1nc - Round 5 - Bf

1NC
A) Space development is staffed missions Livingston 7 – former adjunct professor in the Graduate School of Business at
Golden Gate University his doctoral dissertation was titled “Outer Space Commerce: Its History and Prospects” citing Eric Westling co-author of “The Space Elevator” and numerous papers on space tech and development [quals in card] (9/10/07, “This Week On The Space Show: Eric Westling”, http://www.thespaceshow.com/guest.asp?q=298)

Eric Westling is a science writer, pundit on science, technology, and economics. He is the co-author of “The Space Elevator” with Dr. Brad Edwards . In addition, Mr. Westling is retired and is a former Army officer and
helicopter pilot, civilian Airline Transport Pilot (ATP), former consultant to many small companies regarding engineering, computer, and business troubleshooting. His most recent papers are on Solar Power Satellites, Economics of the Space Elevator, Energy and time lag in the 21st century , and Eric’s axioms (a list of principles of science, technology and economics). Mr. Westling stats that “Space Development is the only long term answer to the, just starting, energy shortage; which will otherwise continue until we have an economic collapse.” He

believes that no-one is doing space development . Instead, we have space technology, not development. NASA has no TRL 10 – therefore no plans to develop space . He defines space development as the rapid expansion of manned [staffed] commercial projects in space. B) Exploration means human presence in space Logsdon, 9 – professor of political science at George Washington, former
director of the Space Policy Institute (John, “Fifty Years of Human Spaceflight Why Is There Still a Controversy?,” http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100025875_2010028362.pdf) Exploration as a Compelling Rationale Many believe that the only sustainable rationale for a government-funded program of human spaceflight is to take the lead in exploring the solar system beyond low

Earth orbit.20 The MIT white paper provides an insightful definition of exploration: Exploration is a human activity, undertaken by certain cultures at certain times for particular reasons. It has components of national interest, scientific research, and technical innovation, but is defined by none of them. We define exploration as

an expansion of the realm of human experience, bringing people into new places, situations, and environments, expanding and redefining what it
means to be human. What is the role of Earth in human life? Is human life fundamentally tied to the earth, or could it survive without the planet? Human presence, and its attendant risk, turns a spaceflight into a story that is compelling to large numbers of people. Exploration also has a moral dimension because it is in effect a cultural conversation on the nature and meaning of human life. Exploration by this definition can only be accomplished by direct human presence and may be deemed worthy of the risk of human life.21 In the wake of the 2003 Columbia accident that took the lives of seven astronauts and the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that criticized the absence of a compelling mission for human spaceflight as “a failure of national leadership,”22 the United States, in January 2004, adopted a new policy to guide its human spaceflight activities. The policy directed NASA to “implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond” and to “extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations.”23 This policy seems

totally consistent with the definition of exploration provided in the MIT white paper. The issue is whether such a policy and its implementation,
focusing on human exploration beyond Earth orbit, can provide an adequate and sustainable justification for a continuing program of government-sponsored spaceflight that will make contributions that will outweigh the costs and risks involved to the “primary objectives” of national pride and prestige, and also to some of the several “secondary objectives.”

C) The aff isn’t a manned commercial project – that’s a voter for predictable limits – they explode the topic by allowing hundreds of potential satellite and military affs – manned missions require a larger investment that we can be prepared to debate against

1NC
Payroll tax will pass- Obama pushing and bipartisan congress Billups 1/25 (Erin Billups; staff writer for NY1 newspaper; “Washington
Beat: Congress Hopes For Less Partisanship In Renewed Payroll Tax Cut Debate”; http://www.ny1.com/content/news_beats/political_news/154856/washington-beat-congress-hopes-for-less-partisanship-in-renewed-payroll-tax-cut-debate; SP) During his State of the Union address on Tuesday, President Barack Obama

put Congress on notice, that there will be no repeat of December's fight over the payroll tax and unemployment insurance extensions. "No side issues. No drama. Pass the payroll tax cut without delay," said the president. The 20-member conference committee met publicly for the first time Tuesday and all expressed similar sentiments. "Let's
put aside our differences for the greater good," said Democratic Senator Max Baucus of Montana, the committee's vice chair. They hope to have recommendations

in by February 17, well before February 29, when the current short term
extension of the payroll tax cut, unemployment insurance and the Medicare doc-fix are set to expire. "We're willing to do the work if anyone else is willing

to join us," said Republican Representative Tom Reed of New York. Many are
looking to this committee as a barometer of whether lawmakers are really trying to put the brinkmanship of 2011 behind them. Democrats warned their colleagues on the right that strategy will not work in an election year. "The payroll tax debate last year shows this strategy has its limits," said Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York. "Don't be surprised if election politics of 2012 may push

Republicans to cooperate with this president more than they might be planning to." But quick passage of long-term extensions will be a heavy lift. Republican conferees point to what they say is the crux of the problem. "They want the payroll tax
holiday and when I say 'they,' I mean the Democrats, but they don't want to pay for it," said Representative Renee Ellmers of North Carolina. With the president

prioritizing higher taxes for the wealthy, Democrats argued there is a way to pay for the extensions. "Fairness calls on us to

ask those that have done the very best in the last years and decades to contribute a little more towards fiscal responsibility,"
said Representative Sander Levin of Michigan. Republicans have said off the bat that is not going to happen. "Such an idea is clearly not sound economic policy and simply cannot pass in the House [of Representatives]," said Representative Tom Price of Georgia. While they all say they want to turn a new leaf in the new

year, it remains to be seen whether they will be able to put the differences from the past year behind them. The committee meets again next Wednesday.

The aff drains political capital -- causes a battle over funding among industry players -- the CP does not link
Nathan Patena, Capstone Policy analysis at Perpperdine University, “Revisiting the Final Frontier,” April 2011 (http://www.natepatena.com/downloads/space.pdf) Today, America’s space program does not benefit from the same outstanding leadership trifecta that existed during the Apollo era. Since the early 1990s, America

has struggled to find the right balance of political, organizational, and technical leadership necessary to reignite the country’s space program. As outlined in the previous section, political leadership has been intermittent and generally lackluster since 1990. Although Georgia H.W.
Bush had lofty goals for the space program, he lacked the political capital to push his plans through Congress. Despite his token support for the International Space Station, Bill Clinton was rather apathetic to space initiatives. George W. Bush was able to push the Constellation Program through Congress, but these achievements were short-lived, as Barack Obama cancelled the program five years after its adoption. In short, this

dearth of political leadership can be attributed to insufficient political capital, disinterest, or contradictory movements.
Finally, the President and Congress have also struggled to select the right organizational and technical personnel to lead NASA. Daniel Goldin served as NASA’s Chief Administrator from the end of the Bush (Sr.) administration through the beginning of the Bush (Jr.) administration. Although Goldin succeeded in abating Bill Clinton’s push to cancel key space programs, he was largely ineffective in developing and supporting new initiatives (Logsdon, 2008). Realizing the need for sound financial management, George W. Bush selected Sean O’Keefe as Goldin’s replacement. O’Keefe served as a top White House budget advisor before being selected for the position (Logsdon, 2008). In 2003, an independent review board released its report on the

Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. In the document, the board cited a “failure of national leadership” for not providing “strategic vision” to guide America’s space program (Logsdon, 2008). In response, George W. Bush revealed his Constellation Program, hoping to correct some of the aforementioned errors. In support of this highly technical initiative, he selected Michael Griffin, a top scientist and engineer, to replace Sean O’Keefe as NASA’s chief. Since the end of the Constellation program, Barack Obama appointed Charles Bolden to the post. Obama hopes that Bolden, a retired astronaut, can bridge the gap between major space programs. In short, this high turnover rate of top NASA officials underscores the need for multi-faceted leadership that can fuse organizational management with technical expertise and political maneuvering. 4 Policy Objectives & Assessment Criteria As frequently discussed throughout this analysis, the political environment surrounding the American

space program is in a constant state of flux. Many critical policymakers,
lobbyists, and media outlets continue to examine NASA and its various missions under a powerful microscope in order to erode public support for the program. In recent months, President Obama has been publicly touting his new “National Space Policy” (NSP), the legislation which eliminated George W. Bush’s Constellation Program in favor of expanded Earth-science, private sector, and long-range exploration initiatives. In order to properly analyze the quality of the current NSP and viability of future policy proposals, it is important to first define the primary policy objectives and corresponding assessment criteria. 4.1 Political Feasibility Political feasibility is the centerpiece of any sustainable policy initiative. As American citizens were recently reminded during the debate surrounding “The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” (often referred to as “Obamacare”), modern political feasibility is often the result of a simple numerical majority. When so-called entitlement programs such as PPACA, social security, or welfare are passed, even by the slightest of majorities, they typically become so entrenched in public consciousness that they are nearly impossible to reverse. Space policy, however, is not so fortunate. Due to the capricious

nature of support for the space program, political feasibility is rarely defined by a simple political party majority. It is instead built upon personal, regional, and political alliances which undergo constant realignment. As an illustration of this point, consider
the key space policy developments of the past decade. In 2004, Congress passed President Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration” with an overwhelming bipartisan majority. However, only five years later, many of the VSE supporters voted for the program’s destruction under President Obama’s NSP. Any viable space policy proposal must be crafted to withstand the changing tides of political reality by appealing to the personal, regional, and political whims of current and future policymakers. 4.2 Technical Capability There are many inherent challenges of developing effective policy programs to guide yet-to-be-invented technological endeavors such as space exploration. Even the most adept scientific minds are restricted to educated guesses when projecting the future time, resources, and personnel needed to drive new

technological platforms. NASA’s history is strewn with examples of overly aggressive budgets and deadlines including the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and Hubble Space Telescope. The unforeseen technical challenges of these three programs led to drastic cost and deadline overruns, nearly resulting in the cancellation of each program. Although the Shuttle, ISS, and Hubble all escaped the chopping block, their counterpart projects were not so fortunate. The ambitious technical objectives of George H.W. Bush’s SEI and George W. Bush’s Constellation Program were so daunting to some policymakers that they were eventually discontinued. Successful space policy has to carefully and deliberately bridge the gap between ambition and technical capability. If given enough time and money, NASA and its contractors can achieve almost any task - the goal is to produce these same technological wonders without driving costs and deadlines irreconcilably height. 4.3 Program Sustainability In conjunction with the first two objectives, political feasibility and technical capability, space policy initiatives must be sustainable over protracted period of time. Unlike many domestic and international policy program in other sectors, space policy is not a ‘set-it-and-forget-it’ undertaking. Legislation surrounding social security and health care result in bureaucracies and public dependencies which contribute to the nearly permanent nature of these programs. Contrarily, NASA missions are constantly reviewed and reassessed by new Presidents, Congresses, and agency leaders. Emerging legislation needs to build in safeguards against political meddling. Politicians have historically shown a tendency to casually alter key mission objectives, budgets, or deadlines and then complain when objectives are missed, costs skyrocket, or deadlines pass. Care must also be taken to select the proper organizational and technical leadership to manage NASA and its many contractors. Without legislative foresight and long-term organizational commitment, future space policy initiatives are likely to suffer the same fate as SEI or the Constellation Program. 4.4 Implementation Timeline Program sustainability is often contingent on key mission objectives and deadlines built into supporting legislation. For example, President Obama’s National Space Policy calls for human exploration of an asteroid by the late 2020s and Mars by the late 2030s. Contained within these broad objectives are countless checkpoints, deadlines, and financial guidelines. However, since neither program is scheduled to begin in earnest under the late 2010s, there is a high likelihood of major alteration or cancellation before commencement. Viable space policy must contain long-term objectives, but it must also begin implementation before the political and organizational landscape changes too drastically. Lengthy space missions strongly benefit from momentum- and policy momentum requires swift and decisive implementation. 4.5 Financial Efficiency As previously mentioned, political feasibility in the United States is rapidly changing. Party ideologies are starting to

take a back seat to the new driver of political feasibility: the ballooning federal deficit. The relationship between NASA’s
budget and the federal deficit is remarkable. During the 1960s, NASA’s annual budget averaged 50.06% of the annual federal deficit. By the 1970s, this number shrank to 7.74%, and has continued to decline ever since – 3.59% in the 1980s, a slight uptick to 4.94% in the 1990s, and 2.45% in the 2000s. Although NASA’s adjusted annual budget

subsided modestly from $22.2 billion in the 1960s to $16.0 billion in the 2000s, its percentage of the annual deficit fell by more than 95% (The Guardian, 2010). Figure 6, next page, shows the severity of the exponential growth in the federal budget deficit since the start of the civilian space program. Outstanding federal debt now exceeds $14 trillion. As a point of reference, NASA’s entire budget from 1958 to 2010 totaled $454 billion, a mere 3.24% of the current national debt. Equally concerning is the annual debt increase rate, which now hovers around 15%. When this rate is applied to the total outstanding debt, America finds itself in the midget of a budget crisis that continues to grow exponentially. As a result of this emerging financial reality,

politicians are facing mounting public pressure to reduce and eliminate unnecessary programs. Although the civilian space program remains one
of the most efficient and cost effective federal programs, the perception gap discussed in Section 3 continues to plague NASA’s efforts to bolster national space spending. Until this gap narrows, NASA must continue to improve its financial efficiency as a hedge against political pruning. 4.6 Private Sector Engagement When President Obama laid out his National Space Policy in 2009 and 2010, he called for a drastic increase in private sector engagement. This policy represents a significant departure from the status quo. Historically, the success of America’s major space initiative was a byproduct of excellent private sector support of official NASA initiatives. But the 2010 NSP aims to transform private sector engagement from a passive to an active process. Instead of supporting government missions, private space companies are now encouraged to develop radically new ideas with the financial and technical support of NASA and its partners. Private sector engagement is increasingly

important to the future of the space program. America’s
long-standing, deep seeded belief in the power of free market capitalism has driven deregulation and privatization across dozens of major markets since the end of World War II. But the space program has remained public and highly centralized because of the scope and danger associated with space exploration. For most of NASA’s history, the financial and technological hurdles of space flight were considered to be insurmountable for private firms. But in recent years, the advent of advance compute, guidance, and safety technology has drastically reduced the cost and complication of such private missions. At this time, private companies such as SpaceX, Bigelow Aerospace, Orbital Science Corp., PlanetSpace, The Spaceship Company, and Transformation Space Corp. are redefining the boundaries of private achievement by developing highly sophisticated launch platforms, space capsules, habitat modules, and management systems at a fraction of the cost of government development. As such,

increased reliance upon private sector support and technology will be vital to any viable future space policy.

Capital is key to compromise

Philadelphia Inquirer 11, “Don’t expect miracles on job growth,”
http://articles.philly.com/2011-09-08/news/30130709_1_jobs-planamerican-economy-rare-tax The fundamental problem in the American economy is simple: With so many people unemployed and underemployed - some 24 million - there is not enough demand for what the U.S. economy can produce. The solution is to pump more money into the economy to get it going, just as if priming a pump to get water flowing again. Republicans and the president

should be able to find common ground on some significant steps toward that end. Extending or even expanding this year's payroll tax cut would put more than $100 billion into the hands of people who will actually spend it, instead of merely padding the investment
accounts of wealthy taxpayers. Paying for roads, bridges, schools and other construction projects is the kind of investment for which long-term borrowing is justified, because it produces long-term benefits, as well as creating short-term jobs. Sending more aid to state and local governments would help keep their taxes down while maintaining existing jobs and vital public services. Yet Republicans say that job-creating efforts along those lines would have to be offset by cuts elsewhere. That would just shift money around, totally negating any net benefit to the economy as a whole. It's true, the country would have to pay for a lot of the new recovery efforts with borrowed money. Much of the new borrowing, though, will come from cash that would otherwise stay idle or go elsewhere. U.S. companies are sitting on $2 trillion of idle money, and federal borrowing helps recycle dollars that were spent on our gaping trade deficit with China. Given Republican opposition, Obama will probably be forced to use all his

political capital just to take steps that should be no-brainers: extending the payroll tax cut and continuing unemployment insurance. Republicans have questioned the payroll tax cut - a rare tax cut
they don't automatically embrace - professing concern for keeping Social Security financially sound. It's an ironic argument, coming from a party that made a major effort to privatize Social Security.

Failure kills the economy

Marr and Highsmith 11. [Chuck, Director of Federal Tax Policy at
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities., Brian, joined the Center’s Federal Fiscal Policy division in January 2011 as a research assistant. Prior to joining the Center, Highsmith had interned at the National Economic Council and House Budget Committee. He holds a B.A. in Economics and Political Science from Furman University. 9-7-2011 http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3572]

Failure by Congress to extend the temporary payroll tax cut enacted last December would reduce all paychecks starting on January 1, withdrawing needed support from the still-weak economy. The measure, part of the tax cut-unemployment insurance deal

between President Obama and Republican leaders, reduces the employee share of the Social Security payroll tax,[1] boosting workers' take-home pay by an estimated $120 billion in 2011. The tax cut is worth $934 to the average worker. (The table below gives some examples of how the tax cut's expiration would affect workers in different occupations.) Many economists have warned that letting the tax cut expire at the end of December would slow economic growth next year. To reduce the

risk that the economy will continue to grow too slowly to lower unemployment or may even slide back into recession, policymakers should at a minimum extend the tax cut. However,
because the payroll tax cut is already in effect, extending it for a year would provide no new boost to the economy—it would simply prevent the withdrawal of existing support for economic growth. In light of continuing economic weakness, that's not enough: policymakers should accompany the extension with other actions that provide an immediate boost to growth. They could, for example, strengthen the payroll tax cut, such as by applying it to the employer share of the payroll tax in the case of new hires. Policymakers should also enact other measures to support the weak economy, such as extending the federal emergency unemployment insurance program (which likewise is set to expire in December) and enacting other well-designed stimulative measures. (An examination of such other measures lies beyond the scope of this paper.) Premature Expiration Would Constitute Self-Inflicted Blow to Economy According to the Tax Policy Center, the payroll tax cut is benefiting 121 million families

this year,[2] increasing their paychecks by an average of around 1.7 percent. For the average worker, this works out to $934 in additional take-home pay over the course of the year. The Congressional Budget Office has reported that "the increase in takehome pay [spurs] additional spending by the households receiving the higher income, and that higher spending … in turn increase[s] production and employment." [3] A number of economists have recently warned that the U.S. economy is growing very slowly and is particularly vulnerable to shocks, and that allowing the payroll tax cut to expire could constitute such a shock. Economists at Goldman Sachs, for example, recently identified the tax cut's potential expiration as a significant threat to the U.S. economy;[4] they estimate that expiration of the payroll tax cut would reduce growth by as much as two-thirds of a percentage point in early 2012.[5] They

also estimate that if both the payroll tax cut and extended unemployment benefits expire at the end of the year, the fiscal drag on the economy "will be intense in 2012."[6] According to Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody's Analytics, "If [the temporary payroll tax cut and extended federal unemployment benefits] are not extended, real GDP growth will be nearly a percentage point slower in 2012 and there will be approximately one million fewer jobs by year's end." [7] A separate Moody's report concluded

that the potential for "failure to extend the payroll tax cut is a significant downside risk to the outlook for U.S. growth."[8]
Expiration Would Shrink Paychecks of Nearly All Working Americans

Failure to extend the payroll tax cut would harm workers in nearly every job and income category.[9] For example, the nation's

1.4 million truck drivers, whose salaries average $39,450, would pay $789 more in payroll taxes, on average. The nation's 2.7 million nurses, whose salaries average $67,720, would lose $1,354, on average. The table below provides additional examples. Those increased tax payments would

significantly reduce consumer purchasing power in every state.

The table in the appendix provides Treasury Department estimates of how many people in each state are benefitting from the payroll tax cut in 2011 and how much they are receiving. In Ohio, for example, 5.7 million workers

will receive $3.6 billion in higher take-home pay this year, and in Nevada, 1.2 million workers will see their paychecks increase by a combined $800 million. These 2011 figures provide a guide to the economic impact in various states of letting the tax cut expire. Policymakers Should Extend and Expand Payroll Tax Cut The rationale for enacting the temporary payroll tax cut last December — the economy was weak and a payroll tax cut would provide a more efficient bang-for-the-buck than many other tax-cut options — has become still more compelling today, given the renewed signs of economic weakness. At a time of soft economy-wide demand, the

tax cut increases consumer purchasing power in a manner that is both substantial (boosting take-home pay by 2 percent for most workers) and modestly progressive, since the wage cap limits the

benefit for higher-income families (who are more likely to save rather than spend the additional money; see Figure 1). Largely for these reasons, Moody's Analytics estimates that every $1 reduction in federal tax revenue resulting from an employee-side payroll tax cut expands the economy by $1.27.[12] Of 16 tax-policy stimulus options that Moody's economists evaluated, the employee payroll holiday ranked second for effectiveness per dollar of cost, after continuation of the expansion of the refundable component of the Child Tax Credit, included in the 2009 Recovery Act (and now scheduled to expire at the end of 2012). [13] Some critics have noted that the payroll tax cut is not as well targeted as its predecessor — the Making Work Pay tax credit, a part of the Recovery Act that was in effect in 2009 and 2010 — toward people with modest means, who are the most likely to spend any additional take-home pay. Some have also expressed concern that Congress might not allow the temporary payroll tax cut to expire after economic conditions improve, undermining the financing of Social Security. (Under both current law and President Obama's proposal to extend the payroll tax cut, general revenue transfers to the Social Security trust fund offset the loss of payroll tax revenue. As a result, the current temporary payroll tax cut, accompanied by the transfer of general revenues to Social Security, does not adversely affect Social Security's finances, according to the program's chief actuary.) [14] While it might be preferable for Congress to return to the Recovery Act's tax structure and enact a refundable tax credit that better targets low-paid workers most likely to spend the money immediately and avoids any risks to Social Security finances, the likelihood of Congress approving such a policy is very low. A one-year extension of the payroll tax cut is highly preferable to the likely

alternative — expiration without any replacement, which would reduce paychecks across the country at a vulnerable economic time. To be sure, because the payroll tax cut is already in effect, extending it for a year would not provide a new boost to the economy. But it would prevent the withdrawal of some significant existing support for economic growth. To achieve additional stimulus, policymakers could consider expanding the payroll tax cut. They could increase it from 2 percent of qualifying earnings to 3 or 4 percent, for example, or extend it to include the employer share of the payroll tax for new hires. The Congressional Budget Office ranks the latter option as particularly effective stimulus.[15] Alternatively, policymakers could continue the current tax cut but pair it with additional tax relief administered through the individual income tax code. [16] Conclusion As recent economic data demonstrate, for policymakers, the short-term economic risks today are on the downside — the risk of doing too little to boost job creation and economic growth is far greater than the risk of doing too much on a temporary basis. By extending the payroll tax cut — and the provision of additional weeks of unemployment benefits to workers who have exhausted their 26 weeks of state-funded UI benefits without finding a job — policymakers can avoid increasing the risk of renewed recession. But they should do more to reduce the probability of a double-dip recession and increase the probability of a sustainable recovery that generates sufficient jobs to shrink the massive jobs deficit. While a discussion of various steps needed to shore up the economy is beyond the scope of this paper, in the payroll tax arena, policymakers should consider strengthening the payroll tax reduction as part of a larger set of economic measures.

Economic decline causes war – studies prove Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S.
Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has
contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been

considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global

economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996)
also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the

expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could otentially be the trigger for decreased
trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between

economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p.

X9> Economic

decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang
(1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively

correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al
systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

1NC
A. Its implies ownership Glossary of English Grammar Terms ‘5
(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html) Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns

used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

B. The aff engages in data sharing with an international actor – that’s a voter for predictable limits – the USfg could do an infinite number of things with India, China, Russia, the EU, and various other actors – that’s a separate research base that makes it impossible to be neg C. Extra-topicality is a voter – it kills topic focus and lets the aff garner unpredictable advantages

1NC
Text: The United States federal government should enact the outcome of a binding negotiation with the American aerospace industry. In the negotiation, the United States federal government should recommend that the United States federal
government substantially increase its development of Light Detection and Ranging for the purpose of Space Situational Awareness beyond the earth’s mesosphere.

Solvency: Negotiation solves -- parties will come to the table and produce a viable plan
Harter, 1997 (Phillip J., Visiting Professor and Director of the Program on Consensus, Democracy and Governance at Vermont Law School, Duke Law Journal, April) The most well developed of these techniques, other than the public hearings and meetings that are adjuncts of the APA itself, [*1400] is negotiated rulemaking (reg neg). 43 Fifteen years ago, when the theory of negotiated
rulemaking was just emerging, I predicted a number of major benefits from the practice. 44 Among them was the fact that the parties would be able to

participate directly and immediately in the decision, thereby providing a legitimacy that is missing from hybrid rulemaking. In

addition, the

costs of developing the rule may be lower since the parties would not have to engage in as much adversarial research and positioning. The parties could focus on the issues that actually separate them and on the issues of importance to them. "Rulemaking by negotiation can reduce the time and cost of developing regulations by emphasizing practical and empirical concerns rather than theoretical predictions." 45 The parties have the experience and ability to focus on the details
necessary to make a rule work day-to-day in the field. Interestingly, the lack of judicial review was not advocated as a prime benefit. It would be a likely ancillary benefit of the parties' mutual acceptance of the rule and its ensuing legitimacy, but was not an end in itself. Such were the predictions before any reg negs were actually undertaken. Formal evaluations are extraordinarily expensive and face the difficulties inherent in making counter-factual predictions (i.e., what would have happened if some other process were used to develop the rule), or finding a suitably analogous rule with which to compare a given proceeding. 46 As a result, few formal evaluations have been conducted, so that it is difficult to deter- [*1401] mine in a rigorous way the extent to which the theory has been borne out. One major evaluation has been undertaken to compare negotiated rules at the EPA with those developed by the traditional notice-and-comment process. The study is currently being conducted for the EPA by Cornelius M. Kerwin, Dean of the School of Public Affairs at American University and Professor Laura I. Langbein. They have released a draft report of their analysis of the reg neg portion of their study. 47 Their initial conclusions include: Based on the data presented above, negotiated

rulemaking is successful on several critical dimensions. It is widely perceived by participants as an effective means for developing regulations on virtually all important qualitative dimensions. The
criteria established in literature and law for the selection of candidates for reg neg appear to be relevant in the selection process used by EPA, although their importance appears to vary from case to case and the discretion exercised by key Agency officials in the use of techniques is obviously considerable. The opportunity to participate in the process appears to be extended broadly, albeit not universally, and EPA or the facilitator it secured were frequently identified as an initiator of participation. The process of negotiation itself emerges as a very powerful vehicle for

learning what the participants in the process value highly, and
there are many types of information that is exchanged. The interviews suggest further that what is learned has long-term value and is not confined to a particular rulemaking... The negotiation process employs a number of devices to subdivide issues, such as working groups and caucuses, that were viewed as effective by a substantial number of respondents. And the use of non-committee observers serves as a device to expand participation without inflating the negotiating groups past workable limits. Facilitators were generally viewed as competent, unbiased and providing a number of

services that promoted consensus. [*1402] Most participants

believe their participation had a substantial effect on the agreement that was produced and report that the opportunity to have an impact on the outcome was one of the aspects of the process they considered most valuable. 48

The aerospace industry will agree to the recommendation -- results in enactment of the plan Defense Daily, “New Space Policy Promotes International Cooperation, Private Industry,” 6-30-2010 Lexis
The Obama administration has issued

a new national space policy that emphasizes international cooperation and support for a robust space industrial base. In a written statement issued June 28 by the White House,
President Barrack Obama said the new plan would "rapidly increase our capabilities in space while bolstering America's competitive edge in the global economy." "The United States will engage in expanded international cooperation in space activities," the policy document states. "The United States will pursue cooperative

activities to the greatest extent practicable in areas including: space science and exploration; earth observations, climate change research
and the sharing of environmental data; disaster mitigation and relief; and space surveillance for debris monitoring and awareness. " However, Washington remains committed to the use of space systems "in support of its national and homeland security," according to the document. "The United States will invest in space

situational awareness capabilities and launch vehicle technologies; develop
the means to assure mission essential functions enabled by space; enhance our ability to identify and characterize threats; and deter, defend, and if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems," it states. The document also addresses arms control in space. The policy expresses the administration's willingness to "consider" arms control agreements for the space domain. Defense Secretary Robert Gates welcomed the release of the policy. "Space-based capabilities are critical to our military's ability to navigate accurately, strike precisely, and gather battle space awareness efficiently," he said in a press statement. "However, changes in the space environment over the last decade challenge our operations. Today, space is increasingly contested as our systems face threats of disruption and attack, increasingly competitive as more states, private firms, and others develop space-based capabilities, and

increasingly congested with orbital debris." Gates pledged to work closely with his counterparts in other U.S. government agencies to mitigate such risks. The policy also calls for a "robust and competitive" industrial base. "In support of its critical

domestic aerospace industry, the U.S. government will use commercial space products and services in fulfilling governmental needs, invest in new and advanced technologies and concepts,
and use a broad array of partnerships with industry to promote innovation," it states. "The U.S. government will actively promote the purchase and use of U.S. commercial space goods and services within international cooperative agreements." The

Aerospace Industries Association, a top lobbying group for the defense and aerospace sector, said in a statement that the new policy "takes important steps needed to maintain our global leadership in space and ensure continued competitiveness and innovation." AIA hailed the policy's emphasis on "retaining space professionals and improving space professional development" as "an important investment in our workforce.
"

Net Benefit: Deliberative negotiation with the Aerospace industry is key to predictability and long-term planning. This solves the health of Aerospace and the overall economy. Atkins and Newton, ‘10
(Chuck Atkins, Former Chief of Staff to the US House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, No relation to the former Detroit Pistons guard, Elizabeth Newton, Director for Aerospace and Defense Policy at the University of Alabama, “Take the Chaos Out of US Space Policy,” Space News, 5-10-2010, http://spacenews.com/commentaries/100510-takechaos-out-space-policy.html)

The current debate over U.S. civil space policy makes for fascinating reading, but

recurring political chaos about the nation’s space exploration goals benefits no one. Leaving aside for a moment the merits of President Barack Obama’s proposal to redefine the human spaceflight program of NASA, we as a nation should ask: How should our country best make such judgments and, perhaps more important, how can we establish a process that would avoid the kind of instability we are experiencing and lead to better results? As we know, NASA originated in post-World War II geopolitics for
the purpose of developing space systems that would help us master outer space for domestic and international benefits. The political decision to extend our mastery of new territory outside Earth’s orbit was a relatively easy one; at the time, the Soviet Union’s actions made clear the political and technological costs of not acting. Political choices about the space program today are not so obvious,

and it is increasingly clear that the United States needs a better way of setting priorities, goals and missions for human space exploration than was
used during Cold War conditions. By rough count, since 1969 there have been 24 presidential blue-ribbon panels and agency evaluations of NASA’s human space exploration direction, 22 attempts by Congress to terminate the international space station program and cancellations of at least 10 projects related to a space shuttle replacement. While NASA’s budget for human space exploration is approximately 0.5 percent of the total federal budget, these aborted projects represent billions of dollars that could have been spent achieving something for America. The programmatic

churn results not only in a price tag for unrealized projects but also in the well-documented erosion of our aerospace industrial base, decaying infrastructure and the disengagement of our brightest young minds. We should add to this cost the country’s loss of credibility and stature when we derail the plans of our international partners and abandon leadership in one of the few remaining areas where we truly are preeminent. In short, churn carries many opportunity costs. The United States
deserves a sustainable human space exploration effort that is responsibly planned and given the consistent support necessary for a complex technical effort to succeed. In this age of record deficits, unemployment and troubling geopolitics, we — or rather our elected leaders — could choose to proceed differently this time around, with a vision for policy stability. The key challenge is that reconsiderations of space policy seem to match the length of the presidential election cycle, or sometimes even the annual appropriations cycle. We need to provide greater intellectual continuity to these reviews if we are to have any hope of policy stability. Policy stability is not an

unheard-of feat; examples exist where a prioritization process stabilizes long-term national plans while still enabling political accountability for public resources. For example, for the past 40 years, the space science community and, more recently, the Earth science community have managed an inclusive, deliberate process to determine the most important questions and missions of their disciplines for the decade to come. Their process sets 10-year research and technology priorities, taking the guesswork out of the scientific ends that the government should support, thereby reducing and even avoiding the annual churn otherwise created by the U.S. government’s legislative process or election cycles. The executive branch and Congress accept the scientific communities’ priorities and goals and determine the amount of public resources available. While funding and schedules can and do change with the budget process, the goals and destinations in space do not. It is time for human space exploration to be put on similar footing so that the political decisions are less about what the priorities, goals and missions are, and more about how many the country can afford at a given point
in time, especially relative to other national needs. A managed and regular prioritization process should replace episodic, ad hoc presidential commissions in order to ensure that the compelling questions for human space exploration are asked and answered with an enduring consensus in an accountable way and that diverse and iconoclastic views are considered.

And Aerospace Decline Kills Air Power Thompson 9 (David, President – American Institute of Aeronautics and

Astronautics, “The Aerospace Workforce”, Federal News Service, 12-10, Lexis) Aerospace systems are of considerable importance to U.S. national security, economic prosperity, technological vitality, and global leadership. Aeronautical and space systems protect our citizens, armed forces, and allies abroad. They connect the farthest corners of the world with safe and efficient air transportation and satellite communications, and they monitor the Earth, explore the solar system, and study the wider universe. The U.S. aerospace sector also contributes in major ways to America's economic output and high-

technology employment. Aerospace research and development and manufacturing companies generated approximately $240 billion in sales in 2008, or nearly 1.75 percent of our country's gross national product. They currently employ about 650,000 people throughout our country. U.S. government agencies and departments engaged in aerospace research and operations add another 125,000 employees to the sector's workforce, bringing the total to over 775,000 people. Included in this number are more than 200,000 engineers and scientists -- one of the largest concentrations of technical brainpower on Earth. However, the U.S. aerospace workforce is now facing the most serious demographic challenge in his 100-year history. Simply put, today, many more older, experienced professionals are retiring from or otherwise leaving our industrial and governmental aerospace workforce than early career professionals are entering it. This imbalance is expected to become even more severe over the next five years as the final members of the Apollo-era generation of engineers and scientists complete 40- or 45-year careers and transition to well-deserved retirements. In fact, around 50 percent of the current aerospace workforce will be eligible for retirement within just the next five years. Meanwhile, the supply of younger aerospace engineers and scientists entering the industry is woefully insufficient to replace the mounting wave of retirements and other departures that we see in the near future. In part, this is the result of broader technical career trends as engineering and science graduates from our country's universities continue a multi-decade decline, even as the demand for their knowledge and skills in aerospace and other industries keeps increasing. Today, only about 15 percent of U.S. students earn their first college degree in engineering or science, well behind the 40 or 50 percent levels seen in many European and Asian countries. Due to the dual-use nature of aerospace technology and the limited supply of visas available to highlyqualified non-U.S. citizens, our industry's ability to hire the best and brightest graduates from overseas is also severely constrained. As a result, unless effective action is taken to reverse current trends, the U.S. aerospace sector is expected to experience a dramatic decrease in its technical workforce over the next decade. Your second question concerns the implications of a cutback in human spaceflight programs. AIAA's view on this is as follows. While U.S. human spaceflight programs directly employ somewhat less than 10 percent of our country's aerospace workers, its influence on attracting and motivating tomorrow's aerospace professionals is much greater than its immediate employment contribution. For nearly 50 years the excitement and challenge of human spaceflight have been tremendously important factors in the decisions of generations of young people to prepare for and to pursue careers in the aerospace sector. This remains true today, as indicated by hundreds of testimonies AIAA members have recorded over the past two years, a few of which I'll show in brief video interviews at the end of my statement. Further evidence of the catalytic role of human space missions is found in a recent study conducted earlier this year by MIT which found that 40 percent of current aerospace engineering undergraduates cited human space programs as the main reason they chose this field of study. Therefore, I think it can be predicted with high confidence that a major cutback in U.S. human space programs would be substantially detrimental to the future of the aerospace workforce. Such a cutback would put even greater stress on an already weakened strategic sector of our domestic high-technology

workforce. Your final question centers on other issues that should be considered as decisions are made on the funding and direction for NASA, particularly in the human spaceflight area. In conclusion, AIAA offers the following suggestions in this regard. Beyond the previously noted critical influence on the future supply of aerospace professionals, administration and congressional leaders should also consider the collateral damage to the space industrial base if human space programs were substantially curtailed. Due to low annual production rates and highly-specialized product requirements, the domestic supply chain for space systems is relatively fragile. Many second- and third-tier suppliers in particular operate

at marginal volumes today, so even a small reduction in their business could force some critical suppliers to exit this sector.

Human space programs represent around 20 percent of the $47 billion in total U.S. space and missile systems sales from 2008. Accordingly, a major cutback in human space spending could have large and highly adverse ripple effects throughout commercial, defense, and scientific space programs as well, potentially triggering a series of disruptive changes in the common industrial supply base that our entire space sector relies on.

Airpower checks Asia war, Korea war, China war and Indopak war escalation Tellis 98 (Ashley, Senior Political Scientist – RAND, “Sources of Conflict in the
21st Century”, http://www.rand. org/publications/MR/MR897/MR897.chap3.pdf) This subsection attempts to synthesize some of the key operational implications distilled from the analyses relating to the rise of Asia and the potential for conflict in each of its constituent regions. The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuous on the Korean peninsula and, to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas, such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and, therefore, has preplanned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, U.S. air power would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the

diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service; (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies;
and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability—fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS, and tankers —are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve armed operations against large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as

is the case in Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional deterrence will increasingly confront the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China, and the Indian subcontinent are already arenas of WMD proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the
most public attention, chemical and biological warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity. China already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing Scud-class theater ballistic missiles. India will acquire the capability to produce ICBM-class delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire long-range cruise missiles during the time frames examined in this report.

1NC Coop
Cooperation doesn’t solve relations- historically proven* Oberg 06, (James, worked in Mission Control, US- Russia space expert, “The U.S. and China: What ‘Common Ground’ in Outer Space?” http://www.jamesoberg.com/policyoutlook2006.pdf, 8.24.11, NI)
Dennis Wilder, identified as Acting Senior Director of Asian Affairs at the White House National Security Council, told newsmen April 20 that Bush’s directive to

NASA to go talk with Chinese space officials was “trying to deepen the relationship between our two societies and
our two cultures.” 13 But John Logsdon put this concept in historical perspective in a report almost twenty years ago, when he wrote: “Those that advocate

space cooperation as a means of making significant changes in superpower political and military relationships are fighting against most examples provided by history.” 14 Logsdon continued: “For most of the twentieth century, a school of
international political thought called ‘functionalism’ has argued for ‘peace by pieces’— creating a network of cooperative relationships in specific areas of human activity that would weave a web of interdependence to place constraints on conflicts so they did not erupt into armed hostility.” Many international relations strategies in the years immediately after both World Wars were “motivated by this perspective,” he wrote, but “most students of international politics are skeptical of

the ‘spillover’ argument—that habits of cooperation developed in narrow areas of activity will have impacts in other areas of nation-state relationships.” This view—often
extolled as a great benefit of U.S.-Russian space cooperation and hence a great promise for U.S.-Chinese space cooperation—is that such habits of cooperation create habits of international amity. They make people “feel good about each other” and change hearts and minds across borders. Nothing could better illustrate this belief than the words of NASA astronaut Charles Precourt, after his third visit to the Mir space station, in mid-1998. Precourt is a highly intelligent and thoroughly decent human being, but his

view that his exploits in space can force unwilling world leaders to make peace despite themselves seems a bit overblown. IADC solves the coop adv Rendleman 10 – Retired Colonel in U.S. Air Force [James R.

Rendleman, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy, Volume 8, Issue 2 & 3, 2010, Pages 220 - 255 //edlee]

Using global engagement to enhance an understanding and situational awareness of the space debris threat, the United States, other spacefaring nations, and the international commercial space sector are now cooperating and working to reinvigorate data sharing procedures in order to avoid, minimize, and manage the numbers of collisions and other space debris generating events.73 For example, the United States participates in the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). The IADC is an international forum that coordinates activities related to space debris. The primary focus of the IADC is to exchange information and facilitate cooperation on space debris research, mitigation options, and best practices. It involves eleven international governmental space agencies; the United States is represented by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). SSA Sharing program solves Rendleman 10 – Retired Colonel in U.S. Air Force [James R.

Rendleman, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy, Volume 8, Issue 2 & 3, 2010, Pages 220 - 255 //edlee]

The United States, through U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), and NASA, has also been working to expand efforts to provide and share orbital data through the SSA Sharing Program to space operators.74 ‘‘The Air Force operates the

world’s most capable space surveillance network, and commercial and other satellite operators have long relied on the service for information in order to reduce the chances of collisions with other spacecraft or orbital debris.’’75 The situational awareness issue is important enough that commercial satellite operators have begun to lay the ‘‘groundwork’’ for a process bywhich they ‘‘can share data previously deemed competition sensitive to avoid costly mishaps.’’76

NDAA will distribute the space surveillance data to all other entities Taylor 07 – Chief of the Space and International Law Division @

Headquarters United States Air Force Space Command at Peterson Air Force Base [MICHAEL W. TAYLOR(JD @ University of Georgia & LL.M. (Air and Space Law) @ McGill University) “ARTICLE: Trashing the Solar System One Planet at a Time: Earth's Orbital Debris Problem,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Fall 2007, 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 1//edlee

Information obtained through tracking efforts should be disseminated to all satellite operators, including nongovernmental entities. If a satellite operator knows that a particular object in space poses a collision risk to a satellite, the operator can maneuver the satellite to avoid the debris. Since collisions in space increase the amount of debris, all states have a vested interest in ensuring operators have access to this data. Historically, the United States made the data from the SSN available through a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration ("NASA") web page. n88 This changed in 2004,

however, as a result of the National Defense Authorization Act ("NDAA") for Fiscal Year 2004. n89 The 2004 NDAA created a pilot program for the Department of Defense ("DoD") to provide space surveillance data to

any foreign or domestic governmental or commercial entity, consistent with national security. n90 As a result, NASA stopped providing tracking data in 2005. In order to receive SSN tracking data, entities have to agree to pay any reasonable charges set by the DoD and not to redistribute the data. n91 These potential restrictions initially
caused some concern among scientists and satellite operators. n92 These concerns, however, ultimately proved unfounded as the DoD continued providing the same data as NASA, n93 the DoD has never charged a fee for access to the

data, and the data is being freely redistributed to anyone with internet access. n94 For both the former NASA

public database and the new DoD public database, the DoD has withheld information about certain classified U.S. Government satellites and the rockets that launched them for national security reasons. n95 The DoD has not yet decided what to do in 2009 after the pilot program ends. Of course, for the reasons expressed above, the United States should continue to make most of the data available for the benefit of all satellite operators.

Coop high now Rendleman 10 – Retired Colonel in U.S. Air Force [James R.

Rendleman, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy, Volume 8, Issue 2 & 3, 2010, Pages 220 - 255 //edlee]

International cooperation and associated multinational operations are important components of an effective global wide range of such activities because it is in its best

engagement strategy to assure access to space capabilities for a nation, its allies, and partners. The United States engages in a

national interests to do so. The 2010 National Space Policy and U.S. national security strategy documents increasingly emphasize international cooperation to

achieve important national interests. For example, National Space Policy (first quote below) and National Defense Strategy (second quote) provide the rationale for international cooperation: Identify Areas for Potential International Cooperation.

Departments and agencies shall identify potential areas for international cooperation that may include, but are not
limited to: space science; space exploration, including human space flight activities; space nuclear power to support space science and exploration; space transportation; space surveillance for debris monitoring and awareness; missile warning; Earth science and observation; environmental monitoring; satellite communications; GNSS [global navigation satellite systems]; geospatial information products and services; disaster mitigation and relief; search and rescue; use of space for maritime domain awareness; and long-term preservation of the space environment for human activity and use. Pg. 238

SSA now Chow 10 (Tiffany Chow, SWF Secure world foundation Research Assistant, “SSA Sharing Program SWF Issue Brief” http://swfound.org/media/6572/swf%20issue%20brief%20%20ssa%20sharing%20program%20with%20execsum%20%20final.pdf )
The quality and quantity of information made available through the SSA Sharing Program may improve soon as the U.S. military’s SSA capabilities expand. For example, on September 25, 2010, the U.S. Air Force launched a $500

million Space‐Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite from Vandenberg AFB in California. This satellite will provide the U.S. Air Force with the first uninterrupted and unobstructed optical observation of Earth orbit and the debris located there. This is the first satellite of its kind to be solely dedicated to SSA. 46 Some have suggested hosting SSA payloads on

commercial satellites to expand SSA capacity and “boost the number of
sensors aloft.” 47 Moreover, the S‐Band Space Fence project is proceeding, with Lockheed Martin winning the concept development contract in late June 2009. 48

The S‐Band Space Fence will enable uninterrupted tracking from Earth of many more objects, including significantly smaller ones, with greater precision than currently possible. 49
However, it is unknown how much these improvements will improve the low accuracy TLEs available on Space Track

No accidental escalation- empirics Quinlan 05- former senior fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies
(Sir Michael, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHP41_QUINLAN.pdf, first published in 1997, reedited in 2005,)

There have certainly been, in over fifty years since the Second World War, many accidents involving nuclear weapons, from

transporters skidding off roads to strategic bombers crashing with or losing the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby atmosphere highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear explosion. Some commentators suggest that this reflects remarkable good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so long. A more rational deduction from the facts

of this experience would however be that the probability of any accident's triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are highly complex; and that in a large number of ways the half-century has seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements. It is undoubtedly possible to
see respects in which, after the Cold War, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are plainly less so. The half-

century we have come through entirely without accidental explosion included early years in which knowledge was

sketchier, weapon design less safety-oriented and precautions less developed than they later became, as well as years in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and alert arrangements more tense. Squo solves for SSA – SBSS GAO 11 ( United States Government Accountability Office, GAO Report to the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, “SPACE ACQUISITIONS Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities” May 2011 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11545.pdf) Recent events, such as the Chinese antisatellite test and the Iridium and Cosmos satellite collision, have highlighted the need for better SSA capabilities governmentwide. DOD has recognized that its existing SSA systems fall short of capability needs and has significantly increased its dollar investments to enhance SSA capabilities. Moreover, the Air Force successfully launched

its SBSS satellite—after several years of delays—which is anticipated to appreciably enhance SSA. However, most other SSA acquisition
efforts that focus on fielding major additions in capability over the next 5 years have or are facing significant challenges and risks, such as the use of immature technologies; planning to deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments; technical requirements instability; operations in a multiple security level environment; and data integration issues. If these efforts do not progress as planned, risk of continuing or worsening SSA capability gaps will result. Therefore, while it is too early to determine the extent to which these new capabilities will address existing shortfalls, it is essential that new SSA

system acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at the start of development to help ensure capabilities from these systems are delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. Should DOD decide to proceed on a path that leaves open important questions, including those about technologies, then it is important that this footing be based on thorough analyses of the risks involved—such as with the use of backup
technologies—including cost, schedule, and performance implications. Such analyses could provide the knowledge needed to determine whether the acquisition program is worth pursuing or what trade-offs would need to be made with other investments should additional resources be required. We have consistently made recommendations for establishing reliable acquisition business cases, such as maturing technologies prior to development start, utilizing evolutionary development, and stabilizing requirements,

and DOD has already embraced these for its newest major space acquisition—the Global Positioning System IIIA program.

Squo solves for SSA – Minataur 4 Graham 9/5/11 (William Graham a Deputy Administrator and Acting
Administrator of NASA, “Minotaur IV launches first Space Based Space Surveillance satellite”, http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/09/live-minotaur-first-space-basedspace-surveillance-satellite/ )

An Orbital Minotaur IV has made its first orbital launch during the
early hours of Sunday morning, carrying the first Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite for the US Air Force and Missile Defense Agency. The launch - from Vandenberg Air Force Base – was

on schedule, at the start of a 14 minute window, whiched opened at 04:41 UTC (21:41 local time on Saturday). SBSS-1 is designed to track and detect other spacecraft in orbit, and will form part of the United States Strategic Command’s Space Surveillance Network. The tracking of satellites from orbit earlier proved an unexpected capability of the MSX satellite, however SBSS-1 will be the first spacecraft dedicated to this mission. SBSS data will supplement that returned by the Ground Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) system, which is used for
most satellite tracking applications. MSX, the Midcourse Space Experiment, was launched aboard a Delta II in 1996 as part of a Ballistic Missile Defense Organization programme to track missiles and warheads making suborbital flights. It used both infrared and visible light instruments to achieve this task. The spacecraft was expected to cease operations when it ran out of coolant in 1997; however the visible light sensor, Space-Based Visible (SBV), was still operable since it did not need to be kept at cryogenic temperatures. MSX was used for an extended mission, during which it was used to track satellites and debris in and close to geosynchronous orbit. The satellite ceased operations in June 2008 following the failure of the SBV instrument

1NC Nuke Primacy
Nuclear primacy can’t deter Blair and Yali 06
[Bruce G. Blair, President of the World Security Institute, author of numerous articles and books on security issues including the Logic of Accidental Nuclear War and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, and Chen Yali, editor in chief of Washington Observer, a Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group, Autumn 2006, “The Fallacy of Nuclear Primacy”, pp. 51-77, World Security Institute, http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_4.pdf ]

History Refutes the Primacy Predictions If the Russian strategic nuclear forces were acutely vulnerable 10-15 years ago, then we do not have to wait to test the professors’ dire predictions of the future. We can go back to a past future to test them. The professors’ predictions and hypotheses about the adverse implications of nuclear primacy in the future – fraying of nuclear relations, re-kindling of a nuclear arms race, heightened instability during a crisis, and increased risk of nuclear war – lend themselves to testing in the crucible of history. What actually happened after Russia’s strategic collapse over a decade ago? Nothing remotely reminiscent of the theoretically predicted upheaval. Contrary to the professors’ expectations, deterrence did not unravel; the imbalance did not lead to growing nuclear tensions or to a nuclear arms race and did not induce Russia or China to take destabilizing steps. The United States did not contemplate a preventive nuclear strike against Russia or China, nor did Russia or China become more poised than before to preempt in a crisis with America. All sides all but ignored the theoretical first strike capability of the United States during the past 15 years (and much longer in the case of China). This history is not a perfect crucible for testing all of the professors’ hypotheses, but the preponderance of evidence so far refutes their argument. What this recent history really seems to be suggesting is that U.S. nuclear primacy is an academic artifice that was and is practically useless

for understanding America’s relations with other nuclear powers. Nuclear primacy in modern times offers no exploitable political leverage. Russia and China appear quite confident in their deterrent arsenals in spite of the lopsided U.S. advantage estimated by models of nuclear war.

Can’t solve irrational actors Blair and Yali 06
[Bruce G. Blair, President of the World Security Institute, author of numerous articles and books on security issues including the Logic of Accidental Nuclear War and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, and Chen Yali, editor in chief of Washington Observer, a Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group, Autumn 2006, “The Fallacy of Nuclear Primacy”, pp. 51-77, World Security Institute, http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_4.pdf ]

In all calculations of nuclear primacy and deterrence, the players are assumed to be rational. However, rational actors might lapse into irrational behavior in readily imaginable ways that are completely obtuse to the nuclear primacy framework. The obvious scenario in this regard concerns the defeat of China’s military force in a potential Taiwan conflict. The Taiwan issue has been a core national interest of China, one that arouses such fervent emotions throughout the country that irrational behavior in its use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.

Nuclear primacy bolsters crisis instability – causes china war Lieber & Press, 7 – *Assistant Professor of Political Science at the

University of Notre Dame AND **Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Winter 2007, Keir A., Daryl G., China Security, “U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of Chinese Deterrent,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/pdfs/Issue5full.pdf, Sawyer) Second, the emergence of U.S. nuclear primacy may lead to

dangerous crisis instability and increase the odds of nuclear war. For example, if China does not redress its vulnerability in

peacetime, leaders in Beijing may feel compelled to do so in the midst of a brewing crisis or conventional war. In such a case, Beijing may feel pressure to alert its small intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force either to signal China’s resolve or to (slightly) reduce the

vulnerability of its arsenal. But a Chinese alert could backfire and trigger a preemptive nuclear attack on China’s vulnerable missile force. Invulnerable first strike capability from satellite causes pre emption and nuclear war- no transition Chari, 7 – Research Professor, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
(“CHINA’S ASAT TEST Seeking the Strategic High Ground,” http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1512612560IPCS-Special-Report34.pdf Veevz)

Possession of satellites with both defensive and offensive capabilities could, in theory, enable the nation possessing them to acquire virtual invulnerability to counterattack by the adversary’s missiles. In other words, the ability to intercept a ballistic missile attack, using information acquired by reconnaissance and communication satellites, could ensure an invulnerable first strike capability, untrammeled by the angst that the adversary would be
able to launch a second strike and inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. Disrupting a putative detection and interception capability by ASAT means could, arguably, restore the balance, and ensure that second-strike capabilities remain robust; thereby, the nuclear deterrent relationship between adversaries would also remain stable. Unfortunately, this scenario is unlikely to obtain in the

real world. A nation which discovers that its space-based assets have become vulnerable to attack would, most likely, either enlarge their numbers or equip them with self-protecting equipment possessing both defensive and offensive capabilities. It could also place its other nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert to

attack the aggressor if it finds its space-based assets being targeted or attacked. This not implausible scenario might very well spell the initiation of a nuclear Armageddon. Proceeding further, the

national judgment of when, how and in what manner it would determine that its space-based assets have been attacked to launch its counter-attack from space or earth would be made by computers. Given the reality that computers do malfunction and the well-recognized maxims of Murphy’s Law, the transfer of decisionmaking on such vital national security issues to computers and machines is hardly reassuring. Stated differently, the chances of accident, misunderstanding and misperception will increase should decisionmaking be largely premised on mechanical instruments, which is inevitable when satellites are equipped and empowered to launch attacks and defend themselves in space. This dispensation is, intrinsically, conducive to great instability and tensions in bilateral relations. And it causes prolif Wang, 7 – Professor of National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army of China (Winter 2007, Zhongchun, China Security, “Nuclear Challenges and China’s Choices,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/pdfs/Issue5full.pdf, Sawyer)

Since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia has gradually shifted to a reality of U.S. hegemony over the global nuclear community. A look at U.S. approaches and actions in its nuclear weapons program illustrates both its efforts and successes toward a hegemon status. The reality of U.S. nuclear hegemony and the resulting aggressive behaviors of the United States has

profoundly undermined the disarmament movement and driven some threatened countries to pursue nuclear weapons programs.

First, the refusal of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has greatly increased the dangers of resumed nuclear testing and the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The CTBT is an important

part of the global nuclear nonproliferation system, as it constrains worldwide nuclear proliferation by banning all nuclear explosions for military or civilian purposes and limits a country's ability to make nuclear advancements. In 1999, the U.S. Senate, whose consent is required for international treaties to become valid and binding, voted not to ratify the CTBT. The United States believed that the CTBT could not ensure the safety, security and reliability of its nuclear deterrent force. In September 2001, the United States decided that it would no longer provide funds for organizing and implementing ratification mechanisms for on-site inspections of suspect locations for the CTBT despite the fact that on-site inspection is one of the core ratification mechanisms of the treaty. The United States also stopped sending delegates to participate in expert panels related to the implementation of on-site inspections at that time. The more delayed the ratification and implementation of the CTBT, the greater the danger of resumed nuclear tests. The U.S. government has created major obstacles for the treaty to take early effect which will undoubtedly result in vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Second, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the cornerstone of strategic stability between nuclear great powers, has triggered a nuclear arms race in defense capabilities. 6 The ABM treaty is the foundation for a series of arms control treaties between the United States and Russia. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty clears the legal obstacles to its development of a missile defense system, which grants the United States a great nuclear advantage against other nations. Third, in signing the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) with Russia in 2002, the United States was able to push forward its own interests and agenda and thus dominate the international nuclear arms control and disarmament process. 7 The treaty states that the total number of deployed combat nuclear warheads of the United States and Russia must not exceed 1,700-2,200 by Dec. 31, 2012. However, it is not really effective as a permanent and verifiable arms control treaty; the treaty does not require the destruction of nuclear warheads (they can be stored), nor does it require that reductions be permanent. Under SORT, the United States committed to a non-equal reduction of nuclear weapons to the Russian commitment. 8 More importantly, SORT forced Russia to accept the reality of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty because it allows Russia and the United States to field multiple-warhead land-based ballistic missiles. 9 The forth indication of U.S. nuclear hegemony is its readiness to use nuclear weapons

at will to threaten other countries. Since the mid-1990s, a new interventionism has dominated the U.S. approach to foreign policy. The United States, in its own interests, assigned titles such as “rogue state” and “axis of evil” to other countries. 10 It also disregarded the United Nations and unleashed military strikes against other countries (most notably Iraq). In their new nuclear strategy, the United States willfully defines

“major threat” and “contingency” as the basis for the use of nuclear weapons. With such efforts and actions by the United States, it is no wonder other countries already under grave national security pressures and driven to pursue nuclear weapons. Global nuclear war Taylor, 1 (Theodore, Chairman of NOVA, Former Nuclear Weapons Designer, Recipient of the US Atomic Energy Commission’s 1965 Lawrence Memorial Award and former Deputy Dir. of Defense Nuclear Agency, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, in “Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking”, http://wwwee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor. html) Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or

outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars

between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might

complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

The United States is not vulnerable to EMP – satellites are already prepared and routinely checked Ghoshroy 04, Research Associate at MIT [Subrata Ghoshroy.

“Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space.” The Federation of American Scientists. September 2004. http://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/space_report.html. Accessed June 22, 2011.]

The United States is not entirely unprepared for the effects of a high-altitude nuclear explosion (HANE). Nuclear response planners during the Cold War prepared for a Soviet first strike that included an "EMP lay-down," another term for a high-altitude nuclear explosion. Consequently, much care has been taken to minimize the vulnerability of military assets in space and of the supporting infrastructure on the ground from the electromagnetic pulse effect. Survival of military satellites in a nuclear environment is a routine requirement for both critical infrastructure and equipment.