1994 MayJune Docket Call

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U'- ItiV  ta'  let  ilng 
1018    r ~ s t o n 6th  fl 
Houston  TX  77002 
DOCI(ETa[[--
May/June  1994  A Publication of Harris  County Criminal  Lawyers  Association 
Randy McDonald 
Tanya L.  Elliott 
Loren A.  Detamore 
Winston E.  Cochran, Jr. 
Paul St.  John 
Charles L.  Henke, Jr. 
George Parnham 
Lloyd W. Oliver 
Sandra Gary 
Bob Mabry 
Mark A. Goldberg 
1994  CANOl  ·AlES 
HCClA 
Officers &  Directors 
1993-1994 
President  ..... ....Dan  Cogdell 
President-Elect  ........ ..... ......Jim Skelton 
Vice-President  ... .... . ... ....Deborah A.  Gottlieb 
Treasurer  ..... . .... .... .........Dick  Wheelan 
Secretary  .David Cunningham 
Immediate Past President.  . .Kent A. Schaffer 
Chairman of the  Board  ......... .  George  Parnham 
Directors: 
W.B. Bennie House, Jr. 
Marjorie A.  Meyers 
Ron  Hayes 
Daniel  Wannamaker 
Kenneth  W.  Smith 
Allen  C.  Isbell 
Rosemary Garza 
Rick Brass 
Joseph A.  Porto 
Mary E.  Conn 
Lloyd W.  Oliver 
Mark A.  Goldberg 
Danny  Easterling 
Wayne  Heller 
Clyde  Williams 
Past-Presidents  1971-1993 
C.  Anthony  Friloux  (1972-1973) 
Stuart  Kinard  (1973-1974) 
George  Luquette  (1974-1975) 
Marvin O. Teague  (1975-1976) 
Dick  DeGuerin  (1976-1977) 
W.  B.  "Bennie" House, Jr.  (1977-1978) 
David  R.  Bires  (1978-1979) 
Woody  Densen  (1979-1980) 
Will  Gray  (1980-1981) 
Edward A. Mallett  (1981-1982) 
Carolyn Garcia  (1982-1983) 
Jack B. Zimmermann  (1983-1984) 
Clyde  Williams  (1984-1985) 
Robert  Pelton  (1985-1986) 
Candelario  Elizondo  (1986-1987) 
Allen  C.  Isbell  (1987-1988) 
David  Mitcham  (1988-1989) 
Jim  E.  Lavine  (1989-1990) 
Rick  Brass  (1990-1991) 
Mary E.  Conn  (1991-1992) 
Kel1/lA.  Schaffer  (1992-1993) 
President's Club 
David  Cunningham 
Kent  A.  Schaffer 
Docket Call 
Editor  ....... . . ...... _.. . ....Allen  C. Isbell 
Associate Editor  ..........Robert  Pelton 
Design & Production  .. .Donna  K.  Kleszcz 
ADVERTISING  RATES 
Full Page  $300.00 
112  Page  $150.00 
114  Page  $75.00 
Business card size  $37.50 
Distribulion500 copies per issue. Articles  and  other edi-
toriat  contributions  shoutd  be  sent  to  the  Editor,  202 
Travis ,  Suite  208,  Houston  77002  or  the  Association 
office  at  405 Main  SI. , 303, Houston  77002  Telephone 
(713)  227-2404. 
2  DOCKET CALL 
DOCKET CALL  May/June 1994 
Contents 
Hearsay  .......................................................4 
Sentencing Options 1994, Part II  ...................................5 
To  Tell The Truth  ...............................................12 
Illegal Expenditure or Investment Statute  ..........................15 
A Fair Trial at Last? Theus, and The Criminal Defendant with "Priors"  ..18 
Perusing the Code of Judicial Conduct  ............................20 
Update on  The Value of a Jury Consultant  ... , ......................23 
ELECTIONS 1994 
June 14 & 15, 1994 - Criminal Courthouse 
301  San  Jacinto,  Cafeteria area - 9 to  12 noon 
PLEASE VOTE!
Annual Banquet - June 30,1994 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 
WEDNESDAY APPELLATE UPDATES 
30 I  San Jacinto 
12:00 noon,  I 77th  Di strict  Court 0 1:00 MCLE 
July 1,1994  HCCLA Nuts &  Bolts Seminar Series 1994 
183rd  Dist rict  Courtroom,  30 I  San Jacinto,  12:00 Noon  Friday. 
Federal Guilty Pleas - David Gerger 
August 5, 1994  Criminal Appeals - Kris Woldy 
June 9,  1994 
July  14,1994 
HCCLA Board Meeting, Thursday  noon,  Scanlan  Bldg. , 
405  Main, 2nd  floor  conference 
HCCLA Luncheon Meeting 
Treebeard' s  at The Church,  1117  Texas,  2nd  fl . church  aud. 
12:00 noon Thursday. 
June 23,1994 
Senator John  Whitmire - Criminal Justice Reforms 
July 21,  1994 
June 14  &  15,1994 
Annual Elections - Criminal Courthouse 
301  San Jacinto - Cafeteria Area - 9-12 noon 
June 30,1994 
Annual  Banquet - The Houstonian - 6:30 pm 
.July  17-30,  1994 
Trial Practice Institute Summer 1994 
NCDC, Macon,  GA,  call  (912)  746-4151 
July 9-16, 1994 
Western Trial Advocacy Institute 
14th Annual  Criminal  Defense Seminar emphasizing 
Communication and  Trial  Skill s,  Laramie,  Wyoming. 
For information call  (307) 766-2422. 
"Law  will  never  be  strong  or  respected  unless  it  has  the  sentiment  of  the  people 
behind  it.  If the  people  of a  State  make  bad  laws  they  will  suffer  for  it.  They  will 
be  the  first  to  suffer.  Suffering  and  nothing  else  will  implant  that  sentiment  of 
responSibility  which  is  the  first step  to  reform." 
by  James  Bryce, American Commonwealth,  Vol.  I,  pg. 352 
MAY/JUNE  1994 
Elections 1994 - HCClA Board of Directors 
About The Nominees: 
George L.  Parnham 
Admitted  to  State  Bar of Texas.  1969; also  admit-
ted  to  practice  U.S.  Supreme  Court;  U.S. COUl1  of 
Appeals,  Fifth  and  Eleventh  Circuits;  U.S.  District 
COllrt  for  the  Southern  District  of Texas.  Education: 
Loyola  University (B.S.,  1963); University  of Texas 
at  Austin  (J.D.,  1970).  Board  Certified,  Criminal 
law,  1983.  Member:  Houston  and  Federal  Bar 
Associations;  State  Bar  of Texas;  Texas  Trial 
lawyers  Association;  Charter  Member  of  Harris 
County  Criminal  lawyers  Ass ociation  (current 
Chairman  of  the  Board);  Texas  Criminal  Defense 
lawyers  Association;  National  Criminal  Defense 
lawyers  Association;  American  Trial  lawyers 
Association, Climinal  Division.  Have  guest  lectured 
in  criminal  law  courses  at  South  Texas  College  of 
law;  published  an  article  on  Criminal 
Discovery/Search  and  Sei zure  in  "Docket  Call"  and 
have  tried  cases in  numerous  state  and  federal  juris-
dictions throughout  the  United States. 
Paul  St. John 
I am  a native Texan  and  a twenty-seven  year  resi-
dent  of  Houston.  I  received  a  Bachelor  of Arts 
degree  in  Psychology  from  the  University  of 
Oklahoma  in  1982,  and  a  Doctor  of  Juri sprudence 
degree  from  The University  of Houston  in  1985. 
I am  admitted  to  practice before  the  United  States 
d.istrict  of  Texas,  as  well  as  the  Fifth  Circuit  Court 
of Appeals. 
Since  1990, my  practice  has  focused  primarily on 
the  defense  of the  criminally  accused.  My  member-
ships  include  the  Harris  County  Criminal  lawyers 
Association,  Texas  Criminal  Defen se  lawyers 
Association.  State Bar of Texas, College of the  State 
Bar,  Houston  Bar  Association,  Houston  Young 
lawyer s  Association  and  the  American  Bar 
Association.  I  have  been  active  on  several  HBA 
committees  and  have  served  for  the  last  two  years 
on  the  State  Bar  Penal  Code  and  Criminal 
Procedure Committee. 
Lloyd W.  Oliver 
Background  and  Education:  Former 
Teacher/Coach,  Sheriff's  Deputy,  Prosecutor, 
Criminal  Defendant,  Inmate,  Notary  Public,  Trial 
lawyer  for  18  years  - Criminal  Courts  of  Harris 
County;  Board  Certified,  School  of  Hard  Knocks, 
often  in  contempt of court. 
Sandra Gary 
r am  a  refornled  Hanis  County  Prosecutor  seek-
ing the  position  of Secretary  for  H.C.C.L.A . My  job 
qualifications  include  writing  skills  perfected  by 
copious  note-taking  from  D.A.  file s.  And  as  my 
clients  will  attest.  1 am  willing  to  work  long,  hard 
hours  for  little  or  no  pay.  On  a serious  note,  I am  a 
oraduate  of Texas  A&M  University  and  U.  of  H. 
Law  School.  I have  counseled juveniles on  a volun-
teer  basis  and  1 am  active  in  my  church.  I welcome 
your suppOIt. 
Kenneth W.  Smith 
Graduated  Pan  America  University  with  a  B.A. 
1973  and  University  of  Houston  with  a  J.D.  1976. 
licensed  to  practice  law  1976.  Member  of 
HCClA,  TCDlA,  HBA,  and  the  State  Bar. 
Director of HCClA for  2 years.  Contributed  articles 
to  Docket Call . 
Loren A.  Detamore 
r am  a  cross  between  a  "damn  yankee"  and 
practically  native  Texas.  A "damn  yankee"  having 
been  born,  raised  and  gone  to  school  in  Columbus, 
Ohio, and  practically  native Texas  Jiving  in  Houston 
since  1966.  Having  gone  to  and  graduated  from  The 
Ohio  State  University  (pre  Woody  Hayes),  Bachelor 
of Chemical  Engineering,  I'm  a "buckeye"  which  is 
defined  as  a worthless  inedible  nut  similar to a chest· 
nut.  It  took  three  law  sc hool s,  University  of 
Houston,  University  of Tulsa,  and  finally  Duquesne 
University,  Pittsburgh  for  J.D.  1964.  I  have  been 
practicing  criminal  law  almost  exclusively  since 
1983. 
Judy Prince 
1 have  been  a member of HalTis  County  Criminal 
Lawyers  Association  since  1991,  when  1 started  my 
practice.  HCClA  hus  the  potential  for  being  much 
more  active,  powerful  and  influential.  I  believe  that 
it  should  be,  and  [ am  willing  to  devote  the  neces-
sary  time  and  hard  work  toward  that  goal.  To 
achieve  this  goal,  r believe  that  we  need  to  increase 
membership.  and  we  could  do  so  by  increasing  the 
benefits of membership. 
There  is  a  wealth  of experience  and  knowledge 
within  the  organization  that  could  be  utilized.  We 
need  to  find  more ways  to  gather and  share  informa-
tion  and  knowledge,  and  we  need  an  active  and 
hard-working  Board  of Directors  who  are  commit-
ted  to  improving  and  strengthening  the  organiza-
tion.  These  are  the  goals  I  would  seek  as  one  of 
your directors. 
J. Charles Whitfield, Jr. 
J.D.  Degree  in  1957  from  South Texas  College of 
law,  Private  practice  since  that  date.  The  last  7 
years  practice  limited  to  Criminal  law.  Board 
Certified  in  Criminal  Law  since  1975. 
Public  Service:  State  Representative  from  Hanis 
County  representing  Harris  County  at  large  for  four 
terms.  ran  for  State  Senate  and  lost.  Ran  for 
Congress  in  1976 and  lost. 
Tanya  L.  Elliott 
Graduate  of South Texas College  of Law  in  1992. 
Intem  Harris  County  Disu'ict  Attorneys  Office  1992. 
Member  of the  Texas  State  Bar since  May,  J993. 
Currently  practicing  in  Criminal  Di strict And  County 
Coults.  Member in  good  standing of HCClA. 
Bob Mabry 
A Houston  native  who  grew  up  in  Deer  Park. 
Bob  Mabry  graduated  from  Au stin  College  in 
Sherman,  Texas  in  1982  with  a  degree  in  philoso-
phy.  While  a  st udent ,  he  successfully  managed  a 
friend's  political  campaign.  He  got  his  J.D ..  from 
South Texas  in  1990.  He  was on  Law  Review  and  is 
admitted  before  local  federal  courts  and  the 
Northern  Di strict.  He  has  been  commissioned  to 
write  an  article  for  Proof  of  Facts  3d.  and  teaches 
Adult  Education  courses  in  law,  philosophy  and 
scripture  at  Emerson  Unitarian  Church.  Bob  hopes 
that  he  might  be  a  voice  on  the  Board  for  younger 
lawyers. 
Charles L.  Henke Jr. 
Education:  The  University  of  Houston  law 
Center.  Houston  Texas·  Juris  Doctor,  May  1992; 
Admitted  State  Bar  of Texas,  Nov.  \992;  Admitted 
U.S.  District  Court.  Southern  District  of Texas,  Feb. 
1993; Admirted  U.S.  District  Court,  Northern  Distlict 
of Texas,  May  1994;  Admitt.ed  U.S .  District  COUlt, 
Eastern  District  of Texas.  May  1994;  Admitted  U.S. 
Coult of Appeal s for  the 5th Circuit, June  1993. 
Nov.  1992  - Present  - Began  my  own  law  prac-
tice  specializing  in  the  representation  of individuals 
in  criminally-related  matters.  With  an  emphasis  on 
white  collar  crime,  I  have  handled  virtually  every 
type  of State criminal  case  as  well  as  a limited  num-
ber of Federal  criminal  <.:ases.  Representative clients 
include  individual s charged  with  capital  murder. 
dru g  crimes,  robbery,  burglary.  sexual  assault. 
assault.  OWl  and  many  more. 
Winston E.  Cochran, Jr. 
Winston  Coch.ran  was  an  assistant  district  attor-
ney  in  FOl1  Bend  County  and  Harris  County  from 
1980  to  1991.  concentrating  on  appeals  and  heaJth 
and  pollution  cases.  He  left  the  D.A. ·s  office  for  an 
unsuccessful  run  for  state  representative  in  1992. 
Since  then  he  has  been  in  private  practice.  concen-
trating  on  criminal  defense.  particularly  appellate 
matters,  with  a  few  civil  cases  as  well.  He  is  con-
tributing  author of the  State  Bar Criminal  Appellate 
Practice manual. 
Mark Goldberg 
Mark  Goldberg  has  been  a  member  of 
H.C.C.L.A . for  seven  years.  During  that  time  he  has 
served  on  the  Board  of Directors and  2 terms  as  the 
organization's treasurer.  He  has  been  responsible  for 
numerous c.L.E. criminal defense  seminars. 
Mark  Goldberg  believes  that  H.C. C.L.A.  as  the 
largest  criminal  defense  specialty  association. 
should  provide  opportunities  for  new  attorneys  to 
learn  defen se  work,  as  well  as  provide  a  fOlum  for 
the  exchange  of  ideas  and  challenges  to  the  mol" 
experienced  defense  attorneys  in  Harris  County. 
FUl1hermore,  H.C.C.L.A.  should  act  as  a  voice  in 
communicating  courthouse  problems  to  the  judges 
and  prosecutors. 
Nominations for 1994-1995
President-Elect: Randy  McDonald, 
George 1.  Parnham 
Vice-President:  Mark  A.  Goldberg, Lloyd 
W.  Oliver 
Secretary: Sandra Gary,  Kenneth  W. 
Smith 
Treasurer: Dick Wheelan,  Loren  A. 
Detamore 
Directors:  Paul  St.  John,  Judith  Martin 
Prince, Kenneth W.  Smith; W.B.  Bennie 
House,  Jr.,  Loren A.  Detamore, J.c. 
Whitfield,  John  E. Crow,  Harry  A.  Loftus, 
Jonathan  Munier,  Will  Outlaw,  Moses 
Sanchez, E.  Ross  Craft, Tanya L. Elliott, 
Bob  Mabry, Dick Wheelan,  Charles L. 
Henke, Jr.,  Winston  E,  Cochran, Jr. 
Elections  will  take  place  on  Tuesday  and 
Wednesday,  June  14  &  15,  1994  at  the 
Criminal  Courthouse  Bldg.,  301  San 
Jacinto,  cafeteria  area  from  9:00  to  12:00 
noon.  PLEASE VOTE! 
DOCKET CALL  3 
MAY/JUNE  1994 
Hearsay
• • • 
by  Allen  C. Isbell 
Rusty  Herman  is  on  a  roll. 
the  5th  Circuit  reversed  and 
ordered  a  case  dismissed;  the  14th 
Court  reversed  and  remanded  a 
non-death  capital  for  trial;  an 
aggravated  assault  dismissed,  and 
a  misdemeanor  assault  dismissed!. 
...1van  Lopez  Victoria  won  a 
reversal  from  the  5th  Circuit  also 
in  a  narcotics  conspiracy  case .... 
Mary  Conn  is  on  the  move.  Her 
new  address  is  3000  Smith,  Tel. 
520-6333. 
The  desperation  of  the  Harris 
County  judiciary  to  beat  lawyers 
at  softball  was  proved  when  they 
invited  WaIter  Boyd  to  play  on 
their  team.  They  won!  due  to 
Boyd's  uncanny  athletic  prowess 
(or so  he  says) .... Judge Ted Poe 
honored  by  the  Cystic  Fibrosis 
Foundation  at  the  ] 994  "Celebrity 
Wai ters  Gala."  Among  the 
celebrity  waiters  were  Judge 
Miron  Love,  Judge  George 
Godwin,  Judge  Eric  Andell, 
Judge  Pat  Lykos,  Jack 
Zimmermann,  Judge  Hannah 
Chow,  Judge  Ruben  Guerrero, 
Judge  Michael  Peters,  Judge 
Brian  Rains,  and  Judge  Carl 
Walker. 
Local  attorneys  will  speak  at 
the  20th  Annual  Advanced 
Criminal  Law  Course  in  Dallas 
July  25-28,  1994:  Cathleen  C. 
Herasimchuk,  John  Ackerman, 
Marjorie  A.  Meyers,  Robert  A. 
Morrow,  Gary  Trichter, 
Catherine  Burnett,  Jim  Lavine, 
Dick  DeGuerin,  and  Judge  Lupe 
Salinas.  For the  20th  year,  yours 
truly's invitation  to  speak was  lost 
in  the  mail. 
Become a 
Member of 
HCCLA! 
Dallas  may  be  a  fun  place  to 
be  in  July,  but  you  need  to  be  in 
Houston  for  the  Criminal  Practice 
Seminar  June  15-18,  1994,  at  the 
SOllth  Texas  College of Law.  This 
is  a  must  for  lawyers  represent-
ing  indigent clients.  To  be certi-
fied  or to be recertified  locally  to 
represent  indigents,  you  must 
attend  all  or  part  of  this  semi-
nar.  In  other  words,  no  atten-
dance;  no  appointments.  This  is  a 
great  seminar,  even  if  you  do  not 
represent  indigents.  It covers  the 
1994 Penal  Code  changes,  the  new 
law  of administrative  license  revo-
cation,  and  other  changes  that 
everyone needs  to  know.  You  can 
earn  21.50  C.L.E.  hours  for  as  lit-
tie  as  $135.00 (HBA  member;  pre-
registration).  Contact  administra-
tive  office  of  the  District  Courts 
for  more  information. 
Lily  Warden  is  now  coordina-
tor  for  Judge  Mejia  (315th 
District Court) .... Misty Jones is 
the  new  coordinator  for  Judge 
Salinas  (351st  District  Court). 
Rosemary  Garza  is  appointed  to 
the  Legal  Services  to  the  Poor  in 
Criminal  Matters  Committee  by 
State Bar President Jim Branton. 
New Members 
Welcome! 
Member Sponsor
Mark 1.  Kelly  Loren 
Detamore 
Bob Mabry 
Lloyd Oliver 
Moses M.  Sanchez  Lloyd  Oliver 
Will  Outlaw 
Lloyd  Oliver 
Edward W. 
Barnett, Jr.  Dick Wheelan 
Justice B.  Adjei  Bill Dupont 
Nancy G.  Revelette  Dan Cogdell 
Shannon Momorl
seeks volunteer
work in a law
office for skills
training to use
after graduation.
Contact 733-4275
4  DOCKET  CALL 
MAY/JUNE 1994
Sentencing
Options 1994,
Part II by Robert Pelton
[Editor's note: last issue (Marchi April 1994), Robert Pelton started a series on
Sentencing Options. This article continues where the previous article ended.]
Sec.B. DWI COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION.
(a) Ajudge granting community
supervision to a defendant con-
victed of an offense under Chapter
49, Penal Code, shall require as a
condition of community supervi-
sion that the defendant submit to:
1) not less than 72 hours of
continuous confinement, if
the defendant was punished
under Section 49.09(a); not
less than 10 days of continu-
ous confinement, if the
defendant was punished
under Section 49. 09(b) or
(c); or not less than 30 days
of continuous confinement if
the defendant was convicted
under Section 49.07, and
2) an evaluation by a superviso-
ry officer or by a person,
program, or facility approved
by the Texas Commission on
Alcohol and Drug Abuse for
the purpose of having the
facili ty prescribe and carry
out a course of conduct nec-
essary for the rehabilitation
of the defendant's drug or
alcohol dependence condi-
tion.
(b) A judge granting communi-
ty supervision to a defendant con-
victed of an offense under, Section
49.08, Penal Code, shall require as
a condition of community supervi-
sion that the defendant submit to a
period of confinement of not less
than 120 days.
(c) If the director of a facility to
which a defendant is referred
under Subdivision (2) of
Subsection (a) of this section
determines that the defendant is
not making a good faith effort to
participate in a program of reha-
bilitation, the director shall notify
the judge that referred the defen-
dant of that fact.
(d) If a judge requires as a con-
dition of community supervision
that the defendant participate in a
prescribed course of conduct nec-
essary for the rehabilitation of the
defendant's drug or alcohol depen-
dence condition, the judge shall
require that the defendant pay for
all or part of the cost of such reha-
bilitation based on the defendant's
ability to pay. The judge may, in
his discretion, credit such cost
paid by the defendant against the
fine assessed. In making a deter-
mination of a defendant's ability
to pay the cost of rehabilitation
under this subsection, the judge
shall consider whether the defen-
dant has insurance coverage that
will pay for rehabilitation.
(e) The confinement imposed
shall be treated as a condition of
community supervision, and in the
event of a sentence of confinement
upon the revocation of community
supervision, the term of imprison-
ment served hereunder shall be
credited toward service of such
subsequent confinement
(f) If a judge grants community
supervision to a defendant con-
victed of an offense under
Sections 49 .04- 49.08, Penal
Code, and if before receiving
community supervision the defen-
dant has not submitted to an eval-
uatien under Section 9 of this arti-
cle, the judge shall require the
defendant to submit to the evalua-
tion as a condition of community
supervision; If the evaluation indi-
cates to the judge that the defen-
MAY/JUNE 1994 DOCKET CALL 5
·. 
dant is in need of treatment for
drug or alcohol dependency, the
judge shall require the defendant
to submit to that treatment as a
condition of community supervi-
sion in a program or facility ap-
proved or licensed by the Texas
Commission on Alcohol and Drug
Abuse or in a program or facility
that complies with standards
established by the community jus-
tice assistance division of the
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, after consultation by the
division with the commission.
(g) A jury that recommends
community supervision for a per-
son convicted of an offense under
Sections 49.04-49.08, Penal Code,
may recommend that any driver's
license issued to the defendant
under Chapter 173, Acts of the
47th Legislature, Regular Session,
1941 (Article 6687b, Vernon's
Texas Civil Statutes), not be sus-
pended only if the defendant was
21 years of age or older at the time
of the commission of the offense.
(h) If a person convicted of an
offense under Sections 49.-
04-49.08, Penal Code is placed on
community supervision, the judge
shall require, as a condition of the
community supervision, that the
defendant attend and successfully
complete before the 181 st day
after the day community supervi-
sion is granted an educational pro-
gram jointly approved by the
Texas Commission on Alcohol and
Drug Abuse, the Department of
Public Safety, the Traffic Safety
Section of the Texas
Transportation, and the communi-
ty justice assistance division of the
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice designed to rehabilitate
persons who have driven while
intoxicated. The Texas
Commission on Alcohol and Drug
Abuse shall publish the jointly
approved rules and shall monitor,
coordinate, and provide training to
persons providing the educational
programs. The Texas Commission
on Alcohol and Drug Abuse is
responsible for the administration
of the certification of approved
educational programs and may
charge a nonrefundable applica-
tion fee for the initial certification
of approval and for renewal of a
certificate. The judge may waive
the educational program require-
ment, however, if the defendant by
a motion in writing shows good
cause. In determining good cause,
the judge may consider but is not
limited to: the defendant's school
and work schedule, the defen-
dant's health, the distance that the
defendant must travel to attend an
educational program, and the fact
that the defendant resides out of
state, has no valid driver's license,
or does not have access to trans-
portation. The judge shall set out
the finding of good cause in the
judgment. If  a defendant is
required, as a condition of com-
munity supervision, to attend an
educational program, the court
clerk shall immediately report that
fact to the Department of Public
Safety, on a form prescribed by
the department , for inclusion in
the person's driving record. The
report must include the beginning
date of the person ' s community
supervision. Upon the successful
completion of the educational pro-
gram, the person shall give notice
to the community supervision and
corrections department. The
department shall then forward the
notice to the court clerk. The court
clerk shall then report the date of
successful completion of the edu-
cational program to the
Department of Public Safety for
inclusion in the defendant's dri-
ving record. If the department
does not recei ve notice that a
defendant required to complete an
educational program has success-
fully completed the program with-
in the peliod required by this sec-
tion, as shown on department
records, the department shall sus-
pend the defendan t' s dri ver' s
license, permit, or privilege or
prohibit the person from obtaining
a license or permit, as provided by
Section 24(g)(2), Chapter 173,
Acts of the 47th Legisla ture,
Regular Session, 1941 (Article
6687b, Vernon's Texas Ci vii
Statutes). This subsection does not
apply to a defendant if a jury rec-
ommends community supervision
for the defendant and also recom-
mends that the defendant's dri-
ver's license not be suspended.
(i) If a defendant convicted of
an offense under Sections 49.-
04-49.08, Penal Code, is p l   ~ e d on
community supervision, the judge
may require as a condition of
community supervision that the
defendant not operate a motor
vehicle unless the vehicle is
equipped with a device that uses a
deep-lung breath analysis mecha-
nism to make impractical the oper-
ation of the motor vehicle if ethyl
alcohol is detected in the breath of
the operator. The judge shall
require the defendant to obtain the
device at his own cost. The
Department of Public Safety shall
approve devices for use under this
subsection. The provisions of
Section 23A(f), Chapter 173, Acts
of the 47th Legislature, Regular
6 DOCKET CALL
MAY/JUNE  1994 
Session,  1941  (Article  6687b, 
Vernon's  Texas  Civil  Statutes), 
apply  to  the  approval  of a  device 
under  this  subsection  and  the  con-
sequences  of  that  approval. 
Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of 
this  section,  if  a  defendant  is 
required  to  operate  a  motor  vehi-
cle  in  the  course  and  scope  of the 
defendant's  employment and  if the 
vehicle  is  owned  by  the  employer, 
the  defendant  may  operate  that 
vehicle  without  installation  of  an 
approved  ignition  interlock  device 
if  the  employer  has  been  notified 
of that  driving  privilege restriction 
and  if  proof of that  notification  is 
with  the  vehicle. This  employment 
exemption  does  not  apply,  howev-
er,  if  the  business  entity  that  owns 
the  vehicle  is  owned  or controlled 
by  the  defendant  whose  driving 
privilege has  been restricted. 
U)  The  judge  shall  require  a 
defendant  who  is  punished  under 
Section  49.09,  Penal  Code,  as  a 
condition  of community  supervi-
sion,  to  attend  and  successfully 
complete,  before  the  end  of  the 
defendant's  period  of  driver's 
license  suspension,  an  educational 
program  for  repeat  offenders 
approved  by  the  Texas 
Commission  on  Alcohol  and  Drug 
Abuse.  The Texas  Commission  on 
Alcohol  and  Drug  Abuse  shall 
adopt  rules  and  shall  monitor, 
coordinate,  and  provide training  to 
persons  providing  the  educational 
programs.  The  Texas  Commission 
on  Alcohol  and  Drug  Abuse  is 
responsible  for  the  administration 
of  the  certification  of approved 
educational  programs.  The  judge 
may  waive  the  educational  pro-
gram  requirement  only  if  the 
defendant  by  motion  in  writing 
shows  good  cause.  In  determining 
good  cause,  the judge  may  consid-
er the  defendant's school  and  work 
schedule,  the  defendant's  health, 
the  distance  that  the  defendant 
must  travel  to  attend  an  education-
al  program,  and  whether  the 
defendant  resides  out  of  state  or 
does  not have access  to  transporta-
tion.  The  judge  shall  set  out  the 
finding  of good  cause  in  the judg-
ment.  If a  defendant is  required, as 
a  condition  of community  supervi-
sion,  to  attend  an  educational  pro-
gram,  the  court  clerk  shall  imme-
diately  report  that  fact  to  the 
Department  of Public  Safety,  on  a 
form  prescribed  by  the  depart-
ment,  for  inclusion  in  the  defen-
dant's  driving  record.  The  report 
must  include  the  beginning date  of 
the  defendant's  community  super-
vision.  On  the  successful  comple-
tion  of the  educational  program 
for  repeat  offenders  the  defendant 
shall  give  notice to  the community 
supervIsIOn  and  corrections 
department.  The  community 
supervision  and  corrections 
department  shall  then  forward  the 
notice  to  the court clerk. The court 
clerk  shall  then  report  the  date  of 
successful  completion  of  the  edu-
cational  program  to  the 
Department  of  Public  Safety  for 
inclusion  in  the  defendant's  dri-
ving  record.  If the  Department  of 
Pu bl ic  Safety  does  not  recei ve 
notice  that  a  defendant  required  to 
complete  an  educational  program 
has  successfully  completed  the 
program for  repeat offenders  with-
in  the  period  required  by  this  sec-
tion,  as  shown  on  department 
records,  the  department  shall  con-
tinue  the  suspension  of  the  defen-
dant's  driver's  license,  permit,  or 
privilege  or prohibit  the  defendant 
from  obtaining a  license or permit, 
as  provided  by  Section  24(q)(2), 
Chapter  173,  Acts  of  the  47th 
Legislature, Regular Session,  1941 
(Article  6687b,  Vernon's  Texas 
Civil  Statutes). 
(k)  Notwithstanding  Section 
24(9),  Chapter  173,  Acts  of the 
47th  Legislature,  Regular  Session, 
1941  (Article  6687b,  Vernon ' s 
Texas  Civil  Statutes),  if the  judge, 
under  Subsection  (h)  or  U)  of this 
section,  permits  or  requires  a 
defendant  punished  under  Section 
49.09,  Penal  Code,  to  attend  an 
educational  program  as  a  condi-
tion  of  community  supervision, 
and  the  defendant  has  previously 
been  required  to  attend  such  a  pro-
gram,  the  judge  nonetheless  shall 
automatically  suspend  the  driver' s 
license,  permit,  or operating  privi-
lege  of  that  person  for  a  period 
determined  by  the judge according 
to  the  following schedule: 
1.  not less  than  90 days  or more 
than  365  days,  if  the  defen-
dant  is  convicted  under 
Sections 49.04-49.08; or 
2.  not  less  than  180  days  or 
more  than  two  years ,  if  the 
defendant  is  punished  under 
Section 49.09. 
(l)  If the  Department  of  Public 
Safety  receives  notice  that  a 
defendant  has  been  required  or 
permitted  to  attend  an  educational 
program  under  Subsection  (h)  of 
this  section,  but  the  judge  has  not 
ordered  a  period  of  suspension, 
the  department  shall  suspend  the 
defendant's  driver's  license,  per-
mit,  or operating privilege,  or shall 
issue  an  order  prohibiting  the 
defendant from  obtaining a  license 
or permit for a  period of 365 days. 
Sec.  14. SUBSTANCE
ABUSE FELONY PROGRAM.
MAY/JUNE  1994 
DOCKET CALL  7 
(a)  If a court places  a defendant 
on  community  supervision  under 
any  provision  of this  article  as  an 
alternative  to  imprisonment,  the 
judge  may  require  as  a  condition 
of community  supervision  that  the 
defendant  serve a  term  of confine-
ment  and  treatment  in  a  substance 
abuse  justice  under  Section  493. 
009,  Government  Code.  A  term  of 
confinement  and  treatment 
imposed  under  this  section  must 
be  an  indeterminate  term  of  not 
more  than  one  year or less than  six 
months. 
(b)  A  judge  may  impose  the 
condition  of community  supervi-
sion created under this section  if: 
l. the  judge  places  the  defen-
dant  on  community  supervision 
under this  article; 
2.  the  defendant  is  charged  with 
or  convicted  of a  felony  other 
than  a  felony  under  Section 
21.11,22.011,22.021, or 25.06, 
Penal Code;  and 
3.  the  judge  makes  an  affirma-
tive finding  that: 
(A)  drug  or  alcohol  abuse 
significantly  contributed  to 
the  commission  of  the  crime 
or  violation  of  community 
supervision;  and 
(B)  the  defendant  is  a  suit-
able  candidate  for  treatment, 
as  determined  by  the  suit-
ability  criteria established  by 
the  Texas  Board  of Criminal 
Justice  under  Section  493.-
009(b), Government Code. 
(c)  The judge requires  as  a  con-
dition  of  community  supervision 
that  the  defendant  serve  a  term  of 
confinement  and  treatment  in  a 
substance  abuse  treatment  facility 
under  this  section,  the  judge  shall 
also  require as  a condition  of com-
munity  supervision  that  on  release 
from  the  facility  the  defendant 
participate  in  a  drug  or  alcohol 
abuse continuum  of care  treatment 
plan. 
(d)  The  Texas  Commission  on 
Alcohol  and  Drug  Abuse  shall 
develop  the  continuum  of  care 
treatment plan. 
Sec.  15. PROCEDURES
RELATING TO STATE JAIL
FELONY COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION.
(a)  On  conviction  of a  state jail 
felony,  the judge  shall  suspend  the 
imposition  of the  sentence  of con-
finement  and  place  the  defendant 
on  community  supervision.  The 
judge  may  suspend  in  whole  or  in 
part  the  imposition  of any  fine 
imposed on conviction. 
(b)  The  minimum  period  of 
community  supervision  a  judge 
may  impose  under  this  section  is 
two  years.  The  maximum  period 
of community  supervision  a  judge 
may  impose  under  this  section  is 
five  years.  A judge  may  extend  a 
period  of community  supervision 
under  this  section  at  any  time  dur-
ing  the  period  of  community 
supervision,  or  if  a  motion  for 
revocation  of community  supervi-
sion  is  filed  before  the  period  of 
community  supervision  ends, 
before  the  first  anniversary  of the 
expiration  of  the  period  of  com-
munity  supervision. 
(c)  A  judge  may  impose  any 
condition  of  community  supervi-
sion  on  a  defendant  that  the  judge 
could  impose  on  a  defendant 
placed  on  supervision  for  an 
offense  other  than  a  state  jail 
felony,  except  that  the  judge  may 
impose on  the  defendant condition 
that  the  defendant  submi t  to  a 
period  of confinement  in  a  county 
jail  under Section  12  of this  article 
only  if  the  term  does  not  exceed 
30  days,  or  does  not  exceed  60 
days  if  the  defendant  previously 
has  been convicted of a felony. 
(d)  A  judge  may  impose  as  a 
condition  of community  supervi-
sion  that  a  defendant  submit  at  the 
beginning  of  the  period  of  com-
munity  supervision  to  a  term  of 
confinement  in  a  state  jail  felony 
facility  for  a  term  not to  exceed  60 
days,  or  180  days  if the  defendant 
previously  has  been  convicted of a 
felony,  or  one  year  if  the  defen-
dant  is  convicted  of  an  offense 
punishable  as  a  state  jail  felony 
under Section 481.112,  Health  and 
Safety  Code,  or  the  defendant  pre-
viously  has  been  convicted  of two 
or  more  felonies.  A judge  may  not 
require  a  defendant  to  submit  to 
both  the  term  of  confinement 
authorized  by  this  subsection  and 
a  term  of  confinement  under 
Section  12  of  this  article.  For  the 
purposes  of  this  subsection,  a 
defendant  previously  has  been 
convicted of a felony  regardless  of 
whether the  sentence for  the  previ-
ous  conviction  was  actually 
imposed  or  was  probated  and  sus-
pended. 
(e)  If a  defendant  violates  a 
condition  of community  supervi-
sion  imposed  on  the  defendant 
under  this  article  and  after  a  hear-
ing  under Section 21  of this  article 
the judge  modifies  the  defendant's 
community  supervision,  the  judge 
may  impose  any  sanction  permit-
ted  by  Section  22  of  this  article, 
except  that  the  judge  may  not 
require a defendant to serve a  peri-
od  of  confinement  in  a  state  jail 
felony  facility  as  a  modification  of 
the  defendant's  community  super-
vision. 
8  DOCKET CALL 
MAY/JUNE 1994
(f) If a defendant violates  a con-
dition  of community  supervision 
imposed  on  the  defendant  under 
this  article  and  after  a  hearing 
under Section  21  of this  article  the 
judge  revokes  the  defendant's 
community  supervision,  the  judge 
shall  dispose  of  the  case  in  the 
manner  provided  by  Section  23  of 
this  article.  The court retains juris-
diction  over  the  defendant  until 
the  first  anniversary  of the date the 
defendant  is  received  into  the  cus-
tody  of a  state  jail.  At  any  time 
after the 75th day  after the date the 
defendant  is  received  into  the  cus-
tody  of a  state  jail  and  before  the 
first  anniversary  of  the  date  the 
defendant  is  received  into  the  cus-
tody  of a  state  jail,  the  judge  on 
the  judge's  own  motion,  on  the 
motion  of  the  attorney  represent-
ing  the  state,  or  on  the  motion  of 
the  defendant  may  suspend  further 
execution  of  the  sentence  and 
place  the  defendant on  community 
supervision  under  the  conditions 
of this  section. 
(g)  The  facility  director  of  a 
state  jail  felony  facility  shall 
report  to  a  judge  who  orders  a 
defendant  confined  in  the  facility 
not  less  than  every  90  days  on  the 
defendant's  programmatic 
progress,  conduct,  and  conformity 
to  the  rules of the facility. 
(h)  (1)  A  defendant  confined  in 
a  state  jail  felony  facility  after 
revocation  of community  supervi-
sion  does  not  earn  good  conduct 
time for time served in  the  facility. 
2)  A  judge  may  credit  against 
any  time  a  defendant  is  sub-
sequently  required  to  serve 
in  a  state  jail  felony  facility 
after revocation  of communi-
ty  supervision  time served  by 
the defendant in  county jail: 
(A)  from  the  time  of  the 
defendant ' s  arrest  and 
confinement  until  sen-
tencing  by  the  trial  court; 
(B) as  a  condition  of commu-
nity  supervision  under 
Subsection (d)  of this  sec-
tion;  and 
(C)after  modification  of 
community supervision. 
3)  A  judge  shall  credit  against 
any  time  a  defendant  is  sub-
sequently  required  to  serve  in  a 
state jail felony  facility  after  revo-
cation  of  community  supervision 
any  time  served  by  the  defendant 
in  a  state  jail  felony  facility  after 
sentencing. 
Sec. 16 COMMUNITY SER-
VICE.
(a) A  judge  shall  require,  as  a 
condition  of community  supervi-
sion,  that  the  defendant  work  a 
specified  number  of  hours  at  a 
community  service  project  or  pro-
jects for  an  organization or organi-
zations  approved  by  the judge and 
designated  by  the  department, 
unless  the  judge  determines  and 
notes  on  the  order  placing  the 
defendant  on  community  supervi-
sion that: 
1.  the defendant  is  physically  or 
mentally  incapable  of partic-
ipating  in  the project; 
2.  participating  in  the  project 
will  work  a  hardship  on  the 
defendant  or  the  defendant's 
dependents; 
3.  the  defendant  is  to  be  con-
fined  in  a  substance  abuse 
punishment  facility  as  a  con-
dition of community  supervi-
sion; 
4.  there  is  other  good  cause 
shown. 
(b)  The  amount  of community 
service work ordered  by  the judge. 
1.  may  not  exceed  1,000  hours 
and  may  not be  less  than 320 
hours  for  an  offense  classi-
fied  as  a  first  degree felony; 
2.  may  not  exceed  800  hours 
and  may  not  be  less  than  240 
hours  for  an  offense  classi-
fied  as  a  second  degree 
felony; 
3.  may  not  exceed  600  hours 
and  may  not  be  less  than  160 
hours  for  an  offense  classi-
fied  as  a  third  degree felony; 
4.  may  not  exceed  400  hours 
and  may  not  be less  than  120 
hours  for  an  offense  classi-
fied  as  a state jail felony; 
5.  may  not  exceed  200  hours 
and  may  not  be  less  than  80 
hours  for  an  offense  classi-
fied  as  a  Class  A  misde-
meanor  or for  any  other mis-
demeanor  for  which  the 
maximum  permissible  con-
finement,  if any,  exceeds  six 
months  or the  maximum per-
missible  fine,  if any,  exceeds 
$4,000;  and 
6.  may  not  exceed  100  hours 
and  may  not  be  less  than  24 
hours  for  an  offense  classi-
fied  as  a  Class  B  misde-
meanor or for  any  other mis-
demeanor  for  which  the 
maximum  permissible  con-
finement,  if  any,  does  not 
exceed  six  months  and  the 
maximum  permissible  fine, 
if  any  does  not  exceed 
$4,000. 
(c)  If the  judge  modifies  the 
defendant's  terms  of community 
supervision  to  include  confine-
ment  in  a  state jail  felony  facility, 
the judge shall  order the defendant 
to  continue  to  work  towards  ful-
fillment  of his  work  requirement 
MAY/JUNE 1994  DOCKET CALL  9 
during  his  period of confinement. 
(d)  A defendant required  to  per-
form  community  service  under 
this  section  is  not a  state employee 
for  the  purposes  of Article  8309g 
or 8309h, Revised Statutes. 
Sec.  17.  CHANGE  OF RESI-
DENCE;  LEAVING  THE 
STATE. 
(a)  If,  for  good  and  sufficient 
reasons,  a  defendant  desires  to 
change  his  residence  within  the 
state,  the  change  may  be  effected 
by  application  to  the  supervising 
supervision  officer,  which  change 
shall  be  subject to  the judge's con-
sent  and  subject  to  such  regula-
tions  as  the  judge  may  require  in 
the  absence  of  an  officer  in  the 
locality  to  which  the  defendant  is 
transferred. 
(b) Any  defendant who removes 
himself from  the  state  without per-
mission  of the judge  having  juris-
diction  of the  case  shall  be consid-
ered  a  fugitive  from  justice  and 
shall  be  subject  to  extradition  as 
provided by  law. 
Sec.  18.  COMMUNITY 
CORRECTIONS FACILITIES. 
(a)  In  this  section,  "community 
con·ections  facility"  means  a  facil-
ity  described  by  Subsection  (b)(2) 
of Section  1,  Article  42.13,  of this 
code. 
(b)  If a judge  requires  as  a  con-
dition  of community  supervision 
that  the  defendant  serve  a  term  in 
a  community  corrections  facility, 
the  term  may  not be  more  than  24 
months. 
(c)  A  defendant  granted  com-
munity  supervision  under this  sec-
tion  may  not  earn  good  conduct 
credit  for  time  spent  in  a  commu-
nity  corrections  facility  or  apply 
time  spent  in  the  facility  toward 
completion  of a  prison  sentence  if 
the  community  supervision  is 
revoked. 
(d) As  directed  by  the judge, the 
corrections  facility  director  shall 
file  with  the  community  supervi-
sion  and  corrections  department 
director  a  copy  of  an  evaluation 
made  by  the  director of the  defen-
dant's  behavior  and  attitude  at  the 
facility.  The director shall examine 
the  evaluation,  make  written  com-
ments  on  the  evaluation  that  he 
considers  relevant,  and  file  the 
evaluation  and  comments  with  the 
judge  who  granted  community 
supervision  to  the defendant.  If the 
evaluation  indicates  that  the 
defendant  has  made  significant 
progress  toward  compliance  with 
court-ordered  conditions  of  com-
munity  supervision,  the  court  may 
release  the  defendant  from  the 
community  corrections  facility. 
The  defendant  shall  serve  the 
remainder  of  his  community 
supervision  under  any  terms  and 
conditions  the  court  imposes 
under this  article. 
(e)  No  later  than  18  months 
after  the  date  on  which  a  defen-
dant  is  granted  community  super-
vision  under  this  section,  the  com-
munity corrections facility  director 
shall  file  with  the  community 
supervision  and  corrections 
department  director  a  copy  of  an 
evaluation made  by  the director of 
the  defendant's  behavior  and  atti-
tude  at  the  center.  The  director 
shall  examine  the  evaluation, 
make  written  comments  on  the 
evaluation  that  he  considers  rele-
vant,  and  file  the  evaluation  and 
comments  with  the  judge  who 
granted  community  supervision  to 
the  defendant.  If the  report  indi-
cates  that  the  defendant  has  made 
significant  progress  toward  court-
ordered  conditions  of  community 
supervision,  the court shall  modify 
its  sentence  and  release  the  defen-
dant  in  the  same  manner  as  pro-
vided  by  Subsection  (e)  of  this 
section.  If the  report  indicates  that 
the  defendant  would  benefit  from 
continued  participation  in  the 
community  corrections  facility 
program,  the  court  may  order  the 
defendant  to  remain  at  the  com-
munity  corrections  facility  for  a 
period  determined  by  the  court.  If 
the  report  indicates  that  the  defen-
dant  has  not  made  significant 
progress  toward  rehabilitation,  the 
court  may  revoke  community 
supervision  and  order  the  defen-
dant  to  the  term  of  confinement 
specified  in  the  defendant ' s  sen-
tence. 
(f) If ordered  by  the judge  who 
placed  the  defendant on  communi-
ty  supervision,  a  community  cor-
rections  facility  director  shall 
attempt  to  place  a  defendant  as  a 
worker  in  a  community-service 
project  of  a  type  descri bed  by 
Section  16  of this  article. 
(g)  A  defendant  participating  in 
a  program  under  this  article  shall 
be confined  in  the  community  cor-
rections  facility  at  all  times  except 
for: 
1.  time  spent  attending  and 
traveling  to  and from  an  edu-
cation  or  rehabilitation  pro-
gram as  ordered by the court; 
2.  time  spent  attending  and 
traveling  to  and  from  a  com-
munity-service project; 
3.  time  spent  away  from  the 
facility  for  purposes 
described  by  this  section; 
and 
4.  time  spent  traveling  to  and 
IO  DOCKET CALL 
MAY/JUNE  1994 
from  work,  if applicable. 
(h)  A judge  who  requires  as  a 
condition  of community  supervi-
sion  that  the  defendant  serve  a 
term  in  a  community  corrections 
facility  may  not  impose  a  subse-
quent  term  in  a  community correc-
tions  facility  or  jail  during  the 
same  supervision  period  that, 
when  added  to  the  terms previous-
ly  imposed, exceeds 24 months. 
(i)  If a  defendant  participating 
in  a  program  under  this  section  is 
not  required  by  the judge  to  deliv-
er  the  defendant's  salary  to  the 
restitution  center  director,  the 
employer  of  the  defendant  shall 
deliver  the  salary  to  the  director. 
The  director  shall  deposit  the 
salary  into  a  fund  to  be  given  to 
the  defendant  on  release  after 
deducting: 
1.  the  cost  to  the  center for  the 
defendant's  food,  housing, 
and supervision; 
2.  necessary  travel  expense  to 
and  from  work  and  commu-
nity-service  projects  and 
other  incidental  expenses  of 
the defendant; 
3.  support  of  the  defendant's 
dependents;  and 
4.  restitution  to  the  victims  of 
an  offense  committed  by  the 
defendant. 
Sec. 19. FEES.
(a)  Except  as  otherwise  provid-
ed  by  this  subsection,  a  judge 
granting  community  supervision 
shall  fix  a  fee  of not  less  than  $25 
and  not  more  than  $40  per  month 
to  be  paid  to  the  court  by  the 
defendant  during  the  community 
supervision  period.  The judge  may 
make  payment  of the  fee  a  condi-
tion  of  granting  or  continuing  the 
community  supervision.  The judge 
may  waive  or  reduce  the  fee  or 
suspend  a  monthly  payment of the 
fee  if  the  judge  determines  that 
payment  of  the  fee  would  cause 
the  defendant  a  significant  finan-
cial  hardship. 
(b)  The  judge  shall  deposit  the 
fees  received  under Subsection  (a) 
of  this  section  in  the  special  fund 
of  the  county  treasury,  to  be  used 
for  the  same  purposes  for  which 
state  aid  may  be  used  under 
Article 42.131  of this  code. 
(c)  A  judge  receiving  a  defen-
dant  for  supervision  as  authorized 
by  Article  42.11  of this  code  may 
impose  on  the  defendant  any  telm 
of community  supervision  autho-
rized  by  this  article  and  may 
require  the  defendant  to  pay  the 
fee  authorized  by  Subsection  (a) 
of  this  section.  Fees  received 
under this  section  shall  be  deposit-
ed  in  the  same  manner as  required 
by  Subsection  (b)  of this  section. 
(d)  For  the  purpose  of  deter-
mining  when  fees  due  on  convic-
tion  are  to  be  paid  to  any  officer or 
officers,  the  placing  of the  defen-
dant  on  community  supervision 
shall  be  considered  a final  disposi-
tion  of the case,  without the  neces-
sity  of waiting  for  the  termination 
of the  period  of community  super-
vision. 
Sec. 20. REDUCTION OR
TERMINATION OF COMMU-
NITY SUPERVISION.
(a) At any  time,  after the  defen-
dant  has  satisfactorily  completed 
one-third  of the  original  communi-
ty  supervision  period  or  two  years 
of  community  supervision, 
whichever  is  less,  the  period  of 
community  supervision  may  be 
reduced  or  terminated  by  the 
judge.  Upon  the  satisfactory  ful-
fillment  of the  conditions  of com-
munity  supervision,  and  the  expi-
ration  of the  period  of community 
supervision,  the  judge,  by  order 
duly  entered,  shall  amend  or  mod-
ify  the  original  sentence  imposed, 
if  necessary,  to  conform  to  the 
community supervision  period  and 
shall  discharge  the  defendant.  If 
the judge discharges  the  defendant 
under  this  section,  the  judge  may 
set  aside  the  verdict  or permit  the 
defendant  to  withdraw  his  plea, 
and  shall  dismiss  the  accusation, 
complaint,  information  or  indict-
ment  against  the  defendant,  who 
shall  thereafter  be  released  from 
all  penalties  and  disabilities  result-
ing  from  the  offense  or  crime  of 
which  he  has  been  convicted  or  to 
which  he  has  pleaded  guilty, 
except that: 
1.  proof  of  the  conviction  or 
plea  of  guilty  shall  be  made 
known  to  the  judge  should 
the  defendant  again  be  con-
victed  of  any  criminal 
offense;  and 
2.  if  the  defendant  is  an  appli-
cant  for  a  license  or  is  a 
licensee  under  Chapter  42, 
Human  Resources  Code,  the 
Texas  Department of Human 
Services  may  consider  the 
fact  that  the  defendant  previ-
ously  has  received  communi-
ty  supervision  under this arti-
cle  in  issuing,  renewing, 
denying,  or  revoking  a 
license under that chapter. 
(b)  This  section  does  not  apply 
to  a  defendant  convicted  of an 
offense  under  Sections  49.-
04-49.08,  Penal  Code,  or  a  defen-
dant  convicted  of  an  offense  pun-
ishable as  a state jail felony. 
MAY/JUNE  1994 
DOCKET CALL  II 
To  Tell  The Truth 
Well the cat's out of the bag
now. Lonny Morrison finally said
it in his swan song editorial in the
State Bar Journal so I guess it's
all right to talk about it. It has
been painfully apparent to anyone
with the normal number of limbs
and senses for some time now.
There's too many goddamn
lawyers. There, I said it. There's
too many goddamn lawyers. Tom
Paxton wrote it in a song ten
years ago,
"In ten years we're gonna
have one million lawyers, one
million lawyers, one million
lawyers.
"In ten years we're gonna
have one million lawyers, how
much can the poor nation stand?"1
I used to think he was kidding.
I used to think it was funny.
There is no taking criminal
defense out of the larger universe
of lawyers and their problems .
The discrepancy between supply
and demand is one of those prob-
lems. If not the biggest problem
facing the profession, it is certain-
ly the root cause of numerous
problems the bar faces. From the
by Louis F. Linden
paucity of writings on this topic
in the bar journals and papers it
appears that it has been defacto
taboo to discuss this in public
forums. Certainly there are good
reasons for not wanting to write
or speak about it. It ' s a swamp.
It's a miasma. It's a land war in
southeast Asia. If you point out
the problem someone will proba-
bly be cheeky enough to ask for a
solution. For years our leaders
kept mum hoping the economic
tide would rise enough to float all
the new as well as old boats in the
bar. It hasn't happened. Instead
we have a seemingly eternal
spring low tide and fewer and
fewer boats are floating at all.
Many are aground on their side
and the exposed sea weed, barna-
cles and dead fish are beginning
to stink. Of those that are float-
ing, many are in landlocked pools
with no prospect of sailing any-
where.
So how did we come to this
sorry pass? It is the intersection
of two powerful trends. One has
to do with law schools and soci-
ety. In spite of the fact that
lawyers are usually ranked by the
public somewhere below used car
salesmen and people who stomp
on tiny, baby chicks for fun,
becoming a lawyer is still one of
the most popular vehicles of
upward social mobility. Existing
law schools have grown and new
ones have sprung up because they
are tremendous money makers!
They require no expensive labora-
tories or exotic equipment. A few
books and some classrooms and
bingo! you're in business. Eager
attorney wannabes will stand in
line to get in until they become an
integral part of the landscape. As
far as the educational world is
concerned, law schools are sec-
ond only to having an extra key to
the U.S. Mint. They churn new
bar fodder ou t at a prodigious
rate. According to the State Bar
there are presently 58,193 lawyers
in Texas. When I became a mem-
ber of the bar in 1976 there were
32, 330. There are presently
15,681 lawyers in Harris County
alone, up from the 1976 figure of
7,217. Since 1976 the ratio of
lawyers to popUlation in Texas
has gone from 1 lawyer for every
393 persons to 1 lawyer for every
303 persons. The increase is even
more dramatic for Harris County.
In 1976 the ratio was one lawyer
for every 288 persons; in 1994 the
number is one lawyer for every
188 persons. Put another way, the
population of Harris County has
increased about forty-one percent
since 1976 while the number of
lawyers has more than doubled at
one hundred and seventeen per-
cent. The number of lawyers has
grown at a rate nearly three times
that of the popUlation at large.
The Bar is metastasizing.
The other major factor is the
changing economy. During the
salad days of the oil boom there
was enough economic activity to
absorb the ever increasing num-
ber of attorneys . When I first
came to Houston in 1980 the City
12 DOCKET CALL
MAY/JUNE 1994
was peppered with signs adver-
tising, "Business Cards in Four
Hours!" Then oil prices went in
the dumper and the economy of
Houston contracted like a black
hole near to the point of collapse.
Many of those lawyers got
dumped out of their law firms and
into the street. The layoffs have
continued since then. When I was
John Ackerman's campaign man-
ager in 1992 we used a number of
lawyer lists for fund raising.
Many were from the last two pre-
vious elections. As we went
"Criminal
litigation is
much more
complex and
to a large
extent open
ended."
complex and to a large extent
open ended. There are lawyers
advertising that they take felonies
for $350.00 a pop. Can anyone
do more than plead guilty in short
order for $350.00?
Another aspect concerns the
more than 75 percent of all crimi-
nal defendants in Harris County
who are represented by appointed
counsel. The County government
completely controls this portion
of the market. With the incredible
oversupply of lawyers, they can
set virtually any fee structure they
want; there will always be enough
hungry mullets to take whatever
comes their way at whatever fee.
They proved it when they reduced
fees for appointed cases the last
time. The lines of under
employed lawyers didn't shrink.
If anything they grew. Where
else does one take a twenty per-
cent pay cut and even more peo-
ple sign up to go to work? There
is a pervasive fear that they will
do it again. Rumors to that effect
are rife throughout the Court-
house grapevine. I don't think
we'll see it this year simply
because of the budget cycle. But
theoretically, with enough under
employed and unemployed
lawyers, they could cut the rate ad
infinitum.
So there, that's the easy part.
Now, what are we going to do
about it? The simplest answer is
to limit the number of new
lawyers. But even that is not sim-
ple. What criteria do we use?
Forget going back to the white,
male good 01' boys club that the
bar used to be. It was a dumb
idea then and it's a dumb idea
now. Do we try to predict who
will be a good lawyer? Through-
about the task of updating the lists
a very obvious trend became
apparent. There were dozens of
lawyers whose address had been
something like Joe Blow Attorney
at Law, Dewey, Cheatem and
Howe, 35th Floor, Texas
Capitalist Bank Building,
Houston, TX 77002. Their new
addresses were all things like Joe
Blow Attorney at Law 12345
Outintheburbs Lane Suburbia,
Texas 77540. They had been
dumped out into the street by the
law finns and commercial institu-
tions they worked for and are now
practicing out of their back bed-
rooms.
The same economic con-
traction has diminished the poten-
tial paying client base. Real in-
come in the United States has
been declining steadily for twenty
years. Fewer people than ever
before can afford to hire an attor-
ney. We have an ever increasing
work force competing for an ever
diminishing client base. The
effect of these two factors,
increased supply and shrinking
demand, is to drive down prices
just like Adam Smith and Harry
Blackmun said it would.
In the theoretical perfect mar-
ket that would be good for con-
sumers. The problem is that
prices have been driven below the
level at which effective assistance
of counsel can be provided and
below the level at which a lawyer
can make a living. In the theo-
retical perfect market the services
would then become scarce and
prices would rise. The conceptual
flaw in the ointment is that this
isn't a free market. The con-
sumers do not have the option of
simply forgoing legal represent-
ation. How many times have we
heard the words, "Hire a lawyer
or go back to jail. " If they are
unable to pay a fee that will sup-
port effective assistance of coun-
sel, they will pay a lower fee for
ineffective assistance of counsel.
This not only debases and
demeans the profession, it debas-
es and demeans the criminal jus-
tice system. There is no incentive
to improve performance. We are
not selling routine legal services.
The market may work for simple
wills and uncontested divorces.
Criminal litigation is much more
MAY/JUNE 1994 DOCKET CALL 13
because  I  love  my  country  and  I 
fear  my  government.  I  wanted  to 
be at  the interface  between  the 
state  and  the  individual.  I  had  to 
take  the LSAT  twice and  there  are 
still  some  faculty  members  at  the 
University  of Texas  School  of 
Law who swear I  was  admitted  by 
mistake.  Need  I  say  my  law 
school  grades  were  adequate  at 
best?  I  didn't  even  bother  to 
interview  for  jobs  (I hate  the 
sound  of  snickering).  I  went  to 
law  school  because  I  wanted  to 
kick  the  state' s  butt.  I  don't think 
and Jug Band Stompers. In that
capacity he once met Pete Seeger
who told him, "Just remember,
music is  much too important to
leave to professionals. " As a
result, he became a labor organiz-
er because they had all the good
songs.
1.  "One  Million  Lawyers  and  other 
Disasters" <D 1985  Flying  Fish 
Records 
"The
definition
ofagood
lawyer, like
truth,
beauty,
and con-
tact lenses
is largely
in the eye
ofthe
beholder. " 
out  much  of  history  the  ability  to 
keep  rich  people  rich  was  the  for-
emost  criteria.  It's  a  natural  con-
comitant  of our materialistic  soci-
ety.  Vinson-Elkins  doesn't  hire 
lawyers  because  they  are  empa-
thetic  or  socially  concerned  or 
dedicated  to  justice  or  the  Bill  of 
Rights.  They  hire lawyers  to  pro-
tect their clients'  money.  The def-
inition  of  a  good  lawyer,  like 
truth,  beauty, and  contact lenses is 
largely  in  the  eye  of the  beholder. 
I don't think I  want Vinson-Elkins 
(or  Baker-Botts  or  Butler-Binion) 
deciding  who  gets  to  become  a 
lawyer.  I  became  a  lawyer 
Vinson-Elkins  would  approve. 
I  don't  think  that  there  is  a 
workable solution for  the criminal 
defense  bar  until  there  is  a  solu-
tion  for  the  bar  in  general.  Even 
idealistic  lawyers  willing  to 
forego  the  fat  cat  civil  lawyer 
salaries  to  have  a  chance to  take a 
bite  outta  the  State's  butt  can't 
make  it  on  what's  out  there  now. 
We  simply  can't  make  use  of one 
lawyer for  every  188  men  women 
and  children  in  Harris  County. 
These  are  unpleasant  times  and 
we  are  faced  with  unpleasant 
decisions.  Even  if  we  cut  law 
school  enrollments  25 %  across 
the  board  (imagine  the  antitrust 
implications  of  that  one!!)  we 
couldn't  expect  relief  before  the 
turn  of the  century.  But  at  least 
we can  talk  about  it  now.  Even  if 
we  are  frozen  in  inaction  like  a 
deer  paralyzed  in  the  headlights 
of an  onrushing truck. 
Lou Linden practices criminal
defense exclusively in Houston
("The Whore with a Heart of
Oil"), Texas. He is formerly the
leader of the Francis Anne Wood
Shimer Memorial Cat Ki ckers
Federal 
Practice 
Seminar 
Materials 
Available 
for $25 
Call  227-2404 
Fifth 
Annual 
Banquet 
Thursday, 
June 30, 1994 
The Houstonian 
$25 per person 
RSVP to 227-2404
14  DOCKET CALL 
MAY/JUNE 1994
Illegal 
Expenditure or 
Investment 
Statute 
by  Juan Martinez Gonzales
Beeville, Texas
The new offense of "Illegal
Investment" was originally created
in 1981 by the Legislature on the
war against drugs The offense is
now called "Illegal Expenditure or
Investment". The statute was com-
pletely amended by the legislature
last year. The effective date of the
new "Illegal Expenditure or
Investment" statute is September 1,
1994.
The new amended statute, sub-
section (1) provides that a person
commits an offense, if the person
knowingly or intentionally:
expends funds the person knows
are derived from the commission of
an offense listed in Section
48l.115(a) which includes posses-
sion of a controlled substance listed
in Penalty Group 1; or expends
funds the person knows are deri ved
from the commission of an offense
listed in Section 481. 116(a) which
includes possession of a controlled
substance listed in Penalty Group
2; or expends funds the person
knows are derived from the com-
mission of an offense punishable
under Section 481.1l2(d) manufac-
ture, grams or more, but less than
200 grams; Section 481.112(e)
manufacture, deli very or posses-
sion of controlled substance which
is 200 grams or more, but less than
400 grams; Section 48l.113(d)
manufacture or delivery of con-
trolled substance in Penalty Group
2 where controlled substance is
four grams or more but less than
400 grams; Section 48l.1l4(c)
manufacture or deli very of con-
trolled substance in Penalty Group
3 where controlled substance is 28
grams or more but less than 200
grams; Section 48l. 117(c) pos-
session of controlled substance in
Penalty Group 3 where controlled
substance is 28 grams or more but
less than 200 grams; Section
481.118(c) possession of a con-
trolled substance in Penalty Group
4 where controlled substance is 28
grams or more but less than 200
grams; Section 48l.120(b)(5)
delivery of marihuana where
amount of marihuana delivered is
2000 pounds or less but more than
fifty pounds; Section 481.120(b )(6)
delivery of marihuana where
amount of marihuana delivered is
more than 2000 pounds; Section
48l.121(b)(5) possession of mari-
huana where amount of marihuana
possessed is 2000 pounds or less
but more than 50 pounds; Section
481.121(b)(6) possession of mari-
huana where amount of marihuana
possessed is more than 2000
pounds.
A person also commits an
offense under this statute, subsec-
tion 2, when he knowingly or
intentionally finances or invests
funds the person knows or believes
are intended to further the commis-
sion of an offense listed in subsec-
tion(lO) or an offense for which the
punishment is listed under section
(1). The new statute specifically
states than an offense under it is a
first degree felony.
Both the present and future
"Illegal Expenditure or
Investment" statute contain the
same words: "funds", "finances",
"invests", and "believes". The
statute has been attacked as being
unconstitutionally vague, since the
words "funds", "finances",
"invests" and "believes" are not
defined. Several Texas appellate
courts have upheld the statute when
these arguments have been made.
Other constitutional attacks to
the vagueness of the statute on
other grounds have been rejected
by the appellate courts.
The Court of Criminal Appeals
DOCKET CALL 15
MAY/JUNE  1994 
• •
has held that the term "finances"
within meaning of statute means to
raise or provide funds or capital for
or to furnish with necessary funds
for purposes of gaining possession
of controlled substances The Court
of Criminal Appeals has also held
that the term "invests" means with-
in meaning of the statute to commit
money in order to earn a financial
return.
Appellate courts have held that
the term "funds" within meaning of
statute means "money or "cash", or
"an asset or groups of assets set
aside for a specific purpose."
An appellate court has held that
the term "believes" within meaning
of statute means "to think or sup-
pose; to entertain as likely or prob-
able true."
The Illegal Expendi ture or
Investment statute has a mens rea
element that is required to be
proved. It requires that the person
knowingly or intentionally invested
funds, which he knew or he
believed were intended to further
the commission of a felony con-
trolled substance offense.
The Court of Appeals in Cox v.
State, held that the evidence was
insufficient to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant in
individual or personal capacity,
intentionally or knowingly
financed and invested funds that he
knew and believed were intended
to further the commission of pos-
session of useable quantity of mari-
huana and defendant could not be
convicted on the basis of his own
conduct.
In Cox, the defendant's conduct
consisted of driving an automobile
containing two co-defendants and
then entering a restaurant with the
two men. Moments later the co-
defendants left the restaurant and
took automobile to a motel about a
"The  Illegal 
Expenditure 
or Investment 
statute has a 
mens rea ele-
ment that is 
required to  be 
proved.  It 
requires that 
the person 
knowingly or 
intentio nally 
invested 
funds,  which 
he knew or he 
believed were 
intended to 
further the 
commlsslon 
ofafelony 
controlled 
substance 
offense." 
where drug deal took place and the
two co-defendants got busted. The
actions of defendant Cox was that
he sat alone at a table inside the
restaurant and appeared to be look-
ing in the direction of the motel.
The appellate court in Cox held
that the actions of the defendant
Cox as a party were not properly
before the jury, because the judge
had given the jury an abstract
instruction on the law of parties.
The appellate court ruled that the
application paragraph in the charge
failed in any form to apply the
applicable portions of the abstract
definition to the specific facts of
the case. Therefore, the jury was
only authorized to convict appel-
lant on his own conduct alone. In
Cox the court ruled that the evi-
dence was insufficient.
Convictions under the Illegal
Expenditure or Investment Statute
have been upheld where the defen-
dant has negotiated a drug deal, the
defendant has purchased chemicals
to make the illegal drug, the defen-
dant was with someone else who
supplied the cash for the drug deal,
where defendant has money readily
available and showed money to do
a drug deal, and where the defen-
dant made a complete transfer of
money for the drugs.
No actual transfer of funds is
required for completion of offense
under the Illegal Expenditure or
Investment Statute. The accused
completes crime when he supplies
money or commits funds with
intent to further possession or
delivery of controlled substance.
In Jordan, Biggins, Jr. and
Richardson v. State, the Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the
decision of the Dallas Court of
Appeals which held that an actual
transfer of funds was needed before
someone could be convicted of ille-
hundred yards from the restaurant gal investment. The Court of
16 DOCKET CALL
MAY/JUNE 1994
Criminal Appeals  held  that  the  Dal-
las  Court  of Appeals  decision  was 
in  conflict with  three  other  court of 
appeals decision. 
Judge  McCormick  stated  in  his 
decision  that  neither  the  statute  nor 
the  indictment  which  tracks  the 
statute  speak  in  terms  of  transfer-
ring  funds.  The  offense  requires 
that  there  be  an  intent  to  "finance" 
or "invest'.  He stated  that although 
the  funds  in  this  case  had  not 
changed  hands,  the  money  had 
been  "raised"  and  "committed"  by 
agreement  for  the  purpose  of gain-
ing possession of cocaine. 
Even  if another  individual  sup-
plies  money  for  the  transaction,  a 
defendant  can  be  equally  responsi-
ble  for  the  commission  of  the 
offense under the  law of parties. 
A  person  can  also  be  convicted 
of attempted  illegal  investment.  If
the  indictment  alleges  that  a  defen-
dant  "negotiated"  a  drug  transac-
tion  or  "displayed  money",  the 
state  is  bound  to  prove  those  ele-
ments. 
Evidence  in  possession  for  ille-
gal  investment  was  sufficient  to 
support finding  that  defendant used 
or  exhibited  a  deadly  weapon  dur-
ing  the  commission  of our  flight 
from  the  offense,  although  defen-
dant did  not  have  pistol  with  him at 
the  time  he  handed  over the  money 
to  buy  drugs,  where  pistol  was  in 
the  car  in  which  he  waited  for  cul-
mination  of  the  drug  transaction; 
time  spent  waiting  in  the  car  was 
part  of defendant's  involvement  in 
the  commission of the offense. 
In  an  illegal  investment  prose-
cution  it  is  inadmissible  for  the 
State  to  use  unadjudicated  extrane-
ous  offenses  at  the  punishment 
phase of the  trial. 
The  appellate  courts  have 
rejected  the  defense  of entrapment 
and  outrageous  conduct  when 
raised  on  appeal  to  the  offense  of 
Illegal Expenditure or Investment. 
TEX.CODE  CRIM.  PRO-
CED.ANN.,  Art.  44.04(b)  makes 
clear  that  the  Legislature  intended 
to  deny  bail  to  convicted  felons 
whose  punishment  exceeds  fifteen 
years  confinement  or  where  the 
defendant  has  been  convicted  of an 
offense  which  is  listed  under 
TEX.HEALTH  & SAFETY 
CODE,  Section  481.  107(b) 
through  (e),  which  includes  the 
offense  of  illegal  investment. 
(Section 481.126(b). 
It  has  been  my  experience  that 
these  illegal  investment  cases  are 
extremely  hard  to  defend.  As 
defense  lawyers  we  should  caution 
the  jury  panel  on  the  inherent  dan-
gers  of guilt  by  association,  where 
more  than  one  person  is  charged 
with  the  same  offense.  The  jury 
panel  should  also  be  made  aware 
that  "mere  presence"  at  the  scene 
of the  offense or close  proximity  to 
the  place  of  the  offense  does  not 
make  one  a  party  to  the  offense  of 
illegal  investment. 
A  jury  instruction  should  be 
filed  in  behalf of the defendant that 
"mere  presence  does  not  make  one 
a  party  to  the  offense."  It  is  possi-
ble  that  an  innocent  person  may  be 
caught  in  a  web  of events  or  sce-
nario  that  place  him  at  the  scene  of 
a drug transaction. 
Be  creative.  Request  a  jury 
instruction  that  "the conduct  of law 
enforcement  agents  must  not  fall 
below  reasonable  standards  of 
proper use of law  enforcement. 
If your client  is  not  an  innocent 
bystander  try  to  create  a  fact  issue 
on  entrapment or government over-
reaching.  Once a fact  issue is  creat-
ed  you  are  entitled  to  an  instruction 
on  your defense or fact  issue. 
The  Texas  Court  of  Criminal 
Appeals  has  not  ruled  whether  a 
defendant  has  a  right  to  a  jury 
instruction  on  government  over-
reaching  (outrageous  governmental 
conduct)  or  a  right  to  a  defense  of 
outrageous  governmental  conduct, 
but  there  is  authority  from  federal 
cases,  law  reviews  and  treatises 
that  a  defendant  is  entitled  to  a 
government overreaching charge. 
You  have a better chance  with  a 
jury  on  the  issues  of entrapment 
and  government  overreaching  than 
you  do  from  an  appellate court.  So 
you  have  nothing  to  lose  by  sub-
mitting  requested  jury  instructions 
on  entrapment  and/or  government 
overreaching, in  your illegal  expen-
diture or investment cases. 
1.  HOUSE BILL NO.  268, Acts  of 
1981,  67th  Leg.,  p.  703,  ch. 
268,  8  adding  at  4.052  to  the 
Controlled  Substances  Act; 
TEX.  REV.CIV.STAT.ANN., 
Art.  4476-15 4.052. 
2.  Wendorf,  The  War  on  Crime: 
1981  Legislation,  33  BAY.  L.-
REY.  765, 783  (1981). 
3.  TEX.HEALTH  & SAFETY 
CODE  ANN.  481.126 
(Vernon's Supp.  1993). 
4.  SENATE BILL NO.  1067,  Acts 
of  1993,  73rd  leg.,  p.  3713,ch 
900  2.02 
5.  Ex parte Guerrero, 811  S.W.2d 
726,  728  (Tex.App.-Corpus 
Christi  1991);  Stevens v. State,
817  S.W.2d  800,  804 
(Tex.App.-Forth  Worth  1991, 
pet.  ref'd);  Martinez v. State,
852 SW2d 
DOCKET CALL  [7
MAY/JUNE 1994
A Fair Trial
At Last?
Theus,and
The
Criminal
Defendant
with
  P r ~   o r s  
by De Edward Greer
Before exuding too much due-
process-oriented glee, we should
acknowledge that Theus is in
"heavenly appellate orbit," and
seems on the verge of setting
crimes and misdemeanors" sud-
denly found that many of his
taken-for-granted human charac-
teristics simply evaporated, one
being that he was now "incompe-
tent" to testify in court. Much
later, in the United States, a crimi-
nal was more or less "competent,"
but the right to testify was consid-
ered "forfeited," part of the pun-
ishment for the crime.
Fast-forwarding a bit, the
unfortunate crux of old Art.
38.29-evolved from the above.
That is that you could attack the
person of a criminal defendant, by
showing he'd been convicted of a
crime. The standard instruction
was that you couldn't consider
this prior conviction as evidence
of guilt, but it was quite permissi-
ble to allow it to affect the weight
you would give his testimony. In
other words, the prior conviction
impugned his character, made him
a "bad guy," and a juror didn't
have to "pay him any mind", if
he didn't want to.
In other words-and there are
doubtless some prosecutors and
judges who will deny this, and
some appellate judges who don't
even begin to understand it-if
the DA could legally label this
accused citizen an "ex-con," it
was essentially "your choice," if
you were a juror, whether you
would give his (or her) story any
consideration whatever, without
regard to factual believability.
We truly spoke with forked
tongue: Out of one side of the
mouth we said you are entitled to
be tried on this charge onl y, not
as a criminal generally, but out of
the other side, as was so fittingly
argued by the real-life DA in the
real-life trial of this accused ci ti-
zen named Theus, "You just ask
yourself: Who do I believe-
Officer Bledsoe, or this.. . this con·
victed arsonist, this ... this one-
time ex·con!!!" etc., etc., etc.
In other words-and this is so
simple, so elementary, that per-
haps it will yet shine through its
seemingly blackened and slander-
ous-appearing facade-a criminal
defendant, who took the stand, in
Texas, with a prior felony convic-
tion, rarely, if ever, got a truly fair
trial.
Let's now consider some nuts
and bolts aspects of this enor-
mously promising holding.
Theus Facts, and the Essence of
its Holding
In the original Theus trial, the
Appellant had filed a pre-trial
motion to exclude the arson prior
on the grounds that it had little
probative value as to credibility,
and great potential for prejudice.
It was a very "weak" felony, i.e.,
small fire, no damage, no restitu-
tion, no fine, Appellant was given
three years probation which was
later revoked on technicals only.
But if it was admitted, the jury
would be left to conjure up all
kinds of prejudicial "facts," i.e.,
people burned alive, millions of
dollars of insurance fraud dam-
age, etc.
Back in 1987, shortly after
Rule 609(a) went into effect,
Cathleen Herasimchuck wrote in
the Houston Law Review that the
new rule represented "a major
change in Texas evidentiary law."
But despite the indisputable accu-
racy of this former prosecutor's
assessment, it seems no one
believed her, and if an attorney
began to boldly argue about the
rule ' s "balancing test ," judges
would often react more or less as
if the lawyer were phonetically
some sort of record. There i
Theus 1,_816 S.W.2d 773, Theus
II, §45 S.W.2d 874, Theus III, 858
S.W.2d 25, Theus IV, 863 S.W.2d
489,=and Theus V, not yet report-
ed. Further, I sincerely hope ther
ill be a Theus VI, because with-
out it we may regress to the
square-one dark ages of old Art.
38.29, Code of Criminal
Procedure . Explanation is in
order. First, let's consider:
A Brief History Of Impeach-
ment With Prior Convictions
The evolution of this practice
is a fascinating area of the law.
Space being at a premium a short
outline will have to suffice.
Under the old English common
law, one convicted of "high
18 DOCKET CALL
MAY/JUNE 1994
reciting in tasteful monotone from
the Manhattan telephone directo-
ry.
So of course at the Theus trial,
the conviction was admitted and
the State utilized it in every way
possible to attack Appellant's
character someth ing that was
more or less "permitted" under
the old law 29
B s II, 845 S.W.2d
changed that, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals interpreted Rule
609(a) as it reads, namely that
henceforth, for impeachment pur-
poses, a prior conviction must be
probative as to credibility in order
to be admitted; plus, this proba-
tive value as to credibility must
be "balanced" against its prejudi-
cial effect. The Court stuck wit
a group of five, "balancing-test
factors" found in most evidence
manuals, and noted that while
four of the five favored admissi-
bility, the conviction nevertheless
had to be reversed because (1) the
particular conviction had so little
probative value as to credibility
and great potential for prejudice;
and, (2) after admission, the trial
judge did not pennit the Appellant
to "mitigate" the prejudice, when
presented with the opportunity, by
allowing him to argue to the jury
the relatively minor facts of this
PrIOr.
Don't rejoice yet, however,
for here lie some interesting, and
very slightly confusing aspects of
this case, which should be care-
fully considered. First, do not be
misled by the "four ou t of fi ve
factors favor admissibility" part
of the opinion. These "factors"
evolved as an aid in helping a trial
judge properly apply the balanc-
ing test. But note that the first
"factor" is the "impeachment
value of the prior crime," and this
must, and can only relate to credi-
bility. For example, Weinstein's
first factor is "the relationship the
crime has to veracity. The trial
judge must then weigh this
against the conviction's potential
for prejudice. In other words, the
first "factor" is not only the most
important one, it is actually the
"thing itself," i.e., the ultimate
issue to be decided. Certainly, it
cannot be reduced to "equal foot-
ing" with the other factors, as
they are only "aids" in making
this determination. With that in
mind then, let's consider another
slightly confusing aspect, a com-
parison of the situations faced
under Tex. R. Cr. Ev. 404 (b), and
the Montgomery holding, 810
S.W.2d 372, with those under
Tex. R. Cr. Ev. 609(a), Theus.
One should carefully note that
(1) there is a slightly different bal-
ancing test for Montgomery than
for Theus, and (2) the terms, "pro-
bative value" and "prejudicial
effect" mean different things
under each rule and case as well.
Under 404(b), an "extraneous-
offense-type" prior conviction is
often admitted, for example, to
show "common design or
scheme." So it is actually a kind
of ','hybrid substantive evidence,"
which, because it tends to show
common design, actually tends to
indirectly prove the guilt of the
accused. Under 404(b), this evi-
dence "may be excluded if the
value is substantially
6u tweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice ... " This balanc-
(
ing test applies to all relevant evi-
dence, and is used whether the
€vidence is sought to be intro-
.auced against the accused, the
". .
  or a wItness.

Under 404(b), "probative
value" (and for simplicity, let's
just assume it relates to the
accused) means how compelling-
ly does the evidence actually
show "common design," etc.
hence indirectly, the guilt of the
accused. If it tends to indirectly
prove his guilt, it is inherently
"prejudicial." What renders it
inadmissible is if there is unfair
prejudice, i.e., weak on "common
design," but very strong on show-
ing "bad character," generally.
Under 609(a), "probative
value" means how compellingly
does it reflect on a witness's (can
be accused) potential for truthful-
ness. "Prejudicial effect" means
anything that connects it too
strongly with either guilt, or bad
character generally.
Under 404(b), the evidence
will be admitted if the probative
value is (1) greater than, (2) the
same as, or (3) less than the preju-
dicial effect. It will be excluded
if the probative value is substan-
tially less than the prejudicial
effect.
Under 609(a), the evidence
will be admitted only if the proba-
tive value is greater than the prej-
udicial effect. It will be excluded
if the probative value is (1) the
same as, (2) less than, or (3) sub-
stantially less than the prejudicial
effect.
Next issue we will consider
the present chronological status of
Theus, then perhaps close with
some suggestions on how possi-
bly to best utilize the effects of its
holding.
[to be continued next issue,
Editor]
DOCKET CALL 19
MAY/JUNE 1994
by Allen C. Isbell
Perusing The Code 
of Judicial  Conduct 
Having no self-interest in the
subject, that is, not being presently
angry with a judge or judicial can-
didate, I perused the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
I neither knew nor suspected
that some of the rules in the Code
existed. This faulty knowledge
may be due to having observed the
behavior and rhetoric of judicial
candidates for more than twenty
years.
The Code of Judicial Conduct
contains very good rules that, if
kept, would make a judiciary that
all Texans could take pride in.
Knowing that every judge and judi-
cial candidate in Harris County
abides fully by these rules, I write
this column because some judges
or candidates in other parts of the
State may see this issue, and
become better informed.
Canon 1 UPHOLDING THE
INTEGRITY AND INDEPEN·
DENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.
This is appropriately placed at the
beginning. It reads:
"An independent and honorable
judiciary is indispensable to justice
in our society. Ajudge should par-
ticipate in establishing, maintain-
ing, and enforcing high standards
of conduct, and should personally
observe those standards so that the
integrity and independence of the
judiciary are preserved."
Canon 3 PERFORMING THE
DUTIES OF JUDICIAL
OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND
DILIGENTLY. This demands
courageous judges.
B.(2) requires that
"A judge should be faithfUl to
the law and shall maintain profes-
sional competence in it. A judge
shall not be swayed by partisan
interests, public clamor or fear of
criticism. "
C. (3) requires judges to curtail
any bias or prejudice that a court
official or staff person may feel
toward those with whom they come
in contact:
"A judge should require staff,
court officials and others subject to
the judge's direction and control to
observe the standards of fidelity
and diligence that apply to the
judge and to refrain from manifest-
ing bias or prejudice in the perfor-
mance of their official duties. "
Does this include bias or preju-
dice toward the accused? Does this
include prejudice toward the crimi-
nal defense lawyer?
c. (4) probably applies to prob-
lems in Family and Civil courts
because the fee schedule for court
appointments in criminal cases is
below the fair market value of ser-
vices rendered. It is an important
ru Ie, however.
"A judge shall not make unnec-
essaryappointments. Ajudge shall
exercise the power of appointment
impartially and on the basis of
merit. A judge shall avoid nepo-
tism and favoritism. A judge shall
not approve compensation of
appointees beyond the fair market
value of services rendered."
20 DOCKET CALL
MAY/JUNE 1994
D. (2) says judges are to refer a
lawyer to the Office of the General
Counsel of the State Bar of Texas
or take other appropriate action, if
a judge has information that clearly
establishes that a lawyer has com-
mitted a violation of the Texas
Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthi-
ness or fitness as a lawyer.
I was unfamiliar with D. (1)
which imposes a duty on judges to
report other judges:
"A judge who receives informa-
tion clearly establishing that anoth-
er judge has committed a violation
of this Code should take appropri-
ate action. A judge having knowl-
edge that another judge has com-
mitted a violation of this Code that
raises a substantial question as to
the other judge's fitness for office
shall inform the State Commission
on Judicial Conduct or take other
appropriate action."
I wonder how often judges fol-
low this rule?
Canon 4 CONDUCTING
THE JUDGE'S EXTRA JUDI-
CIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINI-
MIZE THE RISK OF CON-
FLICT WITH JUDICIAL
OBLIGATIONS. This is an "eye-
opener".
A judge may participate in civic
and charitable activities. He may
serve as an officer, director, trustee,
or non-legal advisor of an educa-
tional, religious, charitable, frater-
nal, or civic organization not con-
ducted for the profit of its mem-
bers. But, there are limitations ,
including:
C. (1) "A judge should not
serve if it is likely that the organi-
zation will be engaged in proceed-
ings that would ordinarily come
before the judge or will be regular-
ly or frequently engaged in adver-
sary proceedings in any court. "
Does this include organizations
that picket or protest at the court
house?
c. (3) "A judge should not give
investment advice to such an orga-
nization, but may sen1e on its board
of directors or trustees even though
it has the responsibility for approv-
ing investment decisions. "
Is this a comment on the finan-
cial prowess of the judiciary, gener-
ally? Probably not, but it is a good
rule.
D. (1 )-(3) encourage judges to
divest themselves of investments or
other economic interests that might
require frequent disqualification.
Probably, this is more of a problem
with civil judges.
The Code prohibits financial
dealings between judges and
lawyers, which require "frequent
transactions". Caveat: the rule
does not prohibit a judge or a can-
didate from soliciting funds from
lawyers for a campaign.
I believe most judges and candi-
dates in Harris County are aware of
that caveat.
Canon 5 REFRAINING FROM
INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL
ACTIVITY. This caught my attention.
(1) reads:
"A judge or judicial candidate
shall not make statements that indi-
cate an opinion on any issue that
may be subject to judicial interpre-
tation by the office which is being
sought or held, except that discus-
sion of an individual's judicial phi-
losophy is appropriate if conducted
in a manner which does not suggest
to a reasonable person a probable
decision on any particular case. "
Do special interest or single
issue groups respect the mandate of
this rule? It takes courage to tell
such groups that you will not make
a statement on a "controversial
topic" because the rules forbid it,
especially, when these groups
threaten to censure you to their
adherents and support your oppo-
nent, who may be less conscien-
tious about this rule ..
(2) says that judges or candi-
dates for judicial office "shall not
make pledges of promises or con-
duct in office regarding judicial
duties other than the faithful and
impartial performances of the
duties of the office. "
Campaign slogans that promise
to favor this or that group's interest
seem to violate this.
Can one be elected, merely
promising to faithfully and impar-
tially perform the duties of the
offices.?:.-_______- __
(3) says that judges or candi-
dates for judicial office "shall not
authorize the public use of his or
her name endorsing another candi-
date for any public office, except
that either may indicate support for
a political party. "
I believe I've seen this rule vio-
onclusion
The principle "that ends justify
the means" is morally flawed, but it
is a powerful agent in human
behavior. If a judge or judicial can-
didate believes that old adage that
"the first goal of a politician is to
be elected", and ignores the restric-
tive rules of the Code, society loses
ultimately.
DOCKET CALL 21
MAY/JUNE 1994
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22 DOCKET CALL
MAY/JUNE 1994
Update on 
The Value 
ofa Jury 
Consultant 
by Inese A. Neiders,
Ph.D., J.D., Columbus,
Ohio.
Acquittal: State of
Georgia vs. Randall
Hattaway, child sex
case
Lawyers: Charles
A. Mathis, Jr. Esq. and
Virgil L.  Adams, Esq.
of Mathis, Jordon and
Adams, offices in
Milledgeville and
Macon Georgia.
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Charles Mathis is past
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Association. The firm
is noted for its civil
rights and plaintiff's work.
Jury Consultant: Inese A. Neiders, Ph.D., J.D.,
Columbus, Ohio
Facts: Randall Hattaway was accused of sexually
molesting a male child, two other males came forth
and alleged that they had been molested by Mr.
Hattaway fifteen to twenty years ago.
Jury Problem: The case arose in Milledgeville,
Georgia a small town in the Bible Belt in the heart of
Georgia. The lawyers are minority lawyers and the
defendant is a single white male who has never had a
conviction in a life that spans over six decades.
Individual sequestered voir dire as well as a ques-
tionnaire elicited information that one third of the juror
pool was composed of corrections officers or their
family members. Extremely negative statements were
made about child sexual abusers before the evidence
was presented. One juror stated that he was on the
grand jury that indicted Mr. Hattaway. One juror was
in a civil case in which Mr. Mathis had obtained a ver-
dict against him. Much critical information was
gained through the use of this approach (see "How to
Save Your Client While Saving the Court Time"
Docket 17 September/October, 1992).
Through the use of a questionnaire and a jury con-
sultant, the lawyer selected a jury that found Randall
Hattaway "Not Guilty".
CHARLES FORD
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS, INC
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DOCKET CALL 23
MAY/JUNE  1994 
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