Administrative Law Course Outline

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURSE OUTLINE
I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

§
Definitions
a.
Administrative Law
b.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (see Administrative Code of
1987, Section 2)
c.
National Government (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
d.
Local Government (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
e.
Agency of the Government (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
f.
Department (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
g.
Bureau (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
h.
Office (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
i.
Instrumentality (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
j.
Regulatory agency (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
k.
Chartered institution (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
l.
Government-owned or controlled corporation (see Administrative Code of 1
987, Section 2)
§
Kinds of Administrative Law
§
Scope of Administrative Law
§
Sources of Administrative Law
Cases:
1.
Mecano v. COA, 216 SCRA 500
2.
Leveriza v. IAC 157 SCRA 282
3.
Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Dev. Bank Employees, 64 SCA
D 918 or 249 SCRA 162
4.
Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, 65 SCAD 261 or 249 SCRA 538
5.
Ignacia Balicas v. Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), Office of th
e Ombudsman, G.R. No. 145972, March 23, 2004
6.
Malaga v. Panachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516
7.
Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454
II.
§

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Creation, Establishment and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

2003 Bar Exams: Validity of abolition of long-standing Bureau under DILG by the
President.
Cases:
1.
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 134
2.
Viola v. Alunan, III, 277 SCRA 409 (1997)
3.
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935,
Dec. 7, 2010
4.
Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Commissioner Fe
Barin, G.R. No. 150974, June 29, 2007
5.
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Hum
an Rights, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004
§
Reorganization of Administrative Agencies
a.
Definition of Reorganization
b.
President s power to reorganize; basis
c.
Power of other agencies to reorganize; limitations
Cases:
1.
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052
, August 29, 2007
2.
Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration, G.R. No. 152845, August 5, 2
003

3.
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Servic
e Commission, 221 SCRA 145
4.
Sinon v. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410
5.
Domingo v. DBP, 207 SCRA 766
6.
Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 60 SCAD 262 or 242 SCRA 196 (1995)
§
§

Reasons/purposes for creating administrative agencies
Common types of administrative agencies

III.

POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

§
General Principles
Cases:
1.
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 SCRA
623 (1965)
2.
Kilusang Bayan, etc. v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92 (1992)
3.
Senator Robert S. Jaworksi v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004
4.
Radio Communications of the Phils., v. National Telecommunications Commiss
ion, 215 SCRA 455 (1992)
5.
Matienzo v. Abellera, 162 SCRA 11 (1988)
6.
Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, Inc., 382 SCRA 552 (2002)
7.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, 49 SCAD 649 or 231
SCRA 292 (1994)
§

Quasi-Legislative Power (Rule-Making)

a.
b.
c.

Legislative power
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Non-delegation of legislative power

d.

Exceptions to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power

Cases:
1.
US v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908)
2.
People v. Vera, 65 Phil 327 (1937)
3.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
4.
Rabor v. CSC, 61 SCAD 569 or 244 SCRA 614 (1995)
5.
Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel, A
.M. No. 03-9-02-SC, Nov. 27, 2008
e.
o
o
o

Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations
Supplementary or detailed legislation
Interpretative legislation
Contingent legislation

Cases:
1.
2.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Gutierrez v. DBM, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010 (and other allied cases)

3.
4.
f.

BPI Leasing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127624, Nov. 18, 2003
Board of Trustees v. Velasco, G.R. No. 170436, February 2, 2011
Requisites for Validity of Administrative Rules and Regulations

Cases:

1.
2.
3.
g.

Dagan
Smart
Conte
Penal

v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009
Communications Inc., v. NTC, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003
v. Commission on Audit, 76 SCAD 16 or 264 SCRA 19 (1996)
Rules and Regulations

2002 Bar Exams: Validity of rules and regulations issued by a Department Secreta
ry providing penalties.
Cases:
1.
2.
3.

People v. Santos, 63 Phil. 300 (1936)
People v. Que Po Lya, 94 Phil. (1954)
People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)

h.

Force and effect of administrative rules and regulations

Cases:
1.
2.
i.

Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 (1992)
Javellana v. DILG, 212 SCRA 475 (1992)
Requirements of notice and hearing or publication

Case:
1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 (1996)
2. Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corp., G.R. No. 179579, Feb. 1, 20
12
2000 Bar Exam: Requirement of notice and hearing of proposed administrative rule
s.
j.

Construction of administrative rules and regulations

Case:
1.
Victorias Milling Co v. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 627
2.
National Food Authority v. MASADA Security Agency, G.R. No. 163448, March
8, 2005
3.
SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 126999, Augus
t 30, 2000
k.
Prospective or retroactive operation of rules and regulation
Case:
1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Azucena T. Reyes, G.R. No. 159694, Janua
ry 27, 2006
2. Rosario Dadulo v. Honorable Court of Appeals, Office of the Ombudsman, et al
, G.R. No. 175451, Sept. 28, 2007
l.
Case:

Amendment or repeal of administrative rules and regulations

1.
Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Company, Inc., G
.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002
m. Administrative rule and interpretation distinguished

o. Kinds of executive interpretations of the law
Case:
1. San Miguel Corp. v. Inciong, 103 SCRA 139 (1981)
p. Weight accorded to contemporaneous construction
Case:
1. Asturias Sugar Central Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 (1967)
r. When contemporaneous construction disregarded
s. Erroneous construction creates no right; exception
§
Quasi-Judicial Power (Adjudicatory)
a.
Definition
Cases:
1. Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)
2. Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc. v. DSM Construction and Development Corp., GR No
. 153310, March 2, 2004
3. NAPOCOR v. Hon. Rose Marie Alonzo-Leasto, GR No. 148318, Nov. 22,2004
b.
Distinguished from quasi-legislative functions
Cases:
1.

Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)

c.

Jurisdiction

Cases:
1.
2.

Chin v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 201 SCRA 190 (1991)
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 (1997)

d.
Administrative Due Process
Administrative Procedure (1987 Administrative Code, Book VII)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Definition of "contested case"
Institution of proceedings
Forum shopping
Acquisition of jurisdiction of quasi-judicial agency
Default in administrative case
Hearing
Subpoena
Contempt power
Evidence

e.
Due Process in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings
Generally
Case:
1.
2.

Santiago v. Alikpala, 25 SCRA 356 (1968)
NDC v. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429 (1963)

f.

Cardinal Primary Requirements of Due Process

Case:
1.
2.
3.
g.

Fabella v. CA, 89 SCAD 264 or 282 SCRA 256 (1997)
Lupo v. Adminstrative Action Board, 190 SCRA 69 (1990)
Madenilla v. CSC, 194 SCRA 278 (1991)
Administrative Appeal and Review

Administrative procedure
Generally
Case:
1.
Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. v. NLRC. 87 SCAD 196 or 279 SC
RA 337 (1997)
Rules subject to Supreme Court modification
Case:
1.

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 30 (1994)
Technical rules not applicable

Cases:
1.
h.

Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 747 (1971)
Administrative Res Judicata
Definition
Exceptions

Cases:
1.
Exec. Judge Henry Basilla v. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Clerk of Court Loli
ta delos Reyes and Junior Process Server Eddie delos Reyes, MCTC, Placer-Esperan
za-Cawayan, Masbate, G.R. No. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1404, December 14, 2004
2.
National Housing Authority v. Segunda Almeida, Court of Appeals and RTC o
f San Pedro, Laguna Br. 31, G.R. No. 162784, June 22, 2007
3.
Judge Felimon Abelita III, v. P/Supt. German Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez
, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009
§
Fact-Finding, Investigative, Licensing, and Rate-Fixing
Cases:
1.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corp., et al, G.
R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008
2.
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 10 SCRA 46 (1
964)
3.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMA Network, December 23, 2008
IV. JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW
§
Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction
Definition
Cases:
1.
Emerson B. Bagonghasa v. Johanna L. Romualdez, G.R. No. 179844, March 23,
2011
2.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Uniwide Sales Inc., G.R. No. 174674, October 2
0, 2010

3.
GSIS v. COA, G.R. No. 138381, November 10, 2004
4.
Gregorio Vigilar v. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011
5.
Geraldine Gaw Guy v. The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigrat
ion, G.R. No. 167824, July 2, 2010
§
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
a. Definition
b. Exceptions
Cases:
1.
New SunValley Homeowners Association v. Sanguniang Barangay ng Sun Valley,
G.R. NO. 156686, July 27, 2011
2.
Arlin Obiasca v. Jeane Basallote, G.R. No. 176707, February 17, 2010
3.
Republic v. Carlito Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
4.
Khristine Rea Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, et
al, G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004
§
Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action
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Notes on Quasi-Legislative Power (Rule-Making Power)
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER (RULE MAKING POWER)
§

Legislative power

Power to make, alter, and repeal laws.
§
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
§
Non-delegation of legislative power
Power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that de
partment to any other body or authority.
§
Exception to the doctrine of Non-delegation of legislative power
a.
Delegation to the President (e.g. Sec. 23(2) (war) and 28(2) (ta
riff rates), Art. IV, Constitution)
b.
Delegation to the local governments (e.g. Sec. 48, Local Governm
ent Code)
c.
Delegation to the people
d.
Delegation to the Supreme Court (e.g. Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Cons
titution)
e.
Delegation to Administrative Agencies.
Cases:
1. US v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908)
Lesson: Fixing of penalties for violation of laws is a matter purely within the
hands of the legislature.
SC s words: The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its autho
rity, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] of Act No. 355, of the Philippine Cus
toms Administrative Act, as amended by Acts Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 12
35, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also t
o "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. This prov
ision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.
In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excel
sior Redwood Company (88 Cal., 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can
not impose a penalty under statutes authorizing them to do so, the court saying:
"Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority t
o make rules and regulations with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, t
he penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in

the hands of the legislature."
Notes:
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred up
on the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any o
ther body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the a
uthority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws
must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgme
nt, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can not reli
eve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power
shall be developed, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide t
his sovereign trust." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power cons
titutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instr
umentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation
and not through the intervening mind of another.

2. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)
Lesson: Old Probation Law violated the doctrine of non-delegation when it placed
the discretion to the local governments the decision to allocate for the salary
of the probation officer.
3. Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991)
Lesson: Executive Order No. 93 is complete and it also provided sufficient stand
ard. A reading of Section 3 of said law shows that it set the policy to be the g
reater national interest. Also, delegation of legislative power has become the r
ule and its non-delegation the exception.
SC s words: The standards of the delegated power are also clearly provided for. Th
e required "standard" need not be expressed. In Edu vs. Ericta and in De la Llan
a vs. Alba, this Court held: "The standard may be either express or implied. If
the former, the non-delegated objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole."
In People vs. Rosenthal the broad standard of "public interest" was deemed suff
icient. In Calalang vs. Williams, it was "public welfare" and in Cervantes vs.
Auditor General, it was the purpose of promotion of "simplicity, economy and ef
ficiency." And, implied from the purpose of the law as a whole, "national securi
ty" was considered sufficient standard and so was "protection of fish-fry or fis
h eggs."
The observation of petitioner that the approval of the President was not even re
quired in said Executive Order of the tax exemption privilege approved by the FI
RB, unlike in previous similar issuances, is not well-taken. On the contrary, un
der Section 1 (f) of Executive Order No. 93, aforestated, such tax and duty exem
ptions extended by the FIRB must be approved by the President. In this case, FIR
B Resolution No. 17-87 was approved by the respondent Executive Secretary, by au
thority of the President, on October 15, 1987.
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz commenting on the delegation of legislative power st
ated

"The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power
has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the incr
easing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of governmental funct
ions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding i
ts attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created pecu
liar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonab
ly to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To ma
ny of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may
not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the req
uired direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions."
Thus, in the case of Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 51 this Court enunciated the ratio
nale in favor of delegation of legislative functions
"One thing however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separatio
n of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or deleg
ati potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudi
niis, Anglia edited by G.E. Woodline, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 16
7) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has b
een made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise t
o the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislati
on, not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern gove
rnments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, 68 Phil. 318, 1939). Accordingly, with
the growing complexities of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of g
overnmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by
the legislative, and toward the approval of the practice by the Courts." (Empha
sis supplied.)
The legislative authority could not or is not expected to state all the detailed
situations wherein the tax exemption privileges of persons or entities would be
restored. The task may be assigned to an administrative body like the FIRB.
Moreover, all presumptions are indulged in favor of the constitutionality and va
lidity of the statute. Such presumption can be overturned if its invalidity is p
roved beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, a liberal interpretation in favor of c
onstitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
E.O. No. 93 is complete in itself and constitutes a valid delegation of legislat
ive power to the FIRB. And as above discussed, the tax exemption privilege that
was restored to NPC by FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 of June 1987 includes exemption
from indirect taxes and duties on petroleum products used in its operation.
4. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
Lesson: 2 tests explained. Also, the reason for the delegation.
SC s words: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a val
id delegation of legislative power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficie
nt standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its term
s and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the de
legate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient sta
ndard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map o
ut the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from ru
nning riot. 14 Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legisl
ative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of th
e legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major p
owers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislati
ve power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occ
asions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the au
thorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, h
owever, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. Thi
s had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growin
g inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demandi
ng its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reas
onably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. T
o many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not
to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its d
elegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to th
em.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of spec
ialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislatu
re has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies th
e authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. T
his is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid dow
n in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the o
pportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of w
hat are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issue
d by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the f
orce and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contr
act prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases wit
hout challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the Nationa
l Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a s
ufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. T
hat standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating th
e Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the righ
ts of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
5. Rabor v. CSC, 61 SCAD 569 or 244 SCRA 614 (1995)
Lesson: High degree of detail not necessary in a law that delegates power to adm
inistrative agencies to exercise subordinate legislation.
SC s words: Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree
of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. I
t seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and sp
ecific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implemen
ting administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legi
slative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respe
ct of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated r
ule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may
be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting o
f administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by th
e governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied

in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to t
his test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined in t
he present Civil Service law - found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executiv
e Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987 - and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Governmen
t Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of reti
rees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by
both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is crystal
clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.

§
a.

Delegation of legislative power to Administrative Agencies
Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers of administrative agencies

b.
Kinds of rule-making power
1.
Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority (subordinate l
egislation)
2.
Rule-making by the constructuion and interpretation of a statute being adm
inistered (interpretative legislation)
3 kinds:
? Interpretation as incident of the execution of a law
? Interpretation handed down by the Secretary of Justice upon the request of a
government agency or official
? Intyerpretation in adversary proceedings
3.
Determination of facts under a delegated power as to which a statue shall
go into effect (contingent legislation)
c.

Reasons for delegation of legislative power

Delegation of legislative pwer has become more and more frequent, if not necessa
ry. This has led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reasons for the delegation of legislative power are the increasing complexit
y of the tast of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of socie
ty has ramified its activites and created peculiar and sophisticated problems th
at the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary.
d.
What can and cannot be delegated
What can be delegated
Legislature may properly delegate to administrative agency
any legislative power other than the making, altering or repealing of a law, th
e determination of legislative policies and objectives to be achieved, and the f
ormulation and promulgation of a defined and binding rule of conduct. It can de
legate the discretion as to how the law shall be enforced, to issue rules to fil
l in details, to ascertain facts on which the law will operate, to exercise poli
ce power, and to fix rates. To be valid, however, the delegation has to pass th
e competence and sufficiency of standard tests.
What cannot be delegated Doctrine of separation of pwers prohibits the delegatio
n of that which is purely legislative in nature. This consists of the power to
make the law, or to determine what the law shall be, and to alter or repeal it.
e.
Test to determine validity of delegation
1.
Completeness test
The law must be complete in all its terms and conditio
ns when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the onl
y thing he will have to do is to enforce it.

2.
Sufficient standard test - There must be adequate guidelines or limitati
ons in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate s authority and prevent t
he delegation from running riot.
Case:
1.
8

ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 200

Lessons: (1) Clarifying the 2 tests. (2) It is unlawful for congress to exercise
veto on the IRRs of an administrative agency.
SC s words:
On the 2 tests: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative po
wer: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is co
mplete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or impl
emented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides ade
quate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the dele
gate s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, t
he standard must specify the limits of the delegate s authority, announce the legi
slative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fix
ing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions
of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the rev
enue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR
) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanct
ions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Perform
ance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing the delegated power
to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter
referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of
the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year,
as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in th
e following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the Excess the Revenue Targets Percent (%) of the Exces
s Collection to Accrue to the Fund
30% or below
15%
More than 30%
15% of the first 30%
plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately followi
ng the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be release
d on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expecte
d of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expe

nditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress.
The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies re
venue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, a
nd the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the D
BCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the det
ermination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also u
ndergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board s authority and ide
ntifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collect
ion falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board.
e following powers and functions:
xxx

xxx

The Board in the agency shall have th

xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and e
mployees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven an
d a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affectin
g the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated u
nder this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and complian
ce with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exe
mptions shall apply:
On legislative veto: The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was
created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR
) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approv
ed the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. He
nce, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implemen
ting and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Co
ngress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program obje
ctives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to elim
inate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of leg
islative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressiona
l perception of public interest.
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers ma
y be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervis
ion.
a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity o
f attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine ec
onomy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise
of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the ot
her branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for

consideration of the agency involved.
b. Congressional investigation - While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a p
assive process of looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional
investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress t
o conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21,
Article VI,
c. Legislative supervision - The third and most encompassing form by which Congr
ess exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. Supervision con
notes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committ
ee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both con
gressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch
actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressiona
l supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy wit
hin the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can itself formulate th
e details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.
In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and cond
itions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the e
xecutive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules
and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-m
aking) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (cont
ingent rule-making).
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and i
nterpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and a
re entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a st
atute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself
. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of co
nstitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an approp
riate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of
an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the
Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based o
n a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 933
5, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in
this Court by the Constitution.

2.
cases)

Gutierrez v. DBM, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010 (and other allied

Lesson: If the law is clear, no need for IRR to be implemented. In this case, no
need for publication of the IRR.
SC s words: As will be noted from the first sentence above, all allowances were deem
ed integrated into the standardized salary rates except the following:
(1)
representation and transportation allowances;
(2)
clothing and laundry allowances;
(3)
subsistence allowances of marine officers and crew on board government v
essels;
(4)
subsistence allowances of hospital personnel;
(5)
hazard pay;
(6)
allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
(7)
such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12

as may be determined by the DBM.
But, while the provision enumerated certain exclusions, it also authorized the D
BM to identify such other additional compensation that may be granted over and a
bove the standardized salary rates. In Philippine Ports Authority Employees Hir
ed After July 1, 1989 v. Commission on Audit, the Court has ruled that while Sec
tion 12 could be considered self-executing in regard to items (1) to (6), it was
not so in regard to item (7). The DBM still needed to amplify item (7) since o
ne cannot simply assume what other allowances were excluded from the standardize
d salary rates. It was only upon the issuance and effectivity of the correspond
ing implementing rules and regulations that item (7) could be deemed legally com
pleted.
Delegated rule-making is a practical necessity in modern governance because of t
he increasing complexity and variety of public functions. Congress has endowed a
dministrative agencies like respondent DBM with the power to make rules and regu
lations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. Such power
is, however, necessarily limited to what the law provides. Implementing rules
and regulations cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to am
end or repeal a statute belongs to the legislature. Administrative agencies imp
lement the broad policies laid down in a law by filling in only its details. The
regulations must be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law and must c
onform to the standards prescribed by law.
On publication: It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition
precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of its contents befo
re their rights and interests are affected by the same. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardi
zed salary rates is not dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This
benefit is deemed included in the standardized salary rates of government emplo
yees since it falls under the general rule of integration all allowances.
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was fac
tually integrated into the employees salaries. Records show that the government
employees were informed by their respective offices of their new position titles
and their corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with the Notices
of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the b
reakdown of the employee s gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the compos
ition of his standardized pay under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was considered
part of the employee s monthly income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequen
ce of the consolidation of COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is
thus nothing in these cases which can be the subject of a back pay since the amo
unt corresponding to COLA was never withheld from petitioners in the first place
.
Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette o
r newspaper of general circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into
the standardized salary rates upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758. As the Court
has said in Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit,
the validity of R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend on the validity of its i
mplementing rules.
3.

BPI Leasing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127624, Nov. 18, 2003

Lesson: Subordinate and interpretative legislation distinguished. General rule i
s prospective application of administrative rules.
SC s words: Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their natur
e and substance: legislative and interpretative. A legislative rule is in the ma
tter of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is de
signed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in ch
arge of enforcing.
The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in nature.
Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pur
suant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277 (now Section 244) is an express gr
ant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. In Pa
per Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court rec
ognized that the application of Section 277 calls for none other than the exerci
se of quasi-legislative or rule-making authority. Verily, it cannot be disputed
that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of t
he Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as a
lleged by BLC.
BLC further posits that, assuming the revenue regulation is legislative in natur
e, it is invalid
After upholding the validity of Revenue Regulation 19-86, the Court now resolves
whether its application should be prospective or retroactive.
On non-retroactivity: The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including
administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the leg
islative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary imp
lication. In the present case, there is no indication that the revenue regulatio
n may operate retroactively.
Furthermore, there is an express provision stating that it shall take effect on J
anuary 1, 1987, and that it shall be applicable to all leases written on or after
the said date.
Being clear on its prospective application, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without further interpretation. Thus, BLC is not in
a position to invoke the provisions of Revenue Regulation 19-86 for lease rental
s it received prior to January 1, 1987.
It is also apt to add that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As
such, these are regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and are to be s
trictly construed against the person or entity claiming the exemption. The burd
en of proof is upon him who claims the exemption and he must be able to justify
his claim by the clearest grant under Constitutional or statutory law, and he ca
nnot be permitted to rely upon vague implications. Nothing that BLC has raised j
ustifies a tax refund.
4.

Board of Trustees v. Velasco, G.R. No. 170436, February 2, 2011

Lesson: Internal rules do not need publication.
SC s words: Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are t
o be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent charact
er are to be filed. According to the UP Law Center s guidelines for receiving and
publication of rules and regulations, interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrativ
e agency and not the public, need not be filed with the UP Law Center.

Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 w
as about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197
was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed re
solutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of th
e GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions wit
h the UP Law Center.
f.

Requisites for validity of administrative rules and regulations

1.
Must be
2.
Conform
3.
Must be
4.
Must be
f the law.
Cases:
1.

germane to the objects and purposes of the law
to the standards that the law prescribes
reasonable
related solely to carrying into effects the general provisions o

Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009

Lesson: Requisites, explained.
SC s words: The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guide
lines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites:
1.
Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2.
It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3.
It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
4.
It must be reasonable.
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances. Philr
acom s authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the president
ial decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the issuances
are fair and reasonable. Xxx
P.D. No. 420 hurdles the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency.
Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in Sec
tion 1 which is to promote and direct the accelerated development and continued g
rowth of horse racing not only in pursuance of the sports development program bu
t also in order to insure the full exploitation of the sport as a source of reve
nue and employment. Furthermore, Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and
control over every aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing
and scheduling of races, the construction and safety of race tracks, and the se
curity of racing. P.D. No. 420 is already complete in itself.
Clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation of rule-making power to Philra
com. Clearly too, for its part Philracom has exercised its rule-making power in
a proper and reasonable manner. More specifically, its discretion to rid the f
acilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses afflicted with EIA is aimed at preserving t
he security and integrity of horse races.
Petitioners also question the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-makin
g powers to MJCI and PRCI.
There is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the delegator
and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. The Philracom directive is merely instructive i
n character. Philracom had instructed PRCI and MJCI to immediately come up with
Club s House Rule to address the problem and rid their facilities of horses infect
ed with EIA.
PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the racehorse owners to
submit blood samples and subject their race horses to blood testing. Complianc
e with the Philracom s directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under Sec
tions 11 of R.A. No. 7953 and Sections 1 and 2 of 8407.

As correctly proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated autho
rity of Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by Congress allo
wing MJCI to do and carry out all such acts, deeds and things as may be necessary
to give effect to the foregoing. As justified by PRCI, obeying the terms of the f
ranchise and abiding by whatever rules enacted by Philracom is its duty.
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to Philr
acom s guidelines. They question the supposed belated issuance of the guidelines,
that is, only after the collection of blood samples for the Coggins Test was ord
ered. While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after Philra
com s directive, this circumstance does not render the directive nor the guideline
s void. The directive s validity and effectivity are not dependent on any supplem
ental guidelines. Philracom has every right to issue directives to MJCI and PRC
I with respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without implementing guid
elines.
On publication: Petitioners also argue that Philracom s guidelines have no force a
nd effect for lack of publication and failure to file copies with the University
of the Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administr
ative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice and hearing,
In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court had the occasion to rul
e that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or re
gulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no d
etermination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.
The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it mu
st be within the limits of the powers granted to it. The administrative body ma
y not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of t
he Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or wh
ich created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statu
te.
The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and eradicating E
IA. These guidelines are in accord with Philracom s mandate under the law to regu
late the conduct of horse racing in the country.
Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be unreason
able or discriminatory. In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCI s premis
es underwent the same procedure. The guidelines implemented were undoubtedly re
asonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be accompli
shed, i.e., the complete riddance of horses infected with EIA.
It also appears from the records that MJCI properly notified the racehorse owner
s before the test was conducted. Those who failed to comply were repeatedly warn
ed of certain consequences and sanctions.
Furthermore, extant from the records are circumstances which allow respondents t
o determine from time to time the eligibility of horses as race entries. The lea
se contract executed between petitioner and MJC contains a proviso reserving the
right of the lessor, MJCI in this case, the right to determine whether a partic
ular horse is a qualified horse. In addition, Philracom s rules and regulations o
n horse racing provide that horses must be free from any contagious disease or i
llness in order to be eligible as race entries.
All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in issui
ng the contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with Phil

racom s directive.
2.

Smart Communications Inc., v. NTC, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003

Lesson: Rule-making and Adjudication distinguished.
SC s words: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making power
s and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or
rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in d
elegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal pro
visions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is requir
ed that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by la
w. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling st
atute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statu
tory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promul
gated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subj
ect to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsi
stent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the sta
tute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or
defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an a
dministrative order, the former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an adminis
trative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative po
licy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power
to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performan
ce of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out thei
r quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required t
o investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh ev
idence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and ex
ercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies be
fore going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administra
tive agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and
not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative pow
er. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Autho
rity, it was held: The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies b
efore a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor Ge
neral on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution
in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legisl
ative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agenci
es made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhau
stion doctrine.
3.

Conte v. Commission on Audit, 76 SCAD 16 or 264 SCRA 19 (1996)

Lesson: Administrative issuances should adhere to the statutes that they are sup
posed to implement.
SC s words: It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an admi
nistrative order, the former must prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to
and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such
rule or regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge t
he authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its powe
r beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control wi
th respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as w
ell as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Con
stitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which cr
eated it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. Th
ough well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in
favor of the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to interpret in eith
er RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any doubt as to the u
ltra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rul
e against petitioners.
As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Res. 56, we can hardly impute ab
use of discretion of any sort to respondent Commission for denying petitioners re
quest for reconsideration of the 3rd Indorsement of July 10, 1989. On the contr
ary, we hold that public respondent in its assailed Decision acted with circumsp
ection in denying petitioners claim. It reasoned thus: After a careful evaluation
of the facts herein obtaining, this Commission finds the instant request to be d
evoid of merit. It bears stress that the financial assistance contemplated under
SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS employees who opt to retire under R.A.
No. 660. In fact, by the aggrieved parties own admission (page 2 of the request f
or reconsideration dated January 12, 1993), it is a financial assistance granted
by the SSS management to its employees, in addition to the retirement benefits
under Republic Act No. 660. (underscoring supplied for emphasis) There is therefo
re no question, that the said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a r
etirement benefit that has the effect of modifying existing retirement laws part
icularly R.A. No. 660.
g.

Penal rules and regulations

Cases:
1.

People v. Santos, 63 Phil. 300 (1936)

Lesson: Effect when administrative agency issue orders that are beyond its autho
rity.
SC s words: The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with havi
ng ordered his fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and
Malabon III registered in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three
kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction
is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without pe
rmission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
These acts constitute a violation of the conditional clause of section 28 above
quoted, which reads as follows: "Provided, That boats not subject to license und
er Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above (within
3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdict
ion is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, particu

larly Corregidor) only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permiss
ion may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendat
ion of the military or naval authorities concerned."
Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to lice
nse from fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reserv
ations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of
the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Com
merce upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. Inasm
uch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such instructions, o
rders, rules and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and p
roper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceed
ings arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated
, contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditio
nal clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause i
n question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to leg
islating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to hi
m, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones
Law, and now to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. S
uch act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon th
e Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative p
ower which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and v
oid and without effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindo
ro, 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; U. S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phi
l., 327).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the con
ditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secre
tary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as consti
tuting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act
No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and cannot be
delegated to him.
2.

People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. (1954)

Lesson: Necessity of publication.
SC s words: But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as
a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law befo
re its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be v
iolated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or com
mitted any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction.
This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raise
d in the court below.
3.

People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)

Lesson: The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mod
e or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
SC s words: The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing ele
ctro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point o
f the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is
not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or pro
ceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be

extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matt
ers not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctio
ned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, cit
ing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue
vs. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs
. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries Law provides that the Secretary
"shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent"
with that law, "as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisi
ons thereof. That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by s
ection 7 of the Revised Fisheries Law, Presidential Decree No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Commissioner of Fisheries "to
prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natura
l Resources, forms, instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purp
ose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries."
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the ri
ght to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, th
at power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An a
dministrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers express
ly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 7
34, 58 SE 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and
boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose
, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of exte
nding, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a
valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an adminis
trative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, 5 Wash. 2nd 322; 105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly app
ear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferre
d upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special c
are. (State vs. Miles, supra).