After Pax Americana

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After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable
Multipolarity
Author(s): Charles A. Kupchan
Source: International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 40-79
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539379
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AfterPax Americana

Charles
A. Kupchan

Benign Power, Regional Integration,and
the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity
I An

era of unprece-

centurydraws near.The
dented peace appears to be at hand as the twenty-first
world's major powers enjoy cooperativerelations,democracyis takingroot in
many countriesthathave long sufferedunder authoritarianrule,and theworld
economy is becoming increasinglyliberalized and integrated.Contraryto the
dire predictionsof a returnto a Hobbesian world, the end of the Cold War has
not been accompanied by the fragmentationof internationalorder and the
emergenceof rivalryamong atomisticnational units.1
A sobering reality,however, must temper optimism about the emerging
internationallandscape. The peace and prosperityof the currentera rely too
heavily on a single ingredient:Americanpower. The United States serves as a
criticalextraregionalbalancer in Europe and East Asia, is the catalystbehind
multilateraleffortsto combat aggressionand peacefullyresolve long-standing
disputes,and is the engine behind the liberalizationof the world economy.But
America's preponderance and its will to underwriteinternationalorder will
Even if the U.S. economy grows at a healthyrate,Amernot last indefinitely.
ica's share of world productand its global influencewill decline as otherlarge
countries develop and become less enamored of followingAmerica's lead.2

and Senior
is AssociatePr-ofessor
Relationsat Georgetozvwn
CharlesA. Kutpchan
University
ofInternational
Fellowat theCouincilon ForeignRelationis.
The author would like to thank participantsin seminars at the followinginstitutionsfor their
thoughtfulcomments:Hebrew University,Columbia University,Universityof Californiaat San
Diego, Council on ForeignRelations,GeorgetownUniversity,Universityof Californiaat Berkeley,
Harvard University,Okazaki Institute(Tokyo), the American Center (Tokyo), and the Danish
Instituteof InternationalAffairs(Copenhagen). The critiques of Michael Barnett,Richard Betts,
AlbertFishlow,Gary Hufbauer,CliffordKupchan, JosephLepgold, Gideon Rose, Peter Trubowitz,
Ole Waever,Fareed Zakaria, and the reviewersof International
were particularlyhelpful.
Securi-ity
For researchassistance,I would like to thankJasonDavidson, Delphine Park, and Mira Sucharov.
1. See, forexample,JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future:Instabilityin Europe afterthe Cold
Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.
War,"International
Secuirity,
2. For general analysis of the secular processes throughwhich the locus of preponderantpower
changes over time,see Robert Gilpin, War and Changein WorldPolitics(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981). During the second half of the twentiethcentury,U.S. economic
Frankel,
outputhas fallenfromroughlyone-halfto one-quarterof gross world product.See Jeffrey
Blocs in the WorldEconomnic
System(Washington,D.C.: InstituteforInternational
Regioncal
Tradinig
Economics, 1997), p. 6.
Ioteoiiatioinal Seciiritiy,Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79

? 1998 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.

40

AfterPax Americana| 41

Furthermore,
the American electoratewill tireof a foreignpolicy thatsaddles
the United States with such a disproportionateshare of the burden of managing the internationalsystem.America'sunipolar momentwill not last long. To
assume that internationalorder can indefinitelyrest on American hegemony
is both illusoryand dangerous.
How should the prospect of waning American power affectthe conduct of
American grand strategy?3Several prominentschools of thoughtsuggest that
the decline of American hegemonyneed not be cause forconcern;peace will
outlast American preponderance.The optimistscontend that democracy,globalization, the spread of internationalinstitutions,and changes in the sources
of state power are eroding national boundaries and making warfarean obsolete tool of statecraft.4
The end of the twentiethcentury,however,is n6t the
firsttime in historythat studentsof internationalpolitics have proclaimed an
end to war. In the years leading up to World War I and again during the
interwarperiod, scholars and diplomats alike argued that economic interdependence,technologicalinnovation,and societal aversion to the horrorsof war
If today's optimistsprove to
were making armed conflicta historicalartifact.5
be as wrong as yesterday's,there is good reason to be worried about the
potentialconsequences of a relativedecline in U.S. power.6
Even ifthe optimistsare rightthatinternationalpoliticshave entereda more
peaceful era, the waning of Americanhegemonystillprovides cause foralarm.
3. Even if American hegemony lasts for decades more, debate about craftinga posthegemonic
order should take place now, while U.S. preponderance is still sufficientto maintain the status
quo. It is farmore prudentto put in place the foundationof a durable orderby design thansimply
to wait untilcurrentarrangementsunravel. Many analystsagree thatU.S. preponderancewill not
last,but few have given thoughtto how the prospectof decline should affectU.S. grand strategy.
One exceptionis ChristopherLayne. Layne calls fora U.S. grand strategyof offshorebalancing to
conserve U.S. resources and to help protectthe United States fromgettingdragged into distant
conflicts.He failsto address, however,how to promotepeace as the United Stateswithdrawsfrom
existingcommitments.Instead,he makes the case thatthe United States should simplystand aloof
fromthe regional conflictslikelyto emerge in the wake of an Americanretrenchment.
See Layne,
"From Preponderance to OffshoreBalancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,"Inter-inatioinal
Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124.
Security,
4. On the democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the DemocraticPeace (Princeton,N.J.:
PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993); and Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics,"American
PoliticalScienceReviezv,
Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.On the decliningutilityof
warfare,see Richard Rosecrance,The Rise of theTradinig
State (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and
JohnMueller,Retr-eat
froinDoomsday:The Obsolescence
ofMajor War(New York:Basic Books, 1989).
5. See, forexample, Norman Angell, The GreatIlliusion(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1911).
6. Importantcritiques of the democratic peace hypothesis have been collected in two edited
volumes: Michael E. Brown,Sean M. Lynn-Jones,
and Steven E. Miller,eds., DebatingtheDemnocratic
Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is
DemocracytheAnswver?
(Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).

International
Security23:2 | 42

Although scholars disagree about whetherbipolar or multipolarsystemsare
more stable, most agree thatboth are less stable than unipolar systems.7The
end ofAmerica'sunipolarmomentand thereturnto multipolarity
thusthreaten
to triggerstructuralsources of competition that may well override other
sources of peace. Indeed, the ongoing debate between realistsand institutionalists of various stripesessentiallyrevolves around pittingstructuralsources
of competitionagainst ideational and institutionalsources of cooperation.8
Structure,however, may be the solution,not an endemic source of rivalry
that must be overcome by antidotes such as democracy,globalization, and
internationalinstitutions.If order devolved fromstructureitself,ratherthan
fromeffortsto tame systemicforces,that order would be more durable and
self-sustaining.The prospect of the end of American hegemonythus raises a
crucial question: Is it possible to constructa stable multipolarity?
I argue thatthe United States should prepare forthe inevitabledecline of its
preponderanceby encouragingthe emergenceof regional unipolarityin each
of the world's threeareas of industrialand militarypower-North America,
Europe, and East Asia. Unipolarityat the regional level will offsetthrough
structuralforces the fragmentationand rivalrythat otherwise would likely
accompany the decline of Americanhegemony.Because even global wars start
at the regional level, securing peace within regions is an essential firststep
toward securingpeace globally.
I introducethe notion of "benign unipolarity"to map out the logic upon
which my analysis rests.Benign unipolarityrefersto a hierarchicalstructure
in which a preponderantgeographic core establishes a hub-spoke patternof
influenceover a weaker periphery.As in an empire,the core exertsa powerful
centripetalforceover the peripheryby virtueof itsuncontestedpreponderance
and the size and scope of its economy. In contrast to a classical empire,
however,regional order emergesfroma consensual bargain between core and
periphery,not fromcoercion.The core engages in self-restraint
and agrees to
subject the exercise of its preponderantpower to a set of rules and norms
7. On the greaterstabilityof bipolarity,see KennethN. Waltz,"The Stabilityof a Bipolar World,"
Daedalus,Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; and Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future." For
argumentsin favor of multipolarity,
see Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer,"Multipolar Power
Systems and InternationalStability,"WorldPolitics,Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 390-406. For
general discussion of polarityand stability,see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe
afterthe Cold War,"International
Security,Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter1990/91),pp. 5-57; and Michael
Mastanduno, "Preservingthe Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategyafter
Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.
the Cold War,"International
Security,
8. See the exchange between John Mearsheimer and his critics in "Promises, Promises: Can
InstitutionsDeliver?" International
Security,
Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-93.

AfterPax Americana| 43

arrived at through multilateralnegotiation.In return,the peripheryenters
willinglyinto the core's zone of influence.Regional spheres of influenceagain
become the main orderingformationsin the internationalsystem,but these
spheres are based on voluntary,not forced,participation.Furthermore,order
emerges preciselybecause of the withholdingand moderation of power, not
its unfetteredexercise.Benign unipolaritythus holds promise fordampening
competitionamong regions as well as withinthem.
I argue that consensual unipolar formationsare already emergingin North
America, Europe, and (to a lesser degree) East Asia, but that scholars and
policymakersneed to understandmore fullytheirattributesand take explicit
steps to encourage their furtherdevelopment. The challenges ahead vary
considerablyacross these threeregions.
North America has long been unipolar. Unipolaritycame about througha
willfulact of structuraltransformation-theamalgamationof theUnited States
into a unitarystate. Since America's rise as a great power, its preponderance
has been a key factorin preventingmajor interstatewar in the region.Because
the uncontestedpower of the United States now endows North America with
a natural unipolarity,the key challenge is taming the unilateralism made
possible by preponderanceand deepening the consensual characterof America's relationshipwith its neighbors.
Europe has long been multipolar-and sufferedthe consequences. Since the
close of World War II, however, WesternEurope has pursued an ambitious
experimentaimed at eliminatingthe ill effectsof multipolarity
by transforming
its structureto unipolarity.The vehicle fordoing so has been European integrationand the constructionof the European Union (EU), a process that has
succeeded in establishinga preponderantFranco-Germancore at the centerof
a consensual regional formation.With the help of America's protectiveguarantees, Europe's core engages in strategicrestraintand exercisesits power in
a benign manner.In return,Europe's smaller powers have willinglyentered
the regional formation.Not only has interstaterivalrybeen all but eliminated,
but the core exertsa powerfulmagneticattractionover the periphery,creating
an effectivehub-spoke pattern of governance. Indeed, the continent'snew
democraciesare now clamoringat the gate to become partof Europe's unipolar
construction.The key challenges ahead are to ensure the integrityof the
Franco-Germancoalition and Europe's unipolarityeven as American power
wanes and Europe's border moves eastward.
East Asia has long been, and remains,multipolar.America's militarypresence continues to hold in abeyance the competitivejockeying that would
otherwiseemerge.Unlike Europe, however,East Asia has not takenadvantage

Security23:2 | 44
International

of the luxuryprovided by an extraregionalbalancer to proceed with its own
politicalintegration.Postwar Germanyintegratedinto Europe even as Europe
integratedinto theWest.In contrast,postwarJapanwas deeply integratedinto
the communityof capitalistdemocracies,but its integrationinto East Asia has
been shallow and only economic in form.The region'smajor stateshave strong
political ties to the United States, but not to one another. In this sense,
America's presence, although it keeps the peace for now, also stands in the
way of the intraregionalintegrationneeded to ensure stabilityin the aftermath of American hegemony. East Asia has a long way to go if it is to
constructa consensual regional formationcapable of overcomingits dangerous multipolarity.
An effortto bridge realist and idealist approaches to the preservationof
peace guides thisexplorationintotheconstructionofa new internationalorder.
I recognizethe pervasive role thatpower will continueto play in international
affairsand the extentto which power asymmetrieswill serve as inescapable
determinantsof order. It is no accident that empires have been the most
pervasive provider of order throughouthistoryAt the same time,profound
materialand ideational changes over the course of the twentiethcenturyhave
made classical empires obsolete,established consensual politicsas an international norm,and removed many of the traditionalincentivesto coercive and
predatorybehavior. The notion of benign unipolarityrests not on the denial
of power realities,but on the opportunityto channel throughwillfulagency
the manner in which, and the ends to which, power is exercised.In addition,
I am seeking to help break down the barriersbetween securitystudies and
internationalpolitical economy by bringinggeopoliticsback into the study of
regionalism.In the pages thatfollow,I explore the strategicimplicationsof an
internationallandscape increasinglyshaped by flows of trade and capital and
the economic implicationsof an internationalstructureincreasinglycharacterized by regional concentrationsof power.9

9. The limitationsof currentthinkingabout the emerginginternationalsystemstem in part from
the high disciplinarywalls that still stand between internationalpolitical economy and security
studies. The study of regionalismand institutionssuch as the EU, the North AtlanticFree Trade
Agreement(NAFTA), and theAsia PacificEconomic Cooperationforum(APEC) remainsprimarily
the domain of economistsand political economiststrained to thinkabout exchange and wealth
creation. The study of geopolitics,polarity,and institutionssuch as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization(NATO), the OrganizationforSecurityand Cooperation in Europe, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remainsprimarilythe domain of securityspecialists.A
limiteddegree of fertilizationacross these disciplinarybarriersis occurring,however. Theoretical

AfterPax Americana| 45

I begin by laying out the logic of benign unipolarity.I then discuss the
descriptive and prescriptiveimplications of the notion for North America,
Europe, and East Asia. In the finalsection,I theorizeabout the dynamicsthat
would characterizeinternationalpoliticsin a world ofbenignunipolar regions,
exploringhow to effecttheirinternalcohesion as well as cooperativerelations
among them.

The LogicofBenignUnipolarity
The promotionof intraregionalpeace is the logical startingpoint of effortsto
constructa stable internationalorderto followAmericanhegemony.10
If neighbors are at peace with each other,they are likely to be at peace with-states
furtherafield.If neighborsare at war with each other,statesfurtherafield are
likely to become involved, both to contain the war and to preventthe emergence of a powerfulvictorwith extraregionalambition.
Regional unipolarityprovides orderand stabilitythroughpower asymmetry
and the structuralhierarchythat follows fromit. The preponderance of the
leading regionalstatediscourages othersfrombalancing against it and enables
the leader to underwritethe institutionsand normsof regionalorder.Whereas
roughly equivalent power produces balancing and contestationover leadership, asymmetryproduces hierarchyand a core-peripherypatternof relations.
perspectives traditionallyreserved for the study of economic bodies are being used to study
securitybodies. See, for example, John Duffield,"Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The
Contributionsof Regional SecurityRegimes,"ReviewofInternational
Vol. 20, No. 4 (October
Stuidies,
1994), pp. 369-399. And theoreticalperspectivestraditionallyreservedforthe study of geopolitics
and securityare being applied to groupingssuch as the EU. See, forexample, Ole Waever's work
on European integration,in particular,"Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretationof
Post-WallEuropean Security,"in Rick Fawn and JeremyLarkins,eds., International
Societyafterthe
Cold War (New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1996), pp. 220-260. I am indebted to Waever forinitially
inspiringme to apply the logic of empires to the EU and, consequently,to otherregional bodies
traditionallyviewed primarilyas trade groupings.For a contemporaryperspectiveon the geopoliticalimportanceof regionalzones of influence,see Charles WilliamMaynes, "A WorkableClinton
Doctrine,"ForeignPolicy,No. 93 (Winter1993),pp. 3-21. For more generalworks on contemporary
regionalism,some of which do touch on geopoliticalconcerns,see Peter Katzensteinand Takashi
Shiraishi,eds., Netzvork
Pozver:Japanand Asia (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1997); Edward
Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., The PoliticalEconomny
of Regionalism(New York: Columbia
in
UniversityPress, 1997); David Lake and PatrickMorgan, eds., RegionalOrders:Butilding
Secuirity
a Nezv World(UniversityPark: PennsylvaniaState Press, 1997); Jeffrey
Frankel and Miles Kahler,
and Rivalry:Japanand the UnitedStates in PacificAsia (Chicago: Universityof
eds., Regionalismii
in WorldPolitics:
Chicago Press, 1993); and Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell,eds., Regionalismn
RegionalOrganizationand International
Order(Oxford,U.K.: OxfordUniversityPress, 1995).
10. On promotingregionalpeace as a pathway to global stability,
see JosephS. Nye, Peace in Parts:
Integration
and Conflictin RegionalOrganizationi
(Boston: Little,Brown,1971).

International
Security23:2 | 46

Asymmetryby itselfdoes not preventbalancing,however.The characterof the
leading state and the mannerin which it wields its power also determinehow
other states react to preponderance. Cores that engage in self-bindingand
exercise theirpower in a benign manner are unlikelyto triggerbalancing.11
Indeed, the benign exercise of power gives rise to the trust,shared interests
and identities,and internationalinstitutionsessential to escaping anarchyand
fosteringa communityof stateswithinwhich the rules of self-helpcompetition
no longer apply.12 In contrast,states that exercise unfetteredpower and that
engage in predatoryand exploitativebehavior are likelyto triggerbalancing
coalitions and strategicrivalry.Locking in regional peace means gettingright
both the structureand the characterof power.13

11. I define the terms "benign" and "self-binding"as follows. Self-bindingis the mechanism
throughwhich states render theirpower benign. Self-bindinghas quantitative,qualitative,and
proceduralcomponents.In quantitativeterms,self-bindingentailsa state'swillingnessto withhold
power, to refrainfromfullyexercisingits resourcesand influence.This strategicrestraintmay be
codified,as in the cases of contemporaryGermany and Japan, or it may be embodied only in
practice.The qualitativecomponentof self-bindingconcernsthe ends to which power is exercised.
Benign states seek to manage ratherthan maximize power, to promotejoint gains ratherthan to
behave in an extractiveand exploitativemanner,and to erectordersbased upon the notion that
the spread of shared norms and identitiesand the formationof communityat the international
level can overcome competitiverelationsamong atomisticstate units. The procedural component
of self-bindingentails a preferenceformultilateralover unilateralinitiative.Benign states favor
consensual governance,and resortto unilateraldecisionmakingonly when multilateralismfailsto
produce an acceptable outcome.
12. The.notion that greatpowers have characterand pursue different
types of behavior has firm
rootsin classical realism.Classical realistsregularlydistinguishbetween revisionistand status quo
powers. See, for example, Arnold Wolfers,"The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in
Politics(Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins
Wolfers,ed., Discordand Collaboration:
Essayson International
UniversityPress, 1962); Randall Schweller,"Tripolarityand the Second World War," International
Studies Quarterly,Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 73-103; Schweller,"Neorealism's Status-Quo
Bias: What Security Dilemma?" SecurityStudies,Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; and
Mastanduno, "Preservingthe Unipolar Moment." I am extendingthistypologyto include benign
powers. Revisioniststates seek to overturnthe prevailingsystemthroughacquisitive and predatorystrategies.Status quo states seek to preservethe prevailingsystemby pursuing competitive,
but not acquisitive,strategies.Benign statesseek not just to preservethe status quo, but to deepen
its stabilityand cooperativecharacterby reassuringotherstates and fosteringconsensual governance throughthe withholdingas well as the exerciseofpower. The key difference
between a status
quo stateand a benignstatestemsfromdivergingconceptionsof the sources of orderand stability.
Stabilityin a world of status quo states stems from the absence of strategicrivalry among
satisfied-but atomisticand self-regarding-stateunits still residingin an anarchic environment.
The securitydilemma does not operate because no revisioniststate exists to triggerit. Stabilityin
a world of benign states stems fromsuccessful effortsto carve out nonanarchicspace through
promotingcooperation,trust,and shared values and identities.The securitydilemma does not
operate because states no longer reside in an anarchic,self-helpsetting.
13. Consider how importantboth the structureand characterof power are to the stabilityof the
currentinternationalsystem. The asymmetryassociated with American preponderance creates
structuralhierarchy.Other major states are not balancing against U.S. preponderance in part

AfterPax Americana| 47

Benign unipolarityrepresentsa means of combiningthe rightstructurewith
the rightcharacter.The structuralhierarchythataccompanies power asymmetryis a potentpeace-causing agent. Hierarchyalone is not enough, however;
the emergenceof a stable order also depends on the benign characterof the
core and its willingnessto forgea consensual bargain with the periphery.The
core agrees to engage in self-binding.In return,the peripherybandwagons and
agrees to enterinto the core's sphere of influence.This bargain provides the
core with what it wants-a regional order to its liking at low cost. It also
provides the peripherywith what it wants-the tamingof the core's power by
exposing it to the moderatinginfluencesof a multilateralframework.Power
asymmetriescreatehierarchy,
but orderemergesbecause power is withheldat
the same time that it is exercised.This bargain also sets in motion a gradual
process throughwhich individual states come to equate theirown interests
and identitywith the interestsand identityof the region as a whole. Regional
cohesion thenrestsnot only on a coincidenceof separate nationalinterests,but
also on a nascent social characterand sense of community.14
Daniel Deudney's concept of "negarchy" provides furtherinsightinto the
logic of benign unipolarity.15Consensual regionalformationsprovide orderby
mixing traditionalhierarchywith elements of negarchy-order that emerges
throughself-binding,throughthe constraintand moderationof power rather
than its unfetteredexercise.Like the U.S. Constitution,which uses "particular
configurationsof negatives" and an "elaborate system of power-constraint
devices" to establishdomestic order,benign unipolarityrelies on a systemof
negotiatedchecksand balances to establishinternationalorder.It is thisnotion
of mixing empowerment with disempowerment,of hierarchywith mechanisms that check the advantages of preponderance, that is at the heart of
benign unipolarityand the conceptionof regional order thatfollows fromit.16
because of starkpower asymmetry,
but also because they view U.S. intentionsas benign,not as
exploitative or predatory.Were U.S. behavior to become predatory,its preponderance would
triggerthe formationof balancing coalitions,such as those formedagainst Germanyand Japanin
the 1930s.
14. See Ole Waever, "Integrationas Security,"in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., AtlanticSecurity:
Contending
Visions(New York:Council on ForeignRelationsPress, 1998); and PeterJ.Katzenstein,
"United Germanyin an IntegratingEurope," in Katzenstein,ed., TamedPower:Germanyin Europe
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1997).
15. Daniel Deudney,"The PhiladelphianSystem:Sovereignty,
ArmsControl,and Balance ofPower
in the American States-Union,circa 1787-1861,"International
Organization,
Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring
1995), pp. 191-228.
16. It is the power-checkingquality of benign unipolaritythat distinguishesit from its main
conceptual competitor-hegemony. According to hegemonic stabilitytheory,the strongerthe
hegemon and the more able it is to provide public goods, the more stable the order.See Robert

International
Security23:2 | 48

The power-constraintdevices that work togetherwith asymmetryto produce benign unipolaritytake two forms.First,core states erectinternalrules
and institutionsthat check theirexternalpower. Societal norms against coercive intervention,checks and balances among branches of government,and
constitutionallimitson the use of forceare examples. Second, core stateserect
externalrules and institutionsthat bind themselvesto other states.17 For example, the institutionsthat govern the Franco-Germancoalition,and the EU
more generally,check the power of individual states,establishmechanismsfor
collective decisionmakingand initiative,and promote the spread of regionwide interestsand identities.18
Keohane, AfterHegemnony
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984),pp. 31-32. In contrast,
benign unipolarityemerges not fromthe hegemon's impositionof order,but throughnegotiation
between the core and its surroundingperiphery.The resultis a hierarchicalorder that is more
multilateralin spiritand practicethan thatenvisaged in hegemonicstabilitytheory.Furthermore,
order emerges throughthe withholdingof power as well as its application. In this sense, and
will lead
contraryto hegemonicstabilitytheory,a weaker core and one thatexercisesself-restraint
to a more cohesive and durable regionalformationthan will a strongerand domineeringone. The
less preponderantand the more benign the core, the more it relies on bargains to establishorder
and the less fearfulsmaller states are of exploitationresultingfromgross power asymmetries.
The differencesbetween hegemonyand benign unipolarityhelp resolve a long-standingpuzzle:
why regional institutionsin Europe are farmore developed than in North America or East Asia.
If power asymmetryalone were the main determinantof institutionalizedregional order,the
reverse should be true. The United States and Japan have been more preponderantin their
respectiveregionsthan has been eitherGermanyor the Franco-Germancoalition.For measures of
the relativepreponderanceof the United States,Japan,and Germanyin theirrespectiveregions,
see JostephGrieco, "Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalizationin Western
Europe, East Asia, and theAmericas,"in Mansfieldand Milner,ThePoliticalEconomyofRegionalism,
pp. 173-175.
The notion of benign unipolarityexplains why regionalismin Europe is the most advanced.
Europe's less starkasymmetriesengendergreaterrelianceon consensual governance.If Europe is
to constructunipolarity,it must do so throughnegotiationbetween core and periphery.North
America's unipolaritycomes without tryingbecause of U.S. preponderance.As a result,institutionalized governanceis emergingonly gradually,as the United States recognizesthe advantages
associated with withholdingpower and playing by the rules of multilateralism.In Asia as well, a
combinationof stark asymmetriesand fear about whetherthe core will exercise its power in a
benign mannerhas inhibitedthe emergenceof institutionalizedregionalorder.Power asymmetry
must be pronounced enough to establish hierarchy,but not so pronounced that it inhibits a
consensual regional formation.For a similar argumentabout the extentto which less hegemony
may produce more regionalism,see Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter?The Reorganization
of the PacificPolitical Economy," WorldPolitics,Vol. 45, No. 4 (July1993), pp. 501-525.
17. I include both formsof power constraintin thenotionof self-bindingintroducedabove. Daniel
Deudney and JohnIkenberryuse the term"co-binding" to referexclusivelyto externalpowerconstraintdevices in which states bind one another.See Deudney and Ikenberry,"Structural
Liberalism: The Nature and Sources of Postwar WesternPolitical Order," ReviewofInternational
Studies(forthcoming).
devices thatmoderate externalrelationsamong EU membersare not as
18. The power-constraint
robust as those that govern internalpolitics within the United States,but they are based on the
same underlyinglogic. Indeed, were European integrationto deepen considerablyin the years
ahead and lead to a federal union, the power-constraintdevices that now operate among its

AfterPax Americana| 49

These power-checkingdevices endow contemporaryunipolar formations
with quite differentattributesthan theirhistoricalantecedents-empires. Today's cores will exercise influenceover theirperipheriesthroughmore subtle
and less coercivemeans thanin previous eras. Multilateralinstitutionsand the
indirectinfluenceof markets,capital flows,and informationhave replaced the
directintrusionsof colonial rule.In addition,cores will relymore on thespread
of shared values and identitiesto facilitategovernance and engender cohesion.19Furthermore,
both core and peripherywill be more cost-sensitivethan
in the past. Consensual participationmeans thatthe peripherycan exit if it is
no longer reaping benefitsor deems thatthe core is not honoringits commitment to self-binding.Core states too will be more cost-sensitivethan during
previous eras, tendingto see foreigncommitmentsas liabilitiesratherthan as
assets.20This strategicstinginessmeans thatcontemporaryunipolar formations
will not fall prey to overextension,as did many classical empires.21 On the
contrary,they will be exclusive groupings of the wealthy and soon-to-be
wealthy. Whereas imperial cores used to extend their reach over far-flung
possessions of littleeconomic or strategicvalue, today's have-nots are likely
simply to be ignored.
CONSTRUCTING

POLARITY

AND THE SOURCES

OF STRATEGIC

RESTRAINT

The notion of benign unipolarity requires two conceptual amendments to
conventionalaccounts of polarityand structure.The firststemsfromthe claim
that polarity can be willfullyconstructedrather than being an immutable
product of the distributionof power among nation-states.22
To call for the
individual states would be transformedinto constitutionalchecks operating within a single,
amalgamated polity
19. See G. JohnIkenberryand Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," InteriationalOrganization,
Vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 283-315.
20. Recenthistoryhas played an importantrole in bringingabout thisreevaluationof the benefits
of maintaining extensive external commitments.The colonial empires of the early twentieth
centurycollapsed in part because the cores became unable to support the wide range of commitments theyhad acquired. So too were both great powers of the late twentiethcenturychastened
by costlyand futileattemptsto maintainorder in theirrespectiveperipheries.
21. See Paul M. Kennedy,The Rise and Fall oftheGreatPowers(New York:Random House, 1987);
JackSnyder,MythsofEmpire(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1991); and Charles A. Kupchan,
The Vutlnerability
ofEmpire(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1994).
22. A mildly constructivistperspective informsthe analysis throughoutthis article. A starting
assumptionis thatinternationalstructurecan be shaped by willfulagency and practiceand is not
simplyan immutableproductof the distributionof materialpower among stateunits.Cooperative
interactionamong statescan shape identitiesand interests,in turncreatingshared understandings
of structurethat diverge fromtraditionalnotions of self-helpand competitiveanarchy.See AlexVol. 46, No. 2 (Spring
ander Wendt,"AnarchyIs What StatesMake of It,"International
Or-ganization,
1992), pp. 391-425. My analysis differsfromWendt'sin an importantrespect.Wendt is a structu-

International
Security23:2 | 50

constructionof regional unipolarityassumes that agents have considerable
controlover structure.This claim does not representas radical a departureas
it initiallyappears. History provides many examples of willful processes of
integrationand amalgamation that transformedstructure.The United States
once consistedof separate and competitivestateunits. It became a single pole
through federation.About one hundred years later,Germany overcame its
multipolaritythroughits own process of unification.Europe is now in the
It is not becoming a single pole, but the EU
midst of a similartransformation.
is endowing Europe with a unipolar structurethroughthe establishmentof a
preponderantFranco-Germancoalition-what I call a "pluralisticcore"-that
These instancesof geopogoverns in a hub-spoke patternover its periphery.23
liticalengineeringtake time,but theyhave succeeded in producing structural
transformation.
The second conceptual amendment stems fromthe claim that poles have
character and that the manner in which they exercise their power shapes
relationswith theirsmaller neighborsas well as with otherpoles. The attributes of internationalstructureare determined by polarity,but also by the
and competitivebehavior is not endemic.
characterof the poles. Self-regarding
Indeed, my analysis rests on the claim that strategicrestraintand the withholding of power are becoming embedded featuresof contemporaryinternational politics.Because a core's willingnessto engage in self-binding,not just
its preponderance,is centralto the peace-causing effectsof benign unipolarity,
justifyingthis claim is necessary to complete the logical foundation of my
argument.
Core states are exercisingtheir power in a more benign fashion than in
previous historicaleras forfivemain reasons.24First,changes in the sources of
ralistand takes sovereignstatesto be the key unit of analysis. Interactionbetween states can alter
how statesunderstandthe attributesof a given structure,but practicedoes not change structureas defined by the distributionof material power. In contrast,I am arguing that certainstatesFrance and Germany are prime examples-engage in practicesthat pool sovereigntyand, in so
doing, transformthe units thatconstitutestructure,not just the attributesof a given structure.
23. AlthoughFrance and Germanymaintainseparate nationalgovernmentsand capitals,theyare
and jointmilitaryforces)
engagingin practices(jointdecisionmaking,a single marketand currency,
that pool sovereignty,give the coalition attributesof unitarygovernance,and thereforeendow it
with aspects of constitutinga single pole. I am relyingon the notionof a pluralisticcore to capture
the type of political unit representedby the Franco-Germancoalition.
24. An intellectualtensionadmittedlyexistsbetween my claim thatstrategicrestraintis becoming
an embedded featureof internationalpoliticsand my insistenceon the need forstructuralsources
of stability.Why bother with constructingorder based on structuralhierarchyif the exercise of
strategicrestraintwill itselfmoderate competition?Structuralsources of stabilityfortwo reasons
remain importanteven in a world of benign states. First,although benign great powers refrain

AfterPax Americana| 51

state power have diminished the returnsto predatorybehavior. Technology,
information,and productivityhave replaced land and labor as the key determinants of wealth, making trade and investmentfar more effectivetools of
statecraftthan territorialconquest.25Nuclear weapons and the proliferationof
sophisticatedconventionalweapons also make conquest more difficult.Liberating wealth creation fromquestions of territorialcontrol enables core and
peripheryto pursue joint gains throughcooperative strategiesmore regularly
than during previous eras. In addition, economic and technologicaltransformation gives core statesconsiderable influenceover theirsmallerneighbors.26
In sum, core states can get what they want and thinkthey deserve without
resortingto overt formsof coercion.
Second, changes in prevailinginternationalnorms encourage benign behavior.Were a regionalpower to attemptto coerce its neighborsintoa hierarchical
order,both its victimsand extraregionalstates would resist.So too mightits
own population oppose such coercive behavior. Order that emerges through
consensus is thus likely to be cheaper and more durable than order that
emerges through coercion. Accordingly,cores face normative-and, conse-

frompredatorybehavior,theystillexpect the advantages, influence,and prestigethataccompany
superiority.To take seriouslythe notion of carvingout nonanarchicspace does not mean denying
thatpower stillmattersa great deal. Germany,forexample, exercisesself-restraint
in Europe and
works hard to embed the national state in a supranationalpoliticalspace, but nonethelessexpects
to be the EU's most influentialactor.To pretendotherwiseand resistthe hierarchythatdevolves
frompower asymmetrieswould only alienate major states and provide incentivesfor them to
divergefrombenignbehavior.Second, structuralsources of stabilityprovide insuranceagainst the
breakdown of unit-levelsources thatare more prone to unforeseenshock and rapid change. The
Concertof Europe, forexample, functionedsmoothlyas long as the governingregimesin its five
members adhered to agreed norms of behavior. The revolutionsof 1848, however,led to widespread domestic upheavals thatunderminedthe Concert,rapidlybringingcompetitivebalancing
back to a multipolarEurope. Had structuralsources of stabilityalso been operative,European
peace may well have weathered the unit-levelchanges that caused the Concert to unravel. See
Charles A. Kupchan and CliffordA. Kupchan, "Concerts,Collective Security,and the Future of
Europe," International
Security,Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161. On the revolutionsof
1848 and the end of the Concert,see pp. 142-143,n. 81.
25. See, forexample, Rosecrance,TheRise oftheTradingState;and Van Evera, "Primed forPeace,"
pp. 14-16. For a contraryview arguingthatconquest stillpays in the contemporaryera, see Peter
Liberman,Does ConquestPay? (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1996). For a critiqueof
Liberman's arguments,see Charles Kupchan's review of his book in AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 1008-1009.
26. Consider the effectof preparations for monetaryunion on the political economies of EU
member states or the extentto which the internationalcommunity'sinterventionin the Asian
economic crisis has affecteddomestic politics and business practices in the region. In addition,
peripheral states usually need to meet certain political criteriato gain access to contemporary
regional formations,inducing them to carryout domestic reforms.Consider the powerful effect
thatprospectivemembershipin the EU and NATO has had on reformin Central Europe.

International
Security23:2 | 52

quently,instrumental-incentivesto self-bindeven when preponderanceprovides them the option of resortingto coercive behavior.
Third, the spread of democracy makes more likely the benign exercise of
power. Cores ruled by democraticregimes tend to pursue moderate foreign
policies toward other democracies for both institutionaland normativereasons. On the institutionalside, the checksand balances associated withdemocracy constrainthe conduct of foreignpolicy and limit the resources that the
state allocates to foreignengagement. Open debate also tends to produce
centristpolicies. On the normativeside, democraciesdevelop a mutual respect
based on theirshared commitmentto the rule of law and consensual politics.
Conflicts of interestbetween them are thereforesettled through peaceful
means.27 In addition, common domestic norms nurture a shared sense of
community,helping to forgea transnationalspace in which the rules of selfhelp competitionno longer apply.
Fourth,ongoing processes of integrationare normalizingand institutionalizing self-bindingpractices.For example, pluralisticcores (cores thatconsistof
more than one state) produce an intrinsicbinding effectthatextends into the
core's relationshipwith its periphery.Sustainingthe coherenceof the FrancoGerman coalition requires bargaining and self-limitationon behalf of both
parties,which in turnmoderatethe influencethatthe coalitionwields over the
periphery.The EU as a whole, because it institutionalizespower-constraint
devices internationallyjust as a constitutiondoes so domestically,and because it promotes regionwide interestsand identities,reinforcesself-binding
practices.
Fifth,many of the world's leading regional powers have undergone moderThe political and social legacy of World War II
ating social transformations.
reinforcesself-bindingin Germanyand Japan.Societal aversion to war and a
commitmentto wielding influencethroughotherthanmilitarymeans continue
to limitthe scope of externalambitionin both countries.28
Even in the United
has not been subjected to the devastation of war since
States,whose territory
the nineteenthcentury,aversion to the use of forceand the potential loss of
liferuns strong.29

27. See Russett,GraspingtheDemocraticPeace; and Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics."
28. See Peter J.Katzenstein,CulturalNormsand National Security:Police and Militaryin Postwar
Japan(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1996); and Thomas U. Berger,"Norms, Identity,and
National Security,"in PeterJ.Katzenstein,ed., The CultureofNationalSecurity:Normsand Identity
in WorldPolitics(New York:Columbia UniversityPress, 1996), pp. 317-356.
29. JohnMueller argues in RetreatfromDoomsdaythat this social transformation
has been driven
by moral change; war has become unthinkable.Edward Luttwakblames decliningbirthratesand

AfterPax Americana| 53

RELATIONS

BETWEEN

BENIGN

POLES

Even if benign unipolaritypromotes regional order in the manner outlined
above, the formationof unipolar regionswould be undesirableif the resultant
blocs ended up in a securitycompetitionwith one another.My prescription
would then constitutea recipe for triggeringconflictamong regional behemoths, not for securing global stability.For four reasons, however, benign
unipolaritywould make for more peaceful relationsnot just within regions,
but also between them.
First,preciselybecause benign unipolar formationsare instrumentsformanaging ratherthan accumulating power, they would dampen, not stimulate,
interregionalrivalry.The self-bindingand consensual bargainingthatconstrain
the exercise of power within regions would also operate between regions;
power that is checked at the regional level will be similarlychecked at the
extraregionallevel. Benign regional formationsby theirverynatureturntheir
energies inward ratherthan outward, seeking to hold power at bay, not to
project it. The European Union provides an excellentillustration.The EU is
oftencriticizedforits failureto forgea common defensepolicy and its unwillingness to assume a greaterdefense role beyond its boundaries, but the purpose of the EU is to manage power within,not outside, Europe. Accordingly,
it has been designed with a host of checks and balances that moderate competitivebehavior among its members and that constrainits abilityto project
power externally.That the EU is inwardlyfocused is evidence thatits experimentin geopoliticalengineeringis workingwell. Consensual unipolar formations are-and would be seen by actors in other regions as-providers of
securityand stability,not blocs with predatoryintent.30
Second, interregionalrelationswould benefitfromthe deeper intraregional
integrationassociated with benign unipolarity.Relations between regions
would be moderatedbecause relationswithinthemwould be cooperativeand
consensual. Consider the cases of Europe and East Asia. European integration
has to some extentcome at the expense of Europe's external ties,31but the

the resultantreluctanceto lose childrenin battleas a major factorchangingattitudestoward war.
Vol. 73, No. 4 (July/August1994),
See Luttwak "Where Are the Great Powers?" ForeignAffairs,
pp. 23-28.
towardtheprospectofEU enlargementto its staunchopposition
30. Compare Russia's indifference
to NATO enlargement.Despite the aggregateeconomic and militarypower of EU memberstates,
Russia sees the EU as a benign formationthat does not threatenits security.How regional
groupingsperceive the characterof each other'spower will be farmore importantthan capability
itselfin determiningthe tenorof interregionalrelations.
31. The Common AgriculturalPolicy and other tariffand nontariffbarriershave discriminated
against extraregionalstates,but they have been centralto the political deals struckin order to

Security23:2 | 54
International

internalpeace and stabilitythatintegrationhas engendered have contributed
to Europe's abilityto sustain cooperative relationswith outside powers. As a
result, Europe is set to enjoy internal stabilityand hence cordial external
relationseven as the United Statesretractstheprotectiveumbrellathatinitially
made possible European integration.In contrast,East Asia has been well
integratedinto the global economy,but in a way that has stunted its own
politicalintegration.Ongoing intraregionalrivalriesand competitivejockeying
complicateits relationswith outside powers. Absent America's protectiveumbrella, these rivalrieswould likely intensify,
embroilingEast Asia in conflict
and jeopardizing its engagementwith otherregions.Puttingregional integration beforeglobal integrationwill help constructbenign unipolarityin each of
the world's threemain areas of militaryand industrialpower, in turnlaying
the groundworkforpeaceful interregionalrelations.32
Third, the constraintson political centralizationinherentin a unipolar regional formationwould check the concentrationof power under a single
authority,
decreasingthelikelihoodthatit would evolve intoa unitaryregional
behemoth. Benign regional formationsare more than groupings of national
stateseach of which retainsthe traditionalprerogativesof sovereignty,
but less
than federationsthat centralize governance and sublimate the autonomy of
theirconstituentunits. And although these formationshave a nascent social
characterthat is rooted in a sense of communityand shared identity,this
deepen integrationand create a unipolar structure.Intraregionaltrade as a percentage of total
trade is higherin Europe than in North America and East Asia. As of 1990, intraregionalexports
as a percentageof totalexportsstood at roughly60 percentforEurope and roughly40 percentfor
North America and East Asia. See Grieco, "SystemicSources of Variation,"p. 172. Interestingly,
the United States duringthe earlypost-WorldWar II years did not objectto European protectionism, preciselybecause Washingtonappreciated the geopolitical significanceof fosteringregional
integration.See Frankel,RegionalTradingBlocs,p. 5.
32. My argumentrestson the assumptionthatan increase in commercialrivalrybetween regions
would not result in securitycompetition.This assumption in turn rests on the hypothesisthat
commercialrivalriesbecome securityrivalriesonly when forotherreasons the partiescome to see
each other as geopolitical rivals. For example, economic competitionbetween Britainand the
United States could today lead to a securitydilemma only if forreasons otherthan commercial
rivalrythe two parties no longer held benign images of each other.A perceptionof threatand
malign intentis necessaryto transformeconomic competitioninto strategicrivalry.How commercial rivalriesevolve into violent conflicthas received insufficient
attentionin the scholarlyliterature.For thoughtfulanalysis of one case study and initialhypotheses,see JackLevy and Salvatore
Ali, "From CommercialCompetitionto StrategicRivalryto War: The Rise of Anglo-DutchRivalry,
1609-1652,"in Paul Diehl, ed., TheDynamicsofEnduringRivalries(Champaign: Universityof Illinois
Press, 1988), pp. 29-63. The argumentthatbenign states tend to pursue absolute, as opposed to
relative,gains with each otheris of directrelevancehere. See Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and
the Patternof InternationalCooperation,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReviezv,
Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726.

AfterPax Americana155

identitycoexists with distinctculturaland linguisticdifferencesthatserve as
barriersto centralizationand the transferof political loyaltiesto an authority
beyond thenation-state.33
Even as regionsevolve intounipolar structures,
they
are not likely to amalgamate into single poles of power under a central
authority.34
Finally,consensual regionalformationsare unlikelyto evolve into predatory
behemothsbecause theywould unravel fromwithin if they sought to do so.
For reasons just outlined, the separate national units in regional formations
will retain a significantdegree of autonomy and will not amalgamate into a
unitaryfederalstructure.Accordingly,ifa core statewere to develop predatory
ambitionand pursue aggressive behavior,its immediate neighborswould be
the most threatened.The pursuit of such ambitionand the explicitamassing
of power it would entail would thus constitutea violation of the consensual
bargain at the heart of benign unipolarity.Were France, for example, to act
upon its rhetoricand seek to turn the EU into a global imperial power,
Germanyitselfand France's smallerneighborswould be the firstto resist.The
returnof geopolitical ambitionto Europe would thereforebe far more likely
to triggerintra-Europeanbalancing and the end of the Franco-Germancoalition than it would the emergence of the EU as a global power. Regional
multipolarity,
not an aggressive regional unipole, would be the result.

TheRiseofBenignUnipolarity
in NorthAmerica,
Europe,
and EastAsia
My aim in this section is to demonstratethatbenign unipolarityis not just a
theoreticalconstruct,but a geopolitical formationthat holds considerable
promiseof becoming a reality.I provide evidence thatbenignunipolar regions
are in fact taking shape and are having a powerful impact on the emerging
internationalorder.

33. For discussion of ascriptive,linguistic,and cultural barriers to amalgamation, see Ernest
Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983), pp. 64-73.
34. As Fareed Zakaria has recentlydocumented, the United States did not pursue ambitious
external policies until the locus of authorityshiftedfrom the individual states to the federal
governmentand fromCongress to the executive branch. See Zakaria, From Wealthto Power:The
Unusual OriginsofAmerica'sWorldRole (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1998). Even
though regional blocs would contain enormous power capabilities, their decentralized nature
would limittheirabilityto projectpower externally.In thisrespect,the federalaspirationscoming
from some quarters in Europe~should be discouraged because their fulfillmentcould trigger
externalambitionand fosterinterregionalsecuritycompetition.

International
Security23:2 | 56

NORTH

AMERICA

North America has enjoyed a relativelypeaceful centuryand has been spared
the greathegemonicwars thatcost so many lives in Europe and East Asia. The
North America has been unipolar. Its major states
reason is straightforward:
have not foughtfor supremacy because American preponderance naturally
establishesa regionalhierarchy.The United States has throughoutthe century
enjoyed an uncontestedadvantage in economic and militarypower. Today U.S.
gross domestic product (GDP) is eight times that of Canada and Mexico
combined,while U.S. militaryexpenditureis twenty-seventimesthatof its two
neighbors.35Mexico and Canada send some 70 percentof theirexportsto the
United States, while the United States sends in returnonly 25 percentof its
exports.36The power of the U.S. marketand the threator realityof military
interventionhave long ensured thatNorthAmerica,CentralAmerica,and the
Caribbean fallwithinAmerica's sphere of militaryand economic dominance.37
That unipolaritycomes so easily to NorthAmericahas in factworked against
the establishmentof more formalinstitutionsof regional governance.Instead,
U.S. preponderance creates a de facto core and a surroundingperiphery.A
hub-spoke patternof intraregionalrelationshas evolved largely throughthe
operationof the marketand America's unilateralefforts-includingdirectand
indirectmilitaryintervention-to create a securityenvironmentto its liking.38
Since the mid-1980s,order based on de factopower asymmetrieshas given
way to a regional formationexhibitingthe de jure characteristicsof benign
unipolarity.39
The NorthAmericanFree Trade Agreement(NAFTA) institutionalized a regional order based on consensual bargaining between core and
35. InternationalInstitutefor StrategicStudies (IISS), The MilitaryBalance,1997-1998 (London:
OxfordUniversityPress, 1997), pp. 18, 37, 221. In 1990 U.S. GDP was fivetimesthatof all of Latin
America combined. See Peter Smith,TalonsoftheEagle: Dynamicsof U.S.-LatinAmericanRelations
(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1996), p. 224.
36. Andrew Wyatt-Walter,
"Regionalism,Globalization,and World Economic Order," in Fawcett
and Hurrell,Regionalistn
in WorldPolitics,p. 101.
37. For a succinctoverview of the historyof Americaninvolvementin Centraland South America,
see Smith,TalonsoftheEagle.
38. Steady increases in intraregionalflows of trade and investmentwere largely market-driven,
with institutionsfollowingfromand not precedinghigh levels of economic interdependence.See
Albert Fishlow and Stephan Haggard, "The United States and the Regionalizationof the World
Economy" (Paris: OrganizationforEconomic Cooperation and Development, 1992), pp. 17, 32.
39. The United States to some degree engaged in the quantitativeand qualitative componentsof
self-bindingwell beforethe 1980s. Had it not, its preponderancewould likelyhave triggeredfar
more balancing in the periphery.It was not until the 1980s, however,that the United States also
began to practice procedural self-binding-thatis, to prefermultilateralto unilateral initiative.
Americanpower was thus exercisedin a relativelybenign manner(with some notable exceptions)
well beforethe 1980s,but became more benign with the shifttoward regional multilateralism.

AfterPax Americana| 57

peripheryand a new Americanwillingnessto subjectthe exerciseof its power
to a multilateralframework.40
The original idea for,and impetus behind, the
agreementcame fromCanada and Mexico. Both countriescould do nothingto
change the asymmetriesin theirrelationshipwith the United States,but they
could make a deal to subject U.S. policy to the constraintsof a multilateral
framework.As Stephan Haggard and AlbertFishlow put it,NAFTA reflected
"the efforts
by weaker countriesto bind the United Statesto clear rules."'41The
agreementin many respects representsthe periphery'sdecision to structure
and controlde facto power asymmetriesby design, ratherthan to let them
operate by default.42
The United States was attractedto the deal in part foreconomic reasons: to
gain market access and cheaper labor and to use the threatof hemispheric
regionalismto encourage Japanand Europe to move forwardon the Uruguay
Round trade negotiations.43
Washingtonalso used NAFTA to pursue a host of
order-relatedobjectives.NAFTA was to lock in politicaland economic reforms
in Mexico, strengthenliberalpoliticalforcesby widening the middle class, and
attractforeigncapital to Mexico, which would bolster the economy and promote political stability.44
Economic growthand political reformwould in turn
help stem the tide of illegal immigrationand facilitateeffortsto limit drug
The agreementalso contains measures forenvironmentalcleanup
trafficking.
and protection.
The United States was thus using a host of subtle formsof penetrationto
promote stabilityin its periphery.45
Looking outward fromthe core, NAFTA
40. For discussion of the evolutionof consensual strainsin U.S. policy,see Augusto Varas, "From
Coercion to Partnership:A New Paradigm forSecurityCooperation in the WesternHemisphere,"
in JonathanHartlyn,Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, eds., The UnlitedStatesand LatinAmnerica
in the1990s:BeyondtheCold War(Chapel Hill: Universityof NorthCarolina Press,1993), pp. 46-63.
41. Fishlow and Haggard, "The United States and the Regionalization of the World Economy,"
pp. 8, 23.
42. Canada and Mexico have not always dealt with U.S. preponderanceby willinglysubmitting
to Americanpower and seeking to modifyits conduct. During the Cold War,in part because U.S.
attentionand power were concentratedelsewhere,Canada in particularattemptedto mix balancing and bandwagoning and to resistU.S. influenceby developing linkages to extraregionalstates
and multilateralforums.NAFTA representsa considered shiftto a policy of bandwagoning in
which both Canada and Mexico have decided to seek leverage over U.S. power ratherthan to
resistit. See Andrew Hurrell,"Regionalism in the Americas,"in Fawcettand Hurrell,Regionialism
in Wor-ld
Politics,pp. 269-273.
43. Wyatt-Walter,
"Regionalism,Globalization,and World Economic Order,"p. 85.
44. For a concise summaryof the motivationsbehind NAFTA, see Hurrell,"Regionalism in the
Americas," pp. 269-273; and Smith,TalonsoftheEagle,pp. 245-260.
45. The Clinton administration'srescue of the plunging peso in 1994-95,forexample, resultedin
an extraordinarydegree of Americaninterventionin the Mexican economy.In returnforU.S. and

International
Security23:2 | 58

representedmuch more than a trade agreementand was to a considerable
extenta vehicle forrecastingMexico's political economy in America's image.
As Andrew Hurrell remarks,institutionalizedregionalismin North America
is "part of a broader rethinkingof relations. . . which has importantstrategic
and geopolitical implications."46In effect,NAFTA resultedfroma deal struck
between a peripherylooking to tame and moderate the behavior of the core
and a core looking to enhance its abilityto shape regionalorder.47And despite
the core's reluctanceto extend this bargain furthersouth-Congress denied
PresidentBill Clinton fast-tracknegotiatingauthorityin 1997-other states in
the Americas are pressingforentryinto the club.
EUROPE

The Napoleonic Wars,the
Europe has long sufferedthe effectsofmultipolarity.
Crimean War,the wars of German unification,and the two world wars are all
testimonyto the destructivepotential of rivalryamong proximate poles of
power. Since 1945 Europe has pursued a novel solution to its structuralinstability:replacingmultipolaritywith unipolarity.Most Europeans would object
to the notion that the EU is an instrumentforendowing Europe with unipolarity;conventionalwisdom holds that integrationis meant to banish power
politics fromthe continent,not recast it. Nevertheless,European integration
has fromthe outset had potentgeopoliticalobjectives.In the words of Robert
Schuman,a foundingfatherof European integration,"Because Europe was not
united, we have had war.... The action to be taken must firstof all concern
France and Germany.This proposal [fora coal and steel community]will create
the firstconcretefoundationfora European federationwhich is so indispensable for the preservationof peace."48 Europe's smaller powers came to welInternationalMonetaryFund assistance,Mexico was obligated to deposit its oil exportrevenue at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and to introducea stabilizationplan that covered fiscal
and monetarypolicy,banking reform,and social programs.
46. Hurrell,"Regionalism in the Americas,"p. 272.
47. Regionalism in North America lacks the explicitidentity-building
agenda found in Europe.
The scope and characterof Americanpreponderancein partexplains why.In lightof the powerful
cultural magnetismof the United States, assertinga distinctiveidentityand preservingcultural
autonomyremainissues of considerablepoliticalsaliencyin both Canada and Mexico. Despite the
fear of America's "cultural imperialism"and the absence of more overt identity-building
instruments,surveydata reveal thattheattitudesof Americans,Mexicans,and Canadians are converging
around a set of core values. See Ronald L. Inglehart,Neil Nevitte,and Miguel Basanfez,TheNorth
AmericanTrajectory:
and PoliticalTiesamongtheUnitedStates,Canada,and Mexico
Cultural,Econiomic,
(New York:Aldine de Gruyter,1996).
48. Schuman quoted in GregoryF Treverton,
and theFutureofEurope(Princeton,
America,Germany,
N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1992), p. 104. Even scholars who have focused primarilyon the
economic implicationsof the EU acknowledge that the "overridingmotivationbehind the foun-

AfterPax Americana| 59

come this effortto renderbenign the continent'spower center,even if participation in Europe meant enteringa regional order craftedprincipallyby the
Franco-Germancoalition.
The United States played a centralrole in enabling Europe to pursue unipolarity.America's militarypresence essentiallytook securityissues offthe European agenda, buying time foreconomic and politicalintegrationto proceed.49
The process of integrationhas produced an effectiveunipolaritythat has
succeeded not only in eliminatingcompetitivebalancing among Europe's major powers; the EU also exertsa powerfulcentripetalforceacross the continent,
withmost currentmemberseager to participatein the innercircleof monetary
union and many of Europe's new democracies waiting impatientlyforadmission to the club.
Constructed,as opposed to natural,unipolarity,and a pluralisticratherthan
an amalgamated core, endow Europe with a center that has quite different
attributesthan that of North America. Although more unwieldy than an
amalgamated core, a pluralisticcore encourages consensual formsof politics
because the pulling and hauling of coalition management act as an internal
check and make negotiationand compromisea centralfeatureof governance.
Compromise within the core encourages compromisebetween the core and
the periphery.Core self-bindingis also far more deeply ingrained in societal
attitudesin Germany than it is in the United States. Germany is as averse to
unilateralaction as the United States is fond of it. A large part of the reason is
the extentto which Germanyhas come to equate its own interestsand identity
with those of a broader European construction.In the words of Peter Katzenstein,German "interests,pursued throughpower and bargaining,were fundamentallyshaped by the institutionalcontextof Europe and the Europeanization of the identityof the German state."50
The power asymmetrybetween core and peripheryin Europe is also less
starkthan it is in North America. The GDP of the Franco-Germancoalition is
about 80 percent of the GDP of all other EU members combined. FrancoGerman defense spending representsroughly85 percentof that of all other
dation of the European Economic Communitywas to bind Germanyto France so thattherewould
never be a repeat of the threewars thattheyhad foughtover the precedingcentury."See Frankel,
RegionalTradingBlocs,p. 241.
49. Some analysts contend thatthe process of integrationremains dependent on a U.S. presence
and that the EU would be unable to sustain its political coherencewere America's strategicrole
on the continentto wane. See JosephJoffe,"Europe's American Pacifier,"ForeignPolicy,No. 54
(Spring 1984), pp. 64-82; and Robert Art, "Why WesternEurope Needs the United States and
NATO," PoliticalScienceQuarterly,
Vol. 111,No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39.
50. Katzenstein,"United Germanyin an IntegratingEurope," p. 15.

International
Security23:2 | 60

EU memberscombined.51 Furthermore,
asymmetriesin defense capabilityare
temperedby Germany'scontinued reluctanceto assume defense responsibilities commensuratewith its size because of the legacy of World War II and
because America's presence in Europe obviates the need fora greaterGerman
role. Again, less starkasymmetryworks to the advantage of regionalcohesion.
The core does not have sufficient
preponderanceto relyon unilateralinitiative
in turnreinand thusdepends more heavilyon compromisewiththeperiphery,
forcingthe consensual bargain at the heartof Europe's constructedunipolarity.
Europe's unipolar structureis reflectedin its patternsof governance.Despite
formalinstitutionsthat seek to diffuseauthorityacross member states,most
decisions within the EU arise from agreements struckbetween France and
Germany.The union's major initiatives-the single market,monetaryunion,
and enlargement-have emanated primarilyfromParis and Bonn, not from
other European capitals or fromthe EU bureaucracyin Brussels.52This core
draws the peripherytoward the centerthroughboth inducement(the rewards
of inclusion) and threat(the punishmentof exclusion).
The prospectof materialgain has ostensiblybeen the EU's drivingforce,but
geopoliticalobjectiveslie just beneath the surface.Indeed, the evolution of the
EU is to a large extentthe storyofconsensual bargainingamong memberstates
over the constructionof benign unipolarity.Constitutionalizedself-bindingin
Germany,the checksand balances intrinsicto theFranco-Germancoalition,the
institutionaldiffusionof power across member states-these are all mechanisntsthat serve to mix empowermentand disempowerment,to create order
but also throughthe core's willingnessto reduce
throughpower asymmetry,
the benefitsof preponderanceand engage in consensual bargaining.
European monetaryunion (EMU) is only the most recentexample. Germany
will voluntarilybind its power by handing over controlof its monetarypolicy
to a supranationalauthoritythatgoverns throughconsensus and thatis politically independent.53Other European stateswill have greaterinput into monetaryissues, and the euro, not the deutsche mark,will be Europe's dominant
51. IISS, TheMilitaryBalance,1997-1998,pp. 46-100.
52. Katzenstein,"United Germanyin an IntegratingEurope," pp. 26-27, 42-43. On decisionmaking and the evolutionof EU institutions,
see RobertKeohane and StanleyHoffmann,eds., TheNew
EuropeanConmmunity:
Decisionmaking
and Institutional
Change(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1991);
Alberta Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics:
Institutions
and Policymaking
in the "New" EuropeanCommunity
(Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution,1992); and Andrew Moravcsik, ed., Centralizationor
Fragmentation?:
Europe beforethe Challengesof Deepening,Diversity,and Democracy(New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998).
53. On European monetary union, see Peter Kenen, Economicand MonetaryUnion in Europe
Frieden,
(Cambridge,U.K.: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1995); and BarryEichengreenand Jeffrey
eds., ThePoliticalEconomyofEuropeanMonetaryUnification
(Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

AfterPax Americana| 61

currency.At the same time,however,Germanyis effectively
exportingits own
monetary policy to its neighbors; ultimately,the EU will have a political
economy craftedin Germany'simage. Moreover,the primaryimpetus behind
EMU came not fromministriesof financeor firmsdoing business in Europe,
but frompoliticiansconcernedabout the geopoliticalstructureofEurope. EMU
is firstand foremostabout embedding the German state inside a broader
Europe and preventing the return of national rivalries, not about wealth
creation. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl has stated, "In reality,the policy of
European integrationcomes down to the question of whetherwe have war or
peace in the twenty-first
century."54
Althoughthe economicbenefitsto smaller
powers remain unclear,they play along because the deal deepens a unipolar
structurethat moderates and renders more benign the behavior of Europe's
power center.55
Europe exhibitsmany of the attributesof a benign unipolar formation.The
core's influenceover theperipheryoperates throughformalinstitutionsas well
as a host of subtle mechanisms-the market,the allure of entryinto Europe's
dominant political formation,and the propagation of a sense of community
and common identity.56
At the same time,linguisticand cultural differences
constitutenaturalbarriersto centralizationand politicalamalgamation,leaving
the EU straddlingthe national and supranational realms. Europe's core also
exhibits the cost sensitivityand strategicrestraintthat are characteristicof
benign unipolarity.The EU's inabilityto make progressin forginga common
foreignand securitypolicy and its failed effortsto address on its own the war
in Bosnia illustratethat the union suffersmore fromthe underprovisionof
externalengagementthan fromthe overprovisionand overcommitmentcharacteristicof previous eras.57 Finally,the EU promises to remain a club forthe
54. Helmut Kohl, speech at the Universityof Louvain, Belgium,February1, 1996,as cited in "Kohl
Issues New Warningto Britainover EU Reform,"Agence France-Presse,February2, 1996. On the
motivationsbehind monetary union, see also Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary
Politics and Maastricht,"InternationzalOrganization,Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-40; and Joseph
Grieco, "State Interestsand InternationalRule Trajectories:A Neorealist Interpretationof the
MaastrichtTreatyand European Economic and MonetaryUnion," SecurityStudies,Vol. 5, No. 3
(Spring 1996), pp. 176-222.
55. For an analysis suggesting that poorer economies in Europe's south do not stand to benefit
economicallyfrommonetaryunion, see ErikJones,"Economic and MonetaryUnion: Playingwith
or Fragmentation?;
and Lloyd Gruber,"Power Politicsand the
Money,"in Moravcsik,Centralization
Transformation
of European MonetaryRelations,"paper presentedat the annual meetingof the
American PoliticalScience Association,San Francisco,August 1996.
56. The EU has deployed a host of community-building
mechanisms,includinga flag and soon a
common currency,cultural,educational,and media programs,and a European parliament.
57. The incorporationofFranceas partofa pluralisticEuropean power centerfacilitatesGermany's
abilityto be an underproviderof security.Germanyand France have arrivedat a division of labor
in which Bonn serves as the engine behind economic integrationwhile Paris focuses more on

Security23:2 | 62
International

excludingthe poorer statesto Europe's south
wealthyand soon-to-be-wealthy,
and east.58
EAST ASIA

East Asia today resembles Europe prior to its successful experimentwith
constructedunipolarity.59Suspicion and political cleavage still characterize
relations among the area's major powers. Many East Asian states are in the
midstof rapid politicaland economic change,producingdifferencesin domestic structureand wide disparitiesin growthrates across the region-the same
A key difference,
volatile mix thattriggeredwar in Europe twice thiscentury.60
however,distinguishestoday's East Asia fromyesterday'sEurope: a peacetime
Americanpresence.Whereas Europe fellprey to destructiverivalryduring its
era of multipolarity,
America'srole as an extraregionalbalancer keeps in check
the competitivejockeyingthatmightotherwisetriggerwar in East Asia.
Although America's presence in East Asia is indispensable, the particular
nature of U.S. engagement also has high costs: it impedes the intraregional
political-military
issues. France's force-projection
capabilities,its willingnessto use them,and its
nuclear weapons make it well suited to thisrole. Nevertheless,France demonstratesmore interest
in flexingits muscles in formercolonial areas in the Middle East and Africathan in working to
deepen the EU's abilityto manage securitywithinEurope. The EU's power centerthus promises
to continueits strategicstinginessand to remainreluctantto take on increased commitments.See
Philip H. Gordon, "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy," InternationalSecurity,Vol. 22, No. 3
(Winter1997/98),pp. 74-100.
58. Although the EU has formalizedits economic relationshipwith Turkeyand has developed a
set of informalties with states in North Africaand the Middle East, these states are not likely
candidates formembership.
59. Japan'seconomic preponderancehas in recentdecades endowed Asia with aspects of unipolarity.In 1990 Japan's GDP representedover 70 percent of East Asia's total GDP. See Grieco,
"Systemic Sources of Variation," p. 174. Japan's economic preponderance does not, however,
produce effectiveregional unipolarityforthreereasons. First,Japan does not maintaina military
establishmentcommensuratewith its economic capabilityand in factshuns regionalleadership in
the securityrealm. It relies almost entirelyon the United States to manage regional security.
Second, the legacy of World War II and the absence of reconciliationwith formeradversaries,
including China, mean that Japan is not viewed as a benign power within the region. Japan's
commitmentto self-bindingthereforedoes not have the same reassuring effectas Germany's.
Accordingly,were Japan to pursue a more ambitious regional role, its neighbors would likely
engage in balancing ratherthan bandwagoning. Third,China's rise and the absence of a SinoJapanese coalition increasinglydilute Japan's economic predominance.On China's growing economic power and its effecton regionalpatternsof influence,see Mark Selden, "China, Japan,and
the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995," in Katzensteinand Shiraishi,Network
Power,pp. 306-340.
60. For discussion of the potentialsources of instabilityin East Asia, see Aaron L. Friedberg,"Ripe
Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter
forRivalry:ProspectsforPeace in a MultipolarAsia," International
Security,
1993/94),pp. 5-33; and RichardK. Betts,"Wealth,Power,and Instability:East Asia and the United
Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter1993/94),pp. 34-77.
States afterthe Cold War,"International
Security,

AfterPax Americana| 63

integrationessential to long-termstability.American might and diplomacy
prevent conflict,but they do so by keeping apart the parties that must ultimatelylearn to live comfortablyalongside each otherifregional stabilityis to
endure. A comparison with Europe is again instructive.Throughoutthe Cold
War,Europe took advantage of the securityprovided by America's protective
umbrellato redresstheinstabilityintrinsicto itsmultipolarstructure.Germany
addressed its darkerpast and sought reconciliationwith its neighbors.Europe
integrateditselfinternallyat the same time that it was integratedinto the
Atlanticcommunity.
In contrast,Asia has not takenadvantage of the peace affordedby America's
presence to pursue its own political integration.61 Individual countrieshave
bilateral securityalliances with the United States, but not with each other.62
Indeed, Washingtonhas generally discouraged regional forums that do not
include the United States. Furthermore,Japan's unwillingnessto confrontits
behavior during World War II and to seek reconciliationwith its former
adversaries continues to stand in the way of more cooperative intraregional
relations. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum has formalized an
agenda foreconomicintegrationin theAsia Pacificregion,but thedrivingforce
behind APEC is the United States,again makingorderin East Asia dependent
on an extraregionalactor.This arrangementmay be good forthe international
economy because it encourages open trade across the Pacific.It may also be
good for the United States because it enhances American influence in the
Pacific region. It is bad for East Asia in the long run, however, because it
impedes the consolidationof a hierarchicalregionalordercapable of providing
stabilityin the aftermathof American hegemony.63
61. Peter Katzensteincontendsthatregional integrationi
in Asia has proceeded much furtherthan
meets the eye; the absence of visible formsof interstatecooperationis in part a product of social
and political norms that favor informalpolitical and economic networks over European-style
institutions.
See "Introduction:Asian Regionalismin ComparativePerspective,"in Katzensteinand
Shiraishi,Netzvork
Pouwer,pp. 1-44. I agree withKatzensteinthatstate-society
relationsand political
norms in East Asia are quite differentfromthose in Europe. Regional integrationin East Asia
thereforefollows its own path and would likelybe less institutionalizedthan in Europe even if
furtheralong. But I maintainthat political integrationin the region is still at a very low level in
relative terms,largelybecause of tensions and rivalriesamong East Asia's major states and the
extentto which the United States remainsthe main conduit forcontactamong them.
62. ASEAN is a clear exception,but it does not include, and indeed was formedin partto balance
against,the region's major powers.
63. It is of course impossible to prove the counterfactual:that regional integrationin East Asia
would have proceeded much furtherif the United States had not discouraged it and insisted on
creatinga hub-spokepatternof relationswith Washingtonat the center.Available evidence makes
clear,however,thatAmerican opposition played a significantrole in dissuading Japan and other
regional states frompursuing Asia-only multilateralforums.On the evolution of this hub-spoke

International
Security23:2 | 64

If the benign unipolaritythat has brought peace to North America and
Europe is to emerge in East Asia, the region must focus on its own internal
integration,not on its integrationinto an American-ledglobal order.The first
step would be the consolidation of a Sino-Japanesecoalition. Were a SinoJapanese power centerto cohere, it would enjoy uncontestedpreponderance
in East Asia. The combined GDP of China and Japan is today close to three
times that of all other East Asian states. Defense expendituresin Japan and
China amount to 1.4 times what other regional states combined spend on
defense.64These asymmetrieswill only increase in coming years as Chinese
economic and militarygrowth continues. Although a distant prospect, the
formationof a pluralisticpower center of China and Japan is the essential
As long as balancstartingpoint forconstructinga stable regional hierarchy.65
ing ratherthan consensual bargainingcharacterizesthe relationshipbetween
East Asia's two most powerfulstates,a cooperativeregional orderwill remain
out of reach.66
Inasmuch as economic integrationlaid the foundationforEurope's political
integration,East Asia is beginningto head in the rightdirection.Intraregional
economic integrationincreased dramaticallyafterthe marked appreciationof
theyen in themid-1980s,givingrise to a hub-spokepatternof tradeand capital
flows with Japan at the center.67
Unlike in Europe, however,political integrapatternof securityrelationsand Washington'seffortsto maintainit, see Bruce Cumings, "Japan
Century,"pp. 136-168,and Susume Yamakage, "Japan's
and NortheastAsia into the Twenty-first
National Securityand Asia-Pacific'sRegional Institutionsin the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 275-305,
both in Katzensteinand Shiraishi,NetworkPower;Frankel,RegionalTradingBlocs,pp. 266-267; and
Edward Lincoln,Japan'sNew GlobalRole (Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1993), pp. 186191. For evidence thatfearof U.S. disengagementleads to greatercooperationbetweenJapan and
Secuirity
Triangle
DespiteAntagonism:The ULitedStates-Korea-Japani
Korea, see VictorCha, Alignmenet
(Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversityPress, forthcoming).
64. Data fromIISS, TheMilitaryBalance,1997-1998,pp. 173-198. I included in these comparisons
all Asian members of APEC, including Australia and New Zealand. Hong Kong's GDP was
counted as part of China's, while Taiwan's GDP and defense spending were included as part of
the aggregate periphery.
65. I ask skepticalreadersto thinkback to 1945 and question how likelyit thenseemed thatFrance
and Germany would forma coalition that would become the core of a peaceful and integrated
Europe. To be sure,France and Germanybenefitedfromconditionsnot presentin Asia: a common
externalthreatand similarlevels of economic and political development.Nevertheless,as China
continues to modernize,its economy and domestic political environmentare likelyto follow the
same trajectoryas other developing states in East Asia. Moreover, as the Concert of Europe
demonstrated,similarityof domestic regime type is not necessary for great power cooperation.
while Prussia, Russia, and Austria
Britainand France were developing parliamentaryinstitutions,
were staunch defendersof monarchy.
66. See Susan Shirk,"Asia-PacificRegional Security:Balance of Power or Concertof Powers?" in
Lake and Morgan,RegionalOrders,pp. 245-270.
67. On the degree to which, and the mechanismsthroughwhich, intraregionaltrade and investment flows have positioned Japan at the centerof a regional economy,see Frankel and Kahler,

AfterPax Americana| 65

tion has not followed fromdeeper economic integration.Increasingtrade and
investmentwithinEast Asia were driven principallyby the marketand proximity;a multilateralsystemof management(APEC) followedfrom,ratherthan
preceded, de facto integration.68
Some members of APEC have attemptedto
institutionalizetheforumand to expand the scope of its dialogue beyond trade
liberalizationto include political and securityissues,69but effortsto put securitymatterson its agenda have thus farbeen futile.The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have had more
success in addressing securityissues.70They have, however,focused primarily
on resolvingdisputes among Asia's smallerstatesand on pursuingconfidencebuilding measures,not on forginga cooperativesecurityregimeforthe region
as a whole. And the recent economic turmoil in East Asia has distracted
attentionfromthe securityagenda.
The main obstacle to deeper political integrationis thatbalancing continues
to predominateover bandwagoning, thus preventingboth intracoreand coreperipherycohesion. It is the quality of power, not the quantity,that is the
problem.The asymmetriesnecessaryto constructa hierarchicalorderexist,but
statesin the regionare not yetconfidentthatpower asymmetrieswill manifest
themselves in a benign manner and that a regional order, if one were to
emerge,would be consensual. America's presence holds more overt formsof
balancing and competitionin abeyance, but it does not repair political and
ideological cleavages-a task only regional statesthemselvescan perform.For
now, historicalmemoriesand the absence of reconciliationcontinueto fuelfear
of a more assertiveJapan.In addition,China's repressiveregimeand confrontational rhetoricraise appropriate questions about the purposes to which it
will put its increasing power. Indeed, ASEAN countries resisted the establishment of APEC and continue to oppose its institutionalizationprecisely
Regionalismi
and Rivalry;and the chapters by T.J.Pempel, Takashi Shiraishi,Richard Doner, and
Mark Selden in Katzensteinand Shiraishi,NetworkPower.
68. See RobertGilpin, "APEC in a New InternationalOrder,"in Donald Hellmann and Kenneth
Pyle, eds., FromAPEC to Xanadu (Armonk,N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 30-34. For a thorough
descriptionof APEC, see Yoichi Funabashi, Asia PacificFusion:Japan'sRole in APEC (Washington,
D.C.: InstituteforInternationalEconomics, 1995).
69. Hadi Soesastro, "The InstitutionalFrameworkfor APEC: An ASEAN Perspective,"in Chia
Siow Yue, ed., APEC: Challengesand Opportunities
(Singapore: Instituteof SoutheastAsian Studies,
1994).
70. ASEAN foreignministersbegan in 1994 to host consultationswith theircounterpartsfromthe
United States, Japan, Canada, the EU, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, China,
Vietnam,Laos, and Papua New Guinea. This multilateralforumbecame known as the ARF. India
and Burma became members 6f the ARF in 1996. See Yuen Foong Khong, "Evolving Regional
Securityand Economic Institutions,"SoutheastAsian Affairs
1995 (Singapore: Instituteof Southeast
Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 48-60.

International
Security23:2 | 66

because of fearthatit could become a vehicle forEast Asia's dominantpowers
to impose a regional order of theirown making.71

Peace withinBenignUnipolarRegions
Benign unipolarityis in the midst of taking shape in North America and
Europe. It is a more distant vision in East Asia. If regional unipolarityis to
develop and serve as a source of structuralstabilityas American hegemony
wanes, policymakersand scholars alike need to thinkthroughhow to encourage the constructionand maintenanceof consensual regionalformations.What
variables will affecttheirinternalcohesion and determinewhethertheyprosper and deepen or lose momentumand unravel?
THE CHARACTER

AND

COHERENCE

OF REGIONAL

CORES

The trajectoryof regional cores will be the most importantdeterminantof the
evolution of regional formations.Regional cores must exercise power and
leadership sufficient
to sustainunipolarity.At the same time,theymustengage
in self-bindingand withholdpower to ensure thatasymmetryproduces bandwagoning ratherthan balancing.
The power centers of North America, Europe, and East Asia each face a
different
set of challenges.That North America's core consistsof a preponderant,unitarystateboth enhances and impedes cohesion. NorthAmerica enjoys
natural unipolarity and the stabilitythat accompanies it. In addition, the
United States provides a level of consistentleadership that a pluralisticcore
cannot. But the scope of Americanpreponderancemeans thatthe core will be
less inclined to govern throughdeal-making;starkasymmetriesdiminishthe
need for negotiated outcomes. Moreover,peripheral states,preciselybecause
they fear exposure to the core's unchecked power, still face incentives to
balance against ratherthan bandwagon with the United States. In this sense,
the unitarynatureof Americanpower and purpose paradoxicallystands in the
way of consensual integrationin NorthAmerica,and may ultimatelyleave the
region with more fragileand less developed institutionsof governance than
those in Europe and East Asia.72Especially because the United States lacks the
societal commitmentto self-bindingpresentin Germanyand Japan,its elected
71. Soesastro,"The InstitutionalFrameworkforAPEC," pp. 46-47. See also Fishlow and Haggard,
"The United States and the Regionalizationof the World Economy,"pp. 29-33.
72. This is an importantand counterintuitivepoint. Pluralisticcores, precisely because power
resourcesand authorityare divided between two (or more) separate states,may be moreconducive

AfterPax Americana| 67

leaders must consciously resist the unilateralist option made possible by
American preponderance and rely on consensual bargaining to deepen regional order.
The main challenge facingEurope's core is preservingthe Franco-German
coalitioneven as the Cold War recedes into the past and France and Germany
confronta host of domestic challenges. The most immediate problem stems
fromlagging economic performance.As the austerityaccompanyingpreparation formonetaryunion continuesand as high unemploymentpersists,debate
over structuraladjustmentand reformof the welfaresystemwill intensify,
and
Frenchand German elites will be temptedto blame Europe and each otherfor
the dislocation. Unless both sides resist this temptation,not only the single
currency,but also the integrityof the Franco-Germancoalition,will be put at
risk.73
Generational change will also pose increasing problems for the FrancoGerman coupling. For youngerGermans and French,who have lived through
neither the horrors of World War II nor the formidable task of patching
togethera Europe at peace, escaping the past will no longerserve to legitimate
the European enterprise.74
Europe's currentleaders must thereforegenerate
new argumentsto ensure thatthe nextgenerationretainsan abiding appreciation of the Franco-German coalition. The adaptation to global economic
change, the inclusion in Europe of the continent'semergingdemocracies,and
the constructionof a new political space thatallows the national state to exist
comfortablyalongside a supranational union must now provide the impetus
behind integration.But the Germans and the Frenchalso need to arrive at a
common vision of where the EU is headed, a process thatwill be more difficult
than it appears.
than amalgamated cores to the cohesion and durabilityof regional formations.The states that
comprisea pluralisticcore need to strikea bargain with each otherabout power sharing,and thus
will be more inclined to negotiate with the peripheryabout regional governance. In addition,
peripheralstateswill be less likelyto balance against the core because neitherits resourcesnor its
authorityare concentratedin a unitarystate.
73. See Roger C. Altmanand Charles A. Kupchan, "Arrestingthe Decline of Europe," WorldPolicy
Journal,Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter1997/98), pp. 1-9. For a pessimisticassessment of the long-term
consequences of a single currency,see MartinFeldstein,"EMU and InternationalConflict,"Foreign
Affairs,
Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/December1997), pp. 60-73.
74. YoungerGermans,includingBundestag membersfromKohl's own party,have made clear that
they are more at ease with the national state and less intenton sublimatingGermany inside a
broader Europe. So too are younger French less fearfulof rivalrywith Germany and thus less
intenton holding theirneighborsin a tightembrace.See "One Europe, Up to a Point," Economist,
September14, 1996,p. 48; and AAdyPollak, "The Attitudeto Europe Is Hard-Headed Acceptance,"
IrishTimes,May 20, 1996, p. 10.

Security23:2 | 68
International

French and German leaders in fact hold incompatible conceptions of the
ultimate objectives and character of the union. For Germany,Europe is a
constructfor moderatingand managing power-for ensuring that the continent never again falls prey to the destructiveforces of national rivalry.For
France,the EU is more about amassing and projectingpower, aggregatingthe
union's militaryand economic resourcesso thatit can assert itselfas a global
player.The EU is to do forEurope what the national state is no longer strong
enough to do forFrance.
Melding thesecompetingvisions ofEurope will requirecompromiseby both
parties. The Germans will need to assume greater defense responsibilities
withinEurope, and the Frenchwill have to realize thattheirvision of the EU
is not only politicallyunattainable,but also strategicallyundesirable. Pressing
the EU to focus on projectingpower externallyratherthan managing power
internallyrisks triggeringboth discord within Europe and competitionbetween Europe and otherregions. Paris should instead seek to strengthenthe
abilityof the Franco-Germancore to manage securityin Europe as America's
role on the continentgradually diminishes.75
Effectingthe coherence of a pluralistic core in East Asia is a far more
formidabletask than in Europe.76China and Japan have yet to engage in a
substantivebilateraldialogue thatcould serve as a basis forreconciliationand
partnership;both preferto deal with the United States ratherthan with each
other.77The key challenge ahead is to nurturea new coalitionbetween China
and Japanthatenables themto constructand manage collectivelya hierarchical
75. The Labour Party's 1997 victoryin Britainraises the novel possibilitythat London mightbe
able to help Paris and Bonn forgea compromisevision. Prime MinisterTony Blair appears to be
pushing Britaintowardmuch deeper engagementin the EU. The firsttripofBlair'sforeignminister
was to Paris and Bonn, not Brussels or Washington,and the Labour governmentis far more
receptivethan its predecessor to Britain'seventual participationin monetaryunion. It is at least
conceivable thatBritainwill over timetake on a guiding role in theevolutionof the EU. The British
share Germany'sperceptionof the EU as an instrumentforbindingand managingpower,but also
share France's appreciationof the importanceof power projection.In addition,Britaincould help
define a middle road between Germany's desire to embed the national state in a supranational
union and France's Gaullist insistenceon preservinga strongnational state.
76. For a sober assessmentofthe trajectoryofSino-Japaneserelationsduringthe 1990s,see Michael
Green and BenjaminSelf,"Japan'sChanging China Policy: FromCommercialRealism to Reluctant
Realism," Survival,Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 35-58.
77. As one indicatorof these preferences,the numberof Chinese and Japanese studentsstudying
in the United States faroutweighs the number studyingin each other'scountries.The numberof
Japanese studentsin the United States outweighs the number in China by almost six times. The
numberof Chinese studentsin the United States outweighsthe numberin Japanby just over three
1996 (Lanham, Md.: UNESCO Publishing and Bernan Press,
times. UNESCO, StatisticalYearbook,
1997), section3, pp. 397-402.

AfterPax Americana| 69

regionalorderin East Asia.78If the European experienceis any indication,this
taskwill requiredecades ofdeliberateeffort
to overcomethepast and construct
the habits and institutionsof partnership.
APEC provides a useful startingpoint,but only that;America's role is too
prominent.Instead, Washington should explicitlyseek to facilitatea more
substantiveSino-Japanesedialogue. Even if it comes at the expense of trade
flows across the Pacificor of American influencein East Asia, the formation
of a Sino-Japanesecoalition is essential if regional integrationis to advance
beyond the economic realm. The United States should stay engaged militarily
to buy time for this regional power center to cohere, but Washingtonmust
ensure thatit no longeropposes or stands in the way of directcontactbetween
East Asia's two main powers. Furthermore,Washington should welcome
China's call fora pan-regionalforumthatdoes not include the United Statesas long as the body serves as a vehicle forregional integration,not balancing
against U.S. power.79
Two factorswill play particularlyimportantroles in shaping Sino-Japanese
relations.The firstconcernsJapan'swillingnessto confrontits past in order to
close the enormous gap thatremainsbetween Japanesebehavior and regional
perceptionsof Japanese intentions.AlthoughJapan's constitutionrestrictsthe
use of force to self-defensemissions and Tokyo actively shuns international
leadership and diplomaticunilateralism,neighboringstatesremaindistrustful
of Japan.80This gap between behavior and perceptionis largelythe resultof
Japan'sfailureto address its wartimeactions and to pursue reconciliationwith
the victimsof its aggression.81 The benign effectsof Japan's self-bindingwill
continueto be diluted untiltheJapaneseare ready to hold themselvesaccountable for their behavior. So too will recent talk of an "Asian way" and the
emergenceof a regionalidentitymean littleuntilthe Japaneseare prepared to
78. For a similar view of the importance of Sino-Japanesepartnership,see Robert Manning,
"Haunted by a BitterPast," Impact21 (December 1996), pp. 10-13; and Manning, "Burdens of the
Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-JapaneseRelations in the Emerging InternationalSystem,"
Washington
Quarterly,
Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter1994), pp. 45-58. See also Akira Iriye,Chinaand Japan
in theGlobalSetting(Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress,1992); and Mark Selden, "China,
Japan,and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995,"in Katzensteinand Shiraishi,
NetworkPower,pp. 306-340.
79. See JamesKynge "China to EmbraceASEAN in PursuitofNew Order,"FinancialTimes,August
25, 1997, p. 3.
80. Thomas U. Berger,"From Sword to Chrysanthemum:Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism,"
International
Security,
Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150.
81. For a thoughtfultreatmentof the different
ways in which Germanyand Japanhave dealt with
theirrespectivepasts, see Ian Buruma, The WagesofGuilt(New York:Meridian, 1994).

Security23:2 | 70
International

acknowledge thattheirlast attemptat community-building-theGreaterEast
Asia CoprosperitySphere-was part of a darker and predatorypast.82
The second key determinantof whether a pluralisticcore coheres in East
Asia is the manner in which China exercises its increasing power. Chinese
behavior will to some extentbe shaped by its externalenvironment.As China's
power rises,its neighborsshould seek to strikethe same deal thatEU members
struckwith Germany:a greatersay forChina in shaping the termsof regional
orderin returnforself-bindingand China's willingnessto play by the rules of
multilateralism.Drawing China into the core of a hierarchicalregional order,
even if Beijing's intentionsare still somewhat uncertain,promises to expose
China to the same processes of moderationand liberalizationthatotherdeveloping economies face as they enterthe global market.The gradual and cautious embrace of China in a multilateralsystemof regionalgovernancewill by
no means ensure thatChina exercisesits growingpower in a benign manner.
It will,however,encourage self-bindingby givingChina a voice commensurate
withits power. It will also facilitateeconomic openness, strengthenliberalizing
coalitions,and nurturea moderatingmiddle class-all of which make more
likely China's peaceful ascendance and the gradual formationof a SinoJapanese partnership.83
SUSTAINING

THE BARGAIN

BETWEEN

CORE AND

PERIPHERY

Benign unipolar formationsrely on a sustained consensus between core and
periphery,not just on an initialbargain.Each side must hold up its end of this
bargain and remainsatisfiedwith the other'sperformance.Core, periphery,or
both can otherwise exit. Existing literatureon regionalism underscores the
extentto which economic incentiveand sustained growthoftenfacilitateintegrationand regionalcohesion.84In thisrespect,the recenteconomic downturn
in East Asia representsa substantialsetback.85What are the othermain challenges to the cohesion of unipolar formations?
see YoichiFunabashi,"The Asianization ofAsia,"
82. For discussion of an emergingAsian identity,
ForeignAffairs,
Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December1993), pp. 75-85.
83. On theabilityofeconomic openness to fosterpoliticaland economicreformin China, see Susan
Shirk,"Internationalization
and China's Economic Reforms,"in RobertKeohane and Helen Milner,
eds., Internationalization
and DomesticPolitics(Cambridge,U.K.: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996),
pp. 186-206. On the relationshipbetween liberal domesticcoalitionsand regionalcooperation,see
Etel Solingen, "Democracy, Economic Reform,and Regional Cooperation," Journalof Theoretical
Politics,Vol. 8, No. 1 (January1996), pp. 79-114.
84. See, forexample, Ippei Yamazawa, "On PacificEconomic Integration,"EconomicJournal,
Vol.
102, No. 415 (November 1992), pp. 1519-1529.
85. Because of the domesticreformsbeing implementedin the wake of the crisisand because East
Asia enjoys savings and investmentrates that are 50 percent higher than those in Europe and

AfterPax Americana| 71

THE DURABILITY
OF SELF-BINDING.
Unlike classical empires, which often
foundered as a result of revoltsfroma peripheryseeking greaterautonomy,
benign unipolar formationsare farmore likelyto fall prey to revoltsfromthe
core. It is now the core thataccepts limitson itsbehaviorby exercisingstrategic
restraintand subjectingitselfto the constraintsof a multilateralframework.
Self-bindingcan thereforego only so farbeforecore states will calculate that
the gains of sustaining benign unipolarityno longer outweigh the costs of
diminished autonomy.This insightcalls into question the conventionalwisdom thatintegrationmust keep moving forwardifregionalformationsare not
to unravel.86
It is hard to imagine, for example, that France and Germany would as a
matterof course submitto the will of theirsmaller partnersin the EU should
Paris and Bonn regularlybe outvoted on mattersof centralconcern.In North
America, taming the unilateralisturges of the United States is a far greater
challenge to regional integrationthan is encouraging the participationof the
periphery.Indeed, in Europe and NorthAmerica alike,an expectantperiphery
presses forentrywhile core states equivocate, fearfulof new obligationsand
constraints.And China's willingness to moderate the scope and characterof
its regional ambition is the single most importantdeterminantof whethera
consensual hierarchyevolves in East Asia. As policymakersshape regional
structuresof governance, they should seek an equilibrium point along the
spectrumof integration-one sufficientto committhe core to engage in selfbinding,but not so ambitiousthatit induces the core to renege on the bargain
thatunderpins regional order.
SECURITY. During past eras, core states often fell prey to their excessive
concernabout securityin theirperipheries.In contrast,today's major statesare
more likely to exhibit insufficient
concern about securityin the periphery.87
Whether contemporaryunipolar formationsface unraveling because of the
underprovision of securitydepends primarilyon the evolution of strategic
thinkingwithin respectivecores. Three main pathways exist throughwhich

NorthAmerica,many analystsforeseea returnto robustgrowthforthe region.See Steven Radelet
and Jeffrey
Sachs, "Asia's Reemergence,"ForeignAffairs,Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/December
1997), pp. 44-59. Reformof the Japanese economy and the expansion of domestic demand are
particularlyimportantto Asia's recovery.IncreasedJapaneseimportsfromits weakened neighbors
will not only help stimulategrowth,but also deepen regional economic integration.
86. See, forexample, Waever,"Integrationas Security."
87. Compare recent with earlier developments in the Balkans. At the opening of this century,
Europe's great powers raced to carve up the region,oftendecreasing theirown securitythrough
excessive engagement.At the close of this century,Europe's powers did theirbest to stay out of
the Balkans, decreasing theirown securitythroughtoo littleengagement.

International
Security23:2 | 72

core statescould, over time,adopt a more expansive definitionof theirsecurity
interests.
First,economic interdependencebetween core and peripherycould reach
levels sufficientto induce cores to make deeper sacrificesin meetingstrategic
challenges in the periphery.During the 1994-95 economic turmoilin Mexico
and the 1997-98turmoilin East Asia, forexample,theinternationalcommunity
pursued extraordinarymeasures to preventa more widespread financialcrisis.
In this respect,it is not unimaginable thateconomic interestswould be strong
enough to warrant militaryinterventionin the periphery should financial
stabilitybe threatenedby revoltor internalchaos. Increasinglevels of international trade and investmentas well as considerable sensitivityamong the
globe's main financialmarketswill put pressureon core statesto run the risks
associated with maintainingeconomic stabilityin their respective zones of
influence.
Second, as contemporaryregional formationsmature and core states sink
furthercosts into theirdevelopment,order-relatedinterestsmay come to play
a more dominant role in motivatingcore behavior. If regional formations
continue to evolve into order-providingunipolar structures,their leading
members will have a greater interestin making the sacrificesnecessary to
maintainthem.88
Finally,the process of community-building
could lead to a sense of shared
identitysufficientto contributeto core-peripherycohesion and broaden conThe historyof classical empires is repletewith examples
cept'sof self-interest.
of the abilityof socializationand ideational convergenceto undergirdimperial
management.89So too have shared identityelements been strongenough to
induce states to come to one another's assistance for emotive rather than
strategicreasons.90Elites and publics in contemporaryregional formations
88. NATO members,forexample, eventuallyfound the will to intervenein Bosnia with sufficient
forcenot because the intrinsiccosts of the conflictgrew intolerable,but largelybecause theyfeared
that continued paralysis would have corrosive effectson NATO and transatlanticrelations.See
speech by President William Clinton, "Peace in Bosnia: A Dividend of American Leadership,"
December 6, 1995, delivered to the Committeefor American Leadership in Bosnia, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Department of State, Dispatch Supplement,
Vol. 6, No. 5 (December 1995), p. 22; and
WilliamOdom, "PuttingOut the Balkan Fire,"ForeignAffairs,
Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December
1995), pp. 152-153.
89. See Ikenberryand Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power."
90. During the 1930s,forexample,the Frenchcame to view theloss of certainimperialpossessions
It was emotive attachment,however, not the
as tantamountto losing metropolitanterritory.
intrinsicstrategicvalue of the possessions, thatshaped these attitudes.See Kupchan, The VulnerabilityofEmpire,p. 258.

AfterPax Americana| 73

mightdevelop similar extraterritorial
allegiances, endowing these groupings
with more cohesion and durabilitythan would be predicted by a narrow
calculation of materialcosts and benefits.

Peace amongBenignUnipolarRegions
My analysis should not be interpretedas a call for the end of American
hegemony and the deliberate devolution of the internationalsystem from
unipolarityto tripolarity.Instead, I take the eventual waning of American
hegemonyto be inevitable,making it unavoidable thatthe internationalcommunitywill have to choose between strivingfora benign tripolarity
by design
or settlingfor a competitivemultipolarityby default.91The case for benign
tripolarityrests in part on the arguments,outlined above, as to why the
formationof three regional blocs would not triggerthe securitycompetition
traditionallyascribed to tripolarity:the three regional formationswould be
instrumentsfor managing power, not amassing it; interregionalrelations
would benefitfromintraregionalpeace; culturaland linguisticbarrierswould
inhibit the political centralizationneeded to project power externally;and
regions would unravel fromwithin if theircore states developed predatory
intent.92At the same time,the management of interregionalrelationswould
rise in importance and necessitate the following amendments to the policy
agenda.
REGIONALISM

VERSUS

GLOBAL

MULTILATERALISM

CurrentU.S. policy is guided by the conventionalwisdom that global multilateralism should take precedence over regionalism.The more open regions
are to one another,the betterrelationswill be among them. Regional trade
arrangementsare thereforedesirable only if theydo not come at the expense
of global trade.93My analysis challenges head-on this conventionalwisdom:

91. ChristopherLayne argues in favor of multipolarityby default,contendingthat the returnof
multipolarcompetitionamong Eurasia's major powers will embroilthose states in regional rivalries,reducingtheirabilityand inclinationto engage in securitycompetitionwiththe United States.
Layne does not provide compellingarguments,however,as to why the United States would find
major wars in Europe and East Asia any less threateningto its national securitythan in the past.
See Layne, "From Preponderanceto OffshoreBalancing."
92. For discussion of thepotentialfora stable tripolarity,
see Schweller,"Tripolarityand theSecond
World War,"esp. pp. 80, 99-100.
93. See, forexample,JagdishBhagwati,The WorldTradingSystemat Risk(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton
UniversityPress, 1991); RobertHormats,"Making Regionalism Safe," ForeignAffairs,
Vol. 73, No.

International
Security23:2 | 74

according to the logic of benign unipolarity,regionalismshould take precedence over global multilateralism.Economic and political integrationat the
regional level are essentialbuilding blocks of global integration.Global multilateralism is thereforedesirable only if it does not come at the expense of
regionalintegrationand theconstructionof stableregionalorders.APEC might
ensure vibranttrans-Pacifictrade,but it does not serve the interestsof international stabilityif puttingAmerica at the centerof East Asia's only inclusive
multilateralstructureimpedes the consolidation of a self-sustainingregional
order.The same logic applies in reverseto the EU. The EU's protectivetariffs
may create an irritantin transatlanticrelations,but they are well worth this
cost if they contributeto the coherence of a stable unipolarityin Europe.
Contemporaryregional formationsare geopolitical structures,not mere trade
groupings.The obsession of policymakerswith global multilateralismshould
accordinglygive way to a new emphasis on regionalism.94
INTERREGIONAL

INSTITUTIONS

As policymakersand scholars devote increasingattentionto deepening and
managing regional formations,they will also need to recast institutionsfor
governingrelationsamong regional blocs. Bodies such as the Group of Seven
(G-7), the UN SecurityCouncil, and the World Trade Organization provide
potentialforumsforaddressingan interregionalagenda, but theytend to focus
on resolvingshort-term
disputes ratherthan on facilitatinglong-termcooperation. 'Accordingly,a directorateof core countries should be established to
develop a set of "rules of the road" and a common vision of how regional
groupingswill fitinto global structures.This directorate,which mightreplace
the G-7, would consist of the United States, France, Germany,Japan,China,
and perhaps Russia (forreasons discussed below). The body would serve as a
global concertof major powers, monitoringand coordinatingrelationsboth
withinand among regional groupings.

2 (March/April1994), pp. 97-108; Fred Bergsten,"APEC and World Trade," ForeignAffairs,
Vol.
73, No. 3 (May/June1994),pp. 20-26; and Frankel,RegionalTradingBlocs.Frankelanalyzes in detail
the circumstancesunder which regional tradingarrangementsfacilitateglobal liberalization.
94. Recent experience suggests that greateremphasis on regional trade would not lead to significantdecreases in interregionaltrade. Economic integrationwithinEast Asia, forexample, has
not come at the expense of its extraregionaltrade. Between 1970 and 1990, East Asia's share of
world trade doubled, while its intraregionaltrade grew from30 to 41 percentof its total trade.
See Peter Petri, "The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytic History,"in Frankel and Kahler,
Regionalismand Rivalry,p. 42. See also T.J.Pempel, "TranspacificTorii:Japan and the Emerging
Asian Regionalism,"in Katzensteinand Shiraishi,NetworkPower,pp. 81-82.

AfterPax Americana| 75

ECONOMIC

STRAINS

AND THE ALLURE

OF PROTECTIONISM

As regional formationsdeepen and theirpolitical saliency in member states
rises, the risk increases that economic shock or prolonged periods of lagging
performancewill lead to protectionismand interregionalrivalry.When political leaders turnto protectionismto cordon offtheirnational economies from
marketdisturbancesand finda short-term
fixto lagging performance,theyare
likely to favor intraregionalover interregionalties, especially if they have
already codified regional trade agreements,have high levels of interdependence with theirneighbors,and have sunk costs in the maintenanceof intraregional cohesion.95 Precisely because the logic of my argument privileges
regional over global trade arrangements,members of consensual regional
formationswill have to take special precautionsto guard against retreatinto
protected trade blocs. A directorateof core countries could accordinglybe
tasked withmonitoringinterregionaltariffs
and flowsof tradeand investment.
THE GEOPOLITICS

OF EXCLUSION

A major weakness of an internationalorder based on benign unipolarityin
NorthAmerica,Europe, and East Asia is its effecton excluded actors.Contemporary regional formationsare clubs for successfulstates,not failed or poor
ones. As a result,theyexclude those areas of the globe thatare most in need
of integrationinto global marketsand councils. The proliferationof weapons
technologyis also raising the stakes of instabilityin developing regions. The
recentnuclear testsin India and Pakistan underscorethe potentialfordangerous arms racingamong developing states.And assuming thatrelationsamong
the world's major powers remain cooperative,revisioniststates in the developing world, especially those armed with weapons of mass destructionand
those whose size and population make them locally dominant powers, will
emerge as the principalchallengersto the status quo.96
Cordoning offprivileged regional formationsfrominstabilityin the developing world, fromrogue states,and fromthe effectsof collapsing states will
be ineffectiveand may well backfire.Exclusion tends only to make matters
worse by exacerbating economic duress and by breeding resentmentand
95. The experienceof the 1930s provides ample evidence of the allure of retreatinginto exclusive
trading zones in response to external economic shock. The collapse of an open trading order
contributedboth to the domesticdislocationthatfueled fascismand to the "go-it-alone"attitudes
thatunderminedsecuritycooperationamong the democracies.
96. See RobertChase, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy,"Pivotal States and U.S. Grand Strategy,"
ForeignAffairs,
Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February
1996), pp. 33-51.

Security23:2 | 76
International

insecurity.It also reinforcesthe sense of isolation thatfuelsrevisionistregimes
Instead, regional formationsshould seek to
and theirclaims of encirclement.97
include such statesin theirrespectivezones of influence,seekingto draw them
into the internationalcommunitythroughthe same centripetalforcethatpulls
A regionaldivision of labor makes the most
the peripherytoward the center.98
sense over the long term,withNorthAmericanstatesfocusingon Centraland
South America,European countriesconcentratingon the Middle East, Africa,
and Southwest Asia, and East Asian states focusingon South and Southeast
Asia.
The potentiallynegative consequences of exclusion also apply to Russia,
which is fallinginto a geopolitical no-man's-landbetween a risingEast Asia
and a Europe thatis expanding toward Russia's borders.Two courses of action
deserve consideration.First,Russia could be encouraged to reconstructits own
regional formationby deepening the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The key problem is that this formationmay prove to be coercive ratherthan
consensual in character.If excluded frompreponderantformationsto its east
and west, Russia may well constructa union aimed at power accretionrather
than power management.The preferablealternativeis forthe EU and NATO
to open theirdoors to Russia and seek to incorporatethe formerSoviet Union
At present,neitherthe EU nor NATO
into a broader European construction.99
is keen to extend its reach beyond Central Europe. Both institutionsfear the
dilution and diminishingeffectivenessthat accompany large membership.100
97. On the foreignpolicies of revolutionarystatesand how outside powers should deal withthem,
see Stephen M. Walt,Revolutionand War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1996).
98. Isolating revisioniststates may be appropriate in certaincases, especially when the state in
question is deliberatelyattemptingto exportinstabilitythroughterrorismor overtacts of aggression against its neighbors.As recentexperienceswith Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba demonstrate,
however,diplomaticisolationand economic sanctionshave not proved effectivein bringingabout
regime change.
99. IncludingRussia in NATO would furthertransformit froma collectivedefense to a collective
is in turnnecessaryto ensure thatNATO's continuing
securityorganization.This transformation
enlargementdoes not draw new dividing lines and triggerbalancing among excluded states.For
furtherdiscussion of Russia's inclusion in a broader Europe, see JamesGoodby,EuropeUndivided:
TheNew LogicofPeace in U.S.-RussianRelations(Washington,D.C.: United States Instituteof Peace
Press, 1998).
100. In addition,a Europe thatincludes Russia would finditselfwith two noncontiguouspower
centers-a Franco-Germancoalition and Russia. At least on deductive grounds, this formation
could triggerintercorebalancing as opposed to cooperation.A pluralisticcore of contiguousstates
should be more stable than one of noncontiguous states. Contiguityforces powerful states to
extremes-eitherto move in lockstepto avoid competitionor to be rivalsin a searchforsuperiority.
Core statesthatare separated by an expanse of land are more likelyto have mixed relations.They
will likelycompete fordominance in the area between them.But thisexpanse of land also serves
as a buffer,making it unnecessaryforthe parties to choose between close partnershipand open
rivalry.From this perspective,Russia's inclusion in Europe would not lead to the union's unrav-

AfterPax Americana| 77

Nevertheless,ensuringthat Russia is included in Europe should be a central
item on the agenda as core states seek to address and redress the geopolitics
of exclusion.

Conclusion
Americaat presentarguablyhas more influenceover internationalpoliticsthan
any othergreatpower in history.Accordingly,it may seem paradoxical to call
upon the United States to begin preparingforthe demise of Pax Americana.
However, it is preciselybecause of its preponderantpower and the stabilityit
affordsthat the United States has the abilityand the luxury to look beyond
the horizon. Preparingforthe futureentails neitherthe retrenchment
nor the
disengagementof Americanpower. On the contrary,the United States should
sustain global hegemonyforas long as it can. But in the meantime,it should
follow three guidelines to ensure that American unipolarity,when its time
comes, peacefullygives way to a benign tripolarity.
First,the United States must deepen its commitmentto self-bindingand
ensure thatit exercisesits preponderantpower withrestraintand moderation.
Doing so means strengthening
multilateralinstitutionsand relianceon consensual formsof internationalgovernance.As the leading state in the world, the
United States,throughthe benign exercise of its power, will both enable and
encourage through emulation others to do the same. More important,the
United States needs to buy more time for unipolar regional formationsto
develop. Behavior thatinduces balancing against U.S. power would lead to the
the processes of
untimelydemise of Americanunipolarity,in turninterrupting
regionalintegrationmade possible by America'sbenignleadership.The United
States must thereforeavoid unilateralismand overbearing behavior, which
promise only to squander Americanpreponderanceand precipitatepremature
returnto a competitivemultipolarity.101
eling,but it would impair its coherenceby dilutingits core. It is also worthnotingthatunipolar
formationshave existed withouta geographicallyfixedcore. The CarolingianEmpire established
by Charlemagne in the late eighth century,for example, was ruled froma court that traveled
throughoutthe imperial realm. It is at least conceivable that Brussels could one day become
Europe's effectivepower centeror thatEurope could be governedby a mobile core,circumventing
some of the problems involved in including Russia in a broader Europe. On the Carolingian
Empire,see Louis Halphen, Charlemagne
and theCarolingianEmpire,trans.Giselle de Niee (Amsterdam: North-Holland,1977); and Heinrich Fichtenau,The CarolingianEmpire(New York: Harper
and Row, 1964).
101. On the importanceof basing U.S. grand strategyon multilateralism,
see JohnGerard Ruggie,
WinningthePeace: Americaand WorldOrderin theNew Era (New York:Columbia UniversityPress,
1996).

International
Security23:2 | 78

Second, the United States should make the consolidationof pluralisticcores
in Europe and East Asia a top priority.Even if Washingtonloses some of its
leverage abroad as a result,it is in America'slong-terminterestto fosterbenign
centersof power in both regions. The United States should help strengthen
Europe's core by dealing with France and Germany collectivelyratherthan
individually.A Paris-Bonn-Washington
dialogue could be formalizedthrough
regularministerialmeetings.102The United Statesshould also encourage initiatives such as the joint visit to Moscow in March 1998 of German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl and FrenchPresidentJacquesChirac. And to the extentpossible,
Washingtonshould encourage greaterFranco-Germancooperation and activism in managing European security.
Moving China and Japantoward partnershipis a farmore complicatedtask.
The United States must begin simplyby making clear thatit supports a much
more dense and independentbilateralrelationshipbetween Beijingand Tokyo.
The United States needs to remain engaged to reassureboth parties,but must
no longer stand in the way of a Sino-Japaneserapprochement.In this respect,
the United States should make clear to Japan thatits strategicdependence on
American power is not a viable solution to its securityneeds over the long
term. To help pave the way for a regional alternative,Washington should
encourage Japan to address openly its wartime behavior, the only lasting
antidote to the historical memories that continue to poison Sino-Japanese
relations. The United States should simultaneouslypress hard to initiate a
meaningfulsecuritydialogue between Beijing and Tokyo.The agenda should
include regular sharing of information,exchange of militarypersonnel and
politicians,and joint exercises, as well as discussion of territorialdisputes,
theatermissile defense,and disposal of chemical weapons. The United States
should also facilitateincreasing economic cooperation between China and
Japan, particularlyin the areas of transportationand energy infrastructure.
Again, the United States should serve as a catalystforbilateralprogramsthat
then proceed under theirown steam.
Third,the United States needs to give regionalismprecedence over global
multilateralism-even at the expense of global trade flows-and pay greater
heed to thegeopoliticalimplicationsof regionalintegration.The success of U.S.
policies in the Americas, Europe, and East Asia should be measured not by
theirabilityto maximize American influence,but by theirabilityto promote
102. Should Britaincontinue to deepen its engagementin the EU, London mightbe included in
this dialogue as well as in the global directoratementionedabove.

AfterPax Americana| 79

self-sustainingand peaceful regional orders. President Clinton is rightthat
America is the world's "indispensable nation." But the United States must use
thatunique stationto make itselfdispensable and to erectregional structures
of order capable of withstandingthe demise of Americanpreponderance.The
days of Pax Americanaare numbered.Now is thetimeto ensure thattheglobal
stabilityand prosperityit has fosteredare not.

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