Admin Law Compilation

V. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER Marina vs. Gamilla FACTS: Sometime in May 1986, the UST Faculty Union (USTFU) entered into an initial collective bargaining agreement with the University of Santo Tomas (UST) wherein UST undertook to provide USTFU with a free office space at Room 302 of its Health Center Building. 3 On 21 September 1996, the officers and directors of USTFU scheduled a general membership meeting on 5 October 1996 for the election of the union officers. However, respondent Gamilla and some faculty members filed a Petition 4 with the MedArbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) seeking to stop the holding of the USTFU election. 5 Meanwhile, on 2 October 1996, Rev. Fr. Rodel Aligan, O.P., Secretary General of the UST, issued a Memorandum to the Deans, Regents, Principals and Heads of Departments regarding the holding of a faculty convocation on 4 October 1996. 6 On 4 October 1996, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001, enjoining the holding of the election of the USTFU officers and directors. However, denying the TRO they themselves sought, Gamilla and some of the faculty members present in the 4 October 1996 faculty convocation proceeded with the election of the USTFU officers. On the other hand, the scheduled election for 5 October 1996 did not push through by virtue of the TRO. 7 In the succeeding week, on 11 October 1996, petitioners filed with the DOLE a petition for prohibition, injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, 8 seeking to invalidate the election held on 4 October 1996. HCDAcE Two months later, on 4 December 1996, UST and USTFU, represented by Gamilla and his co-officers, entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a period of five (5) years from 1 June 1996 up to 31 May 2001. The CBA was ratified on 12 December 1996. 9 In another front, the Med-Arbiter issued a TRO dated 11 December 1996, enjoining Gamilla and his fellow officers to "cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of the officers and directors" of USTFU. 10 On 27 January 1997, at around eleven in the morning (11:00 a.m.), respondents Gamilla, Cardenas and Aseron, with some other persons, served a letter of even date on petitioners Mariño and Alamis, demanding that the latter vacate the premises located at Room 302, Health Center Building, UST — the Office of USTFU. However, only the office messenger was in the office at the time. After coercing the office messenger to

step out of the office, Gamilla and company padlocked the door leading to the union's office. 11 On 5 February 1997, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a Complaint 12 for injunction and damages with a prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order over the use of the USTFU office. Trial Court sided with petitioners and ordered the defendants to to refrain from preventing/disturbing in any manner whatsoever the plaintiffs in entering the said premises. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Trial Court on the ground that petitioners' cause of action in the complaint before the trial court is inextricably linked and intertwined with the issue of who are the legitimate officers of the USTFU, which issue was then being litigated before the DOLE. The appellate court held that Civil Case No. 97-81928 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-016 appear to be the same, with the observation that the civil case merely "grew out" from the labor case. It also cited the prohibition against the issuance of injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, unless otherwise provided by law. 23 It added that it would have been more appropriate for the RTC to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the subject case before issuing the assailed orders.

HELD: Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint 40 and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. As pointed out by petitioners, the Court of Appeals erroneously categorized the instant matter as a labor dispute. Such labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 45Jurisdiction over labor disputes, including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations is vested in Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 46 On the other hand, an intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members. It encompasses all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, not

excepting cases arising from chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Labor Code. 47 In contrast, an inter-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among legitimate labor organizations involving questions of representation for purposes of collective bargaining; it includes all other conflicts which legitimate labor organizations may have against each other based on any violations of their rights as labor organizations. 48 Like labor disputes, jurisdiction over intra-union and inter-union disputes does not pertain to the regular courts. It is vested in the Bureau of Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor. Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-016 entitled "Eduardo J. Mariño, Jr., et al. v. Gil Gamilla, et al." before the BLR is neither a labor nor an inter-union dispute. It is clearly an intraunion dispute. The case before the trial court, Civil Case No. 97-81928 entitled Eduardo J. Mariño, Jr., et al. v. Gil Gamilla, et al., 49 on the other hand, is a simple case for damages, with an accompanying application for injunction. The complaint essentially bears the following allegations: that despite an outstanding temporary restraining order prohibiting the holding of an election of officers, respondent Gamilla and others proceeded to hold a purported election; that there was a case pending before the DOLE questioning the validity of the supposed election; and, that respondent Gamilla with two other persons (later learned to be respondents Aseron and Cardenas) compelled the office messenger to vacate the premises of the USTFU office, and thereafter padlocked the room. Petitioners alleged respondents' act of padlocking the office was without lawful basis, and had prevented them from entering the office premises, thereby denying them access to personal effects, documents and records needed in the on-going cases both in the DOLE and in the complaint a quo, and ultimately precluding the union from serving its members. Fundamentally, the civil case a quo seeks two reliefs — one is for the removal of the padlocks on the office door and restraining respondents from blocking petitioners' access to the premises, while the other is for the recovery of moral and exemplary damages. Prior to the institution of the civil case, petitioners filed before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR a petition for prohibition, injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against herein respondents for the latter's assumption of office as elected USTFU officers. Specifically, they prayed that respondents be enjoined from claiming to be the duly elected officers of the union and from performing acts for and in behalf of the union. The propriety of padlocking the union's office, the relief sought by the petitioner in the civil case, is interwoven with the issue of legitimacy of the assumption of office by the respondents in light of the violation of the union's constitution and by-laws, which was then pending before the Med-Arbiter. Necessarily, therefore, the trial court has no

jurisdiction over the case insofar as the prayer for the removal of the padlocks and the issuance of an injunctive writ is concerned. Let us go back to the claim for damages before the lower court. Art. 226 of the Labor Code provides, thus: The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labormanagement relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.

Thus, unlike the NLRC which is explicitly vested with the jurisdiction over claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, 54 the BLR is not specifically empowered to adjudicate claims of such nature arising from intra-union or inter-union disputes. In fact, Art. 241 of the Labor Code ordains the separate institution before the regular courts of criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of the rights and conditions of union membership. The Court has consistently held that where no employer-employee exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the regional trial court that has jurisdiction. 55 Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such, can exercise only those powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. Consequently, matters over which they are not granted authority are beyond their competence. 56 While the trend is towards vesting administrative bodies with the power to adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization, to ensure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them, this should not deprive the courts of justice their power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply. 57 In their complaint in the civil case, petitioners do not seek any relief under the Labor Code but the payment of a sum of money as damages on account of respondents' alleged tortuous conduct. The action is within the realm of civil law and, hence, jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. 58 ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Facts: Toribio claimed to have laid off workers from National Labor Union due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory. The Court of industrial relations, represented by the Sol-Gen forwarded a motion for recon with the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the National Labor Union prays for the vacation of the judgment of the trial court and have a new trial in CIR on the grounds of: 1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis 2. the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work. 3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme 4. The company union was an employer dominated one ( National Worker’s Brotherhood) 5. Laborers rights to CBA is indispensable. 6. the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where industrial peace has always been the rule 7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union. 8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents. 9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment. Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial? Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR. There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. The function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive . It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wage shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and

between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include any matter necessary for solving the dispute. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. Some examples that it must follow are: 1. right to a hearing 2. consideration of evidence by the court 3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached 4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin court so as to free them from technical rules 5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court may also delegate some powers to other judicial bodies. 6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustn’t merely accept the views of a subordinate. 7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision. The record is barren and doesn’t satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a conclusion of law. Evidence was still inaccessible. The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR.

Suntayvs People Facts: the proper steps in order that accused Suntay, allegedly in the US, be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law; and of prohibition to enjoin the DFA Secretary from canceling the petitioner’s passport without previous hearing

On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UP compound in Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16 years old (so go rape diaynisi Alicia nubla)

On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs

On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school.

On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted

On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law."

On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him.However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of the proceeding in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved

Petitioner’s Claim: while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior hearing Held: Where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon are undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing.

Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasijudicial hearing" by the respondent Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.

The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMILIO L. GALANG, in his capacity as Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant. Facts of the Case: Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports (Exhibits P, Q, and R) of Immigration Office, Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a communication of 10 September 1959, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11 September 1959, in this tenor:

"In reply to yours of even date requesting that you be furnished copy of the decision, order or resolution of the Board of Commissioners denying the application for extension of stay of Mr. GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, please be advised that, pursuant to immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the Board… In view thereof, you and your client are advised anew that Mr. Bisschop is hereby required to depart within five (5) days of this notice." No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September 1959. Issues: (a) Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearing on all applications for extension of stay of aliens; b) Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions in such cases. Ruling of the Court: We fully agree with appellant's contention on several grounds. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippines Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellantcommissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. With respect to the contention that the decision of the Board of Commissioners on

matters of petition for extension of stay of aliens should be promulgated in writing, appellee relies on Section 8 of the Immigration Act, which provides that in "any case coming before the Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall prevail". However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the word "decision", as employed in this section, obviously refers to the number of "votes" necessary to constitute the decision of the said Board. The Sampaguita Shoe case (102 Phil., 850), which was taken into account by the lower court, is not applicable to the case at bar; it applies to judicial decision, as provided in Section 1, Rule 35, of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, as pointed out in appellant's brief, where the intention of the lawmaker is otherwise, the immigration laws specifically enumerate when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of deportation under Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). But there is nothing in the immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, , vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, Facts: 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. According to the Board, Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporationis involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP). Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations. A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989. Acting on the motion for recon filed by Solar, the Board issued an Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities.

Solar, however, went to the RTC on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board. RTC dismissed. CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. CA declared the Writ of Execution null and void. Issue: Whether CA erred in reversing the RTC on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. Ruling: Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders. It may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary. Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life." From the reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC.

Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition. In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that persuasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes and their implementing regulations. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to

the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled that the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated. ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Montemayor vs Bundalian FACTS: Montemayor was the OIC-Regional Director, Region III of DPWH. He was removed from office due to a letter-complaint submitted by respondent Bundalian to the Philippine Consulate where the petitioner was accused of accumulating unexplained wealth which he allegedly amassed through lahar funds. With the letter were attached documents such as the Grant Deed for a big-ass house in California and an SPA for petitioner’s sister-in-law authorizing her to purchase the property. The Consulate forwarded the complaint to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption for investigation. The petitioner then submitted his counter-affidavit but refused to submit his SALN. He also defended that similar charges against him were discharged due to insufficiency of evidence. PCAGC then submitted its report to the Office of the Pressident which concurred with the PCAGC that his property was unlawfully acquired. His appeal to the CA was likewise dismissed. On appeal to the SC, he contended that the decisions of the Office of the President and the PCGAC in establishing his guilt were not supported by evidence. ISSUES: 1. WON he was denied due process 2. WON the charges against him were not backed by substantial evidence WON the dismissals by the Ombudsman of similar complaints were binding on the current case (res adjudicata). HELD: 1. He was afforded due process because he was given the opportunity to be heard, he was represented by counsel and he was allowed to present his counteraffidavit. He also was able to attend the hearings and filed motions in his favor before the PCAGC.

2. On the third issue, we cannot sustain petitioner’s stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.[15]Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. 3. LASTLY AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, on the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.[10] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[11] Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted that it was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks issued by Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to convince us. With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove nonownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the Court’s power to do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.

Ocampo vs. ombudsman Facts: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) wrote a letter to NIACONSULT requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers  ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche Gesselschaft Technische Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee

NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally received   Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust

Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the respondent OMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued an order 10 requiring petitioner to file his counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt  Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the said order.

A year later, or on March 17, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued another order 11 giving petitioner another chance to file his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence  . Again, petitioner failed

respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed Resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:  "Withal, for such dishonesty, untrustworthiness, and conduct prejudicial to the service as established by overwhelming evidences, it is respectfully

recommended that respondent Jesus C. Ocampo be discharged from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation;‖ PETITIONER moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case claiming that he was denied due process    that the administrative case was resolved on the basis of the complainant's evidences, without affording him the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and to present his evidence that the criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on February 24, 1997 the dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed

RULING: DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL ACTION WILL NOT FORECLOSE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION    The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE FULLY EQUATED TO DUE PROCESS IN ITS STRICT JUDICIAL SENSE  In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied

A PARTY WHO CHOOSES NOT TO AVAIL OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER THE CHARGES CANNOT COMPLAIN OF A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS  — Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the complaint against him. In fact, petitioner was given considerable length of time to submit his counter-affidavit

 

It took more than one year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner was considered to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant's evidence was set Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator

JUDGMENT SERRANO vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION petitioner, he "filed an application with the Public Service Commission requesting authority to operate a taxicab automobile service within the City of Manila and from said city to any place in the Island of Luzon open to motor vehicle traffic and vice versa, with the use of fifty (50) units." "the Public Service Commission denied completely [his] application . . . It is not known from the decision appealed from whether the application of the petitioner was dismissed for lack of interest or failure to prosecute or denied for failure to qualify." A motion for reconsideration was filed and denied by respondent Public Service Commission. Hence the present petition for review. Petitioner relies on the constitutional provision that "no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." Ruling: Public Service Commission is not a court of record The above constitutional mandate does not lend support to petitioner's plea. Its wording is clear and definite. The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based is incumbent on a court of record. The Public Service Commission is not a court of record within the meaning of the above constitutional provision. So it was held by us in Dagdag v. Public Service Commission, 8 with its categorical pronouncement of the Commission not being "a judicial tribunal," its functions being "limited and administrative in nature." Reference was made in the above decision to the earlier case of Filipino Bus

Co. v. Philippine Railway Co., 9 where not once but twice it was explicitly stated that the Public Service Commission is "not a court." Quasi-judicial tribunals should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope of the above constitutional provision justifies the summary disposition of petitioner's application in the manner followed by respondent Public Service Commission. In Ang Tibay v. Court, 10 speaking of the Court of Industrial Relations, which is likewise an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial powers like the Public Service Commission, we made clear that while it is "free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements," it does not mean "that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirement of due process . . ." Seven cardinal primary rights, which, this Court held, must be respected, are enumerated, the last being "that quasi-judicial tribunals," and the Public Service Commission is one of them, "should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it." There is a need then to remand the matter to respondent Public Service Commission so that it could consider the evidence and discharge the function committed to it by law. IN RE MATTER OFTHEPETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS( PIO NERIA vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION) FACTS: Pio Neria(Petitioner) seeks to inquire into the legality of his arrest by agents of the respondent Commissioner of Immigration, and his subsequent detention at the Bureau of Immigration's detention station. Petitioner arrived at the Manila International Airport from Hongkong. The immigration inspector at the airport, not satisfied with the petitioner's travel documents, referred the matter of their admission to the Board of Special Inquiry for investigation "to determine filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen". The Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing. The said board on August 2, 1961 deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for petitioner's admission. into the Philippines. This written decision was subsequently submitted to the members of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, who attest that he "was admitted as a citizen of the Philippines".

The Secretary of Justice then issued a Memorandum Order directing that all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on Appeal from, or on review motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry are set aside. The Board of Commissioners is directed to review, all decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into the country. In compliance with the directive, the Board of Immigration Commissioners, proceeded to review motu proprio the entire proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to the petitioner's case. On September 4, 1962 the new Board of Immigration Commissioners found that the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the Philippines as an alien not properly documented for admission and be returned to the port from where he came. The present petition for habeas corpus was filed by petitioner claiming that he "has been unlawfully and illegally confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty in the Bureau of Immigration Detention Station by Respondent’s agents. The lower court granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner. The lower court held that "the decision rendered by the new Board of Commissioners is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and no administrative action being possible because the question involved in this case is purely a legal question, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application in this case." ISSUE: WON the decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioner valid so as to justify petitioner’s detention. HELD: The legality or illegality of the petitioner's detention or confinement3 depends upon resolution of the issue of whether the decision of the new Board of Immigration Commissioner is null and void for having been rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613, as amended, which provides in part that [t]he decision of any two members of the Board [of Special Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu propio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision.... August 2, 1961 was the date when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded its hearing of petitioner's case. That date and not September 4, 1961, therefore, is the date of promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, which decision should "prevail and shall be final ... unless reversed by the Board of

Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision." HOWEVER, the minutes of the meeting of the new Board of Commissioners show that as late on August 8, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on the case of the petitioner. The alteration of the date of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners from August 8, 1962 to August 2, 1962 was deliberate. On August 2, 1962, it did not reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, because having actually deliberated on the case of the petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could not have on August 2 resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of Immigration Commissioners as a body deliberated on and voted for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, the review motu proprio was effected 6 days beyond the one-year period fixed by section 27 (b). The said decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, and the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength of such decision, are therefore, null and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by that time had already become "final." The respondent also contends that the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus was prematurely filed, because he did not first appeal the decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who, by law, is vested with power of control and supervision over the said Board. 11 We have already held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one",12 or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and "nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done" thereon.13 The case at bar falls under this exceptions. Manila Electric vs. Phil. Consumers

Facts: On September 11, 1974, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, with the objective of enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the reach of consumers," promulgated Presidential Decree No. 551 providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies. On February 5, 1982, the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the Board of Energy (BOE) a "Petition for Specific Performance, Damages and Violation of P.D. No. 551" against the Manila Electric Company (Meralco), docketed as BOE Case No. 82-198. PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its

customers of all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551, through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2% on the basis of Section 4 of PD 551: "Sec. 4.All the savings realized by electric franchise holders from the reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and tariff reductions and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall be passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Secretary of Finance shall promulgate rules and regulations and devise a reporting systems to carry out the provisions of this Decree." In its answer to the petition, Meralco alleged that it was duly authorized by the BOE in its Order dated March 10, 1980 in BOE Case No. 79-692 to retain the disputed savings; and that the said Order had long become final. On November 25, 1982, the BOE issued its Decision dismissing PCFI's petition, declaring that Meralco was indeed authorized by the BOE, in BOE Case No. 79-692 which have long become final and executory for the respondent (Phil Consumers) did nothing to seek relief or to appeal from the said order of March 10, 1980. PCFI filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence the petition for certiori (g.r. 63018) which was dismissed on the ground of lack of merit holding that: When this petition was filed on January 27, 1983, the November 25, 1982 ruling was already final and executory. Moreover, the March 10, 1980 judgment rendered in BOE Case No. 79-692, where Meralco had filed a motion for authority to defer passing on to customers the savings from the reduction of franchise taxes, was not appealed or questioned by the petitioners. Instead, they filed BOE Case No. 82-198 on February 5, 1982 or almost two years later, raising the same issues against the same parties. BOE's questioned decision in Case No. 82-198 used the facts in BOE Case No. 79-692 for its conclusions. Not only had the March 10, 1980 decision confirmed the findings of the Minister of Finance on Meralco's accounts and finances but in filing the second case, the petitioners were asking for a readjudication of the same issues in another challenge to these same findings. Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip, private respondents herein, filed with respondent RTC a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 who prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled to the savings realized by Meralco under P.D. No. 551. Once again, they insisted that pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the ultimate consumers. Meralco, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata, citing this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 which affirmed the BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198.

On January 16, 1991, respondent RTC rendered the assailed Decision declaring null and void the Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 63018 and on the basis of the Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that the disputed savings belong to the consumers and that the decision of the BOE is ultra vires being a well-settled rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear, it leaves no room for interpretation. The memorandum issued by the Minister of Finance which was made the basis of the decision of the Board of Energy has no legal effect because Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 551 is clear and unequivocal. Meralco moved for the reconsideration of the above decision but was denied hence Meralco’s petition for review on certiorari. Issue: WON Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12% allowable rate recognized in this jurisdiction. Ruling: Petition is meritorious. The issue has long been settled. Thus, the relitigation of the same issue in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 cannot be sanctioned under the principle of res judicata. Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: 1) there must be a final judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. All the above requisites are present in the records: FIRST REQUISITE — there must be a final judgment: It is beyond question that this Court's Resolution dated October 22, 1985 in G.R. No. 63018, sustaining the BOE's Decision dated November 25, 1982 in BOE Case No. 82198 which dismissed PCFI's petition, attained finality on December 4, 1985. In fact SC had long ago issued an Entry of Judgment stating that said resolution had already became final and executor and is recorded in the Book of Entries. SECOND REQUISITE — the court which rendered the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties:

There is no question that the BOE has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties herein. Under P.D. No. 1206, the BOE is the agency authorized to "regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies .'' As such, it has jurisdiction over Meralco, an electric company, and over the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. It bears stressing that P.D. No. 551 was passed precisely to enable the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates within the reach of consumers. Clearly, the matter on how the disputed savings should be disposed of in order to realize a reduction of rates is within the competence of the BOE. THIRD REQUISITE — it must be a judgment or order on the merits: The BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198 is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections. After according both parties the opportunities to be heard, the BOE disposed of the controversy by resolving the rights of the parties under P.D. No. 551. In its Decision, the BOE declared in clear and unequivocal manner that Meralco "has been duly authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. No. 551" and that private respondent PCFI's argument to the contrary is "untenable." The BOE's Decision was upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 63018. FOURTH REQUISITE — there must be between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action: There is identity of parties between the two cases. BOE Case No. 82-198 was a contest between private respondent PCFI, as petitioner, and Meralco, as respondent. Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 involves the same contenders, except that respondent Edgardo Isip joined PCFI as a plaintiff. But his inclusion as such plaintiff is inconsequential. A party by bringing forward, in a second case, additional parties cannot escape the effects of the principle of res judicata when the facts remain the same. Res judicata is not defeated by a minor difference of parties, as it does not require absolute but only substantial identity of parties. The subject matters of BOE Case No. 82-198 and Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 are likewise identical since both refer to the savings realized by Meralco from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551. The subject matter of an action refers to the thing, wrongful act, contract or property which is directly involved in the action, concerning which the wrong has been done and with respect to which the controversy has arisen. In both cases, the controversy is how the disputed savings shall be disposed of — whether they shall be retained by Meralco or be passed on to the consumers. With respect to identity of causes of action, this requisite is likewise present. In both cases, the act alleged to be in violation of the legal right of private respondents is Meralco's retention of the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. While it is true that BOE Case No. 82-198 is one for specific performance, while Civil Case No. Q-89-3659

is for declaratory relief — in the ultimate — both are directed towards only one relief, i.e., the refund of the disputed savings to the consumers. To seek a court's declaration on who should benefit from the disputed savings (whether Meralco or the consumers) will result in the relitigation of an issue fairly and fully adjudicated in BOE Case No. 82198. Clearly, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. The doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same thing and more importantly, the same contentions. As can be gleaned from the records, private respondents' arguments in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 bear extreme resemblance with those raised in BOE Case No. 82-198. The pronouncement of the BOE in BOE Case No. 82-198 finding such fact to be "beyond question" is clear and not susceptible of equivocation. This pronouncement was sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 63018. In finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOE, this Court saw the wisdom of its assailed Decision. Thus, this Court held: "[I]n dismissing the petition for specific performance, the BOE authorized Meralco, in lieu of increasing its rates to get a more reasonable return on investments while at the same time refunding to consumers the benefit of P.D. No. 551, to instead defer the passing on of benefits but without the planned increases. Instead of giving back money to consumers and then taking back the same in terms of increased rates, Meralco was allowed by the BOE to follow the more simplified and rational procedure."

Nasipit Lumber Company vs. NLRC and COllado Facts: Juanito Collado is a security guard, guarding the premises owned by NALCO. During his watch, some properties of NALCO were stolen and Collado was implicated in the theft and placed under preventive suspension. NALCO filed a petition (application) for clearance to dismiss Collado with the Regional Office No. X of the Department of Labor. Collado opposed, but failed to appear on the scheduled hearing despite notice. On October 12, 1976, the application for clearance to dismiss was approved in an order issued by Regional Office No. X Officer-in-Charge Roy V. Seneres. Collado filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to rebut the false findings or adduce evidence in his favor. He further denied participation in the theft.

The case was elevated to the Secretary of Labor. On June 7, 1978, Acting Secretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong issued an order affirming the order of Officer-in-Charge Roy V. Seneres thereby granting petitioner's application for clearance to dismiss Collado. Instead of resorting to this Court on a petition for certiorari, 8 on October 9, 1978, Collado filed a complaint before the Butuan District Labor Office, Butuan City, for unjust dismissal and reinstatement with backwages and benefits. 9 Without going to specifics, Collado averred therein that his termination from employment "was unfounded, unjust and illegal, based as it was on uncorroborated and malicious suspicion, insinuation and hearsay, and characterized by harassment." NALCO filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. It alleged that in view of Acting Secretary Inciong's aforesaid order, Collado did not have any sufficient cause of action and therefore his complaint was a nuisance. 10 In its position paper, NALCO added that because Acting Secretary Inciong's order had become final and executory, the issue of illegal dismissal had also become res judicata. The case having been certified for compulsory arbitration, on January 29, 1979, Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso G. Agbuya rendered a decision ordering NALCO to reinstate Collado to his former position without backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Both parties appealed the decision. The labor arbiter, upon appeal, awarded backwages to Collado and that the case has not been barred by res judicata. Held: The two principal issues presented to this Court for adjudication are the applicability of the principle of res judicata and the legality of Collado's reinstatement with backwages and without loss of seniority rights. On the first issue, we hold that this is one of the cases wherein the pronouncement of this Court thru Justice Vicente Abad Santos in Razon vs. Inciong 19 applies. The Court stated therein that the principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are "non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law." Said pronouncement is in consonance with the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers. 20 The requirement of a clearance to terminate employment was a creation of the Department of Labor to carry out the Labor Code provisions on security of tenure and termination of employment. The proceeding subsequent to the filing of an application for clearance to terminate employment was outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. The fact that said rule allowed a procedure

for the approval of the clearance with or without the opposition of the employee concerned (Secs. 7 & 8), demonstrates the non-litigious and summary nature of the proceeding. The clearance requirement was therefore necessary only as an expeditious shield against arbitrary dismissals without the knowledge and supervision of the Department of Labor. Hence, a duly approved clearance implied that the dismissal was legal or for cause (Sec. 2). On the legality of Collado's dismissal, we hold that the NLRC abused its discretion in directing his reinstatement with two (2) years backwages. The relation between petitioner and Collado is now strained by the latter's violation of the trust and confidence reposed on him as a member of the security force, a position impressed with a high degree of trust.22 Proof beyond reasonable doubt of an employee's misconduct is not required when loss of confidence is the ground for dismissal. It is sufficient if the employer has "some basis" to lose confidence or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. Clavanovs HLURB

Facts: Clavano sold a house and lot in Cebu to Sps. Tenazas, who paid 50% of the purchase price. Alleging the spouses’ default, Clavano refused to accept their subsequent payments and instead sued them for rescission of the contract and forfeiture of all prior payments made. This was however dismissed.

The spouses filed a specific performance complaint with the HLURB Cebu Regional Office against Clavano to compel it to honor the contract. They asked for judgment compelling Clavano to accept their payment and to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor, plus damages. The HLURB Regional Office ruled in favor of the spouses, and this was upheld by the HLURB in its Decision, and the Office of the President. The petitions of Clavano in the CA and the SC were not given merit due to its failure to comply with rules on civil procedure.

When the HLURB Decision lapsed into finality, the HLURB Regional Office issued a Writ of Execution. Eventually, the spouses complained via a motion to the HLURB, alleging that there were defects in the housing unit, that the Deed of Absolute Sale was unnotarized, and that the TCT was still in Clavano’s name. They also asked

Clavano to pay the corresponding expenses re: notarization fees and taxes, among others. HLURB granted this motion via an Order.

Clavano contests this, saying that the HLURB Order amended the final HLURB Decision which, according to Clavano, has been fully executed. Clavano also pointed out that in the contract, it was agreed upon that the spouses will be the ones to answer for the expenses involved in the transfer of title. HLURB, in another Order, denied Clavano’s motion for reconsideration. The CA upheld the HLURB Orders, and so the Sheriff demanded from Clavano the reimbursements sought by the spouses.

Held:

Since the HLURB Decision has become final, the agency is left with no other authority but to enforce the decision’s dispositive portion, which it can no longer amend, modify, or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the judgment. Clavano is correct in availing of the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision; consequently, where the order of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro-tanto no validity. Subsequent HLURB orders requiring Clavano to pay for the expenses incurred do not fall within the ambit of the HLURB Decision. The Orders cannot be considered part of the decision which must be executed against Clavano. The obligation to pay for such expenses is unconnected with and distinct from the obligations to execute and deliver the deed of absolute sale and the certificate of title. The HLURB or the CA cannot order Clavano at this late stage to reimburse the charges and fees relative to the transfer of title when the spouses did not allege this obligation nor pray for this relief and did not attempt to prove this cause of action. Sps. Tenaza only sought the enforcement of the mutually binding contract to sell so that they could finally own the house and lot but did not ask for the transfer of the title at Clavano’s expense. Likewise, the assailed Orders do not involve supervening events where the court a quo is allowed to admit evidence of new facts and circumstances and thereafter to suspend execution of the judgment and grant relief as may be warranted which may

or may not result in its modification. The responsibility for the expenses for registering and titling the subject house and lot - a matter pre-dating the filing of the complaint with the HLURB, and in fact, written in the contract to sell - does not qualify as a supervening event. The foregoing matters, in addition to alleging them in the complaint, should have also been heard during the trial on the merits before the HLURB where the parties could have proved their respective claims. However, believing that the assailed rulings were merely part of the execution of the HLURB Decision, the HLURB instead precipitately resolved the issue in favor of the spouses without notice and hearing. Since the Orders are a wide departure from and a material amplification of the final and at least executory HLURB Decision, they are pro tanto void and absolutely unenforceable for any purpose.After the decision has become final and executory, it can no longer be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. Under the circumstances, SC has no authority to unsettle the final and perhaps satisfactorily executed HLURB Decision. The general power of courts to amend their judgments or orders to make them conformable to justice cannot be invoked to correct an oversight or error as a judicial error may not be considered as a mere ambiguity, curable without a proper proceeding filed before the judgment had become final. The spouses are barred from raising the issue either in the instant case or in another action. Under Sec. 47, Rule 39, a final and executory judgment is conclusive upon any matter ―that could have been raised in relation thereto.‖

Petition for certiorari GRANTED.

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P. VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ, respondents.

Facts of the Case: Petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes"

proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases. Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the aforequoted Rule 168 to read as follows:. "168. Original jurisdictional interpartes proceedings. — The Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. [In the event that the Patent Office is provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences taxes over the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice of decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official of the office designated by the Director but all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.). In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Patents has authority to delegate the hearing of petitioners’ cases to hearing officers. Ruling of the Court: It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents under the general lawand Republic Acts Nos. 165 and 166 to sustain the contention of petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed

necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166). It has been held that power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. 4There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners by concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings,decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent,cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, claims of interference,cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law and other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far too much of the time and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious consideration of the more important issues. The remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This subdelegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail."

Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION AND/OR MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION, vs. LUCINA S. SENDINO and the OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila Facts: Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Parañaque for P307,800.00 On July 18, 1989, Sendinopaid REVI P16,600.00 as full downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so. For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI informed Sendinoof the cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989. April 20, 1990, Sendinofiled a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB. This petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading petitioners Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) which appeared to be the to be the registered owner of the subject lot as per TCT No. 76023. April 3, 1991 the HLURBrendered its judgment in favor ofSendinoand ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot and to paySendino moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President (OP) January 7, 1993. OP rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied. Issues: 1) Whether OP erred in declaring that the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions, notwithstanding absence of express grant by Executive Order No. 90 which created it. 2) And even if the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions, whether OP likewise seriously erred in declaring that the Board of Commissioners is allowed to sit in a decision to render judgment and to delegate its quasi-judicial authority to a subordinate office.

Ruling: 1) The President issued EO 90 S. 1986, recognizing the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of the principal housing agencies of the government.Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981 transferred all the functions of the National Housing Authority (pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 957, 1216 and 1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions relating to land use and housing development in a single entity. Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the renamed body, the HLURB,would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor which included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and acquisition. United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit: There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The constitutionality of such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the NHA (now HLURB) over cases involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. NHA and again sustained in a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. NHA where We restated that the National Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of said agency." Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. In view of the Court's pronouncement in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981,

thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h)ear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific performance." 14 Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see how the HSRC — which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific performance for contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers — had suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through E.O. 90. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the determination of private rights under these agreements is no longer a uniquely judicial function. 16 The absence of any provision, express or implied, in E. O. 90, repealing those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing Authority, furthermore militates against petitioners' position on the question. 2) Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the OAALA should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners sitting en banc, we find ample authority — both in the statutes and in jurisprudence-justifying the Board's act of dividing itself into divisions of three. Under section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." Since nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how the Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions. After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been withheld." The practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore assumes greater significance when one notes that the HLURB, as constituted, only has four (4) full time commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners to deal with all the functions, administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise, entrusted to it.

In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its authority in ordering petitioners to comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot subject of the contract between the original parties. It cannot be gainsaid that the quasi-judicial functions exercised by the body are necessary incidents to the proper exercise of its powers and functions under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted delineating the scope of authority of its Board of Commissioners. Denying the body those functions so necessary in carrying out its power to regulate housing and land use results in its effective emasculation as an important regulatory body in an area vital to the national economy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SEARCH AND ARREST

REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN DISCLAIMER: The case was very long so there was some difficulty in consolidating it into a coherent piece. Try focusing your reading more on the last two paragraphs of the ruling portion. FACTS: The PCGG issued an order for the sequestration of the respondents Sipalay and Allied Bank for ill-gotten wealth of Lucio Tan and others. Sipalay and Allied opposed the orders in the Supreme Court buy the SC remanded the resolution to Sandiganbayan. PCGG also issued search and seizure orders against the bank documents of Sipalay and Allied Bank which are necessary for the investigation. However, despite Sipalay’s motions opposing the sequestration orders, the PCGG did not act on its motions and proceeded to start sequestration. In the Sandiganbayan, the validity of the search and seizure order was under question for lack of prima facie foundations. PCGG presented witnesses, all of whom testified for the validity of the search order by pointing out documents which would justify the issuance of the search order. The PCGG, however, never tendered any of the evidence pointed out by the witnesses. Instead, it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. PCGG likewise contends that its filing of a motion to dismiss should halt the period within which to present their evidence. The Sandiganbayan ruled against PCGG and considered only the testimonies of the witnesses without documentary evidence to support its claims. Sandiganbayan invalidated PCGG’s orders. ISSUES: WON there was exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary before assailing the sequestration orders. WON the motion to dismiss halted the time within which to present evidence to the court.

WON the search and seizure orders were backed by sufficient prima facie foundations. HELD: 1. A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principle aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss, nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Sotto v. Jareno," 144 SCRA 116, 119 has made it quite clear that: "Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it." PCGG is guilty of estoppel by laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of action. PCGG should be deemed to have waived such perceived defect for "proper time" cannot mean or sanction an unexplained and unreasoned length of time. The leniency extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches — or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time. 2. The PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating in the judgment the resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said motion should have been resolved first and separately. That would have been unnecessary in the light of the "peculiarities" of this case where there was nothing left for the parties to do but to await the forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for the submission of the PCGG's written formal offer of documentary evidence which the PCGG failed to do within the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to dismiss instead. That the 20-day period was not suspended upon the filing of the motion to dismiss. The Court agrees with petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the only period suspended by a motion to dismiss is the period to file an answer where a period is to be suspended by the filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such suspension. PCGG filing of a motion to dismiss, without seeking leave of court to stay the running of the period for filing its written formal offer of evidence — as agreed upon and ordered in open court could not have the effect of suspending the period. Without express leave of court, PCGG could not improvidently assume that it has liberty to suspend the running

of the period agreed upon. PCGG is deemed to have waived presentation of further evidence and to have its evidence rested on the basis of the evidence on record. 3. The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in SIPALAY's case is Section 26 of Article XVIII. The Sandiganbayan voided the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY " for lack of sufficient prima facie factual foundation, . . ." In so concluding, it only took into account the testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal, Bautista and Alonte. By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN'S exclusive reliance on the testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned. The SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the PCGG, inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might have supported the testimonial evidence were offered by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence decree that " The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." There is no doubt that the testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as evidence meriting due appreciation by the SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules requires that the offer of testimonial evidence "must be made at the time the witness is called to testify." With respect to documents, however, the same Section 35 (second paragraph) provides a different time for their offer. Dr. Doromal's testimony is reviewable as no attack on its admissibility was ever launched by the SANDIGANBAYAN. With respect to Atty. Alonte's testimony, the SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which finding the PCGG does not contest. As to Commissioner Bautista's supervening death in the course of her crossexamination, the controlling case is "Fulgado v. C.A., et al., where the Court allowed the testimony of the plaintiff who died before his cross-examination, to remain in the record. If testimony is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any cross-examination, with more reason should testimony partially cross-examined at the time of the witness' death (as in Commissioner Bautista's case) remain intact. Dr. Doromal was basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to documents purportedly coming from Malacañang, the US State Department and other sources. What his testimony essentially yields is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s supporting the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable in these documents. But, to repeat, any reference thereto is unwarranted since there was no offer thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized at this point that mere identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents not formally offered. Verily then, without the PCGG documents having been formally offered, however decisive and compelling they may otherwise be, it is as if a prima facie evidence/s case does not exist at all. That makes Dr. Doromal's testimony by and in itself worthless. The same can be said of deceased Commissioner Bautista as well who was similarly immersed in the mechanical process of identification. In fact, her testimony and the documents she referred to were totally unrelated to the sequestration

order issued against SIPALAY, as they chiefly dwelt on the search and seizure order issued against ALLIED. Being immaterial, nothing therefrom can shore up a prima facie case against SIPALAY. The order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a search warrant. Not only is the order captioned as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the branch manager to make available to the PCGG team all bank documents precisely for that purpose. It is unauthorized because nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 (particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuit of its mandated purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained wealth. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 enumerates the powers of the PCGG; and the Court in " Cojuangco, Jr. v.PCGG" simplified these powers. It cannot be validly argued by the PCGG that its authority to issue a search and seizure order possessing the essential features of a search warrant is derivable from subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from No. 4 of the simplified enumeration in the "Cojuangco" case, by implication. "Baseco" has clarified once and for all the essential nature of the provisional measures of sequestration, freeze orders and provisional takeover that the PCGG is explicitly equipped with. Attachment and receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in character, not involving an active and drastic intrusion into and confiscation of properties as what a search warrant (or search and seizure order) necessarily entails. All processes that the PCGG is allowed to issue in discharging the duty for which it was created, therefore, ought to be viewed strictly in this context. And this finds further support in "Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG" and being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER cannot escape, and must pass the acid test for validity as provided by the prevailing constitution under which it was issued — the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION which adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution. Supporting jurisprudence thus outline the following requisites for a search warrant's validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is so constitutionally defective. Firstly, deceased Commissioner Bautista's in-court declarations did not in any way establish probable cause. This is so because, as what her testimony irresistibly suggested, the purported facts and circumstances supporting the order are exclusively traceable from documents she identified but which were never formally offered in evidence in the SANDIGANBAYAN. She never testified to any fact of her own personal knowledge

to bolster the PCGG'S claim that ALLIED was in possession and control of illegallyamassed wealth by Lucio Tan. Her testimony, therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving, or uncorroborated suspicion. And the rule is that search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. Secondly, the PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a " judge" and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" were empowered by the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. Thirdly, the order does not provide a specification of the documents sought to be searched/seized from ALLIED. It EXPRESSLY REFERS TO "all bank documents" which is too all embracing, the obvious intent of which is to subject virtually all records pertaining to all business transactions of ALLIED of whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of seizure warrant is not a particular description, thus contravening the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of things to be seized. Being a general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is constitutionally objectionable and to be more precise, void for lack of particularity.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY FACTS: Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna The "Operation Report" on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated: xxx xxx xxx "ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys. "RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room." In respect of Van Den Elshout, the "After Mission Report," dated 27 February 1988 read in part: "Noted: There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite sometime."

deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 1)There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation 2)Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision 3)Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act RULING: We reject petitioners' contentions The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it  In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant

But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens,





"It is a fundamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked

The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part: "(a)The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien; The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2Constitutions, which are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature  Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.

"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings  What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence

The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.

GUEVARA vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and determination before said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20, 1957 and the supplementary petition thereof of June 1, 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc., praying for reconsideration of the resolutions of the Commission Facts: The Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the NASSCO, the ACME, and the ASIATIC, the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00 and P17.00 each, respectively Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 Ruling: Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement

of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice" Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.

VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION A. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES PAAT vs. CA FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by DENR because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration of the order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents Regional Trial Court issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under

administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. ISSUE: Instances where Exhaustion of Remedies may be disregarded. HELD: The plea of petitioners for reversal is in order. A party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court; it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. 11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. 12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16 (5) when there is irreparable injury, 17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 21(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22 In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents. In their letter of reconsideration, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus: xxx xxx xxx If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. 24 It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for

replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings. Moreover, the assumption by the trial courtof the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

Lopez vs. City of Manila Facts: Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the conduct of the general revision of real property as follows: "General Revision of Assessments 2 and Property Classification — The provincial, city or municipal assessor shall undertake a general revision of real property assessments within two (2) years after the effectivity of this Code and every three (3) years thereafter." Although R.A. 7160 took effect on January 1, 1992, the revision of real property assessments prescribed therein was not yet enforced in the City of Manila. However, the process of real property valuation had already been started and done by the former city assessor. In 1992, the schedule of real property values in the city was prepared and submitted to the City Council of Manila, but for unknown reason, was not acted upon. Nevertheless, despite the inaction of the City Council, there was a continuous update of the fair market values of the real properties within the city. Mrs. Lourdes Laderas, the newly appointed City Assessor of Manila, received Memorandum Circular No. 04-95, from the Bureau of Local Government Finance, Department of Finance. This memorandum relates to the failure of most of the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, including the City of Manila, to conduct the general revision of real property. For this purpose, Mrs. Laderas embarked in a working dialogue with the Office of the City Mayor and the City Council for the completion of the task. And after obtaining the necessary funds she began the process of general revision based on the updated fair market values of the real properties. In the year 1995, the increase in valuation of real properties compared to the year 1979 market values ranges from 600% to 3,330%, but the City Assessor's office initially fixed the general average of increase to 1,700%. Mrs. Laderas felt that the increase

may have adverse reactions from the public, hence, she ended up reducing the increase in the valuation of real properties to 1,020%. In September 1995, the City Assessor's Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market values to the City Council for its appropriate action. And the proposed schedule underwent into the regular process of enacting an ordinance and was later on passed as Manila Ordinance No. 7894, entitled: "An Ordinance Prescribed as the Revised Schedule of Fair Market Values of Real Properties of the City of Manila. With the implementation of Manila Ordinance No. 7894, the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increased by five hundred eighty percent (580%). With respect to the improvement on petitioner's property, the tax increased by two hundred fifty percent (250%). As a consequence of these increases, petitioner Jaime C. Lopez, filed a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 with preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO). The petition alleged that Manila Ordinance No. 7894 appears to be "unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. At the same time Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect, reducing by fifty percent (50%) the assessment levels (depending on the use of property, e.g., residential, commercial) for the computation of tax due. The new ordinance amended the assessment levels provided by Section 74, paragraph (A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794. As a result, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 reduced the tax increase of petitioner's residential land to one hundred fifty-five percent (155%), while the tax increase for residential improvement was eighty-two percent (82%). Despite the amendment brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the controversy proceeded and the reason relied upon by the City of Manila for the dismissal of the petition was for failure of the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. The court trial RTC directed the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction but denied the motion to dismiss. Respondent filed an instant motion for reconsideration and was granted. The dismissal order was justified by petitioner's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies and that the petition had become moot and academic when Manila Ordinance No. 7894 was repealed by Manila Ordinance No. 7905. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit. Hence the petition. Issue: WON petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and therefore petition ought to be dismissed. Ruling:

Petitioner further asserts that the question of the constitutionality of the city ordinance may be raised on appeal, either to the Secretary of Justice or the Regional Trial Court, both having concurrent jurisdiction over the case, in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. He states that at the time he instituted this complaint, it was premature to resort to the remedies provided by R.A. 7160 because he has not received the formal notice of assessment yet, hence, he could not be expected to pay under protest and elevate the exorbitant assessment to the Board of Assessment Appeals. On the other hand, respondent argues that the adjustment of the fair market values of real properties in the City of Manila was long overdue, being updated only after fifteen (15) years. As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. This rule, however, admits certain exceptions Should the taxpayer question the excessiveness of the amount of tax, he must first pay the amount due, in accordance with Section 252 of R.A. 7160. Then, he must request the annotation of the phrase "paid under protest" and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals by filing a petition under oath together with copies of the tax declarations and affidavits or documents to support his appeal. The rule is well-settled that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulations of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. Furthermore, the crux of petitioner's cause of action is the determination of whether or not the tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the trial court which states that the petition does not fall under any of the exceptions to excuse compliance with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit: "One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference with matters coming primarily within the competence of other department. . . .

There are however a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is private land; and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding. In the court's opinion, however, the instant petition does not fall within any of the exceptions above-mentioned. . . . . . . Instant petition involves not only questions of law but more importantly the questions of facts which therefore needed the reception of evidence contrary to the position of the respondent before the hearing of its motion for reconsideration. Now, on the second exception on the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies, supra, there is no showing that administrative bodies, viz., The Secretary of Justice, the City Treasurer, Board of Assessment Appeals, and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals are in estoppel. On the third exception, it does not appear that Ordinance No. 7894 or the amendatory Ordinance No. 7905 are patently illegal. Re the fourth exception, in the light of circumstances as pointed elsewhere herein, the matter does not need a compelling judicial intervention. On the fifth exception, the claim of the petitioner is not small. Re the sixth exception, the court does not see any irreparable damage that the petitioner will suffer if he had paid or will pay under protest as per the ordinance. He could always ask for a refund of the excess amount he paid under protest or be credited thereof if the administrative bodies mentioned in the law (R.A. 7180) will find that his position is meritorious. Re the seventh exception, the court is of the opinion that administrative relief provided for in the law are plain, speedy and adequate. On the eight exception, while the controversy involves public interest, judicial intervention as the petitioner would like this court to do should be avoided as demonstrated herein below in the discussion of the third issue. The ninth and tenth exception obviously are not applicable in the instant case."

Uy vs. Palomar Manuel Uy (appellee, for short) is a duly authorized agent of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO, for short), a government entity created and empowered by law to hold sweepstakes draws and lotteries for charitable and public purposes. As such

agent of the PCSO, appellee is engaged in the sale and distribution of sweepstakes and lottery tickets which the PCSO prints and issues for each and every one of the not less than twenty draws that said office annually holds. To carry out its business of selling sweepstakes and lottery tickets issued by the PCSO, appellee, upon authority of the said office, employs sub-agents throughout the Philippines, through which sub-agents not less than 70% of appellee's total sales for each draw are made; and, with the consent of the PCSO, appellee agrees to give 50% of the agent's prize to the sub-agent selling the prize-winning ticket. The agent's prize is 10% of the prize won by the ticket sold. For the Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw which would be held on December 15, 1963, the PCSO fixed the first, second and third prizes at P700,000.00, P350,000.00, and P175,000.00, respectively, and set a sale goal of P6,000,000. 00 worth of tickets. The PCSO directed its duly authorized agents to undertake every means possible to help achieve the six-million-peso sales goal. In compliance with said directive, appellee devised and, through his representatives, offered to the public, the "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan. The plan was designed to boost the sales of tickets for the PCSO Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw. According to said plan, the appellee's sub-agents and purchasers of whole sweepstakes tickets sold by appellee and his sub-agents may, in addition to the regular prize money of the December 15, 1963 draw, win bonuses and awards as follows: for the sub-agent and buyer of the ticket winning the first prize, one 1963 Volkswagen sedan each; for the sub-agent and buyer of the ticket winning the second prize, one Radiowealth 23-inch television set each; for the sub-agent and buyer of the ticket winning the third prize, one Radiowealth refrigerator each; for the subagents and buyers of the tickets winning any of the six fourth prizes, one Radiowealth sewing machine each; and for the sub-agent and buyer of the ticket winning the charity prize, one Radiowealth Fiesta "hi-fi" radio set each. Except for the amount paid for the authorized price of the sweepstakes tickets, those entitled to benefit from the plan did not have to pay any other amount in consideration of the right to benefit from the plan. The awards may be claimed by presenting to the appellee the sales invoice of the winning tickets, in the case of the seller, and the eight shares of the winning tickets, in the case of the buyers. Manuel Uy filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 55678) against the Postmaster General, praying for an injunction to restrain said Postmaster General and his subordinates, agents or representatives from enforcing Fraud Order No. 3, dated November 22, 1963, declaring Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency as conducting a lottery or gift enterprise and directing all postmasters and other employees of the Bureau of Post concerned to return to the sender any mail matter addressed to Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency or to any of its agents or representatives with the notation "Fraudulent" stamped upon the cover of such mail matter, and prohibiting the issuance or payment of any money order or telegraphic transfer to the said agency or to any of its agents and representatives. cdphil

As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued ex parte by the lower court. The Postmaster General moved for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction, but the motion was denied. The Postmaster General filed an answer to the complaint, setting up the defense that Manuel Uy was conducting a lottery or gift enterprise that is prohibited by law; that as Postmaster General he has the authority to issue the fraud order in question and he did not abuse his discretion in doing so; and that Manuel Uy had not exhausted all the administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention. Held: Appellant also invokes the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and asserts that the action of the appellee in the present case was premature because he had not first appealed the fraud order to higher administrative authorities. This assertion of appellant has no merit. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast one. It admits of exceptions, amongst which are: (1) where the question involved is purely a legal one, 11 12 The question involved in the present case is legal — whether or not the "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan of appellee, based upon the facts as stipulated, is a lottery or gift enterprise. We take note that the Grand Christmas Sweepstakes draw in conjunction with which appellee's plan was offered, was scheduled for December 15, 1963, or barely five days from December 10, 1963, the date when appellee learned of the issuance of the fraud order. Time was of the essence to the appellee. In the "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan of the appellee We do not see the presence of the element of consideration, that is, payment of something of value, or agreement to pay, for the chance to win the bonus or award offered. True, that to be a participant in said plan, one must have to buy a whole sweepstakes ticket (8) shares sold by the Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency or by its sub-agents. But the payment for the price of the sweepstakes ticket is the consideration for the chance to win any of the prizes offered by the PCSO in the sweepstakes draw of December 15, 1963. Wholly or partly, said payment cannot be deemed as a consideration also for the chance to win the prizes offered by the appellee. For nothing is asked of, or received from, the buyer of the ticket more than the authorized price thereof, and which price appears on the face of the ticket. In fact, appellant admits that except for the price of the ticket, those entitled to participate and benefit from the plan do not part with any other consideration for the right to take part and benefit therefrom. 19 Indeed, as correctly observed by the lower court, "there is absolutely no separate consideration for the right to win any of the offered bonuses or awards." The more recent case of Garden City Chamber of Commerce vs. Wagner 22 laid down the test in more definitive terms, as follows:

"The examination of authorities made in the present case induces the belief that the consideration requisite to a lottery is a contribution in kind to the fund or property to be distributed. (Emphasis supplied)

LEANDRO P. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY GOVERNING BOARD, and JOSEFEL P. GRAJEDA, respondents. Facts: On 18 October 1988, the PCA Governing Board (the "Board" for brevity) passed Resolution No. 109-88, creating an "Investigation Committee" which would look into the complaint made by one Antonio Pua against petitioner, Leandro garcia, then administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority, for supposed irregularities committed by him. The Investigation Committee, after conducting formal hearings on the charges against petitioner by complainant Antonio Pua found prima facie evidence that petitioner indeed committed a crime. The PCA, through its then Acting Board Chairman, Apolonio B. Bautista, filed an administrative complaint, gainst herein petitioner Leandro P. Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with his grant of export quota for "fresh young coconuts" or "buko." The Board, placed petitioner under preventive suspension. The petitioner through his lawyer employ tactics that delayed the proceeding prompting the Board to issue Resolution No. 046-89 stating that the period of delay in the disposition of the case caused by petitioner shall not be counted in the computation of preventive suspension and petitioner's re-assumption of office shall require prior notice of reinstatement by the Board. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction which was granted by the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion, dated 04 July 1989, praying for the creation of a new investigating committee and that, pending resolution thereof, the Investigation Committee be prevented from conducting further proceedings. The RTC did not grant the petition, but ordered that evidence of petitioner will be received on whether a temporary restraining order shall be issued. Later, the Board issued Resolution No. 070-89 finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge and imposing upon him the penalty of forced resignation. However, the RTC issue a TRO stopping the respondent Board from implementing its resolution. Respondent appealed to CA which granted the lifting of TRO.

Issue: 1. WON CA erred in granting the motion of lifting the TRO. (answer is in relation to exhaustion of administrative remedies) 2. WON the Philippine Coconut Authority violate administrative due process

Held: No on both issue. The records would show that petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the trial court even while the administrative investigation was yet ongoing. Petitioner's immediate recourse to the trial court was premature and precipitate. From the decision of the PCA Board, once rendered, an administrative remedy of appeal to the Civil Service Commission would still be available to him. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first been exhausted. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an administrative body, like the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special competence. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts. Petitioner would insist that the Grageda Investigation Committee defied the restraining order ("TRO") issued by the trial court when it submitted to the Board on 21 August 1989 its resolution finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charges and recommending the penalty of forced resignation, later adopted and approved by the Board in its Resolution No. 070-89 on 25 August 1989. There was no such defiance. The trial court issued the TRO on 26 July 1989, and it became functus oficio after 15 August 1989. Thus, when the Grageda Investigation Committee submitted its recommendation to the Board on 21 August 1989, which the latter adopted and approved on 25 August 1989 in its Resolution No. 070-89, respondents were no longer under any legal restraint. The second issue of alleged violation by the PCA of administrative due process must also be dealt with against petitioner. The petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to submit his case at the administrative level. He filed an answer to the administrative complaint and his refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. The essence of due process to him was that opportunity to be heard Petitioner imputes violation by the PCA of administrative due process for having conducted a hearing to determine a"prima facie case" against him when no such hearing is required. The proceedings, he asseverates, reflects PCA's departure from the administrative procedures set forth in Section 38, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, which provides:

"SECTION 38.Procedure in Administrative Cases Against NonPresidential Appointees. — (a) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons. "(b)In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case." Petitioner's stance is patently bereft of merit. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the conduct of a formal hearing or investigation to ascertain whether or not a "prima facie case indeed exists to warrant the filing of a formal administrative charges." Nor could petitioner rightly claim that the Investigation Committee was biased against him. It should be noted that the composition of the Investigation Committee was repeatedly changed, per PCA Board Resolution No. 039-89, No. 109-88, No. 011-89 and No. 017-89, all because of petitioner's claim of partiality. The PCA demonstrated its objectivity in proceeding with the investigation by accommodating petitioner to the fullest. An endless request for the recomposition of the Committee would be to unduly prolong the investigation and the PCA should not be faulted when it finally denied the subsequent like requests of petitioner. The conduct of administrative disciplinary cases are outlined in the Civil Service Law or P.D. 807 vesting it in the heads of agencies subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission under the circumstances outlined in the law. PCA Board Resolution No. 046-89 has expressed that "the period of delay in the disposition of the case, resulting from petitioner's requests for extension of time, postponement/cancellation of the scheduled hearings and related requests filed by counsel of respondent Administrator Leandro P. Garcia, shall not be counted in computing the period of preventive suspension." This holding accords with the provisions of Section 42 of P.D. 807

"SECTION 42.Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided ."

The observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and policy which should not be ignored. The doctrine insures an orderly procedure and withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its course. Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate and impermissible

Gonzales vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders dated November 27, 1990 and April 22, 1991 from the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), signed by the respondent DAR Regional Director Antonio S. Maraya, and issued pursuant to the operation land transfer program of the government under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 3 . Petitioner was directed to surrender the titles 4 to her land and to submit the other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank was ordered to pay the petitioner an aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for the two parcels of land.

On December 20, 1991, the petitioner filed a Petitionwith Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction, alleging

that the petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of her land.

the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated June 29, 1992, denying due course to, and dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals failed to exhaust the administrative remedies

Held: The petition is devoid of merit. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. 8 It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. 9 Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. 10 Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. After a careful perusal of the records, we find the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to be applicable in this case.

The petitioner raises the following exceptions to the doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as applicable to the case at bar: (1) where the questioned order is a patent nullity; (2) where there is a deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right to due process; and (3) where the question involved is a purely legal one.

the proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator

(RARAD). Prior resort to these administrative bodies will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. 24 From there, the petitioner has yet another forum available — the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation or determination of just compensation. 25 Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification both in law and in jurisprudence must be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. IaDcTC KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by ARMANDO REGINO , petitioner, vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and ELISSA BALADAD, respondents. Facts of the Case: Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001 –2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and ElissaBaladad, respectively, as teachers. In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers — Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and ElissaBaladad — allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after

announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCST's policy. On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaintfor damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. Issue: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable. Ruling of the Court: The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the courts. Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine: "The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. . . . Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified. Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.

Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.Petitioner's action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. BATELEC II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC., vs. ENERGY INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATION BUREAU (EIAB), PUYAT STEEL CORP. (PSC) AND NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), Facts: BATELEC II is an electric cooperative authorized to distribute electric power in Rosario, Province of Batangas. PSC is a galvanizing steel sheet company in the Philippines having been established in 1956. Granted a pioneer status by the Board of Investments, it embarked to build in Rosario, Batangas Province, its new plant, envisioned as a modern galvanizing plant utilizing a state-of-the-art non-oxidizing furnace-type process, the first of its kind in the country. As this new plant would entail a delivery voltage of 69 kilovolts (kv), PSC commenced on 14 November 1997 its negotiations for the supply of said energy requirement with BATELEC II, the electric franchise holder in the area. As the 69 kv transmission lines owned by the NPC are located about 1.4 kilometers away from the plant, PSC and BATELEC II entered into an agreement wherein the latter, not having any 69 kv transmission lines at present, shall handle the construction of the needed 69 kv transmission lines. 02 December 1996, BATELEC IIsubmitted to PSC a Bill of Materials for the proposed construction, P2,956,838.56 with a proviso that additional costs shall later be incurred for other items. December 1996, PSC accepted BATELEC II's proposal.BATELEC II vouched to complete the installation of the needed facilities by April 1997. Yet, BATELEC II botched in making good its part of the bargain.The scheduled completion was never fulfilled by BATELEC II even several months after the targeted date. 17 November 1997, PSC filed with the Bureau an application for direct connection with the NPC.The Bureau, under the umbrella of the Department of Energyderives its mandate from Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 7638. As a standard operating procedure, the Bureau, in its evaluation of an application for direct power connection, whether new or for renewal, takes into account the technical or financial capability of the electric franchise holder in the applicant's site, in this case BATELEC II, to serve the energy needs of the applicant. For the purpose of looking for any possibility of settlement, the parties concerned were invited to a conference on 17 December 1997. Bureau decreed that BATELEC II's claim

that it had already constructed the needed 69 kv transmission lines has remained a bare claim, not supported by evidence on record as BATELEC II itself admitted in the meeting of 17 December 1997 that it has yet to construct said facility. Further, the Bureau made the determination that BATELEC II was neither technically nor financially capable of supplying the 69 kv of power supply to PSC. From all the findings, it is clear that BATELEC II failed to meet the performance standards set forth by ER 1-97.It is thus concluded that it is not capable of serving applicant's bulk energy needs. Accordingly, in a resolution dated 16 March 1998, the Bureau approved PSC's application for bulk power supply with the NPC after it made the determination that BATELEC II is not technically and financially capable of serving the bulk energy needs of PSC. PSC filed a complaint for Damages With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with RTC to enjoinBATELEC II from committing acts that would prevent direct power connection between respondents PSC and the NPC. RTC granted. BATELEC II filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. CA denied the petition on the grounds of: (1) failure to exhaust administrative remedies as petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Bureau's resolution; and (2) failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original copy of the Bureau's resolution in defiance of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96. Relevant Issue: Whether the CA commit a reversible error in dismissing the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 Ruling: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities to accord them the prior opportunity to decide controversies within their competence before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, however, there being instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal;

2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner availed of administrative relief before filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It did not appeal the Bureau's resolution dated 16 March 1998 to the Secretary of Energy, which under Section 8 in relation to Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 7638 31 has the power over the bureaus under the Department. It has not, as well, suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to the Court of Appeals against the Resolution in question. Neither has petitioner shown that the instant case falls among the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Moreover, in light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of. 32 As found by the appellate court, petitioner has, likewise, failed to establish that it had filed a motion for reconsideration before its direct recourse to judicial review nor has it amply argued why it should be excused from the observance of such requirement. Moreover, in light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of. As found by the appellate court, petitioner has, likewise, failed to establish that it had filed a motion for reconsideration before its direct recourse to judicial review nor has it amply argued why it should be excused from the observance of such requirement. Equally specious is petitioner's train of thought that the requisite of filing a motion for reconsideration of the challenged resolution of the Bureau prior to filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals is dispensable in this case inasmuch as such petition is anchored on a purely question of law. 33 It is a settled rule, it is true, that on purely legal question the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies. This is because nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done in the administrative forum. But the pivotal issue in this case of whether petitioner, not the NPC, should supply the power needs of PSC requires a probe into the technical and financial capability of petitioner to meet the requirements of bulk power supply of PSC — a question of fact, the determination of which is within the expertise of the Bureau. The contention of petitioner that the issue is on pure question of law is, therefore, hollow. Petitioner cannot in the guise of raising pure question of law, seek judicial intervention without exhausting the available administrative remedies.

Merits: The policy of preference to the franchise holder is premised on the condition that such franchise holder must in the first place be capable of supplying adequately the power requirements of the BOI-registered customer and that such capability must first be ascertained through a hearing in due course. If after a hearing (or an opportunity for such hearing) it is established that the affected franchise holder is incapable or unwilling to match the reliability and rates of NPC, then a direct connection with NPC may be granted. This is the prevailing situation in the case at bar. Here, after due hearing and after careful consideration of the pleadings submitted by petitioner franchise holder and respondent PSC, the Bureau made the distinct finding that petitioner is not technically and financially capable of satisfying the power requirements of PSC. This determination by the Bureau, an administrative government agency which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In scores of cases, it is an elementary rule, sanctified by long and consistent usage, that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision and of the Court of Appeals dismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs DEFENSOR FACTS: The petitioner, Holy Spirit, is assailing the validity of the implementing rules of RA 9207. RA 9207 is a law which was passed by President Arroyo to secure land tenure for the urban poor. The respondents are ex-officio officers of the National Government Center Administration Committee which is an administrative body in charge of the National Government Center, a housing project. The respondents passed implementing rules and regulations for RA 9207 but was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that the IRR were void for being inconsistent with RA 9207 and for being capricious, whimsical and arbitrary. ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s case should prosper. HELD: NO. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative

agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.[13] The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.[14] Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[15] True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant.[16] A direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[17] In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[18] the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. [19] A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Court’s taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,[20] the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court. A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

law.[21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.[22] Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.[23]Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that ―respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction‖ may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. In a number of petitions,[24] the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.[25]

****NO DIMSON vs LOCAL WATER ****NO SAMAR ELECTRIC VS SELUDO INFORMATIONAN TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION vs. COMELEC FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act 8046,5 which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the elections in ARMM. Initially intending to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, Comelec -- in its Resolution No. 2985 eventually decided against full national implementation and limited the automation to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, due to the failure of the machines to read correctly some automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire Province of Sulu.8 The Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid," which invites interested offerors, vendors, suppliers or lessors to apply for eligibility and to bid for the procurement by purchase, lease, lease with option to purchase, or otherwise, supplies,

equipment, materials and services needed for a comprehensive Automated Election System. Out of the 57 bidders,13 the Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) found Modernization Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BAC’s Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. Fve individuals and entities protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted. Respondents claim that petitioners acted prematurely, since they had not first utilized the protest mechanism available to them under RA 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act, for the settlement of disputes pertaining to procurement contracts. Respondents assert that throughout the bidding process, petitioners never questioned the BAC Report finding MPC eligible to bid and recommending the award of the Contract to it (MPC). According to respondents, the Report should have been appealed to the Comelc en banc, pursuant to the aforementioned sections of RA 9184. In the absence of such appeal, the determination and recommendation of the BAC had become final. ISSUE: WON there is a need to Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. HELD: Section 55 of RA 9184 states that protests against decisions of the Bidding and Awards Committee in all stages of procurement may be lodged with the head of the procuring entity by filing a verified position paper and paying a protest fee. On the other hand, Section 58 provides that court action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated by the statute shall have been completed. Cases filed in violation of this process are to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent Comelec came out with its en banc Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to Respondent MPC even before the BAC managed to issue its written report and recommendation. Thus, how could petitioners have appealed the BAC’s recommendation or report to the head of the procuring entity (the chairman of Comelec), when the Comelec en banc had already approved the award of the contract to MPC even before petitioners learned of the BAC recommendation?

It is claimed25 by Comelec that during its April 15, 2003 session, it received and approved the verbal report and recommendation of the BAC for the award of the Contract to MPC, and that the BAC subsequently re-affirmed its verbal report and recommendation by submitting it in writing on April 21, 2003. However, it is obvious that petitioners could have appealed the BAC’s report and recommendation to the head of the procuring entity (the Comelec chair) only upon their discovery thereof, which at the very earliest would have been on April 21, 2003, when the BAC actually put its report in writing and finally released it. And even assuming arguendo that petitioners had somehow gotten wind of the verbal BAC report on April 15, 2003, the Comelec en banc itself made it legally impossible for petitioners to avail themselves of the administrative remedy that the Commission is so impiously harping on. There is no doubt that they had not been accorded the opportunity to avail themselves of the process provided under Section 55 of RA 9184, according to which a protest against a decision of the BAC may be filed with the head of the procuring entity. Some Observations on the BAC Report to the Comelec Respondents may not have realized it, but the letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184. In the light of Paat v. Court of Appeals.29 Paat enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded. The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as Nos. 7, 10 and 11: "(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." As already stated, Comelec itself made the exhaustion of administrative remedies legally impossible or, at the very least, "unreasonable."

****NO Philhealth vs Chinese General Hospital Sunville Timber Products Inc. vs. Abad Facts:

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992. llcd On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by Section 1 of PD 605. Trial Court (Judge Abad) denied the motions to dismiss, which denial was sustained by the Court of Appeals, reasoning that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention. The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved. HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed. prLL One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the

special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9 As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3 when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is not other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8) when strong public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. 19 Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws and regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene. The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review. As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's

uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR. cdll WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

ALFREDO ESTRADA, RENATO T. CANILANG and MANUEL C. LIM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BACNOTAN CEMENT CORPORATION (BCC), respondents. Facts: Alfredo Estrada, Renato T. Canilang and Manuel C. Lim, as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI), Jeffrey Khong Hun as President of WFPI, Manuel Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales, and Ricardo Serrano as Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint alleges that: WFPI and the Municipality of Subic entered into an illegal lease contract, which in turn became the basis of a sub-lease in favor of BCC; the sub-lease between WFPI and BCC is a violation of the first lease because the cement plant, which BCC intended to operate in Wawandue, Subic, Zambales, is not related to the fish port business of WFPI; and BCC's cement plant is a nuisance because it will cause pollution, endanger the health, life and limb of the residents and deprive them of the full use and enjoyment of their properties. Defendants WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC filed separate motions to dismiss, both alleging that the complaint states no cause of action. BCC, in its motion, added that: the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court; that the complaint was premature; and that the RTC has no jurisdiction on the matter. Respondent Serrano of the DENR also filed a motion to dismiss stating that there was no cause of action insofar as he is concerned since there was nothing in the complaint that shows any dereliction of duty on his part. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of RTC Olongapo City, Branch 72, issued an order denying respondents' motions to dismiss and granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision, granting BCC's petition on motion to dismiss on the grounds of :

1. denial of said Motion to Dismiss by the Court a quo, was a grave abuse of 2. 3. 4. 5.
discretion because of the doctrine of Administrative Remedy the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court is general in character while the jurisdiction of DENR is very specific xxxx xxxx the complaint filed by the private respondents has no prayer for preliminary injunction

Issue: Whether or not the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going to court

Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A premature invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground. The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with. Petitioners claim that their action before the trial court, without going to the DENR first, is justified because they are in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of respondent's cement repacking plant and the DENR does not have the power to grant them the relief they are praying for. We do not agree. Republic Act No. 3931, An Act Creating the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission, was passed on June 18, 1964 to maintain reasonable standards of purity for the waters and air of the country with their utilization for domestic, agricultural, industrial and other legitimate purposes. It created the NPCC which had the power, to issue, renew, or deny permits, for the prevention and abatement of pollution. 26 In 1976, Presidential Decree No. 984 was enacted to strengthen the NPCC giving it, among others, the following:

Sec. 6.Powers and Functions. — . . . xxx xxx xxx (e)Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing. EAISDH (f)Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished. (g)Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof . . . xxx xxx xxx (j)serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. P.D. No. 984 also empowered the commission to issue ex parte orders directing the discontinuance or temporary suspension or cessation of operation of an establishment or person generating sewage or wastes without the necessity of prior public hearing whenever it finds a prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceed the allowable standards set by the commission. 27 Executive Order No. 192 was passed, reorganizing the DENR. It transferred the power of the NPCC to the Environmental Management Bureau 28 and created the PAB, under the Office of the Secretary, which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases under R.A. No. 3931 and P.D. No. 984.

Cases where doctrine of administrative remedy is not observed: (1)when there is a violation of due process, HCacDE (2)when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(3)when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4)when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5)when there is irreparable injury, (6)when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7)when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9)when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10)when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11)when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12)when no administrative review is provided by law, (13)where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14)when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

C. DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION Abejovsdela Cruz ***note: unsa man tawnningakaso irrelevant kaayusaatong topic nga doctrine of primary jurisdiction… labor case ni for the information of everyone … ***

Facts:

On July 19, 1986, the Philippine Ports Authority canceled its arrastre management contract with Metro Port Services, Inc. and directly assumed the cargo handling operations in the South Harbor of Manila.

Labor and personnel of previous operator, except those positions of trust and confidence, shall be absorbed by grantee. Labor or employees benefits provided for under existing CBA shall likewise be honored. Marina retained the bulk of the 2,700-man personnel of Metro but refused to continue the employment of 65 of the 123 persons constituting the security force. The guards excluded were served with notices of separation effective on various dates during the period from July 19 to August 24, 1986. Their reaction was to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Department of Labor and Employment on August 5, 1986.

Labor Arbiter Crescencio R. Iniego held in favor of the complainants. he ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of back salaries, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 1

his decision was affirmed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission except for the award of moral and exemplary damages,

held: every employee must enjoy some degree of trust and confidence from the employer as that is one reason why he was employed in the first place. One certainly does not employ a person he distrusts. Indeed, even the lowly janitor must enjoy that trust and confidence in some measure if only because he is the one who opens the office in the morning and closes it at night and in this sense is entrusted with the care or protection of the employer's property. The keys he holds are the symbol of that trust and confidence.

The employer's trust and confidence in him is limited to that ministerial function. He is not entrusted, in the Labor Arbiter's words, "with the duties of safekeeping and

safeguarding company policies, management instructions, and company secrets such as operation devices." He is not privy to these confidential matters, which are shared only in the higher echelons of management. It is the persons on such levels who, because they discharge these sensitive duties, may be considered holding positions of trust and confidence. The security guard does not belong in such category. It follows that the Labor Arbiter did not err in interpreting Paragraph 7 and assuming jurisdiction over what is clearly a labor dispute involving employer-employee relations. Turning now to the alleged illegal dismissal of the private respondents, we affirm first of all that loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissal under our labor laws. However, that ground, like any other ground, must first be established in proper proceedings before an employee can be lawfully dismissed.

The record shows that the above procedure was not followed by the petitioner when it dismissed the private respondents. There was no hearing conducted as required by the rules, only an alleged background investigation that supposedly linked them to pilferages in the pier. No charges were formally preferred against the private respondents nor where they given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated and served notices of termination in disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure

It remains to say that if the petitioner distrusts the private respondents, it may still seek to establish its lack of confidence and trust in them by proving that ground for their dismissal at an investigation conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. But before it can do so, it must first reinstate all of them as among the personnel of the previous operator to be absorbed by the grantee of the permit, conformably to its commitment in the aforesaid Paragraph 7. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 30, 1987, is AFFIRMED with the modification that the payment of back salaries shall be limited to only three years. The temporary restraining order dated January 6, 1986, is LIFTED. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, represented by GOV. ISAGANI S. AMATONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE

ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., respondents. Facts of the Case: When respondent electric cooperative charged increased power rates against the petitioner for the month of May, 1991, the petitioner filed a Complaint for Illegal Collection of Power Bills against respondent before the trial court. Petitioner contended that jurisdiction is vested with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) or the regular trial court, while respondent's position was that jurisdiction lies with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Petitioner also claimed that because of the unconstitutionality and arbitrariness of the imposition of the charges, the case is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Issue: Which government agency has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal collection of power bills by an electric cooperative? Ruling of the Court: Since the complaint is one questioning the increase in the power rates, the proper body to investigate the case is the NEA. The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives remain within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration, despite the enactment of Executive Order No. 172, creating the Energy Regulatory Board. The issue raised in the complaint is the legality of the imposition of the FCC or ICC. Despite the fact that diesel fuel was used to run its machinery, the fact is that respondent charged its consumers to compensate for the increase in the price of fuel. Petitioner did not question the price of diesel fuel. Rather, it questioned the charges passed on to its end users as a result of increase in the price of fuel. And the body with the technical expertise to determine whether or not the charges are legal is the NEA. Electric cooperatives, such as the respondent, are vested under Presidential Decree No. 269 with the power to fix, maintain, implement and collect rates, fees, rents, tolls, and other charges and terms and conditions for service. However, the NEA requires that such must be in furtherance of the purposes and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 269. NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrowers, supervised or controlled entities, is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations. It may also, motuproprio or upon petition of third parties, conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters, affecting electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.

Thus, a party questioning the rates imposed by an electric cooperative may file a complaint with the NEA as it is empowered to conduct hearings and investigations and issue such orders on the rates that may be charged. Consequently, the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ERB. In case a party feels aggrieved by any order, ruling or decision of the NEA, he may file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons. True, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies has certain exceptions as embodied in various cases. This doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. It is disregarded: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. Petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions. Mere allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been specifically granted by law to special government agencies. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the

authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. A party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly.

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, , vs. NHA, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the NHA, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, Facts: (Contract to Sell) 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to Yuson as embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Aggrieved, Yusponbrought his dispute with Antipolo Realty beforeNHA. NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by respondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint.

SC denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December 1978, "without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." A motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979 Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Office of the President which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same. Issue: Whether in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted on a matter beyond its competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform. Ruling: Petitioner's arguments are lacking in merit. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. The Court held that under the 'sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered' In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocably, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]" Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. NHA: There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety

of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts." In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of PD 957. Presidential Decree No. 1344 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA. Merits: Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the general Civil Law, in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of all installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner. Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the lengthening of the original contract period for payment of installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. No pronouncement as to costs.

VILLAFLOR vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On December 2, 1948, petitioner filed a sales application with the Bureau of Lands covering a tract of public lands consisting of 140 hectares. In paragraph 6 thereof, he recognized that the land is of public domain. On August 16, 1950, petitioner entered into a Deed of Relinquishment of Rights in favor of private respondent in consideration of P5,000. On the same date, August 16, 1950, private respondent filed a sales application over two parcels of land which was correspondingly awarded the following day. On January 31, 1974, petitioner protested the sales application of private respondent claiming ownership with the Bureau of Lands, and claiming that it has not paid the P5,000 provided for in the deed. The Director of Lands, however, found that petitioner was paid the stipulated amount, the same being part of the administrative process in the disposition of the land in question, that his sales application was rejected for leasing the same to another even before he had acquired transmissible rights thereto and that he recognized the public character of the land in his application and relinquished any and all rights he may have by virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation thereon. The same was affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources. aTcIEH On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for Declaration of Nullity (Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession and Damages, at about the same time he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources at to the Office of the President. The trial court dismissed the complaint, which on appeal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Hence, this recourse, petitioner assailing the findings of the Bureau of Lands and the capacity of corporations to acquire public lands. ISSUE: WON the petitioner can assail the decisions of the RTC and CA in relying on the findings of the Bureau of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources HELD: NO. The findings of fact of an administrative agency, such as the Bureau of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources, must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even, if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts. Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the

question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. "In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency. Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the factual findings of the Director of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources is not misplaced. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, 29 by the courts. 30 The findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence.

****NO PALOMA vs MORA ****NO EURO-MED vs BATANGAS HEIRS OF LORENZO vs. LBP FACTS:

Petitioners are the owners of a land located in Isabela. The land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657 the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.[5] Of the entire area. By virtue of Executive Order No. (EO) 405 vesting LBP with primary responsibility to determine the valuation and compensation for all lands covered by RA 6657. Petitioners rejected the valuation. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the DARAB. The DARAB dismissed the petition. Unable to agree on the revalued proposal, petitioners instituted a case before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Tuguegarao (RARAD) for the purpose of determining the just compensation for their land. Petitioners manifested their acceptance thereof. On the other hand, LBP moved for reconsideration. Pursuant to Section 57 [18] of RA 6657, LBP filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as a SAC. Petitioners moved to dismiss LBP’s petition on the ground that they already accepted the RARAD’s decision, which, perforce rendered it final and executory. They alleged that LBP’s petition must be considered barred by the RARAD’s decision on the ground of res judicata. Nevetheless, the SAC rendered a decision, based on LBP’s evidence alone (since petitioners held in default), fixing the just compensation. Petitioners insist that the RARAD, in exercising quasi-judicial powers, has concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. Hence, the RARAD’s decision, being a final determination of the appraisal of just compensation by the DARAB, should be appealed to SC and not the SAC. For its part, LBP insists that the RARAD/DARAB decision is merely a preliminary valuation, since the courts have the ultimate power to decide the question on just compensation. ISSUE: WON the decision of RARAD is binding and thus would constitute res judicata. HELD: The PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide: Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters x x x Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to

landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR’s original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts. We do not agree with petitioners’ submission that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just compensation filed by LBP after the RARAD rendered its decision. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[51] we had the occasion to rule that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the determination of just compensation even during the pendency of the DARAB proceedings, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has ―original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.‖ This ―original and excusive‖ jurisdict ion of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. It must be emphasized that the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain.[55] The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. When the parties cannot agree on the amount of just compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on the winning and losing parties. On the other hand, the determination of just compensation in the RARAD/DARAB requires the voluntary agreement of the parties. Unless the parties agree, there is no settlement of the dispute before the RARAD/DARAB, except if the aggrieved party fails to file a petition for just compensation on time before the RTC. ****NO GUY vs IGNACIO Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Seludo FACTS: As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II), an electric cooperative providing electric service to all members-consumers in all municipalities within the Second Congressional District of the Province of Samar,

individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005 on January 22, 2005. The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same resolution also disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district elections. Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had been curtailed by the subject board resolution, private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against petitioner SAMELCO II, impleading individual petitioners as directors thereof, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga, Samar. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. C-2005-1085 and was raffled to Branch 33 of the said court . . . . In his petition, private respondent prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 5, [Series] of 2005, contending that it was issued without any legal and factual bases. He likewise prayed that a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the individual petitioners from enforcing the assailed board resolution. Granting private respondent's prayer for a TRO, the public respondent issued one, effective for seventy-two (72) hours which effectivity was later on extended for another seventeen (17) days. HTAIcD In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Individual petitioners assert that, since the matter involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II, primary jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification Administration (NEA). In her assailed Order dated May 6, 2005, [the RTC judge] sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petition for prohibition and barred the petitioners and/or their representatives from enforcing Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC but was denied. They went to the CA but CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Motion for Recon in the CA likewise was denied. Petitioner went to the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that the CA erred in interpreting the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in a very limited sense. Petitioners also argue, in their second assignment of error, that it is wrong for the CA to rule

that there is nothing under the law creating the National Electrification Administration (NEA), which grants the said administrative body the power to ascertain the validity of board resolutions unseating any member of the Board of Directors of an electric cooperative. Held: The Court finds the petition meritorious. Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1645, provides: Section 5.Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 10.Enforcement Powers and Remedies. — In the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities. If the electric cooperative concerned or other similar entity fails after due notice to comply with NEA orders, rules and regulations and/or decisions, or with any of the terms of the Loan Agreement, the NEA Board of Administrators may avail of any or all of the following remedies: xxx xxx xxx. (e)Take preventive and/or disciplinary measures including suspension and/or removal and replacement of any or all of the members of the Board of Directors, officers or employees of the Cooperative, other borrower institutions or supervised or controlled entities as the NEA Board of Administrators may deem fit and necessary and to take any other remedial measures as the law or the Loan Agreement may provide. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.) In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 7 of P.D. No. 1645, states: Section 7.Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows: SaETCI

Section 24.Board of Directors. — (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions. The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of vacancies, the procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall be defined in the by-laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and regulations. A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric cooperatives. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. 5 If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. 6 Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. 7 Section 38 (1), Chapter 7, Book 4 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 provides, thus: Supervision and control shall include the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs . . . . (Emphasis supplied. Based on the foregoing discussions, the necessary conclusion that can be arrived at is that, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, the NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. 9In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court, in a long line of cases, 11 has held that before a

party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. 12 The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. 13 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. 14 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. 15 The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. 16 Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.