Air Force Review - Vol. 2, No. 1

Published on February 2017 | Categories: Documents | Downloads: 32 | Comments: 0 | Views: 282
of 39
Download PDF   Embed   Report

Comments

Content

 

Vol 2 No AIR FORCE REVIEW

 

CONO NOMI MICS CS OF THE ECO AIR AI R PO POW WER IN EXT XTE ERN RNAL AL SECU CURI RITY TY LTC ELM LME ER R AM AMON ON PA PAF F

The security environment in the Asia- Pacific remains volatile and uncertain because of various factors including the overlapping claims in the South China Sea. Most if not all of  the six countries claim ownership of part or of the whole Spratly Island Group are relentlessly pursuing their own respective interests. These countries include a hegemonic giant, considered to be pushing its position in spite bilateral and multilateral accords such as the UNCLOS. The pronounced interest of the United States to stay in the region is considered by other countries as constant. There is a perception that their presence will guarantee protection to its long-standing ally, the Philippines. On the contrary, even with the benefit of a Mutual Defense Treaty of 1947, there is no help expected based on experience in the past. Le Lear arni ning ng from from th the e ne negl glec ectt of th the e co count untry ry’s ’s exte externa rnall ca capa pabi bilit lity, y, th the e AFP AFP Modernization program, enacted in 1995, was envisioned to enhance the capability of  the AFP to be a credible force that can defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. The law outlines the principles of total defense, defense-in-depth and an active defense as strategies for national defense. It calls for the enhancement of  the capability of the air force and the navy as well as the army to address both the external and internal security concerns of the country. Recent Rece nt world development developments s after the Septe September mber 11, 2001 terrorist terrorist attack attack, makes security concerns a priority endeavor for most nations. In the local front, the communists, terrorists, the secessionist rebels, the Abu Sayaff bandits, as well as the perpetrators of transnational crimes continue to inflict a heavy toll on the economy.  As a result, the AFP has upinternational its security measures respond to establishment this new wave of terrorism as well as tostepped avert the terrorist to organization of links with the local rebel groups. Nevertheless, the external situation has remained an immediate concern of  the AFP. AFP. As the pri priori ority ty polic policy y in the modern moderniza izatio tion n procure procuremen mentt and equipm equipment ent upgrade have been affected, there are quarters in the establishment that believe a shift is forthcoming forthcoming in the emphasis from exte external rnal to internal. nternal. However, However, that remains remains debata deb atable ble since since the overal overalll outloo outlook k in the AsiaAsia- Pacifi Pacific c remains remains uncertain uncertain to the whole region. The expected vast mineral and oil reserves in the disputed territory and its impor imp ortan tance ce as a naviga navigatio tional nal sealane sealane are the prim primary ary intere interest st for cla claims ims on the islands. island s. For example, example, the Malampaya Malampaya Project Project is a 4.5 billion-dollar billion-dollar project that has an undersea pipeline that delivers gas to power plants in Batangas province south of  Manila. Malampaya has a confirmed reserve of 78 billion cubic meters of gas and 85

 

million millio n barrel barrels s of conden condensat sate. e. Asi Aside de fro from m the Mal Malamp ampaya aya sit site e the Depart Departmen mentt of  Energy Ene rgy announced announced last quarte quarterr 200 2001 1 the approval approval for drilling drilling of at least least seven seven oil wells we lls in the country. country. In 2002, 2002, there there are at least least six ongoing ongoing offs offshor hore e oil drilli drilling ng pr proj ojec ects ts inclu includi ding ng th three ree in Pala Palawa wan, n, one one in Mi Mind ndor oro, o, one one in Su Sulu lu and and anot anothe herr in Cotabato. The recent completion of the Malampaya Project off the coast of Palawan, renews the importance of the security requirements in the western front. While it may not be the only site of oil and natural gas reserves in the disputed area, it is still one of the most important considerations. It is no wonder then that the claimant countries adamantly hold on to their interest in these islands and is likely to remain so for long. The Philippines continues to recognize the dangers that are posed by disputes ov over er South South China China Sea, Sea, and the econom economic ic opp opport ortunit unities ies of a peacef peaceful ul and secure secure environment. It is then strategically sound to defend these economic projects, as, mandated by our constitution. These reasons make it imperative for our government to do whatever it takes to address the issue. It is completely irrational to leave it to chance, and risk a security lapse. While diplomatic means could be an option to ease tension in the area, adequate force capability is needed to back-up the diplomatic initiatives. The question is, how then are we going to defend ourselves? And with what? It is dis disadv advant antage ageous ous if the Philip Philippin pines es downg downgrad rades es the countr country’s y’s defens defenses es in the west we ster ern n fr fron ont, t, be beca cause use othe otherr claim claimant ant co coun untr tries ies could could ta take ke adva advant ntag age e of th the e weakened weake ned securit security y postu posture. re. If the imbalan imbalance ce is not cor correc rected ted,, dire dire conseq consequen uences ces would include an easy kill for the enemy and a loss by default by the country. As a consequence of a weak air force, whatever political, military and economic gains we have achieved, will be all for naught. Is this what our country deserves? Certainly not and we are not about to give up! Credible Air Power stands as the one option that will project defense-in-depth or the main attack platform for air defense. For instance, a squadron composed of 8 single-seat and four dual -s -seat f-16s, a land based radar and two surveillance surve illance/reco /reconnaissa nnaissance nce aircraft could also be used for comma command nd and control. The requirements are surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, for the meantime, will be beefed up with our present attack helicopters and transport aircraft. By the time we are engaged in the defense acquisitions would be forthcoming. On the whole, the cost of this fleet of aircraft is modest, considering the need to guard the 4.5 billion dollar project and similar other projects underway worth an estimated 26.3 trillion dollars. If this falls on deaf ears, are we then willing to take the risk? Either Either way we are already taking great great risk. Until we are able to address address our immediate concern of external defense, we cannot hope to achieve peace as well as secure environment for economic growth. It is imperative to address the immediate threats to our economic assets through well-considered but decisive and credible air power development.

 

COMMANDER'S CORNER:

Our Own Battleplan

Upon my assumption in 2000, I adjusted the PAF from being a credible air force to power that defines victory in peace or war. This vision, well founded on the tenets of air power, is underwritten by the PAF Modernization Program. To move towards that vision, I laid down three operational imperatives that apply to the broad range of our missions: brilliance in the basics, completion of the core, richness in results. All three had been defined for the guidance of our airmen. The overall strategy, however, that holds the three imperatives in relationship with other factors, has not been fully explained. To henceforth set the rule heading of the Air Force, I unveiled at the start of  th thiis year year th the e FIRS FIRST T FO FORC RCE E St Stra rate tegy gy,, th the e PAF PAF St Stra rate tegy gy for for 20 2002 02--2007. 2007. It Its s main main fe feat atur ure e is th the e de decl clar arat atio ion n of th the e PAF’ PAF’s s co core re and share shared d comp compet eten enci cies es are are th the e capabilities that render our service special and unique, that only we can best deliver, and which identif identify y the Air Force. Force. They form form part part of any moder modern n Air Fo Force rce’s ’s bas basic ic doctrine. The shared competencies, on the other hand, are the capabilities common and essential to all major services. They include the development and application of  doctrine, modern weapons systems, established bases, trained personnel and right organization.

 

Both core and shared competencies lie at the heart of our air power strategy. Unfort Unf ortunat unately ely,, all these these years years they they hav have e not been proper properly ly identi identifie fied. d. As a result result,, while we have been gallant in service, we have been unable to call our shots and best possible poss ible “plays.” “plays.” We have been content to merely serve our ‘functions” ‘functions” such as airlift, close air support, search and rescue, and others, which have relegated us mostly to a support role, and made us dependent on the hope that with new acquisitions, we will fly better. better. It It’s ’s time time to face realiti realities. es. The truth truth is, no matter matter how modern modernize ized d we be beco come me,, no matt matter er how much we de deve velo lop, p, as soug sought ht by RA 78 7898 98,, we ca can n ne neve verr emerge truly victorious without first developing and perfecting our own “signature plays” and winning moves- using all available resources and opportunities. These The se “ signat signature ure plays, plays,”” these these ide identi ntifie fied d core com compet petenc encies ies,, are the main main focus of the First Force strategy, whose ultimate aim is to progressively transform the PAF into the lead force in military missions as non-military engagements. For easier recall rec all,, I have have embedd embedded ed the them m in the very very title title “FIRST “FIRST FORCE” FORCE”:: For Force ce projec projectio tion, n, Inform Inf ormati ation on advant advantage age,, Rap Rapid id respon response se and mobil mobility ity,, Stra Strateg tegic ic impact impact,, Tact Tactica icall synerg syn ergy, y, Force Force genera generatio tion n and suppor support, t, Organi Organizat zation ional al brilli brilliance ance,, Resea Research rch and applied innovation, Control of stations, and Empowered quality workforce. By design, the first five (FIRST) are the PAF’s core competencies- the defining strengths we must painstakingly develop, as well as the desired outcomes we must atta attain in in all mi miss ssio ions ns.. But But just just as impo import rtant ant wi will ll be our our focus focus on th the e ne next xt fi five ve (FORCE), which underline our shared competenci (FORCE), competencies. es. All of them are to be regarded as our key result areas. All of them are the PAFs’ principal means and ends. The “FIRST “FIRST FORCE” FORCE” will will hencef hencefort orth h be the prima primary ry referen reference ce point point for all op opera eratio tional nal plans, plans, and it is ideal ideal for PAF commande commanders, rs, off office icers, rs, and airme airmen n could could commit them to memory like Air Force personnel in other countries remember theirs. The yearly operational targets will change, but these ten bearings, these ten points in the PAF’s battle plan must stay.

FIRST FORCE STRATEGY 2002  “Our strategic vision is for the Air Force to define total quality and culture of  excellence through air power” 

LT GEN BENJAMIN P DEFENSOR JR  The idea idea th that at th the e Phil Philip ippi pine ne Air Air Forc Force e fil fills ls th the e role role in le lead ading ing mi milit litar ary y an and d nonmilitary operations was intensified by the noteworthy achievements at the end of  the year. However, the beginning of 2002 is a remarkable pronouncement of a new strategy strat egy aimed to significant significantly ly develop develop the Air Force in trans transformin forming g into the nation’s nation’s First Fir st Force Force on the avenue of Air Po Power wer.. A highly highly decis decisive ive,, flexible flexible,, and versatil versatile e

 

quality Air Force capable and ready to lead in military and non-military roles in the security, defense, and development of the nation. The PAF Vision  “Philippine Air Force defining victory vic tory in peace and a nd conflict”. The The PAF PAof F national en envi visi sion ons s a mod oder erni nize zed dthe Air Aiprotection r Forc Force e asofth the e le lead adin ing g fo forc rce e as in well th the e preservation sovereignty and territorial integrity as the principal partner in national development effort of the government. As such, the imperatives lie on the capability thrust and operational dynamism of the Air Force through the pool of airpower-driven airmen and highly trained competent leaders. In particular, the key factors in carrying out this vision is essentially founded on the organi org anizat zation ion’s ’s brillia brilliance nce in the basics basics compl completi etion on of the compet competenc encies ies,, and the richness in results despite the availability of meager resources at hand. Yet, the Air Force will continue to be faster, stronger, and better organization in service to the country and people.  A quality Air Force defining defining victory in peace and conflict–this is the PAF Vision for a total span of five years, starting 2002. The PAF Objectives The PAF establishes objectives in the accomplishment of its mandated mission wi with th emph emphas asis is on air po powe werr appl applic icat atio ion. n. First First,, th the e decis ecisive ive de defea featt of al alll arme armed d internal threats through the application of applied operational doctrine in all kinds of  force for ce engage engagemen ment. t. Second Second,, the proje projecti ction on of air power power s the nation nation’s ’s first first line of  defense defen se in protecting protecting national territory territory and maintaining maintaining territorial territorial integrity. integrity. Third, the protection of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) through active air defense. Fourth, the contribution to regional peace and stability through pursuing bilateral defense agreem agr eement ents s within within the region region.. Fif Fifth, th, PAF will suppor supportt and assist assist lead lead govern governmen mentt agencies though progressive non-traditional engagement. Finally, to establish PAF as First Force in most missions through its established core competencies. The PAF Operational Concepts In pursuit of its objectives, the PAF acknowledges fundamental requirements to First Force Strategy as follows:  Active Air Defense is the capability based on decisive airpower paradigm as applie app lied d to protec protectt nation national al territ territory ory,, to deter deter enemy enemy aggres aggressio sion, n, and to suppre suppress ss enemy forces. Dynamic Interoperability is the synergistic optimization of forces engaged in theater for the effective accomplishment of PAF mission. It speaks of air power as a  ‘force multiplier” in any armed engagement. Integrated Support Integrated Support entails entails sustainabili sustainability ty of logist logistical ical require requirement ment vis-à-vis available resources in any PAF engagement.

 

Joint Security is a collective commitment in the course of operations interlinked linke d with other military military forces, forces, governmen governmentt agencies, agencies, non-military non-military units, units, general general public, and allies. Non-Traditional Engagement constitutes, socio-economic ventures, and relief  and recovery efforts of the PAF serving as the primary partner of the government in national development and progress. Key Result Areas and Operational Targets Force Projection In peacetime, the Air Force will actively participate in securing the Malampaya Proj Projec ectt th thro roug ugh h inte intensi nsifi fied ed ma mari riti time me air air pa patr trol ols s over over zoni zoning ng and secu securi rity ty and econom eco nomy y to optimi optimize ze resou resource rces. s. On operat operations ions aga against inst terror terror,, the Air Force Force will will proactively participate as well as support international peacekeeping effort. Finally, PAF will expand the role and capability for search and rescue in times of crisis and calamities. In times of conflict and increasing threat, PAF will project air defense through better bett er radars, radars, more fighters, fighters, and integrated integrated Philippine Philippine Air Defense Defense Control Control Center Center (PADCC) and Air Defense Alert Center (ADAC). The Air Force will interdict strongholds of terro terrorr and conflic conflictt and will will suppor supportt govern governmen mentt effort effort against against crimin criminalit ality y and lawlessness in order to encourage foreign investors in the country. In the light of  Internal Security Operations (ISO), PAF will employ and lead a new strategy based on air power operational application and provide active assistance and support to allies through bilateral defense cooperation. Information Advantage In the new era, information closely associated with technology is a decisive milita mil itary ry tool. tool. In this this regard regard,, the PAF will establ establish ish an Air ForceForce-wide wide informati information on advantage through inter/intra command connectivity. It will include the acquisition of modern platforms such as sensors, radar system, and aircraft. Similarly, the Air Force Forc e will integrate integrate the management management systems systems of pers personnel onnel,, logis logistics, tics, and finance. finance. Moreover, More over, PAF will upgrade technical intelligence intelligence capability capability and will likewise develop computer security. Rapid Response and Mobility The The PAF PAF will will ad adop optt a wide wide--fa fast st--resp respon onse se st stra rate teg gy in al alll scen scenar ario ios s an and d co cond ndit itio ions ns of emer emerge genc ncy, y, cala calami mity ty,, an and d dist distre ress ss.. In orde orderr to ac achi hiev eve e su such ch undertaking, the Air Force will maintain above 75 percent operational readiness of  aircraft under its inventory. Moreover, the adoption of new doctrine will effect the full utilization of air assets such as Sikorsky and Bell helicopters for combat and search rescue, and the PAF reservists and civilian volunteers for rapid response tasks and responsibilities will also be organized to support the Air Force. In tactical operations, PAF will increa increase se the employ employmen mentt of SF-2 SF-260 60 TPs TPs.. Also, Also, qui quick ck rea reacti ction on tea teams ms from from th 710 Special Operations Wing (SPOW) will be organized and employed fro combat in areas as required.

 

Strategic Impact  As a result of the country’s growing dependence on aerospace and technological advances, PAF is envisioned to have the best potential and leverage in the future. Hence, the Air Force’s effort should gear towards its transformational role in the future. In line with this, the PAF will develop strategic impact by establishing new PAF doctrine covering strategic, tactical, and operational levels. The Air Power Institute will be activated to pursue doctrine development and further the study of  air air po powe werr ap appl plic icat atio ion. n. More Moreov over er,, PAF PAF will will en ende deav avor or in en enha hanc ncin ing g ai airr powe powerr consciousness among AFP personnel including concerned decision-makers in various gover governme nment nt agencie agencies. s. The PAF will will push push for the increa increase se cap capabi abilit lities ies of Air Fo Force rce Research and Development Center (AFRDC), as well as the establishment of a repair center of aircraft. Likewise, selected air bases and stations will be offered to selected commercial aerospace aerospace industries as growth growth centers. Tactical Synergy In jointne jointness, ss, the PAF produc produces es the best best synerg synergist istic ic effect effects– s–the the AFP’s AFP’s first first force multipliers. In this regard, the PAF, guided by operational doctrine of decisive fo forc rce e en enga gage geme ment nt,, will will incr increa ease se part partic icip ipa ation tion in join jointt ex exer erci cise ses s fo forr grea greate terr intero int erope perab rabilit ility. y. To optimi optimize ze the adv advant antage ages s of cro cross ss tra trainin ining, g, the Air Force Force will will actively partake in bilateral defense training such as the RP-US Balikatan. PAF will also als o increa increase se the num numbe berr of sea search rch and rescue rescue and surviva survivall trainin training g for civ civilia ilian n volunteers ready to tap in any eventuality. Likewise, the reservist training programs willl be red wil redesi esigne gned d for purpo purposes ses of better better app applic licati ation on and field field expert expertise ise.. PAF will will continue to increase exposure to non-traditional activities in support to government and nongovernme nongovernmental ntal organizati organizations. ons. Furthermo Furthermore, re, PAF will pursue special projects projects with other law enforcement agencies to sharpen operational readiness to respond to peace and order. Force Generation and Support Forc Force e Gene Genera rati tion on an and d Supp Suppor ortt mean means s an any y ac acti tivi vity ty th that at su sust stai ains ns PA PAF F operational readiness as a fighting force. It covers three areas, namely: Resource and Fi Fina nanc ncia iall Mana Manage geme ment nt,, Focu Focused sed Acqu Acquis isit itio ion, n, Upgr Upgrad ade e an and d Maint Mainten enanc ance, e, and and Enli Enlist stme ment nt of Su Supp ppor ort. t. Th The e Air Air Forc Force e wi will ll ado adopt IT Proj Projec ectt Ma Mana nage geme ment nt and and IT Delivery of Services. Likewise, changes in the procurement system will be instituted to implement a PAF wide cost-cutting strategy and to focus financial resources to core requirements. The procurement of quality personnel will be pursued to optimize expe expert rtis ise e and co comp mpet eten ency cy.. Even Eventu tual ally ly,, PAF PAF wi will ll up upgr grad ade e air aircr craft aft and aircr aircraft aft armaments support facilities to provide more capable weapons and support systems for tactical units. Additionally, the Air Force will push through with the acquisition of  more fighters and transport aircraft and the commissioning of additional helicopters. Howev Ho wever, er, upgrad upgrade e will will not only include include equipm equipment ent but also person personnel nel in terms terms of  training to keep the aircraft properly maintained. Organizational Brilliance Organiz Org anizatio ational nal brillia brilliance nce in the Air Force Force means means simpli simplicit city, y, flexibi flexibility lity,, and responsiveness. Most of the time there exists, in all units, alignment between and among resources, objectives, mission, leadership directions. In ordersystems, to makedoctrines, intensifiedstructures, air campaigns in the South, theand Command will

 

establish a 4th Tactical Operations Wing in Davao to cover the whole area of Eastern Mindanao. Likewise, the Air Force will make further response through the activation of the 740th Com Combat bat Wing Wing tha thatt will will lead lead in Intern Internal al Securit Security y Operat Operation ions s (ISO) (ISO) in certain areas of the country. Additionally, the 724th Explosive Ordnance Disposal and th the the 726 726 K-9 Sq Squa uadro drons ns wi will ll be fully fully co cons nsti titu tute ted d for for othe otherr spec special ial oper operat atio ion n purposes. Research and Applied Innovation  Air power is the great provider that allows all dimensions as well as other forces and agencies to opti forces optimize mize their respective respective contribution contribution to national national security. security. Be Behind hind the rise of air power power is resear research ch and dev develo elopme pment nt or inno innovat vation ion.. For this pu purp rpos ose, e, th the e Air Air forc force e wi will ll br brea eak k mo more re bo bound undar arie ies s wi with th more more of it its s de deve velo lope ped d pr prec ecis isio ion n guid guidan ance ce sy syst stem ems, s, crit critic ical al airc aircra raft ft an and d ae aero rosp spac ace e grou ground nd su supp ppor ortt equipment, equip ment, aerial bombs bombs and warheads, and automatic automatic grenade launcher syste systems. ms. Likewise, several conversion projects will be undertaken through the resourceful Air Force Research and Development Center (AFRDC). Command and Control of Stations The PAF aim is to project not only the name and discipline of its airman, but also the Air Force culture in every air base and station and a culture that is highstepping with the times reflective of effectiveness, efficiency and modernity. On the ot other her hand, the relativel relatively y long long per period iod for base base develo developme pment nt will will not in any way hamper the mandated mission of the PAF. Yet, the Air Force will continue to project additional bases and alternate stations in the western front. Eventually, the Air Force will continue to project additional bases and alternate stations in the western front. Eventually, the Air Force culture of excellence will surface in all PAF bases. Empowered Quality Work Force Given the expandin Given expanding g cap capabi abilit lities ies of the Air Force, Force, every airm airman an has to be steepe ste eped d in the bas basics ics of air power power,, trained trained and motiva motivated ted well, well, provid provided ed qualit quality y responsive education, and given the appropriate support systems to do his job and fulfill his purpose in the PAF. Hence, PAF has to provide the best to the airmen so they can give their best to the Air Force in return. In line with this endeavor, the Air Forc Force e wi will ll pr prov ovid ide e airme airmen n be bett tter er oppo opport rtuni uniti ties es for for tr train ainin ing g local locally ly and and ab abro road ad.. Increase exchanges with foreign counterparts on matters of expertise will also be un unde dert rtake aken n to advan advance ce th thei eirr ca caree reers rs and and br broa oade den n th thei eirr mi mind ndse set. t. Likew Likewis ise, e, th the e Comman Com mand d will will intensi intensify fy the culture culture of excell excellenc ence e within within the organiz organizati ation on for the airmen to appreciate the basics of air power. In a nutshell, the FIRST FORCE Strategy responds to the challenge to make the Air Force the nations LEADING FORCE through a majority of airpower applications and best performance. Significantly, the inherent role of air power in the preservation of our national security and territorial integrity essentially propels the PAF in coming out with the FIRST FORCE Strategy. As stressed by Winston Churchill the rationale be behin hind d th the e exis existe tenc nce e of th the e Ai Airr Forc Force: e: “Not “Not to ha have ve an adeq adequat uate e air force force in th the e present state of the world is to compromise the foundations of national freedom and independence…” 

 

DEFINING DEFINING DOCTRINE By Major Noel Lacambacal Patajo PAF  Assistant C hief, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, S tudies, GHQ Doctrine Doctri ne is like a compas compass s bearin bearing; g; it giv gives es us the gener general al direct direction ion of our  course cou rse.. We may deviate deviate from that cour course se on occasi occasion, on, but the hea headin ding g provid provides es a  common comm on purpose purpose to all who travel along the way. This puts a grave burd burden en on those  who formulate doctrine, for a small error, even a minute deviation, in our compass  bearing upon setting out, may place us many miles away from the target at the end  of the flight flight.. If those who disti distill ll doctr doctrine ine from exp experi erienc ence e or devise devise it from logical  logical  inference in the abstract fail to exercise the utmost rigor in their thinking, the whole  service suffers. I. B. HOLLEY, Jr 

The preceding statement underscores the importance of doctrine and reminds us of the the heavy responsibility of doctrine writers. Such responsibility, I suspect, may be the underlying reason why it is difficult to find dedicated doctrine writers not only within the Air Force but also within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Recently, the Commander-in-Chief, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal  Arroyo reminded the AFP of the iimportance mportance of doctrine. The orders are clear an and d it is no longer needed to repeat what the over-all Commander desires regarding the AFP doctrine. began when then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 spearheaded the effort to print several set of manuals per major services. servi ces. The effo effort rt was the  “general direction” for the AFP. A FP. The Office of Special Studies of the Air Force, with guidance from J3 and Force, the Office of the Assistant Chief of   Air Staff for Operations, A-3, handled the Air Force manual writing writin g and publication. publication. Through Through the years, years, these manuals serve as the sole reference of the Air Force. When the AFP modernization began to take shape in the early 1990s, doctrine was not a major major component. component. It was only during the subsequent subsequent deliberation deliberations s that doctrine, as basis of modernization, modernization, became the acknowledge acknowledge reference. The AFP, as well as, its major major services has the manuals manuals of the late 1970s to refer to. As such, it is fair to say that the AFP modernization modernization has been anchore anchored d on doctrine. doctrine. Currently, Currently, it is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Education and Training, Training, J8 that is responsible responsible for doctrine doct rine component compo nent of the Modern ization. . office Why isresponsible J8 handling handlingfor doctrine development now when J3 AFP usedModernization to be the main doctrine

 

development? developm ent? This is one aspect of AFP doctrine developm development ent that I intend to discuss in the future paper. But, what is doctrine? doctrine? When I was still very much involved in doctrine doctrine development and overseeing the Air Force side of doctrine development, almost all Officers Office rs with varying rank level ask the same question. question. I belie believe ve that such question question was posited not because of ignorance but of worry that doctrine definition has been blurred by time, technology, theories and most of all of their experiences. Doctrine  ne  The Nature of Doctri

Doctrine is a body of principles in any branch of knowledge. It is based on an accumulation of knowledge gained through experience, study, analysis, and test. Doctri Doc trine ne is dynam dynamic. ic. It varies varies fro from m time time to time, time, sit situat uation ion to situatio situation. n. As such, it is considered to be the best way of doing things in the present period.

Military Doctrine  Military doctrine is officially believed and taught as the best way to conduct military affairs. It is an authoritative statement of principles for the employment of  military resources designed for continuing applicability in war and peace. It is founded primarily on the result of accurate analysis and interpretation of experience. In areas where there is no real experience to draw on, doctrines are formulated from the extrapolations of experience based on sound judgment, logic, intuition, and sometimes ‘gut feeling’. Military doctrines can be very dynamic and should change accordingly with the type of conflict, along with corresponding changes in the environment, political directions about the employment of military forces, and the doctrine of the threat force in that particular conflict. Categories of Military Doctrine 

Military doctrines are divided into three categories: Environmental, Joint and Combined. Figure 1: STRUCTURE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

 

Doctrine. Environmental doctrine is a compilation of beliefs about the Environmental Doctrine. best employment of military forces within a particular operating medium. The Armed Forces operate in three different environments – land, sea, and air – each with distinct nature and characteristics. The uniqueness of each environment calls for separate and specific doctrine that embodies the beliefs on how to use land power, sea power, and air power in their respective respective environments. environments. Environment Environmental al doctrine doctrine is also known as Single Service Doctrine. Doctrine.. In relation to air power, joint doctrine provides guidance for Joint Doctrine employment of PAF forces engaged in joint operations with the other major services. It prescribes the best way to integrate and employ air forces with land and naval forces in joint military operations. Responsibility for the development of doctrines for certain types of joint operations is assigned to individual major services. The major service having primary responsibility for the development of doctrine for joint operations does so in consultation and coordination with the other services. Doctrine. Combined doctrine establishes the principles, organization, and Combined Doctrine. procedures agreed upon between the AFP and allied forces in combined operations. This type of doctrine is normally developed to support mutual defence treaties, agreements, or organizations and promotes compatible arrangements for employment of AFP forces in combined operations. In relation to air power, combined doctrines serves as a guide for the application of air power doctrine to combined operations, and describes the best way to integrate and deploy air forces with allied forces in coalition warfare. Inter-relationship. Inter-relationship. In modern warfare, the key to victory is jointness in planning and operations. However, fundamental to joint operation is single-service expertise. Therefore, single service doctrine is the backbone of joint and combined doctrine. It is only when single service doctrine is strong that the synergy of land, air and sea power can result in optimum combat power. Figure 2: The Levels of Doctrine

Levels of Doctrine Strategic Doctrine. Doctrine . Strategic doctrine states the fundamental principles for employment of air forces to attain national objectives in peace and war. It serves as a

 

reference or authority for all other doctrines; information for instruction in military service schools; material for public and internal information programs; and positions to support budgetary procurement programs. It establishes the framework and foundation for the effective use of air power. Operational Doctrine. Doctrine. Operational doctrine establishes principles and rules governing organization, direction, and employment of air forces in the accomplishment of basic combat operational missions in conventional and unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency and special operations, and various various military tasks consonant with m military ilitary preparedness. It embodies the concepts and principles derived from the strategic doctrines, serving as a guide for the air force in the organization and employment of  its forces to perform its function in a particular type of conflict with authorised entitlements. Doctrine. Tactical doctrine establishes detailed tactics, techniques and Tactical Doctrine. procedures (TTP) that guide the use of specific weapons to accomplish specific objectives. It represents guidance on how the air force should be employed in engagements and battles. It should address how to accomplish tactical objectives and how combat situations such as threat, weather, terrain, and available weapons, influence tactics. Inter-relationship.. The three levels of doctrine are interrelated. In air power doctrine, Inter-relationship for example, they are neither mutually exclusive nor rigidly limited to precise boundaries. I am convinced convinced that AFP officers officers will continue continue to search search for the definition definition of  doctrine. From the foregoing, doctrine. foregoing, allow me to echo Winsto Winston n Churchill, Churchill, who said: Those who are possessed of a definitive body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short views, and indulging their natural impulses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day. Military Air Power noted “The clarity and therefore the utility of doctrine is a direct dire ct product of how well language is used in writing.”  writing.”  Notes: 1.

Major Major Noel L Pataj Patajo o PAF, PAF, Philippine Philippine Air Force Force Doctrine Doctrine Writing Writing Handboo Handbook, k, Canberra 1999.

2.

Lt Col Col Charles Charles M Westenhoff, Westenhoff, USAF, USAF, Military Military Air Air Power Power The The Cadre Cadre Digest Digest of Air power Opinions and Thoughts, Maxwell AFB, October 1990

 

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL VIABILITY OF EMPLOYING NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN AIR FORCE OPERATIONS LTC NESTOR P DEONA PAF (GSC)

“Victory s miles miles upon those who anticipate anticipate the chang chang es in the character character of war, war, not  upon those who wait to ada adapt pt themselves themselves aft after er the chang es occur .” Giulio Douhet Introduction Today’s emerging warfare is characterized by two interrelated trends. One is the limited nature of conflict that gives premium on minimizing non-combatant casualties as well as collater collateral al damage. The other is speed and precision, precision, which entails entails the reduction reduction of  unintended or undesired effects through accuracy or by weapon especially designed to avoid such effects. The Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict have proven how the accuracy of  weapons delivery systems limited the collateral damage that could otherwise have been prohibitive. The conduct of warfare has evolved through the centuries that wars were fought. In the Second World War, we have seen the maximization of weapons lethality with the use of nuclear weapons on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Weapons have become so lethal that it has even threatened the very existence of the planet. The fear of  mass mas s dest destruc ructio tion n thus thus provid provided ed the shi shift ft towa towards rds wea weapon pon tha thatt minimiz inimize e rather rather than than maximize lethality. Thus, the emerge Thus, emergence nce on non non-l -leth ethal al techno technolog logies ies has the potent potential ial to alt alter er the character and conduct of military operations. The interest in non-lethal weapons sprung from the need to have options appropriate to the changes in the threat environment and the exp expand anding ing roles roles of the milita military. ry. Thou Though gh tra tradit dition ional al enemie enemies s rem remain ain,, the there re wil willl be adversaries amidst high-density civilian populations against whom we need new methods in applying force. Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) therefore are extremely important as part of  the scheme in addressing the changing nature of conflict. Evidently Eviden tly,, the eme emergi rging ng concep conceptt of non-l non-leth ethal al war warfar fare e is att attrac ractiv tive e to pol politi itical cal leaders and policy makers alike. Such a concept emphasizes the promise of waging a more mo re huma humane ne wa warr si sinc nce e it cons conser erve ve li life fe,, re resou sourc rces es and and the envi enviro ronm nmen ent. t. Thus, Thus, the the prospect prosp ect for this new generatio generation n of weapon weapons s resonates resonates strongly with popular opinion that has gro grown wn inc increa reasin singly gly averse averse to cas casual ualtie ties s as a consequ consequenc ence e of mil milita itary ry operati operations ons.. Moreov Mor eover, er, the rel relati ative ve reversi reversibil bility ity of the eff effect ects s of non non-l -leth ethal al weapons weapons on targets targets compared to the longer lasting effects of lethal conventional weapons complement the former’s growing acceptability in military operations other than war.

The Need for Non-Lethal Weapons The need for NLW in the Philippine Air Force is justified by several compelling reasons. First is the limited nature of warfare as well as the changes in the strategic setting threat environment the demand to casualties collateral damage dam ageand is the increa increasin sing. g. Second Second is where the expand exp anding ing rol role e minimize of the milit military ary tha thatt and now includ include e

 

fulfil fulfillin ling g missi missions ons in a variet variety y of non-c non-comb ombat at operat operation ions s such as tra transi nsitio tional nal cri crimes mes,, peac peacek ekee eepi ping ng oper operat atio ions ns and and supp suppor ortt to poli police ce opera operati tion ons. s. Thi Third rd are are the the evol evolvi ving ng domest dom estic ic securi security ty threat threats s where where non non-trad -traditi itiona onall actors actors such such as civil civil soc societ iety, y, interes interestt groups, organized crime and terrorist groups are becoming key players. Fourth is the public sensitivity to the use of excessive force and aversion to casualties, thus, demands a conflict that is civilized and humane. Lastly is the enemy’s predilection to using human shie shield lds, s, host hostag ages es and and mi mino nors rs as a dete deterr rren entt as well well as a poli politi tical cal trap trap agai agains nstt the the government.

 A pplic pplications ations in A ir F or orce ce Operations The application of NLWs is a novel approach to minimize casualties and collateral damages damag es in specialized specialized Air Force operations. operations. Thus, its introducti introduction on is in harmony harmony with the govern gov ernmen ment’s t’s aversi aversion on to the use of exc excess essive ive force force and the publ public’ ic’s s sensiti ensitivit vity y to casualties and collateral damages during the conduct of military operations. Undeniably, NLWs can be introduced and applied in sertain PAF operational roles such such as coun counte terr insu insurge rgency ncy,, peac peaceke ekeep epin ing g oper operat atio ions ns,, supp suppor ortt to nati nation onal al poli police ce operations, support to other government agencies and civil disturbance operations. Selected PAF Missions and Applicable Non-Lethal Technologies NLT Technology/

Psyop s/

PAF Missions Counter  insurgency Counter  terrorism Peacekeepin g operations Counter  drug Non-combat evacuation

Psywar 

Disaster  relief  Civil disturbance operations Ground defense

Acoustic s

Laser  s

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Barrier  s

Riot contro l agent s

+

Optical s

electromagneti cs

+

+

+

+

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

 

NLWs are not viewed NLWs viewed as a substi substitut tute e for let lethal hal force. force. Thi This s sug sugges gests ts that that for forces ces equipped with lethal and NLWs shoul remain close enough for mutual support. It was emphasized that the employment of NLWs does not mean no zero casualties but rather an attempt to avoid fatalities and collateral damage.

Criteria for Integration Several criteria for the integration of NLWs to the PAF were identified. These are poli politi tica call acce accept ptab abil ilit ity, y, oper operat atio iona nall util utilit ity, y, safe safety ty and and cost cost effe effect ctiv ivene eness ss.. Poli Politi tica call acce accept ptab abil ilit ity y enum enumer erat ates es the the stra strate tegi gic c ra rati tion onal ale e and and adva advant ntag ages es of NL NLWs Ws.. Whil While e operational utility prescribed the operational capabilities and desired qualities for NLWs to be acquired, safety, factors in suitability in situations where it is difficult to distinguish between friend or foe. Cost effectiveness strikes a balance between the desired effects and affordability given the constraint in the Air Force’s budget for weapon acquisition.

Conclusion The employment of NLWs in PAF operations is viable in the strategic and tactical sens sense. e. The main main ra rattiona ionale le for for the the use use of non-l non-let etha hali lity ty at the the st stra rate tegi gic c le leve vell is the the enhancement of the political utility of force. Hence, NLW is attractive to political leaders and policy makers alike. The strategic utilization of NLW can enhance the flexibility of  commande comm anders rs as well as present present more options for national national decisiondecision-maker makers s in confl conflict ict and crisis situations. In a tactical environment, NLWs are well suited in addressing the threat posed by an ill-defined adversary especially when the use of lethal forces will result to unacceptable consequences. In any arm armed ed confro confronta ntatio tion, n, incide incidenta ntall and accide accidenta ntall casual casualtie ties s could could not be avoided. The employment of non-lethal weapons does not guarantee a bloodless situation. It just minimizes the bloodshed. Neither are non-lethal weapons perceived to replace lethal arms in the foreseeable future. At this time it cannot be a substitute to the PAF’s conventional forces and lethal weap we apons ons capa capabi bili liti ties es.. Howe However ver,, NLW NLW can can be in inte tegr grat ated ed into into the the PA PAF F capa capabi bili lity ty to complement existing weapons in the Air Force inventory. What the Air Force could do is to system sys temati atical cally ly employ employ them them to amp amplif lify y their their eff effect ects s and reduce reduce the relian reliance ce on let lethal hal means. Hence, to meet the challenges ambiguous consider  non-lethal weapons options. Non-lethal of weapons makesituations, available tothe thePAF PAFmust forces a wider 

 

range of responses to difficult and critical situations. More than that, non-lethality helps avoid criticism that would result from non-combatant casualties and thus enables the PAF to maintain the moral high ground.

Recommendations The A ir For ce s hould take take an an active role in the long long te term rm planning planning and advocacy  advocacy    for the applic ation of non-let non -lethal hal capabili capabilities tiesNLWs . It may appropr iate forneeds. the A ir F orc e to engage in undertaking the assessment of forbe specific mission It is also proposed that non-letha non-lethall doctrines doctrines should be integ integrated rated with exis existing ting military milita ry doctri doctrines nes to enha enhance nce the utili utilizat zation ion of curren currentt milita military ry cap capabi abilit lities ies at hand. hand. Similarly, the integration of non-lethality as a component of the PAF’s armed capability woul wo uld d re requ quir ire e doctr doctrine ine to gover govern n thei theirr appr appropr opria iate te em empl ploym oymen entt in futu future re Air Air Forc Force e operations. The PAF’s PAF’s choice and acquis acquisiti ition on of non non-l -leth ethal al system systems s mus mustt be bas based ed on the following factors: First is the availability of the system and if it is deliverable. Second is the com compat patibi ibilit lity y of the non non-leth -lethal al sy syste stems ms to existi existing ng wea weapon pon sy syste stems ms and traini training ng processes. Last is the employability of the system to effectively save lives and contribute to mission accomplishment. Given the strategic and tactical viability of employing NLW in PAF operations, it is pr prop opos osed ed that that NL NLW W devel develop opme ment nt func functi tion ons s be abso absorb rbed ed by the the We Weapo apons ns Syst System ems s Development Directorate (WSDD) of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, A-5. this direct dir ectora orate te shall shall have have the primary primary respons responsibi ibilit lity y of advanc advancing ing the PA PAF F NLW Progr Program, am, making further studies on NLW applications and monitoring latest developments in nonlethal technology. th

To evalua evaluate te the operat operation ional al employ employmen mentt of NLWs, NLWs, the 710 Speci Special al Operations Operations Wing could be designated as a test unit. The wing has been at the forefront of the PAF’s involvement in unconventional operations such as counter-insurgency, counter terrorism, counter-drug and civil disturbance control where NLWs employment fits in.

LTCOL rector tor OS S , HP A F , curr cu rr ently, he LTCOL NESTOR P DE ONA PAF (GSC  ) was for merly the Di rec is the Secretary of Air Staff, HPAF.

 

TO THE PAF FIGHTERS By 1LT 1LT CHIVAL CHIVAL CAR LOS F ESC ALANTE PAF 

As technology allowed man to fly at altitudes which would not have otherwise been bee n reache reached d by his natural natural means, means, so are parallel parallel advances advances making making pos possib sible le the increa inc rease se in his sensory sensory abiliti abilities. es. Al Alrea ready dy we have have equipm equipment ent that all allow ow us to hear  hear  across acro ss distances and to see through walls. And one relevant relevant landmark landmark development development is that of a portable see-in-the-dark gadget – the Night Vision Goggles (NVG). This device is fast finding indispensable application most particularly in the military. NVG act NVG actual ually ly isn’t isn’t as novel novel as, perhaps, perhaps, the ee-bom bomb b or bio clo clonin ning, g, but its cur curren rentt employment in tactics is yet to be realized especially in our own air force.

Though undoubtedly beneficial these devices are, its compatibility with our  present aircraft stands to be thoroughly considered before an assessment of its applicability can be readily made.

Night vision equipment actually saw its roots as early as the Second World War during which special special scopes were used with the illumination illumination from infrared infrared lamps. This capability capability allowed a special advantage as various night operations went on unhindered under the cover of darkness. darkness. However, However, the scopes that were used, then, were laborious laboriously ly heavy and the infrared infrared lamps could be transported only aboard a vehicle. Eventually, the advantage that had once been enjoyed was eroded by the enemy’s enemy’s own discovery discovery of the scope’ scope’s s technology. Not only did the infrared light sources give-a give-away way their positions, but its sheer  immobility especially against restricting terrain obstacles proved to be its biggest limitation. Thus evolved development of NVG’s that were capable of operating even under  passive lighting conditions, i.e. allowing the user to view in the dark using only ambient light energy available. These first generation of NVG’s were mostly used in the 1960’s during the Vietnam conflict.

 

Basically, the NVG gave the naked eye a glimpse of a poorly lit object by amplifying the little light energy in the ambient environment into a visible image. image. The gadget is useless under total dark darkness. ness. What happens is a photo cathode in the NVG converts traces of light energy it captures captures into electrical electrical energy. energy. This electric electric charges are amplified amplified throug thr ough h an el elect ectron ronic ic intens intensifi ifier er tube tube into into magnit magnitude udes s enough enough to projec pro jectt an im image age in the phosphor phosphoresc escent ent screen. screen. The image image on this screen scr een is, then, focuse focused d throug through h an ocular ocular lens lens whi which ch makes makes the imag image e visi visibl ble e to the the user user.. There Therefo fore re,, one one does does not not actu actual ally ly “s “see ee through” an NVG but “looks at” a processed image. Genera Gene rati tion on one one NVG’ NVG’s s can can be easi easily ly bough boughtt in the the U.S. U.S. for  for  person per sonal al use costin costing g anywhe anywhere re betwee between n Php 20, 20,000 000 to Php 35, 35,000 000.. But the only NVG’s allowed, however, for military aviation purposes are the generation generation III types. Commonly Commonly referred referred to as either the AVS-9 or F-4949, these goggles are more compact and amplify light more effect effective ively. ly. F-494 F-4949’s 9’s have been been in use since since the early early 1990’s 1990’s which should give us an idea of how adept its users are by now with its operation. Pilo Pilots ts usin using g F-49 F-4949 49’s ’s are are trai traine ned d to adap adaptt to the the in inhe here rent nt li limi mita tati tion ons s of thes these e devic devices es.. Imag Images es seen seen thro throug ugh h an NV NVG G is a monochromatic green (purposely so, as this is the color to which the hu hum man ey eye e is mos ostt resp respon onsi sive ve). ). Users ers comm ommon only ly ex expe pect ct a compromis compro mise e in image image clarit clarity y and sharpn sharpness ess granti granting ng tha thatt amb ambien ientt lighting is no dimmer than at least one thousandth times a full-moonlit evening eveni ng or that it is not totally totally dark. The most debilitating handicaps, especially for pilots, are the limited field of vision (FOV) of the F-4949 which is confined to 40 and the compromised perception of depth. now, pil pilots ots have to to Research is still underway to improve FOV to at least 100 . But for now, make a continuous continuous sweep from left to right in in order that as wide a field is monitored monitored as possible.  

 

As for the sense of depth, pilots are trained to make do with various visual “hints” they see by their goggles to judge distances. Landings are either performed with close cockpit crew coordination and an elaborate computer-aided landing approach system. Otherwise, a pilot is required to flip-up and turn-off his goggles and land by more conventional visual aids. The issue, then, as to whether the F-4949 currently in use by USAF are presently applicable to PAF aircraft, more particularly the fighters, ultimately rests on the operational compatibility compatibility of these these devices with our aircraft cockpits. Various criteria ultimately point to at least two questions: questions: 1) Are the cockpit lightings sufficient sufficient for the fighter to satisfactorily monitor his instruments and manage his cockpit?; and 2) is the canopy transparent enough to allow the transmission of adequate infrared radiation to be picked-up by the NVG?

 

Th e S-211, at least, operates with red interior  lamps which is typical of  all aircraft designed for night flying. flyi ng. By design, the spectral range F-4949’s is between 625 nanometers nanometers to 950 nanometers. Therefore, the imaging of  red-lit redlit objects such as cockpit instruments should, at least, be no problem. A complication may perhaps may be the ISIS D211 sighting system whose targeting reticle may either be invisible invisible or produc produce e unwanted glare to the NVG user. The latter, however, however, is more likely and is, as a matter of fact, the lesser of these two evils if indeed nighttime weapons delivery should actually be launched. The second question, admittedly, admittedly, cannot be as readily answered. Most canopies, though visually transparent, have been known to block of a good amount of infrared light on which NVG’s NVG’s are heavily heavily dependent. dependent. Either Either our canopies canopies be subjected subjected to spectral spectral evaluation or an actual NVG be directly tested on them at night. Admittedly, this study alone cannot provide an over-night conclusion as to whether our fighters are ready to embra whether embrace ce NVG as part of their tactics. tactics. The device may not provide the same impact as an on-board aircraft radar or a satellite-assisted surveillance system as aspired aspired under our modernization thr thrusts. usts. However, its relative cost presents this gadget as a practical complementary measure, if not a stopgap, towards improving the PAF’s effectivity in accomplishing its mission. REFERENCES: 1.

Maj Stephe Stephen n C. Hatley Hatley USAF. USAF. “NVG’s “NVG’s Don’t Fly a att Night Night Without Without Them”. Them”. USAF Flying Safety Magazine, Sept 2001. pages 4-9. 4-9.

2.

http://ww http://www.nig w.night ht-vi -vision-goggl sion-goggles.c es.com om

3.

http:/ http://ni /night ghtsee see.co .com m

 

A PREVIEW OF THE PAF WOMEN PILOTS By 1LT LILIAN VICTORIA F DELA CRUZ PAF In an appa appare rent nt move move to prov provid ide e equa equall oppo opport rtuni unity ty the the Arme Armed d Forc Forces es of the the Philippin Philip pines, es, partic particula ularly rly the Philip Philippin pine e Ai Airr Force, Force, opened opened its doo doors rs in the early early 90s to female who wanted to become aviators. To dat date, e, the Philippi Philippine ne Ai Airr Force Force has women pilot pilots s who are with with the comba combat, t, instructor, rescue, tactical and transport fields. Since accepting female pilots into its fold, the number of female pilots in the Philippine Air Force continues to grow. Starting with only two females in 1994, the Air Force now has a total of 25 female pilots since 2000. However, the figure has been trimmed down to 23 following the deaths of two females in tragic accidents in 2001. When the Philippine Philippine Air Force opened its doors for fema female le pilots, it init initially ially wanted them to be involved with administrative and instruction flights. This explains why women pilots pilot s from the fist two classes of the PAF Flyin Flying g School that had women were assigned assigned as th instructor pilots with the then 100 Training Wing. It was only in December of 1996 that the Air Force welcomed female pilots into its th

other flying units like the Airlift Winggraduates and the 505 Search Rescue Group. The year after that, four out of220 the five female of the PAF and Flying School 97-Bravo carved history a new in the Philippine Air Force. The Air Force made an unprecedented th

Move of allowing female pilots to join the 15 Strike Wing as combat pilots flying the MG520 attack helicopters and the OV10A bomber planes. th

Recently, the 5 Fighter Wing made history when 2Lt Cecile Bernabe was accepted in the fighter jock’s kingdom as its first fighter pilot. Studies within the Command have been made to assess the feasibility of women pilots, particularly those who are being utilized as tactical pilots. th

For the female pioneers pioneers of the 15 Strike Wing, there was some apprehensions when they first reported repor ted to the Wing in June 1998. they had several questions in mind. Will they be able to see through their Combat Crew Training? Can they fit into the bastion of the male combat pilots, who have been for years been used to having only men th in the 15 Strike Wing? Their entry Their entry was act actual ually ly well well met as eve everyt rythin hing g inc includ luding ing com combat bat fly flying ing undergoes change and female pilot officers are now welcomed in the Wing. Theirr entry Thei entry was not about about pro provid viding ing a point point or mak making ing sta statem tement ent.. The They y mer merely ely wanted to be treated as equals, like any other pilot trainee.

 

Then 2Lt Maribelle Belila and 2Lt Lilian dela Cruz were among the first of the four  women who initially saw deployment in Zamboanga after they were checked out as pilots of the MD520MG helicopters in March 1999. Lieutenants Mary Grace Baloyo and Ma Rita Reduta, meanwhile were checked out as Combat Combat Ready Ready Pilots Pilots of the OV-1 OV-10A 0A Bronco Bronco air aircra craft ft seven seven months months lat later. er. Their fir first st deployment was in Palawan. Life, they believed, would never be easy as it involved tremendous adjustments. It took time before they saw deployment because modifications had to be made, particularly comfor com fortt rooms rooms in the depl deploy oymen mentt areas. areas. But the then n the these se concern concerns s wer were e swiftl swiftly y soon soon addressed. Following the modifications made to suit both genders, the female pilots are no longer restricted to one Advance Command Post (ACP). They have been all over deployment areas in Mindanao-Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Davao, Jolo, Palawan, Pulacan, Sanga-Sanga and Zamboanga. Zamboanga. They have also flown combat missions from Kauswagan to Camp Abubakar in 2000, during the height of the Armed Forces campaign against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In 2001, they were also actively involved in various military campaigns to thwart the Abu Sayyaf Group.

 

FIRST FORCE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MALAMPAYA PROJECT 2LT CHRISTOPHER ALLAN M MENDOZA PAF Th The e Mala Malamp mpay aya a ga gas s fiel field d was discovered by Shell Philippines Exploration (SPEX) in 1992. However, it was not easily explored due to Shell Philippines Exploration servi service ce cont contra ract ct with with Oc Occi cide dent ntal al Ph Phil ilip ippi pine nes. s. None Noneth thel eles ess, s, whe when n Shell She ll acq acquir uired ed the remain remaining ing fif fifty ty percent (50%) of Occidental Philippin Phil ippines' es' interest interest in the service service cont contra ract ct,, it paved paved the the way for the the de deve velo lopm pmen entt of th the e Mala Malamp mpay aya a Natura turall Gas Gas Proj Projec ect. t. Th The e to tottal investment required in the de deve velo lopm pmen entt of th the e Mala Malamp mpay aya a Projectt amount Projec amounted ed aro around und US$4. US$4.5 5 billion. bill ion. This project project repres represents ents the larges estt and most significant industria indus triall inves investment tment in Phil Philippine ippine business. With explorations con onfi firrmin ing g th the e pr pres esen enc ce of 85 million barrels of condensate and at least 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the operation of the project will succes suc cessfu sfully lly sup supply ply gas ava availa ilable ble for pow power er plant plant ope operat ration ions s for the next 20 years. This is equiva This equivalen lentt to 30% of the countr country's y's petrol petroleum eum requireme requirement nt for the sam same e period which will surely allow the government a savings of around US$4.5 Billion. On the other hand, the project will not only improve the country's energy requirement but it is also expected to provide additional revenues in the amount of US$8.07 Billion. This is entirely based on a scheme where the government gets 60% of the total net proceeds as stipul stipulate ated d in the contra contract. ct. In additi addition, on, the Ar Armed med For Forces ces of the Phi Philip lippin pines es could could als also o benefit from the Malampaya power project that will provide revenue stream for the defense establishment in line with its Modernization Program. A bill has been filed in Congress allocating to the AFP Trust Fund the share of the government from taxes and charges collected from the Malampaya project. However, a major consideration However, consideration associated associated to Malampaya operation operation is the security and protection of the area of operation specifically related facilities and platforms. In line with this, President President Gloria Macapagal Macapagal Arroyo Arroyo issued Presidential Presidential Proclamat Proclamation ion No. 72 establishing safety and exclusion zones around the area of the Malampaya operation. In addition, the Armed Forces of the Philippines was mandated to undertake the necessary measures meas ures in the implementa implementation tion and enforcement enforcement of the established established safe safety ty and exclu exclusion sion zones.

 

The establishments of safety and exclusion zones prohibit the conduct of certain activities within the area without authorization from the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of National Defense (DND) and Shell Philippines, respectively. Moreover, an inter-agency committee was established to develop comprehensive strategy and plan in the effective implementation and enforcement of safety and exclusion zones. However, the main mai n respon responsib sibili ility ty lie lies s with with the Ar Armed med Forces Forces of the Phili Philippi ppines nes as man mandat dated ed by the Pr Pres esid iden entt and and as be bein ing g the the defe defens nse e forc force e in the the country. The security requirements by the operation of the Mala Ma lamp mpay aya a Natu Natura rall Gas Project in the established safety and exclusi usion zones zon es dem demand and contro controll of  th the e air air spac spaces es,, sur surface face and and subsub-su surf rfac ace e in th the e area in order der to deter  ho host stil ile e in intr trus usiion on.. Th The e concept of a joint security forc force e will will cove coverr areas areas of  possible threat and will be stationed near the facilities and platforms. Likewise, regular naval patrol and maritime air  surv survei eill llan ance ce wi will ll be pr prov ovid ided ed in th the e safe safety ty zone zones s and and adja adjace cent nt excl exclus usio ion n area areas. s. Undeniably, the western area of the Malampaya station, which is an international sea-lane communication, is vulnerable to covert intrusion in any form of attack. Furthermore, the ongoing activities near the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) pose another peril in the security of the Malampaya operation. Worst, is the intensified terroristic activities deeply involved in econ econom omic ic sa sabo bote teur urs s such such as th the e re rece cent nt at atta tack ck of Wo Worl rld d Tr Trad ade e Cent Center er and and th the e destruction of Brazil's oil rig. The estima estimated ted Hydroc Hydrocarbo arbon n dep deposi osits ts broken broken down as oil is abo about ut 1.748 1.748 bil billio lion n barrel bar rels s (US$26 (US$26.22 .220 0 Trill Trillion) ion) and as gas app approx roxima imatel tely y 16,766 16,766 billio billion n cubic cubic feet feet (US (US$46 $46 Billion). Hence, security must be provided for unhampered exploration. The Philippine Air  Force For ce has the primar primary y concer concern n of securi securing ng the countr country' y's s outer outer zone zone of defens defense e tha thatt involves active air defense. However, in the light of the Malampaya operation, there are still still import important ant aspect aspects s of air power power applic applicati ation on aside aside fro from m tac tactic tical al ope operat ration ions s suc such h as search and rescue missions, airlift operations, counter air operations, close air support and interdictio interdiction. n. Certainly Certainly,, the developmen developmentt of air power as the primary defense defense posture of the country has limited its application in the internal security operations. Today, the Philippine Air Force struggles a strategic shift in the employment of air  power capability towards external defense. The role of air power is inherently associated in the preservation of our national security and territorial integrity. The current security requirement of the Malampaya Gas Project illustrates the necessity of paradigmatic shift from internal concerns to external concerns. Indeed, the project is situated at a strategic doorway - characteristically adjacent to a critical area of sea-lane of communication and transportation. Though limited in resources and capability, the PAF continue to provide air assets committed in securing the Malampaya area in performing maritime patrols.

 

The ser seriou ious s issue issue reg regardi arding ng the li limit mited ed capability of the PAF to provide effective security for the Malampaya needs to be addressed by the National Nati onal Government Government and Congr Congress ess through through the im imme medi diat ate e acqu acquis isit itio ion n of mo mode dern rn equi equipm pmen ent. t. Moreover, the AFP must fully realize the im impor portan tance ce of air power applic applicati ation on as the vit vital al cog of our national defense posture. In the global scene, the current war against terrorism waged by the United States against Afghanistan affirms the de deci cisi sive vene ness ss of ai airr po powe werr appl applic icat atio ion n in th the e settleme sett lement nt of moder modern n armed conflict conflict.. Moreove Moreover, r, the painful and costly lessons of history during World War I and II, Korean War, Bosnian War and the Gulf War attested to the success of air power. The outbreak of war in Mindanao tailored by the secessionists group confirmed the airworthiness of the PAF roles as an independent and distinct force in the suppression of enemy forces.

In con conclu clusio sion, n, the Phi Philip lippin pine e Ai Airr Force Force define defines s air pow power er encomp encompass assing ing bot both h military and economic endeavor. As a result, the PAF addresses both internal and external defens def ense e and ser serves ves as the partne partnerr of the govern governmen mentt in nat nation ional al dev develo elopme pment nt eff effort orts. s. Now, it Now, it's 's abou aboutt time time for for the the gove govern rnme ment nt to look look for for al alte tern rnat ativ ive e sour sources ces of fund funds s to implement the PAF Modernization Program to address in particular the Malampaya project and in general the Philippine sovereignty.

1 SPEX, "Malampaya Deep Water to Gas Project Brochures and Pamphlets", p. 3 2 Department of Energy and US DNR Technical Assistant Division

 

VIP FLYING IN AN UNFRIENDLY ENVIRONMENT BY CPT DANIEL M ESPIRITU PAF FLYING THE PRESIDENT INTO THE HEART OF SIERRA MADRE AND THE CORDILLERA’S

Flying the highest figure in the land is the job of the pilots and crew of the th 250 Presidential Airlift Wing. It is the President’s thrust to personally assess the needs of the least privileged Filipino people in the most remote part of the country. This intention sometimes does not give much options to the presidential pilots especially in flying to a place with probably the most unfriendly environmental condition in the archipelago. The unit’s mission is; “to provide safe, secure and  effective  air transportation to the President of the Republic of the Philippines, immediate members of his/her family, visiting visit ing heads of state and other loca locall and foreign foreign VVIP’s”. Flying Flying the Presi President dent requires requires the highest degree of safety, the ultimate achievable comfort, and maximum security. This th is the very reason why the original word “efficie “efficient” nt” is changed to “effe “effective” ctive” in the 250 PAW mission statement although it has been the usual word for several years. It is mainly becaus bec ause e the word word   effective   justif justifies ies the unit’s unit’s fir firm m sta stand nd in mis missio sion n acco accompl mplish ishmen ment. t. Although to be effective and to be efficient is at the same time the primary consideration, efficiency  can   can be traded off to  effectiveness if the situation requires so.  A firm stand that explains the doctrine of conducting ocular inspection and probing flight prior to the real McCoy.

Ocular inspection  on the planning aspect of a presidential engagement is a general assessmen assess mentt of all the la landi nding ng zon zones es (LZs) (LZs) and surrou surroundi nding ng env enviro ironme nment nt on int intend ended ed places pla ces of eng engagem agement ent.. It covers covers selecti selection on and cleari clearing ng of the safes safestt and widest widest LZ, determination of fuel requirements based on the actual nature of LZs and other aspects essential to flight planning planning and performance of the missi mission. on. The inspection might be done by land or by air possibly involving involving a non-250 PAW air asset asset.. On the other hand, probing   flig ht   is done to determine the actual time en route, to check suitability of LZs and to confirm if recommendations during the ocular inspection regarding improvement of the chosen chose n landing spots have been done accurately. accurately. The flight requires requires the use of the same type of aircraft to be used on the real McCoy. This procedure on VVIP flying obviously involve extra efforts and additional resources to the extent of considering “back-ups to the back-up” but it guarantees the unit with 101% successful mission accomplishment. The recent visit of the President in the mountainous regions of Northern Luzon was indeed a th great challenge on the part of the 250 PAW, but with the employment of the right doctrine and with the unlimited tactics and skills of the Presidential pilots, the mission is a clear  success.

 

TACTICS WILL COME ALONG AS SITUATION CALLS In the world of reality, there are times that even the most ideal doctrine can never  be employed. This is proven consistent in the field of helicopter flying wherein terrain, weat we athe herr cond condit itio ion, n, time time cons constr trai aint nt,, li limi mite ted d re reso sourc urces, es, secur securit ity y si situ tuat atio ion, n, othe other  r  environmental factors are the most likely the common causes. It was was ti time med d with with most most unpr unpred edic icta tabl ble e tren trend d of we weat athe herr when when the the vi visi sitt of the the President took place in the rugged terrains of Sierra Madre and the Cordillieras from 29 December 2001 to 11 January 2002. The visit covered the provinces of Benguet, Ilocos Sur,, Ab Sur Abra, ra, Ifug Ifugao, ao, Kalinga Kalinga and the Pacific Pacific side of Isabela Isabela.. It was on this pressing pressing time when whe n the Bl Blueb uebird irds, s, withou withoutt int intent ent,, have have overri overridde dden n the ideal ideal proced procedure ure in VIP fly flying ing which calls for the formulation of a tactical approach in VIP flying called, “ the Round-

Robin maneuver”. WHEN THE LESSER LESSER EVIL IS THE LAST OPTION (THE R OU OUND-ROBIN ND-ROBIN MANEUVER ) In situations very far from the ideal, usually the flight commander is being pressed to the wall and made to choose the lesser evil as the last option. Howev However, er, it should be an option that still could guarantee safe and successful mission accomplishment. The postchristmas Sierra Madre- Cordillera presidential mission is a scenario wherein the Roundrobin maneuver is best applicable.

This new tactic in VIP flying “ the roun round d-rob robin maneuv neuve er ”, is espe especi cial ally ly suit suited ed for for mo mount untai aino nous us re regi gion ons s as be best st de desc scri ribe bed d by th the e ru rugg gged ed te terr rrai ain, n, hi high gh pi pinn nnac acle les s and and narrow ridges of the Sierra Madre and the Cordillera. It is a maneuve uver  empl mploy oyed ed in mu mulltipl tiple e he heli lico copt pter  er  operation that rotates the members of  the flight in the sequence of take offs and landings in areas of limited space. In this scenario the other members of the flight drop their passengers at the primary LZ before proceeding to the alternate LZ. The primary aircraft and the last aircraft to land will occupy the primary LZ. The  R ound-robin ound-robin   maneuver does not cater only to space-limited LZ’s, but it also increases the leverage in fuel reserve and lessen the airborne exposure of  the the VI VIP P sinc since e it si sign gnif ific ican antl tly y re redu duce ces s en ro route ute and and loit loiter er time time.. It al also so sati satisf sfie ies s the the considerat consi deration ion that the back-up back-up aircraf aircraftt (“B”) should should always be at the side or nearest nearest to the primary aircraft (“A”), either airborne or on the ground, due to its role as back-up and security aircraft. By protocol, in multiple helicopter operation, the primary aircraft (“A”) lands first, followed by the back-up aircraft (“B”) carrying close-in-security personnel, then the secondary aircraft (“C”), followed by the tertiary (“D”) etc. Oftentimes protocol in the sequence of landing is being waived in space-limited LZ’s. However, the proximity of “B”

 

to the primary aircraft must never be waived as much as possible due to its security function. CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT Definition: Primary aircraft - aircraft that carries the VVIP designated as “A”. Back-up aircraft aircraft –  – back up u p to the primary aircraft that carries close in and SRU (Special Reaction Unit, PSG) personnel designated as “B”. aircraft  - back-up to the back-up aircraft that carries other VIPs Secondary/Tertiary aircraft designated desi gnated as “C”, “D” etc. They will be rotated rotated to act as “B” on the roundroundrobin concept. LZ – landing zone and parking Primary LZ – p arking position for the primary aircraft while the VVIP is in the place of engagement. It must be on or near the place of  engagement. Alternate LZ – LZ  – alternate landing spot and parking position for other members of the flight after dropping their passengers at the primary LZ in mountainous areas wherein there is no access for land vehicle to the primary LZ. From the first departure point to the first itinerary, with a primary LZ that can only accommodat accom modate e two or only one aircraft, aircraft, C, D, etc. should take off ahead ahead of A and B to avoid slowing slowi ng down of A and B prior to landing. landing. This technique will give enough time for C, D, E etc. To drop passengers passengers at the primary primary LZ (wherein “A “A” ” and “B” will later later make full stop landing) landi ng) before proceeding proceeding to the alternate alternate LZ. It also allows C, D, E, etc. To make advance route and weather recon for the primary and the back-up aircraft. It further  facilitates the role of other VIPs with the flight, like military commanders and local officials who are designated to receive the President on site. During the take off to the second itinerary, A and B must take off first so that C, D, E, etc. can pick -up their  their  assigned passengers at the primary LZ. Upon completing engine start, C, D, E etc. shall airborne immediately and make a “pattern” along the final approach of the pick-up zone. After take off, B followed by A, will then proceed and land ahead on the next LZ. After unloading its passengers, B must transfer to the alternate LZ, providing space for C, D, E, etc. to drop their passengers before they transfer to the alternate LZ. This time, the last aircraft aircraft to land will make full stop and occupy the space at the side of  the primary aircraft and then become the new back-up aircraft. The new “B” shall now switch function and callsign with the original back up. In short, the proximity of an aircraft

 

to the primary aircraft will determine which aircraft will serve as the new back up that will take effect as soon as all aircraft have landed. Posting of placards beside each aircraft as enlarged manifest will solve possible complications in loading for the next itinerary. Same series of procedure shall be applied to the succeeding itineraries. Employ Emp loymen mentt of the Round Round-r -robi obin n con concep ceptt will will pro provid vide e signif significa icant nt maneuve maneuverin ring g flexibility and considerably reduce en route and loiter time. In the sense, it lessens fuel load requirement thereby increasing the much needed engine power available for a safe high altitude altitude and confined landing. landing. Furthermo Furthermore, re, this maneuver reduces reduces the expos exposure ure of  the the Pr Pres esid iden entt to unne unnece cess ssary ary risk risks s when when ai airb rbor orne ne in such such mo moun unta tain inou ous s area areas s of  operation.

 

COUNTER COU NTERING ING TER TERROR RORISM ISM IR OM OMM M NDO NDO G INS INST T SY SYMM MMETR ETRII TH THRE RE TS CPT OTTO THOMAS AM PACIA HISTORY AND PROFILE

According to Rudolf Levy in a manual for Crisis Management (1978), terrorism is not a new phenomena; its use for various reasons has been practiced for many centuries. History and legends have shown that terrorism with guerilla warfare and hostage strategies have been in use with varied degrees of success practically since the beginning of the history of man. As early as 512 BC, military military leader Darius Darius was defeated by guerilla guerilla activity acti vity by the native native Scithians Scithians.. Alexander Alexander the Great Great was known known to devise devise speci special al strategies to combat terrorism and and guerilla activities. The Roman Empire has its problems with continued subversive activities and terror terrorism. ism. Since the invention of gunpowder gunpowder and with it the firearm, the bomb and the booby-trap, terrorism has become a sophisticated tactic used together with military operations often used as a political tool. Terrorism has undergone a series of reorganizations and redefinitions. TERMS:

Terrorism – the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, often political or ideological in in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation intimidation or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience audie nce beyond the immediate immediate victims. victims. A systematic systematic use of terror terror especial especially ly as a means of coercion.

nti-terrori ori s m   – preven preventive tive measures measures taken taken to reduce reduce the probab probabili ility ty of a ter terror rorist ist act  A nti-terr occurring.

Counter terrorism   – are offens offensive ive reacti reactive ve measur measures es taken taken to res respon pond d to ter terror rorist ist acts including gathering of information, and threat analysis. Cr is is Ma Mana nagg em emen entt T ea eams ms  – concerned with the plans, policies. procedures, techniques, and controls for dealing sudden violent acts of terrorism.

 

perationss  – are actions conducted by specially trained organized, and equipped  S peci al O peration military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic or psychological objectives by non-conventional means in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas.

Commando – a military unit trained and organized as shock troops especially for hit and run raids into an enemy territory.

Proactive  – plan of action ahead of time. A contemporary terrorist very seldom acts on his own, he belongs to a group or an organization, is motivated by some sort of political philosophy and in all cases embraces some som e cause. cause. Ther There e is, in most most cases cases a theore theoretic tical al – politi political cal or religi religious ous progr program am of  motivation to justify the existence and the tactics of the organization. The present terrorist organizations in most cases have capable leadership, professionally trained in the art of  science of the “fifth column” warfare. In many cases these terrorist or guerilla organizations serve as fronts for other  political or foreign which may not wish to be directly identified with the particular  terrorist activity or cause. Today’s terrorist/guerilla activities are generally identified within four basic categories: 1.   Nationalistic Movement.  Fight for independence from foreign domination, freedom movements and self determination movements. 2.   Right Wing.   Since the end of World War II, there have been a number of right wing organizatio organizations ns here and abroad. abroad. However, However, the use of terrorism terrorism agains againstt the general gener al populati population on has not been used extensively. extensively. Normally Normally the right wing terrorism terr orism is directed directed at a particular particular group group of people people.. In many cases the right wing ideology is further identified with Nationalist Movements. 3.   Left Wing. ing. A  A survey of world terrorist activities has produced a proof that most of the terrorist activities are directly identified with left wing organizations and communist international movements. Fundamentalists/ Extremist/Separatist – In a guise of promoting religious beliefs and ideology, this group has ingrained within their offspring the world of violence and machismo. Terrorist Terror ist act activi ivity ty is aimed aimed at the gen genera erall pop popula ulatio tion n by whi which ch the ter terror rorist ist organizatio organi zation n seeks to influence influence or destroy the established established system system.. Terrorist Terrorist acts have a direct influence on the social structure; it erodes the trust in the established social syst system em and and fost foster ers s in inse secu curi rity ty am amon ong g the the peop people le,, showi showing ng that that thei theirr pres presen entt governm gove rnment ent is ine inept pt in the matters matters of securi security ty and can cannot not defend defend the them m or pro provid vide e adequate protection. PORTRAIT OF A TERRORIST In combatin combating g terror terrorism ism,, we must must fir first st of all get into a terror terrorist ist’’ mind. mind. We must determine who they are, what their motives are and how would they possibly accomplish their the ir indoct indoctrin rinate ated d threat threat to our society society.. Since Since terror terrorism ism has not only been a loc locali alized zed issue, it has garnered in civil society when the World Trade Center has been hit twice throughgreater the useperspective of an aircraft.

 

A terrorist could be categorized as Crazy, a Criminal or a Crusader. Today’s terrorist has probably had training in the use of weapons, explosives, booby-traps, small group fighting, as well as in the specialized tactics of hijacking (sea jacking), assassinations and kidnapping. The terrorists receive these instructions together with political and ideological indoctrination at training camps in Libya, South Yemen, North Korea, Russia, Cuba, Afghanistan and a number of other places. Today’s terrorism is internationa internationalized lized and the Socialist World Organization is supporting the terrorist movements with their  trained leaders, advisers, advisers, and monetary support. The terrorist groups operate throughout the world with continuous contact with the “Mother Organization”. CRISIS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Shown below is the crisis conceptual conceptual framework framework base on the DND-AFP DND-AFP CRISIS MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE: The Proactive Stage includes the following: Prediction MANAGEMENT Prediction (Threat Analysis); Analy sis); Prevention (Operati (Operation on Security, Security, Personnel Personnel Security Security and Physical Physical Security); Security); Preparati Prepa ration on (Planning, (Planning, Organizing Organizing,, Training, Training, Equipp Equipping, ing, Mainta Maintaining ining Read Readiness iness). ). Once a crisis cris is situati situation on erupts, reactive reactive stage starts. It includes the following: following: Implement Implementation ation of  the Contingency Contingency Plan Plan,, Initial Initial Action, Action, Action, then either either Negotiatio Negotiation n or Tacti Tactical cal Act Action ion Intervention then finally Post Action.

PROACTIVE

ACTIVE

Prediction

IContingency MPLAN o f   Preparation Plan and Submission Submi ssion of  POR Initial Action

Prevention

Action

Preparation

-Negotiation -Tactical Action

REACTIVE

 

CRISIS ACTION PLAN Military units must have a Crisis Management Action Plan to enable them to react in cases when crisis incidents occur. Generally military comm commanders anders plan, organize, train, equip and maintain maintain operational operational readiness. readiness. They must organize negotiation, negotiation, operations, operations, serv servic ice e supp suppor ortt and and a publ public ic affa affair irs s grou group. p. The They y will will provi provide de proc procedu edure res s for for thei their  r  immediate activation when the need arises. Once a si Once situ tuat atio ion n aris arises es,, we si simp mply ly cann cannot ot be caug caught ht flat flatfo foot oted ed.. The MOVE MOVE,, SHOOT, COMMUNICATE, SEE and other prerequisites are being addressed to as of this writing. And since we do have an effective, potent and readily deployable force to conduct counter terrorist operations and other types of special operations throughout the country, tr trai aini ning ng mu must st be sust sustai aine ned d to shar sharpe pen n furt furthe herr our our S5 (SKI (SKILL LL,, SP SPEED EED,, STR STREN ENGTH GTH,, STAMINA STA MINA and STABIL STABILITY) ITY).. The Air Force’ Force’s s Quick Quick Re React action ion Tea Teams ms (QRT) (QRT) are alr already eady capa capabl ble e of the the foll follow owin ing: g: cond conduc ucti ting ng hosta hostage ge re resc scue ue oper operat atio ion n invo involv lvin ing g grou group p of  host hostag ages es,, par parti ticu cula larl rly y in urba urban n and and rura rurall sett setting ings; s; be depl deploy oyed ed with within in shor shortt noti notice ce anywhere in the country; conduct special operations and infiltrate or exfiltrate by air and land. Currently, the need to develop and fine tune our anti-hijacking capability is a must in the next two to three years years which which must must be addres addressed sed to. The desi desired red modern modern and sophisticated equipage is not a “nice to have” thing but necessary tools to accomplish our mission mission which is to neutralize neutralize terrorists. terrorists. We must likewise have real time intelligence intelligence once a crisis is there. Countering terrorism is to foresight the worst possible scenarios of terrorism like biological and chemical warfare, suicide bombers, and other means of creating trouble. This we have been preparing for. But one message remains the same and that on our end our will to fight these threats couldn’t be eroded for we have the sincere and dedicated people who will give trouble makers what they deserve. References: Crisis Management for US Marshall (1978) Info kit on the Course on Internal Armed Conflict (NDCP) Update on the Trends of Terrorism (OA-2) DND-AFP Crisis Management Doctrine

 

THE 205TH TACTICAL HELI HE LICOP COPTE TER R WIN WING G ON THE ECONOMY OF FORCE 1LT 1L T JA JASO SON N T BUE BUERA RANO NO PA PAF F

From a distance they look like birds flying in flocks darkening darkening the skies, but as they come closer, you will will see not birds, but a dozen UH-1H (Huey) helicopters gallantly flying in formation, off to perform a single mission. But those golden days of the “Hueys” in the 1980’s have long gone. The drastic decrease of UH-1H helicopters in the early nineties attributed to its aging frame and the difficulty in the availability of its vital components slowly depleted the number of the Huey helicopters in the Air Force th inventory. The 205 Tactical Helicopter Wing being the home of the Hey, adapted with the situation and made a good strategy in the deployment of the remaining twenty three (23) UH-1H in their fleet. With the AFP’s need of utility helicopters to carry personnel and logistics and to bring them to places where other means of transportation cannot reach th and fix-wing aircraft cannot land, the 205 TH THW W is in inde deed ed facin facing g a great great chal challe leng nge e in accomplishing its mission of conducting Tactical Air Operation to support AFP forces and perform socio-economic flights to support the government in nation building. With limited air assets and logistics to support the operation of eight (8) Army Divisions and Three (3) Marine Brigades and with more than 7,100 islands to cover, the th task seems difficult to meet. Thus, 205 THW have come to economize economize the use of its assets by strategically deploying them parallel with the AFP’s ground forces distribution and in a manner manner in which each of them can promptly promptly support the other in cases where a greater number of Hueys are needed. This in turn maximizes the use of our remaining assets in answering all needs. Current situations in Mindanao where massive troops deployment has been going on, have resulted in three (3) Army Divisions and three (3) Marine Brigades simultaneously conducting sustained combat operations to end the lawless activities of the Abu-Sayaff Group, the need for Huey helicopters increases in this th area. Reacting on this matter, the 205 THW sent an additional three (3) more aircraft from the Visayas to augment this need, thus the total number of Huey helicopters in the south th was increased to ten (10). This ,means that the 205 THW is in the position of providing the best that it can in areas where it is needed most, but at the same time, not underestimating the situation on secondary targets by deploying five (5) aircraft in Luzon, two (2) in Palawan and six (6) in Visayas.

 

The PAF, sensing the greater need for Utility Helicopter has come to acquire an additional five (5) UH-1H helicopters through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and made th a program to upgrade and recover recover more Huey helicopters helicopters from the 410 Maintenance Wing storage. The arrival of five (5) UH-1H helicopters from the EDA will strengthen the th 205 THW capability. With a total of twenty-eight (28) Huey helicopters now under our  inventory inven tory,, we are able to provide provide better service service to the AFP and Count Country. ry. In line with the th ground troops disposition, 205 THW is planning to deploy the 28 aircraft in the following distribution. LOCATION LUZON

UNIT TH

207

THS

NO OF ACFT 8

CJVAB

2

TARLAC

1

LUCENA

2

CAUAYAN

1

PALAWAN VISAYAS

208TH

THS

2

BACOLOD

2

MBEAB MINDANAO

TH

TH

210  /208

2

TH

2

208

DAVAO

206

COTABATO JOLO ZAMBOANGA TOTAL

1/1 12

TH

CAGAYAN DE ORO

Two (2) Army Division

2

210

TH

Three (3) Army Division

2 8

ILOILO

TACLOBAN

AFP GROUND FORCES DISTRIBUTION

2 TH

TH

206  /208

2 3/1 28

The integration of the newly acquired five (5) UH-1H helicopters and the th completion of the ongoing Huey upgrading completion upgrading and recovery recovery at 410 MW combined with the th excellent managerial expertise of our Commanders, the 205 THW will soon bounce back to its golden years; a Wing accomplishments, a force to reckon with and a partner in nation building, provider of faster and better services to the nation

 

Thee Chief Th o f i r S t af f

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE L REYES O-6444 AFP is AFP  is a distinguished member of the Philippine Military Academy Class of 1973. He is also a graduate of various local and international courses such as Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering, Master in National Security Administration, Safety Officer Course and Squadron Officer Course in Maxwell, Alabama, USA. He was a recipient of the Distinguished Graduate Award for exemplary performance when he completed his Defense Management Course in 1984 and CGSC in 1993, respectively. Further, he attended several seminars such as International Humanitarian Law, Visiting Forces Agreement, UNCLOS, Conflict Resolution and Disaster  Management to name a few. A well-exp well-experien erienced ced pilot and bemedalle bemedalled d officer, officer, BGEN REYES held numerous command and staff positions both in the Air Force and the AFP. His career is ripened with nume numero rous us fi fiel eld d assi assign gnme ment nts s and and comb combat at expe experi rienc ence e from from the the nor north ther ernm nmos ostt to the the southernmost part of the country. Among them were as Chief for Plans and Program (L-5), th AFP LOGCOM, Director, DME (A-6), Commander, CASF 10, Director for Operations, 15 SW, Chief, Division Staff, 3AD, Commander, Task group Valentine, Commandant of PAF Flying School, Secretary Joint Staff, GHQ AFP and Chief of Operations (A-3). In his previous position as Secretary Joint Staff, he made remarkable GHQ Staff actions. And An d as Chi Chief ef of Operat Operation ions s (A-3), (A-3), he outsta outstandi ndingl ngly y pushed pushed up ope operat rationa ionall readin readiness ess posting the highest OR rates of PAF air assets. He assumed the position as Chief of Air Staff last 01 December 2000, succeeding BGEN Lamberto E Sillona. He is concurrently the Chairman of various PAF boards and Special Committees. He is also an Ex-officio member of the PAF Modernization Board and ViceChair Cha irman man of the PAF PAF Doctri Doctrine ne Board, Board, respecti respectively vely.. He is the younge youngest st Genera Generall in the whole AFP today. His friends and classmates dub him as the "Epitome of Excellence".

Q. How doAir you seetoday? your role as the Chief of Air Staff Staff in the overal overalll operatio operations ns of the Philippine Force

 

A. Basi Basically cally,, the role of the Chief of Air Staff Staff remains remains the same as it was before, before, that is, primarily to supervise, direct, coordinate and orchestrate the work (not the staff  officers) of the coordinating and special staffs in order to carry out the CG, PAF’s intentions inten tions.. There are also times that I decide withi within n the level entrusted entrusted by the CG. One notable change now, is that the operations of the PAF have become a bit complex due to the advent of additional roles the Air Force has portrayed for the last few years. CMO,, Sports CMO Sports,, Special Special Operat Operation ions, s, Rescue Rescue and oth other er soc socio io-econ -economi omic c activi activitie ties s all related rela ted to nation building have taken larger larger roles in the PAF’s overal overalll operations. operations. With more roles to perform amid limited assets and resources, we have to make do on what we have. Q. How do you relate your present present position position with your previous previous positions positions both in the headquarters and in the field? A. Th The e posi positi tion on of CA CAS comp compel els s me to vie view w thin things gs on on a macro macro lev level el.. I am now now directly involved in the wider scope of decision-making with the end view of attaining whatt is good for the whole wha whole Ai Airr Force and not just for a single uni unitt in particu particular lar.. You have to see the bigger bigger pic pictur ture e fir first st before before casting casting your share share in top top-l -leve evell dec decisi ision on maki ma king ng or poli policy cy making. making. Unli Unlike ke in the the fiel field d wh wher ere e al alll you you have have to do is focus focus in accomplishing your unit’s mission, here at HPAF as CAS, you have to deal with a lot of  variables to be able to satisfy the PAF needs in its entirety. Q. Presi President dent Gloria Gloria Macapag Macapagal al Arroyo Arroyo stressed stressed the import importance ance of the AFP doctri doctrines nes in her speech during the AFP Anniversary (Dec 2001), as the Chief of Air Staff, how do you see your role in the doctrine development development of the PAF? A. As Vice-Ch Vice-Chairm airman, an, PAF Doctrine Doctrine Board Board and an Ex-Offic Ex-Officio io Member o off the PAF Modernization Board, it is but fitting that I assume an active role in the doctrine developm develo pment ent of the PAF. Doct Doctrine rine Developmen Developmentt stands as one of the main components compon ents of PAF Modernization. Modernization. As such, the PAF Doctrine Board and its subcommittees are assured of my full support in the furtherance of appropriate doctrines for the PAF. In fact, I was the advocate advocate of the Night Surface Surface Attack Doc Doctrine trine and the th Special Operations Training Doctrine at 15 Strike Wing wherein we have introduced the use of new tactics for the OV-10 aircraft to further increase its effectiveness in combat. Lately, the reconfiguration of the SF-260TP into a light attack mode which I have fully supported, hence a formulation of new applicable doctrine, is another  manifestation of my commitment to this this field. I firmly believe that continuous doctrine development is one area that should be given more focus for salient reasons that cannot be overemphasized. Q. As Hea Head d and Mem Member bers s of var variou ious s board boards/c s/comm ommitt ittees ees in the the Air Air Forc Force, e, what what is your perception on the PAF Modernization priorities? A. We have have to be be ve very ry rea reali list stic ic in in sett settin ing g up our our pri prior orit itie ies. s. W Wha hatt do we we ur urge gent ntly ly need and what resources resources are avail available? able? We should be aware of the present economic economic condition of the country and from there; we can gauge on how far we can go. The question questi on is: do we have enough funds funds for the multi-mill multi-million ion dollar dollar priority priority list? If this could not be realizable within the next 5 years or so, then we have to reprioritize and opt for the attainable ones. We need modern equipment suited for current operations and near future situation, i.e. ISO, maritime patrol, transnational & terrorists threats among others. Q. Whatt are Wha are your your fut future ure pla plans ns both both in your your car career eer and you yourr lead leaders ership hip in uni units ts of  PAF and AFP?

 

A. Life Life and and car caree eerr is is a jjou ourn rney ey.. IItt is is a jou journ rney ey th thro roug ugh h rrou ough gh a and nd some someti time mes s smooth smoot h roads. Of my 33 years in the service, service, I have traversed a lot of those roads and perh perhap aps s lu lucky cky enough enough to be a surv surviv ivor or.. I don’ don’tt ha have ve any any spec specif ific ic pl plans ans for for the the remaining rema ining 5 years of my career. career. What I have are broad ones. My personal personal outlook is to work wor k the hardest hardest and give my best best shot shot on every assignm assignment ent entr entruste usted d to me. One should not expect rewards, promotions, recognition or any form of accolades in doing things for he might get deeply frustrated. If you get recognize for a job well done, it's fine; if not, fine too. The idea is to go on positively positively come what may…anyway may…anyway it is good for your heart.

Sponsor Documents

Or use your account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Forgot your password?

Or register your new account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Lost your password? Please enter your email address. You will receive a link to create a new password.

Back to log-in

Close