COMPLETING THE FORM FOR CONSENT OR REFUSAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE JURISDICTION were never sent to this Plaintiff as per the court general order. Dkt. #64 and attachment 1 were served by a process server back in January of 2011who was instructed to put the documents in Judge O'Toole's hand but instead the documents were accepted by Judge O'Toole's assistant on his behalf (receipt verifying process served Dkt. #69 attachment 1); no response from Judge O'Toole came forth and usurpation of this case continued. In spite of this Plaintiff‘s strong objection, the reference to the Magistrate was forced (see docket text at #58) as well as this Plaintiff‘s Request for Relief in Dkt. # 51 “(1) This entire action to be put immediately before Judge O’Toole…” Dkt. #57 with the order referencing the case to the Magistrate included the pro se staff attorney‘s ruling on Dkt. #51. Both Dkt. # 51 & #52 were captioned “REQUEST IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY RELIEF FROM JUDGE O’TOOLE”. See this Plaintiff‘s affidavit attachment 1 to Dkt. #97, affidavit attachment 1 to Dkt. # 100, and attachment 1 to Dkt. #64 the language of this mandamus was also referenced in the Extraordinary Writ filed with this court June 10, 2011. The January Mandamus never received a response and the Extraordinary Writ filed with this court in June was ―DENIED without an opinion ten days after filed. Usurpation falls under the crimes victims act. TITLE 18 PART II CHAPTER 237 § 3771§ 3771. Crime victims‘ rights (d)(3) Motion for relief and writ of mandamus The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred. The district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a victim‘s right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court of appeals shall take up and

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decide such application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing this chapter. If the court of appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be clearly stated on the record in a written opinion. This Plaintiff noted on September 21, 2011 that on June 28, 2011 Brian Childs, of Jackson Lewis made a Notice of Appearance in the already decided case; this Plaintiff also noted June 13, 2011 docket text that was not present on the docket, June 20, 2011, the day ―JUDGMENT‖ was entered. Guy P Tully made his notice of appearance on June 15, 2011 which was without any delay placed on the docket; apparently he assumed another successful fraud at the five day mark. Brian Childs‘ Notice of appearance on June 28, 2011 was also docketed without any delay. This Plaintiff noted when going through the ECF training modules the notice to officers of this court that explained Notice of Appearance can take a few days to enter on the docket. Brian Childs made another appearance in this court on June 16, 2011 yet that appearance was not docketed until June 21, 2011. See case no. 11-1693. June 13, 2011 docket text:
[CASE submitted. Panel: Sandra L. Lynch, Chief Appellate Judge; Kermit V. Lipez, Appellate Judge; Jeffrey R. Howard, Appellate Judge. [11-1668] (SBT)]

There was no panel assignment when this Writ was denied on June 20, 2011; in fact the block on the upper part of the docket designated for Panel Assignment information appears as follows on the three dockets this Plaintiff downloaded from pacer which are dated June 10th, June 20th and September 22nd [Panel Assignment: not available]. The attorney‘s appearance was made on June 28th to effectuate entry into the case with an appearance of legitimate purpose and the docket text note dated June 13th was entered at that time. The Extraordinary Writ filed by this Plaintiff in this court never went before any Circuit Judge. This Plaintiff paid the $450.00 filing fee. PLEASE SEE THE EMERGENCY MOTION SUBMITTED WITH THIS DOCKETING STATEMENT This Plaintiff submitted her June 2010 hospital discharge papers to the US District Court with her Complaint and motion for appointment of an attorney that clearly indicated deficits including ordered medication that would make self representation a significant challenge; there is no record of any sealed document to the court of appeals from the US District Court and the hospital discharge paper is nowhere on the US District Court‘s docket. In spite of a well pled 41 page Complaint, supported by 47 exhibits that indicated clear and unquestionable violation of the ADA laws and a clear indigent status related to the alleged retaliation that was compounded by relocation expenses where relocation would not have occurred absent the allegations of the complaint, Pro Bono assistance was DENIED (see Dkt. #9). Clearly the order‘s further qualifier ―The Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied without prejudice to renewal after the defendants have replied to the complaint‖ by the course of this action was just for show.
DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1991). In order to qualify for appointment of counsel, a party must be indigent and exceptional circumstances must exist such that denial of counsel will result in fundamental unfairness impinging on the party's due process rights. Id. The Court must examine the total situation, focusing on

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the merits of the case, the complexity of the legal issues, and the litigant's ability to represent him or herself. Id. at 24.

In short, Defendants refused to interview this Plaintiff who was a qualified individual for a full time open position, denied this Plaintiff opportunity to perform on the clock the duties described when hired for a16 hour position which this Plaintiff accepted only because Defendant Webster enticed the offer stating that that the special project would lead to full time work. This Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment as she was led to believe that the position she accepted still existed but was never given an opportunity to do the work while working on the clock; the denial of opportunity to compete for the open full time position ended up being the final straw that led to constructive discharge. During orientation this Plaintiff was instructed to sign a blank piece of paper and was told by the nurse conducting the orientation that this Plaintiff would be meeting with Defendant Mikita after orientation to plan and write the job description for which she was hired; Defendant Mikita then refused to meet and write the job description. Retaliation related to this Plaintiff‘s expressed objection to discrimination based on disability was prevalent during employment, post employment and escalated to the max after the EEOC charge was filed. The position sought was still vacant on this Plaintiff‘s last day of work. Defendants submitted a false record to the EEOC in March of 2010 and falsely claimed a non practicing nurse who worked in their human resource department is whom they had hired into the full time open position. The nurse who was actually hired to fill the position terminated with the employer at the time the EEOC investigation became active in March of 2010. Dkt. #76 attachment 1 is a PDF that was posted on line by ELDER SERVICES OF CAPE COD AND THE ISLANDS, INC. names Dawn Manning as the ADON and interim DON (information that was provided to Elder Services by the Employer—Manning is listed twice in this document because the Employer had not updated the organization at the time of publication) not Diana Lawson as the record submitted to the EEOC by the Defendants falsely claimed. Paragraph 187 of the Complaint (Dkt. #1) states, ―Defendants submitted the employee record of a non-practicing nurse that worked in their human resource office as the applicant they chose to fill the Assistant Director position; Diana Lawson worked at Pleasant Bay in the office when Plaintiff was employed there and relayed to Plaintiff that she had no desire to practice nursing.‖ The Defendant‘s Answer (Dkt. #21) to paragraph 187 states, ―Admit that Defendant Pleasant Bay submitted to the EEOC the employee record of the person they hired to fill the Assistant Director of Nursing position, but deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in paragraph 187.‖ [see Dkt. #15 attachments 39 & 40] Paragraph 188 of the Complaint (Dkt. #1) states, ―Plaintiff‘s experience and qualifications were not inferior to the experience and qualifications of the actual chosen applicant or Diana Lawson; the actual ADON chosen was Dawn Manning and she terminated with Pleasant Bay when the EEOC charge investigation became active in March 2010. Defendants specifically stated in their position statement to the EEOC that they were not considering any of the Registered Nurses working at their facility for the ADON position (page 4 lines 1-3). The Defendant‘s Answer (Dkt. #21) to paragraph 188 states, ―Deny the allegations in paragraph 188.‖

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(page 4 lines 1-3) of the Defendant‘s position statement to the EEOC---"Complainant was one of about 40 nurses--15 to 20 of whom were registered nurses--and Webster and Mikita were not considering any of them for the position either." See Dkt. #15 attachments 45, 46, & 47 for the full text of the fraudulent position statement and Dkt. #15 attachment 26 page 3 where Diana Lawson‘s name is submitted as the hired candidate in Defendant‘s response to the EEOC‘s request for information (RIF). See Dkt. #15 attachment 3 Plaintiff‘s references, attachment 6 cover letter/ resume, attachment 11 facility policy regarding job descriptions (also mandatory per 105CMR 150.002), attachment 13 off the clock work update & expressed interest in position to Webster, Dkt. #50 attachment #2 for the official facility employment application that was withheld when the position statement was submitted to the EEOC Dkt. #50 attachment 3 for Plaintiff‘s generic employment application Defendants used as attachment 1 to their EEOC position statement which offered zero support to their position where Defendants falsely claim that this Plaintiff only wanted part time work and was not qualified for the position. Paragraph 189 of the Complaint (Dkt. #1) states, ―Dawn Manning as the Assistant Director of Nursing [ADON] became the Acting Director of Nursing [DON] after Mikita terminated in November of 2009. Her experience is described in a news article July 1, 2010.‖ [see Dkt. #15 attachments 41 & 43] The Defendant‘s Answer (Dkt. #21) to paragraph 189 states, ―Admit the allegation that Dawn Manning became the acting Director of Nursing Services in November 2009, but deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in paragraph 189.‖ Dkt. #77 which strikes just about the entire discovery plan submitted by this Plaintiff is a clear indicator that the players in this pretense litigation had no intent of allowing this Plaintiff her right to due process and prosecution of the retaliation portion of her complaint. By Supreme Court law these defendants have no affirmative defense see Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 ("[n]o affirmative defense is available . . . when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action . . ."); Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293 (same) yet these Defendants, unauthorized attorneys, and rogue court staff have obstructed justice and put this disabled litigant through, now,15 months of pretense litigation in violation of multiple constitutional rights and criminal federal law. Continued retaliation and hostility by these Defendants is more than clear. These unauthorized defense counsel have the nerve to state in their documentation to the US District Court that this Plaintiff has abused court process when they are the abusers of court process; they devised a planned conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of a disabled in forma pauperis pro se litigant with a false appearance in order to effectuate pretense litigation in collusion with court staff. The primary goal was to obstruct justice, no matter the means, and achieve complaint dismissal as soon as possible because their clients‘ only chance at prevailing would be if the case never passed before the eyes of an honest judge. The chilling fact that the players in this highly illegal scheme included taxed paid public servants who appear to be absent fear of consequence as each act of their planned intentional conspiracy by the design of fraud that was exposed by this Plaintiff in her filings to the court was simply

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followed up with more fraud. Multiple communication attempts to an honest authority to halt this usurpation and set this case back on a legal tract were sent via the ECF System, the Court‘s general email, the US Mail, and by process server and all attempts are presumed by this Plaintiff to be blocked from any honest authority as no relief followed. Plaintiff then emailed the Clerk of the Court and requested a response; again, no response and no relief. Three attempts at email to the Clerk of the Court and a response finally came forth in the form of a Certified Letter from the US Marshal presumed to be at the direction of the Clerk of the Court warning this Plaintiff that if she emailed any clerk in the court again she would be facing criminal federal and state harassment charges. Plaintiff would be most appreciative if this court of appeals would prove to her that she does still, in fact, live in the United States of America because at the moment all of for which America stands is appearing to this Plaintiff as only an illusion supported by rhetoric. This Plaintiff lives in disabled housing and did not have a phone at the time; her communication was through Skype or email. See Dkt. #88 attachment 17 and Dkt. #93 attachment 1 See Dkt. #54 See Dkt. #58 attachments 7, 8, & 9 See Dkt. #59 See Dkt. #60 See Dkt. #64 and attachments 1, 4 & 6 See Dkt. #92 (same as Dkt. #85—contempt motion addressed to Chief Judge Wolf) This Plaintiff also believes that Chief Judge Wolf and Judge O‘Toole never received their copy of this Plaintiff‘s Extraordinary Writ that was served to them by certified mail. Considering the volume of people the court serves, it is peculiar that the clerk who signed the return receipts responded, ―Laura McGarry from Washington‖ as soon as this Plaintiff stated her name after placing a call to the court; this Clerk informed this Plaintiff that after accepting certified mail addressed to the Judges he brings the mail to the clerk staff. This Plaintiff then spoke with Chief Judge Wolf‘s Deputy Clerk who expressed no knowledge of the Writ. We discussed a document being served to the Judge and strangely enough the Motion (Dkt. #85) intended for Chief Judge Wolf that was brought to the court by a process server back in March made a sudden appearance on the docket; this Plaintiff had assumed she was taken by a dishonest process server since she never received validation from the process server that the motion went directly into Chief Judge Wolf‘s hand as requested but apparently the process server served the motion to the clerk staff. This contempt motion was then put on the docket by the Judge O‘Toole‘s docket clerk absent the notation that the motion was referred to Judge O‘Toole by Chief Judge Wolf. It was denied in the scanned document that dismissed this action. Again deficient docketing occurred and neither contempt motions by this Plaintiff (Dkt. #58 or #85) received any due process. The faux defense has been nothing but misrepresentation, false statements and blatant fraud upon the court—the record supports the former. Perhaps someone from this court of appeals should ask Judge Sterns how he feels about unauthorized attorneys citing an authority that was established in his court as support for their position by placing the authority in a footnote, misspelling the party‘s name, changing the Lexis number and leaving absent the adverse component of the authority and then scanning the documents before entry into the ECF System to cover the ruse since no hyperlink could be established because the unauthorized Defense Counsel maintain in Dkt. # 47 [―Here, Defendants have submitted all papers in good faith, and the representations in those papers are all legally sound and factually accurate.‖] Defendants‘ Opposition (Dkt. # 36) to Plaintiff‘s Motion (Dkt. #28) to Strike Affirmative Defenses footnote 1 follows:

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Continuing her by-now all-too-well-documented habit of treating this case‘s docket like a personal e-mail correspondent—and perfectly illustrating the harm created by the moving targets she never ceases to manipulate— Plaintiff has purported to amend her Motion to Strike, even as undersigned counsel has been preparing Defendants’ opposition to that motion. See Docket No. 33 (Plaintiff‘s ―Motion Addendum‖). If the Court is inclined to consider Plaintiff‘s ―Motion Addendum‖ at all, the filing should not keep the Motion to Strike from being denied. First, the Motion Addendum advances an utterly implausible position, i.e., that ―Plaintiff [lacks] fair notice of the affirmative defenses in question.‖ See Motion Addendum at 2. One need only consider Plaintiff‘s granularly detailed, point-bypoint factual refutation of Defendants‘ affirmative defenses to realize just how indefensible Plaintiff‘s contention is. Moreover, Defendants owed Plaintiff Rule 8(c)-notice, not Rule 8(a)-notice. See Kaufman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2009 US Dist. LEXIS 68880, *2 (D. Mass. 2009). Where Rule 8(a) applies to ―claims for relief‖ and requires a plaintiff to provide a ―short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,‖ Rule 8(c) governs affirmative defenses and requires only that a defendant ―affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.‖ Contrast Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (interpreting Rule 8(a)); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (interpreting Rule 8(a)). Defendants‘ affirmative defenses have done at least as much as Rule 8(c) requires of them. Although Plaintiff‘s Motion Addendum is nothing more than yet another attempted volley that misses its mark, it does point up the dire need for a net in this match.

Unauthorized Defense Attorneys Misspelled Party and Changed Lexis Number Kaufman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2009 US Dist. LEXIS 68880, *2 (D. Mass. 2009).
Where Rule 8(a) applies to ―claims for relief‖ and requires a plaintiff to provide a ―short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,‖ Rule 8(c) governs affirmative defenses and requires only that a defendant ―affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.‖

REALITY Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68800 at *2 (D. Mass. 2009) Kaufmann v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, No. 09-10239-RGS, 2009 WL 2449872 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2009). Id. (holding that the defendant must amend its affirmative defenses, other than those listed in Rule 8(c)(1), to include a semblance of factual content). Remarking "that sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander" the court stated that it was inclined to hold that both plaintiffs and defendants have the same notice obligation under Rule 8. The court also observed, however, that due to the commonly recognized usage of the affirmative defenses listed in Rule 8(c)(1), these defenses intrinsically provide sufficient notice to satisfy the plausibility standard. The Defendants had not one 8(c)(1) affirmative defense that would stand. See Plaintiff‘s Motion to Strike Defendants‘ Affirmative Defenses (Dkt. # 28), Plaintiff‘s Response to Defendants Answer Dkt. # 29, Motion Addendums Dkt. #32 & #33. All submissions by Defense Counsel on November 5, 2010 were scanned prior to entry into the ECF System; (Dkt. #52) describes the unauthorized attorneys‘ planned ruse to mask their submission of frivolous filings by scanning documents prior to ECF System entry and how when the same was exposed by this Plaintiff they switched the files with word processed PDFs. See Dkt. #52 attachment 3 which shows the timeline of creating the word processed PDF‘s compared to entry into the ECF System; the one scanned PDF that remained a scanned PDF after they switch the other scanned files with word processed files was the bogus attachment 1 to document

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36 which was document 35 scanned and stamped with the word copy –that scanned PDF was created at 2:54:26 and they began entering all scanned documents into the ECF System at 2:58:23. There were absolutely no hyperlinks or ability to search, copy or paste the documents these unauthorized attorneys filed in the ECF System on November 5, 2010. Defense filings on November 5, 2010 used erroneous authorities and argued the wording of the FRCP to suit their need of the moment. They insisted that rule 15 stated ―as a matter of course‖ within 21 days after filing where the rule states after serving in order to strike this Plaintiff‘s complaint amendment where minor corrections to the complaint had been mailed to the court because this Plaintiff ‗s decline in health that required hospitalization followed by a sudden move across the country had her functioning at far less than optimal; the Docket Clerk entered these corrections into the ECF System as Complaint Amendments. All corrections were before any service of process to any Defendant yet this Plaintiff‘s Complaint amendment was Denied during the usurpation rampage by the pro se staff attorney as she wiped out this Plaintiff‘s prosecution with Dkt. #53 and manipulated the filing date from January 20th to January 19th. This Plaintiff‘s well supported motions (Disqualify Defense Counsel Dkt. #27 & Strike All of Defendant‘s Affirmative Defenses #28), Rule 15 compliant complaint amendment (Dkt. #30), US Appeals Court authority and Rule 9 supported response (Dkt. #29) to Defendant‘s ANSWER (Dkt. #21) [the Defendant‘s answer was essentially non responsive as it was full of denials, not enough information and false statement that ignored 47 exhibits and further pleading with particularity was duly warranted], and Plaintiff‘s oppositions Dkt. #41 & #42 to unsupported frivolous defense motions were ignored, denied or stricken by the pro se staff attorney with Dkt. #53. The authorities they used for Dkt #37 & #39 fully explained FRCP 15 before and after the 2009 amendment. They argued USCA authority in a foot note to ensure Plaintiff response to their bogus answer would be stricken; as soon as this Plaintiff emailed them the authority she would be using to support her Dkt #29 they halted the 7.1(A)(2) conference and filed their frivolous motion to strike. Unauthorized Defense Attorneys Dkt #37 & #38 footnote 1
1 Plaintiff

has attempted to avoid the effect of Rule 7(a)(7), after having been alerted to it by the parties’ Rule 7.1(A)(2) conference, through her Motion Addendum Coordinating Documents. See Docket No. 32. This motion addendum is of no moment—it offers no legal basis whatever to support the Response—and should by no means affect the striking of Plaintiff’s Response.

REALITY Plaintiff‘s Motion addendum Dkt. #32 that supported Dkt. #27 & #28 as well as the complaint amendment Dkt. #30
BAUER MECHANICAL INC v. JOINT562 F.3d 784; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6072 [―The Federal Rules themselves instruct us to construe and administer their provisions to do substantial justice and to secure the ―just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.‖] Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, 8(e). Rules 7(a) and (b) do not limit the methods by which a pleading may be filed. See, e.g., Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1576 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming district court ruling recognizing an answer and response attached to a motion for leave to file defensive pleadings); In re World Access, Inc., 301 B.R. 217, 220 n. 1 (N.D.Ill.2003) (recognizing an amended complaint attached to a motion for leave to file an amended complaint instanter);  Andersen v. Roszkowski, 681 F.Supp. 1284, 1287-88 (N.D.Ill.1988) (same). FRCP Rule 9. Pleading Special Matters

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(b) Fraud or Mistake; Conditions of Mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person‘s mind may be alleged generally.

In a just Court a Plaintiff‘s exposure of Defense Counsel‘s unauthorized appearance followed by multiple misrepresentations, false statements and blatant fraud where the allegations of the Complaint are more than adequately supported by existing law and supporting evidence compared to a more than obvious bogus Answer, the determination would be a nonexistent defense followed by Judgment for the Plaintiff and sanctions against the attorneys and Defendants. No legitimate rulings have come from the US District Court and the Honorable Judge O’Toole did not dismiss this action with prejudice nor did he deny this Plaintiff’s post dismissal reconsideration and other motions. The Magistrate, pro se staff attorney, attorney judicial assistant to the Magistrate, Docket and Deputy Clerk to Judge O‘Toole and unauthorized defense counsel do not have the authority to decide this case and no final decisions in any matter related to this action have come from a US District Judge. Dkt. No. 9, 20, 53, & 57 are missing from the written opinions report (Dkt. #88 attachment 31) and their absence indicates that the court considers them void as well; these documents are undersigned by US District Judge but were drafted and filed by the pro se staff attorney with no US District Judge oversight. Orders on January 28, 2011 Dkt. #57 included prohibiting this Plaintiff from making reference to docketing information because the Plaintiff had noted in her third motion to disqualify defense counsel for fraud upon the court (Dkt. # 52) a random entry into the case docket where text was entered by the Docket Clerk on 12/3/2011 at Dkt. # 29 & #34 stating a modification that was neither taken nor needed to effectuate the appearance of legitimate docket entry; this Plaintiff alleges that the bogus scanned documents that had been filed on 11/5/2011 by the unauthorized defense counsel were switched at that time with word processed files. The aforementioned occurred four days after this Plaintiff filed for sanctions (see Dkt. #46). The pro se staff attorney ruled regarding Plaintiff‘s Contempt Motion (Dkt. #58) of which she was part subject with orders (Dkt. #61) that restricted this Plaintiff‘s filing with the court and signed the Magistrate Judge‘s name. Magistrate Judge Sorokin at a bogus February 14, 2011 scheduling conference stated he had authorized these orders and continued a restriction on this Plaintiff‘s filing with the court. This Plaintiff‘s son was present in the court room for the scheduling conference that occurred on February 14, 2011; this Plaintiff attended the conference by phone from Washington State. This Plaintiff‘s son witnessed the Magistrate violate this Plaintiff‘s constitutional right to Article III oversight when the Magistrate Judge denied this Plaintiff‘s direct verbal request for permission to file so that she could appeal his orders to the US District Judge and he, also, denied her request for permission to file so she could request reconsideration of the bogus orders by the pro se staff attorney that were undersigned by the US District Judge (Dkt. #20, #53 & #57). The pro se staff attorney entered an antagonistic memorandum and order (Dkt. #53) that wiped out the prosecution of this Plaintiff‘s action on January 20, 2011 and she manipulated the filing

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date back to January 19, 2011. Dkt. #53 was drafted and entered after the pro se staff attorney was aware of Dkt. #51 and she was not aware of Dkt. #51 until January 20, 2011 because this Plaintiff did not file Dkt. #51 which requested that the pro se staff attorney be enjoined from duty on the case until 17:37 on January 19th. There was absolutely no law, rule or fact in this unauthorized ruling by the pro se staff attorney. An example of the usurpation and purpose for the docket manipulation follows with an excerpt from Dkt. # 57 which is page 25 paragraph 2 of the 51 page abbreviated electronic record: “On January 19, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order (Docket No. 53) that, among other things, denied Plaintiff's two motions to disqualify defense counsel. As aptly noted in Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff's third attempt to disqualify Jackson Lewis' as defense counsel, such request is essentially mooted by this Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s first two attempts to disqualify counsel. See 1/19/11 Order, Docket No. 43.” The dismissal with prejudice (Dkt. # 86) is an adoption of the Magistrates procedurally deficient Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #80) where this Plaintiff had requested that any R & R be by any judge other than Judge Sorokin (see Dkt. #78 & #81) who was actively violating this Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights; (Dkt. # 86) which is beyond bogus by the language alone is a scanned document. The document was scanned with the purpose of masking the properties of the document because it is not an opinion and order by Judge O'Toole; the staff of the US District Court are well aware that this Plaintiff is able to determine the origin of documents entered by the court, i.e. staff computer v. judicial officer computer, by looking at the PDF properties (see affidavit Dkt. # 100 attachment 1, Dkt. #58 attachment 2, Dkt. #70 attachment 1). Judge O‘Toole‘s Deputy Clerk was made fully aware that this Plaintiff knew the exact computer that scanned Dkt. #86 and that her objection to the R & R that the Magistrate had no authority to write never saw a US District Judge. The clerks then began scanning several legitimate appearing opinions by Judge O‘Toole on the computer that scanned the dismissal of this Plaintiff‘s action and this Plaintiff has all those files but used the most peculiar scanned document for her affidavit. The affidavit attachment 1 to Dkt. #100 describes an attempt to produce a scanned legitimate appearing document that would have the same properties as Dkt. #86. As a note of interest, the scanned opinion set with publisher information regarding the criminal case discussed in the affidavit of Dkt. #100 was entered on the all recent opinions web page; the last page of the opinion is page 33 which is directly followed by page 41citing the publisher information. The case had been essentially stagnant with no court entries since May of 2010. Dkt. # 101 that denied reconsideration of the complaint dismissal and all post dismissal motions ignored Plaintiff‘s requests for Judicial Notice. Plaintiff‘s submitted Affidavits were ignored. Plaintiff‘s request that the decision be hand signed by a US District Judge was ignored. Plaintiff‘s multiple requests for a hearing were ignored. Usurpation continued after this Plaintiff filed her documented proof that her Objection (Dkt. #81) to the bogus R & R (Dkt. #80) never went before the US District Judge. Dkt. #100 with an affidavit at attachment 1was filed on September 8, 2011 and Plaintiff‘s request for reconsideration and other post dismissal motions

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were denied under continued usurpation on September 13, 2011(the filing date was manipulated and recorded as 9/12/2011); apparently the exposure of the continued usurpation that was proven in this Plaintiff‘s affidavit was determined to require prompt action by the usurpers of this action. The PDF properties of Dkt. #101 are the same properties of the computer the pro se staff attorney who usurped this action is now using to file documents in the US District Court; she now leaves her name out of the properties but still enters the documents with (PSSA, 4). The undersigned signature of Dkt. #101 and the PDF entered by PSSA4 have the same signature variant from Judge O‘Toole‘s signature which is absent his usual indentation.
C.A. No. 10-11019-GAO –entered 9/21/2011 by PSSA 4- file date is manipulated just as it was on Dkt. #101 1:11-cv-11510-LTS- entered 9/21/2011 by PSSA 4

It appears court staff have take some extra insurance in making this Plaintiff‘s scanned dismissal appear legitimate even after Dkt. #101. This Plaintiff ‗s reconsideration and post dismissal motions that were denied under continued usurpation (Dkt. #101) were entered into the ECF System by Judge O‘Toole‘s Deputy Clerk on (9/13/2011); all other docket entries in the case had been by PSSA 4 or Judge O‘Toole‘s Docket Clerk except while on the Magistrate‘s docket where the Magistrate‘s Judicial Assistant or Docket Clerk made court entries. On 9/15/2011 another case that had been stagnant since 12/10 was decided with a judicial panel. The decision was signed by three US District Court Judges so it required scanning. Judge O‘Toole‘s Docket Clerk entered the scanned PDF from his computer but the scanned PDF was not created from his computer; all other court orders in this case under the judicial panel have been entered by Judge Zobel‘s clerk. The document was scanned on the computer that scanned this Plaintiff‘s dismissal. The staff now had a scanned PDF memorandum and order signed by three US District Judges with the same properties as the PDF file with this Plaintiff‘ case dismissal. The aforementioned case was the quietly decided case finding that an Assistant US Attorney had not violated any rules of misconduct. Case 1:09-mc-10206-RWZ -WGY –GAO decided, scanned and entered on 9/15/2011. This decision also made the all recent opinions web page. Prior to September 13, Plaintiff‘s emergency motions had lingered for more than two months in spite of the fact that this Plaintiff had been informing the court that her son was hospitalized here in Massachusetts and that she needed a prompt decision so she could take him back to Washington State to ensure his healthcare need were met; this Plaintiff had planned to return to Washington State directly after the hearing she requested from this court was granted but her Extraordinary Writ was ―DENIED‖ on June 20th and during this same time period this Plaintiff‘s son became acutely ill and he was hospitalized for nearly a month. The staff of the US District Court knew that this Plaintiff was in Massachusetts because of the death of her father and that the usurpation of this action that had obstructed and delayed justice prevented this Plaintiff from reciprocating support to her father during his time of need; this Plaintiff‘s father generously provided support during this Plaintiff‘s time of need which left her father with insufficient funds to meet his own needs and he ended up in a more than incompetent care setting that promoted his

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early death and yet they planned to continue obstruction justice. This Plaintiff has noted emergency motions answered by Judge O‘Toole in as short of time as two days.
11-cv-11099 emergency motion requested 8/15/2011oders by Judge O‘Toole and entered 8/17/2011

This Plaintiff has filed one law suit in her entire life and it is well supported by established law and evidence. The players of this pretense litigation appear to be only interested in their own self preservation and retaining their falsely perceived power that by law they do not possess. The usurpers of this action labeled this Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and barred her from any future filings with the court and certified that any appeal of this action would be frivolous so in forma pauperis filing with the court of appeals was out of the question no matter any procedure required to challenge this type of order because this Plaintiff is well aware that any challenge would also fall to usurpation. Again, this Plaintiff spent her grocery money to file this appeal just as she had in order to file her Extraordinary Writ that never saw a judge and just as she had in order to initiate service of process (twice) that never saw a judge; this Plaintiff‘s only income is SSDI. This Plaintiff‘s latest filings to the court indicated that she was in Massachusetts with only her laptop and had no means to print or scan; Dkt. #101also terminated this Plaintiff‘s ECF System filing privileges noting that any appeal would have to be by mail. D. Are any related cases or cases raising related issues pending in this court, any district court of this circuit, or the Supreme Court? Yes Case No. 11-1668 In re: McGarry Relief request: this honorable and just court must immediately vacate the June 20, 2011 ―JUDGMENT‖ regarding Case No. 11-1668 an Extraordinary Writ. This Plaintiff is requesting that the Writ and this docketing statement go immediately before a Circuit Judge. This Plaintiff is requesting that this court of appeals order the US District Court to vacate all the void orders of Civil Action NO. 10 CA 11343 GAO passed the case initiating orders of Dkt. #9 and order that Civil Action NO. 10 CA 11343 GAO be immediately placed before an Honorable Judge of the US District Court to process the default judgment as per this Plaintiff‘s request in Dkt. #88 and Dkt.#97 as per FRCP 60. See Motion filed with this court on this date November 8, 2011. F. List each adverse party to the appeal. If no attorney, give address and telephone number of the adverse party. Attach additional page if necessary. 4. Adverse party Geriatric Facilities of Cape Cod, Inc. Attorney No attorney filed a notice of appearance in the US District Court or has indicated in any filing with the US District Court that this corporation is represented by and through an attorney. Address 383 South Orleans Rd Brewster, MA 02631 Telephone 508-240-3500 The defense counsel have made a false appearance in this action with the purpose of carrying pretense litigation; no documentation to the court indicates that they represent the Defendants. The attorneys purposefully did not file a notice of appearance in regards to this action in the US

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District Court to effectuate the aforementioned. See Dkt. #97 the affidavit attachment 1 of Dkt. #97 and all other attachments associated with Dkt. #97. Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts RULE 83.5.2 APPEARANCES (a) Generally. The filing of the complaint shall constitute an appearance by the attorney who signs it. All other appearances in a case shall be made by filing a notice of appearance containing the docket number of the case, name, address and telephone number of the person entering an appearance, in compliance with Rule 5.1(a)(1). (d) Firms and Corporations. The court will not recognize the appearance of a firm or professional corporation unless it is accompanied by the appearance of at least one (1) attorney. In the event that a party is represented by more than one (1) attorney, whether or not from the same firm, the clerk shall not be required to send notice of orders, judgments, trial settings, etc., to more than one (1) attorney for any party, unless the attorneys represent different interests and this fact is noted on the record. Case 1:11-cv-10807-RGS 10/07 2011 Judge Richard G. Stearns: Electronic Order The law in Massachusetts is clear. Corporations must appear and be represented in court, if at all, by attorneys. Driscoll v. T.R. White Co., Inc., 441 Mass. 1009, 1010 (2004), quoting Varney Enters, Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 82 (1998).

BRANDSTEIN et al.v.WHITE LAMPS, Inc., et al.20 F.Supp. 369 (1937) In Osborn et al. v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738, at pages 829, 830, 6 L.Ed. 204, where the court had before it, among other matters, the question of whether the record of the case should disclose that the defendant bank authorized the institution or prosecution of the suit, Chief Justice Marshall, in the course of his opinion, stated: "It is admitted that a corporation can only appear by attorney, and it is also admitted that the attorney must receive the authority of the corporation to enable him to represent it. * * * A corporation, it is true, can appear only by attorney, while a natural person may appear for himself." While a corporation is a legal entity, it is also an artificial one, existing only in the contemplation of the law; it can do no act, except through its agents. Since a corporation can appear only through its agents, they must be acceptable to the court; attorneys at law, who have been admitted to practice, are officers of the court and subject to its control. See Nightingale v. Oregon Cent. Ry. Co., 18 Fed. Cas. p. 239, No. 10,264. "Were it possible for corporations to prosecute or defend actions in person, through their own officers, men unfit by character and training, men, whose credo is that the end justifies the means, disbarred *371 lawyers or lawyers of other jurisdictions would soon create opportunities for themselves as officers of certain classes of corporations and then freely

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appear in our courts as a matter of pure business not subject to the ethics of our profession or the supervision of our bar associations and the discipline of our courts." The foregoing clearly represents what has happened in this more than unfortunate and shameful situation.
Certificate The undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that, to the best of her knowledge and belief, that the statements in the above Docketing Statement are true. Westfield, Massachusetts on this 8th day of November 2011. s/ Laura J. McGarry, Pro Se

Respectfully submitted to the COURT, s/ Laura J. McGarry, Pro Se Laura J. McGarry, Pro Se 1717 Sheridan Road Apt. A- 50 Bremerton, WA 98310 413-214-1750 [email protected] November 8, 2011 Certificate of Service I, Laura J. McGarry, hereby certify that on November 8, 2011 I electronically filed the foregoing document with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that the following counsel of record with the United States Court of Appeals are registered as ECF Filers and that they will be served by the CM/ECF system: Guy Paul Tully & Brian M. Childs of Jackson Lewis, LLP.