What is it to be a “human”

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What is it to be a “human”? My sincere appreciation and thanks to Mr. Aarif Zulfiqar for his tremendous contribution in reading and editing the manuscript to make it presentable and to Mr. Akhter Saeed for long hours of discussion and devoted time. This question may seem irrelevant - for some of us while pondering on the theory of evolution it seems like a fore gone conclusion that ―humanity‖ of the humans must have evolved gradually – from lesser humans to the higher ones in a continuous process of evolution. But still, somehow, we want to assume that we are unique even from our closet Darwinian relatives. But are we? It is not just the philosophers, most of the organized religions of the world also have espoused the idea of uniqueness of humanity. It appears that this idea of exclusivity of human creation may have crystallized from the events that occurred during the nebulous times of prerecorded history. Pitted against the unfathomable brute forces of nature and predators - far superior in physical strength, our ancestors only had the cunning and intelligence on their side to succeed. One might imagine that the stories of their encounters with some ―mythical‖ beings, strong and brute, may be nothing more than our encounters with Neanderthals, prehistoric animals and (inexplicable) natural phenomena. But in each of these mortal struggles our human ―hero‖, with odds piled high against him, would succeed – the brain winning against the brawn. These stories, however, may not just be myths of antiquity - indeed we have won the survival race and, apparently, have out-competed all our cousins to extinction. Chance may have played a role in our success, no doubt, but each of our successes consolidated our belief in ―our special place in the universe‖ to us. As if the historical evidence was not good enough, with the advent of scientific enquiry, we wanted to prove our uniqueness scientifically - pointing out the traits which we thought were uniquely human – thereby making us a superior being. Early on, we believed that it was our hunting ability that made us different, allowing greater component of protein in diet. But look a little deeper and it becomes apparent that until lately, until after the advent of firearms, we were no more than average predator, there are animals with far greater physical strength, suitable sensory endowments to hunt and kill. Can it be an organized social part of the hunt that would fill the void to explain our uniqueness? But studies in Africa by Jane Goodall showed cooperative hunting in chimpanzees[54]. Idea was then floated that ‗tool making‘ defines a special characteristic to be human by the field observations of chimpanzees, and lately in many other animals has pulled the rug. Several researchers have proven that humans are by no means unique in their capacity to make tools and use these tools purposefully. Then came a rather farfetched idea unique sexual behavior of

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human[54]. Here sex was less for procreation and often used as a favour. But then observations of pygmy chimpanzees (bonobos), did demonstrate that we are not alone in our use of sex as a social instument. Bonobo females have been shown to be continuously receptive to the sexual advances and exchange favours in return for social rewards received from males, as well as from females[54]. May be, then, it‘s our verbal abilities and eloquent language - the capacity to speak and verbalize the intricasies ranging from quantum mechanics to non-Euclidian geometry, the beauty of nature, the passion of romantic love, and the cricketing record of a Sir Vivian Richard[54] - that is something unique to human species. As we would discuss shortly (speech-page4), this ability to communicate ideas, intensions and emotions is not unique to us humans either. We might com-up with an exhaustive list of ―uniquely human attributes‖, I am still pondering about the possibility of finding a clearly definable characteristic that is uniquely human. Every notable philosopher, ever-since Aristotle, has pondered upon this question. As a result we have a wealth of accumulated knowledge and observations on the subject. Therefore, before we start, we would have to examine the past enquiries and the list of ―unique human characteristics‖ proposed, at various times in history. Then these proposed hallmarks of our humanity have to be scientifically compared with their counterparts seen in non-humans species. Properties considered unique to humans Culture Etymologically, the word ―culture‖ is derived from cultivation, in its broadest sense, culture can be defined as the total sum of cultivated/learned behavior (and its consequent material expressions) that is passed on / copied by other members of a social group, because it is considered desirable and hence valued by that social group [Wikipedia]. Cultural values are socially transmitted. Hence ―culture‖ represents behavior (in entirety) that is transmitted through social learning / education in contrast to genetically determined behavior [Wikipedia]. Within this behavior one may include the physical expressions of this behavior like art, music, cuisine and architecture as well. Culture, therefore, would broadly represent those actions, behaviors, beliefs, creative endeavors and artifacts we value as a society - even if they do not impart a special survival advantage. [Wikipedia] Culture developed essentially when prehistoric family groups of our human ancestors coalesced to form a tribe. Splintered family groups have an advantage of the ownership of a patch of land with exclusive hunting / foraging rights and that right is defended vigorously. Giving up individual family rights for the tribal lands would not

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only gave us numerical strength to fight off any incursion but also added on to the food security by the tribal culture of sharing the food. There are always going to be some ―free loaders‖ and cultural practices are geared to discourage them. Within this bigger tribal group the scope of specialization appeared with one person particularly adept at bow making and so on and others would use his skill in return of favors – early barter. ―The cultural sophistication seen in human societies seems unmatched in the animal world. It may be partly due to that long stint of ―indoctrination‖ during childhood, we call education. It is not surprising, therefore, that educated and groomed person is often referred to as being ―cultured‖. Façade of this cultural creativity is mind boggling considering the banality of culture seen in our nearest cousins the chimpanzees. But look a little deeper beneath the veneer of cultural sophistication and we realize that at its core, each cultural endeavor is nothing more than a series of smaller elementary actions and value endorsements prized by that particular ―cultural group or nation‖ [58] . ―Some of these actions may be valued across the cultures (valor, honesty) and certain behaviors/characteristics may have a universal appeal like music, beauty etc, while others are practiced or valued by a small group i-e Japanese ritual suicide upon dishonorable conduct. These actions and values define that particular group's characteristic ways of living and represent all that is cherished‖ in that group‘s peculiar ―value system‖ for desirability or otherwise. The traits considered desirable are learned from one another and handed down through the generations, gradually getting ingrained ever deeper with ever increasing layers of sophistication.‖ [58] ―Defining the culture in this way we find that there are other primate species that show group specific practices - certain way of greeting each other or obtaining food – and these practices are handed down the generations by imitation within this particular group. Cetaceans show ever more convincing examples of rudimentary culture. There two distinct groups of killer whales, one group is resident while the other is migratory and therefore called ―transients‖. Both the groups share the same geographical space in the same waters and interbreed freely – but they show very different lifestyles and social hierarchy – showing group unique hunting techniques, predilection for different food and distinctive ways of communication - all of which are passed down from the parents to their offspring‖.[58] Mind Reading ―Mind reading may be nothing more than simple cues gleaned from another person‘s facial expressions, reading ―between the lines‖ of his pronouncements, and observation of his body language. But fundamentally it is the capacity to stand in someone else‘s shoes and to imagine his potential choices available to him to act -

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and then to fix the probability for each action considering his personality, past history, and clues from his recent speech and actions. One of the best ways, perhaps, to judge this ability of an individual to have an insight into the mind of another person (individual) is his ability to deceive. In order to outwit someone else one must understand his opponent‘s motives, desires and intentions – Not surprisingly the "theory of mind" depends upon exactly the same ability for its underpinning. This ability to conceive and understand the mental states of another individual was once thought to be uniquely humans - apparently emerging suddenly around the fifth year of life. But then we discovered that babies are quite capable of deception – leading to the conclusion that "mind-reading" skills develop gradually. It then fuelled a new debate about whether other primates also have the ability to ―deceive‖. Repeated experiments conducted during 1990s proved beyond doubt that great apes and even some monkeys do understand deception, but perhaps their capacity is not as explicit as is the case in adult humans‖. [58] Even if primates are not quite successful at answering ―Sally-Anne test‖1§, but they do show abilities such as seeing as a form of knowing, reading intentions and goals. Tool Use ―In western Africa one group of chimps have learnt, by trial and error, a method to use rocks to crack nuts to get to the edible kernel - while another group has figured out a way to use blades of grass to fish out termites from the mound. One gorilla has been seen using a stick to measure the depth of water - an equivalent of a dipstick. All these actions look amazing but no animal wields tools with quite the alacrity of the New Caledonian crow have achieved a new level of alacrity for purpose-defined designing and wielding of tools. In order to get a tasty morsel hidden deep inside the crevices, they can craft a wide variety of poking barbed tapers and even an instrument with series of notches on one side by biting at the edge of a pandanus leaf with their beaks. Even more amazing is the fact that during lab experiments it 1§

In the Baron-Cohen study of theory of mind in autism, 61 children—20 of whom were diagnosed autistic under established criteria, 14 with Down's Syndrome and 27 of whom were determined as clinically unimpaired—were tested with "Sally" and "Anne". In the test process, after introducing the dolls, the child is asked the control question of recalling their names (the Naming Question). A short skit is then enacted; Sally takes a marble and hides it in her basket. She then 'leaves' the room and goes for a walk. Whilst she is away, and therefore unbeknownst to her, Anne takes the marble out of Sally's basket and puts it in her own box. Sally is then reintroduced and the child is asked the key question, the Belief Question: 'Where will Sally look for her marble?' For the children to 'pass' this test they must answer the Belief Question correctly, by indicating that Sally believes that the marble is in her own basket, continuous with her perspective although not with the child's own. If the child cannot take an alternative perspective, they will indicate that Sally has cause to believe—as they do—that the marble has moved. To pass, the children have to show that Sally has her own beliefs that may not correlate with reality.

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becomes clear they understand the functionality of tools and where to best use it. The way they plan to construct them and then deploy them shows a capacity of planning and fore-thought. It would be hard to suggest that point to a common origin of tool-making in humans and crows – first they lack a dexterous hand -- but there is a seems to a remarkable resemblance in the ways in which their respective brains work. Both are highly lateralized brains. Most crows are found to be ―right-beaked‖ – preferentially using right side of their beak while cutting pandanus leaves.‖[58] Morality ―Marc Bekoff from the University of Colorado at Boulder is a strong proponent of the view that homo-sapiens is not the only species to show morality and values. He has shown experimentally that morality – or something akin to it - is quite common in social mammals. It appears that in this context it may provide survival advantage of a herd. He argues that the acceptable norms of social interaction are learnt during play - going on to the concept of right and wrong - "moral norms‖. It can then be extended to other situations such as sharing of food, defending a prized resource, giving care and grooming in apes and monkeys".[52] For ages, with our preconceived bias we preferred to find alternative explanations but, I am sure, it is hard to explain the results of a classic study conducted in 1964 where it was found that even when a rhesus monkey was hungry, it would not accept the offered food, if doing so meant that another monkey received an electric shock [56]. The same is true of rats. Does this indicate nascent morality? Emotions ―Emotions act as social glue allowing us to bond with others. Emotions also allow us to regulate our interactions in different social settings allowing us to behave flexibly in different situations. But to think of it we are not the only animals that would need graded targeted emotional response, so there is hardly any reason for us to be unique in this property. We can quote many examples of apparent emotional behavior in other species of animals. Elephants have been repeatedly seen caring for an injured incapacitated herd member. Does it show equivalent of human empathy? A funeral ritual performed by magpies and crows in India may suggest grief. Can we label the emotion of spite shown by ―Nick‖, a baboon, to take revenge on a rival by urinating on him? Divers who freed a humpback whale caught in a crab line describe its reaction as one of gratitude. Then there is the excited dance chimps perform when faced with a waterfall -- it looks distinctly awe-inspired. There seems to be consensus among the authorities that animals are not devoid of emotions, but whether they feel these emotions in the same conscious way as we humans do is open to debate.‖ [54]

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Personality ―It is no surprising to find that those animals which live under constant predator threat develop extra-cautious behavior, while same species evolved in an environment with fewer risks appear unafraid and undaunted. Successful survival strategies evolve by natural selection when predator pressure is introduced. But it‘s remarkable to discover that there are individuals who belong to one single species - living in the same geographical location facing the same evolutionary pressures - but can differ in their degree of daring or caution. In a human context we would tend to refer to such differences as ―personality traits‖. If we may extend these human characteristics to them animals, then may we have reckless salamanders, aggressive songbirds, cowardly spiders and may be a fearless fish. Surely we have animals with ―personality‖, we are finding that more and more species of animals are not just characterless beings as we generally believe. It appears that these personality traits evolve to provide diversity within the species so that individuals may adapt to different evolutionary pressures and may survive in a wider variety of ecological niches.‖ [54] Speech ―Naom Chomsky thought ―speech‖ to be a uniquely human attribute, and devised a special term for an imaginary ―language organ‖. He believed that the human ability to generate syntactical structure evolved separately, for reasons that had nothing to do with communication. His ideas are no longer in favor because it would need a reason and evolutionary trail for language development. At this point in time we believe that most of the human communication occurs through speech – We use it not only to express our basic needs but also use it to communicate complex ideas far removed from our daily needs -- ideas which have no counterparts in the physical world. This is very different from animals which can communicate with each other albeit in much simpler ways. But they, too, can express emotions and desires -- think of those midnight neighborhood symphonies of howling dogs or cats in heat. We know that we have a much more advanced speech, which, then, begs the question, ―How did human speech evolve?‖ How does the way humans talk to each other differ from the way animals communicate?‖ [54] We have managed to teach some basic sign language to the apes and dolphins often limited to objects and actions. Apes have learned signs that refer to ‗objects‘ - like food - and to ‗actions‘ like eat. According to Hauser, "They could label things and could sign 'apple' or 'pond.' But what they couldn't say is, 'My apple is in the pond' or 'on the chair.'‖ [54] Looking beyond the traditional explanations

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If the traditional explanations are found wanting, perhaps we need to look more deeply into the realms of thinking, imagination and consciousness to find a more plausible answer to our question. It would be helpful to start by examining the meaning of each of these concepts in the current context. ―Thought‖ refers generally to any mental or intellectual activity that occurs in the sphere of an individual's private (subjective) consciousness. This mental effort is made in the realm of imagination (see below), as compared to the physical effort done in the real world. [59] Because thought underlies almost all human actions and interactions, understanding its physical and metaphysical origins, processes, and effects is of profound significance to the question, ―what is it to be a human?‖ Related to thought is the idea of rationality, which is essentially the exercise of reason.2 It is the manner in which people apply reason to derive conclusions through a process of deliberate consideration. Just having a reason for one‘s action would not necessarily make the action ―rational‖. In fact, a rational decision is one that has not only been reasoned, but is also optimal for achieving a goal or solving a problem.[Wikipedia] The act of thinking rationally can pertain to any element of the physical or imaginary world – it can be about a problem, question, object, ideas, arrangements of ideas or even ―rules of reason and rationality‖ derived from our observations and deductions.3 But whatever it might be, when being applied to the symbolized physical world we instinctively know the boundaries imposed on our thoughts by the rules of reason and rationality - derived from the real world. While imagining a ―real world scenario‖, these rules are applied to the ―symbolized‖ objects and processes in a very stringent way, even though we ―know‖ that these objects are being manipulated in the realm of imagination. The greater the replicative accuracy of the objects, events and rules between the two worlds, the greater would be the predictive accuracy of the ―thought experiment‖. 2

Reason is generally associated with thinking, cognition, and intellect in making sense of events, actions, objects [1][Wikipedia] and all those things that concern him and their interactions. I would like to suggest more specifically that reason is the human ability to apply rules gleaned from the ―real‖ physical world to the symbolized objects/events (which generally represent a real world object or event) in the world of imagination – what one might call the realm of thought ―Regna cogitatio‖ – in order to organize the causal relationship of these objects and events. Reason, then, is our ability to do ―thought experiments‖, manipulating objects and events within the strict framework of the ―rules of reason‖ in order to find a solution to a problem or to make sense of the world. 3

―Rules of reason‖ are those scientific laws or observed rules that govern our physical world. These rules are formulated by a process of induction, based on observed facts and experimental evidence. Legal rules and social customs are sometimes used to reach ―optimal decisions‖ -- and may be considered appropriate for the time and place -- but these sorts of rules may not necessarily fall in the category of ―rules of reason‖. Sharing your meagre food with an unknown stranger may be an esteemed custom but the rules of reason may point to a different course of action. The rules of reason are universal and applicable ―globally‖. We all ―know‖ that an apple will always fall down to the ground. This observation does not require any pre-requisite knowledge of gravity – it would be preposterous to violate this rule even in the realm of imagination - if one is not thinking of space, etc. Everyday experience of gravity on earth has now become a rule of reason.

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In this world of imagination, reality may have to be pared down to its bare essentials, removing all the compounding variables and unrelated noise of the real world. This barebones representation of the problem would allow us to think clearly and sort the (worldly) problem out in a ―rational way‖. Thinking, then, allows us not only to come up with solutions to problems but in the process also gives us the ability to model the world in lots of different ways while building up our knowledge base.4 Imagination, or the faculty of imagining, is the ability to form mental images of perceptions, which would normally be generated by ―real world‖ objects, events, sensations and concepts, at a moment when the said object, image, sensation or concept is absent from the environment and is not perceptible through our senses.5 It is, therefore, a modality that allows us to think and to make sense of the world [2][3][4]. During the act of imagination, we ―know‖ that the object or action we are experiencing is ―not real‖. But how do we come to have this ―knowledge‖? Dreams are very similar to imagination – except that they are involuntary in nature and occur during sleep. During dreams, too, one experiences sensations, images and actions without the causal physical factor (forget about the repressed desires for the time being). Imagination, then, may be nothing more than the ability to day dream on demand. The critical difference between dream and imagination is that of ―voluntary control‖ of imagination. In our real life we can generally segregate our conscious ―real worldly‖ experiences from our wakeful imaginations really well. In the real world, objects and events are ―there‖, and cannot come and go on demand. On the other hand, the objects and events in the ―realm of imagination‖ are demand-generated – we all know that we can stop imagination/day-dreaming any time we like. If the events and objects in the realm of imagination start acquiring the characteristics of real world objects and events, i. e., they start pouring in without our ability to switch them off, like real world objects and events do, the boundary line between reality and 4

A knowledge base (abbreviated KB, kb or Δ) is a special kind of database for knowledge management, providing the means for the computerized collection, organization, and retrieval of knowledge. I would also include a database of knowledge about any experience (and related experiences), its results and how the problems and solutions are related. Knowledge representation (KR) aims at representing knowledge in symbols to facilitate inferencing from [Wikipedia] those knowledge elements, creating new elements of knowledge 5

An object is any observable segment of our physical environment. Once observed, an object such as a tree will form part of our memory. Object (the tree) is now pared down to its bare essentials. Somewhere else in the consciousness or memory, all the categorically related objects (objects in the category of trees) are summed up and ―blended‖ together to define its physical and functional essence. This would be a symbol of our ―tree‖. Similar symbols are produced for basic actions, such as division of an object into four equal pieces (mathematical symbol 1/4), for the language and other spheres of interest. Over a period of time these symbols can get mutated, entrenched and nested, each getting detached from its primordial external origin and taking up a personality of its own (as in advanced mathematical functions). An event is an observable change or series of changes in an object as a result of physical processes. Observation of ―events‖ gives us clues to the rules and laws that govern our [Wikipedia] physical world. Like objects, events can also be symbolized, such as in mathematical functions (e.g., division). An action is a string of interlinked objects and events coordinated to produce a desired result.

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imagination starts getting blurred. The resulting state would then be called ―hallucinations‖.6 The only demarcating feature that differentiates objects, events and processes experienced in the world of imagination from that of hallucination is that of voluntary control of the experience. Although hallucinations are generally considered to be a feature of psychosis, there are occasions when a ―normal‖ person may experience them. Suddenly waking up during ―stage 1 sleep‖ while experiencing a dream, we all know how difficult it is to differentiate a dream experience from reality.

Process Dream experience during sleep Dream experience while awake Dream experience while awake

Control Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary

Status Normal Dreaming Imagination Hallucinations

We all seem to have an innate ability to invent partial or complete personal realms within our minds from the sensory perceptions of the elements derived from our shared world. Our personal world is unique even when the elements perceived are shared. This imaginary world and its imagined sensations are perceived in the mind, i. e., here images are being seen through the "mind's eye". A basic training for the imagination is to listen to a story narrative. [2][6] Here the use of appropriate words by the storyteller and invocation of the ―essence‖ of the objects and events described would educe an experience. The strength and vividness of this ―imaginary experience‖ would depend upon the use of appropriate ―words‖. [7] Words with layered meanings and implications would produce a more complex, richer picture of the object or event in one‘s mind (King James Bible). As discussed earlier, it is most likely that ―qualia of this experience‖ would differ among the audience. Imagination can also be expressed through stories such as fairytales or fantasies. Some of the most famous inventions or entertainment products were created from the inspiration originating in someone's imagination. Children often use narratives or pretend play in order to exercise their imagination. When children create fantasy, they play at two levels: first, they use ―role playing‖ to act out what they have created with their imagination, and at the second level they play again with their ―make-believe situation‖ by acting as if the role they have created is an actual reality participating in the narrative myth. [8] Imagination has now transformed an imitation to a creation. Imagination with the help of reasoning can help provide meaning to physical experience and events. It is also the state in which we may challenge the observed physical rules

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Hallucination, in the broadest sense of the word, is a perception in the absence of a stimulus.

[Wikipedia]

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and come up with a better explanation of the observed facts by formulating new rules, and therefore form the basis of the inductive learning process.[2][5] Consciousness Being conscious carries at least two levels of meanings. First, and most obvious, is being aware (conscious) in contrast to being unaware or unconscious. The state of unconsciousness is most often seen in medical states of anesthesia and brain damage of various origins. Medical conditions that are associated with impairment of consciousness are variously described as disorders of consciousness.[9] 7 All these states -- ―disorders of consciousness‖ as well as the state of dementia, delirium, postictal state -- have two common denominators, loss of ―memory function‖ and an inability to apply the rules of reason (which may be due to loss of memory as well). This type of consciousness may be considered as “basal level consciousness‖ because loss of it causes unconsciousness. Since it is essential for animal existence, it is not, by itself, very helpful in exploring the ―question of humanity‖. The second definition of consciousness is more significant in this context but is harder to pin down – although every human ―knows‖ what it means to be conscious. The English word "conscious" originally derived from the Latin conscius (con- "together" + scire "to know"), but the Latin word did not have the same meaning as our word -- it meant knowing with, in other words having joint or common knowledge with another. (Wikipedia) In the Latin writings the phrase conscius sibi, was used repeatedly which translates literally as "knowing with oneself", or in other words sharing knowledge with oneself about something. (Wikipedia) This ―conscius sibi‖, or its derivate, is the one we talk about while considering the ―unique human consciousness‖. If we start from an early stage of human development to follow the evolution of human cognition and ―consciousness‖ in a child and compare it with that of an animal it would become easy to define the first point of divergence. That point and events surrounding it, might shed some light on problem under discussion. We all know that a newborn child is conscious but only at a ―basal‖ level. In a few months, he starts recognizing people and objects in his environment in a limited way and is rapidly learning about the objects that surround him, their properties, and by induction, the rules of reason, operating in his world. His constant explorative behavior and ―playing‖ is in fact a ―learning experience‖. At this stage you may see him spending endless hours playing with shapes – trying to slot them through appropriately shaped holes. First trying at random, he may manage to slot one through the appropriate 7

Locked-in syndrome -- the patient has awareness, sleep-wake cycles, and meaningful behavior (viz., eyemovement), but is isolated due to quadriplegia and pseudobulbar palsy; Minimally conscious state -- the patient has intermittent periods of awareness and wakefulness and displays some meaningful behavior; Persistent vegetative state -- the patient has sleep-wake cycles, but lacks awareness and only displays reflexive and nonpurposeful behavior; Chronic coma -- the patient lacks awareness and sleep-wake cycles and only displays reflexive behavior; and Brain death -- the patient lacks awareness, sleep-wake cycles, and behavior. [Wikipedia]

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openings - he then keeps on repeating the successful method (without necessarily understanding the basis). The whole process often starts with the mother showing him the right way to do it. This is, therefore, an example of social learning -- learning by imitation and emulation without any insight. A bit later on in his life, he would start associating a ball with a round hole. He has, by now, formed an image, a symbol of a ball, which is very similar to the round hole. He has achieved an ―insight‖ to reach the ―logically reasoned process‖ for problem resolution. Once he has reached this stage, the ―novelty‖ of this particular game would wear off. By now he also starts acquiring language -- the linguistic symbols for description of objects and events (or desired events - eating food). In our human language, word is a symbolic representation of an object, its property or event, etc. But a word, i. e., a symbol, any word, presupposes a ―generalization‖ which requires an act of thought – symbol consciousness. In a child‘s language, words start with ―simple core meanings‖. As he expands his experience and encounters different uses of the same word, the process of generalization begins – with the core, ―prototype concept‖ in the middle and ever decreasing similarities farther away on the periphery. This ―generalized concept‖ of a word would define meanings located in the objects, their properties and related events and practices which constitute its meaning in ―entirety‖. So a child can begin to operate in the ―adult sphere‖ with quite sophisticated words and symbols – but with limited meanings for him. Even when the child may not have grasped the full meaning of a word – like an adult beginning to grasp the meaning of unfamiliar words -- by using the word in the right place at the right time, he has started the process of acquiring the full meaning through his involvement in the system of usage of that word.[51] The start of symbol-consciousness (see more detailed discussion later) gives a child the ability to recognize pictures as a representation of real 3D objects in the real world. Something has happened in his brain. He has acquired the capacity to symbolize the objects, events, sounds, and images. He is now able to see the world and communicate with the world in symbols. By the age of three years, mother starts to read him simple stories. Words depicting objects and events in the story can not only be understood but are visualized in the mind‘s eye. This is the beginning of the stage of imagination. Early on in this stage, the child would often find it difficult to differentiate his ―fantasy world‖ from the real one, but gradually he acquires this distinction too. He also starts to understand and apply the rules of reason to his thought processes, and with increasing repertoire of ―rules of reason‖ at his disposal his ability to process objects and events ―rationally‖ keeps on increasing. One of the ways to get to the bottom of the question of ―being human‖ is to see and compare this early human development of cognition, consciousness and problem solving skills with those of non-humans. Over the last decade, there has been growing interest in the physical cognition of non-human animals, particularly those that regularly

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use tools in the wild. Study of use of tools to overcome a specific hurdle lends itself for scientifically scrutiny because of its simple, robust, repeatable nature. Seen in the wild, every species of animals - both the tool-using and non-tool using – confront daily problems and these complex physical problems ―are‖ resolved with or without use of the tools – that‘s the reason of their continued existence. There is a general consensus, however, that they appear to do so through the use of ―associative learning‖ rather than causal reasoning. [13–26] In the wild, chimpanzees have been observed making and using tools in order to achieve a predefined objective; they have been seen using plant stems to fish for social insects or using stones to crack open hard shelled nuts [42,43]. Experimental studies show that new skills are generally learned by chimpanzees through a process of observation. Chimpanzees have a suite of different social learning mechanisms -- observation, emulation & imitation. [44] This has led to assertions that human physical cognition is fundamentally different from that of other animals. [27,28, 29] ―To compare human cognition - at different stages of development - with that of an animal, scientists have devised a test called ―trap tube test‖. This test objectively assesses the ability and proficiency of the subject (animal or a child) to employ a tool (a stick here) to achieve a desired result – getting a cookie out of a Perspex tube. The transparent, 2‖ diameter, Perspex tube, open at both ends, with a blind trap in the middle is fixed at appropriate height. A cookie (or any appropriate reward) is placed in the tube out of unassisted reach. An appropriate sized, light weight pole is provided to the subject with which it may push the cookie, to get it out. If it is pushed from the wrong end the cookie would drop in the trap and would be un-retrievable. In the figure below the ―figure A‖ shows the ―functional trap-tube‖ – here the trap is functional and the ―cookie‖ has to be pushed from right side to get it out. Use the left opening and the cookie would be pushed into the trap – preventing the reward acquisition. In the ―figure B‖ the trap is rotated 180 degrees and now the trap has become non-functional – here the subject can use both the ends of the tube to get the reward‖.[reproduced from readily available resources, 60]

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Researchers in child development have become interested in how children learn to use tools and to compare it with the tool-using skill of non-human primates. During early stages of human development, like in chimpanzees, this learning is through observation -- imitation without understanding the causal relationship.[45] By the age of 3 years, children have gone a stage further and are able to solve tasks that involve understanding some basic causal principles such as contact [46], force [47], and gravity, as well as tasks that require the combination of these principles to correctly predict the outcome of causal events [48]. Presented with the trap-tube task at the age of 3 to 4 years, children appeared to be overwhelmed by the multiple causal relationships presented in the experiment, with some children showing a significant side bias for the end of the tube, used by the experimenter, in her first successful trial and thus relying on imitation rather than an understanding of the causal relationships involved. However, by the age of 5 to 6 years, children showed no evidence of a side bias and thus did not seem to imitate the actions of the demonstrator in this respect. It appears that as the children‘s individual understanding of the causal relationships increased, their reliance on imitation decreased. Thus, a critical level of understanding seems to have been reached by children between the ages of 5 and 6 years, when individual learning negated a reliance on learning by observation. [40] Although younger children may have knowledge about the causal relationships involved in the trap-tube task, they may not be able to apply this knowledge until they are older. Chimpanzees in the wild may take many years to learn ―tool-use tasks‖ such as nut cracking that involve multiple causal relationships. Longitudinal studies have shown that youngsters learn to crack nuts in stages. In the first stage, they combine nuts and anvils (and hope it would do the job), then combine hammers and anvils, only later combining all three relationships to successfully crack nuts [49]. This supports the hypothesis that chimpanzees, like young children, learn by observation without clear understanding of the causality of relationships. Somehow this development gets arrested in chimpanzees and never proceeds on as it would in humans. By the age of six, humans have crossed a bridge into a new state of ―symbol consciousness‖ (see below), and have also acquired an ability to manipulate these symbols in their realm of thought ―regna cogitatio‖. Types of Consciousness It may be helpful here to consider two types of consciousness proposed by Ned Block: phenomenal (P-consciousness) and access (A-consciousness). [12] P-consciousness is simply raw experience: it is moving, colored, three dimensional forms, sounds, sensations, emotions and feelings with our bodies and responses at the center. These experiences are called qualia. (Wikipedia) These qualia have little if any impact on behavior

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(decision making). A-consciousness consists of information that is globally available in the cognitive system for the purposes of reasoning, speech and high-level action control. Here information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. (Wikipedia) So when we perceive, information about what we perceive is access conscious; when we introspect, information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we remember, information about the past is access conscious; and so on. (Wikipedia) I would propose that A-consciousness can be further subdivided into two functionally different categories: Object-consciousness and Symbol-consciousness. Object consciousness is the primitive function of consciousness and is used both by animals and humans for gaining awareness of the environment, responding to challenges by observation of objects and processes, and then imitating the successful method without understanding the causal associations. This sort of consciousness and its related memory is used by both animals and humans for social learning (problem solving by imitation). Imagine a pride of lions stalking a deer. The way the pride moves and plans its attack, the way the exit paths are blocked, the way each individual lioness performs its function belies a plan and strategic thinking. The deer, on its own part, is aware or the smell of the hunter and the alarm calls of the baboon and hoopoes, and more often than not finds a way out of the trap – again intelligent actions. These plans and actions have been honed over millions of years of selection and learning by observation. This type of learning is ―object oriented‖. It is passed on from older to younger members by observation and imitation, with minimal causal understanding or modification. Both the predator and the prey treat each other as objects. Information is handled by objectconsciousness without ever developing the more advanced route of symbolconsciousness to be categorized into ―prototype classes‖ (see prototype theory below). In this object-consciousness, the observed object/event is perceived in the consciousness and retained in the memory as an ―object‖ – full and three dimensional. A dog would need a three dimensional dog model -- appropriately covered with fur – to perceive it as another dog. It will not be able to recognize a dog picture on a piece of paper – what to say of a pencil drawing of a dog. Limitation of this state of consciousness to the realistic forms only prevents the objects to be symbolized and categorized. Realizing this limitation of object-consciousness is important. Objects, too, can be taken from the physical world into one‘s (realm of thought) ―regna cognitatio‖ and can then be manipulated according to the rules of reason. We do it all the time. But an object per se is clumsy, full of unessential details, and that makes it ―difficult to handle‖. Convert it to a symbol and a new world of possibilities open up – imagine functions and symbols of

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mathematics. On top of that, the ―properties‖ and ―rules‖ applicable to one object would stay limited to it and would not automatically extend to its class, had it been grouped into one. Object-consciousness would only allow a strict ―definition based‖ classification. For example, we may define a bird as something with a beak, feather and ability to fly – by this definition, ostriches and penguins are not included in the class of birds, thus limiting the scope of learning and imagination. This ―limitation‖ of object-oriented learning would demand the same rule and property to be ―observed‖ and learned independently even for objects broadly belonging to the same class. Because of its inherent clumsiness and lack of breadth, object-consciousness and its related object-associated learning place unrealistic demands on the memory, limiting it to the most basic, survival benefitting, functions. These survival benefitting functions are learned by peer observation. It happens when a member of our tribe would stumble upon a solution to a problem purely by chance. The rest of his tribe can then observe the successful solution and imitate his actions without any understanding of the causal relationship. As a result, this learned behavior would stay limited to that particular object or process without any chance of extension to a category -- for projection of property or function. A monkey may learn by chance that it can break open a nut by smashing it with a stone to get the edible kernel. Give him a coconut: would he use the same method to reach the edible flesh? Here the objects, events and memory are being sorted and processed in a fashion which is quite different from those of symbolconsciousness. Symbol-consciousness is a type of consciousness acquired later on in human development where objects and actions can be symbolized. This function gives us the ability to pare down the observed objects and actions to their bare essentials. When we observe a table, we process the object by stripping it down to its ―essence‖. Then all the tables we have ever seen - four legged, three legged, one legged and tables of other sorts, dining table, writing table – are unified in this symbolic category of ―table‖ sharing the unique property of tableness – to an extent that even a smashed-up table on the rubbish heap can still be easily recognized as a table. Thus, when we read or think of a table, what we have is a symbol, without conjuring up a specific image of any ―object‖ called table.8

8

The theory of ideas attributed to Plato centers around the concept of "forms". He believed that every physical object in the world has a corresponding "form" or idea behind it, epitomizing its very nature. The usual example given is that of a table. One can physically interact with a table; it is solid and capable of holding whatever is placed upon its surface, it has a certain number of legs, it is made of a certain type of material. Then there is its "tableness", the underlying idea of what it is to be a table, which is above and beyond its physical characteristics. "Tableness" makes all tables what they are. It serves as their essence. Nothing else besides tables has the essence of "tableness". Similar distinction in the essence of an object and physical object has been recognized in Hindu philosophy, and is called nāmarūpa, nāma describing the spiritual or essential properties of an object or being, and rūpa the physical presence that it manifests.

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This symbolization and then categorization of symbols provides us with a powerful tool where ―rules of reason‖ applicable to one ―member of a class‖ can be extended to include the entire class of objects or actions through a process of conceptual blending. This in turn opens up the possibility to learn in a very different way. A stripped down version of reality (symbols of objects and processes) is made which is easier to handle in the ―world of imagination‖. These symbolic objects and processes can now be manipulated in our mind within the frame work of the ―rules of reason‖ – like we do while performing a thought experiment – Allowing us to reach conclusions and create understanding of ―causal associations‖.[9[ Here we can glimpse the beginning of that human capacity we call ―insight‖. Symbol-consciousness thus has a fundamental and pre-eminent role in human ―understanding‖ to give him an ability to ―make sense‖ of events and objects. This capacity of symbol-consciousness and associated categorization of objects, events and properties would reduce demands on the memory function and give a huge survival benefit to the possessor of the trait. Qualia of P-consciousness and “Essence” of Symbol-Consciousness Qualia is the raw experience which differs from one observer to another and is therefore not shareable. Since it is not available globally, it is unsuitable for use in the realm of thought ―regna cognitatio‖ for the purpose of general applicability of ―rules of reason‖. Symbol or ―essence‖ of an object, on the other hand, as used in the concept of objectconsciousness, is a pared-down representation of an object or process which is globally available and, therefore, available for manipulation by the ―rules of reason‖. Irrespective of their origin -- from our physical world or from our thoughts – there are objects, events, processes or actions which require ―making sense‖ of. We call them problems. Problems in need of resolution are often manipulated and solved by humans in our sphere of imagination – realm of thought ―regna cognitatio‖ – as a thought experiment, before the solution gets implemented in the real world. Comprehension of the problem begins with breaking down the event into its constituent objects, processes and events. The objects are symbolized, then the processes and events are applied to them within the framework of the ―rules of reason‖. Now the process of stringing and restringing of these symbols and processes begins until the required outcome is achieved. The desired outcome may be achievable through more than one route. In this process the ―most obvious route‖ is the one that has been witnessed by us to function successfully in a closely related situation. This is the ―convergent route to solution‖ where a pre-established process known to be successful 9

―Rules of reason‖ themselves can also be considered as ―processes‖ or ―actions‖ – and can be acquired by observation of the physical phenomena and then symbolized in the same manner as previously described (it is not equivalent to derivation of mathematics from logic). Once symbolized and manipulated repeatedly in our thought, these rules of reason may ultimately appear astonishingly surrealistic and removed from everyday experience, as in quantum mechanics.

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in resolving a closely related problem is tinkered with minimally to suit a new situation. Compare this with imitation where a behavior or action is adopted ―without modification‖ to resolve a problem. When you hear someone say, ―When he sat in the chair, it broke down‖, the image your mind conjures up is not that of a ―particular chair‖ with four legs or three, with or without arms, and of any particular color. What you conceive is the ―chairness‖ of a chair, its essence -- which is acted upon within the constraints of the rules of reason. This action would have precipitated that event of interest – the person was too fat, the chair was too flimsy, and when it breaks down, pieces are always imagined as falling down, rather going in any other direction – under the rules of reason (gravity). Conversion of objects into symbols here seems crucial as it pares down the non-essential details and limits it to the bare ―essence‖ of the object in line with Plato‘s assertion. This symbolization not only allows objects to be classified ―according to the essence‖ of the objects – ―class of tables‖, ―class of apples‖, ―class of humans‖, ―class of Chinese‖, and so on -- but would also ―extend the class properties‖ to related classes (and symbols). An object may belong to more than one class at the same time depending upon the physical property under consideration. A dog can simultaneously belong to class of live objects, animals, domesticated animals, etc. This categorization of objects and events follows the ―prototype theory‖ of categorization, allowing rules to be applied, even if loosely, in an extended domain of objects/events.10 In the realm of imagination, these symbols (of objects) can be manipulated/rearranged and sequenced in different ways – to be subjected to different processes (always governed by the rules of reason) to precipitate an event. As previously explained, these ―rules of reason‖ are the scientific laws of our physical world – and are formulated by a process of induction, based on experimental evidence and observed facts. Reason, playing within the rules, can manipulate the objects and events until it can achieve the desired result. This is all happening within the sphere of imagination. Reason, unlike logic, can move forward, manipulating objects to achieve a goal, or go backward. Starting with the results of an observation, it can construct a mental picture of a series of objects, events and processes that must have happened to have produced the observed phenomenon -- trying all the time to limit it within the ―rules‖ as defined previously. 10

Prototype theory is a mode of graded categorization in cognitive science where some members of a category are more central than others. For example, when asked to give an example of the concept ―furniture‖, chair is more frequently cited than, say, stool. Prototype theory also plays a central role in linguistics, as part of the mapping [Rosch E. "Cognitive Representation of Semantic Categories": J Experimental Psychology v. 1975; 104:192-233] from phonological structure to semantics. Thus instead of a definition-based model, e.g., a bird being defined as an object with essential features such as [+feathers], [+beak] and [+ability to fly], prototype theory would consider a category like bird as consisting of different [Wikipedia] elements which have unequal status -- e.g., a robin is more prototypical of a bird than, say, a penguin.

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Ever so infrequently, however, the observed phenomenon cannot be explained by any amount of manipulation of objects, processes and events within the frame work of existing rules. Then with a stroke of genius, the observer invents new rules which would logically explain the observed fact. These new rules must also be able to explain the related observation equally well if not better than the existing rules, or stay selfcontained without violating all the other rules. Speech As discussed earlier, speech development is by no means a uniquely human attribute. Let us consider, step by step, speech development in a child. The first step in this long process begins when infants begin forming ―categories‖ for the common speech sounds they hear, not the whole words so much as the little units we call ―phonemes‖, less than a tenth of a second in duration. Categorization of these sounds allow them to generalize any single phonemes across speakers, so that the mother‘s ―ba‖ sound and the father‘s somewhat deeper ―ba‖ sound are treated the same despite their differences. By about a year of age, babies stop hearing many of these differences, having standardized these phonemes through a process of categorization and blending. By now, babies have started discovering patterns in the strings of phonemes and acquiring six to nine new words every day, just from the examples they hear -- long before they begin speaking them. [53] In turn, these words and strings of words can be categorized too - you can imagine the analogy of a ―category of trees‖, with underlying groups of ―category of branches‖ and ‖category of leaves‖. These phonemes, words and word strings are auditory counterparts of ―objects‖ in the visual domain and may be processed like other objects, in the domain of object consciousness, both by animals and humans. Even if phonemes remain meaningless the words start acquiring meaning -- symbolization. This is the stage when an ―auditory experience defining an object‖ is shifted from ―object consciousness‖ to the domain of ―symbol consciousness‖. ―You might well consider children to behave like ‗sponges‘ soaking up words and phrases - but this notion implies passive acquisition. It appears the process is more active.‖[53] Young children tend to pile up words atop the phonemes, pyramid fashion, to construct new compound structures made from simpler building blocks. But the process does not end here - they do it all over again to string words into sentences. Discovering patterns in the strings of words they hear and inferring the grammar of that particular language: They infer ways of making past tenses, plurals and nested phrases. All of this is happening very early - between the ages of 18 and 36 months. Once appropriately grounded they are ready to take off - detecting patterns on even longer time scales – group of sentences - we may call it a nice story. They infer that a satisfying story has a have a beginning, middle, and a wrap-up ending - and then they start demanding proper endings to their bedtime stories."[53]

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Speech thus acquired could have been an instrument of transmission of knowledge, skills and ideas to the other members of the tribe and to the next generation. It would start a feedback loop when ever-increasing repertoire of skills, information and knowledge would ―force‖ a parallel development of speech to cater for this expanding canvas of events. Thus, speech, instead of being an engine of this ―revolution‖, could simply be the result of increased demand for words and expressions to cater for the events and thoughts generated by our ―creative imagination‖. Dichotomy of Mind and Body The mind-body problem concerns the explanation of the relationship, if there is one, that exists between mind / mental processes, and bodily states / bodily processes. Plato approached this problem by placing our ―material body‖ in a material world while placing soul in the world of ideas – soul, for him, therefore was as immortal as an idea. He explained life as a temporary union of the soul with its material body which would get separated from it at death – Soul would, then, return to the world of Forms. [Wikipedia] He also would believe that since the soul does not exist within limits of physical space and time, as the body does, it can access universal truths. [Wikipedia] Several questions about consciousness must be resolved in order to acquire a full understanding of this problem. These questions include, but are not limited to, whether being conscious could be wholly described in physical terms, such as the aggregation of neurons, synapses, electric impulses and other neural processes in the brain. [Wikipedia] It follows that if consciousness cannot be explained exclusively by physical events in the brain, it must transcend the capabilities of physical systems and require an explanation of non-physical means. [Wikipedia] Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world. Imagine a European turning on the radio to hear a speech in the Chinese language. He can hear ―something‖ – this is perception of a stimulus -- but in order to make sense of it all, he has to relate each Chinese word to its respective ―symbols‖ of objects, actions, etc., and then string all these symbols together, within the rules of reason, to come up with a coherent idea about the speech. This question can be put to rest if we can somehow make a ―conscious machine‖ (more on this later). However, this problem can be largely resolved, at least on the philosophical level, when we consider the world, its objects, rules and actions in a prototype symbolic way. These ―symbolic‖ objects and events get processed in the domain of imagination – within the framework of rules – to yield certain conclusions. These conclusions in turn are nothing more than another set of ―objects and events‖, albeit in the domain of imagination. This resultant object/event can itself become the starting point for a fresh set of processing in our imagination – acting as a feedback loop to create a ―nested surrogate reality‖. This

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process can continue until the final result may seem so detached from the realm of reality that we would struggle to define this state – say, for example, surrealistic existence of mathematics. We may call this state ―consciousness‖. This process of feedback loop will create a landscape of virtual events, all possible but existent only in our mind. This apparent dichotomy would explain the apparent dichotomy of mind and the physical world. This process of symbol categorization and remembering the rules of reason is inherently dependent upon the ―memory function‖. Loss of recent memory – as would generally happen at the beginning of dementia -- would impair proper acquisition and categorization of ―new‖ events and objects (and learning new rules of reasons although new rules are very uncommon) – but previously acquired ―rules of reason‖ are still preserved giving him a semblance of consciousness. Decline of old memory, as seen in advancing dementia, would gradually extinguish ―old” functions, objects, classes and rules - now we would discern a parallel decline in the conscious state. Creativity Since olden days, creativity was seen as a gift of gods – a matter of divine inspiration, giving a person that unique ability to ―see‖ and discover what is hidden from the ordinary. To describe this facility – in those rare gifted beings, Romans and Greeks invoked the concept of a creative "daemon" (Greek) or "genius" (Latin) and linked it to the sacred and the divine.[Wikipedia] This concept of creative genius, sans divinity, is still very close and relevant in our modern times. [33] Concluding his survey of scientific research into creativity, Michael Mumford summarizes that ―creativity involves the production of novel, useful products‖. [30] 11 Rather than being a uniform, monolithic entity / activity, creativity, rightfully, can mean different things to different people. The Little-c/Big-C model [31] defined "creativity" either as something new and relatively rare in a historical sense (major scientific discoveries or great works of art) Big-C; or as producing something new in a personal sense -- an apparent innovation for the creator, regardless of whether others have made similar innovations already or whether others value the particular act of creation, Little-c.[Wikipedia] This approach was further modified by James C. Kaufman and Beghetto into a four-C model. 12 It helped us to clearly demarcate the spectrum of

11

Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking, developed in 1966, aim to quantify the extent of divergent thinking and other problem-solving skills. Three broad areas are tested for scoring: Fluency – the total number of interpretable, meaningful and relevant ideas generated in response to a stimulus; Originality – the statistical rarity of (viably problem solving) responses among the test subjects; and Elaboration – the amount of detail in the responses. 12

mini-c: transformative learning, which means "finding a meaningful interpretations and insights of objects, actions, events and experiences, in personal domain"; little-c: everyday problem solving and creative expression; Pro-C: exhibited by people who are professionally or vocationally creative but not eminent (a surgeon finds a new

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creativity in any creative endeavor – ranging from the creative domain of the amateur un-apprenticed at the bottom of creative domain laddersurrealis through the professional who has achieved domain-competency to the far end of creative genius. By using Kaufman‘s four-C model of creativity we were also able to explain other models and theories of creativity that put greater emphasis upon domain-competence as an essential component, and domain transformation as the highest mark of creativity.[32] [Wikipedia]

It appears that creative thinking goes along a different path with trying to find the solution to a problem. In this context, we can draw a distinction between convergent and divergent thinking. [34] Events that are frequently observed become a part of our consciousness and we categorize them as ―obvious‖. Convergent thinking would make use of this proven ―obvious‖ path for a predetermined outcome to solve run-of-the-mill problems. Here the symbolized objects and events are manipulated according to ―convention‖ – as we saw our parents doing - generating acceptable commonplace solutions to the problem. It is ―thinking within the box‖. But what if do not want the outcome to be the same, what if we want the outcome to be just that bit different from the out of the box solution? Here we would allow our imagination to play with the objects and events in multiple and novel ways to generate numerous and novel solutions – one of which might provide for that ―different outcome‖ – it is called divergent thinking. ―Novelty‖ that is required to think divergently often results from one‘s ability to group objects, events and rules ―loosely‖ according to the prototype theory and by neural cross-talk and uncommon ―connectivity‖ of sensory events as is often seen in ―synesthetes‖. Arguably, the essence of art and creativity is metaphor. Metaphor is just a convenient shorthand for making connection of cognitive phenomena, which to ordinary people, are only distantly related – her blue eyes were deep as a lake, her hair rippled like ocean waves, etc. In here, the far-flung parts of one‘s brain related to different perceptions and ideas are ―unusually‖ cross connected. These ―creative people‖ can invoke ―weak‖ associations and similarities of the sensory perceptions which is obscured in normally connected people hidden in the noise of the background jitter. That is exactly what appears to happen in the minds of synesthetes.[50]

stitching technique – most of the science articles fall into this category); and Big-C: reserved for those insights which are considered truly great and have ―domain changing‖ effect in their field (e.g., Max Plank‘s Quantum Theory).

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According to the famous neuroscientist Ramachandran, all of us in the human species have a bit of perceptual cross-talk. "All of us synesthetes, at least to some extent," he declaress before proposing a test. Look at the shapes above. Imagine that one is named "kiki" and the other "booba". Which one is which? Doesn‘t the shape at right strikes you as kiki and booba is at left? Most of us would relate the jaggedness of the shape on the right with the abruptness of the phonemes in kiki, while the shape on the left with its rounded shape would appear to correspond well with the rolling sounds of booba.[50] Now imagine an Urdu word ―qeh-qa-ha‖ which means laughing out loud:

Not only does the sound of the word reproduce the staccato effect of laughter, but the word itself seems to be happily ―showing its teeth‖. This sort of sensory distortion is called illusion when it is generally shared by a vast majority of people. But if an Illusion stays within the perceptual boundaries of a single individual - is not shared universally it would become a feature of schizotypy (see later). According to Ramachandran, what appears to be a metaphoric illusion to people at large is a literal sensory experience for a creative artist – his world has been distorted to some extent by cross-linked neural pathways to induce illusions. That may explain, he said, why synesthesia is eight times more common among poets, artists and novelists than in the general population. [50] Divergent thinking is sometimes used as a synonym for creativity in psychology literature. [Wikipedia]

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Considering the preceding discussion, every act of new problem solving can be considered as an act of creativity (even at the level of mini-c). As we believe that creativity can only occur in the domain of symbol-consciousness, therefore any act of creativity – but Big-C in particular - would need the objects, actions and events to be symbolized, for the proposed model to work. This also means that creativity cannot take place in the domain of objectconsciousness. Imitation behavior without understanding causal relationship does not demand any thinking at all. Only in the domain of symbol-consciousness may these symbols be manipulated with ease and rules of reasons applied to the whole category efficiently so that causal relationships can be established. Introduce a scattering of schizotypy and the scene is set for imagination to run wild with divergent thinking modifying symbolized objects and events – to the extent of distorting the rules of reason. This modification of object, event or rules of reason in such a novel way to come up with a useful product with unique and novel properties and function is called ―creativity‖. Creativity demands that objects and rules are handled ―divergently‖ in an out-of-the-box fashion. Take the example of Picasso‘s painting ―Girl before mirror‖.

―Examine closely and you would find symbols – some obvious some subtle, open for interpretation - within different parts of this painting. Look at the woman‘s face, for example, it is painted with a side profile as well as a full frontal image. This is a distortion of rules of reason – normally you should not be able to see both the profile

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and the frontal view from a single point of observation. Profile of her face shows her face more like a woman, all dolled up wearing her makeup during the day time. The other side portrays her at night emphasized with the rough charcoal texture (see another violation of the rule – linearity of time) looking younger, vulnerable and sad without the mask of her makeup‖. [41] Coming back to the thought process and creativity, let us think a little out of the box, When symbolized objects are taken into the thought domain, we have a perception of an object without a real one being there. Compare it with the act of hallucination – you are imagining objects and actions without an outside stimulus. Now processing these images and events divergently in order to reach various possible conclusions simultaneously -- compare it with thought disorder – to come up with a novel solution in the end you believe is correct -- compare it with delusion. Some of the conclusions proposed by the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics were in fact considered delusions by the ―saner‖ colleagues of Max Plank (see more in the later discussion of schizotypy). If even a simple act of solving a mundane problem is a sort of creative work (mini-c), can animals be considered ―creative‖ when they solve their problems? But before we grant this label to a stereotype, un-thought-out action, imitated because it happened to be successful, we must think first about imitation -- making an object or perform an act (as one would see, or hear, or sense) resembling the original as closely as possible. As previously discussed, a lot of apparently intelligent animal behavior may be no more than imitation or ―social learning‖. There is, no doubt, a significant chunk of animal behavior, seen from primates to crows, which could not have happened without their having an ―insight‖ of the problem. Modification of material to make task-specific tools is but one example. It appears that some ―rudimentary object-specific‖ insight and creativity is possible in the domain of ―object-consciousness‖ but the contribution of ―symbol-consciousness‖ in the animal ―creativity‖ would need further experimentation. Schizotypy and Schizoid personality disorder Schizotypy is a psychological concept which considers a continuous spectrum starting from normal dissociative, imaginative states to more extreme states related to schizophrenia. [Wikipedia] This concept of gradation of imagination from normal to frank hallucination stands in contrast to the categorical view of psychosis, where the sharply defined compartment of schizophrenia stands apart from normalcy. 13

13

Four characteristic features of schizotypy are: Unusual experiences -- disposition to have unusual perceptual and other cognitive experiences, such as hallucinations, and magical or superstitious interpretation of these experiences. Visual hallucinations operate on a spectrum starting with over-acuteness of the senses to illusions in the middle and

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There is evidence in experimental psychology to suggest that in schizotypal population there is a relative weakness of inhibitory neurological mechanisms. [Wikipedia] One consequence of this weakness of inhibitory mechanisms in high schizotypes and schizophrenics might be a weakened homeostasis in the central nervous system which could lead to episodes of hyper-arousal and then sleep as a provoked reaction. [35][36] Similarities between Stage 1 sleep and psychosis have been recognized, which include hallucinations, delusions, and flattened or inappropriate affect (emotions). [37][38] According to this model, on account of their tendency to high arousal, schizotypes and schizophrenics are people who are liable to ‗micro-sleeps‘, or intrusions of Stage 1 sleep phenomena into waking consciousness. [Wikipedia] Empathy and Conscience Our ability to empathize with others facing a tragic situation may be explained by the previously described method of reductive symbolism. We are aware of ourselves -- the ―self-concept‖. Even animals have a limited awareness of ―self‖ as evidenced by the mirror test.14 As a result of this self-awareness, one would realize that one‘s body, though different and special in a lot of way, is very much a part of this world of objects and events. Therefore, the objective properties and rules of reason are equally applicable to his ―self‖. If fire could incinerate other similar objects, the same would happen to his own body if it is subjected to the fire. Treating ourselves like all the other objects, events and rules, we can also apply the rules of categorization to ourselves. We know that we belong to a family group – even animals do – then we belong to our clan, our racial/religious group, national group and to humanity at large – an ever actual hallucinations on the far end. Cognitive disorganization -- a tendency for thoughts to become derailed, disorganized or to invoke tangential associations with the objects and events situated at the ―periphery‖ of the ―prototype class‖. Introverted anhedonia -- a tendency to be introverted, emotionally flat in social behavior, with decreased ability to feel pleasure from social and physical stimuli. Impulsive nonconformity -- disposition to unstable mood and behavior, particularly with regard to rules and social conventions. 14

In the mirror test devised by Gordon G. Gallup, an animal's skin is marked in some way while it is asleep or sedated, and it is then allowed to see its reflection in a mirror; if the animal spontaneously directs grooming behavior towards the mark, that is taken as an indication that it is aware of itself. Self-awareness, by this criterion, has been reported for chimpanzees and also for other great apes, the European Magpie, some cetaceans and a solitary elephant, but not for monkeys. The mirror test has attracted controversy among some researchers because it is entirely focused on vision, the primary sense in humans, while other species rely more heavily on other senses such as the olfactory sense in dogs. It has been suggested that metacognition in some animals provides some evidence for cognitive self-awareness. The great apes, dolphins, and rhesus monkeys have demonstrated the ability to monitor their own mental states and use an "I don't know" response to avoid answering difficult questions. These species might also be aware of the strength of their memories. Unlike the mirror test, which relies primarily on body images and bodily self-awareness, uncertainty monitoring paradigms are focused on the kinds of mental states that might be linked to mental self-awareness. A different approach to determine whether a non-human animal is conscious derives from passive speech research with a macaw. Some researchers propose that by passively listening to an animal's voluntary speech, it is possible to learn about the thoughts of another creature and to determine that the speaker is conscious. This type of research was originally used to investigate a child's crib speech by Weir (1962) and in investigations of early speech in children by Greenfield and others (1976). With [? needed speech-capable birds, the methods of passive-speech research open a new avenue for investigation. Wikipedia]

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increasing circle. We can see our family members perhaps as individuals, but in a larger group of ―Germans‖, for example, we have just a vague idea of a German – a class property, a symbol only. As we are aware of belonging to a particular group – by extension we become part of the class-symbol as well. In this scenario ―I‖ am aware of being part of a symbolic ―class entity‖ called ―humans‖. Now one human experience can be extended to every other object (human) included in this class -- conceptual blending. Because I am also a part of this class, a story/sight of torture of any human being can induce ―emotional pain‖ of the sort experienced by the real victim – being part of this class called ―humans‖. This ability to stand in ―someone else‘s shoes‖ is the root of all the ethics, fair play and justice – because we would find it abhorrent/unpleasant if justice/fair-play is denied to us. Armies all over the world know that if you de-humanize a person (enemy) then killing him becomes much easier – almost a ―sport‖. Feeling revulsion at the sight of animals being tortured is similar – because we belong to a broader class of animals. Note that we feel much less bothered by trees being mutilated and perhaps not at all if stones could be ―mutilated‖.

Ethics: Need for ethical rules and behavior arose when splintered family groups of prehumen ancestors coalesced to form tribes. Selective pressure to go along this path has already been discussed in the section of ―culture‖ (page-2). An individual or a family group operates within the Darwinian model - The winner takes all and less successful ones are pushed to the margins forcing them to adapt to unexplored ecological niches Failing to do so, they become extinct. In this battle of survival there are no ethics – A lion devouring a young defenseless wider beast is considered just natural and no ethical term of cruelty is applied. Moving on from family groups governed by Darwinian model to a tribal structure incurred survival advantage to the whole group – being able to defend and encroach, collective hunting, and communal care etc. In a sense a tribe has become a ―superorganism‖ and each member gets survival advantage when the tribe survives. (see below) Individual sacrifices big or small, for the tribal advantage, in this context, become explicable – these are geared to defend his own kin/genes in the tribe. Similar behavior is seen in social animals – honey bees – where distribution of labor and individual hard work of worker bees and sacrifice of soldiers would result in the survival of the colony and its genes. Working of a honey bee colony from the context of an individual worker bee is totally exploitative – barred from reproducing condemned to hard labor till death.

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But remember she is the daughter of the same queen – a princess indeed – soldiers dying in defense of the colony is the offspring of the same mother. Getting injured or dying for the colony is in defense of one‘s own genetic survival. A honey bee colony has become a ―super-organism‖. One might imagine folding ones arms over the head to protect it from a blow – arms are courting injury to protect the head for the sake of survival of the organism. But genetically determined Darwinian compulsions - to grab it all for yourself, lingers on just beneath the surface. Some tribal members may not share the hunt or do very little in return for the protection and ―social security‖ provided by the tribe to become ―free loader‖. In response, the tribe evolves practices to discourage such antisocial behavior. These behaviors evolve over period of time and get ever more sophisticated as ever increasing numbers of conflicts are catered for. These enforced cultural practices are the advent of ethical behavior. Anyone caught breaking these rules is reprimanded and punished with the ultimate punishment of banishment from the tribe – ―withdrawal of physical & social security‖ of the tribe. These ethics are only operative to the extent of the tribe. Each tribe now becomes an organism engaged in perpetual Darwinian struggle with other tribes/organism in this battle of survival of the fittest. You might well imagine nation states as tribe and a ―super-big organism‖ with its rules and ethics for its own tribal members, but when facing competition from a different tribe/nation code of conduct drifts increasingly towards the Darwinian struggle – becoming ever more pronounced with increasing tribal/national dissimilarities.

Honor The word ―honor‖, not surprisingly, can carry a variety of meanings because ―honor‖ is a social construct very similar to the concept of ―beauty‖. In diverse cultures beauty has different attributes. Similarly ―Honor‖ can have an extended spectrum of meanings. It would depict those actions or behaviors considered ―honorable‖ in a particular society. But here I would use this word in the sense used by Dr. Samuel Johnson in his Dictionary of the English Language (1755). He defined honor as "nobility of soul, magnanimity, and a scorn of meanness." This sort of honor is derived from the ―perceived‖ virtuous conduct and personal integrity of the person endowed with it. [Wikipedia] Definition of ―virtuous conduct‖ and ―personal

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integrity‖ is again dependent upon the cultural norms and society often confers ―social advantage‖ to those who exhibit these traits. To explain it let us do a thought experiment: Imagine one is in a position to dispense justice – Dispensation of justice, in any culture, would demand ―impartiality‖ and ―fair-play‖. What happens if ―fair‖ and ―impartial‖ decision can only be delivered at your own expense (causing loss to you personally)? What would you do? It is a hard question; it is a question of being honorable – isn‘t it? The question is, ―What is the reason for the existence of a person, willing to do justice at his own expense?‖ It appears that this ―ability‖ originated in the humans with the onset of ―prototypic classification‖ – with it we were able to categorize ourselves with other humans – could stand in their shoes, feel their emotions and suffer their pains and then could empathize with them. Once we recognize that empathy and desire for fair play has its roots in our ability to categorize ourselves with other human beings, it is not hard to imagine the vestiges of honor taking root here. Sometimes in a particular situation a person needs to sacrifice his personal gains in order to uphold the ideals of fair play and justice. This conflict of interests – one (rooted in our primordial survival skills) to be selfish and get away with what we can and the other (acquired late during symbol consciousness) to be conscientious and play a fair game, when we stand in his shoes – is not easy to resolve. Primitive ―Darwinian‖ drives for self-advantage are pretty strong. The constructs of ―justice and fair play‖ can override this primitive drive only in those few where this acquired function (symbol consciousness) has become strong enough to overcome the previously mentioned ―animal drive‖. I would call it ―animal drive‖ because that is what we share with animals, where symbol consciousness and categorization has remained rudimentary at best. People who would successfully tread this path are, necessarily, endowed with a higher level of symbol consciousness, and we esteem them through cultural practices as ―defenders of ethical code of conduct‖ – see section ―ethics‖ page 27. The social advantage bestowed by society -- in recognition of honorable behavior – may compensate for the ―Darwinian disadvantage‖; and it may be the cause for this trait to survive. We may conclude that the lack of ―social recognition‖ of ―conscientious fair play‖ in some societies may be the prime reason for sustained ―Darwinian‖ behavior of individuals in such environments. Self-Awareness Self-awareness is the capacity of an individual to introspect and to be able to perceive himself as an individual separate from the environment and other individuals. [Wikipedia] By virtue of being self-aware an individual can focus his attention onto himself, not only in the physical domain but also in the domain of symbol consciousness -- including thinking about thinking. He is now able to evaluate and compare current events and his

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―actions‖ against the ―rules of reason‖ – which include the rules governing empathy, justice and fair play – and thereby becomes self-conscious as an objective evaluator of his own deeds. In order to understand the origin of self-awareness, we have to consider developmental processes in a child. In the womb, the baby has an existence which can be described as ―half independent‖; for his bodily functions he is still dependent upon his mother. Through her placenta she provides nourishment and filters out waste material, and the physical space in which he exists are all controlled by her. It is not surprising that a newborn has somewhat ambiguous awareness of his body (and his bodily needs); he would cry with hunger and pain, and that is about all. At this stage, perhaps, he perceives his body and surrounding environment as a continuum. A little later you may see a mother playing ―piggies‖ with her child – by now the child has started to realize that touching his own toes and tickling them produces a different sensation than doing the same to another human being. This brings the realization that sensory inputs and motor action of a particular segment of environment (his body) touching, chewing, swallowing, moving, grasping, getting hurt and getting tickled – are special. Even if the hand being touched looks the same, there is a hand – his own hand -- in this physical space which is special. It belongs to him and he has control over it. This realization that a group of objects in the physical world is ―me‖ and this group of objects called ―myself‖ is under my control in a way which is quite different from all others around is the onset of self-awareness in the physical sense. With the advent of symbol consciousness he can symbolize this group of objects called ―self‖ in the same way as all the other objects, including the actions and events related to it. Rules of reason can be applied to them like anywhere else – so the objects and actions of ―self‖ can be reasoned as well. Now he has gained the capacity for selfscrutiny and introspection. Continued awareness of self over a period of time, from the past to the present, is nothing more than a memory of the group of objects and events related to ―self‖. Machine Consciousness Can we create a machine which is conscious in the ―human‖ way? Turing asked this question and an annual competition to win the Loebner Prize seems to bring up better and better programs. But my hunch would be that in order to mimic a human, the machine must have following characteristics: 1. It should have ―sensory organs‖ in order to capture the sensory input. Cameras for eyes, microphones for ears, tactile sensors, etc. – already achieved. 2. It should be able to make sense of these inputs from the camera picture; it should be able to identify objects, their relative positions and their layout.

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3. Once recognized, it should also be able to symbolize objects and events*. 4. It should be able to categorize objects and events in a ―prototypical way‖ and thereby attach properties to each of them. Some of these properties would be absolute while others would be graded (through a database perhaps)*. 5. It should infer actions from the position, gesture and expressions of the recognized objects (maybe from a stored database). 6. It should infer outcomes from previously inferred actions (maybe from a database of actions and outcomes). 7. It must have repertoire of the whole table of ―rules of reason‖ and be able to apply them appropriately to these objects/events. 8. It should have the ability to ―self-learn‖ from the sensory inputs. By repeated ―observation‖ of objects and events bracketed in the same class and related outcomes, it should be able to project the statistical likelihood of an event or object action when a similar ―object‖ or action is next detected. New objects, actions, properties of objects/actions and related outcomes must be automatically acquired and stored in a database. May have to be taught like a child. 9. It may have to have at least a rudimentary ―creativity‖ (mini-c) to pass the test of being conscious – a difficult requirement. Proto-typical classification of objects/events, if achieved, would blur rigid class boundaries, allowing some flexibility, but to be really creative one would need to bend the ―appropriate‖ set of rules of reason just enough -- a very delicate balance. Failing this, the machine would start churning out worthless garbage – machine equivalent of schizophrenia. * Not essential if we want consciousness to be restricted to the rudimentary level.

So what is it to be a human? In the end we come back full circle and ask – what is it to be a human? Each one of us would have a different way of summing it up. For me, our path from a homo to homosapiens is marked by two landmark events. The first one gave us the ability to symbolize and loosely categorize objects and events in ―prototype‖ groups, and the second one, perhaps more importantly, gave us the ability to imagine, dream, or even hallucinate on demand. The second event was perhaps a genetic mutation which got inserted in our genome to induce the mildest form of schizotypy -- to give us our ―imagination‖ and ―divergent symbol processing‖ in the realm of thought ―regna cogitatio‖. I would venture to suggest that every ―normal‖ human being has a schizotypal component. Remove it and he would lose the power of thought experimentation. This schizotypal character must be mild enough to retain his thought experimentation ―strictly

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limited‖ within the ―rules of reason‖. Going down the road a bit further, the sharp boundaries of objects and events begin to fray and the stranglehold of the ―rules of reason‖ begins to loosen. Now the imagination has been liberated, it can go divergent, non-linear and tangential -- a hallmark of creativity (see the example of Picasso‘s painting above). Going down the path any further, the realm of imagination starts melding with reality – objects and the events in one‘s ―thought domain‖ cannot be differentiated from those in the physical world, and to make matters worse, application of the rules of reason breaks down completely. He has gone all the way to madness now -- perhaps the story of Vincent van Gogh. This trait of imagination and thought experiment bestows an ―advantage‖. This might well explain the persistence of schizotypy range, in spite of the poor reproductive potential of its sufferer. It could also explain why schizophrenia is so uniquely human and there are no animal models for this disease. I would venture to predict that a similar mutation might have occurred, by chance, in New Caledonian crows Corvus moneduloides, so they could well be the first animals that will be found to suffer from schizophrenia.

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