American Psychologist Positive Psychology

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AMERI CAN
PSYCHOLOGIST
DECADE
"/BEHAVIOR
Special Issue on Happiness, Excellence,
and Optimal Human Functioning
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Sunrise, Sunset
Gaylord Hassan
Journal of ihe Americon Psychological Associalion January 2000 Volume 55 Number 1 ISSN 0003-066X
ISBN 1-55798-704-1
January
2000
AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST
Volume 55
Number 1
Special Issue: Positive Psychology
Guest Editors: Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
Positive Psychology:
An Introduction
Mar t i n E. P. S e l i g ma n a n d
Mi h a l y Cs i k s z e n t mi h a l y i
The Evolution of Happiness Davi d M. Buss 15
I ndi vi dual Devel opment in
a Bio-Cultural Perspective
Fa u s t o Ma s s i mi n i and An t o n e l l a De l l e Fa v e 24
Subjective Wel l -Bei ng:
The Science of Happiness
and a Proposal f or
a Nat i onal I ndex
Ed Di e n e r 34
The Future of Opti mi sm Ch r i s t o p h e r Pe t e r s o n 44
The Funds, Friends, and
Faith of Happy People
David G. Myers 56
Editor
Raymond D. Fowl er
Managi ng Editor
Mel i ssa G. Warren
Section Editors
James L. Pate
History of Psychology
and Obituaries
Lyl e E. Bourne, Jr.
Science Watch
Patrick H. DeLeon
Psychology in the
Public Forum
Denise C. Park
Science Watch
Associate Editors
Wi l l i am Bevan
Kennet h J. Gergen
Bernadette Gray-Little
Journal of the
American Psychological
Association
O n t h e c o v e r : Sunrise, Sunset; Sun Series #3,
1980, by Gaylord Hassan. Oil on canvas, 60
inches by 48 inches. Copyright by Gaylord Hassan.
Licensed by VAGA, New York, NY. Direct inquiries to
VAGA, (212) 736-6767.
Sel f-Determi nati on Theory
and the Facilitation
of I ntri ns i c Mot i vat i on,
Social Devel opment,
and Wel l -Bei ng
Ri c h a r d M. Ry a n a n d E d wa r d L. De c i 68
Sel f - Det ermi nat i on:
The Tyranny of Freedom
Barry Schwartz 79
Ad a p t i v e Me nt a l
Mechanisms:
Their Role in a
Positive Psychology
Ge or ge E. Vai l / ant 89
Psychological Resources,
Positive Illusions,
and Heal th
She l l e y E. Taylor, Ma r g a r e t E.
Ge of f r e y M. Reed, J u l i e n n e E.
a n d Tara L. Gr u e n e wa l d
Ke me ny , 9 9
Bower,
Emotional States and
Physical Heal th
Pe t e r Sal ovey, A l e x a n d e r J. Ro t h ma n ,
J e r u s h a B. Det wei l er , a n d Wayne T. S t e wa r d
110
Wi sdom: A Metaheuristic
(Pragmatic) to Orchestrate
Mi nd and Vi r t ue
Toward Excellence
Paul B. Baltes and Ursula MI Staudinger 1 2 2
Wi l l i a m C. Ho w e l l
J. Bruce Over mi er
Cheryl B. Travi s
Samuel M. Turner
Production Editors
Cara B. Abrecht
Stefanie Lazer
Kurt Pawl i k Gary R. VandenBos
States of Excellence Davi d Lubi nski and Cami l l a Persson Be nbow 137
Creativity: Cognitive,
Personal, Developmental,
and Social Aspects
Dean Kei t h Si mont on 151
The Origins and Ends
of Giftedness
Ellen Winner 159
Toward a Psychology
of Positive
Youth Development
Re e d W. Lar s on 170
A nnouncements
184
Ca l e n d a r
186
I nst ruct i ons t o Aut hor s
190
El ect r oni c mai l f or the Ameri can Psychol ogi st may be sent to APedi t or @apa. or g.
The paper in t hi s j our nal meet s or exceeds EPA gui del i nes f or r ecycl ed paper. Si nce 1986, t hi s j our nal has been pr i nt ed on aci d- f r ee paper.
APA
The American Psychological
Association, founded in 1892 and
incorporated in 1925, is the maj or
psychological organization in the United
States. The purpose of the APA is to
advance psychology as a science, as a
profession, and as a means of promoting
human welfare. It attempts to accomplish
these objectives by holding annual
meetings, publishing psychological
journals, disseminating psychological
literature, and working toward improved
standards for psychological training and
service.
Copyright © 2000 by the
American Psychological Association, Inc.
APA Boar d of Directors
President
Patrick H. DeLeon, PhD, MPH, JD
Washington, DC
President-Elect
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Independent practice, Quincy, MA
Past President
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Colorado State University
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Harvard Medical School
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The American Psychologist (ISSN 0003-066X)
is published mont hl y in one vol ume per year by the
American Psychol ogi cal Association, Inc., 750 First
Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242.
Subscriptions are available on a cal endar-year basis
only (January t hrough December). The 2000 rates
follow: Nonmember Individual: $198 Domestic,
$238 Foreign, $265 Air Mail. Institutional: $400
Domestic, $488 Foreign, $515 Air Mail. Write to
Subscriptions Department, Ameri can Psychol ogi cal
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Positive Psychology
An I ntroduction
Martin E. P. Seligman
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
University of Pennsylvania
Claremont Graduate University
A science of positive subjective experience, positive indi-
vidual traits, and positive institutions promi ses to improve
quali~.' of life and prevent the pathologies that arise when
life is barren and meaningless. The exclusive f ocus on
pathology that has dominated so much of our discipline
results in a model of the human being lacking the positive
f eat ures that make life worth living. Hope, wisdom, cre-
ativity, f ut ure mindedness, courage, spirituality, responsi-
bility, and perseverance are ignored or explained as trans-
f ormat i ons of more authentic negative impulses. The 15
articles in this millennial issue of the American Psycholo-
gist discuss such issues as what enables happiness, the
effects of autonomy and self-regulation, how optimism and
hope affect health, what constitutes wisdom, and how talent
and creativity come to fruition. The authors outline a
f ramework .['or a science of positive psychology, point to
gaps in our knowledge, and predi ct that the next century
will see a science and profession that will come to under-
stand and build the f act ors that allow individuals, commu-
nities, and societies to flourish.
E
ntering a new millennium, Ameri cans face a histor-
r ical choice. Left alone on the pinnacle of economic
and political leadership, the United States can con-
tinue to increase its material wealth while ignoring the
human needs of its peopl e and those of the rest of the
planet. Such a course is likely to lead to increasing self-
ishness, to alienation between the more and the less fortu-
nate, and eventually to chaos and despair.
At this juncture, the social and behavioral sciences can
play an enormousl y important role. They can articulate a
vision of the good life that is empirically sound while being
understandable and attractive. They can show what actions
lead to well-being, to positive individuals, and to thriving
communities. Psychol ogy should be able to help document
what kinds of families result in children who flourish, what
work settings support the greatest satisfaction among work-
ers, what policies result in the strongest civic engagement,
and how peopl e' s lives can be most worth living.
Yet psychologists have scant knowl edge of what
makes life worth living. They have come to understand
quite a bit about bow peopl e survive and endure under
conditions of adversity. (For recent surveys of the history
of psychol ogy, see, e.g., Benjamin, 1992; Koch & Leary,
1985; and Smith, 1997.) However, psychologists know
very little about how normal peopl e flourish under more
benign conditions. Psychol ogy has, since World War II,
become a science largely about healing. It concentrates on
repairing damage within a disease model of human func-
tioning. This al most exclusive attention to pathology ne-
glects the fulfilled individual and the thriving community.
The aim of positive psychol ogy is to begin to catalyze a
change in the focus of psychol ogy from preoccupation only
with repairing the worst things in life to also building
positive qualities.
The field of positive psychol ogy at the subjective level
is about valued subjective experiences: well-being, con-
tentment, and satisfaction (in the past); hope and opt i mi sm
(for the future); and flow and happiness (in the present). At
the individual level, it is about positive individual traits: the
capacity for love and vocation, courage, interpersonal skill,
aesthetic sensibility, perseverance, forgiveness, originality,
future mindedness, spirituality, high talent, and wisdom. At
the group level, it is about the civic virtues and the insti-
tutions that move individuals toward better citizenship:
responsibility, nurturance, altruism, civility, moderation,
tolerance, and work ethic.
Two personal stories, one told by each author, explain
how we arrived at the conviction that a movement toward
positive psychol ogy was needed and how this special issue
of the American Psychologist came about. For Martin E. P.
Seligman, it began at a moment a few months after
being elected president of the Ameri can Psychological
Association:
The moment took place in my garden while I was
weeding with my five-year-old daughter, Nikki. I have to
confess that even though I write books about children, I ' m
really not all that good with children. I am goal oriented
and time urgent, and when I ' m weeding in the garden, I ' m
actually trying to get the weeding done. Nikki, however,
was throwing weeds into the air, singing, and dancing
around. I yelled at her. She walked away, then came back
and said,
Editor' s note. Martin E. P. Setigman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
served as guest editors Ibr this special issue.
Aut hor' s note. Martin E. P. Seligman, Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania; Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Department of Psy-
chology, Claremont Graduate University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mar-
tin E. P. Seligman, Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylva-
nia, 3813 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104-3604. Electronic mail
may be sent to [email protected].
January 2000 ° Ameri can Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association. lnc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00
Voh 55. No. 1. 5 14 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.55.1.5
Martin E. P.
Seligman
Photo by Bachrach
"Daddy, I want to talk to you. "
"Yes, Ni kki ?"
"Daddy, do you r emember before my fifth bi rt hday?
Fr om the t i me I was three to the time I was five, I was a
whiner. I whi ned every day. When I turned five, I deci ded
not to whi ne anymore. That was the hardest thing I ' ve ever
done. And i f I can stop whining, you can stop bei ng such
a grouch. "
This was for me an epi phany, not hi ng less. I learned
somet hi ng about Nikki, about raising kids, about mysel f,
and a great deal about my profession. First, I realized that
raising Ni kki was not about correct i ng whining. Nikki did
that herself. Rather, I realized that raising Ni kki is about
taking this marvel ous strength she h a s - - I call it "seeing
into the s oul "- - ampl i f yi ng it, nurturing it, helping her to
lead her life around it to buffer agai nst her weaknesses and
the st orms of life. Rai si ng children, I realized, is vastly
mor e than fixing what is wr ong with them. It is about
i dent i fyi ng and nurturing their strongest qualities, whal
t hey own and are best at, and hel pi ng t hem find niches in
whi ch t hey can best live out these strengths.
As for my own life, Ni kki hit the nail right on the
head. I was a grouch. I had spent 50 years most l y enduri ng
wet weat her in my soul, and the past 10 years being a
ni mbus cl oud in a househol d full of sunshine. Any good
fort une I had was probabl y not due to my grumpiness, but
in spite of it. In that moment , I resol ved to change.
However , the broadest i mpl i cat i on of Ni kki ' s teaching
was about the sci ence and professi on of psychol ogy: Be-
fore Wor l d War II, ps ychol ogy had three distinct missions:
curi ng ment al illness, maki ng the lives of all peopl e more
product i ve and fulfilling, and i dent i fyi ng and nurturing
hi gh talent. The early focus on positive psychol ogy is
exemplified by wor k such as Ter man' s studies of giftedness
(Terman, 1939) and marital happi ness (Terman, Butten-
wieser, Ferguson, Johnson, & Wi l son, 1938), Wat s on' s
writings on effect i ve parent i ng (Watson, 1928), and Jung' s
work concer ni ng the search for and di scovery of meani ng
in life (Jung, 1933). Right after the war, t wo e ve nt s - - bot h
e c onomi c - - c ha nge d the face of psychol ogy: In 1946, the
Veterans Admi ni st rat i on (now Veterans Affairs) was
founded, and t housands of psychol ogi st s f ound out that
t hey coul d make a living treating mental illness. In 1947,
the Nat i onal Institute of Ment al Heal t h (which, in spite of
its charter, has al ways been based on the disease model and
should now more appropri at el y be r enamed the Nat i onal
Instilute of Mental Illness) was founded, and academi cs
f ound out that t hey coul d get grants if their research was
about pat hol ogy.
This arrangement has br ought many benefits. There
have been huge strides in the underst andi ng of and t herapy
for mental illness: At least 14 disorders, previ ousl y intrac-
table, have yi el ded their secrets to science and can now be
either cured or consi derabl y relieved (Seligman, 1994). The
downsi de, however, was that the ot her t wo fundament al
missions of ps yc hol ogy- - ma ki ng the lives of all peopl e
better and nurturing geni us - - wer e all but forgotten. It
was n' t onl y the subject matter that was altered by funding,
but the currency of the theories underpi nni ng how psychol -
ogists vi ewed themselves. They came to see t hemsel ves as
part of a mere subfield of the health professions, and
psychol ogy became a vi ct i mol ogy. Psychol ogi st s saw hu-
man beings as passive foci: Stimuli came on and elicited
responses (what an extraordinarily passi ve word!). Exter-
nal rei nforcement s weakened or st rengt hened responses.
[)rives, tissue needs, instincts, and conflicts f r om chi l dhood
pushed each of us around.
Ps ychol ogy' s empirical l ocus shifted to assessing and
curi ng individual suffering. There has been an expl osi on in
research on psychol ogi cal disorders and the negat i ve ef-
fects of envi ronment al stressors, such as parental divorce,
the deaths of l oved ones, and physi cal and sexual abuse.
Practitioners went about treating the mental illnesses of
patients within a disease f r amewor k by repairing damage:
damaged habits, damaged drives, damaged chi l dhoods, and
damaged brains.
Mi hal y Csi kszent mi hal yi realized the need for a pos-
itive ps ychol ogy in Europe during Wor l d War II: As a
child, I wi t nessed the dissolution of the smug worl d in
whi ch I had been comf or t abl y ensconced. I not i ced with
surprise how many of the adults I had known as successful
and self-confident became helpless and dispirited once the
war r emoved their social supports. Wi t hout j obs, money, or
status, t hey were reduced to empt y shells. Yet there were a
few who kept their integrity and purpose despite the sur-
roundi ng chaos. Their serenity was a beacon that kept
others from losing hope. And these were not the men and
women one woul d have expect ed to emerge unscat hed:
]' hey were not necessarily the most respected, better edu-
cated, or more skilled individuals. This experi ence set me
[hinking: What sources of strength were these peopl e draw-
ing on?
6 January 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi
Readi ng phi l osophy and dabbl i ng in hi st ory and reli-
gi on did not provi de sat i sfyi ng answers to that question. I
f ound the ideas in these texts to be t oo subjective, to be
dependent on faith or to be dubi ous assumpt i ons; t hey
l acked the cl ear-eyed skept i ci sm and the slow cumul at i ve
gr owt h that I associ at ed with science. Then, for the first
time, I came across psychol ogy: first the writings of Jung,
then Freud, then a few of the psychol ogi st s who were
writing in Eur ope in the 1950s. Here, I thought, was a
possible solution to my que s t - - a discipline that dealt with
the fundament al issues of life and at t empt ed to do so with
the patient si mpl i ci t y of the natural sciences.
However , at that time psychol ogy was not yet a rec-
ogni zed discipline. In Italy, where I lived, one coul d take
courses in it onl y as a mi nor while pursui ng a degree in
medi ci ne or in phi l osophy, so I deci ded to come to the
Uni t ed States, where ps ychol ogy had gai ned wi der accep-
tance. The first courses I t ook were somewhat of a shock.
It turned out that in the Uni t ed States, ps ychol ogy had
i ndeed became a science, if by sci ence one means onl y a
skeptical attitude and a concern for measurement . What
seemed to be lacking, however, was a vision that justified
the attitude and the met hodol ogy. I was l ooki ng for a
scientific approach to human behavior, but I never dreamed
that this coul d yi el d a val ue-free understanding. In human
behavior, what is most intriguing is not the average, but the
improbable. Very few peopl e kept their decency during the
onsl aught of Wor l d War II; yet it was those few who held
the key to what humans coul d be like at their best. How-
ever, at the hei ght of its behavi ori st phase, ps ychol ogy was
bei ng t aught as i f it were a branch of statistical mechani cs.
Ever since, I have st ruggl ed to reconci l e the twin i mpera-
tives that a sci ence of human bei ngs shoul d include: to
underst and what is and what coul d be.
A decade later, the "third way" heral ded by Abr aham
Masl ow, Carl Rogers, and ot her humani st i c psychol ogi st s
promi sed to add a new perspect i ve to the ent renched clin-
ical and behavi ori st approaches. The generous humani st i c
vi si on had a strong effect on the culture at large and held
enor mous promise. Unfort unat el y, humani st i c ps ychol ogy
did not attract much of a cumul at i ve empi ri cal base, and it
spawned myri ad therapeutic self-help movement s. In some
of its incarnations, it emphasi zed the self and encour aged a
sel f-cent eredness that pl ayed down concerns for col l ect i ve
well-being. Future debate will det ermi ne whet her this came
about because Masl ow and Rogers were ahead of their
times, because these flaws were inherent in their original
vision, o1" because of overl y enthusiastic followers. How-
ever, one l egacy of the humani sm of the 1960s is promi -
nently di spl ayed in any large bookst ore: The "ps ychol ogy"
section contains at least 10 shelves on crystal healing,
aromat herapy, and reachi ng the inner child for ever y shelf
of books that tries to uphol d some schol arl y standard.
What ever the personal origins of our convi ct i on that
the time has arrived for a posi t i ve psychol ogy, our message
is to remi nd our field that ps ychol ogy is not j ust the study
of pat hol ogy, weakness, and damage; it is also the study of
strength and virtue. Treat ment is not j ust fixing what is
broken; it is nurturing what is best. Ps ychol ogy is not j ust
a branch of medi ci ne concerned with illness or health; it is
much larger. It is about work, educat i on, insight, love,
growt h, and play. And in this quest for what is best,
positive ps ychol ogy does not rel y on wishful thinking,
faith, self-deception, fads, or hand wavi ng; it tries to adapt
what is best in the scientific met hod to the uni que probl ems
that human behavi or presents to those who wi sh to under-
stand it in all its compl exi t y.
What foregrounds this approach is the issue of pre-
vention. In the past decade, psychol ogi st s have become
concerned with prevent i on, and this was the presidential
theme, of the 1998 Amer i can Psychol ogi cal Associ at i on
convent i on in San Franci sco. How can psychol ogi st s pre-
vent probl ems like depressi on or subst ance abuse or schi zo-
phreni a in young peopl e who are genet i cal l y vul nerabl e or
who live in worl ds that nurture these probl ems? How can
psychol ogi st s prevent murderous school yar d vi ol ence in
children who have access to weapons, poor parental super-
vision, and a mean streak? What psychol ogi st s have
learned over 50 years is that the disease model does not
move ps ychol ogy cl oser to the prevent i on of these serious
probl ems. Indeed, the maj or strides in prevent i on have
come l argel y from a perspect i ve f ocused on syst emat i cal l y
building compet ency, not on correct i ng weakness.
Prevent i on researchers have di scovered that there are
human strengths that act as buffers against ment al illness:
courage, future mi ndedness, opt i mi sm, interpersonal skill,
faith, work ethic, hope, honest y, perseverance, and the
capaci t y for flow and insight, to name several. Much of the
task of prevent i on in this new cent ury will be to create a
science of human strength whose mi ssi on will be to under-
stand and learn how to fost er these virtues in young people.
Wor ki ng excl usi vel y on personal weakness and on
damaged brains, however, has rendered sci ence poor l y
January 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st 7
equipped to effectively prevent illness. Psychologists need
now to call for massi ve research on human strengths and
virtues. Practitioners need to recognize that much of the
best work they already do in the consulting room is to
ampl i fy strengths rather than repair the weaknesses of their
clients. Psychologists working with families, schools, reli-
gious communities, and corporations, need to develop cli-
mates that foster these strengths. The major psychological
theories have changed to undergird a new science of
strength and resilience. No longer do the dominant theories
vi ew the individual as a passive vessel responding to stim-
uli; rather, individuals are now seen as decision makers,
with choices, preferences, and the possibility of becomi ng
masterful, efficacious, or in malignant circumstances, help-
less and hopeless (Bandura, 1986; Seligman, 1992). Sci-
ence and practice that rely on this worldview may have the
direct effect of preventing many of the major emotional
disorders. They may also have two side effects: They may
make the lives of clients physically healthier, given all that
psychologists are learning about the effects of mental well-
being on the body. This science and practice will also
reorient psychol ogy back to its two neglected mi s s i ons - -
making normal people stronger and more productive and
maki ng high human potential actual.
About This Issue
The 15 articles that follow this introduction present a
remarkabl y varied and compl ex picture of the orientation in
psychol ogy- - and the social sciences more general l y--t hat
might be included under the rubric of positive psychology.
Of course, like all selections, this one is to some extent
arbitrary and incomplete. For many of the topics included
in this issue, the space allotted to an entire issue of the
American Psychologist would be needed to print all the
contributions worthy of inclusion. We hope only that these
enticing hors d' oeuvres stimulate the reader' s appetite to
sample more widely from the offerings of the field.
As editors of this special issue, we have tried to be
comprehensi ve without being redundant. The authors were
asked to write at a level of generality appealing to the
greatly varied and diverse specialties of the j ournal ' s read-
ership, without sacrificing the intellectual rigor of their
arguments. The articles were not intended to be specialized
reviews of the literature, but broad overvi ews with an eye
turned to cross-disciplinary links and practical applications.
Finally, we invited most l y seasoned scholars to contribute,
thereby excluding some of the most promising young re-
sear cher s- - but they are already preparing to edit a section
of this journal devoted to the latest work on positive
psychology.
There are three main topics that run through these
contributions. The first concerns the positive experience.
What makes one moment "better" than the next? I f Daniel
Kahneman is right, the hedonic quality of current experi-
ence is the basic building block of a positive psychol ogy
(Kahneman, 1999, p. 6). Diener (2000, this issue) focuses
on subjective well-being, Massimini and Delle Fave (2000,
this issue) on optimal experience, Peterson (2000, this
issue) on optimism, Myers (2000, this issue) on happiness,
and Ryan and Deci (2000, this issue) on self-determination.
Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, and Gruenwald (2000, this
issue), and Salovey, Rothman, Detweiler, and Steward
(2000, this issue) report on the relationship between posi-
tive emotions and physical health.
These topics can, of course, be seen as statelike or
traitlike: One can investigate either what accounts for mo-
ments of happiness or what distinguishes happy from un-
happy individuals. Thus, the second thread in these articles
is the theme of the positive personality. The common
denominator underlying all the approaches represented
here is a perspective on human beings as self-organizing,
self-directed, adaptive entities. Ryan and Deci (2000) focus
on self-determination, Baltes and Staudinger (2000, this
issue) on wisdom, and Vaillant (2000, this issue) on mature
defenses. Lubinski and Benbow (2000, this issue), Simon-
ton (2000, this issue), Winner (2000, this issue), and Larson
(2000, this issue) focus on exceptional performance (i.e.,
creativity and talent). Some of these approaches adopt an
explicit developmental perspective, taking into account that
individual strengths unfold over an entire life span.
The third thread that runs through these contributions
is the recognition that people and experiences are embed-
ded in a social context. Thus, a positive psychol ogy needs
to take positive communities and positive institutions into
account. At the broadest level, Buss (2000, this issue) and
Massimini and Delle Fave (2000) describe the evolutionary
milieu that shapes positive human experience. Myers
(200(I) describes the contributions of social relationships to
happiness, and Schwartz (2000, this issue) reflects on the
necessity for cultural norms to relieve individuals of the
burden of choice. Larson (2000) emphasizes the impor-
tance of voluntary activities for the devel opment of re-
sourceful young people, and Winner (2000) describes the
effects of families on the devel opment of talent. In fact, to
a degree that is exceedingly rare in psychological literature,
every' one of these contributions looks at behavi or in its
ecologically valid social setting. A more detailed introduc-
tion to the articles in this issue follows.
E volutionary P ers pectives
The first section comprises two articles that place positive
psychol ogy in the broadest context within which it can be
understood, namel y that of evolution. To some people,
evolutionary approaches are distasteful because they deny
the importance of learning and sell:determination, but this
need not be necessarily so. These two articles are excep-
tional in that they not only provide ambitious theoretical
perspectives, but - - mi r abi l e di ct u- - t hey also provide up-
lifting practical exampl es of how a psychol ogy based on
evolutionary principles can be applied to the i mprovement
of the human condition.
In the first article, David Buss (2000) reminds readers
that the dead hand of the past weighs heavily on the
present. He focuses primarily on three reasons why positive
states of mind are so elusive. First, because the environ-
ments people currently live in are so different from the
ancestral environments to which their bodies and minds
have been adapted, they are often misfit in modern sur-
8 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
roundings. Second, evol ved distress mechani sms are often
f unct i onal - - f or instance, j eal ousy alerts people to make
sure of the fidelity of their spouses. Finally, selection tends
to be competitive and to involve zero-sum outcomes. What
makes Buss' s article unusually interesting is that after
identifying these maj or obstacles to well-being, he then
outlines some concrete strategies for overcomi ng them. For
instance, one of the maj or differences between ancestral
and current environments is the paradoxical change in
peopl e' s relationships to others: On the one hand, people
live surrounded by many more people than their ancestors
did, yet they are intimate with fewer individuals and thus
experience greater loneliness and alienation. The solutions
to this and other impasses are not only conceptually justi-
fied within the theoretical framework but are also emi-
nently practical. So what are they? At the risk of creating
unbearable suspense, we think it is better for readers to find
out for themselves.
Whereas Buss (2000) bases his arguments on the solid
foundations of biological evolution, Fausto Massimini and
Antonella Delle Fave (2000) venture into the less explored
realm of psychological and cultural evolution. In a sense,
they start where Buss leaves off: by looking analytically at
the effects of changes in the ancestral environment and by
looking specifically at how the production of memes (e.g.,
artifacts and values) affect and are affected by human
consciousness. They start with the assumption that living
systems are self-organizing and oriented toward increasing
complexity. Thus, individuals are the authors of their own
evolution. They are continuously involved in the selection
of the memes that will define their own individuality, and
when added to the memes selected by others, they shape
the future of the culture. Massimini and Delle Far e make
the poi nt - - s o essential to the argument for positive psy-
c h o l o g y - t h a t psychological selection is mot i vat ed not
solely by the pressures of adaptation and survival, but also
by the need to reproduce optimal experiences. Whenever
possible, peopl e choose behaviors that make them feel fully
alive, competent, and creative. These authors conclude
their visionary call for individual devel opment in harmony
with global evolution by providing instances drawn from
their own experience of cross-cultural interventions, where
psychol ogy has been applied to remedy traumatic social
conditions created by runaway modernization.
P os i ti ve P er s o nal Trai ts
The second section includes five articles dealing with four
different personal traits that contribute to positive psychol-
ogy: subjective well-being, optimism, happiness, and self-
determination. These are topics that in the past three de-
cades have been extensively studied and have produced an
impressive array of f i ndi ngs- - many of them unexpected
and counterintuitive.
The first article in this set is a review of what is known
about subjective well-being written by Edward Diener
(2000), whose research in this field now spans three de-
cades. Subjective well-being refers to what people think
and how they feel about their l i ves - - t o the cognitive and
affective conclusions they reach when they evaluate their
existence. In practice, subjective well-being is a more sci-
entific-sounding term for what people usually mean by
happiness. Even though subjective well-being research re-
lies primarily on rather global self-ratings that could be
criticized on various grounds, its findings are plausible and
coherent. Di ener' s account begins with a review of the
t emperament and personality correlates of subjective well-
being and the demographic characteristics of groups high in
subjective well-being. The extensive cross-cultural re-
search on the topic is then reviewed, suggesting interesting
links between macrosocial conditions and happiness. A
central issue is how a person' s values and goals mediate
between external events and the quality of experience.
These investigations promise to bring psychologists closer
to understanding the insights of such philosophers of an-
tiquity as Democritus or Epictetus, who argued that it is not
what happens to people that determines how happy they
are, but how they interpret what happens.
One dispositional trait that appears to mediate be-
tween external events and a person' s interpretation of t hem
is optimism. This trait includes both little optimism (e.g., "I
will find a convenient parking space this evening") and big
optimism (e.g., "Our nation is on the verge of something
great"). Christopher Peterson (2000) describes the research
on this beneficial psychological characteristic in the second
article of this set. He considers opt i mi sm to involve cog-
nitive, emotional, and motivational components. People
high in opt i mi sm tend to have better moods, to be more
persevering and successful, and to experience better phys-
ical health. How does opt i mi sm work? How can it be
increased'? When does it begin to distort reality? These are
some of the questions Peterson addresses. As is true of the
other authors in this issue, this author is aware that compl ex
psychological issues cannot be understood in isolation from
the social and cultural contexts in which they are embed-
ded. Hence, he asks questions such as the following: How
does an overly pessimistic culture affect the well-being of
its members? And conversely, does an overly optimistic
culture lead to shallow materialism?
David Myers (2000) presents his synthesis of research
on happiness in the third article of this section. His per-
spective, although strictly based on empirical evidence, is
informed by a belief that traditional values must contain
importanl elements of truth if they are to survive across
generations. Hence, he is more attuned than most to issues
that are not very fashionable in the field, such as the
often-found association between religious faith and happi-
ness. The other two candidates for promoting happiness
that Myers considers are economic growth and income (not
much there, after a mi ni mum threshold of affluence is
passed) and close personal relationships (a strong associa-
tion). Although based on correlational survey studies of
self-reported happiness, the robustness of the findings, rep-
licated across time and different cultures, suggests that
these findings ought to be taken seriously by anyone inter-
ested in understanding the elements that contribute to a
positive quality of life.
In the first of two articles that focus on self-determi-
nation, Richard Ryan and Edward Deci (2000) discuss
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 9
another trait that is central to positive psychology and has
been extensively researched. Self-determination theory in-
vestigates three related human needs: the need for compe-
tence, the need for belongingness, and the need for auton-
omy. When these needs are satisfied, Ryan and Deci claim
personal well-being and social development are optimized.
Persons in this condition are intrinsically motivated, able to
fulfill their potentialities, and able to seek out progressively
greater challenges. These authors consider the kinds of
social contexts that support autonomy, competence, and
relatedness, and those that stand in the way of personal
growth. Especially important is their discussion of how a
person can maintain autonomy even under external pres-
sures that seem to deny it. Ryan and Deci' s contribution
shows that the promises of the humanistic psychology of
the 1960s can generate a vital program of empirical
research.
Is an emphasis on autonomy an unmitigated good?
Barry Schwartz (2000) takes on the subject of self-deter-
mination from a more philosophical and historical angle.
He is concerned that the emphasis on autonomy in our
culture results in a kind of psychological tyranny--an
excess of freedom that may lead to dissatisfaction and
depression. He finds particularly problematic the influence
of rational-choice theory on our conception of human mo-
tivation. The burden of responsibility for autonomous
choices often becomes too heavy, leading to insecurity and
regrets. For most people in the world, he argues, individual
choice is neither expected nor desired. Cultural constraints
are necessary for leading a meaningful and satisfying life.
Although Ryan and Deci' s (2000) self-determination the-
ory takes relatedness into account as one of the three
components of personal fulfillment, Schwartz' s argument
highlights even further the benefits of relying on cultural
norms and values.
Impl i cati ons f o r Mental and P hys i cal Heal th
One of the arguments for positive psychology is that during
the past half century, psychology has become increasingly
focused on mental illness and, as a result, has developed a
distorted view of what normal--and exceptional--human
experience is like. How does mental health look when seen
from the perspective of positive psychology? The next
three articles deal with this topic.
Beethoven was suicidal and despairing at age 31, yet
two dozen years later he composed the "Ode to Joy,"
translating into sublime music Schiller's lines, "Be em-
braced, all ye millions . . . . " What made it possible for him
to overcome despair despite poverty and deafness? In the
first article of this section, the psychiatrist George Vaillant
(2000) reminds readers that it is impossible to describe
positive psychological processes without taking a life span,
or at least a longitudinal, approach. "Call no man happy till
he dies," for a truly positive psychological adaptation
should unfold over a lifetime. Relying on the results ob-
tained from three large samples of adults studied over
several decades, Vaillant summarizes the contributions of
mature defenses--altruism, sublimation, suppression, hu-
mor, anticipation--to a successful and joyful life. Even
though Vaillant still uses the pathocentric terminology of
defenses, his view of mature functioning, which takes into
full account the importance of creative, proactive solutions,
breaks the mold of the victimology that has been one
legacy of psychoanalytic approaches.
It is generally assumed that it is healthy to be rigor-
ously objective about one' s situation. To paint a rosier
picture than the facts warrant is often seen as a sign of
pathology (cf. Peterson, 2000; Schwartz, 2000; and Vail-
lant, 2000, in this issue). However, in the second article of
this section, Shelley Taylor and her collaborators argue that
unrealistically optimistic beliefs about the future can pro-
tect people from illness (Taylor et al., 2000). The results of
numerous studies of patients with life-threatening diseases,
such as AIDS, suggest that those who remain optimistic
show symptoms later and survive longer than patients who
confront reality more objectively. According to these au-
thors, the positive effects of optimism are mediated mainly
at a cognitive level. An optimistic patient is more likely to
practice habits that enhance health and to enlist social
support. It is also possible, but not proven, that positive
affective states may have a direct physiological effect that
retards the course of illness. As Taylor et al. note, this line
of research has enormously important implications for
ameliorating health through prevention and care.
At the beginning of their extensive review of the
impacts of a broad range of emotions on physical health,
Peter Salovey and his coauthors (Salovey et al., 2000)
ruefully admit that because of the pathological bias of most
research in the field, a great deal more is known about how
negative emotions promote illness than is known about
how positive emotions promote health. However, as posi-
tive and negative emotions are generally inversely corre-
lated, they argue that substituting the former for the latter
can have preventive and therapeutic effects. The research
considered includes the direct effects of affect on physiol-
ogy and the immune system, as well as the indirect effects
of affect, such as the marshalling of psychological and
social resources and the motivation of health-promoting
behaviors. One of the most interesting sets of studies they
discuss is the one that shows that persons high in optimism
and hope are actually more likely to provide themselves
with unfavorable information about their disease, thereby
being better prepared to face up to realities even though
their positive outcome estimates may be inflated.
F os tering Excellence
If psychologists wish to improve the human condition, it is
not enough to help those who suffer. The majority of
"normal" people also need examples and advice to reach a
richer and more fulfilling existence. This is why early
investigators, such as William James (1902/1958), Carl
Jung (1936/1969), Gordon Allport (1961), and Abraham
Maslow (1971), were interested in exploring spiritual ec-
stasy, play, creativity, and peak experiences. When these
interests were eclipsed by medicalization and "physics
envy," psychology neglected an essential segment of its
agenda. As a gesture toward redressing such neglect, the
last section of this issue presents six articles dealing with
10 January 2000 ° American Psychologist
phenomena at the opposite end of the pathological tail of
the normal curve--the end that includes the most positive
human experiences.
Wisdom is one of the most prized traits in all cultures;
according to the Old Testament, its price is above rubies
(Job 28:18). It is a widespread belief that wisdom comes
with age, but as the gerontologist Bernice Neugarten used
to say, "You can' t expect a dumb youngster to grow up to
be a wise senior." Although the first president of the
American Psychological Association, G. Stanley Hall, tried
to develop a model of wisdom in aging as far back as 1922
(Hall, 1922), the topic has not been a popular one in the
intervening years. Recently, however, interest in wisdom
has revived, and nowhere more vigorously than at the Max
Planck Institute of Berlin, where the "Berlin wisdom par-
adigm" has been developed. Paul Baltes and Ursula
Staudinger (2000) report on a series of studies that has
resulted in a complex model that views wisdom as a cog-
nitive and motivational heuristic for organizing knowledge
in pursuit of individual and collective excellence. Seen as
the embodiment of the best subjective beliefs and laws of
life that have been sifted and selected through the experi-
ence of succeeding generations, wisdom is defined as an
expert knowledge system concerning the fundamental
pragmatic issues of existence.
The second article in this section, by David Lubinski
and Camilla Benbow (2000), deals with excellence of a
different sort. In this article, the authors review the large
literature concerning children with exceptional intellectual
abilities. If one asked a layperson at what point in the
distribution of intelligence the largest gap in ability is
found, the modal answer would probably be that it is the
gifted people in the top 1% or 2% who differ most in ability
from the rest of the population. As the authors point out,
however, one third of the total ability range is found within
the top 1%--a child with an IQ of 200 is quite different and
needs a different educational environment from a gifted
student with "only" an IQ of 140. Lubinski and Benbow
consider issues of how to identify, nurture, counsel, and
teach children in these high ability ranges, arguing that
neglecting the potentialities of such exceptional children
would be a grievous loss to society as a whole.
One of the most poignant paradoxes in psychology
concerns the complex relationships between pathology and
creativity. Ever since Cesare Lombroso raised the issue
over a century ago, the uneasy relationship between these
two seemingly opposite traits has been explored again and
again (on this topic, cf. also Vaillant, 2000, in this issue). A
related paradox is that some of the most creative adults
were reared in unusually adverse childhood situations. This
and many other puzzles concerning the nature and nurture
of creativity are reviewed in Dean K. Simonton' s (2000)
article, which examines the cognitive, personality, and de-
velopmental dimensions of the process, as well as the
environmental conditions that foster or hinder creativity.
For instance, on the basis of his exhaustive historiometric
analyses that measure rates of creative contributions decade
by decade, Simonton concludes that nationalistic revolts
against oppressive rules are followed a generation later by
greater frequencies of creative output.
The topics of giftedness and exceptional performance
dealt with in the previous two articles are also taken up by
Ellen Winner (2000). Her definition of giftedness is more
inclusive than the previous ones: It relates to children who
are precocious and self-motivated and approach problems
in their domain of talent in an original way. Contrary to
some of the findings concerning creative individuals just
mentioned, such children tend to be well-adjusted and to
have supportive families. Winner describes the current
state of knowledge about this topic by focusing on the
origins of giftedness; the motivation of gifted children; and
the social, emotional, and cognitive correlates of excep-
tional performance. As is true of most other contributors to
this issue, this author is sensitive throughout to the practical
implications of research findings, such as what can be done
to nurture and to keep giftedness alive.
Developing excellence in young people is also the
theme of Reed Larson' s (2000) article, which begins with
the ominous and often replicated finding that the average
student reports being bored about one third of the time he
or she is in school. Considering that people go to school for
at least one fifth of their lives, this is not good news. Larson
argues that youths in our society rarely have the opportu-
nity to take initiative, and that their education encourages
passive adaptation to external rules instead. He explores the
contribution of voluntary activities, such as participation in
sport, art, and civic organizations, to providing opportuni-
ties for concentrated, self-directed effort applied over time.
Although this article deals with issues central also to pre-
vious articles (e.g., Massimini & Delle Fave, 2000; Ryan &
Deck 2000: Winner, 2000), it does so from the perspec-
tive of naturalistic studies of youth programs, thereby
adding a welcome confirmatory triangulation to previous
approaches.
Challenges for the Future
The 15 articles contained in this issue make a powerful
contribution to positive psychology. At the same time, the
issues raised in these articles point to huge gaps in knowl-
edge that may be the challenges at the forefront of positive
psychology. What, can we guess, are the great problems
that will occupy this science for the next decade or two?
The Calculus of Well-Being
One fundamental gap concerns the relationship between
momentary experiences of happiness and long-lasting well-
being. A simple hedonic calculus suggests that by adding
up a person' s positive events in consciousness, subtracting
the negatives, and aggregating over time, one will get a
sum that represents that person' s overall well-being. This
makes sense, up to a point (Kahneman, 1999), but as
several articles in this issue suggest, what makes people
happy in small doses does not necessarily add satisfaction
in larger amounts; a point of diminishing returns is quickly
reached in many instances, ranging from the amount of
income one earns to the pleasures of eating good food.
January 2000 • American Psychologist 11
What, exactly, is the mechani sm that governs the rewarding
quality of stimuli?
The Devel opment o f P os i ti vi ty
It is also necessary to realize that a person at time N is a
different entity from the same person at time N + 1; thus,
psychologists can' t assume that what makes a teenager
happy will also contribute to his or her happiness as an
adult. For example, watching television and hanging out
with friends tend to be positive experiences for most teen-
agers. However, to the extent that TV and friends become
the main source of happiness, and thus attract increasing
amounts of attention, the teenager is likely to grow into an
adult who is limited in the ability to obtain positive expe-
riences from a wide range of opportunities. How much
delayed gratification is necessary to increase the chances of
long-term well-being? Is the future mindedness necessary
for serious delay of gratification antagonistic to moment ary
happiness, to living in the moment ? What are the childhood
building blocks of later happiness or of long-lasting
well-being?
Neuros ci ence and Heri tabi l i ty
A flourishing neuroscience of pat hol ogy has begun in the
past 20 years. Psychologists have more than rudimentary
ideas about what the neurochemistry and pharmacol ogy of
depression are. They have reasonable ideas about brain loci
and pat hways for schizophrenia, substance abuse, anxiety,
and obsessi ve- compul si ve disorder. Somehow, it has gone
unobserved (and unfunded) that all of these pathological
states have their opposites (LeDoux & Armony, 1999).
What are the neurochemistry and anatomy of flow, good
cheer, realism, future mindedness, resistance to temptation,
courage, and rational or flexible thinking?
Similarly, psychologists are learning about the herita-
bility of negative states, like aggression, depression, and
schizophrenia, but they know very little of the genetic
contribution of gene- envi r onment interaction and covari-
ance. Can psychologists develop a biology of positive
experience and positive traits?
E nj oyment Vers us P l eas ure
In a similar vein, it is useful to distinguish positive expe-
riences that are pleasurable from those that are enjoyable.
Pleasure is the good feeling that comes from satisfying
homeostatic needs such as hunger, sex, and bodily comfort.
Enjoyment, on the other hand, refers to the good feelings
people experience when they break through the limits of
homeost asi s- - when they do something that stretches t hem
beyond what they wer e- - i n an athletic event, an artistic
performance, a good deed, a stimulating conversation. En-
j oyment , rather than pleasure, is what leads to personal
growth and l ong-t erm happiness, but why is that when
given a chance, most people opt for pleasure over enjoy-
ment? Why do peopl e choose to watch television over
reading a challenging book, even when they know that their
usual hedonic state during television is mild dysphoria,
whereas the book can produce flow?
Collective Wel l -B ei ng
This question leads directly to the issue of the balance
between individual and collective well-being. Some hedo-
nic rewards tend to be zero-sum when viewed from a
systemic perspective. I f running a speedboat for an hour
provides the same amount of well-being to Person A as
reading from a book of poems provides to Person B, but the
speedboat consumes 10 gallons of gasoline and irritates
200 bathers, should the two experiences be weighed
equally? Will a social science of positive communi t y and
positive institutions arise?
A uthenti ci ty
It has been a common but unspoken assumption in the
social sciences that negative traits are authentic and posi-
tive traits are derivative, compensatory, or even inauthen-
tic, but there are two other possibilities: that negative traits
are derivative from positive traits and that the positive and
negative systems are separate systems. However, if the two
systems are separate, how do they interact? Is it necessary
to be resilient, to overcome hardship and suffering to
experience positive emotion and to develop positive traits?
Does too much positive experience create a fragile and
brittle personality?
B ufferi ng
As positive psychol ogy finds its way into prevention and
therapy, techniques that build positive traits will become
commonpl ace. Psychologists have good reason to believe
that techniques that build positive traits and positive sub-
jective experiences work, both in therapy and perhaps more
importantly in prevention. Building optimism, for example,
prevents depression (Seligman, Schulman, DeRubeis, &
Hollon, 1999). The question is, how? By what mechani sms
does courage or interpersonal skill or hope or future mind-
edness buffer against depression or schizophrenia or sub-
stance abuse?
Des criptive o r P res cri pti ve
Is a science of positive psychol ogy descriptive or prescrip-
tive? The study of the relations among enabling conditions,
individual strengths, institutions, and out comes such as
well-being or income might merel y result in an empirical
matrix. Such a matrix would describe, for example, what
talents under what enabling conditions lead to what kinds
of outcomes. This matrix would inform individuals'
choices along the course of their lives, but would take no
stand on the desirability of different life courses. Alterna-
tively, positive psychol ogy might become a prescriptive
discipline like clinical psychology, in which the paths out
of depression, for example, are not only described, but also
held to be desirable.
Real i s m
What is the relationship between positive traits like opti-
mi sm and positive experiences like happiness on the one
hand, and being realistic on the other? Many doubt the
possibility of being both. This suspicion is well illustrated
12 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
in the reaction attributed to Charles de Gaulle, then Presi-
dent of the French Republic, to a journalist's inquiry:
"Mr. President, are you a happy man?"
"What sort of a fool do you take me for?"
Is the world simply too full of tragedy to allow a wise
person to be happy? As the articles in this issue suggest, a
person can be happy while confronting life realistically and
while working productively to improve the conditions of
existence. Whether this view is accurate only time will tell;
in the meantime, we hope that you will find what follows
enjoyable and enlightening to read.
Conclusions
We end this introduction by hazarding a prediction about
psychology in the new century. We believe that a psychol-
ogy of positive human functioning will arise that achieves
a scientific understanding and effective interventions to
build thriving in individuals, families, and communities.
You may think that this is pure fantasy. You may
think that psychology will never look beyond the victim,
the underdog, and the remedial, but we want to suggest that
the time is finally right for positive psychology. We well
recognize that positive psychology is not a new idea. It has
many distinguished ancestors, and we make no claim of
originality. However, these ancestors somehow failed to
attract a cumulative, empirical body of research to ground
their ideas.
Why didn' t they attract this research, and why has
psychology been so focused on the negative? Why has
psychology adopted the premise--without a shred of evi-
dence- t hat negative motivations are authentic and posi-
tive emotions are derivative? There are several possible
explanations. Negative emotions and experiences may be
more urgent and therefore may override positive ones. This
would make evolutionary sense. Because negative emo-
tions often reflect immediate problems or objective dan-
gers, they should be powerful enough to force people to
stop, increase their vigilance, reflect on their behavior, and
change their actions if necessary. (Of course, in some
dangerous situations, it is most adaptive to respond without
taking a great deal of time to reflect.) In contrast, when
people are adapting well to the world, no such alarm is
needed. Experiences that promote happiness often seem to
pass effortlessly. Therefore, on one level, psychology' s
focus on the negative may reflect differences in the survival
value of negative versus positive emotions.
Perhaps, however, people are blinded to the survival
value of positive emotions precisely because they are so
important. Like the fish who is unaware of the water in
which it swims, people take for granted a certain amount of
hope, love, enjoyment, and trust because these are the very
conditions that allow them to go on living. These condi-
tions are fundamental to existence, and if they are present,
any number of objective obstacles can be faced with equa-
nimity and even joy. Camus wrote that the foremost ques-
tion of philosophy is why one should not commit suicide.
One cannot answer that question just by curing depression;
there must be positive reasons for living as well.
There are also historical reasons for psychology' s
negative focus. When cultures face military threat, short-
ages of goods, poverty, or instability, they may most nat-
urally be concerned with defense and damage control.
Cultures may turn their attention to creativity, virtue, and
the highest qualities in life only when they are stable,
prosperous, and at peace. Athens in the 5th century B.C.,
Florence in the 15th century, and Victorian England are
examples of cultures that focused on positive qualities.
Athenian philosophy focused on the human virtues: What
is good action and good character? What makes life most
worthwhile? Democracy was born during this era. Florence
chose not to become the most important military power in
Europe, but to invest its surplus in beauty. Victorian En-
gland affirmed honor, discipline, valor, and duty as central
human virtues.
We are not suggesting that American culture should
now erect an aesthetic monument. Rather, we believe that
the nation--wealthy, at peace, and stable--provides the
world with a historical opportunity. Psychologists can
choose to create a scientific monument--a science that
takes as its primary task the understanding of what makes
life worth living. Such an endeavor will move all of the
social sciences away from their negative bias. The prevail-
ing social sciences tend to view the authentic forces gov-
erning human behavior to be self-interest, aggressiveness,
territoriality, class conflict, and the like. Such a science,
even at its best, is by necessity incomplete. Even if utopi-
anly successful, it would then have to proceed to ask how
humanity can achieve what is best in life.
We predict that positive psychology in this new cen-
tury will allow psychologists to understand and build those
factors that allow individuals, communities, and societies
to flourish. Such a science will not need to start afresh. It
requires for the most part just a redirecting of scientific
energy. In the 50 years since psychology and psychiatry
became healing disciplines, they have developed a highly
transferable science of mental illness. They developed a
usable taxonomy, as well as reliable and valid ways of
measuring such fuzzy concepts as schizophrenia, anger,
and depression. They developed sophisticated met hods--
both experimental and longitudinal--for understanding the
causal pathways that lead to such undesirable outcomes.
Most important, they developed pharmacological and psy-
chological interventions that have allowed many untreat-
able mental disorders to become highly treatable and, in a
couple of cases, even curable. These same methods and in
many cases the same laboratories and the next generation
of scientists, with a slight shift of emphasis and funding,
will be used to measure, understand, and build those char-
acteristics that make life most worth living. As a side effect
of studying positive human traits, science will learn how to
buffer against and better prevent mental, as well as some
physical, illnesses. As a main effect, psychologists will
learn how to build the qualities that help individuals and
communities, not just to endure and survive, but also to
flourish.
January 2000 • American Psychologist 13
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14 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t
The Evolution of Happiness
David M. Bus s
University of Texas at Austin
An evolutionary perspective offers novel insights into some
major obstacles to achieving happiness. Impediments in-
clude large discrepancies between modern and ancestral
environments, the existence of evolved mechanisms "de-
signed" to produce subjective distress, and the f act that
evolution by selection has produced competitive mecha-
nisms that function to benefit one person at the expense of
others. On the positive side, people also possess evolved
mechanisms that produce deep sources of happiness: those
f or mating bonds, deep friendship, close kinship, and co-
operative coalitions. Understanding these psychological
mechanisms--the selective processes that designed them,
their evolved functions, and the contexts governing their
activation--offers the best hope f or holding some evolved
mechanisms in check and selectively activating others to
produce an overall increment in human happiness.
H
appiness is a common goal toward which people
strive, but for many it remains frustratingly out of
reach. An evolutionary psychological perspective
offers unique insights into some vexing barriers to achiev-
ing happiness and consequently into creating conditions for
improving the quality of human life. These insights are
based on a deeper understanding of the human mind, how
the selective process designed it, and the nature of the
evolved functions of its component parts.
Current mechanisms of mind are the end products of
a selective process, a sieve through which features passed
because they contributed, either directly or indirectly, to
reproductive success. All living humans are evolutionary
success stories. They each have inherited the mechanisms
of mind and body that led to their ancestors' achievements
in producing descendants. If any one of their ancestors had
failed along the way to survive, mate, reproduce, and solve
a host of tributary adaptive problems, they would not have
become ancestors. As their descendants, people hold in
their possession magical keys--the adaptive mechanisms
that led to their ancestors' success.
What evolved psychological mechanisms do humans
po s s e s s , how are they designed, and what functions were
they designed to carry out? At this point in evolutionary
psychological science, psychologists can provide only a
few provisional answers. This article offers several reflec-
tions on these issues, grounded in recent conceptual and
empirical advances, with the explicit acknowledgment of
their tentative and interim nature. The article starts by
examining some impediments to happiness and then offers
suggestions for how these obstacles might be overcome.
Barriers to Improving Qual i t y of Life
An evolutionary analysis leads to several key insights about
barriers that must be overcome to improve the quality of
human life. These include discrepancies between modem
and ancestral environments, evolved mechanisms that lead
to subjective distress, and the fact that selection has pro-
duced competitive mechanisms.
Discrepan_cies B etween Mo der n and
A nces tral Envi ronments
Modem living has brought a bounty of benefits to present
day humans. Medical technology has reduced infant mor-
tality in many parts of the world to a fraction of what it
undoubtedly was in ancestral times. People have the t ool s
to prevent many diseases that afflicted their Stone Age
forebears and to ameliorate the distressing symptoms of
many others. The psychological pain of depression and
anxiety can be reduced with lithium, Prozac, and other
psychotropic drugs. Modern technology gives people the
power to prevent the pain inflicted by extremes of cold and
heat, food shortages, some parasites, most predators, and
other Darwinian (1859) "hostile forces of nature." In many
ways, people live in astonishing comfort compared with
their ancestors.
At the same time, modem environments have pro-
duced a variety of ills, many unanticipated and only now
being discovered. Although people have the tools and
technology to combat food shortages, they now vastly
overconsume quantities of animal fat and processed s ugars
in ways that lead to clogged arteries, heart disease, diabe-
tes, and other medical ailments (Nesse & Williams, 1994;
Symons, 1987). Depletion of the ozone layer may lead to
skin cancer at rates that were unlikely to have afflicted their
ancestors. The ability to synthesize drugs has led to heroin
addiction, cocaine abuse, and addiction to a variety of
prescription drugs.
Evolutionary psychological analysis suggests several
other ways in which modern psychological environments
cause damage. Consider the estimate that humans evolved
in the context of small groups, consisting of perhaps 50 to
200 individuals (Dunbar, 1993). Modem humans, in con-
trast, typically live in a massive urban metropolis sur-
I thank April Bleske, Joshua Duntley, Barry Friedman, Martie Haselton,
Steve Pinker, Cindy Rehfues, and Del Thiessen for insightful comments
on an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David
M. Buss, Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, TX
78712. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected].
January 2000 • American Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the Ameri can Psychological Association, Inc. 0003- 066X/ 00/ $5. 00
Vol. 55, No. 1, 15- 23 DO[: 10. 1037/ / 0003-066X. 55. 1. 15
15
Da v i d M.
Buss
rounded by thousands or mi l l i ons of other humans. Ances-
tral humans may have had a dozen or two potential mates
to choose from. Modern humans, in contrast, are sur-
rounded by thousands of potential mates. They are bom-
barded by medi a i mages of attractive model s on a scale that
has no historical precedent and that may lead to unreason-
able expect at i ons about the quality and quantity of avail-
able mates. Ancest ral humans lived in ext ended kin net-
works, surrounded by genetic relatives such as uncles and
aunts, nephews and nieces, cousins and grandparents. Mod-
em humans t ypi cal l y live in isolated nuclear families often
devoi d of ext ended kin. Ancest ral humans relied on their
friends and relatives to seek j ust i ce, to correct social
wrongs, to deal with vi ol ence inflicted on them from others.
Modem humans rely on hired pol i ce and a legal system
whose l abyri nt h makes the horror of Kafka' s The Trial l ook
like a tea party. ~ It is reasonabl e to speculate that these
large di screpanci es bet ween ancestral and modern environ-
ments create unant i ci pat ed psychol ogi cal probl ems and
reduce the quality of life.
Some empi ri cal evi dence supports this proposi t i on.
The modern barrage of attractive i mages of other humans
provi des an instructive exampl e. The evol ut i onary psychol -
ogist Doug Kenri ck and his col l eagues have provi ded ev-
idence that these i mages may create psychol ogi cal and
social probl ems. In a series of studies on contrast ef f ect s,
they di scovered that men exposed to mul t i pl e i mages of
attractive women subsequent l y rated their commi t ment to
their regul ar part ner as lower, compared with men exposed
to average l ooki ng women (Kenrick, Gutierres, & Gol d-
berg, 1989; Kenrick, Neuberg, Zierk, & Krones, 1994).
Women exposed to mul t i pl e i mages of domi nant , high-
status men showed a si mi l ar decrement in commi t ment to
and l ove of their regul ar partner, compared with women
exposed repeat edl y to less domi nant men. These sex-l i nked
contrast effects were preci sel y predi ct ed by Kenr i ck' s evo-
lutionary psychol ogi cal framework.
Repeat ed exposures apparent l y affect sel f-concept as
well. Women subj ect ed to successive i mages of other
women who are unusually attractive subsequent l y feel less
attractive themselves, showi ng a decrease in sel f-est eem
(Gutierres, Kenrick, & Partch, 1999). Men exposed to
descri pt i ons of hi ghl y domi nant and influential men show
an anal ogous di mi nut i on in self-concept. These effects are
sex-l i nked in ways preci sel y predi ct ed by evol ut i onary
psychol ogi cal hypotheses. The effects suggest that the dis-
crepancy bet ween modern and ancestral envi ronment s in
exposure to medi a i mages may lead to dissatisfactions with
current partners and reductions in self-esteem. They may
interfere with the quality of cl ose relationships and hence
with the quality of life.
A second exampl e is more speculative. Depressi on is
one of the most common psychol ogi cal mal adi es of modern
humans, and it afflicts roughl y twice as many women as
men (Nol en-Hoeksema, 1987). There is some evi dence that
rates of depressi on are increasing in modern life. Fi ve
studies compri sed of 39,000 i ndi vi dual s living in five dif-
ferenl areas of the world reveal ed that young peopl e are
more likely than ol der peopl e to have experi enced at least
one maj or epi sode of depressi on (Nesse & Wi l l i ams, 1994,
p. 220). Moreover, the i nci dence of depressi on appears to
be higher in more economi cal l y devel oped cultures (Nesse
& Wi l l i ams, 1994). Why woul d rates of depressi on be
rising in modem envi ronment s, despi t e the greater abun-
dance of creature comfort s and the presence of technolog-
ical solutions to former ancestral mal adi es of life?
Nesse and Wi l l i ams (1994) offer one hypot hesi s:
Mass conmmnications, especially television and movies, effec-
tively make us all one competitive group even as they destroy our
more intimate social networks . . . . In the ancestral environment
you would have had a good chance at being the best at something.
Even if you were not the best, your group would likely value your
skills. Now we all compete with those who are the best in the
world. Watching these successful people on television arouses
envy. Envy probably was useful to motivate our ancestors to
strive for what others could obtain. Now few of us can achieve the
goals envy sets for us, and none of us can attain the fantasy lives
we see on television. (Nesse & Williams, 1994, p. 220).
Accordi ng to this analysis, the increase in depressi on stems
from sel f-percei ved failures resulting in erroneous compar-
isons between peopl e' s lives and the lives they see depi ct ed
so ght morousl y in the media.
A related expl anat i on of an increase in depressi on
invokes the fact that modem living condi t i ons of relative
anonymi t y and i sol at ed nuclear families depri ve peopl e of
the intimate social support that woul d have charact eri zed
ancestral social condi t i ons (Nesse & Wi l l i ams, 1994, p.
The American legal system, of course, carries many blessings as
well. It probably prevents or lowers the incidence of certain types of
homicide, such as blood feuds, that are prevalent in many tribal societies
and cultures lacking third-party legal systems (see Chagnon, 1992; Kee-
ley, 1996).
16 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychol ogi st
221). In modern America, for example, kin members often
scatter in the pursuit of better j obs and promotions, yielding
a social mobility that removes the social support of ex-
tended kin and makes social bonds more transient. I f psy-
chological well-being is linked with having deep intimate
contacts, being a valued member of an enduring social
group, and being enmeshed in a network of extended kin,
then the conditions of modern living seem designed to
interfere with human happiness.
These are just a few examples that suggest that some
discrepancies between modem and ancestral conditions
impede a high quality of life. Other possibilities include the
lack of critical incidents by which people might establish
true friendships (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996), the sense of
powerlessness modern humans feel in large anonymous
organizations compared with the small social hierarchies of
the past (Wenegrat, 1990), and the increased opportunities
for casual sex lacking in deep intimacy, that might lead
people to feel emotionally empt y (Buss, 1994). These dis-
crepancies between modern and ancestral environments
may interfere with the quest for a high quality of life.
Adaptations That Cause Subjective Distress
A second inapediment to human happiness is that people
have evol ved an array of psychological mechani sms that
are "designed" to cause subjective distress under some
circumstances (e.g. Seligman, 1971). These include psy-
chological pain (Thomhill & Thornhill, 1989), varieties of
anxiety (Marks & Nesse, 1994), depression (Price & Slo-
man, 1987), specific fears and phobias (Marks, 1987),
j eal ousy (Daly, Wilson, & Weghorst, 1982; Symons,
1979), and specific forms of anger and upset (Buss, 1989).
These are all proposed to be evol ved psychological mech-
anisms designed to solve specific adaptive problems, such
as sexual coercion (psychological pain), inhabiting a sub-
ordinate position in the social hierarchy (depression), spou-
sal infidelity (jealousy), and strategic interference (anger). 2
I f these hypotheses are correct, they suggest that part of the
operation of the normal psychological machinery inevita-
bly entails experiencing psychological distress in certain
contexts.
The emotion of j eal ousy provides an illustration.
Much empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that sex-
ual j eal ousy is an evol ved psychological mechani sm de-
signed to combat the adaptive probl em of threat to valued
l ong-t erm mateships (Daly et al., 1982; Symons, 1979).
Jealousy, according to this hypothesis, functions to alert a
person to a mat e' s possible or actual infidelity and moti-
vates action designed to prevent infidelity or deal with
defection. Its design features include sex-linked activators,
with men becomi ng more jealous in response to the threat
of sexual infidelity and women becomi ng more jealous in
response to emotional i nfi del i t y--hypot heses supported by
psychological, physiological, and cross-cultural data (Buss
et al., 1999; Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992;
Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid, & Buss, 1996; Daly et al.,
1982; Geary, Rumsey, Bow-Thomas, & Hoard, 1995;
Wi ederman & Allgeier, 1993).
Subjectively, j eal ousy is typically an ext remel y dis-
tressing emotion, a passion dangerous to the self and to
others (Buss, 2000). It can create the torment of sleepless
nights, cause a person to question his or her worth as a
mate, create anxiety about losing a partner, and play havoc
with social reputation. Jealousy can lead to an obsessive
vigilance that crowds out all other thoughts and to terrify-
ing violence that threatens the safety and well-being of the
partner.
Despite the manifold unhappiness j eal ousy creates,
j eal ousy has a crystalline functional logic, precise pur-
poses, and supreme sensibility. It exists today in modern
humans because those in the evolutionary past who were
indifferent to the sexual contact that their mates had with
others lost the evolutionary contest to those who became
jealous. As the descendants of successful ancestors, mod-
em humans carry with them the passions that led to their
forebears' success. The legacy of this success is a danger-
ous passion that creates unhappiness, but the unhappiness
motivated adaptive action over human evolutionary history
(Buss, 2000).
Anger and upset, according to one evolutionary psy-
chological hypothesis, are evolved psychological mecha-
nisms designed to prevent strategic interference (Buss,
1989). These negative emotions function to draw attention
to the interfering event, alert a person to the source of
strategic interference, mark the interfering events for stor-
age in and retrieval from memory, and motivate action
designed to eliminate the interference or to avoid subse-
quent interfering events. Because men and women over
evolutionary time have faced different sources of strategic
interference, they are hypothesized to get angry and upset
about different sorts of events. Empirical evidence supports
these hypotheses, suggesting that women get more upset
about sexual aggression (Buss, 1989), various forms of
sexual harassment (Studd, 1996), and the horror of rape
(Thornhill & Thornhill, 1989). Men, in contrast, tend to
respond with more anger and upset than women when a
potential mat e leads them on or a current partner withholds
sex (Buss, 1989). These and many other findings support
the hypothesis that many apparently negative emotions
may in fact be quite functional for humans, helping them to
solve adaptive probl ems of social living (see Buss, 2000).
Nonetheless, the subjective experience can be ext remel y
painful and disturbing, reducing the quality of life a person
experiences.
The negative emotions are not limited to sexual skir-
mishing. People experience distress when someone blocks
their ascension in the social hierarchy, when they suffer a
slide in status, when a friend betrays them, when their
coalition is weakened, when their t eam loses, when their
health is impaired, when they are threatened with violence,
when a sibling is favored over them by a parent, when they
are victimized by malicious gossip, when a partner rejects
them, when tragedy befalls a loved one, and when a child
2 St r at egi c i nt er f er ence occur s when a pe r s on' s goal s, or me t hods of
achi evi ng goals~ are i mpe de d or bl oc ke d ( Buss, 1989).
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 17
dies. Human anguish in modem minds is tethered to the
events that would have caused fitness failure in ancestral
times.
Adaptations Designed for Competition
A third impediment to happiness stems from the competi-
tion inherent to evolution by selection. Reproductive d/f-
ferentials caused by design differences make up the engine
of evolutionary change. Selection operates on differences,
so one person' s gain is often another person' s loss. As
Symons (1979) observed, "the most fundamental, most
universal double standard is not male versus female but
each individual human versus everyone else" (p. 229). The
profound implication of this analysis is that humans have
evolved psychological mechanisms designed to inflict costs
on others, to gain advantage at the expense of others, to
delight in the downfall of others, and to envy those who are
more successful at achieving the goals toward which they
aspire.
The evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker provided
an example using the German word Schadenfreude, a word
that appears not to have a direct counterpart in the English
language. Nonetheless,
When English speakers hear the word Schadenfreude for the first
time, their reaction is not "Let me see . . . Pleasure in another's
misfortunes... What could that possibly be? I cannot grasp the
concept; my language and culture have not provided me with such
a category." Their reaction is, "You mean there's a word for it?
Cool!" (Pinker, 1997, p. 367; italics in original)
Ambrose Bierce even defined happiness as "an agreeable
sensation arising from contemplating the misery of others"
(quoted in Pinker, 1997, p. 390).
Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that peo-
ple do take pleasure in the "downfall of tall poppies"
(Feather, 1994, p. 2). Across a series of studies, Feather
(1994) discovered several important conditions under
which people take pleasure in the fall of tall poppies. First,
when the high status of a tall poppy was made salient,
participants reported more happiness with the other' s fall
from grace. Second, when the success of a tall poppy was
not perceived to be deserved, participants reported more
pleasure with his or her fall than when the tall poppy was
perceived to deserve the initial success. Third, envy was the
most common emotional experience participants felt to-
ward a tall poppy, especially if the other person' s success
was in a domain important to the participant, such as
academic achievement among students.
Do people have adaptations to feel especially good
about themselves when superseding or subordinating others
(Gilbert, 1989)? Are envy and depression reliable conse-
quences of being relatively low in the social hierarchy
(Gilbert, 1989; Price & Sloman, 1987)? Given the apparent
universality of status hierarchies in all groups and all cul-
tures worldwide, escape from relative ranking may prove
exceedingly difficult. If a person' s happiness depends in
part on another's misery or failure, then how can people
design lives to improve the quality of all, not just those who
happen to get ahead? These vexing questions become sa-
lient with the recognition that evolution has produced some
psychological mechanisms that are inherently competitive.
Because differential reproductive success is the engine
of the evolutionary process, one person' s gain is often
another person' s loss. Consider two women competing to
attract a particular desirable man as a husband. Research
has shown that in addition to various self-enhancing attrac-
tion tactics, women also derogate their rivals (Buss &
Dedden, 1990; Schmitt & Buss, 1996). Some women will
call a rival promiscuous, spread rumors about how easy she
is to get into bed, denigrate aspects of her face, body, and
clothing style, and sometimes falsely tell others that she has
contracted a sexually transmitted disease. Men are no less
vicious in their derogation tactics. The content of gossip, in
short, is adaptively targeted and undoubtedly affects suc-
cess on the mating market. It can simultaneously create
psychological anguish and ruin the reputations of victims.
The outcome is inherently competitive--one person' s suc-
cess on the mating market is typically another person' s
loss. As Gore Vidal noted, "It is not enough to succeed.
Others must fail" (quoted in Pinker, 1997, p. 390).
Some psychological mechanisms also produce pre-
dictable forms of conflict between the sexes. Men' s
evolved desire for sexual variety, for example, sometimes
prompts sexual overtures that are sooner, more persistent,
and more aggressive than women want (Buss, 1994). Si-
multaneously, women' s strategies of imposing a longer
courtship delay, requiring signs of emotional involvement,
and delaying sex interfere with men' s short-term sexual
strategy (Buss, 1994). Both sexes deceive each other in
ways well predicted by evolutionary theories (e.g., Tooke
& Camire, 1991).
Jealousy provides another instructive example of com-
petition and conflict (Buss, 2000). Jealousy is activated by
perceived or real threats to romantic relationships--by a
rival who is encroaching, a partner who is threatening
defection, or both. Jealousy can undermine self-esteem,
making a person feel "hurt, threatened, broken hearted,
upset, insecure, betrayed, rejected, angry, possessive, en-
vious, unhappy, confused, frustrated, lonely, depressed,
resentful, scared, and paranoid" (Buss, 2000). Jealousy
motivates conflict with partners, fights with rivals, and in
some cases extreme violence. Despite the extensive suffer-
ing it creates, it served our ancestors well in the competi-
tive currency of reproduction. Nonjealous men risked being
cuckolded and spending a life devoted to nurturing a rival' s
children. Nonjealous women risked the diversion or loss of
a partner's commitment to a female rival. Jealousy evolved
to serve a variety of functions, including deterring a mate
from straying, backing off interested rivals, and perhaps
even communicating commitment to a partner (Buss,
2000). These competitive functions have come at the cost
of conflict.
Three Additional Evolutionary Tragedies
of Happiness
These various obstacles to improving human happiness
obviously do not exhaust the evolved impediments to well-
being. Evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker (1997) de-
18 January 2000 • American Psychologist
scribed several other tragedies of happiness. One is the fact
that humans seem designed to adapt quickly to their cir-
cumstances, putting us on a "hedonic treadmill" (Diener,
Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999, p. 286). Ameri cans today have
more cars, color TVs, computers, and brand-name clothes
than they did several decades ago, but Ameri cans are no
happier now than they were then (Myers & Diener, 1995).
Reports of lottery winners suggest that individuals quickly
adjust to their new riches and may be no happier than they
were before (some even report increased conflicts with
others). Happiness may track modern manifestations of
ancestral signals of evolutionary fitness (Ketelaar, 1995),
but peopl e seem to adjust quickly to any gains they expe-
rience, creating the hedonic treadmill where apparent in-
crements in rewards fail to produce sustained increments in
personal happiness.
A second t ragedy of human unhappi ness st ems f r om
the fact that evol ved mechani sms are desi gned to func-
tion well on average, al t hough they will necessari l y fail
in some i ns t ances - - what may be cal l ed instance failure
(Cosmi des & Tooby, 1999). For exampl e, mechani sms
of mat e guardi ng are desi gned to ward of f ri val s and
keep a part ner f r om st rayi ng (Buss & Shackel ford,
1997). Pr esumabl y, mat e- guar di ng mechani sms evol ved
because, on average, t hey succeeded in successful mat e
retention. An i ndi vi dual woman or man, however, mi ght
fail to keep a part ner, thus produci ng a cascade of
psychol ogi cal angui sh and social humi l i at i on, even
t hough mat e- guar di ng mechani sms have succeeded on
aver age over the rel evant sampl e space of evol ut i onary
time. Inst ance fai l ures may even be mor e frequent than
successes over evol ut i onary time, as l ong as the net
benefit of the st rat egy has exceeded its costs.
A third t ragedy of human emot i ons is the as ymme-
try in affect i ve exper i ence fol l owi ng compar abl e gains
and l osses ( Kahneman & Tver sky, 1984). The pai n peo-
ple exper i ence when t hey lose $100, for exampl e, turns
out to be af f ect i vel y mor e di sagreeabl e t han the pl easure
t hey exper i ence when t hey win $100. Losses sting mor e
keenl y; the j oy pr oduced by compar abl e gains is mor e
mut ed. As the f or mer tennis star J i mmy Connors ob-
served, "I hate to lose mor e than I like to wi n" (cited by
Ket el aar, 1995). Evol ved emot i ons, in short, may have
been wel l desi gned to keep peopl e' s ancest ors on t rack
in the currency of fitness, but in some ways t hey seem
desi gned to foi l peopl e' s effort s to pr omot e l ong- t er m
happi ness.
Improving Human Happiness
Gi ven the obstacles to wel l -bei ng--di screpanci es between
modern and ancestral environments, evol ved emotional
mechani sms designed to cause subjective distress, and the
existence of psychological mechani sms that are inherently
compet i t i ve- - i t is clear that an evolutionary perspective
does not offer easy or facile solutions to the probl ems of
i mprovi ng psychological well-being and the quality of life.
In fact, they reveal how difficult such solutions will be to
achieve. Nonetheless, evolutionary psychol ogy does pro-
vide insights into how some of the more unpleasant and
damagi ng features of the human condition might be
ameliorated.
Closing the Gap Between Modern and
Ancestral Conditions
Modern humans cannot go back in time and live the lives
of their Stone Age forebears, nor would an uninformed or
uncritical move in that direction be inherently desirable,
given that modern technology has eliminated many of the
hostile forces of nature that formerly made life brutish,
painful, and short. Nonetheless, the gap between former
and modem conditions might be closed on some dimen-
sions to good effect.
Increase closeness of extended kin. I f be-
ing deprived of extended close kin leads to depression in
modern environments (L. Cosmides, personal communi ca-
tion, Sept ember 17, 1989), individuals can take steps to
remain in closer proximity or to maintain greater emotional
closeness to existing kin. Modern electronic communi ca-
tion, including E-mail, telephone, and video conferencing,
might be exploited to this end when physical proximity is
not possible. With people living longer, opportunities to
interact with grandparents and grandchildren expand, of-
fering the possibility of strengthening the network of ex-
tended kin.
Develop deep friendships. According to Yooby
and Cosmides (1996), people may suffer a dearth of deep
friendships in modern urban living. I t ' s easy to be some-
one' s friend when times are good. I t ' s when you are really
in trouble that you find out who your true friends are.
Everyone has experienced fair-weather friends who are
there only when times are good, but finding a true friend,
someone that you know you can rely on when the going
gets tough, is a real treasure.
The probl em is that when times are good, fair-weather
friends and true friends may act pretty much alike. I t ' s
difficult to know who your true friends are when the sailing
is smooth. Because fair-weather friends can mimic true
friends, the adaptive probl em is how to differentiate those
who are deeply engaged in your welfare from those who
will disappear during your time of deep need (Tooby &
Cosmides, 1996). Selection should fashion assessment
mechanisms to make these differentiations. The strongest
tests, the most reliable sources of evidence of friendship,
come from the help you receive when you are desperately
in need. Receiving help during these times is a far more
reliable litmus test than help received at any other time.
Intuitively, people do seem to have special recall for pre-
cisely these times. People take pains to express their ap-
preciation, communi cat i ng that they will never forget the
sacrifices made by those who helped them in their darkest
hour.
Modern living, however, creates a paradox (Tooby &
Cosmides, 1996). Humans generally act to avoid episodes
of treacherous personal trouble, and in modern living,
many of the hostile forces of nature that would have put
people in j eopardy have been harnessed or controlled.
Laws deter stealing, assault, and murder. A police force
performs many of the functions previously performed by
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 19
friends. Medical science has eliminated or reduced many
sources of disease and illness. People live in an environ-
ment that in many ways is safer and more stable than the
environment inhabited by their ancestors. Paradoxically,
therefore, peopl e suffer from a relative scarcity of c r i t i c al
e v e n t s that would allow t hem to accurately assess who is
deeply engaged in their welfare and to differentiate them
from fair-weather friends. The loneliness and sense of
alienation that many feel in modem living, a lack of a
feeling of deep social connections despite the presence of
many seemingly warm and friendly interactions, may stem
from the lack of critical assessment events that tell them
who is deeply engaged in their welfare (Tooby & Cos-
mides, 1996).
Several strategies may help to close this gap between
modem and ancestral conditions to deepen social connect-
edness (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). First, people should
promot e reputations that highlight their unique or excep-
tional attributes. Second, they should be motivated to rec-
ognize personal attributes that others value but have diffi-
culty getting from other people. This involves cultivating a
sensitivity to the values held by others. Third, they should
acquire specialized skills that increase irreplaceability. I f
peopl e develop expertise or proficiency in domains that
most others lack, they become indispensable to those who
value those competencies. Fourth, they should preferen-
tially seek out groups that most strongly value what they
have to offer and what others in the group tend to lack; in
short, they should find groups in which their assets will be
most highly cherished. Fifth, they should avoid social
groups where their unique attributes are not valued or
where these qualities are easily provided by others.
A sixth strategy involves the imposition of c r i t i c al
t e s t s designed to deepen the friendship and test the strength
of the bond (see also Zahavi, 1977; Zahavi & Zahavi,
1997). Although it would be foolish to subject oneself to a
life-or-death situation merel y to test the strength of a
friendship, more modest tests are possible. Some friends
may fail the tests, in which case they are deemed fair-
weather friends. Those who pass the tests and provide help
during these critical times make the transition to true
friends marked by deep engagement.
Reducing Subjective Distress
I f humans have evol ved psychological mechani sms that
function to produce subjective distress, one can design a
social environment to reduce the likelihood of facing the
adaptive probl ems that trigger psychological anguish. Al-
though these probl ems are probably impossible to avoid
completely, several strategies might lower the likelihood of
their occurrence.
Selecting a ma t e who is similar-Reducing
jealousy and i n f i d e l i t y . One strategy is to select a
l ong-t erm mat e or marriage partner who is similar to you
on dimensions such as values, interests, politics, personal-
ity, and overall "mat e value." A large body of empirical
evidence supports the hypothesis that discrepancies be-
tween partners in these qualities lead to increased risk of
infidelity, instability of the relationship, and a higher like-
lihood of eventual breakup (Buss, 2000; Hill, Rubin, &
Peplau, 1976; Kenrick & Keefe, 1992; Thiessen & Gregg,
1980; Walster, Traupmann, & Walster, 1978; Whyte,
1990). Selecting a mat e who is similar, conversely, should
lower the likelihood of infidelity, and hence the agony
experienced as a result of jealousy. Because j eal ousy ap-
pears to be an evol ved emotion designed to combat threats
to relationships, anything that reduces its activation should
reduce the subjective pain people experience (Buss, 2000).
Furthermore, assortative mating decreases the chance of
divorce, and hence the sequelae caused by di vor ce- - an-
guish experienced by the parties involved as well as by any
children from the union.
Anything that leads to a higher divorce probability
increases the odds of creating stepchildren. Evolutionary
psychologists have demonstrated that stepchildren experi-
ence physical abuse and even homicide at rates 40 to 100
times greater than children residing with their genetic par-
ents (Daly & Wilson, 1988). Selecting a mate who is
similar lowers the odds of breaking up and hence decreases
the odds of producing stepchildren who are at increased
risk of abuse.
Extended kin-Reducing incest, child abuse,
and spousal battering. Incest, child abuse, and
wife battering may be greater now because modem humans
live in isolated nuclear families, protected in a shroud of
privacy. Havi ng kin in close proxi mi t y has been discovered
to offer a protective factor against some of these forms of
abuse, notably wife battering (Figueredo, 1995). Although
no studies have yet been conducted on the protective prop-
erties offered by extended kin for incest and child abuse, it
is not unreasonable to expect that they will yield a similar
effect.
Education about evolved psychological
s e x differences. Evolutionary psychol ogy offers a
precise metatheory about sex di f f er ences- - t he sexes are
predicted to differ only in the domains in which they have
faced different adaptive probl ems (Buss, 1995). Many such
differences have been documented. Men more than women,
for example, infer greater sexual interest when they ob-
serve a smile, which may lead to unwanted sexual advances
that cause subjective distress in women (Abbey, 1982;
Buss, 1994). This male bias in mind reading, however, can
be shown to disappear under certain evolutionarily pre-
dicted conditions (Haselton & Buss, 2000). Education
about the fact that men' s and women' s minds house some-
what different psychological mechanisms, and that the dif-
ferences can be deactivated under certain conditions, may
help to reduce the frequency of strategic interference.
Managing Competitive Mechanisms
Perhaps the most difficult challenge posed by our evol ved
psychological mechani sms is managi ng competition and
hierarchy negotiation, given that selection has fashioned
powerful mechani sms that drive rivalry and status striving.
Status inequality produces a variety of negative conse-
quences, such as the impairment of health (Wilkinson,
1996). One potential method of reducing such inequalities
is to promote cooperation.
20 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
Evolutionists have identified one of the key conditions
that promot e cooper at i on- - shar ed fate (Sober & Wilson,
1998). Shared fate occurs among genes within a body, for
exampl e- - when the body dies, all the genes it houses die
with it. Genes get selected, in part, for their ability to work
cooperatively with other genes. A similar effect occurs
with individuals living in some kinds of groups. When the
fate of individuals within the group is shar ed- - f or exam-
ple, when the success of a hunt depends on the coordination
among all members of the hunting party, or when defense
against attack is made successful by the cooperation of a
group' s member s - - t hen cooperation is enhanced. Knowl -
edge of the evolutionary psychol ogy of cooperation can
lead to an i mproved quality of life for all cooperators.
Axelrod (1984), an evolutionary political scientist,
suggested several ways in which this can be done. First,
enlarge the shadow of the future. I f two individuals believe
that they will interact lYequently in the extended future,
they have a greater incentive to cooperate. I f people know
when the "last move" will occur and that the relationship
will end soon, there is a greater incentive for people to
defect and not cooperate. Enlarging the shadow of the
future can be accomplished by making interactions more
frequent and maki ng a commi t ment to the relationship,
which occurs, for example, with wedding vows. Perhaps
one reason that divorces are so often ugly, marred by
unkind acts of mutual defection, is that both parties per-
ceive the last move and a sharply truncated shadow of the
future.
A second strategy that Axelrod (1984) recommends is
to teach reciprocity. Promoting reciprocity not only helps
peopl e by making others more cooperative, it also makes it
more difficult for exploitative strategies to thrive. The
larger the number of those who follow a tit-for-tat reci-
procity strategy, the less successful it will be to attempt to
exploit others by defecting. Essentially, the cooperators
will thrive through their interactions with each other,
whereas the exploiters will suffer because of a vanishing
population of those on whom they can prey.
A third strategy for the promotion of cooperation is to
insist on no more than equity. Greed is the downfall of
many, exemplified by the myt h of King Midas, whose lust
for gold backfired when everything he touched, even the
food he wanted to eat, turned to gold. The beauty of a
tit-for-tat strategy is that it does not insist on getting more
than it gives. By promot i ng equity, tit-for-tat succeeds by
eliciting cooperation from others.
A final strategy for promot i ng cooperation is to culti-
vate a personal reputation as a reciprocator. People live in
a social world where the beliefs others hold about t h e m- -
their r eput at i ons- - det er mi ne whether others will befriend
or avoid them. Reputations are established through peo-
pl e' s actions, and word about peopl e' s actions spreads.
Cultivating a reputation as a reciprocator will make others
seek t hem out for mutual gain. A reputation as an exploiter
will foster social shunning. Exploiters risk vengeance and
retribution from their victims. The combi ned effect of these
strategies will create a social norm of cooperation, where
those who were formerly exploiters are forced to rehabili-
tate their bad reputations by becomi ng cooperators them-
selves. In this way, cooperation will be promot ed through-
out the group.
By promot i ng cooperation, some evol ved mechani sms
designed to yield competitive advantage lie dormant. 3 Hu-
mans have within their menu of evol ved strategies those
that unleash treachery as well as those that produce har-
mony. By exploiting our knowl edge of the conditions that
promote cooperation, people might be able to mitigate
some of the destruction inflicted by competition.
The Ful fi l l ment of Des i re
A fourth strategy for raising human happiness involves
exploiting knowledge of evol ved desires (Buss, 2000). Just
as humans have evol ved adaptations that create subjective
distress, they have evol ved desires whose fulfillment brings
deep joy. Studies of private wishes reveal an evolutionary
menu of motivations designed to achieve goals historically
correlated with fitness. These include the desire for health,
professional success, helping friends and relatives, achiev-
ing intimacy, feeling the confidence to succeed, satisfying
the taste t ot high-quality food, securing personal safety,
and having the resources to attain all these things (King &
Broyles, I997; Petrie, White, Cameron, & Collins, in
press). Success at satisfying these desires brings episodes
of deep happiness, even if people might habituate to their
constant occurrence.
The fulfillment of mating desires provides another
path. One of the most consistent findings in studies of
well-being is the link to marriage (Diener et al., 1999).
Married women and men are significantly happier than
single women and men, even when other variables such as
age and income are statistically controlled. Moreover,
among married people, those who have succeeded in ful-
filling their desire for a spouse who embodi es the person-
ality characteristics of agreeableness, conscientiousness,
emotional stability, and openness to experience tend to be
more emotionally and sexually satisfied with their mar-
riages than those who fail to marry spouses with these
qualities (Botwin, Buss, & Shackelford, 1997).
In addition to fulfilling major desires, evolution has
equipped people with a host of mechani sms designed to
allow people to bathe themselves in aesthetic pleasure.
People can design environments to exploit evol ved affec-
tive mechanisms that signal adaptive affordances. Land-
scape preferences provide a perfect illustration (Kaplan,
1992; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992). Research supports the
hypothesis that humans have evol ved specific habitat pref-
erences that mimic certain aspects of the ancestral savanna
terrain. People like natural over human-made environ-
ments, habitats with running water and terrain to house
game. They like places where they can see without being
seen (a "womb with a view"). They like environments that
provide resources and safety, prospect and refuge, lush
vegetation and fresh fruit. As noted by Orians and Heer-
3 An obvious exception is when people form cooperative groups to
compete more effectively with other groups, as occurs in sports, warfare,
and political coalitions (e.g., Alexander, 1979, 1987).
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 21
wagen, "It may be difficult for many of us, with the
year-round supplies of a wide array of fruits and vegetables
in our supermarkets, to understand the importance of the
first salad greens of the season to people throughout most
of human history" (1992, p. 569). Appreciating the beauty
of a blossom, the loveliness of a lilac, or the grace of a
gazelle are all ways in which people can, in some small
measure, fill their daily lives with evolutionarily inspired
epiphanies of pleasure.
Havi ng adequate resources to fulfill desires (Diener &
Fujita, 1995), making progress toward fulfilling them (Can-
tor & Sanderson, 1999), achieving a state of "flow" in the
process of achieving them (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), and
succeeding in fulfilling them in particular domains such as
mating (Botwin et al., 1997) provide a few of the evolu-
tionary keys to increasing human happiness.
Conclusions
Evolutionary psychol ogy yields insight into some of the
maj or obstacles to achieving a high quality of l i f e- - di s-
crepancies between modern and ancestral conditions, the
existence of evol ved mechani sms designed to produce psy-
chological pain, and the inherently competitive nature of
some evol ved mechanisms. Given these circumstances and
constraints, i mprovi ng the quality of life will not be easily
or simply achieved. Knowl edge of evolutionary obstacles,
however, provides a heuristic for discovering places to
intercede. The human menu of evol ved strategies is large
and varied, and modern humans have the power to create
conditions to activate some strategies while leaving others
dormant.
This article perforce has neglected or only obliquely
touched on many of the complexities of human happiness,
such as the finding that individual differences in disposi-
tional happiness appear moderately heritable (Tellegan et
al., 1988), that perpetual states of happiness would almost
certainly have been maladaptive (Barkow, 1997), and that
repeated short-term pleasures somet i mes produce enduring
l ong-t erm pain (Solomon, 1980). Comprehensi ve theories
of human happiness will have to explain adaptively pat-
terned phenomena such as why winners of competitions
experience a hedonic and hormonal boost (Mazur & Booth,
in press) and why women' s feelings of well-being appear to
peak during the late follicular phase of the ovulatory cycle,
when fertility and chance of conception are maxi mal
(Sanders, Warner, Backstrom, & Bancroft, 1983). A more
compl et e theory must also explain why some sources of
happiness and subjective distress differ profoundly for men
and women, for parents and children, and for the same
individuals at different stages of life as they confront pre-
dictably different adaptive problems (Buss, 1999). Future
work could profitably include an account of the evolution-
ary psychol ogy of hedonic trade-offs inherent in some
activities, such as an extramarital affair that produces the
i mmedi at e reward of sexual gratification, but a more distant
and uncertain future risk of marital disruption and reputa-
tional damage.
As a species, humans have conquered many of the
external hostile forces of nature that formerly threatened
bodily survival. They have created environments that are
relatively friction free; they have reduced infant mortality,
polio, and malaria; conquered food shortages through ag-
riculture; reduced the destructive i mpact of extremes of
temperature and climate; and eliminated most predators.
With a deeper understanding of the evol ved mechani sms of
mind that define who humans are and how they were
designed to function, peopl e may eventually acquire the
ability to control some of the more destructive social con-
ditions. Through this knowledge, people can take a few
halting steps toward fulfilling the human desire for
happiness.
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J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t 2 3
Individual Devel opment in a Bio-Cultural Perspective
Faust o Massi mi ni
Ant onel l a Del l e Fave
Universitgz degli Studi di Milano
Universit?l 1ULM, Milano, and Universitgt degli Studi
di Milano
Biological and cultural inheritance deeply influence daily
human behavior. However, individuals actively interact
with bio-cultural information. Throughout their lives, the),
preferentially cultivate a limited subset of activities, values,
and personal interests. This process, defined as psycholog-
ical selection, is strictly related to the quality of subjective
experience. Specifically, cross-cultural studies have high-
lighted the central role played by optimal experience or
flow, the most positive and complex daily experience re-
ported by the participants. It is characterized by high
involvement, deep concentration, intrinsic motivation, and
the perception of high challenges matched by adequate
personal skills. The associated activities represent the ba-
sic units" of psychological selection. Flow can therefore
influence the selective transmission of bio-cultural in)Cor -
mation and the process of bio-cultural evolution.
Wat ch wel l over your seed-t hi ngs and children!
Speak wi sel y to these our new children!
Hencef or t h t hey shall be your first speakers,
And the peace- maki ng shield of your people.
- - Zu n i creat i on myt h
T
he pr i mar y rol e of psychol ogy, as stated by the
editors of this special issue, shoul d be the formal -
i zat i on of model s of heal t hy behavi or, whi ch coul d
be frui t ful l y applied to the st udy of human devel opment
and used in i nt ervent i on pr ogr ams in the fields of psychi c
mal adj ust ment and psychopat hol ogy. We share this opin-
ion, as emphasi zed in previ ous wor ks (Massimini, Csik-
szent mi hal yi , & Carli, 1987). In this article we want to
anal yze the basi c feat ures of humans that led to the devel-
opment of cul t ure and consci ousness, the t wo basic pillars
of our history. We adopt a devel opment al perspect i ve,
consi deri ng human psychol ogi cal processes as an emergent
adapt i ve trait that br ought about deep changes in bot h the
ecosyst em and the evol ut i on of our species. We propose a
model of heal t hy behavi or that can shed new light on the
pot ent i al l y const ruct i ve rol e of individuals in their bio-
cultural context.
As our t heoret i cal guidelines we refer t o concept s
comi ng f r om t wo mai n fields concer ned wi t h the st udy of
l i vi ng syst ems. The first is the natural selection paradi gm,
the formal i zat i on of whi ch had an enor mous i mpact on the
devel opment of bi ol ogi cal and social sci ences in the 20th
cent ury. Specifically, the key concept of phenot ypi c vari-
ation as the basic substrate f or bi ol ogi cal selection and
evol ut i on has been fruitfully applied to the st udy of social
and cultural syst ems. The second field we refer t o anal yzes
l i vi ng syst ems as open and sel f-organi zi ng units, intrinsi-
cally oriented t owar d compl exi t y and neg-entropy (i.e.,
order and integration), thanks to the cont i nuous exchange
of i nformat i on with the envi ronment . These concept s have
been used in bi ol ogy, as well as in the st udy of social
syst ems (Khalil & Boul di ng, 1996; Mat urana, 1975;
Monod, 1972; Pr i gogi ne & Stengers, 1984; Varela,
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).
Biology, Culture, and Individuals:
Three Interacting Systems
Biology and Human Evolution
Bi ol ogi cal inheritance obvi ousl y influences human behav-
ior. This influence has been stressed and i nvest i gat ed by a
gr owi ng number of studies conduct ed within the frame-
wor k of soci obi ol ogy and evol ut i onar y psychol ogy. I n this
perspective, the maj or part of human individual and social
behavi or has evol ved in order to ensure survival and re-
product i on in our ancest ors' envi r onment of evol ut i onary
adapt edness ( EEA; Symons, 1990). The differential repli-
cation and t ransmi ssi on of behavi oral sequences is related
t o the enhancement of i ncl usi ve fitness (Al exander, 1987;
Barkow, Cosmi des, & Tooby, 1992: Buss, 1989; Trivers,
1972; Wi l son, 1976). Social learning, altruism, and the
devel opment of moral nor ms are also expl ai ned in this
perspect i ve (Flinn, 1997; Gri nde, 1996; O' Nei l l & Petri-
novi ch, 1998). Ps ychopat hol ogy is anal yzed in terms of
mal adapt i ve traits, inertia of previ ousl y adapt i ve behavi oral
patterns, or bot h (St evens & Price, 1996). Geogr aphi cal
variations in human behavi or and social organi zat i on are
expl ai ned as strategies that have evol ved to cope wi t h the
demands of radi cal l y di fferent natural envi r onment s
(Foley, 1992; Kapl an & Hill, 1992).
Of course, we do n o t deny the f undament al influence
of the bi ol ogi cal inheritance syst em in shapi ng human
behavior. In our opi ni on, however , this perspect i ve is re-
ductionist at t wo levels. First, the rol e of cul t ur e' s devel -
Fausto Massimini, Dipartimento di Scienze Precliniche "L.I.T.A. Vialba,'
Facolth di Medicina e Chirurgia. Universith degli Studi di Milano, Italy;
Antonella Delle Fare, Istituto di Scienze Umane-Universit/t IULM, Mi-
lano, and Dipartimento di Scienze Precliniche 'L.I.T.A. Vialba,' Facolth
di Medicina e Chirurgia. Universith degli Studi di Milano, Italy.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Fausto Massimini, Dipartimento di Scienze Precliniche 'L.I.T.A. Vialba'
via G. B. Grassi, 74, 20157 Milano, Italy. Electronic mail may be sent to
fausto.massimini@ unimi.it.
24 January 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Copyright 2000 by Ihe American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00
Vol. 55, No, I. 24-33 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.55.l.24
Faust o
Ma s s i mi ni
opment and cultural l earni ng in human hi st ory is not ade-
quat el y evaluated. As a great number of i nt erdi sci pl i nary
studies show, far f r om bei ng si mpl y an epi phenomenon of
bi ol ogi cal traits, culture does have a dramat i c i mpact on
human behavi or. As a consequence, with the passage of
time, i ndi vi dual s have had to cope with envi ronment al
demands that have become very di fferent f r om those re-
lated to the ancestral EEA.
Second, a strictly evol ut i onar y perspect i ve does not
leave much hope for the act ual i zat i on of cultural values
such as peaceful and cooper at i ve relations, equality, and
tolerance. Ever y uni t of human behavi or is enact ed under
the ul t i mat e pressure of i ncl usi ve fitness. Soci al interaction
is basi cal l y mani pul at i ve; decept i on is common; strong
social hi erarchy and sexual stratification are the rule. In this
picture, several wi despread and accept ed behavi ors stem-
mi ng f r om culture woul d have no reasons to exist. Inter-
national chi l d adopt i on woul d not be promot ed. Di sabl ed
peopl e woul d have few chances to survi ve and to repro-
duce. Mal es' mat i ng st rat egy woul d be ai med at maxi mi z-
i ng i ncl usi ve fitness, thus support i ng pol ygamy in all hu-
man communi t i es.
We think that a bi ol ogi cal l y gr ounded model leaves no
r oom for the syst em of val ues f ocused on democr acy and
individual rights that has been l abori ousl y devel oped in
several cultures, at least duri ng the last three centuries.
These values are the inspiring gui del i nes of many societies.
I f we di sregard t hem as epi phenomenal and subject to
bi ol ogi cal fitness, how can we build a psychol ogi cal model
based on human devel opment as a gr owt h t oward individ-
ual compl exi t y and cultural integration, shapi ng human
bei ngs as ful l -fl edged member s of manki nd?
Culture and Human Behavi or
The adapt at i on st rat egy of our species is based on social
learning and on the product i on and use of artifacts, material
or symbol i c. This st rat egy was support ed by specific bi o-
l ogi cal features, namel y the upri ght posi t i on, the opposi ng
t humb, and the i mpressi ve gr owt h of brain structures in
bot h mass and compl exi t y. In particular, humans evol ved
specific psychi c processes, defined by Cr ook (1980) as
awareness of external wor l d (subjective sel f-awareness)
and awareness of one' s own internal state (obj ect i ve self-
awareness). Fr om a di fferent perspect i ve, Edel man (1989,
1992) di st i ngui shed bet ween pr i mar y consci ousness (an
adapt i ve trait shared by vari ous species) and hi gher order
consci ousness, defined as the uni quel y human ability t o
r emember , make plans, and set goal s on the basis of mem-
ori zat i on and selective retrieval of i nformat i on acqui red
t hrough experi ence.
Humans started to mani pul at e the envi ronment , to
build artifacts, and t o create social nor ms and roles. Thi s set
of product s, whi ch can be labeled as cul t ure, pr omot ed our
speci es' settlement in vari ous ecol ogi cal niches. The sym-
bol i c represent at i ons of the external wor l d and of i ndi vi d-
uals t hemsel ves were formal i zed by means of descri pt i ons
and behavi oral rules stored in the i ndi vi dual central ner-
vous syst em (i nt rasomat i c level) and in material tools,
books, and artistic and rel i gi ous artifacts (ext rasomat i c
level). The horizontal and vertical t ransmi ssi on of cultural
i nformat i on by means of verbal l anguage, social learning,
and artifacts cont ri but ed to the devel opment of cultural
syst ems (Cloak, 1975). Survi val became mor e and mor e
dependent on the acqui si t i on of cultural i nformat i on, and
life became an unceasi ng l earni ng process (Tomasel l o,
Kruger, & Rather, 1993).
The influence of culture on human behavi or is a mai n
issue in cross-cul t ural psychol ogy. Fr om cogni t i on to social
behavi or and human devel opment , behavi oral di fferences
among individuals can often be t raced back to di fferent
cultural cont ext s (see Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998, f or a
synt het i c over vi ew of the state of the art). The st udy of
cul t ure-speci fi c model s of human behavi or has been re-
cent l y pr omot ed by cultural ps ychol ogy (Stigler, Shweder,
& Herdt, 1990) and i ndi genous psychol ogi es (Ki m &
Berry, 1993).
Several efforts have been made to formul at e suitable
definitions and model s f or culture. Dawki ns (1976) used
the term me me to define the basic cultural unit, subj ect ed to
differential replication accor di ng to its bi ol ogi cal fitness.
Accor di ng to bi o-cul t ural theories ( Boyd & Ri cherson,
1985; Durham, 1982, 1991; Ri cher son & Boyd, 1978;
Ruyl e, 1973), human behavi or is i nfl uenced by a dual
i nheri t ance syst em based on genes and memes. I n cont rast
wi t h Dawki ns ' perspect i ve, culture is descri bed as an
evol vi ng syst em that progressi vel y gains aut onomy f r om
bi ol ogi cal pressures. Memes are submi t t ed t o differential
replication, under bi ol ogi cal or cultural pressures, or bot h;
this process leads to selection and evol ut i on of cultures.
It is i mpossi bl e here to go into the detailed mecha-
nisms of cultural selection and evol ut i on and the vari ous
interaction patterns bet ween genes and memes. Fol l owi ng
Dur ham (1991), we briefly poi nt out t wo mai n issues. First,
culture ew~lves as an aut onomous syst em, thanks to the
creat i on of secondar y values, st emmi ng not f r om individual
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 25
Ant one l l a
Del l e Fa r e
ont ogeny (like the pr i mar y ones) but f r om social history.
Me me s ' differential repl i cat i on can consequent l y depend
upon criteria t hat are purel y cultural, aut onomous f r om the
bi ol ogi cal fitness of the group. Mor eover , the fact ors influ-
enci ng the sel ect i on of genes and memes are different. The
f or mer is the differential survi val and reproduct i on of the
carriers (that which Durham calls selection by consequences);
the latter is the assumption of the cultural meani ng and use-
fulness of memes (selection according to consequences),
whi ch can precede the actual evaluation of memes' transmis-
sion outcomes. Second, memes' differential reproduction can
interact with biological fitness in three different ways: enhanc-
ing it, decreasing it, or being neutral in respect to it.
As concer ns the first issue, meme selection and orga-
ni zat i on in cultural syst ems have been anal yzed by st udy-
i ng const i t ut i ons as sets of cultural i nf or mat i on that regu-
late i ndi vi dual and gr oup behavi or (Calegari & Massi mi ni ,
1978; Massi mi ni & Cal egari , 1979). Const i t ut i ons com-
prise the basic social values, whi ch can be defined as
assumpt i ons on what is desirable f or the individual and f or
the gr oup in a specific cul t ure (Calegari & Massi mi ni ,
1976; Rokeach, 1974). The anal ysi s det ect ed 11 recurri ng
gr oups of norms, whi ch were treated as units of a cultural
net work. Each uni t deals with a maj or probl em that soci et y
has t o sol ve in order to survi ve and reproduce in time. The
units can be gr ouped i nt o four cat egori es, accor di ng to the
issues t hey deal with: (a) bi o-cul t ural reproduct i on (work,
propert y, i ncome), (b) cultural reproduct i on (education,
i nf or mat i on exchange, participation, deci si on maki ng), (c)
prescri pt i on (legal syst em, status), and (d) eval uat i on and
j ust i fi cat i on (individual values, social values). Wi t hi n the
cul t ural net work, the units are connect ed by mut ual influ-
ences. Each culture devel ops specific solutions to the prob-
l ems represent ed in the units accor di ng to its meme selec-
tion history. Cultural net works have al so been det ect ed in
oral l y t ransmi t t ed i nst ruct i on sets (Massimini, 1982). Fr om
anot her perspect i ve, Pockl i ngt on and Best (1997) studied
selection and repl i cat i ve success of memes in a corpus of
texts post ed t o a Int ernet -hased news syst em, in whi ch t hey
l ooked for sets of repeat edl y co- occur r i ng words, their
variation, and their persistence. Furt her studies are i ndeed
needed in the field.
Memes are di fferent i al l y repl i cat ed and t ransmi t t ed by
means of i mi t at i ve behavi or, oral communi cat i on, and ar-
t i fact s' reproduct i on, t hrough choi ce or i mposi t i on. New
memes can be i nt roduced in a cultural syst em by means of
i nvent i ons or acqui si t i on f r om ot her social groups.
The same unit of behavi or can be regul at ed by several
meme variants. These variants compet e f or differential
repl i cat i on and t ransmi ssi on at t wo levels: within cul t ure
and bet ween cultures. Wi t hi n a communi t y, the i nt roduc-
t i on of a new meme or the compet i t i on among variants of
the same meme can explain the hi st ori cal l y frequent phe-
nomenon of village fission and the subsequent emer gence
of new habits, l anguages, and cultural syst ems. Debat es in
the sciences and humani t i es can be translated in terms of
meme compet i t i on. Political parties are expressi ons of dif-
feremial meme replication. Changes in the cont ent or num-
ber of articles in a const i t ut i on are mani fest at i ons of meme
selection.
At the intercultural level, societies may fruitfully ex-
change and bor r ow memes. We have to admit, t hough, that
the most frequent event in human hi st ory has been compe-
tition and i mposi t i on of memes f r om one culture to anot her
One. Onl y one exampl e, however syst emat i cal l y recurring,
will be report ed here: Wars, most l y gr ounded in cultural
beliefs and values, are the ver y basi c l ei t mot i v of the
interaction among societies.
Gi ven the cultural relativity of memes ' fitness, whi ch
is based on assumpt i ons about their val ue wi t hi n a specific
soci et y, cultural evol ut i on is a process of change in neutral
terms: Change per se does not necessari l y mean i mpr ove-
ment, but fitness enhancement . Gi ven the possi bi l i t y of
memes spreadi ng t hr ough i mposi t i on, some cultures can
domi nat e others because of the cultural fitness of their
memes (i.e., ability to survi ve and reproduce in respect
with ot her memes ' variants and not because of the absolute
desirability of the values t hey convey) . For exampl e, duri ng
the second mi l l enni um BC, patriarchal warfare societies
defeat ed and suppressed mor e egalitarian and peaceful
cultures and settled in the Mi ddl e East, Sout h Asia, and the
Medi t erranean area. These cultures were based on agri cul -
tural and trading economy, gender equality, and a rel i gi ous
syst em cent ered on Mot her Goddess and fertility rituals
(Eisler, 1987; Gi mbut as, 1991). They di sappeared not be-
cause of the l ow desirability of their value syst em but
because of their l ack of artifacts and know- how related to
war. I n the last four centuries, cultural ext i nct i on has been
repeat edl y caused by means of vi ol ent col oni zat i on, wi l d
moderni zat i on, and supr emacy of t echnol ogi cal power.
Thi s l orm of meme sel ect i on t hr ough i mposi t i on inhibits
the di fferent i at i on process, whi ch is a basic feature of
l i vi ng syst ems, be t hey species or cultures.
26 Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
As concerns the interactions between memes and
genes, culture often contributes to enhance the biological
fitness of the group; food and housing habits, parenting
practices, and healing systems are generally aimed to en-
able and i mprove human biological survival and reproduc-
tion. However, human history is interspersed with cases of
competition between biological and cultural fitness (Boyd
& Richerson, 1985; Massimini, Inghilleri, & Delle Fave,
1996). Intraspecific violence and biological suppression
due to religious, political, and economic reasons; gulags
and concentration camps; religious celibacy; femal e infan-
ticide; family size reduction; and child abuse are only some
examples of this phenomenon. As concerns memes' inter-
action with the ecosystem, the changes of a culture in time
are often adaptive responses to ecological modifications.
However, in most parts of the world today, the artificial
environment has gradually overcome and is often substi-
tuted for the natural one, sometimes with devastating ef-
fects on the ecological niche and on the survival of a great
number of living species (Brown, Flavin, & French, 1998).
Subjective Experience and P sychological
Selection
It is very difficult to independently evaluate the influence of
biological, environmental, and cultural factors on pheno-
typic behavi or (Altman & Chemers, 1980). Studies deriv-
ing some concepts from the living syst em theory (Miller,
1970) called for a circular causal relationship between
individual behavior, biology, and culture (Massimini,
1982-; Richerson & Boyd, 1978).
Moreover, concerning culture, memes first stem from
individuals, who are the actual inventors of ideas, artifacts,
and value systems (Durham, 1991). Each piece of cultural
information was originally an individual solution to a spe-
cific probl em and has enormous implications for the po-
tential role of each human being in the construction of
society, as other scholars have often clearly stated (see,
e.g., Jung, 1932/1972) and as we discuss in the following
pages.
Being both reproducer and transmitter of bio-cultural
information units, each human being actively influences the
survival and replication of biological and cultural pools.
This influence is again based on a selective process, which
has been defined as psychological selection of bio-cultural
information (Csikszentmihalyi & Massimini, 1985). The
process is shaped by two specific human features: the
subj ect i ve-obj ect i ve awareness and the limited amount of
attention resources (Csikszentmihalyi, 1978). Individuals
cannot pay attention to all occurring environmental stimuli
at the same time. Thus, they have to select a subset of this
i nf or mat i on- - dai l y activities, situations, and social con-
t ext s - - t o be involved in. As a wide range of studies have
pointed out, the main factor directing psychological selec-
tion is the quality of experience. Individuals preferentially
invest their attention in environmental opportunities asso-
ciated with positive and rewarding states of consciousness,
in particular with optimal experience, or flow (Csikszent-
mihalyi, 1975, 1978; Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmiha-
lyi, 1988).
Optimal experience is characterized by the perception
of high environmental challenges, matched with adequate
personal skills. Individuals report high levels of affect,
concentration, and involvement. They perceive loss of self-
consciousness, control of the situation, focused attention,
positive feedback about the quality of their performance,
and clear ideas about the aims of the activity. They also
report being intrinsically motivated, not pursuing external
rewards, the enj oyment being provided by the situation or
the activity itself (Deci & Ryan, 1985).
Specific research tools have been developed to ana-
lyze the quality of experience. The experience sampling
method provides on-line information about its daily fluc-
tuations (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Csikszentmi-
halyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977). The Flow Questionnaire
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Delle Fave & Massimini, 1988)
investigates the psychological features of flow and associ-
ated activities or situations. Several cross-cultural studies,
which gave rise to a data bank comprising about 4,000
participants, showed the recurrence of optimal experience
in its basic features, regardless of gender, age, or cultural
context of the participants (Massimini et al., 1996).
Flow can be associated with the most varied activities,
provided that they are valid opportunities for action, en-
gagement, and high investment in personal skills. Thus,
creative and complex act i vi t i es- - be they work, sports, arts,
hobbies, or social i nt er act i ons I ar e frequently reported as
sources of flow, whereas repetitive and simple tasks are
seldom quoted.
Optimal experience promotes individual development.
To replicate it, a person will search for increasingly com-
plex challenges in the associated activities and will im-
prove his or her skill accordingly. This process has been
defined as cultivation; it fost ers the growt h of com-
pl exi t y not only in the performance of flow activities but in
individual behavior as a whole. The lifelong process of
psychological selection, centered on the preferential repli-
cation of optimal experience and associated activities, re-
sults in the individual' s lije theme (Csikszentmihalyi &
Beattie, 1979). It can be described as a set of activities,
social relations, and life goals uniquely cultivated and
pursued by each individual. In this perspective, optimal
experience represents the basic unit of psychological selec-
tion. To replicate it, individuals cultivate related opportu-
nities for action, which become the component s of their life
theme.
Being rooted in the subjective evaluation of environ-
mental opportunities, psychological selection leads to indi-
vidual differentiation within the social group, emphasizing
the uniqueness of each individual' s developmental trend.
Like biology and culture, psychological selection operates
as an evolution mechanism. In time, it brings changes in
behavior, and it takes part in the progressive differentiation
of the individual as a living system.
This approach shows interesting connections with the
model developed by Edelman (1989, 1992) in the field of
neuroscience. Edelman applies the Darwinian paradigm to
brain development, describing it as the result of an unceas-
ing selection process. Cells of the nervous system grow,
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 27
migrate, and die during ontogenesis on the basis of envi-
ronmental selective pressures. Synaptic connections among
neurons and neuronal groups enhance or decrease their
efficiency throughout life according to the adaptiveness of
the behavior their activity supports. This model is ex-
tremely close to the psychological selection paradigm:
Both perspectives describe individual behavior as strongly
influenced by environmental forces, which are independent
of genetic information. Both models emphasize individual
variation, thus underlining the uniqueness of each nervous
system and of each participant in his or her interaction with
the environment. Both maintain the role of contextual
pressures in promoting the differential reproduction of be-
havioral traits on the basis of their adaptive features.
In our perspective, however, adaptation does not have
only a biological meaning. It also has to be described in
cultural terms. In order to fit in their social context, indi-
viduals have to reproduce culturally adaptive behaviors.
Moreover, individuals are autonomous entities who ac-
tively select environmental information. Their behavior is
not aimed simply at bio-cultural adaptation. They build
their personalized life project, pursuing differentiation and
meanings, as researchers such as Maslow (1968) and
Frankl (1978) have pointed out. In our perspective, indi-
viduals are the sole authors of their developmental trend,
built on the preferential reproduction of those memes that
are related to optimal experiences.
As in biology and culture, development at the psycho-
logical level means growing in complexity (i.e., internal
order and integration of the living system). For humans, it
can be translated into the harmonization of the individual
life theme and cultural opportunities for action. Moreover,
given the interdependence of individuals and culture, the
growth of complexity involves constructive information
exchange with the environment. In order to foster authentic
development, psychological selection has to promote a
creative and satisfied individual, who is integrated in the
cultural environment and committed to the replication of its
basic social values.
However, the outcomes of the process depend on the
type of activities a person associates with flow and on the
features of his or her life theme. Social contexts do not
always provide meaningful opportunities for action, self-
expression, and individual growth. On the one hand, mod-
ernization and technological development bring about
enormous advantages in terms of biological survival, daily
life comforts, and the amount of time available for educa-
tion and leisure; but on the other hand, they bring excessive
automation, constraints on work creativity and personal
initiative, and a high investment of attention in the use and
consumption of artifacts. The gradual loss of traditional
know-how and skills implies an increasing dependence of
individuals on ready-made solutions to meet daily needs.
Thus, during ~heir leisure time, people more and more look
for challenging and complex activities, such as handicrafl,
arts, creative writing, adventure travels with limited equip-
ment and facilities, and high-risk sport performances.
The data we gathered with the Flow Questionnaire are
consistent with these considerations. For example, few
blue- and white-collar workers quote work as a source of
optimal experience; more associate flow with socialization
and leisure activities. These, especially for urbanized sam-
ples, are often represented by traditional skills, such as
gardening, knitting, and do-it-yourself projects. Con-
versely, artisans, farmers, teachers, social workers, and
professionals frequently report their complex and challeng-
ing work activity as a source of flow, also underlining its
positive impact on the quality of life (Delle Fave & Mas-
simini, 1988, 1991).
As we have previously stated, one of the basic features
of flow experience is the participant's engagement in the
task at hand (Delle Fave & Bassi, 1998), in terms of high
levels of concentration, alertness, active participation, and
perception of the importance of the activity. Engagement
can be related to the complexity of the challenge an indi-
vidual is facing, and it has several implications in the
process of personal growth. Any activity that requires
engagement also entails the cultivation of individual skills,
a process that can become a lifelong commitment.
Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837), a well-known Italian
man of letters, devoted his life to writing poems, literary
and philosophical essays, and treatises. In one of his most
famous poems, (1828/1972, p. 55) "A Silvia," he defines
his daily work "gli studi l eggi adri . . , e le sudate carte," the
graceful studies and the hard, laborious papers. In one
sentence, he synthetically described the joys and torments
of complex, highly challenging activities.
This same dedication has been stated by a group of
musicians and music students interviewed by means of the
Flow Questionnaire (Massimini & Delle Fave, 1995). For
these participants, music involves daily commitment, hard
work, and perseverance--in one word, engagement; 72%
reported studying and playing music as the most important
source of optimal experience in their daily life. These
findings are consistent with the data coming from people
devoted to challenging activities, such as surgeons, moun-
tain farmers, mathematicians, and university students.
These individuals very frequently associated flow experi-
ence with their engaging work or study tasks.
Flow is actively pursued by individuals, but it can also
be considered a conquest. It arises out of the constant
engagement in skill cultivation; it is not an easy and auto-
matic state, which is one of the reasons why neither repet-
itive and executive jobs nor passive leisure entertainment,
such as watching TV (Delle Fave & Massimini, 1994;
Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), are included as flow-
inducing situations.
Nevertheless, some studies conducted with the Flow
Questionnaire allowed us to detect the phenomenon of
mimetic flow. Some activities can be perceived as sources
of optimal experience; they can be actively cultivated but
eventually turn out to be poor in complexity potential,
which is an essential feature of authentic flow activities and
a prerequisite for individual development. Moreover, such
activities do not toster the participant's constructive inte-
gration in the culture. This is true, for example, of drug
addiction (Delle Fave, 1996b). Individuals report a flowlike
experience in the first period of drug intake. However, the
28 January 2000 ° American Psychologist
experi ence is chemi cal l y i nduced, thus artificial. The indi-
vi dual is passi ve, di sengaged f r om reality, i ncreasi ngl y
dependent on drugs and unabl e to pursue ot her challenges,
and physi cal l y weak and margi nal i zed f r om the social
cont ext . Thus, apparent psychol ogi cal wel l -bei ng turns out
t o have a negat i ve effect on bi o-cul t ural fitness and indi-
vidual devel opment . The same can be said for antisocial
activities, such as stealing, whi ch have somet i mes been
quot ed as sources of fl ow within specific samples. Chal -
lenge, engagement , and f ocus of attention are there; indi-
viduals also underl i ne the enj oyment in per f or mi ng the
act i vi t y itself, regardl ess of material rewards. But again,
this behavi or causes margi nal i zat i on instead of i ndi vi dual ' s
i nt egrat i on in the cultural context.
Psychological Selection and
Individual Development: Some
Applications
Fl ow experi ence and psychol ogi cal sel ect i on can be used as
t he t wo basic const ruct s t o build a model of opt i mal psy-
chol ogi cal f unct i oni ng and behavi oral devel opment . The
cul t i vat i on of compl ex opport uni t i es for act i on fosters per-
sonal gr owt h as well as individual active i nt egrat i on in the
cultural cont ext . Thi s model can be used in social and
psychol ogi cal i nt ervent i on programs.
Adolescents
Young peopl e are exposed t o vari ous sources of mi met i c
flow in the moder ni zed urban settings of most countries.
The intake of psychoact i ve subst ances and the mi suse and
abuse of t echnol ogi cal artifacts such as comput ers, cars,
and weapons are onl y some exampl es of the apparent l y
compl ex activities t eenagers are at t ract ed to. In most cases,
there is a mi si nt erpret at i on of ri sk behavi or as chal l engi ng
behavi or. No connect i ons wi t h i ndi vi dual devel opment and
i nt egrat i on in the social cont ext can be f ound in such
practices.
On the cont rary, school and learning activities are
oft en descri bed as l ow- chal l engi ng situations. Many West -
ern count ri es are faci ng pr obl ems such as st udent s' poor
per f or mance and students who drop out f r om hi gh schools.
However , bui l di ng an i ndi vi dual as an adult member of a
social gr oup entails an enor mous amount of cultural infor-
mat i on that chi l dren and adol escent s are expect ed t o learn
f r om f ami l y and school . Several studies have dealt wi t h the
structure of educat i onal syst ems and the qual i t y of experi-
ence associ at ed wi t h l earni ng (Csi kszent mi hal yi , 1982;
Csi kszent mi hal yi , Rat hunde, & Whal en, 1993). I n West ern
countries, st udyi ng is a mandat or y act i vi t y for adol escent s;
however , the cont ent s and the way t hey are t aught are
somet i mes unfit to capt ure the attention of the students.
Nevert hel ess, l earni ng can be a very ri ch source of engage-
ment, personal satisfaction, and meani ngf ul i nformat i on
(Delle Fave & Bassi, 1998). Its effect i veness as a source of
opt i mal experi ence can facilitate the acqui si t i on of new
knowl edge and the act i ve part i ci pat i on of the i ndi vi dual in
the process of cultural selection. I n our opi ni on, this is one
of the most i mport ant issues to deal wi t h in order to enable
school s to effect i vel y act as an arena for life skills training
and individual devel opment .
For similar reasons, adol escent s shoul d be encour aged
to engage in structured leisure activities that of f er hi gh
chal l enges, pot ent i al skills i mpr ovement , and devel opmen-
tal chances in terms of cultural integration.
Disablement
The ext reme behavi oral flexibility that charact eri zes hu-
mans at the bi ol ogi cal level has also been det ect ed at the
psychol ogi cal level in studies concer ni ng the qual i t y of
experi ence of di sabl ed persons. In the case of congeni t al or
early i nfancy deficits, the behavi oral const rai nt s do not
present obst acl es to the process of act i ve psychol ogi cal
selection. Persons born blind report ed flow experi ences and
the bui l di ng of compl ex life chal l enges that enable t hem t o
effect i vel y take part in the process of memes ' replication,
t ransmi ssi on, and creat i ve modi fi cat i on (Delle Fave & Mal -
etto, 1992; Negri, Massi mi ni , & Delle Fave, 1992). As f or
handi caps that occur later in life, studies have been con-
duct ed on persons who became blind, parapl egi c, or tet-
rapl egi c after athletic, work, or road acci dent s (Delle Fave,
1996a). The results again emphasi ze the flexibility of hu-
man behavi or. Af t er a maj or t rauma that i mposes dramat i c
changes in the dai l y life and in the access to envi ronment al
opport uni t i es for action, individuals can devel op a st rat egy
defined as transformation of flow. Wher e possi bl e, t hey
keep cul t i vat i ng f or mer flow activities. Ot herwi se, as oft en
happens, t hey manage to i dent i fy new and unexpect ed
sources of concent rat i on and i nvol vement , somet i mes in
areas very di fferent f r om their previ ous interests.
These results fit very well in the f r amewor k of bi o-
cultural evol ut i on and psychol ogi cal selection. Behavi oral
flexibility emerges as a crucial feat ure f or adapt at i on in the
cont i nuousl y changi ng envi ronment , be it the ecol ogi cal
niche or the cultural context. At the psychol ogi cal level,
this flexibility enabl es the individual to pursue devel op-
mental goals despite bi ol ogi cal constraints. Rehabi l i t at i on
pr ogr ams shoul d maxi mi ze these i ndi vi dual resources.
Psychopathology
The f r amewor k of psychol ogi cal sel ect i on can be fruitfully
applied in psychot her apy. The admi ni st rat i on of flow-re-
lated procedures to persons under goi ng psychol ogi cal treat-
ment pr oved t o be useful for the on-l i ne i nvest i gat i on of
individual interaction with the ever yday envi r onment (De-
lespaul, 1995; deVries, 1992). Posi t i ve and negat i ve out-
comes of this relationship in terms of qual i t y of experi ence
can be detected. Negat i ve states of consci ousness, charac-
terized by di srupt i on of attention, di sengagement , mood
instability, and inability to concent rat e, whi ch are t ypi cal
features of several ment al disorders, can be related t o
specific dai l y situations. I ndi vi dual s' descri pt i ons of dai l y
opport uni t i es for fl ow allow the therapist to bui l d a st rat egy
based on individual psychol ogi cal selection. Thi s can pro-
mot e a factual devel opment al process, its ai m bei ng not j ust
the r ecover y f r om sympt oms but the cul t i vat i on of mean-
ingful life chal l enges and the social i nt egrat i on of the
individual. The potentials of this appr oach have been ob
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 29
served both in clinical case studies (Delle Fave & Massi-
mini, 1992) and in psychiatric interventions developed
within international cooperation programs. A therapeutic
approach centered on subjective experience and directed
toward the cultural reintegration of the individual has been
successfully used in the reorganization of two psychiatric
structures in Managua, Nicaragua, and in Berbera, Somalia
(Inghilleri, 1999). American intervention, supervised by
one of the authors, was focused on the rehabilitation of
psychotic patients who had been segregated in the Man-
agua psychiatric hospital for decades. A group of them
were treated by means of exposure to environmental chal-
lenges; specifically, they were recruited for collective work
in coffee plantations. This activity, familiar to most of the
participants, represented a traditional cultural skill as well
as a collaborative group task. The engagement in the work
led to a drastic reduction in drugs and a gradual relocation
of the participants in their own families and cultural context
(Massimini, Terranova, & Inghilleri, 1985).
Social Maladjustment
Social maladjustment comprises several categories of phe-
nomena, and it involves individuals of all ages. From street
children to abandoned elderly persons, from homeless per-
sons to drug addicts, the problem is present under various
forms in every society. Maladjusted individuals are ex-
posed to risks at two different levels. First, their potential
development through the building of a complex life theme
is often seriously limited. Second, marginalization prevents
them from taking active part in the process of memes'
differential replication and transmission. Data have been
collected on the flow experience and life theme among
homeless persons, drug addicts, and adolescents living in
residential institutions. In all cases, individuals report de-
velopmental difficulties at both the personal and the cul-
tural levels. The framework of psychological selection and
cultural evolution can provide useful guidelines for inter-
ventions. The quality of experience has to be evaluated as
the key criterion for a successful rehabilitation program.
Individuals should be offered opportunities for action ac-
cording to their personal skills and preferential allocation
of psychic resources. However, the ultimate goal of inter-
vention has to be the social reintegration of individuals by
fostering the cultivation of culturally adaptive activities and
life goals.
A good application of these theoretical assumptions
comes from the work of Child Workers in Nepal (CWIN).
This nongovernmental social organization, located in Kath-
mandu, is involved in socialization and rehabilitation pro-
grams for children exposed to labor exploitation, street life,
and social and psychological risk factors (CWIN, 1995;
Sattaur, 1993). CWIN strategy effectively fosters individ-
ual and cultural development, as we could see in recent
visits. Street and labor-bonded children are hosted for some
months in CWIN centers. In the meantime, contacts are
established with their parents to facilitate family reunion
and their reintegration in the original social context. Atten-
tion is given primarily to promote adjustment to the social
context and acquisition of social values: the awareness of
child and human fights and the importance of education,
health care, and social equity. Thanks to this new cultural
equipment, CWIN children can behave as the core active
agents of meaningful cultural changes.
Rehabilitation programs are individualized and fo-
cused on psychological selection and life theme. Children
are encouraged to express their life expectations and to
tollow their intrinsic motivation in cultivating the activities
offered in the centers. These activities represent culture-
specific opportunities for action, such as traditional skill
training, religious practices, meditation, arts, and handi-
craft. Far too often international intervention programs in
developing countries are unrelated to the local culture,
being built on Western standards instead. Unfortunately,
this still-common practice arbitrarily introduces radically
unconnected memes in a structured social system. Thus,
these memes have few, if any, chances of integration with
the local ones, or they can even disrupt the cultural evolu-
tion process.
CWIN regularly organizes village-centered advocacy
programs on children's issues; to be effective and long
lasting, any cultural change requires the commitment of all
members of the society. Moreover, it should not undermine
the system' s stability in the short run, but foster the growth
of cnlture complexity in the long run. The abolition of child
labor and street life is not expected to be suddenly realized.
Biological speciation is a slow, gradual, time-consuming
process, eventually giving rise to well-adapted organisms.
The same principle can be applied to cultural evolution,
and it is one of the pillars of CWIN' s careful, exemplary
intervention.
Bicultural Integration
Cultures often meet in violent ways through wars, land
disputes, and religious and ethnic conflicts. Sadly, human
history is full of such events, which can result in the
imposition of memes by the victors on the vanquished. In
other cases, especially in recent times, migration forces
individuals to adapt to cultural contexts that are often
remarkably different from their original ones. The various
outcomes of prolonged exposure to a cultural system other
than one' s own have been extensively studied in cross-
cultural psychology (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen,
1992; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993). The key
role of psychological selection in coping with the accultur-
ation process arises from data collected by means of Flow
Questionnaires in Arizona among Navajos and in Thailand.
The two populations are examples of a successful bicultural
strategy, leading to the balanced integration of traditional
culture with strong modernizing Western influences. Both
groups developed specific strategies in pursuing this goal,
in line with their culture history (see Delle Fave & Inghil-
left, 1996; Inghilleri & Delle Fave, 1996). From the per-
spective of psychological selection, we expect that any
society exposed to rapid modernization has to promote the
bicultural development of its members as individuals in
order to successfully evolve in time. Navajo and Thai
participants reported both traditional and modernized ac-
tivities as sources of optimal experience. The activities
30 January 2000 • American Psychologist
r anged f r om wor k to leisure and f r om social and fami l y
i nt eract i ons to rel i gi ous pract i ces; t hey were meani ngf ul
component s of life t heme. The part i ci pant s were able to
achi eve a compl ex i nt egrat i on of memes st emmi ng f r om
t wo cuRural pool s at the psychol ogi cal level, t hat is, in the
dai l y sel ect i on of envi r onment al i nformat i on.
Unfort unat el y, not ever y cont act bet ween cultures
pr ovi des such encour agi ng out comes. When traditional so-
cieties meet cul t ures mor e power f ul at t he t echnol ogi cal
and economi cal level, the most frequent result is assimila-
tion, whi ch i nvol ves wild moder ni zat i on and the loss of
entire pool s of original knowl edge. On the ot her hand, any
effort to rel y sol el y on anci ent tradition woul d ul t i mat el y
lead to cul t ure secl usi on and the ri sk of ext i nct i on in
t oday' s era of gl obal i zat i on. Bi cul t ural selection turns out
to be the most adapt i ve strategy, especi al l y when it is
gr ounded in individual daily behavi or, in that it allows the
i ndi vi dual s' i nt egrat i on in a changi ng envi ronment . Mor e-
over, this st rat egy pr omot es the gr owt h in compl exi t y of
the ori gi nal culture, thanks t o the i nt roduct i on of new
memes act i vel y sel ect ed and t ransmi t t ed t oget her wi t h the
traditional ones by the individuals.
P sychological Selection and flio-Cultural
Evolution
Af t er this excursus t hrough the selective processes shapi ng
human behavi or, we present some final remarks. The indi-
vidual is the very cent er of cultural change, as an aut ono-
mous agent of me me s ' differential repl i cat i on and trans-
mi ssi on. Mor eover , each human bei ng act i vel y cont ri but es
t o the bui l di ng of culture, not j ust within his or her own
limited cont ext but within the whol e human envi ronment .
Thi s process is part i cul arl y clear nowadays when social
syst ems cont i nuousl y interact and exchange i nf or mat i on
t hr oughout the planet. As we have pr evi ousl y discussed,
the subj ect i ve percept i on of a posi t i ve, compl ex, and in-
trinsically rewardi ng state of consci ousness, namel y flow,
fost ers the r epr oduct i on and t ransmi ssi on of the associ at ed
cultural instructions. Fl ow requires engagement . It is based
on i nvol vement in the act i vi t y for the sake of the experi -
ence and not of extrinsic rewards; it pr omot es the i ndi vi d-
ual ' s devel opment and cultural integration.
It is hard to bel i eve t hat such a compl ex state of
consci ousness can be associ at ed wi t h harmful and devi ant
behavi or. Nevert hel ess, there are mi met i c cases that can be
mi si nt erpret ed as opt i mal experi ence and that are t oo oft en
expl oi t ed by chari smat i c leaders and totalitarian i deol ogi es
t o support devi ance, culture clash, and i mposi t i on of
power. Mor eover , t oday' s l eadi ng cultures are cent ered
mai nl y on extrinsic reward: Moderni zat i on, accumul at i on
and consumpt i on of artifacts, and emphasi s on economi c
and material goal s are the most striking and recurri ng
feat ures of social syst ems. The i mpact of artifacts on nat-
ural envi r onment has creat ed serious pr obl ems f or the
bi ol ogi cal survi val of our species and of the living syst ems
on earth, thus posi ng a cruci al need f or soci al awareness
and i nt ervent i on programs.
Yet, we have evi dence that peopl e do not associ at e
flow wi t h money, power , or interpersonal conflict. Fl ow
sheds light on the most const ruct i ve, cooperat i ve, creat i ve,
and compl ex aspect s of human beings. The const i t ut i ons of
most soeieties i ncl ude ci t i zens' rights, prot ect i on and edu-
cat i on of children, f r eedom of faith and expressi on, and
gender and social equal i t y among their basic cultural val-
ues. There is a gr owi ng effort in the wor l d to bui l d dem-
ocrat i c syst ems, whi ch apparent l y cont rast bot h the bi ol og-
ical t endency to social hi erarchy and t he intercultural con-
flict among memes ( Somi t & Peterson, 1996).
Mor eover , human hi st ory is i nt erspersed with striking
exampl es of compl exi t y and individual devel opment in
people, such as Al bert Schwei t zer, Mahat ma Gandhi , Mar-
tin Lut her King, Jr., and Mot her Teresa. Thei r lives show a
distinctive pattern of sel ect i ve meme replication, ai med to
fost er intercultural i nt egrat i on and cooper at i on beyond cul -
tural selfish reproduct i on and compet i t i on. How can we
cl assi fy these i ndi vi dual s? Are t hey i nspi ri ng yet i sol at ed
except i ons of peopl e who confi rm the rule of meme com-
petition in cultural syst ems? As opponent s of cultural con-
flicts, are t hey onl y unawar e support ers of speci es' bi ol og-
ical fitness?
What about Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma, Ken Saro-
Wi wa in Nigeria, and the hundreds of t housands of political
pri soners and persecut ed peopl e who ri sk their life in many
count ri es for the sake of peopl e' s f r eedom and of human
ri ght s? Are t hey onl y edi fyi ng, unmat chabl e exampl es, or
can t hey become effect i ve model s f or c ommon peopl e' s
behavi or and authentic devel opment ? How can we finally
cat egori ze the count l ess nurses, teachers, physi ci ans, and
rel i gi ous and social workers who dai l y and silently devot e
their life f or the sake of manki nd?
All of these exampl es, f r om the very f amous to the
anonymous ones, show t hat individuals can bui l d a life
t heme cent ered not onl y on personal and cul t ure-speci fi c
chal l enges and goals, but also on concer ns f or ot her human
beings, regardless of their bi ol ogi cal and cultural inheri-
tance. Common peopl e i nvol ved in soci al l y rel evant occu-
pat i ons have wi t nessed that this concer n is a very st rong
source of opt i mal experi ence in their daily life. Thanks t o
the great compl exi t y of the issues and the skills requi red to
deal wi t h them, an i ndi vi dual can choose to devot e a
conspi cuous amount of his or her psychi c resources t o
cultivating the related activities.
We do not mean that life themes focused on other jobs,
challenges, or goals are less valuable or meaningful. Instead,
we would like to emphasize that every human activity can be
performed either from a strictly individual perspective or from
a broader one. This extended worl d outlook should not be
confined to personal biological and cultural fitness, but should
include manki nd as a global living system, whose elements
share the same ecological niche and resources, the same
biological structure and needs, and the same potentials for
growth and development.
To be effective, the process has to occur in each
cultural cont ext - - al t hough fragment at i on and meme com-
petition seem paradoxi cal l y i ncreasi ng t o d a y - - i n spite of,
or because of, cl oser cultural relationships. Gl obal i zat i on is
becomi ng a mor e and mor e concret e reality, but it is based
on the west erni zat i on of knowl edge and on a syst em of
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 31
e c o n o mi c a l r e l a t i ons hi ps t hat e mp h a s i z e s and p r o mo t e s
i ne qua l i t y ( Ch o s s u d o v s y , 1997; Sen, 1992). I n t hes e t er ms ,
t he a i m is not t o s uppor t t he d e v e l o p me n t o f ma nki nd. An y
cul t ur al c ha nge , in or de r t o be de f i ne d as pos i t i ve , has t o
e n h a n c e t he r eal c o mp l e x i t y o f a cul t ur e, wh i c h ent ai l s t he
i mp r o v e me n t o f i nt e gr a t i on a mo n g t he va r i ous c o mp o n e n t s
o f t he c ul t ur e i t sel f , c ons i de r e d as a d y n a mi c l i vi ng s ys t em.
Mo r e o v e r , t he c ha nge has t o e ns ur e a f r ui t f ul e x c h a n g e
wi t h t he e n v i r o n me n t ; c o o p e r a t i o n and r e c i pr oc i t y b e t we e n
s oci al s ys t ems , r at her t han conf l i ct s , f os t e r cul t ur al e v o l u -
t i on in its c ons t r uc t i ve me a ni ng.
Th e r e ar e st i l l ma n y obs t a c l e s t o t hi s goal , but t her e
h a v e b e e n s e ve r a l a c c o mp l i s h me n t s up t o now. The gr eat
wo r l d r e l i gi ons ar e i n v o l v e d in bui l di ng an e c u me n i c a l
pe r s pe c t i ve , one o f t he mos t r e ma r k a b l e a c h i e v e me n t s in
t hi s c e nt ur y i f we c o n s i d e r t hat t he mos t r e l e va nt va l ue s f or
cul t ur al and i ndi vi dua l d e v e l o p me n t ar e s har ed by di f f e r e nt
r e l i gi ous s ys t ems . Apa r t f r o m t he e x t r e me pos i t i ons o f
i nt e gr a l i s m, all r e l i gi ons p r o mo t e t he d e v e l o p me n t o f t he
c o o p e r a t i v e and al t r ui s t i c c o mp o n e n t s o f h u ma n be i ngs
( Ma s s i mi n i & De l l e Fa ve , 1991).
Wh a t l e s s on can be d r a wn f r o m t he e v o l u t i o n a r y hi s-
t or y o f huma ns , at t he t hr ee l e ve l s o f bi ol ogy, cul t ur e, and
p s y c h o l o g y ? It has of t en be e n st at ed t hat h u ma n s do not
l ear n a nyt hi ng f r om t hei r past . Thi s s houl d me a n t hat
cul t ur al e vol ut i on, l i ke bi ol ogi c a l e vol ut i on, is bl i nd and
c e n t e r e d on me me s e l e c t i on and t r a ns mi s s i on onl y f r o m t he
p e r s p e c t i v e o f cul t ur al f i t ness (i . e. , t he p o we r o f me me
r e pr oduc t i on) . But t he s peci f i c pat t er n o f br ai n ( and mi nd)
d e v e l o p me n t has ma d e h u ma n s s e l f - a wa r e bei ngs . I ndi vi d-
ual s can r ef l ect upon t hei r act i ons , ma k e pl ans f or t he
f ut ur e, and r e me mb e r ( and l ear n) f r om pas t e xpe r i e nc e s .
Th e y ar e t he ul t i mat e cr eat or s o f cul t ur e. Th e y ha ve t he
p o we r t o di r ect me me s ' s e l e c t i on f r o m t hei r s ubj e c t i ve
pe r s pe c t i ve , pur s ui ng t he r e pl i c a t i on o f pos i t i ve and c o m-
pl e x e xpe r i e nc e s . Th e y l ook f or me a n i n g f u l l i f e t he me s ,
wh i c h ar e not r es t r i ct ed t o s i mpl e s ur vi val or pa s s i ve ac-
c e pt a nc e o f s oc i a l nor ms , r e ga r dl e s s o f t hei r abs ol ut e val ue.
To b e q u e a t h a c ons t r uc t i ve i nhe r i t a nc e t o t he next
ge ne r a t i ons , h u ma n be i ngs s houl d be e n c o u r a g e d t o i nves t
t hei r l i mi t ed, and t hus pr eci ous , ps yc hi c r e s our c e s in op-
por t uni t i e s f or act i on t hat r e pr e s e nt r eal s our c e s o f de ve l -
opme nt , not onl y f or t he i ndi vi dua l but f or t he nat ur al and
cul t ur al e n v i r o n me n t ( ul t i ma t e l y ma d e up of ot he r l i vi ng
bei ngs , h u ma n s or not ). We hope t hat we ha ve s u c c e e d e d in
e x e mp l i f y i n g s o me o f t he wa ys t o pur s ue t hi s goal . The
pr e s e nt hi s t or i cal pe r i od is r e pl e t e wi t h et hni c conf l i ct s ,
cul t ur e cl as hes , and ma l a d a p t i v e o u t c o me s o f wi l d ar t i -
f a c t s ' r e pr oduc t i on. None t he l e s s , t her e is a g r o wi n g a wa r e -
nes s o f t he i nt r i ns i c va l ue o f di ve r s i t y and c oope r a t i on at
t he i ndi vi dua l as wel l as t he s oci al l evel . Th e s e abs ol ut e
h u ma n va l ue s s houl d be s pr ead t hr ough f or ma l e duc a t i on
and me d i a and by me a n s o f each i n d i v i d u a l ' s a s s umpt i on o f
pe r s ona l r e s pons i bi l i t y t owa r d t he f ut ur e o f t he s ur r oundi ng
wor l d. I n t hi s pha s e o f h u ma n hi s t or y, w o r l d is not a
me t a p h o r t o i ndi c a t e e n v i r o n me n t ; it r ef er s e xa c t l y t o t he
wor l d.
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January 2000 * American Psychologist 33
Subjective Well-Being
The Science of Happiness and a Proposal f or a National Index
Ed Diener
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
One area of positive psychology analyzes subjective well-
being (SWB), people's cognitive and affective evaluations
of their lives. Progress has been made in understanding the
components of SWB, the importance of adaptation and
goals to feelings of well-being, the temperament underpin-
nings of SWB, and the cultural influences on well-being.
Representative selection of respondents, naturalistic expe-
rience sampling measures, and other methodological re-
finements are now used to study SWB and could be used to
produce national indicators of happiness.
F
or millennia thinkers have pondered the question,
what is the good life? They have focused on criteria
such as loving others, pleasure, or self-insight as the
defining characteristics of quality of life. Another idea of
what constitutes a good life, however, is that it is desirable
for people themselves to think that they are living good
lives. This subjective definition of quality of life is demo-
cratic in that it grants to each individual the right to decide
whether his or her life is worthwhile. It is this approach to
defining the good life that has come to be called "subjective
well-being" (SWB) and in colloquial terms is sometimes
labeled "happiness." SWB refers to people' s evaluations of
their lives--evaluations that are both affective and cogni-
tive. People experience abundant SWB when they feel
many pleasant and few unpleasant emotions, when they are
engaged in interesting activities, when they experience
many pleasures and few pains, and when they are satisfied
with their lives. There are additional features of a valuable
life and of mental health, but the field of SWB focuses on
people' s own evaluations of their lives.
Throughout the world, people are granting increasing
importance to SWB. Inglehart (1990) proposed that as
basic material needs are met, individuals move to a post-
materialistic phase in which they are concerned with self-
fulfillment. Table I presents means from an international
college sample of 7,204 respondents in 42 countries, sig-
nifying how students in diverse countries view happiness
(see Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998, for more infor-
mation about this sample). Mean values are presented for
how frequently the respondents reported thinking about
SWB and for how important they believed SWB is. As can
be seen, even in societies that are not fully westernized,
students reported that happiness and life satisfaction were
very important, and they thought about them often. Al-
though there was a trend for respondents in the most
westernized nations to grant SWB greater importance,
mean levels of concern about happiness were high in all of
the countries surveyed. Among the total sample, only 6%
of respondents rated money as more important than happi-
ness. Furthermore, fully 69% rated happiness at the top of
the importance scale, and only 1% claimed to have never
thought about it. Of the respondents, 62% rated life satis-
faction at the top of the importance scale, and only 2%
reported never having thought about it. As people through-
out the world fulfill more of their basic material needs, it is
likely that SWB will become an even more valued goal.
Thus. although SWB is not sufficient for the good life (e.g.,
Diener, Sapyta, & Suh, 1998), it appears to be increasingly
necessary for it.
I briefly describe selected findings on SWB. Because
this article can present only a broad overview, readers are
referred to other reviews of the field (e.g., Diener, 1984;
Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Myers, 1992). Myers
(2000, this issue) discusses several correlates of SWB.
Readers interested in the connections of SWB to psycho-
logical phenomena such as emotion, the biology of plea-
sure, and self-report judgment processes are referred to
Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz (1999), Parducci 1995),
and Strack, Argyle, and Schwarz (1991).
Defining and Measuring SWB
People' s moods and emotions reflect on-line reactions to
evenls happening to them. Each individual also makes
broader judgments about his or her life as a whole, as well
as about domains such as marriage and work. Thus, there
are a number of separable components of SWB: life satis-
faction (global judgments of one' s life), satisfaction with
important domains (e.g., work satisfaction), positive affect
(experiencing many pleasant emotions and moods), and
low levels of negative affect (experiencing few unpleasant
emotions and moods). In the early research on SWB, re-
searchers studying the facets of happiness usually relied on
only a single self-report item to measure each construct.
My sincere thanks are extended to the following individuals for their
perceptive comments: Frederick Kanfer, Eva Pomerantz, Harry C. Trian-
dis, Alexander Grob, Larry Seidlitz, Andrew Clark, M. Joseph Sirgy,
Howard Berenbaum, Ulrich Schimmack, Robert Biswas-Diener, Carol
Diener, Eunkook Sub, Jonathan Lavav, and Daniel Kahneman.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ed
Diener, Depamnent of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel
Street, Champaign, IL 61821. Electronic mail may be sent to
ediencr @ s.psych.uiuc.edu.
34
January 2000 • American Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00
Vol 55. No. 1. 34 43 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.55.1.34
Ed Di ener
For example, Andrews and Withey (1976) asked respon-
dents, "How do you feel about your life as a whole?"
Respondents were provided with a 7-point response scale
ranging from delighted to terrible. Recent measures of
SWB, however, contain multiple items. For example, the
PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Scale; Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) measures both positive and neg-
ative affect, each with 10 affect items, and the Satisfaction
With Life Scale assesses life satisfaction with items such as
"In most ways my life is close to my ideal" and "So far I
have gotten the important things I want in life" (Pavot &
Diener, 1993). Although the psychometric properties of
these scales tend to be strong, they provide only one
approach to assessing SWB.
In the past decade, researchers have used additional
types of assessment to obtain a better gauge of long-term
feelings. In the naturalistic experience-sampling method
(ESM), for example, researchers assess respondents' SWB
at random moments in their everyday lives, usually over a
period of one to four weeks. Sandvik, Diener, and Seidlitz
(1993) found that one-time self-reported life satisfaction,
ESM measures of life satisfaction, reports by friends and
relatives, and people' s memories of positive versus nega-
tive life events intercorrelate at moderate-to-strong levels.
Moum (1996) found that low life-satisfaction reports pre-
dicted suicide over the following five years. Lucas, Diener,
and Suh (1996) found that SWB measures showed dis-
criminant validity from other related constructs, such as
optimism. Thus, there is reason to believe that the existing
measures of SWB have some degree of validity (see Die-
ner, 1994, for a review). Nevertheless, when and how the
various measures differ have not been explored systemat-
ically. For example, Thomas and Diener (1990) found only
a modest relation between global and on-line mood reports,
but researchers do not yet understand what different factors
influence the two types of measures.
Despite the encouraging findings, SWB measures can
be contaminated by biases. For example, Schwarz and
Strack (1999) demonstrated in a series of studies that global
measures of life satisfaction can be influenced by mood at
the moment of responding to the scale and by other situa-
tional faclors. They also found that the ordering of items
and other artifacts can influence reports of SWB. Eid and
Diener (1999) found, however, that situational factors usu-
ally pale in comparison with long-term influences on well-
being measures. Another potential problem is that people
may respond to SWB scales in socially desirable ways. If
they believe that happiness is normatively appropriate, they
may report that they are happier than other types of assess-
ments may indicate.
Although single-occasion self-reports of SWB have
a degree of validity, and interesting conclusions have
emerged from studies using them, the artifacts mentioned
above suggest caution. For this reason, in the future re-
searchers should more frequently combine other types of
measures with one-time scales. Although based on self-
report, the naturalistic ESM can circumvent some memory
and other biases that occur in more global reports. Because
people are randomly signaled at many points in time and
their moods in their natural life settings are recorded, a
more fine-grained record of their experience of well-being
is obtained. ESM yields information on how SWB varies
across situations and time. Kahneman (1999) argued that
ESM ought to be the primary measure of SWB, and Stone,
Schiffman, DeVries, and Frijters (1999) reviewed work in
this area.
Additional methods, such as physiological measures,
reports by informants, and memory and reaction-time mea-
sures, also should be included in complete assessments of
SWB. Although SWB is by definition subjective, experi-
ence can manifest itself in physiology and other channels;
self-report is not the only way to assess experience. Be-
cause different methods of measuring SWB can produce
different scores, a battery of diverse measures will produce
the most informative composite. Although each of the
alternative measures has its own limitations, the strengths
of the different types of measures are often complementary
to each other. For example, in the memory measure devel-
oped by Sandvik et al. (1993), respondents are asked to
generate as many positive and as many negative events
from their lives as they can during a short timed period.
Thus, with this method researchers can assess individual
differences in the relative accessibility of memories for
good and bad events and thereby can determine the
valence-related structure of how respondents recall their
lives.
In addition to using diverse assessment methods, re-
searchers need to use measures of both pleasant and un-
pleasant affect, because both are major components of
SWB. Bradburn and Caplovitz (1965) discovered that these
two types of emotions, formerly believed to be polar op-
posites, form two separable factors that often correlate with
different variables. Indeed, their findings provided a major
January 2000 • American Psychologist 35
T a b l e 1
I mp o r t a n c e o f Subj ec t i v e We l l - Be i n g t o Co l l e g e St udent s
How often do you think about? How important is?
Nation Life satisfaction Happiness Life satisfaction Happiness Money
Argenti na 5. 63 5. 62 6. 67 6. 78 4. 46
Australia 5. 27 5.51 6. 59 6. 66 4. 44
Bahrain 5. 25 5. 14 6. 08 6.21 5.01
Chi na 4. 20 4. 43 5. 67 5.91 4. 82
Germany 5. 43 5. 27 6. 62 5. 95 4.11
Greece 5. 52 5. 54 6. 73 6. 77 4. 89
Hungary 5. 43 5. 59 6. 43 6. 57 4. 30
India 4. 74 5. 20 5. 75 5. 97 4.81
Indonesia 5. 17 5. 78 6. 16 6. 63 4. 89
Japan 4. 27 4. 74 6. 02 6.31 4. 70
Lithuania 5.31 5. 38 6. 18 6. 62 5. 23
Singapore 5. 06 5. 24 6. 25 6. 59 4. 80
SIovenia 5. 56 5. 22 6. 78 6. 62 4. 60
South Afri ca 5. 53 5. 75 6. 44 6.61 5. 00
Tanzani a 4. 46 4.61 5. 06 5. 45 5. 17
Turkey 5. 16 5. 63 6. 25 5. 75 5. 25
United States 5. 19 5. 45 6. 39 6. 58 4. 68
Note. The 1 to 7 "How often do you think about?" scale was anchored by 1 (never), 4 (sometimes),
several times a day ar more). Importance ratings were reported on a 1-7 scale, where 1 was
whatsoever and 7 was extraordinarily important and valuable.
and 7 (very much,
of no importance
impetus to study positive well-being, rather than assuming
that it is only the absence of ill-being. Good life events and
extraversion tend to correlate with pleasant emotions,
whereas neuroticism and negative life events covary more
strongly with negative emotions. Cacioppo, Gardner, and
Berntson (l 999) revi ewed evidence indicating that separate
biological systems subserve pleasant and unpleasant affect.
Thus, it is desirable to measure t hem separately because
different conclusions often emerge about the antecedents
and consequences of these two types of affect. Although
researchers can combi ne positive and negative affect into
an "affect balance" or global "happiness" score, they may
lose valuable information about the two types of affect.
In defining happiness, it is common sense to combine
the frequency and intensity of pleasant emotions. That is,
the peopl e considered to be the happiest are those who are
intensely happy more of the time. The findings of my
colleagues and I contradict this commonsense notion, how-
ever. How much of the time a person experiences pleasant
emotions is a better predictor than positive emotional in-
tensity of how happy the person reports being (Diener,
Sandyik, & Pavot, 1991). Further, emotional intensity
forms a factor that is independent of SWB (Larsen &
Diener, 1985). Thus, feeling pleasant emotions most of the
time and infrequently experiencing unpleasant emotions,
even i f the pleasant emotions are only mild, is sufficient for
high reports of happiness.
Although most people report being above neutral in
mood the majority of the time (Diener & Diener, 1996),
intense positive moment s are rare even among the happiest
individuals (Diener et al., 1991). Instead, happy peopl e
report mild-to-moderate pleasant emotions most of the time
when alone or with others and when working or at leisure.
One lesson from these findings is that i f people seek ecstasy
much of the time, whether it be in a career or a love
relationship, they are likely to be disappointed. Even
worse, they may move to the next relationship or job,
seeking intense levels of happiness, which in fact are rarely
long-lasting and are not necessary for happiness. People
need to understand that intense experiences are not the
cornerstone of a happy life. Furthermore, according to
some theories of adaptation, such as that of Parducci
(1995), highly pleasurable experiences may have the dis-
advantage of serving as a contrast point against which to
compare other positive experiences, thus maki ng the mild
events less pleasurable.
Processes Underlying SWB:
Adaptati on, Goals, and Temperament
In a classic 1971 article, Bri ckman and Campbel l suggested
that all people labor on a "hedonic treadmill." As they rise
in their accomplishments and possessions, their expecta-
tions also rise. Soon they habituate to the new level, and it
no longer makes t hem happy. On the negative side, peopl e
are unhappy when they first encounter misfortune, but they
soon adapt and it no longer makes t hem unhappy. On the
basis of this reasoning, Bri ckman and Campbel l proposed
that people are destined to hedonic neutrality in the long
run. Although an early study by Brickman, Coates, and
36 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
Janoff-Bul man (1978) on lottery winners and peopl e with
spinal cord injuries produced equivocal support for the
notion of a hedonic treadmill, later data have accumulated
to support adaptation. For example, Silver (1982) found
that persons with spinal cord injuries were ext remel y un-
happy i mmedi at el y after the accident that produced their
disability but quickly began to adapt. She found that within
a matter of only eight weeks, positive emotions predomi-
nated over negative emotions in her respondents. During
this period, respondents experienced a downward trend in
unpleasant emotions and an upward trend in pleasant emo-
tions, suggesting a return toward the baseline conditions of
mood experienced by most people.
Researchers have also accumulated evidence that
many life circumstances correlate with SWB at only mod-
est levels, again supporting the idea of adaptation. For
example, Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) esti-
mat ed that 10 resources, including income, number of
friends, religious faith, intelligence, and education, together
accounted for only 15% of the variance in happiness.
Campbel l et al. and later investigators (e.g., Diener, Sand-
vik, Seidlitz, & Diener, 1993) have found small positive
correlations within countries between income and S WB- -
rich people on average are slightly happier than poor people
(Diener, Horwitz, & Emmons, 1985). In a similar vein, Die-
ner, Wolsic, and Fujita (1995) found that a highly prized
possession among college students, physical attractiveness,
predicted only small amounts of variance in respondents'
reports of pleasant affect, unpleasant affect, and life satisfac-
tion. Perhaps even more striking, a number of studies showed
that objective physical health, even among the elderly, is
barely correlated with SWB (e.g., Okun & George, 1984).
Further studies revealed that peopl e adapt to most
conditions very quickly. For example, Suh, Diener, and
Fujita (1996) found that in less than three months, the
effects of many maj or life events (e.g., being fired or
promoted) lost their impact on SWB. Stone and Neale
(1984) examined the effects of a negative life event. They
identified 17 men who experienced a severe, negative life
event during participation in a daily mood study. The
authors reported that "same-day associations were ob-
served, but there was no strong evidence of changes in
next-day mood. The results offer no support for 2-day or
longer effects of daily, negative events" (Stone & Neale,
1984, p. 137). A concrete instance of this phenomenon
from the laboratory of Randy Larsen (personal communi -
cation, 1990) is noteworthy. One of Larsen' s participants in
a study of mood suffered from cancer and was receiving
chemot herapy treatments. During the study, physicians in-
formed the participant that his cancer was in remission, and
his mood skyrocketed. In two days, however, his affect
returned to its former baseline! However, Winter, Lawton,
Casten, and Sando (1999) found that marriage and widow-
hood were still producing heightened and lowered SWB,
respectively, six to eight months after the event.
Bri ckman and Campbel l ' s ( 1971) basic idea has stuck:
People do react strongly to good and bad events, but they
then tend to adapt over time and return to their original
level of happiness. A societal manifestation of adaptation is
contained in Myer s' s (2000) discussion of i ncome and
SWB over the past five decades. Income has risen dramat-
ically in many nations since World War II, and yet SWB
has been virtually flat in the United States and other highly
developed countries (Oswald, 1997). Apparently, peopl e' s
desires increase as their incomes rise, and they therefore
adapt to higher levels of income, with no net increase in
SWB. This interpretation is supported by Cl ar k' s (1998)
finding that recent changes in pay predicted j ob satisfac-
tion, whereas mean levels of pay did not.
Br i ckman and Campbel l ' s (1971) t heory has been
refined in several ways. First, peopl e may not adapt back
to neutrality but may instead return to a posi t i ve set
point. Di ener and Di ener (1995) not ed that most SWB
report s are in the posi t i ve range, above the neutral points
of the scales. The means in Tabl e 2 i ndi cat e this pat -
t e r n- - mos t nations average above 5.5, the mi dpoi nt of
the scale. Caci oppo et al. (1999) suggest ed that there is
a "posi t i vi t y offset , " meani ng that there is a weak ap-
proach t endency in the absence of stimulation. Thus, the
Tabl e 2
Mean Life Satisfaction and Income Across Nations
Nati on Life satisfaction PPP 1992
Bulgaria 5. 03 22
Russia 5. 37 27
Belarus 5. 52 30
Latvia 5. 70 20
Romania 5. 88 12
Estonia 6. 00 27
Lithuania 6.01 16
Hungary 6. 03 25
Turkey 6.41 22
Japan 6. 53 87
Ni geri a 6. 59 6
Korea (South) 6. 69 39
India 6. 70 5
Portugal 7. 07 44
Spain 7. 15 57
Germany 7. 22 89
Argentina 7. 25 25
China (PRC) 7. 29 9
Italy 7. 30 77
Brazil 7. 38 23
Chile 7. 55 35
Norway 7. 68 78
Finland 7. 68 69
United States 7. 73 1 O0
Netherlands 7. 77 76
Ireland 7. 88 52
Canada 7. 89 85
Denmark 8. 16 81
Switzerland 8. 36 96
N o t e . The life satisfaction question asked respondents how satisfied they were
with their "liFe as a whol e these days. " Response options ranged from 1
( d i s s a t i s f i e d ) to 10 ( s a t i s f i e d ) , and purchasing power pari t y (PPP) could range
from 0 to 100. PRC = People's Republic of China.
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 37
set point first post ul at ed by Br i ckman and Campbel l
act ual l y mi ght be in the posi t i ve range because humans
are pr edi sposed to feel pr edomi nant l y pl easant affect if
not hi ng bad is happeni ng.
Another refinement of the hedonic treadmill idea is
that the baseline level of happiness to which people return
is influenced by their temperament. One reason to integrate
personality with the concept of adaptation is that person-
ality predispositions appear to be one of the strongest
factors influencing long-term levels of SWB. As noted by
La Rochefoucauld (1940), "happiness and misery depend
as much on t emperament as on fortune" (p. 23). Studies on
adopted-away separated twins show that about half of the
variance in current SWB in American society is due to
heritability (Tellegen et al., 1988). The partial heritability
of happiness is supported by research on early t emperament
that suggests that emotional reactivity emerges early in life
and is moderat el y stable over time (e.g., Goldsmith, 1996).
Further, in an ESM study in which respondents' moods
were recorded in various naturally occurring situations,
Diener and Larsen (1984) found that participants' average
moods showed a substantial amount of consistency across
both situations and time, suggesting that SWB is not a
result only of situational factors. Although peopl e' s moods
fluctuate from moment to moment, there is a strong degree
of stability in mean levels of mood experienced, even over
a period of years (e.g., Magnus & Diener, 1991) and across
varying life circumstances (Costa, McCrae, & Zonderman,
1987). Laborat ory studies also demonstrate that happy and
unhappy people react differently to the same stimuli. For
example, Rusting and Larsen (1997) demonstrated that
extraverted individuals (those who appear to react more
strongly to rewards) responded more intensely to positive
than to negative pictures in a laboratory situation, whereas
neurotic individuals reacted more strongly to negative
photos.
The dynamic equilibrium model of Headey and Wear-
ing (1992) combi nes adaptation with personality. They
proposed that peopl e maintain levels of pleasant affect and
unpleasant affect that are determined by their personalities.
Advantageous and disadvantageous events move individu-
als temporarily away from their personal baselines, but
over time they return to them. For example, Winter et al.
(1999) found that recent marriage affected positive affect
(but not negative affect) and that recent wi dowhood af-
fected negative affect (but not positive affect). In support of
the idea of adaptation, however, they found that long-term
marriage and wi dowhood did not influence levels of posi-
tive and negative effect. Headey and Wearing maintained
that the separate baselines for positive affect and negative
affect are determined by personality predispositions to ex-
traversion and neuroticism, respectively. For example, Lu-
cas, Diener, Grob, Suh, and Shao (1998) found that extra-
version correlated with positive affect in virtually all of the
40 nations they examined. Headey and Wearing argued that
events and circumstances do influence happiness, but in the
long-term, the i mpact of personality will also exert itself.
Scientists are exploring why people adapt to condi-
tions. Parducci (1995) offered a j udgment theory of adap-
tation based on the fact that peopl e' s satisfaction with
events depends on the distribution of events in this domain
that they have experienced in the past. Parducci maintained
that people react favorably to events that are better than the
comparison point provided by the context of their past
outcomes in this area, and they react negatively to events
that are lower than this compari son point. Another inter-
pretation of adaptation is offered by Kahneman (1999),
who argued that people in good circumstances may be
objeclively happier than people in bad circumstances, but
they may require greater levels of pleasure to declare
themselves happy. Thus, people do not so much totally
habituate to their conditions, according to Kahneman' s
view, as they adapt their expectations to the amount of
pleasure they desire and the relative amount of happiness
they report.
Another reason that people may adapt to new circum-
stances is that they change their expectancies and goals.
Emmons (1986), Cantor and Sanderson (1999), and others
have shown that making progress toward goals is related to
SWB. Diener and Fujita (1999) found that having resources
(e.g., money, physical attractiveness, or social skills) in
areas related to one' s goals is a more accurate predictor of
happiness than having resources that are less related to
one' s important goals. My colleagues and I have also found
that people feel better on days when they make progress
toward ends that they value highly than they do on days
when they are successful at achieving ends that they value
less (Oishi, Diener, Sub, & Lucas, 1999). In another study,
Oishi, Schimmack, and Diener (1999) found that high
sensation seekers were more satisfied with days when they
experienced pleasure and high arousal emotions, whereas
low sensation seekers preferred contentment. Although
some goals, such as seeking excitement, may be influenced
by one' s temperament, other goals are likely to be much
more flexible. Thus, one determinant of peopl e' s adaptation
to conditions often might be the extent to which they alter
their goals when new circumstances prevail. Thus, goal
flexibility may be a key to SWB in adverse circumstances.
Although the reasons for adaptation are not fully un-
derstood, it is clear that people do not habituate completely
to all conditions. Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) con-
cluded that people adapt rapidly to some circumstances
(e.g., imprisonment), adapt slowly to other conditions (e.g.,
the death of a loved one), and adapt little or not at all to
other conditions (e.g., noise and sex). Diener, Diener, and
Diener (1995) reported substantial differences between na-
tions in SWB, even though there has been ample time for
people to adapt to the circumstances in these societies.
Mehnert, Kraus, Nadler, and Boyd (1990) found that indi-
viduals who were born with disabilities reported somewhat
lower levels of SWB than did persons without physical
disabilities, and this differential was especially large for
those with multiple handicaps. This indicates that people
do not necessarily completely adapt to all circumstances,
even after many years. Although personality is undoubt-
edly an important contributor to long-term levels of well-
being, it is an exaggeration to conclude that circumstances
have no influence. Peopl e' s set points appear to move up or
38 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
down, dependi ng on the favorabi l i t y of l ong- t er m ci rcum-
stances in their lives.
Nat i onal and Cultural Patterns
of SWB
A di scussi on of how societal vari abl es influence SWB is
avai l abl e in Di ener and Suh (in press). Tabl e 2 presents the
mean levels of life satisfaction for sel ect ed nat i ons f r om the
Wor l d Val ues Sur vey ( Wor l d Val ues St udy Group, 1994),
conduct ed wi t h represent at i ve sampl es of approxi mat el y
1,000 respondent s per nat i on bet ween 1990 and 1993. The
purchasi ng power pari t y figure is the percent age of pur-
chasi ng power (based on a st andard "basket " of goods) that
the aver age person in each count ry can buy wi t h his or her
year l y i ncome, compar ed wi t h the average purchasi ng
power of i ndi vi dual s in the Uni t ed States. The correl at i on
bet ween mean purchasi ng power i ncome and mean life
sat i sfact i on was .62 across all nat i ons in the survey. The
finding that weal t hi er nations have hi gher levels of report ed
wel l -bei ng has been repl i cat ed several times (see Di ener &
Suh, 1999). One reason that weal t hy nat i ons may be hap-
pi er is that t hey are mor e likely to fulfill basi c human needs
f or food, shelter, and health, as well as to have better
human- f i ght s records (Di ener et al., 1995).
There were count ri es that were unexpect edl y hi gh or
l ow in life sat i sfact i on even after i ncome was controlled.
For exampl e, mean levels of SWB in Brazil, Chile, and
Ar gent i na wer e hi gher t han predi ct ed by their wealth, and
l i fe-sat i sfact i on rates in East ern Eur opean nat i ons and Rus-
sia were low, even after cont rol l i ng for the i ncomes there.
The hi gher - t han- expect ed scores in Latin Amer i can nat i ons
may have been due t o cultural factors, whereas the l ower-
t han-expect ed scores in f or mer communi st count ri es may
have been due to t he political and economi c t urmoi l oc-
curri ng in these nat i ons duri ng the years of the survey.
Japan appeared as an outlier, wi t h hi gh i ncome and rela-
tively l ow SWB. Thi s is perhaps because Japan is a hi ghl y
regul at ed soci et y wi t h st rong conf or mi t y pressures and
very hi gh expect at i ons.
The poorest nat i ons in the s ur vey- - Chi na, India, and
Ni g e r i a - - d i d not show the ext remel y l ow SWB responses
that charact eri zed earlier studies of the poorest societies.
Perhaps this is because levels of i ncome are rising in these
nations, and at the same t i me peopl e there have l ower
expect at i ons t han in the West . The same general patterns in
the Wor l d Val ues Sur vey were f ound in earlier surveys (see
Di ener et al., 1995, f or anal ysi s of the earlier s u r v e y s ) -
much vari ance in SWB is account ed f or by the weal t h of
nations, but cul t ure and political turmoil al so have an
influence.
In accor d wi t h the U. S. findings report ed by Myer s
(2000), Di ener and Oishi (in press) f ound that happi ness
has not i ncreased regul arl y over the years in t he nations
wher e repeat ed surveys have been conduct ed, even t hough
i ncome has i ncreased dramat i cal l y in most of these coun-
tries. Why does the weal t h of nat i ons correl at e wi t h mean
levels of life satisfaction, whereas changes in i ncome in t he
wealthiest nat i ons pr oduce no increases in happi ness? A
likely expl anat i on is that there is a c ommon set of eco-
nomi c desires ar ound the world, and national i ncome is
hi ghl y correl at ed with whet her these desires can be met.
Because of global communi cat i on, it appears t hat the stan-
dard is set now by the weal t hi est nations. Peopl e in Chi na,
India, and Ni geri a want cars, refrigerators, VCRs, and the
ot her possessi ons that t hey see on television. In ot her
words., it may be that most peopl e around the wor l d now
want many of the things that peopl e in the West possess,
and their life satisfaction is i nfl uenced to some degree by
whet her t hey are maki ng progress t owar d obt ai ni ng these
goods. Overall, i ncreases in i ncome in the wealthiest na-
tions, however, do not raise levels of SWB because it is the
rising l i vi ng st andard in these nations that influences peo-
pl e' s level of desires. As i ncome i ncreases in the wealthiest
nations, so does the eval uat i ve standard.
One not ewort hy finding is that vari abl es oft en corre-
late di fferent l y wi t h life sat i sfact i on in di ssi mi l ar cultures.
Indi vi dual i st i c cultures are those that stress the i mpor t ance
of the individual and his or her t hought s, choi ces, and
feelings. In contrast, in col l ect i vi st cultures, peopl e are
more willing to sacrifice their desires to the will of the
group. Di ener and Di ener (1995) f ound t hat sel f-est eem
correl at ed more st rongl y with life satisfaction in i ndi vi du-
alistic than in col l ect i vi st societies. Thus, even a vari abl e
that seems intrinsically of great i mpor t ance to westerners,
self-respect, is not hi ghl y correl at ed with life satisfaction in
some cultures. Anot her interesting nat i onal di fference in
the correlates of ment al heal t h was di scover ed by Eunkook
Suh (1999). He f ound substantial di fferences in whet her
" c ongr ue nc e " - - a c t i ng consi st ent l y across situations and in
accord, with one' s " s el f " - - pr edi ct s life sat i sfact i on in Sout h
Kor ea versus in the Uni t ed States. Suh di scover ed that
congr uence was much less i mport ant to SWB in Korea.
Agai n, a variable that many west ern psychol ogi st s have
vi ewed as cruci al to ment al health may be mor e cul t ure
bound than than t hey have bel i eved.
Suh et al. (1998) also f ound large di fferences in
whet her peopl e in di fferent cultures rel y on their feel i ngs
when maki ng life-satisfaction j udgment s. When deci di ng
how satisfied t hey are, peopl e in i ndi vi dual i st i c nat i ons find
it natural to consul t their affect, and feel i ng pl easant emo-
tions frequent l y is a reasonabl e predi ct or of life satisfaction
in these societies. In contrast, peopl e in col l ect i vi st cultures
t end t o mor e often consul t nor ms f or whet her t hey shoul d
be satisfied and to consi der the social appraisals of fami l y
and friends in eval uat i ng their lives. Thus, peopl e di ffer
mar kedl y across societies in the fact ors t hey consi der t o be
rel evant to life satisfaction, perhaps because culture can
have a pervasi ve influence on peopl e' s val ues and goals.
An interesting pattern reveal s itself when i ndi vi dual -
istic and col l ect i vi st i c nat i ons are compar ed in terms of
di fferent indicators of wel l -bei ng. In i ndi vi dual i st i c na-
tions, there are reports of hi gher life satisfaction, and yet
suicide rates also t end to be hi gher (Diener, 1996). Simi-
larly, there are el evat ed rates of marital sat i sfact i on in
individualistic nations, and at the same t i me the di vorce
rates are high. It seems that peopl e in individualistic soci-
eties say t hey are happy with their ci rcumst ances, yet t hey
more oft en change them. How can these seemi ngl y cont ra-
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 39
di ct ory findings be expl ai ned? It may be that when peopl e
in societies wi t h mor e f r eedom are satisfied with their
marri ages or j obs, t hey stay wi t h them, but individualists
are mor e likely to change their ci rcumst ances when t hey
are dissatisfied. Peopl e in col l ect i vi st societies are mor e
l i kel y to remai n in bad marri ages or bad j obs for the sake
of others and because of norms, and marri age and j ob
sat i sfact i on thus are on average l ower in these cultures even
t hough di vorce rates and j ob t ur nover are also low. Thus,
peopl e in a col l ect i vi st soci et y may be mor e likely to
sacrifice their personal happi ness to do their duty. The
sense of sat i sfact i on f r om doi ng the right thing, however,
may feel mor e rewardi ng when doi ng the right t hi ng is
congr uent wi t h a per s on' s own desires and does not require
explicit sacrifices.
The pattern of SWB findings across cultures may also
be expl ai ned in part by levels of social support. The ex-
t ended fami l i es in col l ect i vi st societies are mor e likely to
interfere with peopl e "f ol l owi ng their bl i ss" but may also
pr ovi de great er social support in t roubl ed times. Fewer
peopl e in col l ect i vi st societies "do their own t hi ng, " but
f ewer i ndi vi dual s are left to fend f or t hemsel ves. Al t hough
researchers cannot explain the paradoxi cal cultural findings
wi t h certainty, these findings do present a chal l enge t o bot h
i ndi vi dual i st i c and col l ect i vi st cultures. How can a soci et y
allow individuals the f r eedom to choose lives that are
rewardi ng and spouses that are to their liking, and never-
theless ensure that families are cohesi ve enough t o offer
stable support ? How can a soci et y encour age peopl e to
attribute successes internally and still not feel failures t oo
sharpl y? And how can a soci et y permi t individuals to do
what t hey want and yet convi nce t hem to act in ways that
are responsi bl e to their families, friends, and communi t i es' ?
Summary
SWB researchers f or mer l y f ocused on who is happy
(see Di ener et al., 1999) - - whet her it be the marri ed, the
weal t hy, spiritual individuals, or ot her demogr aphi c
groups. The recent focus, however , has been on when and
why peopl e are happy and on what the processes are that
i nfl uence SWB. Temper ament and personal i t y appear to be
power f ul fact ors i nfl uenci ng peopl e' s SWB, in part because
i ndi vi dual s usual l y adapt to some degree to good and bad
condi t i ons. Peopl e do not seem to compl et el y adapt t o all
condi t i ons, but as of yet researchers have onl y a rudi men-
t ary underst andi ng of when and why adapt at i on is mor e or
less compl et e. Peopl e' s val ues and goals seem i nt i mat el y
tied to what event s are percei ved as good and bad, and
t herefore a plausible hypot hesi s is that goal change is an
inherent component of adaptation.
Cultural and societal fact ors influence SWB in several
ways. First, some count ri es are bet t er able t o meet peopl e' s
basi c needs, such as f or food, cl ean water, and health, and
these nat i ons evi dence hi gher levels of SWB. Anot her
effect of culture is to alter the correlates of SWB by
i nfl uenci ng peopl e' s goals and values. Finally, variations in
cultural influences on mean levels of SWB appear t o result
f r om vari at i ons in opt i mi sm and positivity, social support,
copi ng patterns, and the degree of regul at i on of individual
desires. The pervasi veness of societal influences on mean
levels of SWB raises the quest i on of how Amer i can cul t ure
is faring.
A Nati onal I ndex of SWB
I propose that the Uni t ed States needs i ndi cat ors of SWB
that can be used to t rack happi ness over time. Ideal l y, these
i ndi cat ors woul d i ncl ude ESMs of nat i onal l y represent at i ve
sampl es of respondent s. Nat i onal ESM surveys coul d pro-
vi de valuable i nformat i on on how frequent l y and i nt ensel y
peopl e feel satisfied and happy in vari ous life ci r cum-
stances and across types of situations. The SWB of indi-
viduals f r om vari ous age groups, regi ons, occupat i onal
categories, and i ncome levels coul d be compar ed, and
pol i cymaker s and corporat e leaders woul d t herefore be
mor e likely to consi der SWB in their decisions. As l ong as
national indicators f ocus on the pr oduct i on of goods and
services, it is those fact ors that leaders are likely to con-
sider. I f a national i ndi cat or of SWB were available, poli-
cies coul d be j udged part l y by how t hey i nfl uenced happi -
ness. Ideally, the nat i onal SWB indicators woul d i ncl ude
vari ous component s of SWB, such as pl easant affect, un-
pl easant affect, life satisfaction, fulfillment, and mor e spe-
cific states such as stress, affect i on, trust, and j oy. The
"Eur obar omet er " surveys conduct ed in Eur opean nations
coul d serve as a model for an index that coul d be imple-
ment ed in the Uni t ed States and conduct ed by either the
federal gover nment or a pri vat e survey agency such as
Gallup. One val ue of national indicators is that researchers
coul d det ermi ne whi ch segment s of soci et y are least happy
and perhaps fashi on pol i ci es to aid them.
An i mport ant basic quest i on to ask before specific
pol i ci es ai med at i mpr ovi ng SWB are consi dered is
whet her SWB is so dependent on t emper ament that policies
cannot affect it. Despi t e the effects of adaptation, life
ci rcumst ances do mat t er to SWB; happi ness is not com-
pl et el y based on i nborn t emperament . The dat a for the least
satisfied nation in the Wor l d Val ues Survey, Bulgaria,
sho~ + that fully 60% of respondent s were bel ow the mi d-
point of the scale on life satisfaction, and 40% were bel ow
neutral for affect bal ance, meani ng t hat t hey report ed mor e
negat i ve than posi t i ve emot i ons. Further, findings on peo-
ple wi t h mul t i pl e disabilities, young wi dows, and peopl e
chroni cal l y exposed t o noise i ndi cat e that humans do not
compl et el y adapt to all condi t i ons. Condi t i ons do mat t er to
SWB, and some nations are superio? to others when it
comes to happiness. Furt hermore, measures f ocused on
specific domai ns, such as wor k or health, are mor e likely to
be sensitive to changes in ci rcumst ances t han are measures
of life satisfaction, whi ch is dependent on so many fact ors
that any single area is likely to have a small impact. Thus,
it is not a fruitless endeavor t o moni t or and enhance
SWB- - c o n d i t i o n s in a soci et y can influence it.
A fundament al quest i on related to moni t or i ng SWB is
whet her it is desi rabl e to i ncrease SWB; is it real l y a good
t hi ng? For exampl e, some mi ght wor r y that t oo much
satisfaction will l eave peopl e unmot i vat ed or that pl easant
emot i ons will cause a shal l ow f or m of hedoni sm. Al l the
evi dence to date, however , suggest s that these concer ns are
40 January 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
u n f o u n d e d - - p e o p l e hi gh in SWB on aver age have a num-
ber of des i r abl e qual i t i es. Ther e is s ome evi dence t hat
happy peopl e par t i ci pat e mor e in c ommuni t y or gani zat i ons,
are mor e l i ked by ot her s, are l ess l i kel y to get di vor ced,
t end to l i ve s l i ght l y l onger , per f or m bet t er at wor k (e. g. ,
St aw, Sut t on, & Pel l ed, 1994; Veenhoven, 1988), and ear n
hi gher i ncomes ( Di ener , Ni cker s on, Lucas, & Sandvi k,
2000). Thes e f i ndi ngs are cor r el at i onal , and ps ychol ogi s t s
have l i t t l e under s t andi ng of why ha ppy peopl e mi ght on
aver age exhi bi t mor e des i r abl e behavi or s. Never t hel es s ,
ha ppy i ndi vi dual s s eem on aver age to be mor e pr oduct i ve
and soci abl e. Thus, hi gh l evel s of SWB mi ght be benef i ci al
f or a soci et y, and no evi dence i ndi cat es t hey woul d be
har mf ul .
A nat i onal i ndex of SWB woul d hel p i nf or m pos t ma-
t er i al i st Ame r i a n soci et y about t he des i r abl e bal ance of
wor k, r el at i onshi ps, r ecr eat i on, and spi r i t ual i t y. Al t hough
weal t hy nat i ons ar e on aver age happi er , it is i mpor t ant to
r ecogni ze t hat r ecent i ncr eases in i ncome in t he r i chest
nat i ons have not benef i t ed SWB. Fur t her mor e, onl y smal l
advant ages in SWB accr ue to t he mos t affl uent me mbe r s of
weal t hy soci et i es. Thus, it ma y be t hat l i t t l e can be gai ned
in t er ms of SWB by i ndi vi dual s maki ng mor e money.
Anot her i mpl i cat i on of t he st at i c l evel s of SWB in t he
Uni t ed St at es is t hat p e o p l e ' s expect at i ons mus t r emai n at
r eal i st i c l evel s. At t he i ndi vi dual l evel , peopl e must r eal i ze
t hat f eel i ngs of weal t h depend as much on t he l evel of one ' s
desi r es as on obj ect i ve i ncome. Las t i ng happi nes s ma y
come, in part , f r om act i vi t i es such as wor ki ng f or one ' s
goal s (e. g. , Emmons , 1986), par t i ci pat i ng in cl ose soci al
r el at i ons hi ps ( Baumei s t er & Lear y, 1995; Myer s , 2000),
exper i enci ng r enewabl e phys i cal pl easur es ( Sci t ovs ky,
1982), exper i enci ng ment al pl easur es ( Kubovy, 1999), and
bei ng i nvol ved in "f l ow" act i vi t i es ( Cs i ks zent mi hal yi ,
1997). Ac c or di ng to t hi s vi ew, f ur t her economi c gr owt h in
t he weal t hi es t soci et i es ma y pr ovi de SWB t o t he ext ent t hat
i t enhances r ewar di ng wor k act i vi t i es i n pur sui t of mean-
i ngf ul goal s. Qual i t y of wor k l i f e is l i kel y to be at l east as
i mpor t ant to SWB as is i ncome. Si mi l ar l y, pol i ci es t hat
f ost er cl os e r el at i onshi ps and meani ngf ul act i vi t i es are
l i kel y to be mor e successf ul at enhanci ng SWB t han pol i -
ci es des i gned excl us i vel y to i mpr ove ef f i ci ency. To t he
ext ent t hat hi gher i ncomes al l ow peopl e to engage in mor e
r ewar di ng act i vi t i es, t hey wi l l i mpr ove SWB. However ,
hi gher pr oduct i vi t y coul d decr eas e l evel s of SWB i f it
r equi r es l ong hour s of bor i ng wor k, hi gh l evel s of st ress,
and l i t t l e l ei sur e t i me.
I f nat i onal i ndi cat or s of SWB wer e avai l abl e on an
annual basi s, i t woul d pr ovi de f asci nat i ng i nf or mat i on t hat
pot ent i al l y coul d enl i ght en pol i cy maki ng, as wel l as i ndi -
vi dual choi ces. A host of i nt er est i ng quest i ons coul d be
answer ed, such as t he f ol l owi ng: Ar e r el i gi ous peopl e
happi er ? Ar e t he ef f ect s of pover t y on SWB moder at ed by
t he l evel of bas i c ser vi ces, such as heal t h and educat i on,
t hat are avai l abl e? Do chi l dr en of di w) r ce suf f er l ower
l evel s of SWB on a l ong- t er m bas i s ? How is t he rat e at
whi ch peopl e are abl e t o save mone y r el at ed t o SWB? Do
et hni c mi nor i t i es in some pl aces have hi gher SWB t han
ot her s? Does t he r el at i on of i ncome to SWB depend on
cons umpt i on, on h o w peopl e spend t hei r i ncomes ? The
above quest i ons are meant to convey t hat a nat i onal SWB
i ndex mi ght be used to ans wer quest i ons f r om a br oad
spect r um of pol i t i cal vi ewpoi nt s , not onl y quer i es r ai s ed by
t he pol i t i cal l eft or ri ght . I deal l y, a nat i onal i ndex woul d
i ncl ude a panel component t hat f ol l owed t he same i ndi vi d-
ual s over t i me. An advant age of a nat i onal i ndi cat or of
SWB woul d be t hat it woul d make cl ear in whi ch domai ns
people, are mor e and l ess sat i sfi ed, t hus suggest i ng wher e
i nt er w: nt i ons mi ght be most needed. Fur t her , a nat i onal
i ndex woul d pr ovi de an educat i onal f unct i on, al er t i ng peo-
pl e to t he f act or s t hat i nf l uence t hei r SWB.
Conclusion
Ps yc hol ogi s t s ' knowl e dge of SWB is r udi ment ar y; a st ron-
ger sci ent i fi c base is necessar y t o make unequi vocal r ec-
omme nda t i ons t o soci et i es and i ndi vi dual s about how to
i ncr ease happi ness. I hope, however , t hat t he above r evi ew
makes it cl ear t hat sci ent i fi c knowl e dge about SWB is
pos s i bl e and desi r abl e. Soci et i es need to af f or d t he same
i mpor t ance to SWB as t hey do now to economi cs : t r acki ng
t he phenomenon, suppor t i ng r esear ch to under st and it, and
educat i ng peopl e about it. To cr eat e a bet t er soci et y wher e
happi nes s is ubi qui t ous, a maj or sci ent i f i c ef f or t to under -
st and qual i t y of l i fe is needed. I f ps yc hol ogi s t s ' i nst i t ut e a
nat i onal sur vey to t r ack SWB, i t is mor e l i kel y t hat it wi l l
become an out come var i abl e t hat is cons i der ed i n pol i cy
deci si ons.
Nobody woul d cl ai m t hat SWB is a suffi ci ent condi -
t i on for ment al heal t h, nor woul d ps ychol ogi s t s choos e to
eval uat e pe opl e ' s l i ves sol el y on t he basi s of whet her t hey
are happy; ps ychol ogi s t s val ue addi t i onal char act er i st i cs.
Never t hel ess, in t hi s democr at i c nat i on wher e t he opi ni ons
of i ndi vi dual s are gr ant ed r espect , pe opl e ' s own eval ua-
t i ons of t hei r l i ves mus t fi gure pr omi nent l y i n as s es s i ng t he
success of Ame r i c a n soci et y.
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Winter, L., Lawt on, M. P., Cast en, R. J., & Sando, R. L. (1999). The
relationship bet ween external event s and affect states in older people.
International Journal (~f Human Development attd Aging, 50, 1 12.
Worl d Values Study Group. (1994). World Values Survey, 1981-1994 and
1990-1993 [Comput er file, ICPSR version]. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute
for Social Research.
J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t 4 3
The Future of Optimism
Chri st opher Pet erson
University of Michigan
Recent theoretical discussions of optimism as an inherent
aspect of human nature converge with empirical investiga-
tions of optimism as an individual difference to show that
optimism can be a highly beneficial psychological charac-
teristic linked to good mood, perseverance, achievement,
and physical health. Questions remain about optimism as a
research topic and more generally as a societal value. Is
the meaning of optimism richer than its current conceptu-
alization in cognitive terms? Are optimism and pessimism
mutually exclusive? What is the relationship between op-
timism and reality, and what are the costs of optimistic
beliefs that prove to be wrong? How can optimism be
cultivated? How does optimism play itself out across dif-
ferent cultures? Optimism promises to be one of the im-
portant topics of interest to positive social science, as long
as it is approached in an even-handed way.
O
ver the years, opt i mi sm has had at best a check-
I ered reputation. Fr om Vol t ai r e' s (1759) Dr. Pan-
gloss, who bl at hered that we live in the best of
all possi bl e worl ds, to Por t er ' s (1913) Pol l yanna, who
cel ebrat ed ever y mi sfort une befal l i ng hersel f and others, to
politicians who compet e vi gor ousl y to see who can best
spin embarrassi ng news into somet hi ng wonderful , so-
cal l ed opt i mi sm has oft en gi ven t hought ful peopl e pause.
Connot at i ons of nai vet e and denial have adhered t o the
notion. I n recent years, however , opt i mi sm has become a
mor e respect abl e stance, even among the sophisticated.
Resear ch by a number of psychol ogi st s has docu-
ment ed di verse benefits of opt i mi sm and concomi t ant
dr awbacks of pessi mi sm. Opt i mi sm, concept ual i zed and
assessed in a vari et y of ways, has been linked t o posi t i ve
mood and good moral e; to perseverance and effect i ve prob-
l em sol vi ng; to academi c, athletic, military, occupat i onal ,
and political success; to popul ari t y; t o good health; and
even t o l ong life and f r eedom f r om trauma. Pessi mi sm, in
cont rast , f or eshadows depressi on, passivity, failure, social
est rangement , morbi di t y, and mortality. These lines of re-
search are surpri si ngl y uni form, so much so that an opti-
mi sm bandwagon has been created, within ps ychol ogy as
well as the general publ i c (Gi l l ham, in press). We see an
interest in how opt i mi sm can be encour aged among the
young and how pessi mi sm can be reversed among the old.
The future of opt i mi sm appears rosy indeed. Or does it?
I begi n this article wi t h a revi ew of what psychol ogi st s
have l earned about opt i mi sm, but my event ual purpose is to
di scuss its fut ure bot h as a research interest of psychol o-
gists and as a social value. I bel i eve that these fut ures are
ent wi ned, perhaps t oo much so. Opt i mi sm as a research
topic has flourished in the cont empor ar y Uni t ed States
preci sel y while peopl e in general have become mor e hope-
ful about the future.
The danger of this coupl i ng is t wofol d. First, some of
the document ed benefits of opt i mi s m- - a t least as t ypi cal l y
s t udi e d- - ma y be bounded. Opt i mi sm in some ci rcum-
stances can have dr awbacks and costs, al t hough researchers
rarel y l ook for these qual i fyi ng condi t i ons. Second, even i f
it needs to be cont ext ual i zed, opt i mi sm as a research t opi c
deserves to be more than a fad. A sophi st i cat ed opt i mi sm
can be quite beneficial to individuals in t ryi ng ci rcum-
stances, and it behooves psychol ogi st s to learn as much as
possi bl e about the topic right now, when soci et y support s
this interest, so that these lessons can be depl oyed in ot her
times and places where t hey can do the most good.
I also comment on the recent call f or a "posi t i ve"
social science. To paraphrase Sel i gman (1998), ps ychol ogy
shoul d be as f ocused on strength as on weakness, as inter-
ested in resilience as in vulnerability, and as concer ned
wi t h the cul t i vat i on of wel l ness as wi t h the remedi at i on of
pat hol ogy. A cl ose l ook at opt i mi sm provi des some in-
sights into how to gui de this redi rect i on of ps ychol ogy so
that it does j ust i ce to the mandat e and avoi ds the "ever y-
thing is beaut i ful " appr oach of humani st i c ps ychol ogy in
the 1960s. A posi t i ve ps ychol ogy shoul d not hol d up Dr.
Pangl oss or Pol l yanna as rol e model s.
What Is Optimism?
A useful definition of opt i mi sm was offered by ant hropol -
ogi st Li onel Ti ger (1979): "a mood or attitude associ at ed
wi t h an expect at i on about the social or material f u t u r e - -
one whi ch the eval uat or regards as soci al l y desirable, to his
[or her] advant age, or for his [or her] pl easure" (p. 18). An
i mport ant i mpl i cat i on of this definition, one dr awn out by
Tiger, is that there can be no single or obj ect i ve opt i mi sm,
at least as charact eri zed by its cont ent , because what is
consi dered opt i mi sm depends on what the i ndi vi dual re-
gards as desirable. Opt i mi sm is predi cat ed on eval ua-
t i o n - - o n gi ven affects and emot i ons, as it were.
Cont empor ar y approaches usual l y treat opt i mi sm as a
cogni t i ve char act er i s t i c- - a goal, an expect at i on, or a causal
Li s a Bossi o, Ser ena Chen, and Fi ona Lee ma d e hel pf ul c omme nt s on a
pr evi ous ver s i on of t hi s ar t i cl e. Thi s wor k wa s s uppor t ed i n par t by
Nat i onal I ns t i t ut es of Heal t h Gr ant P50- HL061202- 01.
Cor r e s ponde nc e c onc e r ni ng t hi s ar t i cl e s houl d be addr es s ed t o Chr i s-
t opher Pet er son, De pa r t me nt of Ps ychol ogy, Uni ve r s i t y of Mi chi gan, 525
East Uni ver s i t y, Ann Ar bor , MI 48109- I 109. El ect r oni c mai l ma y be sent
t o chr i s pet @umi ch. edu.
44 January 2000 * Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00
Vol. 55, No. I. 44 55 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.55.1.44
Christopher
Peterson
Photograph by
Christopher Peterson
at t r i but i on- - whi ch is sensible so long as we r emember that
the bel i ef in question concerns future occurrences about
which individuals have strong feelings. Opt i mi sm is not
si mpl y cold cognition, and i f we forget the emotional flavor
that pervades opt i mi sm, we can make little sense of the fact
that opt i mi sm is both mot i vat ed and motivating. Indeed,
peopl e may well need to feel optimistic about matters. We
should not be surprised that opt i mi sm and pessi mi sm can
have defensive aspects as well as ego-enhancing ones (cf.
Nor em & Cantor, 1986).
Along these lines, we can ask whether peopl e can be
generically optimistic, that is, hopeful without specific ex-
pectations. Although at odds with conventional definitions,
the possibility of free-floating opt i mi sm deserves scrutiny.
Some peopl e readily describe t hemsel ves as optimistic yet
fail to endorse expectations consistent with this vi ew of
themselves. This phenomenon may merel y be a style of
self-presentation, but it may additionally reflect the emo-
tional and motivational aspects of opt i mi sm without any of
the cognitive aspects. Perhaps extraversion is related to this
cognitively shorn version of optimism.
Opti mi sm as Human Nature
Discussions of opt i mi sm take two forms. In the first, it is
posited to be an inherent part of human nature, to be either
praised or decried. Early approaches to opt i mi sm as human
nature were decidedly negative. Writers as diverse as Soph-
ocles and Nietzsche argued that opt i mi sm prolongs human
suffering: It is better to face the hard facts of reality. This
negative vi ew of positive thinking lies at the heart of
Fr eud' s influential writings on the subject.
In The Future of an Illusion, Freud (1928) decided
that opt i mi sm was widespread but illusory. According to
Freud, opt i mi sm helps make civilization possible, particu-
larly when institutionalized in the f or m of religious beliefs
about an afterlife. However, opt i mi sm comes with a cost:
the denial of our instinctual nature and hence the denial of
reality. Religious opt i mi sm compensat es peopl e for the
sacrifices necessary for civilization and is at the core of
what Freud t ermed the universal obsessional neurosis of
humanity.
Freud proposed that opt i mi sm is part of human nature
but only as a derivative of the conflict between instincts and
socialization. He thought some i ndi vi dual s- - Fr eud men-
tioned the educated and in particular neur ol ogi st s- - di d not
need the illusion of optimism, although the masses were
best left with their "neurosi s" intact and the bel i ef that God
was a benevol ent father who would shepherd t hem through
life and beyond. Only with this bel i ef and its associated
fear that God would retaliate against t hem i f they trans-
gressed would peopl e be law-abiding. According to Freud,
a rational prohibition against murder is not compel l i ng to
the masses. It is more persuasive to assert that the prohi-
bition comes directly f r om God.
As psychodynami c ideas became popular, Fr eud' s for-
mul a equating (religious) opt i mi sm and illusion had wide-
spread impact. Although no mental health professional
asserted that ext reme pessi mi sm should be the standard of
heal t h- - pessi mi sm of this sort was presumabl y due to
fixation at an early psychosexual s t age- - mos t theorists
pointed to the accurate perception of reality as the epi t ome
of good psychological functioning: "The perception of
reality is called mentally healthy when what the individual
sees corresponds to what is actually there" (Jahoda, 1958,
p. 6). Similar statements were offered by the entire gamut
of influential psychologists and psychiatrists f r om the
1930s through the 1960s: Allport, Erikson, Fromm,
Maslow, Menninger, and Rogers, among many others (see
Snyder, 1988, and Taylor, 1989, for thorough reviews).
Never mind that one cannot know what is "actually
there" in the future until it happens, and never mind that
Freud in the first place acknowl edged that an illusory bel i ef
was not necessarily a false one. "Reality testing" became
the defining feature of the healthy individual, and psycho-
therapists took as their task the need to expose peopl e to
reality, however painful it mi ght be. Only the most modest
expectations about the future could pass must er as realistic,
and anything else was regarded as denial (cf. Akhtar,
1996).
Matters began to change in the 1960s and 1970s in
light of research evidence showing that most peopl e are not
strictly realistic or accurate in how they think. Cognitive
psychologists document ed an array of shortcuts that peopl e
take ',as they process information. Margaret Marlin and
Davi d Stang (1978) surveyed hundreds of studies showing
that language, memory, and thought are selectively posi-
tive. For example, peopl e use more positive words than
negative words, whether speaking or writing. In free recall,
people produce positive memori es sooner than negative
ones. Most peopl e evaluate t hemsel ves positively, and
in particular more positively than they evaluate others.
Apparently, in our minds, we are all children of Lake
Wobegon, all of whom are above average.
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 45
The skeptical advocate of a harsh reality could dismiss
findings like these as demonstrating little except how wide-
spread optimistic illusions are, but it proved more difficult
to dismiss results showing that psychologically healthy
peopl e in particular showed the positivity bias. Richard
Lazarus (1983) described what he called positive denial
and showed that it can be associated with well-being in the
wake of adversity. Aaron Beck (1967) began to develop his
influential cognitive approach to depression and its treat-
ment, a cornerstone of which was the assertion that depres-
sion was a cognitive disorder characterized by negative
views about the self, experience, and the f ut ur e- - t hat is, by
pessi mi sm and hopelessness.
Early in the course of his theory development, Beck
was still influenced by the prevailing vi ew of mental health
as grounded in the facts of the matter, because he described
peopl e with depression as illogical. By implication, people
who are not depressed are l ogi cal - - t hat is, rational infor-
mation pr ocessor s- - al t hough there was no good reason for
this assumption. Part of cognitive therapy is designing
experiments to test negative views, but Beck' s procedures
are geared toward guaranteeing the results of these exper-
iments, and cognitive therapists never attempt to falsify the
occasionally positive view that a person with depression
might bring to therapy (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery,
1979). In any event, Beck (1991 ) more recently backed off
from this view of people who are not depressed being
logical to allow that they can bring a positive bias toward
their ongoing experience and expectations for the future.
Anthony Greenwal d' s (1980) statement likening hu-
man nature to a totalitarian regi me was another turning
point in how opt i mi sm was regarded by psychologists.
According to Greenwald, the self can be regarded as an
organization of knowl edge about one' s history and identity.
This organization is biased by information-control strate-
gies analogous to those used by totalitarian political re-
gimes. Everyone engages in an ongoing process of fabri-
cating and revising his or her own personal history. The
story each of us tells about ourselves is necessarily ego-
centric: Each of us is the central figure in our own narra-
tives. Each of us takes credit for good events and eschews
responsibility for bad events. Each of us resists changes in
how we think. In sum, the ego maintains itself in the most
self-flattering way possible, and it has at its disposal all of
the psychological mechani sms documented by Matlin and
Stang (1978).
Another turning point in the view of opt i mi sm was
Shelley Tayl or and Jonathan Br own' s (1988) literature
review of research on positive illusions. They described a
variety of studies showing that people are biased toward the
positive and that the only exceptions to this rule are indi-
viduals who are anxious or depressed. Tayl or (1989) elab-
orated on these ideas in her book Positive Illusions, where
she proposed that peopl e' s pervasi ve tendency to see them-
selves in the best possible light is a sign of well-being. She
distinguished opt i mi sm as an illusion from opt i mi sm as a
delusion: Illusions are responsive, albeit reluctantly, to
reality, whereas delusions are not.
The strongest statement that opt i mi sm is an inherent
aspect of human nature is found in Ti ger ' s (1979) book
Optimism: The Biology of Hope. He located opt i mi sm in
the biology of our species and argued that it is one of our
most defining and adaptive characteristics. Tiger proposed
that opt i mi sm is an integral part of human nature, selected
for in the course of evolution, that is developing along with
our cognitive abilities and indeed the human capacity for
culture.
Tiger even speculated that opt i mi sm drove human
evolution. Because opt i mi sm entails thinking about the
future, it first appeared when people began to think ahead.
Once people began anticipating the future, they could
imagine dire consequences, including their own mortality.
Something had to develop to counteract the fear and pa-
ralysis that these thoughts might entail, and that something
was optimism. By this view, opt i mi sm is inherent in the
makeup of people, not a derivative of some other psycho-
logical characteristic. Tiger went on to characterize opti-
mi sm as easy to think, easy to learn, and pl easi ng- - what
modern evolutionary psychologists describe as an evol ved
psychological mechani sm (Buss, 1991).
Op t i mi s m as an I n d i v i d u al Di f f er enc e
At the same time optimism as human nature was being
discussed in positive terms by theorists like Lazarus, Beck,
Taylor, and Tiger, other psychologists who were interested
in individual differences began to address opt i mi sm as a
characteristic people possess to varying degrees. These two
approaches are compatible. Our human nature provides a
baseline optimism, of which individuals show more versus
less: "In dealing with natural systems the shortest analytical
distance between two points is a normal curve" (Tiger,
1979, p. 162). Our experiences influence the degree to
which we are optimistic or pessimistic.
There are numerous treatments of opt i mi sm as an
individual difference. A definitive history of their anteced-
ents is beyond the scope of this article (see Peterson &
Park, 1998, for a more thorough discussion), but certainly
we should acknowledge several intellectual precursors,
starting with Alfred Adl er' s (1910/1964, 1927) fictional
finalism, based on Vai hi nger' s (1911) " as - i f ' philosophy.
Kurt Lewi n' s (1935, 1951) field theory and George Kel l y' s
(1955) personal construct theory provided influential
frameworks for understanding how bel i ef s- - opt i mi st i c,
pessimistic, o1 somewhere in bet ween- - channel ed peo-
pl e' s behavior. Julian Rot t er' s (1954, 1966) social learning
theory and especially his generalized expectations (locus of
control and trust) legitimized an approach to personality in
terms of broad expectancies about the future.
Also important in leading to psychol ogy' s interest in
optimism as an individual difference was the waning of
traditional st i mul us-response ( S- R) approaches to learning
and their repl acement with cognitive accounts emphasizing
expectancies (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993). Ac-
cording to S- R accounts, learning entails the acquisition of
particular mot or responses in particular situations. Learn-
ing by this view entails the forging of associations between
stimuli and responses, and the more closely these are linked
46 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
together in experience (contiguity), the more likely learn-
ing is to occur. Under the sway of behaviorism, learning
was thought to have no central (cognitive) representation.
Used in arguments against S- R views of learning were
findings that the associations acquired in conditioning are
strengthened not by contiguity per se but by contingency:
the degree to which stimuli provide new information about
responses (Rescorla, 1968). S- R theory stresses only t em-
poral contiguity between the response and the reinforcer,
viewing the individual as trapped by the moment ary co-
occurrences of events. I f a response is followed by a
reinforcer, it is strengthened even if there is no real (causal)
relationship between them. In contrast, the contingency
vi ew of learning proposes that individuals are able to detect
cause- ef f ect relationships, separating moment ary non-
causal relationships from more enduring true ones (Was-
serman & Miller, 1997).
So, learning at its essence entails the discovery of
"what leads to what" (Tolman, 1932). Because learning of
this sort necessarily extends over time, it is sensible to vi ew
it in central (cognitive) terms. Although there is disagree-
ment about the fine detail of these central representations,
it is clear that contingency learning is a critically important
psychological process linked to subsequent motivation,
cognition, and emotion. Most theorists in this tradition have
opted to regard the representation of contingency learning
as an expectation to explain how it is generalized across
situations and projected across time. As explained later,
most approaches to opt i mi sm as an individual difference
adopt this approach, in which opt i mi sm is regarded as a
generalized expectation that influences any and all psycho-
logical processes in which learning is involved.
I briefly survey several of the currently popular ap-
proaches to opt i mi sm as an individual difference. It is no
coincidence that each has an associated self-report ques-
tionnaire measure that lends itself to efficient research. The
correlates of these cognates of opt i mi sm have therefore
been extensively investigated. Research is uniform in
showing that optimism, however it is measured, is linked to
desirable characteristics: happiness, perseverance, achieve-
ment, and health.
Most studies have been cross-sectional, but the dem-
onstrated correlates are usually interpreted as consequences
of optimism. Relatively little attention has been paid to the
origins of this individual difference and in particular to the
distinct possibility that its putative outcomes are alterna-
tively or additionally its determinants. Relatively little at-
tention has been paid to the larger web of bel i ef in which
opt i mi sm resides (Quine & Ullian, 1978). Further, rela-
tively little attention has been paid to why opt i mi sm has
such a wide array of correlates. Indeed, opt i mi sm is what I
call a Velcro construct, to which everything sticks for
reasons that are not always obvious.
Dis pos itional o pti mi s m. Michael Scheier and
Charles Carver (1992) have studied a personality variable
~they identify as dispositional optimism: the global expec-
tation that good things will be plentiful in the future and
bad things, scarce. Scheier and Carver' s overriding per-
spective is in terms of how people pursue goals, defined as
desirable values. To them, virtually all realms of human
activity can be cast in goal terms, and peopl e' s behavi or
entails the identification and adoption of goals and the
regulation of actions vis-h-vis these goals. Therefore, they
refer 1:o their approach as a self-regulatory model (Carver &
Scheier, 1981).
Opt i mi sm enters into self-regulation when peopl e ask
themselves about impediments to achieving the goals they
have adopted. In the face of difficulties, do people none-
theless believe that goals can be achieved? I f so, they are
optimistic: if not, they are pessimistic. Opt i mi sm leads to
continued efforts to attain the goal, whereas pessi mi sm
leads to giving up.
Scheier and Carver (1985) measured opt i mi sm (vs.
pessimism) with a bri ef self-report questionnaire called the
Life Orientation Test (LOT). Representative items from
this test, with which respondents agree or disagree, include
the following:
]1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. I f something can go wrong for me it will. [reverse-
scored]
Positive expectations are usually combi ned with (reverse-
scored) negative expectations, and the resulting measure is
investigated with respect to health, happiness, and coping
with adversity (e.g., Carver et al., 1993; Scheier & Carver,
1987; Scheier et al., 1989; Strack, Carver, & Blaney, 1987).
Results show that dispositional opt i mi sm is linked to de-
sirable outcomes and in particular to active and effective
coping (Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986).
Explanatory s t y l e , Martin E. P. Seligman and
his colleagues have approached opt i mi sm in terms of an
individual' s characteristic explanatory style: how he or she
explains the causes of bad events (Buchanan & Seligman,
1995). Those who explain bad events in a circumscribed
way, with external, unstable, and specific causes, are de-
scribed as optimistic, whereas those who favor internal,
stable',, and global causes are described as pessimistic.
The notion of explanatory style emerged from the
attributional reformulation of the learned helplessness
model (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Briefly,
the original learned helplessness model proposed that after
experiencing uncontrollable aversive events, animals and
people become hel pl ess- - passi ve and unr esponsi ve- - pr e-
sumably because they have "learned" that there is no con-
tingency between actions and outcomes (Maier & Selig-
man, 1976). This learning is represented as a generalized
expectancy that future outcomes will be unrelated to ac-
tions. It is this generalized expectation of r esponse- out -
come independence that produces later helplessness.
Explanatory style was added to the helplessness model
to better account for the boundary conditions of human
helplessness following uncontrollability. When is helpless-
ness general, and when is it circumscribed? People who
encounter a bad event ask "why?" Their causal attribution
determines how they respond to the event. I f it is a stable
(long-lasting) cause, helplessness is thought to be chronic.
I f it i:~ a pervasive (global) cause, helplessness is thought to
be widespread. I f it is an internal cause, self-esteem is
thought to suffer.
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 47
All things being equal, people have a habitual way of
explaining bad event s - - an explanatory st yl e- - and this ex-
planatory style is posited to be a distal influence on help-
lessness following adversity (Peterson & Seligman, 1984).
Explanatory style is typically measured with a self-report
questionnaire called the Attributional Style Questionnaire
(ASQ), which presents respondents with hypothetical
events involving themselves and asks t hem to provide "the
one maj or cause" of each event if it were to happen to them
(Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, &
Seligman, 1982). The respondents then rate these provided
causes along dimensions of internality, stability, and glob-
ality. Ratings are combined, although bad-event ratings and
good-event ratings are kept separate. Explanatory style
based on bad events is usually independent of explanatory
style for good events. Explanatory style based on bad
events usually has more robust correlates than explanatory
style based on good events, although correlations are typ-
ically in the opposite directions (Peterson, 1991).
A second way of measuring explanatory style is with
a content analysis pr ocedur e- - t he Content Analysis of
Verbat i m Explanations ( CAVE) - - t hat allows written or
spoken material to be scored for naturally occurring causal
explanations (Peterson, Schulman, Castellon, & Seligman,
1992). Researchers identify explanations for bad events,
"extract" them, and present them to judges who rate them
along the scales of the ASQ. The CAVE technique makes
possible after-the-fact longitudinal studies, so long as spo-
ken or written material can be located from early in the
lives of the individuals for whom long-term outcomes of
interest are known.
Remember that the generalized expectation of re-
sponse- out come independence is hypothesized as being
the proximal cause of helplessness, even though research in
this tradition has rarely looked at this mediating variable.
Rather, researchers measure explanatory style and correlate
it with outcomes thought to revolve around helplessness:
depression, illness, and failure in academic, athletic, and
vocational realms. Invariably, an optimistic explanatory
style is associated with good outcomes (Peterson & Park,
1998).
As explanatory style research has progressed and the-
ory has been modified, the internality dimension has be-
come of less interest. It has more inconsistent correlates
than do stability or globality, it is less reliably assessed, and
there are theoretical grounds for doubting that it has a direct
impact on expectations per se (Peterson, 1991). Indeed,
internality may well conflate self-blame and self-efficacy,
which would explain why it fares poorly in empirical
research. In a modification of the helplessness reformula-
tion, Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989) emphasized
only stability and globality.
The most important recent chapter in helplessness
research was the reframing of explanatory style by Selig-
man (1991) in his book Learned Optimism, in which he
described how his lifelong interest in what can go wrong
with people changed into an interest in what can go right
(cf. Seligman, 1975). Research on helplessness was trans-
formed into an interest in what Seligman called optimism,
although he could have called it mastery, effectance, or
control. His terminology is justified by the central concern
in helplessness theory with expectations, but it is worth
emphasizing yet again that these expectations tend not to be
explicitly studied.
Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) asserted that
everything learned about helplessness (pessimism) informs
what we know about optimism, but this statement is glib.
Opt i mi sm is not simply the absence of pessimism, and
well-being is not simply the absence of helplessness. Re-
search on learned optimism (i.e., optimistic explanatory
style) will not be as substantial as it might be if it remains
focused on the constructs of original interest to helpless-
ness theory. I return to this point later in this article.
On one level, the Scheier and Carver approach is
congruent with the Seligman approach. LOT correlates and
ASQ/ CAVE correlates are strikingly similar, and measures
of the two constructs tend to converge when they a r e - -
r ar el y- - exami ned together in the same study. However, a
closer look reveals some critical differences. The LOT is a
pure measure of expectation, very close to the dictionary
definitions of opt i mi sm and pessimism. An optimistic ex-
pectation leads to the bel i ef that goals can be achieved,
although it is neutral with respect to how this will happen.
In contrast, the ASQ measure reflects causality, so it is
additionally influenced by peopl e' s beliefs about how goals
are brought about. Said another way, optimistic explana-
tory style is more infused with agency than is dispositional
optimism.
Hope, These two visions of opt i mi s m- - expect a-
tion and agency- - ar e integrated in a third approach, C.
Rick Snyder' s (1994) ongoing studies of hope. Snyder
traced the origins of his thinking to earlier work by Averill,
Catlin, and Chon (1990) and Stotland (1969), in which
hope was cast in terms of peopl e' s expectations that goals
could be achieved. According to Snyder' s view, goal-
directed expectations are composed of two separable com-
ponents. The first is agency, and it reflects someone' s
determination that goals can be achieved. The second is
identified as pathways: the individual' s beliefs that success-
ful plans can be generated to reach goals. The second
component is Snyder' s novel contribution, not found in
other formulations of opt i mi sm as an individual difference.
Hope so defined is measured with a bri ef self-report
scale (Snyder et al., 1996). Representative items, with
which respondents agree or disagree, include the following:
I. I energetically pursue my goals. [agency]
2. There are lots of ways around any problem. [path-
ways]
Responses to items are combi ned by averaging. Scores
have been examined with respect to goal expectancies,
perceived control, self-esteem, positive emotions, coping,
and achievement, with results as expected (e.g., Curry,
Snyder, Cook, Ruby, & Rehm, 1997; Irving, Snyder, &
Crowson, 1998).
Issues in Optimism
Let me turn to the future of opt i mi sm and focus on issues
that deserve attention, by both psychologists and citizens in
48 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
general. I also draw out some of the implications of these
issues for how we mi ght conduct positive social science.
To set the stage for this discussion, I introduce a distinction
between two types of opt i mi sm (Tiger, 1979).
Little Optimism Versus Big Optimism
Little opt i mi sm subsumes specific expectations about pos-
itive outcomes: for example, "I will find a convenient
parking space this evening. " Big opt i mi sm refers t o - -
o b v i o u s l y - l a r g e r and less specific expectations: for exam-
ple, "Our nation is on the verge of something great." The
big-versus-little opt i mi sm distinction reminds us that opti-
mi sm can be described at different levels of abstraction
and, further, that opt i mi sm may function differently de-
pending on the level. Big opt i mi sm may be a biologically
given tendency filled in by culture with a socially accept-
able content; it leads to desirable outcomes because it
produces a general state of vigor and resilience. In contrast,
little opt i mi sm may be the product of an idiosyncratic
learning history; it leads to desirable outcomes because it
predisposes specific actions that are adaptive in concrete
situations.
Said another way, the mechani sms linking opt i mi sm
to outcomes may vary according to the type of opt i mi sm in
focus. For example, one of the striking correlates of opti-
mi sm is good health (e.g., Peterson, 1988; Peterson, Selig-
man, & Vaillant, 1988; Scheier & Carver, 1987, 1992).
This link seems to reflect several different pathways, in-
cluding immunological robustness (Kamen-Siegel, Rodin,
Seligman, & Dwyer, 1991; Scheier et al., 1999; Seger-
strom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998: Udelman, 1982),
absence of negative mood (Weisse, 1992), and health-
promoting behavi or (Peterson, Seligman, Yurko, Martin, &
Friedman, 1998). The big-versus-little opt i mi sm distinction
may help us understand which pathways are involved in
given instances of well-being (Peterson & Bossio, 1991).
The trajectory of a severe illness such as AIDS or cancer
may be better predicted by big opt i mi sm working through
the i mmune syst em and mood, whereas the onset of disease
and the likelihood of traumatic injuries may be more in-
fluenced by little opt i mi sm working through behavi or and
concrete lifestyle choices (Peterson, Moon, et al., 1998).
What exactly is the relationship between little and big
opt i mi sm? Empirically, the two are no doubt correlated, but
it is possible to imagine someone who is a little optimist but
a big pessimist, or vice versa. It is also possible to imagine
situations in which big opt i mi sm has desirable conse-
quences but little opt i mi sm does not, or vice versa. The
determinants of the two may be different, and ways of
encouraging t hem may therefore require different
strategies.
Researchers need to approach the big-versus-little op-
t i mi sm distinction more deliberately. On the face of it, the
dispositional opt i mi sm measure of Scheier and Carver
(1985) and the hope measure of Snyder et al. (1996) tap big
opt i mi sm because they ask people to respond to general-
izations about the future. In contrast, measures of explan-
atory st yl e- - especi al l y the CAVE t echni que- - seem to get
at a smaller opt i mi sm because the focus is on specific
causal explanations for concrete events. Studies to date
have rarely included more than one opt i mi sm measure at a
time, and those that do are conducted by researchers more
interested in how measures converge than with the possi-
bility that they have different patterns of correlates. The
big-versus-little opt i mi sm distinction may provide a way of
thinking about such differences if they indeed emerge.
Again, What Is Optimism?
In addition to the big-versus-little opt i mi sm distinction,
there are some other definitional issues that need to be
addressed by psychologists. Let me repeat that opt i mi sm is
not just a cognitive characteristic: It has inherent emotional
and motivational component s (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1990).
Researchers often seem to regard emotion and motivation
as outcomes that are separate from opt i mi sm per se. At
least in the case of big optimism, this assumption may not
be warranted.
We ask different questions if we see emotion and
motivation as part of big optimism. How does opt i mi sm
feel? Is it happiness, j oy, hypomania, or simply content-
ment? Is the optimistic person experiencing flow: actively
engaging in what he or she is doing while not self-con-
sciously mindful (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990)? Fredrickson
(1998) argued that positive emotions, neglected by psy-
chologists relative to negative emotions, broaden the per-
son' s cognitive and behavioral repertoire. Is this true as
well for big opt i mi sm? We know that optimism is linked to
perseverance, but is it associated as well with a good choice
of goals, those that lend themselves to pursuit and eventual
attainmenl? As R. M. Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, and Deci
(1996) discussed, not all goals are of equal merit for
individuals, given their particular psychological makeup
and context. Is opt i mi sm therefore associated with the
choice of goals that facilitate authenticity in this sense?
Carver, Reynolds, and Scheier (1994) have begun to inves-
tigate these sorts of questions by ascertaining the possible
selves of optimists and pessimists.
There are probably activities that satisfy a person' s
need to be optimistic hut are ultimately pointless, the
psychological equivalent of j unk food. Are video games,
the World Wide Web, mystery novels, gambling, and col-
lections of thimbles or mat chbooks (or journal article re-
prints we never read) analogous to empt y calories, activi-
ties whose pursuit consumes time and energy because they
engage optimism but eventually leave us with nothing to
show, individually or collectively?
Optimism and Pessimism
Another definitional issue has to do with the relationship
between optimism and pessimism. They are usually re-
garded as mutually exclusive, but surprisingly there is
evidence that they are not. For example, the opt i mi sm and
pessi mi sm items in Scheier and Car ver ' s (1985) LOT prove
somewhal independent of one another. This lack of corre-
lation can be regarded as a methodological nuisance, but it
is worth considering the possibility that some people expect
both good things and bad things to be plentiful. Such
individuals could be described as having hedonically rich
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 49
expect at i ons as opposed to mi sbehavi ng on a quest i onnai re.
Ar e t hey l i vi ng life fully, or are t hey ambi val ent and
conf used? Di st i ngui shi ng bet ween opt i mi sm and pessi-
mi sm al l ows an i nt ri gui ng quest i on to be investigated: Ar e
there effects of opt i mi sm above and beyond t hose of the
absence of pessi mi sm ( Robi nson- Whel en, Ki m, MacCal -
lum, & Ki ecol t -Gl aser, 1997)?
Al ong these lines, as al ready noted, expl anat ory style
deri ved f r om attributions about bad events is usual l y inde-
pendent of expl anat ory style based on attributions about
good events. The f or mer is usual l y identified as "t he"
opt i mi st i c expl anat or y style, in part because the correlates
are stronger, but a step back reveals this t reat ment is
curious. At t ri but i ons about bad events ( pr esumabl y linked
to expect at i ons about such event s) are identified as opti-
mistic or pessimistic, whereas attributions about good
events are not. One woul d think it shoul d be j ust the
opposi t e, a poi nt made by Snyder (1995) when he de-
scri bed expl anat or y style as a st rat egy of excuse maki ng.
This cri t i ci sm is bl unt e d- - but onl y s o me wh a t - - wh e n in-
t er nal i t y- ext er nal i t y is r emoved f r om the meani ng of the
const ruct .
The concer n of hel pl essness theorists wi t h attributions
about bad event s is expl ai ned by t he out comes of historical
interest: depressi on, failure, and illness. Opt i mi sm is cor-
related wi t h their absence, and pessi mi sm, wi t h their pres-
ence. Expl anat or y style research has led to i ncreased un-
derst andi ng of these probl emat i c states. However , one must
appreciate that the zero poi nt of these t ypi cal out come
.measures signifies, respect i vel y, n o t bei ng depressed, n o t
failing, and n o t bei ng ill. I f we want to ext end findings past
these zero poi nt s to of f er concl usi ons about emot i onal
fulfillment, achi evement , and wellness, we may or may not
be on firm ground. Perhaps expl anat ory style based on
attributions about good event s woul d t hen be mor e rele-
vant. In any event, researchers of posi t i ve social sci ence
need t o st udy not j ust i ndependent variables that pertain to
strength but al so appropri at e dependent variables.
Psychol ogi cal wel l -bei ng cannot be si mpl y the ab-
sence of distress and conflict, any mor e than physi cal
health is the absence of disease. Di scussi ons of what well-
bei ng entails are ongoi ng in vari ous research and theoret-
ical literatures (e.g., Barsky, 1988; Seeman, 1989), but
these have not yet been i ncorporat ed into the lines of
i nqui ry concer ned wi t h opt i mi sm. I r ecommend that this
i ncorporat i on take place, and I specul at e that bi g opt i mi sm
mi ght be a mor e pot ent influence on wel l -bei ng t han is little
opt i mi sm.
In the t ypi cal demonst rat i on of learned helplessness,
ani mal s or peopl e exposed t o aversi ve events t hey cannot
cont rol show deficits in pr obl em sol vi ng relative t o re-
search participants exposed t o aversi ve events t hey can
cont rol as well as part i ci pant s gi ven no pri or experi ence
wi t h aversi ve event s; these latter t wo groups do not differ
f r om one anot her (Peterson, Maier, & Sel i gman, 1993).
Pri or experi ence wi t h cont rol l abl e event s confers no appar-
ent benefit. Perhaps this is because the baseline assumpt i on
is that cont rol exists, or, t o say it anot her way, individuals
are opt i mi st i c unless there is a reason not to be.
I f the test tasks are changed, however , pri or experi-
ence with cont rol l abl e event s does have a demonst rabl e
effect: enhanced persi st ence at a difficult or unsol vabl e
task. Theori st s have di scussed this opposi t e mani fest at i on
of learned hel pl essness under such rubrics as l earned hope-
fulness, l earned i ndust ri ousness, l earned mast ery, l earned
relevance, and learned resourceful ness (e.g., Ei senberger,
1992; Macki nt osh, 1975; Ros enbaum & Jaffe, 1983; Vol -
picelli, Ul m, Al t enor, & Sel i gman, 1983; Zi mmer man,
1990). Out come measures have to al l ow the benefit to be
manifest.
In choosi ng appropri at e measures, it woul d be instruc-
tive f or opt i mi sm researchers to turn to the literature on
resilience ( Ant hony & Cohler, 1987). Here we see an
interest in chi l dren gr owi ng up in dire ci rcumst ances who
not onl y survi ve but thrive. Thei r resilience is onl y evi dent
i f we choose measures t hat reflect thriving. Resi l i ence
depends critically on a support i ve rel at i onshi p wi t h anot her
person. Coul d the same be true of opt i mi sm in the face of
adversi t y? Much of the opt i mi sm literature is curi ousl y
asocial. Researchers do not even di st i ngui sh bet ween pri-
vate versus public (soci al l y communi cat ed) opt i mi sm,
whi ch woul d seem t o be an i mport ant distinction. Emphasi s
is quite individualistic, but opt i mi sm may be as much an
i nt erpersonal charact eri st i c as an i ndi vi dual one. l
The Reality Basis of Optimism
One more i mport ant issue is the relationship of opt i mi sm to
reality. Opt i mi sm can have cost s i f it is t oo unrealistic.
Consi der unrealistic opt i mi sm as descri bed by Wei nst ei n
(1989) with respect to peopl e' s percept i on of personal ri sk
f or illnesses and mi shaps. When peopl e are asked to pro-
vi de a percent age estimate of the likelihood, in compar i son
with peers, that t hey will someday experi ence an illness or
injury, most underest i mat e their risks. The average indi-
vidual sees hi msel f or hersel f as bel ow average in ri sk for
a variety of mal adi es, whi ch of course cannot be.
This phenomenon is appropri at el y l ament ed because it
may lead peopl e to negl ect the basics of health pr omot i on
and mai nt enance. Mor e generally, opt i mi sm in the f or m of
wi shful t hi nki ng can distract peopl e f r om maki ng concret e
plans about how to attain goal s (Oettingen, 1996). Unre-
lenting opt i mi sm precl udes the caut i on, sobriety, and con-
serwttion of resources that accompany sadness as a normal
and pr esumabl y adapt i ve response to di sappoi nt ment and
set back (Nesse & Wi l l i ams, 1996).
For anot her exampl e, consi der the personal i t y vari abl e
of John Henr yi s m (James, Hartnett, & Kal sbeek, 1983;
James, LaCroi x, Kl ei nbaum, & St rogat z, 1984). Inspi red
by the rai l road wor ker of fol kl ore, who won a cont est
agai nst a st eam hammer but di ed t hereaft er of a heart
Consider the helping alliance in psychotherapy, which many theorists
agree is a necessary condition for any form of treatment to succeed (Frank,
1978). One way to look at the helping alliance is in terms of shared
expectations for treatment and its outcome. To the degree that both parties
believe therapy will be helpful, it is likely to continue to and indeed be
helpful (Priebe & Gruyters, 1993; Tryon & Kane, 1990). In other words,
the helping alliance revolves around a dyad-level optimism.
50 January 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
at t ack, t hi s i ndi vi dual di f f er ence refl ect s t he degr ee to
whi ch Af r i can Ame r i c a ns bel i eve t hat t hey can cont r ol al l
event s i n t hei r l i ves sol el y t hr ough har d wor k and det er -
mi nat i on. I ndi vi dual s who scor e hi gh on t he John Henr y-
i sm meas ur e but are l ow in s oci oeconomi c st at us ar e apt t o
be hyper t ens i ve ( James, St r ogat z, Wi ng, & Rams ey, 1987).
Cons t ant st r i vi ng f or cont r ol over event s wi t hout t he
r esour ces to achi eve i t can t ake a t ol l on t he i ndi vi dual who
f aces an obj ect i ve l i mi t to what can be at t ai ned r egar dl es s
of how har d he or she wor ks. I f opt i mi s m is t o sur vi ve as
a soci al vi r t ue, t hen t he wor l d must have a causal t ext ur e
t hat al l ows t hi s st ance to pr oduce r ewar ds. I f not , peopl e
wi l l channel t hei r ef f or t s i nt o unat t ai nabl e goal s and be-
come exhaust ed, i l l , and demor al i zed. Al t er nat i vel y, peopl e
ma y r echannel t hei r i nher ent opt i mi s m i nt o ot her goal s.
Pos i t i ve soci al sci ence shoul d not be c ome so f ocus ed
on opt i mi s m as a ps yc hol ogi c a l char act er i st i c t hat it i gnor es
how i t is i nf l uenced by ext er nal si t uat i ons, i ncl udi ng ot her
peopl e. Thi s danger is easi est to see in t he case of l i t t l e
opt i mi s m, wher e we can eas i l y deci de t hat a gi ven bel i ef is
wr ong. I t is l ess eas y t o see in t he case of bi g opt i mi s m, but
even her e we can use t he br oader vant age of hi st or y or
aggr egat e dat a to r eal i ze t hat some wi del y shar ed bi g goal s
are j us t as unr eal i st i c as t he expect at i on t hat one wi l l l ead
a l i f e f r ee of speci f i c i l l nesses and i nj ur i es.
The r es ol ut i on is t hat peopl e shoul d be opt i mi st i c
when t he f ut ur e can be changed by pos i t i ve t hi nki ng but not
ot her wi se, adopt i ng what Sel i gman (1991) cal l ed a f l exi bl e
or c ompl e x opt i mi s m, a ps ychol ogi cal st r at egy to be exer -
ci s ed when appr opr i at e as oppos e d to a r ef l ex or habi t over
whi ch we have no cont r ol :
You can choose to use optimism when you j udge that less de-
pression, or more achievement, or better health is the issue. But
you can also choose not to use it, when you j udge that clear sight
or owning up is called for. Learning optimism does not erode your
sense of values or your judgment. Rather it frees you to . . .
achieve the goals you set . . . . Opt i mi sm' s benefits are not un-
bounded. Pessimism has a role to play, both in society at large and
in our own lives; we must have the courage to endure pessimism
when its perspective is valuable (p. 292).
I
Par t i cul ar l y i n t he case of l i t t l e opt i mi s m, peopl e need to
under t ake a c os t - be ne f i t anal ysi s of t he bel i ef in quest i on.
Wh e n t her e i s r o o m f or doubt , p e o p l e s houl d fi l l t he
gap wi t h hope. Bi g o p t i mi s m can be mor e hope f ul t han
l i t t l e o p t i mi s m, whi c h has a gr e a t e r pr es s t o be accur at e.
I a s s u me bi g and l i t t l e o p t i mi s m ar e r e dunda nt f or ma ny
pe opl e . Ps y c h o l o g i s t s s houl d t hi nk a bout how t o he l p
p e o p l e d i s a g g r e g a t e t he t wo i n a us ef ul way, t o t each
t he m how t o have d r e a ms but not f a n t a s i e s - - i l l u s i o n s
wi t hout de l us i ons . The pr i or ques t i on, of cour s e, i s, what
ot he r p s y c h o l o g i c a l c ha r a c t e r i s t i c s need t o be i n pl a c e
f or an i n d i v i d u a l t o be f l exi bl e in t he use of hi s or her
o p t i mi s m?
The Cultivation of Optimism
De s pi t e t he c a ut i ons j us t r ai s ed, t her e is a bunda nt r e a s on
t o b e l i e v e t hat o p t i mi s m- - b i g , l i t t l e, and in b e t we e n - - i s
us ef ul t o a pe r s on b e c a u s e pos i t i ve e xpe c t a t i ons can be
s el f - f ul f i l l i ng. Ho w can we set o p t i mi s m i n pl a c e f or t he
y o u n g ? Her e t he r e s e a r c h by Se l i g ma n and hi s col -
l e a gue s is i ns t r uct i ve. Gi l l h a m, Re i vi c h, J a yc ox, and
Se l i gr na n ( 1995) ha ve be gun an i nt e r ve nt i on p r o g r a m
us i ng s t r a t e gi e s f r om t he c o g n i t i v e - b e h a v i o r a l t he r a py
r e a l m t o t each gr a de s chool c hi l dr e n t o be mor e opt i -
mi s t i c. Res ul t s t o dat e s ugge s t t hat o p t i mi s m t r a i ni ng o f
t hi s sor t ma ke s s ubs e que nt e p i s o d e s of de pr e s s i on l ess
l i ke l y. I poi nt out agai n t hat t he a bs e nc e of de pr e s s i on
s houl d not be t he onl y o u t c o me t hat i nt er es t s pos i t i ve
s oci al s ci ent i s t s . We al so wa nt t o know i f opt i mi s t i c
c hi l dr e n end up h a p p y and he a l t hy, wi t h r i ch s oci al
ne t wor ks and r e wa r d i n g pur s ui t s .
I f bi g o p t i mi s m is t r ul y par t of huma n nat ur e, t hen
we ne e d Io be c onc e r ne d wi t h s o me wh a t di f f e r e nt mat -
t er s. Fi r s t , how can o p t i mi s m be c h a n n e l e d in one di r e c -
t i on r at her t han a not he r ? As wi l l be d i s c u s s e d s hor t l y,
o p t i mi s m i n t he Uni t e d St at es has l ong be e n e n t wi n e d
wi t h i n d i v i d u a l i s m. Is t her e any wa y t o har nes s our
i nhe r e nt o p t i mi s m t o a c onc e r n wi t h t he c o mmo n s ? Ca n
o p t i mi s m a bout o n e ' s n e i g h b o r be ma de as s a t i s f yi ng as
o p t i mi s m a bout one s e l f ?
Rel i gi on can pr ovi de some answer s. I ndeed, Ti ger
(1979) ar gued t hat r el i gi ons ar ose at l east in par t to t ap t he
bi ol ogi cal l y gi ven need of peopl e to be opt i mi st i c. Rel i -
gi ous t hought l ends i t sel f par t i cul ar l y wel l t o bi g opt i mi s m
becaus e of i t s cer t ai nt y. Ti ger obs er ved, much as Fr eud
(1928) di d decades earl i er, t hat r el i gi on is mor e amenabl e
to opt i mi s m t han is sci ence, whi ch is expl i ci t l y t ent at i ve
and pr obabi l i s t i c in i t s pr onouncement s .
Se c ul a r s oci al s c i e nt i s t s i nt e r e s t e d in o p t i mi s m of -
t en i gnor e t he c l os e l i nk b e t we e n o p t i mi s m and r e l i gi on,
wi t h the e xc e pt i on o f an i nve s t i ga t i on by Set hi and
Se l i g ma n ( 1993) i n whi c h t hey s t udi e d t he caus al e xpl a -
na t i ons c ont a i ne d in r e l i gi ous t ext s. Ac r o s s Chr i s t i an,
J ewi s h, and Mu s l i m t ext s, c o n s e r v a t i v e t r act s wer e mor e
opt i mi s t i c t han wer e l i be r a l ones. Ca n we ge ne r a l i z e
f r om t hi s r es ul t , j u x t a p o s e it wi t h r e s e a r c h on t he be ne -
fits of o p t i mi s m, and c onc l ude t hat f unda me nt a l i s t s ar e
bet t er of f t han t hei r r e f o r me d c o l l e a g u e s ? Thi s p o s s i b i l -
i t y is wor t hy of i nve s t i ga t i on, and r e s e a r c he r s have t o be
wi l l i ng t o f ol l ow t he da t a wh e r e v e r t hey mi ght l e a d
( Sc huma ke r , 1992).
Se c ond, how can we pr e ve nt o p t i mi s m f r om be i ng
t hwar t ed, ? Her e t her e i s no mys t e r y. St r es s and t r a u ma of
al l sor t s t ake t hei r t ol l on opt i mi s m, and to t he de gr e e
t hat p e o p l e can l e a d l ess t e r r i bl e l i ves , o p t i mi s m s houl d
be s er ved. We do not want t o cr eat e a l i f e wi t hout
c ha l l e nge , b e c a u s e p e r s e v e r a n c e can onl y be e n c o u r a g e d
when p e o p l e me e t and s ur mount di f f i cul t i es , but we do
need t o be sur e t hat t he di f f i cul t i es can be e ve nt ua l l y
s ur mounl e d.
Al s o c ont r i but i ng t o o p t i mi s m i s s oci al l ear ni ng. I
a s s ume o p t i mi s m can be a c qui r e d by mo d e l i n g - - v i c a r -
i ous l y, as i t we r e - - s o we need t o be at t ent i ve t o t he
me s s a ge s our c hi l dr e n r e c e i ve a bout t he wor l d and how
it wor ks . Ex p l a n a t o r y s t yl es of par ent s and c hi l dr e n
c onve r ge , and a l t hough par t o f t he r e a s on f or t hi s ma y be
s har ed e xpe r i e nc e s or ge ne t i c pr e di s pos i t i ons , i t c oul d
al so r ef l ect t he wh o l e s a l e t r a ns mi t t a l of b e l i e f s ys t e ms
Januar y 2000 • Ame r i c a n Ps ychol ogi s t 51
by mo d e l i n g ( Se l i g ma n et al . , 1984). Al s o c o n s i d e r
me s s a g e s f r om t he p o p u l a r me di a , whi c h ar e as mi x e d
vis-?a-vis o p t i mi s m as t hey ar e on any ot he r s ubj ect .
Ra g s - t o - r i c h e s s t o r i e s - - u n r e a l i s t i c pa r a bl e s s ugge s t i ng
t hat a nyt hi ng and e ve r yt hi ng wo n d e r f u l is p o s s i b l e - - a r e
j u x t a p o s e d on t he e ve ni ng ne ws wi t h s t or i es a bout t he
hor r or s t hat l ur k ar ound e ve r y c or ne r ( Le vi ne , 1977).
Thi r d, what can we do to r eki ndl e opt i mi s m t hat has
been t hwar t ed? We know f r om Sel i gman et at . ' s (1988)
r esear ch t hat cogni t i ve t her apy as de ve l ope d by Aa r on
Be c k ef f ect i vel y t ar get s pes s i mi s t i c expl anat or y st yl e in
such a wa y t hat depr es s i on is al l evi at ed and its r ecur r ence
is pr event ed. Agai n, st udi es l i ke t hi s need to be enr i ched by
addi t i onal out come measur es. Does cogni t i ve t her apy
mer el y r et ur n t he per son to a nondepr es s ed mode, or does
i t f ur t her enr i ch t he i ndi vi dual ? Does i t af f ect bi g opt i mi s m
as much as it does l i t t l e opt i mi s m?
The human pot ent i al move me nt began in t he 1960s,
when t her apy t echni ques used f or di s t r es s ed peopl e wer e
used wi t h t he nor mal in an at t empt to make t hem super -
nor mal ( Tomki ns, 1976). Whe t he r t hi s s ucceeded is debat -
abl e, but is t her e s ome equi val ent her e wi t h r espect to
opt i mi s m t r ai ni ng? Wha t happens when c o g n i t i v e - b e h a v -
i or al t her apy i s used wi t h nonpes s i mi s t i c peopl e? Do su-
per opt i mi s t s resul t , and what are t hey l i ke? Ar e t hey t he
epi t ome of wel l - bei ng or car i cat ur es of pos i t i ve t hi nki ng
l i ke Dr. Pangl os s and Pol l yanna?
Optimism and Society
Do c ul t ur e s or hi s t or i c a l er as di f f e r i n t hei r c ha r a c t e r i s t i c
o p t i mi s m? The a ns we r i s p r o b a b l y no i ns of a r as our
f ocus i s on bi g o p t i mi s m. Bi g o p t i mi s m ma ke s s oci et y
pos s i bl e , and a p e s s i mi s t i c c i v i l i z a t i o n c a nnot s ur vi ve
f or l ong. I nde e d, s oc i e t i e s ma ke a va i l a bl e t o p e o p l e
c ount l e s s wa y s of s a t i s f yi ng t hei r needs t o be opt i mi s t i c
a bout ma t t e r s :
One of the recurrent themes of human culture has to do with
cont est s--wi t h play which is given an effortful structure and in
which some more or less entertaining activity takes place but with
an uncertain outcome. Countless humans affiliate with teams,
boxers, billiard players, gymnasts, skaters, racers, runners, divers
and cheer for them to win and feel despondent when they lose . . . .
Contests have a great deal to do with the matter of optimism and
they may well be one of the commonest expressions of a way of
behaving which . . . is common anyway. Contests are usually
optional . . . . Certainly no one is required to take the fan' s role.
(Tiger, 1979, p. 250)
Of cour se, many us do t ake on t hi s rol e, and even f ans of
t he Chi cago Cubs or t he Bos t on Re d Sox fi nd a way to be
opt i mi s t i c about next season when, of cour se, " ever yt hi ng
wi l l be di f f er ent . "
Vi r t ual l y al l soci et i es have cont est s, but st r i ki ng di f-
f er ences exi st acr oss soci et i es in t er ms of mos t ot her ways
of f eel i ng and bei ng opt i mi st i c. As not ed, t he goal s con-
s i der ed des i r abl e wi l l var y f r om per son to per son, gr oup to
gr oup, cul t ur e to cul t ure. Ot her t han a nebul ous be l i e f in
pr ogr es s and s ome human uni ver sal s l i ke cont est s, t her e is
cons i der abl e var i at i on acr oss cul t ur es in t he cont ent of
opt i mi s m (e. g. , Chang, 1996; Hei ne & Lehman, 1995; Lee
& Sel i gman, 1997). Her e is anot her f r ui t f ul t opi c for re-
sear cher s and me mbe r s of a gi ven soci et y to exami ne:
Wha t are t he goal s t hat a soci et y hol ds up as most desi r -
abl e, and how opt i mi s t i c are me mbe r s of t hat soci et y vi s-
~-vi s t hose goal s ?
In t he Uni t ed St at es, t he bi gges t goal s we have as a
peopl e i ncl ude i ndi vi dual choi ces, i ndi vi dual r i ght s, and
i ndi vi dual f ul f i l l ment . Amer i cans ar e gr eat l y occupi ed wi t h
what t hey can and cannot accompl i s h in t hei r e ve r yda y
l i ves, in par t i cul ar wi t h what t hey can acqui r e. In a capi -
t al i st soci et y, p e o p l e ' s acqui si t i on of mat er i al goods and
t hei r concomi t ant f asci nat i on wi t h t he mone y t hat al l ows
t hem to do so r epr esent a s oci al l y sanct i oned way of
sat i sf yi ng t he opt i mi s t i c f or ce t hat or gani zes t he ent i r e
cul t ure. The downs i de of opt i mi s m sat i sf i ed in t hi s way is
t he encour agement of gr eed.
Shal l ow mat er i al i s m resul t s. I n t he Uni t ed St at es t o-
day, we even see peopl e t ur ni ng t hems el ves i nt o c ommod-
i t i es. We want to be mar ket abl e, to keep our opt i ons open,
and to cash in on what happens to us, es peci al l y mi sf or -
t unes. "Becaus e it wi l l l ook good on my r 6sum6" is a
r at i onal e I hear i ncr eas i ngl y oft en f r om my st udent s as an
expl anat i on f or why t hey are pur sui ng some s eemi ngl y
sel fl ess and good act i vi t y. No wonder peopl e ar e al i enat ed,
and no wonder depr es s i on is on t he r i se among young
adul t s ( Robi ns et al. , 1984).
However , onl y t he cr assness of t hi s r at i onal e is new.
Ther e has l ong been a t r adi t i on in t he Uni t ed St at es of
" s el f - hel p" books pr omi s i ng peopl e success i f t hey onl y
t hi nk pos i t i vel y ( St ar ker , 1989). As emphas i zed, t hough,
opt i mi s m need not be at t ached j us t to sel fi sh concer ns, and
it need not per t ai n j us t to i ndi vi dual agency ( Wal l ach &
Wal l ach, 1983). Col l ect i ve a g e n c y - - c o l l e c t i v e opt i mi s m,
i f you wi l l - - wo u l d seem a des i r abl e goal to add t o t hose
as s oci at ed wi t h i ndi vi dual opt i mi s m (cf. Snyder , Cheavens,
& Symps on, 1997). A r es ur gence of t r adi t i onal r el i gi on,
vol unt eer i s m, or phi l ant hr opy woul d f aci l i t at e t hi s change,
so l ong as peopl e do not ask what is in i t f or t hem ( Sel i g-
man, 1988).
In his book The Positive Thinkers, Donal d Me ye r
(1988) t r aced t he hi st or y of a uni quel y Ame r i c a n br and of
opt i mi s m by di s cus s i ng its i nf l uent i al pr oponent s: Phi neas
Qui mby, Ma r y Baker Eddy, Dal e Car negi e, Nor ma n Vi n-
cent Peal e, and Ronal d Reagan, among ot hers:
The popular psychology of positive t hi nki ng. . , flourished among
people able, for reasons of culture and politics, to imagine that the
only thing wrong with their lives was within themselves. If they
could learn how to manage their own cons ci ous nes s . . , the world
outside would prove positive in its response. Of course this world
was always that of the United States, not of mankind, but the
sense of God' s abundance waiting only to be received . . . had
always taken for granted the greater readiness of Americans, and
hence America, for such grace. (p. 382)
Wha t Me y e r i de nt i f i e d i s a ver y bi g o p t i mi s m, r i ch and
f uz z y i n i t s me a ni ng. Nu me r o u s ot he r -isms adher e t o
t hi s p o l i t i c a l l y l aden f or m of Ame r i c a n o p t i mi s m, not a-
bl y c a pi t a l i s m, ma t e r i a l i s m, and i n d i v i d u a l i s m, as
di s c us s e d.
52 Januar y 2000 ° Ame r i c a n Ps ychol ogi s t
P o s i t i v e t h i n k i n g as e x a mi n e d b y Me y e r ( 1 9 8 8 ) h a s
a d d i t i o n a l l y b e e n d e f i n e d b y wh a t i t o p p o s e s : Ca t h o l i c s ,
wo me n , mi n o r i t i e s , t h e l o we r c l a s s e s , i n t e l l e c t u a l s , h o -
mo s e x u a l s , a n d e v e n g o v e r n me n t i t s e l f . Vi c t i m b l a mi n g
i s c o mmo n ( W, Ry a n , 1 9 7 8 ) . P e s s i mi s t s a r e s i n g l e d o u t
as b e i n g e s p e c i a l l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e : R e me mb e r S p i r o Ag -
n e w' s a l l i t e r a t i v e a t t a c k s o n t h e " n a t t e r i n g n a b o b s o f
n e g a t i v i s m" ? I t wo u l d b e wi s e f o r p o s i t i v e s o c i a l s c i e n -
t i s t s t o a n t i c i p a t e t h a t s e g me n t s o f t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c
ma y h e a r p r o n o u n c e me n t s a b o u t t h e i mp o r t a n c e o f o p -
t i mi s m i n t e r ms o f t h e s e u n f o r t u n a t e p o l i t i c a l c o n n o t a -
t i o n s , as a n i n a d v e r t e n t c o d e f o r e x a c t l y t h e o p p o s i t e o f
wh a t i s b e i n g c o n v e y e d . As I h a v e t r i e d t o ma k e c l e a r i n
t h i s a r t i c l e , o p t i mi s m a n d i t s b e n e f i t s e x i s t f o r al l o f us ,
i f we a p p r o a c h o p t i mi s m i n a n e v e n - h a n d e d wa y .
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J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t 55
The Funds, Friends, and Faith of Happy People
David G. Myers
Hope College
New studies are revealing predictors of subjective well-
being, often assessed as self-reported happiness and life
satisfaction. Worldwide, most people report being at least
moderately happy, regardless of age and gender. As part of
their scientific pursuit of happiness, researchers have ex-
amined possible associations between happiness and (a)
economic growth and personal income, (b) close relation-
ships, and (c) religious faith.
W
ho is happy? Is happiness showered on those
of a particular age, gender, or income level'?
Does it come with certain genetically predis-
posed traits? With supportive close relationships? With a
spiritual perspective?
Such questions not only went unanswered during most
of psychology' s first century, they went largely unasked as
psychologists focused on illness more than health, on fear
more than courage, on aggression more than love. An
electronic search of Psychological Abstracts since 1887
turned up 8,072 articles on anger, 57,800 on anxiety, and
70,856 on depression, while only 851 abstracts mentioned
joy, 2,958 happiness, and 5,701 life satisfaction. In this
sampling, negative emotions trounced positive emotions by
a 14-to-1 ratio (even greater than the 7-to-1 margin by
which treatment exceeded prevention).
Although human suffering understandably focuses
much of our attention on the understanding and alleviation
of misery, one sees harbingers of a more positive dimen-
sion to psychology. For example, a new scientific pursuit of
happiness and life satisfaction (together called subjective
well-being) has begun with two simple questions: (a) How
happy are people? and (b) who are the happy people--what
characteristics, traits, and circumstances mark happy lives?
How Happy Are People?
A long tradition views life as tragedy, extending from
Sophocles' observing (in Oedipus at Colonus) that "Not to
be born is, past all prizing, best" to Woody Allen' s dis-
ceming (in Annie Hall) of two kinds of lives: the horrible
and the merely miserable. Albert Camus, Allen Drury,
Tennessee Williams, and other novelists and playwrights
similarly give us images of unhappy people.
Many social observers concur. "Our pains greatly
exceed our pleasures," it seemed to Rousseau, "so that, all
things considered, human life is not at all a valuable gift."
"We are not born for happiness," agreed Samuel Johnson.
In his book The Conquest of Happiness, philosopher Ber-
trand Russell (1930/1985) echoed that most people are
unhappy. Recent warm-hearted books for the would-be
happy (often written by people who generalize from their
counseling of the unhappy) concur. In Are You Happy?
Dennis Wholey (1986) reported that experts he interviewed
believed perhaps 20% of Americans are happy. ' Ti n sur-
prised!" responded psychologist Archibald Hart (1988) in
his 15 Principles f or Achieving Happiness. "I would have
thought the proportion was much lower!" In Happiness is
an Inside Job, Father John Powell (1989) agreed: "One-
third of all Americans wake up depressed every day. Pro-
fessionals estimate that only 10 to 15 percent of Americans
think of themselves as truly happy." Thomas Szasz (quoted
in Winokur, 1987) spoke for many in surmising, "Happi-
ness is an imaginary condition, formerly attributed by the
living to the dead, now usually attributed by adults to
children, and by children to adults."
However, when asked about their happiness, people
across the world paint a much rosier picture. For example,
in periodic National Opinion Research Center surveys 3 in
10 Americans say they are "very happy." Only 1 in 10 say
they are "not too happy." The remaining 6 in 10 describe
themselves as "pretty happy." Yet, the idea that others are
not so happy persists: More than two thirds of a represen-
tative sample of Minnesotans rate their "capacity for hap-
piness" in the upper 35% "of other people of your age and
sex" (Lykken, 1999).
Most people are similarly upbeat about their satisfac-
tion with life (inglehart, 1990; Myers, 1993). In western
Europe and North America, 8 in 10 rate themselves as more
satisfied than dissatisfied. Fewer than 1 in 10 rate them-
selves as more dissatisfied than satisfied. Likewise, some
three fourths of people say yes, they have felt excited,
proud, or pleased at some point during the past few weeks;
no more than a third say they have felt lonely, bored, or
depressed. Across languages, these self-reports seem to
retain the same meaning. Whether they are German-,
French-, or Italian-speaking, the Swiss report high levels of
life satisfaction--higher than the levels of their German,
French, and Italian neighbors (Inglehart, 1990).
Ed Diener (Myers & Diener, 1996) has aggregated
data from 916 surveys of 1.1 million people in 45 nations
representing most of humanity. He recalibrated subjective
well-being onto a 0-to-10 scale (where 0 is the low ex-
My thanks go to Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet for her helpful comments on
an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David
G. Myers, Hope College, P.O. Box 9000, Holland, MI 49422-9000.
Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected].
56
January 2000 • American Psychologist
Copyr i ght 2000 by the Amer i can Psychol ogi cal Associ at i on, Inc. 0003- 066X/ 00/ $5. 00
V o l 55, No. 1, 56 67 DOI : 10.1037//0003-066X.55,1.56
David G.
Myers
treme, such as ve©, unhappy or completely dissatisfied with
life, 5 is neutral, and 10 is the high extreme). As shown in
Figure 1, the average response is 6.75.
These bullish self-reports were vividly illustrated in a
survey of Detroit area residents. Asked which of the faces
in Figure 2 "comes closest to expressing how you feel
about your life as a whole," more than 9 in 10 people
picked one of the happy faces. A 1998 survey of 1,003
American adults by Opinion Research Corporation painted
a similarly upbeat picture (Black & McCafferty, 1998).
Asked "Who of the following people do you think is the
happiest?" people responded "Oprah Winfrey" (23%),
"Bill Gates" (7%), "the Pope" (12%), "Chelsea Clinton"
(3%), and "yourselF' (49%), with the remaining 6% an-
swering "don' t know."
These positive reports characterize all ages, both
sexes, all races studied, and all strategies for assessing
subjective well-being, including those that sample people' s
experiences by paging people to report their moods. (The
few exceptions to these happiness statistics, noted Diener
& Diener, 1996, include hospitalized alcoholics, newly
incarcerated inmates, new therapy clients, South African
blacks under apartheid, and students living under condi-
tions of political suppression.) This positivity, noted Diener
and Diener, contradicts the intuitions of psychology stu-
dents, half of whom think the elderly are "mostly un-
happy." Another third guess the same of African Ameri-
cans; 9 in 10 students assume the same of unemployed
me n.
Are these seemingly happy people merely in denial of
their actual misery? By definition, the final judge of some-
one' s subjective well-being is whomever lives inside that
person' s skin. "If you feel happy," noted Jonathan Freed-
man (1978), "you are happy--that' s all we mean by the
term." Although we presume happiness refers to something
Figure 1
Subj ecti ve Wel l -Bei ng
160
©
Z
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1.50 2.50
2.00 3.00
6,50 7.50 8.50
7.00 8.00
3.50 4.50 5.50
4.00 5.00 6,00
Subjective Well-Being
Note. As self-reported in 916 surveys of 1.1 million people in 45 nations (with
answers calibrated on a 0 to 10 scale, with 5 being neutral and 10 being the
high extreme). Figure by Ed Diener, from data collated by Ruut Veenhoven and
reported in Myers & Diener, 1996 (i.e., from "The Pursuit of Happiness," by
D. G. Myers & E. Diener, 1996, Scientific American, pp. 54- 56. Copyright
1996 by E. Diener. Adapted with permission). Average subjective well-being
was 6.75.
deeper and more lasting than a momentary good mood, our
working definition is simply whatever people mean when
describing their lives as happy.
Self-reports of happiness are, in fact, reasonably reli-
able over time, despite changing life circumstances (Die-
net, 1994). Moreover, there is convergent validation for
self-reported happiness. Those who report they are happy
also seem so to their family members and close friends
(Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 1991; Sandvik, Diener,
& Seidlitz. 1993). Their daily mood ratings reveal mostly
positive emotions. Further, their self-reported happiness
predicts other indicators of well-being. Compared with
those who are depressed, happy people are less self-fo-
I
Figure 2
Faces Scale: "Whi ch Face Comes Closest to Expressing
How You Feel About Your Life as a Whol e?"
20% 46% 27% 4% 2% 1% 0%
Note. The scale and data are from Social Indicators of Well-Being: Ameri-
cans' Perceptions of Life Quality {p. 207 and p. 306), by F. M. Andrews and
S. B. Withey, 1976, New York, Plenum Copyright 1976 by Plenum. Reprinted
with permission.
January 2000 • American Psychologist 57
cused, less hostile and abusive, and less vulnerable to
disease. They also are more loving, forgiving, trusting,
energetic, decisive, creative, sociable, and helpful (Myers,
1993; Veenhoven, 1988).
Yet, aren' t depression rates on the rise? They are.
Nevertheless, in one multinational assessment of psychiat-
ric disorders, the lifetime rate of depression was only nine
percent in the most vulnerable young adult age group
(Cross-National Collaborative Group, 1992). At any time,
only about two percent of peopl e suffer maj or depression or
bipolar disorder (National Advi sory Mental Health Coun-
cil, 1993).
Ergo, the set point for mood seems slightly positive,
and for good reason: Positive emotions are conducive to
sociability, optimistic goal striving, even healthy i mmune
systems (Weisse, 1992). They also define an emotional
background against which negative emotions, in response
to threats, gain signal value. When something goes awry,
the stone in the emotional shoe alerts the organism to act to
alleviate the negative mood.
Who Is Happy?
Although many peopl e believe there are unhappy times of
l i f e- - t i mes of adolescent stress, midlife crisis, or old age
decl i ne- - r epeat ed surveys across the industrialized world
reveal that no time of life is notably happiest and most
satisfying (Myers & Diener, 1995). Emotionality changes
with maturity, and the predictors of happiness change (later
in life, satisfaction with social relations and health become
more important). Yet, in every age group there are many
happy and some unhappy people.
Li ke age, gender gives little clue to happiness. Despite
the wel l -known gender gaps in mi s er y- - men more often
act antisocial or become alcoholic, women more often
ruminate and get depressed or anxi ous- - men and women
are equally likely to declare themselves "very happy" and
"satisfied" with their lives. This conclusion is grounded in
surveys of 170,000 adults in 16 countries (Inglehart, 1990),
in surveys of 18,000 university students in 39 countries
(Michalos, 1991), and in a meta-analysis of 146 other
studies (Haring, Stock, & Okun, 1984).
Who are the relatively happy people? As Diener
(2000, this issue) indicated, some cultures (especially af-
fluent cultures marked by political freedom) are conducive
to increased satisfaction with life, if not more positive
emotions. Certain traits and temperaments also appear to
predispose one to experience happiness. Some of these
traits, notably extraversion, are known to be genetically
influenced, which helps explain Lykken and Tel l egen' s
(1996) finding that about 50% of the variation in current
happiness is heritable. Like cholesterol levels, happiness is
genetically influenced but not genetically fixed.
What else might influence personal happiness? Mi-
haly Csikszentmihalyi (1990, 1999) has observed increased
quality of life when work and leisure engage one' s skills.
Bet ween the anxiety of being overwhel med and stressed
and the apathy of being underwhelmed and bored lies a
zone in which peopl e experience what Csikszentmihalyi
terms f l o w . When their experiences are sampled using
electronic pagers, peopl e report greatest enj oyment not
when mindlessly passive but when unself-consciously ab-
sorbed in a mindful challenge.
Additional research has focused on three other possi-
ble correlates of happiness. Even i f money can' t buy hap-
piness, is there nevertheless an association between wealth
and well-being? How important are supportive, close rela-
tionships for a sense of well-being? What connections, if
any, exist between religiosity and happiness? Si mpl y said,
do funds, friends, or faith predict happiness?
Weal th and Well-Being
Could money buy you happiness? Most deny it. However,
ask a different quest i on- - "Woul d a l i t t l e more money
make you a l i t t l e happi er ?"- - and many will smirk and nod
yes. There is, we believe, some connection between wealth
and well-being. Asked how satisfied they were with 13
aspects of their lives, including friends, house, and school-
ing, Ameri cans expressed least satisfaction with "the
amount of money you have to live on" (Roper Organiza-
tion, 1984). What would i mprove their quality of life?
"More money, " was the most frequent response to a Uni-
versity of Michigan national survey (Campbell, 1981, p.
41), and the more the better. In one Gallup Poll (Gallup &
Newport, 1990), one in two women, two in three men, and
four in five people earning more than $75,000 reported they
would like to be rich. Thus, the modern Ameri can dream
seems to have become life, liberty, and the purchase of
happiness. Although most realize that the seemingly happy
lifestyle of the rich and famous is beyond their reach, they
do imagine "the good life" that might become possible
when they achieve greater wealth.
The clearest evidence of this "greening of Ameri ca"
comes from the annual UCLA and Ameri can Council on
Education survey of nearly a quarter million students en-
tering college. Those agreeing that a "very important"
reason for their going to college was "to make more
money" rose from one in two in 1971 to three in four in
1998 (Astin, Green, & Korn, 1987; Sax, Astin, Korn, &
Mahoney, 1998). The proportion who consider it "very
important or essential" that they become "very well off
financially" rose from 39% in 1970 to 74% in 1998 (Figure
3). Among 19 listed objectives, this was number one,
outranking "devel opi ng a meaningful philosophy of life,"
"becomi ng an authority in my field," "helping others in
difficulty," and "raising a fami l y. " For t oday' s young
Americans, money matters.
Does being well off indeed pr oduc e - - or at least cor-
relate wi t h- - psychol ogi cal well-being? Woul d peopl e be
happier if they could exchange a middle-class lifestyle for
one with palatial surroundings, Aspen ski vacations, and
executive class travel? Would they be happier if they won
a publishers' sweepstakes and could choose from its sug-
gested indulgences: a 40-foot yacht, deluxe mot orhome,
designer wardrobe, luxury car, and private housekeeper?
"Whoever said money can' t buy happiness i sn' t spending it
right," proclaimed a Lexus ad.
As Diener (2000, this issue) reported, there is some
tendency for wealthy nations to have more satisfied people.
58 January 2000 ° Ameri can Psychologist
O
80%
" - 70%
~ 60%
~ 50%
~ e
~ ~, 40%
~ ~ 30%
e 20%
e ~
10%
0"/.
Figure 3
Changing Materialism
90%
Develop a meaningful philosophy of life
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Note. F r o m annual surveys o f more than 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 U. S. students entering c o l l e g e (total sample a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6 . 5 mi l l i o n students), Data from Dey, Astin, a n d Kern,
1 9 9 1 , a n d subsequent annual reports, i n c l u d i n g Sax e t a l . , 1 9 9 8 .
The Swiss and Scandinavians, for instance, are generally
prosperous and satisfied. When peopl e in poorer nations
compare their lifestyles with the abundance of those in rich
nations, they may become more aware of their relative
poverty. However, among nations with a gross national
product of more than $8,000 per person, the correlation
between national wealth and well-being evaporates (Figure
4). Better (so far as happiness and life satisfaction go) to be
Irish than Bulgarian. But whether one is Irish, Belgian,
Norwegian, or Ameri can hardly matters. Indeed, the Irish
during the 1980s reported consistently greater life satisfac-
tion than did the doubly wealthy but less satisfied West
Germans (Inglehart, 1990). Moreover, noted Diener, Die-
ner, and Diener (1995), national wealth is entangled with
civil rights, literacy, and the number of continuous years of
democracy. For a clearer look at money and happiness,
researchers have therefore asked whether, across individu-
als and over time, peopl e' s well-being rises with their
wealth.
Are Rich People Happier?
In poor countries such as India, where low income threat-
ens basic human needs more often, being relatively well of f
does predict greater well-being (Argyle, 1999). Psycholog-
ically as well as materially, it is better to be high caste than
low. However, in affluent countries, where most can afford
l i fe' s necessities, affluence matters surprisingly little. In the
United States, Canada, and Europe, the correlation between
income and personal happiness, noted Ronald Inglehart
(1990), "is surprisingly weak (indeed, virtually negligible)"
(p. 242). Happiness tends to be lower among the very poor.
Once comfortable, however, more money provides dimin-
ishing returns on happiness. Summarizing his own studies
of happiness, David Lykken (1999) observed that "People
who go to work in their overalls and on the bus are j ust as
happy, on the average, as those in suits who drive to work
in their own Mercedes" (p. 17).
Even very rich peopl e- - t he Forbes 100 wealthiest
Americans surveyed by Diener, Horwitz, and Emmons
( 1985) - - ar e only slightly happier than the average Amer-
ican. Although they have more than enough money to buy
many things they don' t need and hardly care about, 4 in 5
of the 49 super-rich peopl e responding to the survey agreed
that "Money can increase OR decrease happiness, depend-
ing on how it is used." Some were indeed unhappy. One
January 2000 ° Ameri can Psychologist 59
F i g u r e 4
National Wealth and Well-Being
g l
X
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, , ~ , z , , ~ , q , , ~ , ~ , , ~ ,,~ . 4 . ~ , . q , , , , q , q , , q , ~ , q , , ~ , ~ ,
GNP/Capita in 1991
Note. From Wor l d Bank dat a and the 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 Wor l d Values Survey. The subjective wel l -bei ng i ndex combines happi ness and l i fe satisfaction ( aver age of
percent age descri bi ng themselves as [a] " ver y happy " or " happy " minus percent age " not very happy " or " unhappy, " and as [b] 7 or abov e minus 4 or bel ow on
Q l O-point l i fe satisfaction scale). Figure from Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (p. 62) , by R. Inglehart, 1997, Princeton, N J, Princeton Uni versi l y Press.
Copyr i ght 1997 by R. Inglehart. Reprinted with permission.
fabulously wealthy man could never remember being
happy. One woman reported that money could not undo
mi sery caused by her children' s problems. When sailing on
the Titanic, even first class cannot get you where you want
to go.
Our human capacity for adaptation (Diener, 2000, this
issue) helps explain a maj or conclusion of subjective well-
being research, as expressed by the late Richard Kammann
(1983): "Objective life circumstances have a negligible role
to play in a theory of happiness. " Good and bad events
(e.g., a pay hike, being rejected for tenure) do temporarily
influence our moods, and peopl e will often seize on such
short-run influences to explain their happiness. Yet, in less
time than most people suppose, the emotional impact of
significant events and circumstances dissipates (Gilbert,
Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). In a society
where everyone lived in 4, 000-square-foot houses, people
would likely be no happier than in a society in which
everyone lived in 2,000-square-foot houses. Thanks to our
capacity to adapt to ever greater fame and fortune, yester-
day' s luxuries can soon become t oday' s necessities and
t omor r ow' s relics.
60 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
D o e s Economic Growth Improve
Human Moral e?
Over time, does happiness rise with affluence? Will Frank
and Shirley Mac Capaci be enduringly happier for having
in 1998 won the $195 million Powerball lottery? Likely
they will not be as happy as they initially supposed. Lottery
winners typically gain only a temporary jolt of joy from
their winnings (Argyle, 1986; Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-
Bulman, 1978). Although they are delighted to have won,
the euphoria eventually fades. Likewise, those whose in-
comes have increased over the previous decade are not
happier than those whose income has not increased (Die-
ner, Sandvik, Seidlitz, & Diener, 1993). As Richard Ryan
(quoted by Kohn, 1999) noted, such satisfactions have "a
short half-life."
If not surrounded by wealth, the pain of simplification
may also be short-lived. Economist Robert Frank (1996)
experienced this:
As a young man fresh out of college, I served as a Peace Corps
Volunteer in rural Nepal. My one-room house had no electricity,
no heat, no indoor toilet, no running water. The local diet offered
little variety and virtually no meat . . . . Yet, although my living
conditions in Nepal were a bit startling at first, the most salient
feature of my experience was how quickly they came to seem
normal. Within a matter of weeks, I lost all sense of impoverish-
ment. Indeed, my $40 monthly stipend was more than most others
had in my village, and with it I experienced a feeling of prosperity
that I have recaptured only in recent years.
If enduring personal happiness generally does not rise
with personal affluence, does collective happiness float
upward with a rising economic tide? Are Americans hap-
pier today than in 1940, when two out of five homes lacked
a shower or bathtub, heat often meant feeding a furnace
wood or coal, and 35% of homes had no toilet ("Tracking
the American Dream," 1994)? Consider 1957, when econ-
omist John Galbraith was about to describe the United
States as The Affluent Socie~. Americans' per person in-
come, expressed in today' s dollars, was about $9,000.
Today, it is $20,000, thanks to increased real wages into the
1970s, increased nonwage income, and the doubling of
married women' s employment. Compared with 1957, to-
day' s Americans are therefore part of "the doubly affluent
society," with double what money buys. Although income
disparity has increased between rich and poor, the rising
tide has lifted most boats. Americans today own twice as
many cars per person, eat out more than twice as often, and
often enjoy microwave ovens, big-screen color TVs, and
home computers. From 1960 to 1997, the percentage of
homes with dishwashers increased from 7% to 50%,
clothes dryers increased from 20% to 71%, and air condi-
tioning increased from 15% to 73% (U.S. Commerce De-
partment, Bureau of the Census, 1979, Table 1383; 1998,
Table 1223). So, believing that it is "very important" to be
very well-off financially and having seen their affluence
ratchet upward little by little over four decades, are Amer-
icans now happier?
They are not. As Figure 5 indicates, the number of
people reporting themselves "very happy" has, if anything,
F i g u r e 5
Has Economic Growth Advanced Human Morale?
s s o , o o o i o l o o " , .
$18,000 9O%
$ 1 6 , 0 0 0 l Personal l ncom i 8 0 %
$12,000 ,, 600/0
$10,000 5O%
$8, 000 - , Percentage Very Happy 4 0 %
$ 6 , 0 0 0 * " " * " * " * ' ~ * ' ~ " ÷ * **~* . . . . " w " " ' , * 3 0 %
$ 4 , 0 0 O 2 0 %
$2,000 10%
$ 0 , , , , , 0 %
1 9 5 6 1 9 6 3 1 9 7 0 1977 1 9 8 4 1991 1 9 9 8
Note. While inflation-adjusted income has risen, self-reported happiness has
not. Income data from the U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of the Census
(1975}, and Economic Indicators. Happiness data f r om General Social
Surveys, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. See
Footnote 1.
declined slightly between 1957 and 1998, from 35% to
33%: We are twice as rich and no happier. Meanwhile, the
divorce rate doubled. Teen suicide tripled. Reported violent
crime nearly quadrupled. Depression rates have soared,
especially among teens and young adults (Seligman, 1989;
Klerman & Weissman, 1989; Cross-National Collaborative
Group, 1992). Compared with their grandparents, today' s
young .adults have grown up with much more affluence,
slightly less happiness, and much greater risk of depression
and assorted social pathologies. I call this conjunction of
material prosperity and social recession the American par-
adox (Myers, in press). The more people strive for extrinsic
goals such as money, the more numerous their problems
and the less robust their well-being (Kasser & Ryan, 1996).
It is hard to avoid a startling conclusion: Our becom-
ing much better off over the last four decades has not been
accompanied by one iota of increased subjective well-
being. The same is true of European countries and Japan,
according to Richard Easterlin (1995). In Britain, for ex-
ample, sharp increases in the percentages of households
with cars, central heating, and telephones have not been
accompanied by increased happiness. The conclusion is
startling because it challenges modem materialism. So far
as happiness goes, it is not "the economy, stupid." Eco-
nomic growth in affluent countries has provided no appar-
ent boost to human morale.
C l o s e R e l a t i o n s h i p s a n d W e l l - B e i n g
One can easily imagine why the stress of close relation-
ships might exacerbate illness and misery. "Hell is other
January 2000 • American Psychologist 61
people, " mused Jean-Paul Sartre. Thus, people may fret
over dysfunctional relationships. Pop psychol ogy books
warn us against the yoke of codependent connections,
marked by too much support and loyalty to a troubled
partner at the cost of one' s self-fulfillment. Recognizing
how the "chains" of marriage and the "shackles" of com-
mi t ment can put peopl e in "bondage, " modern individual-
ism advises us to give priority to enhancing our own
identity and self-expression. "The only question which
matters, " declared Carl Rogers (quoted in Wallach &
Wallach, 1985), "is, ' Am I living in a way which is deeply
satisfying to me, and which truly expresses me?' "
Need to Belong
Without disputing the human quest for personal identity,
social and evolutionary psychologists remind us that we are
also, as Aristotle recognized, social animals. Social bonds
boosted our ancestors' survival chances. Children kept
close to their caregivers were protected from harm. Adults
who formed attachments were more likely to come together
to reproduce and conurture their offspring to maturity.
Groups shared food, provided mates, and helped care for
children. For hunting, six hands were better than two.
Facing enemies, there was strength in numbers. As inher-
itors of this legacy, we therefore have a deep need to
belong, contend Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary (1995).
Because of our panhuman quest for close relation-
ships, new social bonds are typically marked and cemented
by celebration. When we marry, have a child, gain a new
job, or j oi n a fraternity, sorority, or religious communi t y,
we celebrate the event with food, ritual, or parties. Thrown
together at school, at summer camp, or on a cruise, we
often resist our newly formed gr oup' s dissolution. Hoping
to maintain the relationships, we promise to call, to write,
to come back for reunions. Seeking acceptance and belong-
ing, we spend billions on clothes, cosmetics, and diet and
fitness aids, especially in cultures where the absence of
arranged marriages and the possibility of divorce make
romantic attachment more dependent on attractiveness.
To be sure, the need to belong feeds both deep attach-
ments and menacing threats. Out of our need to define a
"we" come loving families, faithful friendships, fraternal
organizations, and t eam spirit, but also teen gangs, isola-
tionist cults, ethnic hostilities, and fanatical nationalism.
Because the fear of aloneness somet i mes seems worse than
the pain of emotional or physical abuse, attachments may
also keep people in degrading relationships. When our
social ties are threatened or broken, negative emotions may
overwhel m us. Exile, imprisonment, and solitary confine-
ment are progressively more severe forms of punishment.
Recently bereaved people often find life empt y and point-
less. Those denied others' acceptance and inclusion may
feel depressed. Anxiety, jealousy, loneliness, and guilt all
involve disruptions to the human need to belong.
The known toxicity of such negative emotions for
human health and the healing power of confiding self-
disclosure (Pennebaker, 1990) help explain why epidemi-
ologists, af t er following thousands of lives through time,
have consistently found that close, intact relationships pre-
dict health. Compared with those having few social ties,
people supported by close relationships with friends, fam-
ily, or fellow members of church, work, or other support
groups are less vulnerable to ill health and premature death
(Cohen, 1988; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Nelson,
1988). When afflicted with leukemia or heart disease, those
who experience extensive social support have higher sur-
vival rates (Case, Moss, Case, McDermott, & Eberly, 1992;
Colon, Callies, Popkin, & McGl ave, 1991; Williams et al.,
1992). When social ties break, with widowhood, divorce,
or dismissal from a job, i mmune defenses weaken for a
time, and rates of disease and death rise (Dohrenwend et
al., 1982; Kaprio, Koskenvuo, & Rita, 1987; National
Academy of Sciences, 1984). "Woe to one who is alone
and falls and does not have another to help," observed the
writer of Ecclesiastes (4:10).
Friendships and Well-Being
Do the correlates of social support include psychological as
well as physical well-being? Being attached to friends and
partners with whom we can share intimate thoughts has two
effects, believed Francis Bacon (1625): "It redoubleth j oys,
and cutteth griefs in half." Three hundred and fifty years
later, John Lennon and Paul McCart ney (1967) sang the
same idea: "I get by with a little help from my friends."
Indeed, people report happier feelings when with oth-
ers (Pavot, Diener, & Fujita, 1990). When asked by the
National Opinion Research Center, "How many close
friends would you say you have?" (excluding fami l y mem-
bers), 26% of those reporting fewer than five friends and
38% of those reporting five or more friends said they were
"very happy. ''1
Other findings confirm the correlation between social
support and well-being. For example, those who enjoy
close relationships cope better with various stresses, in-
cluding bereavement, rape, j ob loss, and illness (Abbey &
Andrews, 1985; Perlman & Rook, 1987). Among 800
college alumni surveyed, those with "Yuppi e va l ue s " - -
those who preferred a high income and occupational suc-
cess and prestige to having very close friends and a close
mar r i age- - wer e twice as likely as their former classmates
to describe themselves as "fairly" or "very" unhappy (Per-
kins, 1991).
Marriage and Well-Being
For more than 9 in 10 people worldwide, reported the
United Nat i ons' Demographic Yearbook, one exampl e of a
close relationship is eventually marriage. Given our need to
belong and the resulting links between friendship and well-
being, does marriage predict greater well-being, or is hap-
piness more often associated with independence?
A mountain of data reveal that most people are hap-
pier when attached than when unattached. Repeated sur-
veys in Europe and North Ameri ca have produced a con-
Analyses of National Opinion Research Center General Social
Survey data for this article were conducted at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
gss/and at http://csa.berkeley.edu:7502/.
62 January 2000 ° American Psychologist
sistent result: Compared with those who never marry, and
especially compared with those who have separated or
divorced, married people report being happier and more
satisfied with life. For example, among the 35,024 Amer-
icans surveyed by the National Opinion Research Center
between 1972 and 1996, 40% of married adults declared
themselves very happy--nearl y double the 24% of never-
married adults who said the same (Figure 6). Pooling data
from national surveys of 20,800 people in 19 countries,
Arne Mastekaasa (1994) confirmed the marriage-happi-
ness correlation. Married people are also at decreased risk
of depression (Figure 7).
Even less happy than those unmarried or divorced are
those in not-very-happy marriages, However, those report-
ing their marriage as "very happy" are among the happiest
of people: 57% declared life as a whole to be very happy
(compared with 10% of those whose marriage is "pretty
happy" and 3% of those with a "not-too-happy" marriage).
Henry Ward Beecher would not have been surprised:
"Well-married a person is winged; ill-matched, shackled."
As it happens, three in four married Americans say their
spouse is their best friend, and four in five say they would
marry the same person again (Glenn, 1996; Greeley, 1991).
Is marriage, as is often supposed, more strongly linked
with men' s happiness than women' s? Do "guys wed for
better; wives for worse," as one newspaper headlined
(Peterson, 1993)? Given women' s greater contribution to
household tasks, we might expect so. Domestic equi t y--an
ideal not yet realized in most marriages--is a predictor of
marital happiness (Feeney, Peterson, &Noller, 1994; Scha-
fer & Keith, 1980). Nevertheless, the married versus not-
married happiness gap is similar for women and men. This
is the consistent finding of national surveys in the United
States (Figure 6), in Canada and Europe (Inglehart, 1990),
and in a meta-analysis of 93 studies of gender, marriage,
and well-being (Wood, Rhodes, & Whelan, 1989). Al-
though there are some indications that a bad marriage may
Figure 6
Marital Status and Happiness
Note. Data from 35,024 participants in the General Social Survey, National
Opinion Research Center, 1972 to 1996. See Footnote 1.
be more depressing to a woman than to her husband, the
myth that single women are generally happier than married
women can be laid to rest.
So, why are married people happier? Is marriage
conducive to happiness, or is happiness conducive to mar-
riage? The traffic between marriage and happiness appears
to be two-way.
First, happy people may be more appealing marriage
partners. Because they are more good-natured, more out-
going, and more focused on others (Veenhoven, 1988),
they generally are socially attractive. Unhappy people are
more often socially rejected. Misery may love company,
but research on the social consequences of depression
reveals that company does not love misery. An unhappy
(and therefore self-focused, irritable, and withdrawn)
spouse or roommate is often not perceived as fun to be
around (Gotlib, 1992; Segrin & Dillard, 1992). For such
reasons, positive, happy people more readily form happy
relationships.
Yet, "the prevailing opinion of researchers," reported
Mastekaasa (1995), is that the marriage-happiness corre-
lation is "mainly due" to the beneficial effects of marriage.
Consider: If the happiest people marry sooner and more
often, then as people age (and progressively less happy
people move into marriage), the average happiness of both
married and never-married people should decline. (The
older, less happy newlyweds would pull down the average
happiness of married people, leaving the unhappiest people
in the unmarried group.) However, the data do not support
this prediction, which suggests that marital intimacy, com-
mitment, and support do, for most people, pay emotional
dividends. Marriage offers people new roles, providing
new stresses but also additional rewards and sources of
identity and self-esteem (Crosby, 1987). When marked by
intimacy, marriage--friendship sealed by commi t ment - -
reduces loneliness and offers a dependable lover and com-
panion (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1997).
Faith and Well-Being
Is religion, as Freud (1928/1964, p. 71) surmised, corrosive
to happi ness--by creating an "obsessional neurosis" that
entails guilt, repressed sexuality, and suppressed emo-
t i ons - or is it more often associated with joy? Accumu-
lating evidence reveals that some forms of religious expe-
rience correlate with prejudice and guilt, but that in general
an active religiosity is associated with several mental health
criteria. First, actively religious North Americans are much
less likely than irreligious people to become delinquent, to
abuse drugs and alcohol, to divorce, and to commit suicide
(Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993; Colasanto & Shriver,
1989). Thanks in part to their lessened smoking and drink-
ing, religiously active people even tend to be physically
healthier and to live longer (Koenig, 1997; Matthews &
Larson., 1997).
Olher studies have probed the correlation between
faith and coping with crises. Compared with religiously
inactive widows, recently widowed women who worship
regularly report more joy in their lives (Harvey, Barnes, &
Greenwood, 1987; McGloshen & O' Bryant, 1988; Siegel
January 2000 ° American Psychologist 63
Figure 7
Marital Status and Depression Rate
7%
Note.
tw,,~
6 %
5 %
5 . 8 0 %
4 %
~a 3 %
2 %
1%
,<
0 %
D i v o r c e d
T w i c e
Data from Robins and Regier, 1991, p. 72.
5 . 1 0 %
C o h a b i t
4 . 1 0 %
D i v o r c e d
O n c e
2 . 4 0 %
N e v e r
M a r r i e d
1 . 5 0 %
I
M a r r i e d
& Kuykendall, 1990). Among mothers of developmentally
challenged children, those with a deep religious faith are
less vulnerable to depression (Friedrich, Cohen, & Wil-
turner, 1988). People of faith also tend to retain or recover
greater happiness after suffering divorce, unemployment,
serious illness, or bereavement (Ellison, 1991; McIntosh,
Silver, & Wortman, 1993). For people later in life, accord-
ing to one meta-analysis, the two best predictors of life
satisfaction have been health and religiousness (Okun &
Stock, 1987).
In surveys taken in various nations, religiously active
people also report somewhat higher levels of happiness
(Inglehart, 1990). Consider a U.S. Gallup Organization
(1984) survey. Those responding with highest scores on a
spiritual commi t ment scale (by agreeing, e.g., that "My
religious faith is the most important influence in my life")
were twice as likely as those lowest in spiritual commi t -
ment to declare themselves "very happy. " National Opin-
ion Research Center surveys reveal higher levels of "very
happy" peopl e among those who feel "ext remel y close to
God" (41%) rather than "somewhat close" (29%) or not
close or unbelieving (23%). Self-rated spirituality and hap-
piness may both be socially desirable responses, however.
Would the happiness correlation extend to a behavioral
measure of religiosity? As Figure 8 indicates, it does.
Seeking to explain these associations between faith
and well-being, researchers have considered several possi-
bilities. A partial explanation seems to be that faith com-
munities provide social support (Ellison, Gay, & Glass,
1989). Religion is usually practiced communal l y, involving
"the fellowship of kindred spirits," "the bearing of one
anot her' s burdens," "the ties of love that bind." This was
the vision of John Winthrop (1630/1965), who, before
leading one of the first groups of Puritans to shore, de-
clared, "We must delight in each other, make others' con-
ditions our own, rejoyce together, mourn together, labor
and suffer together, always having before our eyes our
communi t y as members of the same body" (p. 92). Penn-
syl vani a' s old-order Amish, who are known for their agrar-
ian, nonmaterialistic culture, their pacifism, and their self-
sufficient communal life, suffer low rates of maj or depres-
sion (Egeland & Hostetter, 1983; Egeland, Hostetter, &
Eshleman, 1983).
Another possible explanation for the fai t h-wel l -bei ng
correlation is the sense of meaning and purpose that many
people derive from their faith. Seligman (1988) has con-
tended that a loss of meaning feeds t oday' s high depression
rate, and that finding meaning requires
an at t achment to somet hi ng l arger t han t he l onel y self. To the
ext ent t hat young peopl e now find it har d to t ake seri ousl y t hei r
r el at i onshi p wi t h God, to care about t hei r r el at i onshi p wi t h t he
count r y or to be part of a l arge and abi di ng fami l y, t hey will find
it ver y difficult to find meani ng in life. To put it anot her way, t he
sell" is a very. poor site tk~r fi ndi ng meani ng. (p. 55)
For Rabbi Harold Kushner (1987), religion satisfies "the
most fundamental human need of all. That is the need to
know that somehow we matter, that our lives mean some-
thing, count as something more than just a moment ary blip
in the universe."
Many religious worldviews not only propose answers
to some of l i fe' s deepest questions; they also encourage
hope when confronting what Sheldon Solomon, Jeffery
Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski (1991) call "the terror
resulting from our awareness of vulnerability and death."
Aware as we are of the great enemies, suffering and death,
64 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
Figure 8
Religious A ttendance and Happiness
5 0 %
4 7 %
~, 4 0 %
~t
3O%
>.
: 2 0 %
1 0 %
0 %
3 1 %
2 8 % .....
3 5 %
3 9 %
Note.
Less than Monthly+ Nearly Weekly Several
Monthly Weekly Times
Data from 34, 706 participants in the General Social Survey, Nat i onal Opi ni on Research Center, 1972 to 1996. See Footnote 1.
rel i gi on of f ers a hope that in the end, the very end, "all shal l
be we l l , and all shal l be we l l , all manner o f t hi ngs shal l be
wel l " (Julian o f Nor wi c h, 1373/ 1901) .
Conclusion
The correl at i onal e vi de nc e that marks this y o ung enterprise
l eaves many fi el ds f or future researchers to pl o w as t hey
expl ore the root s and fruits o f happi ness. Ho we v e r , this
muc h we n o w know: Age , gender, and i nc o me ( as s umi ng
peopl e have e no ug h to afford l i f e' s neces s i t i es ) gi ve little
cl ue to s o me o n e ' s happi ness. Wi l l i am Cowpe r ' s 1782
hunch appears correct: "Happi ness depends, as Nature
s hows , Les s on ext eri or t hi ngs than mos t suppose. " Bet t er
cl ues c o me f r om kno wi ng pe opl e ' s traits and the qual i ty o f
their wor k and l ei sure experi ences ( Cs i ks z e nt mi hal yi ,
1999; Di ener, 2000, this i s s ue) , kno wi ng whet her t hey
e nj oy a support i ve ne t wor k o f c l o s e rel at i onshi ps, and
kno wi ng whet her the pers on has a fai th that e nc o mpa s s e s
soci al support, purpose, and hope. Res earch on subj ect i ve
we l l - be i ng c o mpl e me nt s s oc i e t y' s e mphas e s on phys i cal
and materi al we l l - be i ng and p s y c h o l o g y ' s hi stori c preoc-
cupat i on wi t h negat i ve e mot i ons . By aski ng wh o i s happy
and why, t hos e e ngage d in the sci ent i f i c pursuit o f happi -
nes s can hel p our cul ture rethi nk its priorities and e nvi s i on
a wor l d that e nhanc e s human wel l - bei ng.
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J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t 67
Self-Determination Theory and the
Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation,
Social Development, and Well-Being
Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci
University of Rochester
Human beings can be proactive and engaged or, alterna-
tively, passive and alienated, largely as a function of the
social conditions in which they develop and function. Ac-
cordingly, research guided by self-determination t heo~
has f ocused on the social-contextual conditions that facil-
itate versus forestall the natural processes of self-motiva-
tion and healthy psychological development. Specifically,
factors have been examined that enhance versus undermine
intrinsic motivation, self-regulation, and well-being. The
findings have led to the postulate of three innate psycho-
logical needs--competence, autonomy, and relatedness--
which when satisfied yield enhanced self-motivation and
mental health and when thwarted lead to diminished mo-
tivation and well-being. Also considered is the significance
of these psychological needs and processes within domains
such as health care, education, work, sport, religion, and
psychotherapy.
T
he fullest representations of humanity show people
to be curious, vital, and self-motivated. At their best,
they are agentic and inspired, striving to learn; ex-
tend themselves; mast er new skills; and apply their talents
responsibly. That most peopl e show considerable effort,
agency, and commi t ment in their lives appears, in fact, to
be more normat i ve than exceptional, suggesting some very
positive and persistent features of human nature.
Yet, it is also clear that the human spirit can be
diminished or crushed and that individuals sometimes re-
j ect growth and responsibility. Regardless of social strata
or cultural origin, exampl es of both children and adults
who are apathetic, alienated, and irresponsible are abun-
dant. Such non-optimal human functioning can be observed
not only in our psychological clinics but also among the
millions who, for hours a day, sit passively before their
televisions, stare blankly from the back of their classrooms,
or wait listlessly for the weekend as they go about their
jobs. The persistent, proactive, and positive tendencies of
human nature are clearly not invariantly apparent.
The fact that human nature, phenotypically expressed,
can be either active or passive, constructive or indolent,
suggests more than mere dispositional differences and is a
function of more than j ust biological endowments. It also
bespeaks a wide range of reactions to social environments
that is worthy of our most intense scientific investigation.
Specifically, social contexts catalyze both within- and be-
tween-person differences in motivation and personal
growth, resulting in peopl e being more self-motivated,
energized, and integrated in some situations, domains, and
cultures than in others. Research on the conditions that
foster versus undermine positive human potentials has bot h
theoretical import and practical significance because it can
contribute not only to formal knowl edge of the causes of
human behavi or but also to the design of social environ-
ments that optimize peopl e' s development, performance,
and well-being. Research guided by self-determination the-
ory (SDT) has had an ongoing concern with precisely these
issues (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991; Ryan, 1995).
Self-Determination Theory
SDT is an approach to human motivation and personality
that uses traditional empirical methods while empl oyi ng an
organismic metatheory that highlights the importance of
humans' evolved inner resources for personality develop-
ment and behavioral self-regulation (Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci,
1997). Thus, its arena is the investigation of peopl e' s
inherent growth tendencies and innate psychological needs
that are the basis for their self-motivation and personality
integration, as well as for the conditions that foster those
positive processes. Inductively, using the empirical pro-
cess, we have identified three such needs- - t he needs for
compet ence (Harter, 1978; White, 1963), relatedness
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Reis, 1994), and aut onomy
(deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975)--t hat appear to be essential
for facilitating optimal functioning of the natural propen-
sities for growth and integration, as well as for constructive
social devel opment and personal well-being.
This work was supported in part by research Grant MH-53385 from the
National Institute of Mental Health. We thank all of the members of the
Human Motivation Research Group at the University of Rochester who
have contributed to these ideas and research, and to Jennifer LaGuardia,
Charles Couchman, and Phyllis Joe for their specific help with this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to either
Richard M. Ryan or Edward L. Deci, Department of Clinical and Social
Sciences in Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.
Electronic mail may be sent to either [email protected] or
[email protected].
68 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00
Vol. 55, No. 1, 68-78 DOI: 10. 1037110003-066X. 55. 1. 68
Richard M.
Ryan
Photo by Joe Gawlowicz,
University of Rochester
Much of the research guided by SDT has also exam-
ined environmental factors that hinder or undermine self-
motivation, social functioning, and personal well-being.
Although many specific deleterious effects have been ex-
plored, the research suggests that these detriments can be
most parsimoniously described in terms of thwarting the
three basic psychological needs. Thus, SDT is concerned
not only with the specific nature of positive developmental
tendencies, but it also examines social environments that
are antagonistic toward these tendencies.
The empirical methods used in much of the SDT
research have been in the Baconian tradition, in that social
contextual variables have been directly manipulated to
examine their effects on both internal processes and behav-
ioral manifestations. The use of experimental paradigms
has allowed us to specify the conditions under which peo-
ple' s natural activity and constructiveness will flourish, as
well as those that promote a lack of self-motivation and
social integration. In this way, we have used experimental
methods without accepting the mechanistic or efficient
causal meta-theories that have typically been associated
with those methods.
In this article we review work guided by SDT, ad-
dressing its implications for three important outcomes. We
begin with an examination of intrinsic motivation, the
prototypic manifestation of the human tendency toward
learning and creativity, and we consider research specify-
ing conditions that facilitate versus forestall this special
type of motivation. Second, we present an analysis of
self-regulation, which concerns how people take in social
values and extrinsic contingencies and progressively trans-
form them into personal values and self-motivations. In
that discussion, we outline different forms of internalized
motivation, addressing their behavioral and experiential
correlates and the conditions that ale likely to promote
these different motivations. Third, we focus on studies that
have directly examined the impact of psychological need
fulfillment on health and well-being.
The Nat ur e of Mot i vat i on
Motivation concerns energy, direction, persistence and
equifinality--all aspects of activation and intention. Moti-
vation has been a central and perennial issue in the field of
psychology, for it is at the core of biological, cognitive, and
social regulation. Perhaps more important, in the real
world, motivation is highly valued because of its conse-
quences: Motivation produces. It is therefore of preeminent
concern to those in roles such as manager, teacher, reli-
gious leader, coach, health care provider, and parent that
involve mobilizing others to act.
Although motivation is often treated as a singular
construct, even superficial reflection suggests that people
are moved to act by very different types of factors, with
highly varied experiences and consequences. People can be
motivated because they value an activity or because there is
strong external coercion. They can be urged into action by
an abiding interest or by a bribe. They can behave from a
sense of personal commitment to excel or from fear of
being surveilled. These contrasts between cases of having
internal motivation versus being externally pressured are
surely familiar to everyone. The issue of whether people
stand behind a behavior out of their interests and values, or
do it for reasons external to the self, is a matter of signif-
icance in every culture (e.g., Johnson, 1993) and represents
a basic dimension by which people make sense of their own
and others' behavior (deCharms, 1968; Heider, 1958; Ryan
& Connell, 1989).
Comparisons between people whose motivation is au-
thentic (literally, self-authored or endorsed) and those who
are merely externally controlled for an action typically
reveal that the former, relative to the latter, have more
interest, excitement, and confidence, which in turn is man-
ifest both as enhanced performance, persistence, and cre-
ativity (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, &
Ilardi, 1997) and as heightened vitality (Nix, Ryan, Manly,
& Deci, 1999), self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995), and
general well-being (Ryan, Deci, & Grolnick, 1995). This is
so even when the people have the same level of perceived
competence or self-efficacy for the activity.
Because of the functional and experiential differences
between self-motivation and external regulation, a major
focus of SDT has been to supply a more differentiated
approach to motivation, by asking what kind of motivation
is being exhibited at any given time. By considering the
perceived forces that move a person to act, SDT has been
able to identify several distinct types of motivation, each of
which has specifiable consequences for learning, perfor-
mance, personal experience, and well-being. Also, by ar-
ticulating a set of principles concerning how each type of
motivation is developed and sustained, or forestalled and
undermined, SDT at once recognizes a positive thrust to
human nature and provides an account of passivity, alien-
ation, and psychopathology.
January 2000 • American Psychologist 69
Edwa r d L.
D e ci
Photo by Joe Gawlowicz,
University of Rochester
Intrinsic Mot i vat i on
Perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the positive poten-
tial of human nature as much as intrinsic motivation, the
inherent tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to
extend and exercise one' s capacities, to explore, and to
learn. Developmentalists acknowledge that from the time
of birth, children, in their healthiest states, are active,
inquisitive, curious, and playful, even in the absence of
specific rewards (e.g., Harter, 1978). The construct of in-
trinsic motivation describes this natural inclination toward
assimilation, mastery, spontaneous interest, and explora-
tion that is so essential to cognitive and social devel opment
and that represents a principal source of enj oyment and
vitality throughout life (Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde,
1993; Ryan, 1995).
Yet, despite the fact that humans are liberally en-
dowed with intrinsic motivational tendencies, the evidence
is now clear that the maintenance and enhancement of this
inherent propensity requires supportive conditions, as it can
be fairly readily disrupted by various nonsupportive con-
ditions. Thus, our theory of intrinsic motivation does not
concern what causes intrinsic motivation (which we view
as an evol ved propensity; Ryan et al., 1997); rather, it
examines the conditions that elicit and sustain, versus sub-
due and diminish, this innate propensity.
Cognitive evaluation theory (CET) was presented by
Deci and Ryan (1985) as a subtheory within SDT that had
the aim of specifying factors that explain variability in
intrinsic motivation. CET is framed in terms of social and
environmental factors that facilitate versus undermine in-
trinsic motivation, using language that reflects the assump-
tion that intrinsic motivation, being inherent, will be cata-
lyzed when individuals are in conditions that conduce
toward its expression. In other words, it will flourish if
circumstances permit. Put in this way, the study of condi-
tions that facilitate versus undermine intrinsic motivation is
an important first step in understanding sources of both
alienation and liberation of the positive aspects of human
nature.
CET, which focuses on the fundamental needs f o r
competence and autonomy, was formulated to integrate
results from initial laboratory experiments on the effects of
rewards, feedback, and other external events on intrinsic
motivation, and was subsequently tested and extended by
field studies in various settings. The theory argues, first,
that soci al -cont ext ual events (e.g., feedback, communi ca-
tions, rewards) that conduce toward feelings of competence
during action can enhance intrinsic motivation for that
action. Accordingly, optimal challenges, effectance-pro-
rooting feedback, and freedom from demeani ng evaluations
were all found to facilitate intrinsic motivation. For exam-
ple, early studies showed that positive performance feed-
back enhanced intrinsic motivation, whereas negative per-
formance feedback diminished it (Deci, 1975), and r e -
s e a r c h by Vallerand and Reid (1984) showed that these
effects were mediated by perceived competence.
CET further specifies, and studies have shown (Fisher,
1978; Ryan, 1982), that feelings of compet ence will not
enhance intrinsic motivation unless accompani ed by a
sense of aut onomy or, in attributional terms, by an internal
perceived locus of causality (deCharms, 1968). Thus, ac-
cording to CET, people must not only experience compe-
tence or efficacy, they must also experience their behavi or
as self-determined for intrinsic motivation to be in evi-
dence. This requires either immediate contextual sup-
ports for aut onomy and compet ence or abiding inner r e -
s o ur c e s (Reeve, 1996) that are typically the result of p r i o r
developmental supports for perceived aut onomy and
competence.
In fact, most of the research on the effects of environ-
mental events in intrinsic motivation has focused on the
issue of aut onomy versus control rather than that of com-
petence. Research on this issue has been considerably mo r e
controversial. It began with the repeated demonstration that
extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation. Deci
(1975) interpreted these results in terms of rewards facili-
tating a more external perceived locus of causality (i.e.,
diminished autonomy). Although the issue of reward ef-
fects has been hotly debated, a recent, comprehensive
meta-analysis (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) confirmed,
in spite of claims to the contrary by Eisenberger and
Cameron (1996), that all expected tangible rewards made
contingent on task performance do reliably undermine in-
trinsic motivation.
Also, research revealed that not only tangible rewards
but also threats, deadlines, directives, pressured evalua-
tions, and imposed goals diminish intrinsic motivation be-
cause, like tangible rewards, they conduce toward an ex-
ternal perceived locus of causality. In contrast, choice,
acknowl edgment of feelings, and opportunities for self-
direction were found to enhance intrinsic motivation be-
cause they allow peopl e a greater feeling of aut onomy
(Deci & Ryan, 1985). Field studies have further shown that
70 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
t eachers who are aut onomy support i ve (in cont rast to con-
trolling) cat al yze in their students great er intrinsic mot i va-
tion, curiosity, and desire f or chal l enge (e.g., Deci, Nezl ek,
& Shei nman, 1981; Flink, Boggi ano, & Barrett, 1990;
Ryan & Grol ni ck, 1986). St udent s t aught with a mor e
cont rol l i ng appr oach not onl y l ose initiative but learn less
effect i vel y, especi al l y when l earni ng requires concept ual ,
creat i ve pr ocessi ng (Amabi l e, 1996; Gr ol ni ck & Ryan,
1987; Ut man, 1997). Similarly, studies showed that auton-
omy- suppor t i ve parents, rel at i ve t o cont rol l i ng parents,
have children who are more intrinsically mot i vat ed
(Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997). Such findings general i zed
t o ot her domai ns such as sport and musi c in whi ch support s
for aut onomy and compet ence by parents and ment ors
incite mor e intrinsic mot i vat i on (e.g., Frederi ck & Ryan,
1995).
Al t hough aut onomy and compet ence support s are
hi ghl y salient f or pr oduci ng variability in intrinsic mot i va-
tion, a third factor, relatedness, also bears on its expressi on.
I n i nfancy, intrinsic mot i vat i on is readi l y observabl e as
expl or at or y behavi or and, as suggest ed by at t achment the-
orists (e.g., Bowl by, 1979), it is mor e evi dent when the
i nfant is securel y at t ached to a parent. Studies of mot hers
and infants have, indeed, shown that bot h securi t y and
mat ernal aut onomy support predi ct more expl or at or y be-
havi or in the infants (e.g., Frodi, Bridges, & Grol ni ck,
1985). SDT hypot hesi zes t hat a similar dynami c occurs in
i nt erpersonal settings over the life span, with intrinsic
mot i vat i on mor e likely to flourish in cont ext s charact eri zed
by a sense of securi t y and relatedness. For exampl e, Ander -
son, Manoogi an, and Rezni ck (1976) f ound that when
chi l dren wor ked on an interesting task in the presence of an
adult st ranger who i gnor ed t hem and failed to respond to
their initiations, a ver y l ow level of intrinsic mot i vat i on
resulted, and Ryan and Gr ol ni ck (1986) obser ved l ower
intrinsic mot i vat i on in students who experi enced their
t eachers as col d and uncaring. Of course, many intrinsically
mot i vat ed behavi or s are happi l y per f or med in isolation,
suggest i ng that proxi mal relational support s may not be
necessary for intrinsic mot i vat i on, but a secure relational
base does seem to be i mport ant for the expressi on of
intrinsic mot i vat i on to be in evi dence.
To summari ze, the CET f r amewor k suggest s that so-
cial envi r onment s can facilitate or forestall intrinsic mot i -
vat i on by support i ng versus t hwart i ng peopl e' s innate psy-
chol ogi cal needs. St rong links bet ween intrinsic mot i vat i on
and satisfaction of the needs f or aut onomy and compet ence
have been cl earl y demonst rat ed, and some wor k suggest s
that sat i sfact i on of the need f or relatedness, at least in a
distal sense, may also be i mport ant for intrinsic mot i vat i on.
It is critical to remember, however , that peopl e will be
intrinsically mot i vat ed onl y f or activities that hol d intrinsic
interest f or t hem, activities that have the appeal of novel t y,
chal l enge, or aesthetic value. For activities that do not hol d
such appeal, the principles of CET do not apply, because
the activities will not be experi enced as intrinsically mot i -
vat ed t o begi n with. To underst and the mot i vat i on for t hose
activities, we need to l ook mor e deepl y into the nature and
dynami cs of extrinsic mot i vat i on.
Self-Regulation of Extrinsic
Motivation
Al t hough intrinsic mot i vat i on is an i mport ant t ype of mo-
tivation, it is not the onl y t ype or even the onl y t ype of
sel f-det ermi ned mot i vat i on (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Indeed,
much of what peopl e do is not, strictly speaki ng, intrinsi-
cal l y mot i vat ed, especi al l y after early chi l dhood when the
fi' eedom to be intrinsically mot i vat ed is i ncreasi ngl y cur-
tailed by social pressures to do activities that are not
interesting and t o assume a vari et y of new responsibilities
( Ryan & La Guardi a, in press).
The real quest i on concer ni ng noni nt ri nsi cal l y mot i -
vated pract i ces is how individuals acqui re the mot i vat i on to
carry t hem out and how this mot i vat i on affects ongoi ng
persistence, behavi oral quality, and wel l -bei ng. Whenever
a person (be it a parent, teacher, boss, coach, or therapist)
attempts t o fost er certain behavi ors in others, the ot hers'
mot i vat i on for the behavi or can range f r om amot i vat i on or
unwi l l i ngness, to passi ve compl i ance, to act i ve personal
commi t ment . Accor di ng to SDT, these di fferent mot i va-
tions reflect di fferi ng degrees to whi ch the val ue and reg-
ulation of the request ed behavi or have been i nt ernal i zed
and integrated. Int ernal i zat i on refers to peopl e' s "t aki ng i n"
a value or regulation, and i nt egrat i on refers to the furt her
t ransformat i on of that regul at i on into their own so that,
subsequent l y, it will emanat e f r om their sense of self.
Int ernal i zat i on and integration are cl earl y central is-
sues in chi l dhood soci al i zat i on, but t hey are also cont i nu-
ally re]evant f or the regul at i on of behavi or across the life
span. In nearly ever y setting peopl e enter, certain behavi ors
and va]ues are prescribed, behavi ors that are not interesting
and values that are not spont aneousl y adopt ed. Accor d-
i ngl y, SDT has addressed the issues of (a) the processes
t hrough whi ch such noni nt ri nsi cal l y mot i vat ed behavi ors
can become truly sel f-det ermi ned, and (b) the ways in
whi ch the social envi r onment influences those processes.
The l erm extrinsic motivation refers to the perfor-
mance of an act i vi t y in order to attain some separabl e
out come and, thus, cont rast s wi t h intrinsic motivation,
whi ch refers to doi ng an activity f or the i nherent satisfac-
tion of the act i vi t y itself. Unl i ke some perspect i ves that
vi ew ext ri nsi cal l y mot i vat ed behavi or as i nvari ant l y non-
aut onomous, SDT pr oposes that extrinsic mot i vat i on can
vary great l y in its relative aut onomy ( Ryan & Connel l ,
1989; Vallerand, 1997). For exampl e, students who do their
homewor k because t hey personal l y grasp its value f or their
chosen career are ext ri nsi cal l y mot i vat ed, as are those who
do the work onl y because t hey are adheri ng to their par ent s'
control. Bot h exampl es i nvol ve instrumentalities rat her
than enj oyment of the wor k itself, yet the f or mer case of
extrinsic mot i vat i on entails personal endor sement and a
feel i ng of choi ce, whereas the latter i nvol ves compl i ance
with an external regulation. Bot h represent intentional be-
havi or (Heider, 1958), but t hey vary in their relative au-
t onomy. The former, of course, is the t ype of extrinsic
mot i vat i on that is sought by astute soci al i zi ng agents re-
gardl ess o1: the applied domai n.
Januar y 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st 71
F i g u r e 1
The Self-Determination Continuum Showing Types of Motivation With Their Regulatory Styles, Loci of Causality,
and Corresponding Processes
Behavi or Nonself-Determined Self-Determined
Motivation
StylesRegulat°ry ~ R e g u l ~
E~ic M o t ~
Perceived
Locus of
Causality
Impersonal External Somewhat Somewhat Intemal Internal
External Internal
Rel evant Nonintentional,
Regul at ory Nonvaluing,
Processes Incompetence,
Lack of Control
Compl i ance, Sel f-cont rol , Personal Congruence, Interest,
E x t e r n a l Ego- I nvol ve me nt , I mpor t ance, Awareness, Enjoyment,
Rewards and Internal Rewards Conscious Synt hesi s Inherent
Punishments and Punishments Valuing With Self Satisfaction
Wi t hi n SDT, Deci and Ryan (1985) i nt roduced a
second subt heory, cal l ed organi smi c integration t heory
(OIT), to detail the di fferent f or ms of extrinsic mot i vat i on
and the cont ext ual fact ors that either pr omot e or hi nder
i nt ernal i zat i on and i nt egrat i on of the regul at i on for these
behavi ors. Fi gure 1 illustrates the OI T t axonomy of moti-
vat i onal t ypes, arranged f r om left to fight in terms of the
degree to whi ch the mot i vat i ons emanat e f r om the sel f (i.e.,
are sel f-det ermi ned).
At the far left of the sel f-det ermi nat i on cont i nuum is
amot i vat i on, the state of l acki ng the i nt ent i on to act. When
amot i vat ed, peopl e either do not act at all or act wi t hout
i nt ent - - t hey j ust go t hrough the mot i ons. Amot i vat i on re-
sults f r om not val ui ng an act i vi t y (Ryan, 1995), not feel i ng
compet ent to do it (Bandura, 1986), or not expect i ng it to
yi el d a desi red out come (Sel i gman, 1975). To the right of
amot i vat i on in Fi gure 1 are five classifications of mot i vat ed
behavi or. Al t hough many theorists have treated mot i vat i on
as a uni t ary concept , each of the cat egori es identified
within OI T descri bes t heoret i cal l y, experientially, and
funct i onal l y distinct t ypes of mot i vat i on. At the far right of
the cont i nuum is the classic state of intrinsic mot i vat i on,
the doi ng of an act i vi t y for its inherent satisfactions. It is
hi ghl y aut onomous and represents the prot ot ypi c i nst ance
of sel f-det ermi nat i on. Ext ri nsi cal l y mot i vat ed behavi ors,
by contrast, cover the cont i nuum bet ween amot i vat i on and
intrinsic mot i vat i on, var yi ng in the extent to whi ch their
regul at i on is aut onomous.
The ext ri nsi cal l y mot i vat ed behavi ors that are least
aut onomous are referred to as externally regulated. Such
behavi ors are per f or med t o satisfy an external demand or
reward cont i ngency. Indi vi dual s t ypi cal l y experi ence ex-
ternally regul at ed behavi or as cont rol l ed or alienated, and
their act i ons have an external per cei ved l ocus of causal i t y
(deCharms, 1968). Ext ernal regul at i on is the t ype of mot i -
vat i on f ocused on by operant theorists (e.g., Skinner,
1953), and it is external regul at i on t hat was t ypi cal l y con-
trasted with intrinsic mot i vat i on in earl y l aborat ory and
field studies.
A second t ype of extrinsic mot i vat i on is l abel ed in-
trojected regulation. Int roj ect i on i nvol ves taking in a reg-
ulation but not fully accept i ng it as one' s own. It is a
rel at i vel y cont rol l ed f or m of regul at i on in whi ch behavi ors
are per f or med t o avoi d guilt or anxi et y or t o attain ego
enhancement s such as pride. Put differently, i nt roj ect i on
represents regul at i on by cont i ngent sel f-est eem (Deci &
Ryan, 1995). A classic f or m of i nt roj ect i on is ego i nvol ve-
ment (deCharms, 1968; Ni chol l s, 1984; Ryan, 1982), in
whi ch peopl e are mot i vat ed t o demonst r at e ability (or avoi d
failure) in order to mai nt ai n feel i ngs of worth. Al t hough
internally driven, i nt roj ect ed behavi ors still have an exter-
nal percei ved l ocus of causal i t y and are not real l y experi-
enced as part of the self. Thus, in some studies, external
regul at i on (being i nt erpersonal l y cont rol l ed) and in-
t roj ect ed regul at i on (being i nt rapersonal l y cont rol l ed) have
been combi ned to f or m a cont rol l ed mot i vat i on composi t e
(e.g., Wi l l i ams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci, 1996).
A mor e aut onomous, or sel f-det ermi ned, f or m of ex-
trinsic mot i vat i on is regulation through identification.
Ident i fi cat i on reflects a consci ous val ui ng of a behavi oral
goal or regulation, such t hat the act i on is accept ed or
owned as personal l y important. Fi nal l y, the most aut ono-
72 January 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
mous form of extrinsic motivation is integrated regulation.
Integration occurs when identified regulations are fully
assimilated to the self, which means they have been eval-
uated and brought into congruence with one' s other values
and needs. Actions characterized by integrated motivation
share many qualities with intrinsic motivation, although
they are still considered extrinsic because they are done to
attain separable outcomes rather than for their inherent
enjoyment. In some studies, identified, integrated, and in-
trinsic forms of regulation have been combined to form an
autonomous motivation composite.
As people internalize regulations and assimilate them
to the self, they experience greater autonomy in action.
This process may occur in stages, over time, but we are not
suggesting that it is a developmental continuum in the
sense that people must progress through each stage of
internalization with respect to a particular regulation.
Rather, they can relatively readily internalize a new behav-
ioral regulation at any point along this continuum depend-
ing on both prior experiences and current situational factors
(Ryan, 1995). Nonetheless, the range of behaviors that can
be assimilated to the self increases over time with increased
cognitive capacities and ego development (Loevinger &
Blasi, 1991), and there is evidence that children's general
regulatory style does tend to become more internalized or
self-regulated over time (e.g., Chandler & Connell, 1987).
Ryan and Connell (1989) tested the formulation that
these different types of motivation, with their distinct prop-
erties, lie along a continuum of relative autonomy. They
investigated achievement behaviors among school children
and found that external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic
regulatory styles were intercorrelated according to a quasi-
simplex pattern, thus providing evidence for an underlying
continuum. Furthermore, differences in the type of extrin-
sic motivation were associated with different experiences
and outcomes. For example, the more students were exter-
nally regulated the less they showed interest, value, and
effort toward achievement and the more they tended to
disown responsibility for negative outcomes, blaming oth-
ers such as the teacher. Introjected regulation was posi-
tively related to expending more effort, but it was also
related to feeling more anxiety and coping more poorly
with failures. In contrast, identified regulation was associ-
ated with more interest and enjoyment of school and with
more positive coping styles, as well as with expending
more effort.
Other studies in education extended these findings,
showing that more autonomous extrinsic motivation was
associated with more engagement (Connell & Wellborn,
1991), better performance (Miserandino, 1996), lower
dropout (Vallerand & Bissonnette, 1992), higher quality
learning (Grolnick & Ryan, 1987), and better teacher rat-
ings (Hayamizu, 1997), among other outcomes.
In the realm of health care, greater internalization has
been associated with greater adherence to medications
among people with chronic illnesses (Williams, Rodin,
Ryan, Grolnick, & Deci, 1998), better long-term mainte-
nance of weight loss among morbidly obese patients (Wil-
liams et al., 1996), improved glucose control among dia-
betics (Williams, Freedman, & Deci, 1998), and greater
attendance and involvement in an addiction-treatment pro-
gram (Ryan, Plant, & O' Malley, 1995).
Demonstrations of positive outcomes being associated
with more internalized motivation have also emerged in
other diverse domains, including religion (Ryan, Rigby, &
King, 1993), physical exercise (Chatzisarantis, Biddle, &
Meek, 1997), political activity (Koestner, Losier, Valler-
and, & Carducci, 1996), environmental activism (Green-
Demers, Pelletier, & Menard, 1997), and intimate relation-
ships (Blais, Sabourin, Boucher, & Vallerand, 1990),
among others.
The advantages of greater internalization appear, then,
to be manifold (Ryan et al., 1997), including more behav-
ioral effectiveness, greater volitional persistence, enhanced
subjective well-being, and better assimilation of the indi-
vidual within his or her social group.
F acilitating Integrati on o f Extrinsic
Moti vati on
Given the significance of internalization for personal expe-
rience and behavioral outcomes, the critical issue becomes
how to promote autonomous regulation for extrinsically
motiwtted behaviors. That is, what are the social conditions
that nurture versus inhibit internalization and integration?
Because extrinsically motivated behaviors are not typ-
ically interesting, the primary reason people initially per-
form such actions is because the behaviors are prompted,
modeled, or valued by significant others to whom they feel
(or want to feel) attached or related. This suggests that
relatedness, the need to feel belongingess and connected-
ness with others, is centrally important for internalization.
Thus, OIT proposes that internalization is more likely to be
in evidence when there are ambient supports for feelings of
relatedness. For example, Ryan, Stiller, and Lynch (1994)
showed that the children who had more fully internalized
the regulation for positive school-related behaviors were
those who felt securely connected to, and cared for by, their
parents and teachers.
The relative internalization of extrinsically motivated
activities is also a function of perceived competence. Peo-
ple are more likely to adopt activities that relevant social
groups value when they feel efficacious with respect to
those activities. As is the case with all intentional action,
OIT suggests that supports for competence should facilitate
intermdization (Vallerand, 1997). Thus, for example, chil-
dren who are directed to perform behaviors before they are
developmentally ready to master them or understand their
rationale would be predicted, at best, only to partially
intern~tlize the regulations, remaining either externally reg-
ulated or introjected.
Finally, the experience of autonomy facilitates inter-
nalization and, in particular, is a critical element for a
regulation to be integrated. Contexts can yield external
regulation if there are salient rewards or threats and the
person feels competent enough to comply; contexts can
yield introjected regulation if a relevant reference group
endorses the activity and the person feels competent and
related; but contexts can yield autonomous regulation only
January 2000 • American Psychologist 73
if they are autonomy supportive, thus allowing the person
to feel competent, related, and autonomous. To integrate a
regulation, people must grasp its meaning and synthesize
that meaning with respect to their other goals and values.
Such deep, holistic processing (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998) is
facilitated by a sense of choice, volition, and freedom from
excessive external pressure toward behaving or thinking a
certain way. In this sense, support lor autonomy allows
individuals to actively transform values into their own.
Again, research results have supported this reasoning.
For example, Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, and Leone (1994)
demonstrated in a laboratory experiment that providing a
meaningful rationale for an uninteresting behavior, along
with supports for autonomy and relatedness, promoted
its internalization and integration. Controlling contexts
yielded less overall internalization, and the internalization
that did occur in those contexts tended to be only in-
trojected. Using parent interviews, Grolnick and Ryan
(1989) found greater internalization of school-related val-
ues among children whose parents were more supportive of
autonomy and relatedness. Strahan (1995) found that
parents who were more autonomy-supportive promoted
greater religious identification, as opposed to introjection,
in their offspring. Williams and Deci (1996), using a lon-
gitudinal design, demonstrated greater internalization of
biopsychosocial values and practices among medical stu-
dents whose instructors were more autonomy-supportive.
These are but a few of the many findings suggesting that
supports for relatedness and competence facilitate internal-
ization and that supports for autonomy also facilitate inte-
gration of behavioral regulations. When that occurs, people
feel not only competent and related but also autonomous as
they carry out culturally valued activities.
One further point needs to be made regarding the
controversial issue of human autonomy. The concept of
autonomy has often been portrayed as being antagonistic to
relatedness or community, in fact, some theories equate
autonomy with concepts such as individualism and inde-
pendence (e.g., Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986), which do
indeed imply low relatedness. But, within SDT, autonomy
refers not to being independent, detached, or selfish but
rather to the feeling of volition that can accompany any act,
whether dependent or independent, collectivist or individ-
ualist, in fact, recent research in Korean and U.S. samples
has found a more positive relation between autonomy and
collectivistic attitudes than between autonomy and individ-
ualistic attitudes (Kim, Butzel, & Ryan, 1998). Further-
more, research has shown positive, rather than negative,
links between relatedness to parents and autonomy in teen-
agers (Ryan & Lynch, 1989; Ryan et al., 1994). Clearly,
then, we do not equate autonomy with independence or
individualism.
A l i enati o n an d Its P r eventi o n
SDT aims to specify factors that nurture the innate human
potentials entailed in growth, integration, and well-being,
and to explore the processes and conditions that foster the
healthy development and effective functioning of individ-
uals, groups, and communities. But a positive approach
cannot ignore patholog2( or close its eyes to the alienation
and inauthenticity that are prevalent in our society and in
others. Accordingly, we investigate nonoptimal (as well as
optimal) developmental trajectories, much as is done in the
field of developmental psychopathology (e.g., Cicchetti,
1991). We now turn to a brief consideration of that issue.
By definition, intrinsically motivated behaviors, the
prototype of self-determined actions, stem from the self.
They are unalienated and authentic in the fullest sense of
those terms. But, as already noted, SDT recognizes that
extrinsically motivated actions can also become self-deter-
mined as individuals identify with and fully assimilate their
regulation. Thus, it is through internalization and integra-
tion that individuals can be extrinsically motivated and still
be committed and authentic. Accumulated research now
suggests that the commitment and authenticity reflected in
intrinsic motivation and integrated extrinsic motivation are
most likely to be evident when individuals experience
supports for competence, autonomy, and relatedness.
It is the flip side of this coin, however, that speaks
directly to the issues of alienation and inauthenticity and is
relevant to such questions as why employees show no
initiative, why teenagers reject their schools' values, and
why patients adhere so poorly to treatment. SDT under-
stands such occurrences in terms of the undermining of
intrinsic motivation and, perhaps even more typically, the
failure of internalization. To explain the causes of such
diminished functioning, SDT suggests turning first to indi-
viduals' immediate social contexts and then to their devel-
opmental environments to examine the degree to which
their needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness are
being or have been thwarted. We maintain that by failing to
provide supports for competence, autonomy, and related-
ness, not only of children but also of students, employees,
patients, and athletes, socializing agents and organizations
contribute to alienation and ill-being. The fact that psycho-
logical-need deprivation appears to be a principal source of
human distress suggests that assessments and interventions
would do well to target these primary foundations of men-
tal health.
Psychologic.a! Ne e ds a n d
Me n t a l Heal t h
As we have seen, both the cognitive evaluation and organ-
ismic integration components of SDT have led us to posit
a parsimonious list of three basic psychological needs as a
means of organizing and interpreting a wide array of em-
pirical results, results that seemed not to be readily and
satisfactorily interpretable without the concept of needs.
Much of our more recent work has used the concept of
three basic psychological needs to address new phenomena
and, more particularly, to evaluate the postulate that these
three needs are innate, essential, and universal.
By our definition, a basic need, whether it be a phys-
iological need (Hull, 1943) or a psychological need, is an
energizing state that, if satisfied, conduces toward health
and well-being but, if not satisfied, contributes to pathology
and ill-being. We have thus proposed that the basic needs
for competence, autonomy, and relatedness must be satis-
74 January 2000 • American Psychologist
fled across the life span for an individual to experience an
ongoing sense of integrity and well-being or "eudaimonia"
(Ryan & Frederick, 1997; Wat erman, 1993). Accordingly,
much of our research now focuses on the link between
satisfaction of the basic psychological needs and the expe-
rience of well-being.
Specifying psychological needs as essential nutri-
ments implies that individuals cannot thrive without satis-
fying all of them, any more than people can thrive with
water but not food. Thus, for example, a social environ-
ment that affords compet ence but fails to nurture related-
ness is expected to result in some i mpoveri shment of well-
being. Worse yet, social contexts that engender conflicts
between basic needs set up the conditions for alienation and
psychopat hol ogy (Ryan et al., 1995), as when a child is
required by parents to give up aut onomy in order to feel
loved.
To suggest that the three needs are universal and
devel opment al l y persistent does not imply that their rela-
tive salience and their avenues for satisfaction are unchang-
ing across the life span or that their modes of expression are
the same in all cultures. The very fact that need satisfaction
is facilitated by the internalization and integration of cul-
turally endorsed values and behaviors suggests that indi-
viduals are likely to express their competence, autonomy,
and relatedness differently within cultures that hold differ-
ent values. Indeed, the mode and degree of peopl e' s psy-
chological-need satisfaction is theorized to be influenced
not only by their own competencies but, even more impor-
tant, by the ambient demands, obstacles, and affordances in
their sociocultural contexts. Thus, to posit universal psy-
chological needs does not diminish the importance of vari-
ability in goals and orientations at different developmental
epochs or in different cultures, but it does suggest similar-
ities in underlying processes that lead to the devel opment
and expression of those differences.
Our recent investigations of the importance of basic
psychological needs have addressed three questions: Are
the pursuit and attainment of all culturally congruent aspi-
rations and life values associated with well-being? Do
need-related processes operate similarly within different
cultural circumstances? Is within-person variability in basic
need satisfaction related to variability in well-being indi-
cators? We briefly consider some of this work.
First, we discuss the relation of personal goals to
well-being. We have hypothesized that the pursuit and
attainment of some life goals will provide relatively direct
satisfaction of the basic needs, thus enhancing well-being
(Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996), whereas the pur-
suit and attainment of other goals does not contribute to and
may even detract from basic need satisfactions, leading to
ill-being. In accord with this reasoning, T. Kasser and Ryan
(1993, 1996) exami ned individual differences in the em-
phasis people place on intrinsic aspirations (goals such as
affiliation, personal growth, and communi t y that directly
satisfy basic needs) compared with extrinsic aspirations
(goals such as wealth, fame, and i mage that at best indi-
rectly satisfy the needs). They found, first, that placing
strong relative importance on intrinsic aspirations was pos-
itively associated with well-being indicators such as self-
esteem, self-actualization, and the inverse of depression
and anxiety, whereas placing strong relative importance on
extrinsic aspirations was negatively related to these
well-being indicators. Ryan, Chirkov, Little, Sheldon,
Timoshina, and Deci (1999) replicated these findings in a
Russian sample, attesting to the potential generalizability
of the findings across cultures.
These findings go beyond goal importance per se.
Both Ryan, Chirkov, et al. and T. Kasser and Ryan (in
press) have found that whereas self-reported attainment of
intrinsic aspirations was positively associated with well-
being, attainment of extrinsic aspirations was not. Further,
Sheldon and Kasser (1998) found in a longitudinal study
that well-being was enhanced by attainment of intrinsic
goals, 'whereas success at extrinsic goals provided little
benefit. Together, these results suggest that even highly
efficacious people may experience less than optimal well-
being if they pursue and successfully attain goals that do
not fulfill basic psychological needs. We hasten to add,
however, that the meaning of specific goals is culturally
influenced, so that how specific goals relate to well-being
can vary across cultures, although the relation between
underlying need satisfaction and well-being is theorized to
be invariant.
Clearly, there are many factors that lead people to
emphasize certain life goals that may not be need fulfilling.
For example, exposure to the commerci al medi a can
prompt a locus on materialism (Richins, 1987), which
provides only fleeting satisfactions and could actually de-
tract from basic need fulfillment and, thus, well-being.
Prior deficits in need fulfillment (e.g., from poor caregiv-
ing) might also lead individuals to yearn for more extrinsic
goals as a substitute or compensat ory mechanism. In fact,
T. Kasser, Ryan, Zax, and Sameroff (1995) found that teens
who had been exposed to cold, controlling maternal care
(as assessed with ratings by the teens, mothers, and observ-
ers) were more likely to develop materialistic orientations,
compared with better nurtured teens who more strongly
valued the intrinsic goals of personal growth, relationships,
and community. In short, cultural and developmental in-
fluences produce variations in the importance of goals, the
pursuit of which, in turn, yields different satisfaction of
basic needs and different levels of well-being.
In other research, we have examined the relations of
peopl e' s reports of need satisfaction to indicators of well-
being in various settings. For example, V. Kasser and Ryan
(in press) found that supports for aut onomy and relatedness
predicted greater well-being among nursing home resi-
dents. Baard, Deci, and Ryan (1998) showed that empl oy-
ees' experiences of satisfaction of the needs for autonomy,
competence, and relatedness in the workplace predicted
their performance and well-being at work. Such research
shows that within specific domains, especially those central
to the lives of individuals, need satisfaction is correlated
with i mproved well-being.
A more compelling way of demonstrating the essential
relations between need fulfillments and mental health has
been the examination of role-to-role and day-t o-day fluc-
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 75
t uat i ons in bas i c need sat i sf act i on and t hei r di r ect ef f ect s on
var i abi l i t y in wel l - bei ng, whi l e cont r ol l i ng f or i ndi vi dual
di f f er ences and var i ous conf oundi ng var i abl es. For exam-
pl e, Shel don et al. (1997) demons t r at ed t hat sat i sf act i on in
each of sever al l i fe r ol es (e. g. , st udent , empl oyee, fri end),
r el at i ve to t he i ndi vi dua l ' s own mean sat i sf act i on, was
at t r i but abl e t o t he degr ee to whi ch t hat r ol e suppor t s au-
t hent i ci t y and aut onomous f unct i oni ng. Si mi l ar l y, i n a
st udy t hat e xa mi ne d dai l y var i at i ons i n wel l - bei ng, Shel -
don, Rei s, and Ryan (1996) used hi er ar chi cal l i near mod-
el i ng t o show t hat wi t hi n- per s on dai l y f l uct uat i ons i n t he
sat i sf act i on of a ut onomy and c ompe t e nc e needs pr edi ct ed
wi t hi n- per s on f l uct uat i ons in out comes such as mood, vi -
t al i t y, phys i cal s ympt oms , and sel f - est eem. In a mor e re-
cent st udy, Rei s, Shel don, Gabl e, Ros coe, and Ryan (in
pr ess) f ound t hat var i at i ons in t he f ul f i l l ment of each of t he
t hr ee needs (i. e. , compet ence, aut onomy, and r el at ednes s )
i ndependent l y pr edi ct ed var i abi l i t y in dai l y wel l - bei ng.
These st udi es suppor t t he vi ew t hat basi c ps ychol ogi cal
needs are det er mi nat i ve wi t h r egar d t o opt i mal exper i ence
and we l l - be i ng i n dai l y l i fe.
Conclusions
Debat es concer ni ng t he act i vi t y or pas s i vi t y, r es pons i bi l i t y
or i ndol ence, of human bei ngs have been per enni al ( Kohn,
1990). As ps yc hol ogy has be c ome mor e advanced, bot h in
t er ms of our under s t andi ng of evol ut i on and ne ur obi ol ogy
and of soci al behavi or and its causat i on, ampl e suppor t f or
bot h per s pect i ves coul d be gar ner ed. SDT addr esses t hi s
i ssue by at t empt i ng to account f or bot h t he act i vi t y and t he
passi vi t y, t he r es pons i bi l i t y and t he i ndol ence. To do t hi s,
we have as s umed t hat humans have an i ncl i nat i on t owar d
act i vi t y and i nt egr at i on, but al so have a vul ner abi l i t y to
passi vi t y. Our f ocus, accor di ngl y, has been t o s peci f y t he
condi t i ons t hat t end to suppor t pe opl e ' s nat ur al act i vi t y
ver sus el i ci t or expl oi t t hei r vul ner abi l i t y.
Our ear l y i nves t i gat i ons f ocus ed on t he soci al condi -
t i ons t hat enhance ver sus di mi ni s h a ver y pos i t i ve f eat ur e
of human nat ure, namel y, t he nat ur al act i vi t y and cur i osi t y
r ef er r ed t o as i nt r i nsi c mot i vat i on. We f ound t hat condi -
t i ons s uppor t i ve of a ut onomy and c ompe t e nc e r el i abl y fa-
ci l i t at ed t hi s vi t al expr es s i on of t he human gr owt h t en-
dency, wher eas condi t i ons t hat cont r ol l ed be ha vi or and
hi nder ed per cei ved ef f ect ance under mi ned its expr essi on.
Subs equent l y, we i nves t i gat ed t he acqui s i t i on and r egul a-
t i on of noni nt r i ns i cal l y mot i vat ed behavi or s and, her e t oo,
we f ound evi dence of t he dr amat i c powe r of soci al cont ext s
t o enhance or hi nder t he or gani s mi c t endency t o i nt egr at e
ambi ent soci al val ues and r esponsi bi l i t i es. Cont ext s sup-
por t i ve of aut onomy, compet ence, and r el at ednes s wer e
f ound to f ost er gr eat er i nt er nal i zat i on and i nt egr at i on t han
cont ext s t hat t hwar t sat i sf act i on of t hese needs. Thi s l at t er
fi ndi ng, we ar gue, i s of gr eat si gni f i cance f or i ndi vi dual s
who wi sh to mot i vat e ot her s i n a way t hat engender s
commi t ment , ef f or t , and hi gh- qual i t y per f or mance.
Yet , our pr i mar y concer n t hr oughout t hi s pr ogr a m of
r es ear ch has been t he wel l - bei ng of i ndi vi dual s, whet her
t hey are st udent s in cl as s r ooms , pat i ent s in cl i ni cs, at hl et es
on t he pl ayi ng fi el d, or e mpl oye e s in t he wor kpl ace. As
f or mul at ed by SDT, i f t he soci al cont ext s in whi ch such
i ndi vi dual s are e mbe dde d are r es pons i ve to basi c ps ycho-
l ogi cal needs, t hey pr ovi de t he appr opr i at e devel opment al
l at t i ce upon whi ch an act i ve, as s i mi l at i ve, and i nt egr at ed
nat ur e can ascend. Exces s i ve cont r ol , nonopt i mal chal -
l enges, and l ack of connect ednes s , on t he ot her hand,
di sr upt t he i nher ent act ual i zi ng and or gani zat i onal t enden-
ci es e ndowe d by nat ure, and t hus such f act or s r esul t not
onl y in t he l ack of i ni t i at i ve and r es pons i bi l i t y but al so in
di st r ess and ps ychopat hol ogy.
Knowl e dge concer ni ng t he nut r i ment s essent i al f or
posi t i ve mot i vat i on and exper i ence and, in t urn, f or en-
hanced per f or mance and wel l - bei ng has br oad si gni f i cance.
It is r el evant to par ent s and educat or s concer ned wi t h
cogni t i ve and per s onal i t y de ve l opme nt becaus e i t speaks to
t he condi t i ons t hat pr omot e t he as s i mi l at i on of bot h i nf or -
mat i on and behavi or al r egul at i ons. It is al so r el evant to
manager s who want to f aci l i t at e mot i vat i on and commi t -
ment on t he j ob, and it is r el evant to ps ychot her api s t s and
heal t h pr of es s i onal s becaus e mot i vat i on is per haps t he cri t -
i cal var i abl e in pr oduci ng mai nt ai ned change. Thus, by
at t endi ng to the r el at i ve pr es ence or depr i vat i on of suppor t s
for basi c ps ychol ogi cal needs, pr act i t i oner s are bet t er abl e
to di agnos e sour ces of al i enat i on ver sus engagement ,
and f aci l i t at e bot h enhanced human achi evement s and
wel l - bei ng.
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78 January 2000 • American Psychologist
Self-Determination
The Tyranny of Freedom
Bar r y Schwar t z
Swarthmore College
Ameri cans now live in a time and a place in which f reedom
and autonomy are valued above all else and in which
expanded opportunities f or self-determination are re-
garded as a sign of the psychological well-being of indi-
viduals and the moral well-being of the culture. This article
argues that freedom, autonomy, and self-determination can
become excessive, and that when that happens, f reedom
can be experienced as a kind of tyranny. The article f urt her
argues that unduly influenced by the ideology of economics
and rational-choice theory, modern American society has
created an excess of freedom, with resulting increases in
peopl e' s dissatisfaction with their lives and in clinical
depression. One significant task f or a f ut ure psychology of
optimal functioning is to deemphasize individual f reedom
and to determine which cultural constraints are necessary
f or people to live meaningful and satisfying lives.
Secur i t y is mor e i mpor t ant t han weal t h.
- - J a c o b von Uexkul l ( 1938/ 1954, p. 26)
L
et me t el l you about an exper i ence I had al mos t 20
year s ago. It happened at a sof t bal l game, and to
under s t and it, you need to know a l i t t l e bi t about
sof t bal l . I ma gi ne a si t uat i on in whi ch t her e is a r unner at
fi rst base and one out. A gr ound bal l is hi t to t he pi t cher .
The pi t cher fi el ds t he gr ound bal l and wheel s ar ound to
s econd base. The i dea is to t ry f or a doubl e pl a y by
t hr owi ng to s econd ahead of t he r unner ar r i vi ng f r om first,
and t hen havi ng t he t hr ow r e l a ye d f r om s econd t o first, i n
t i me to beat t he bat t er. Typi cal l y, when a bal l is hi t up t he
mi ddl e of t he di amond, t he s econd bas eman and t he short -
st op conver ge at s econd base. Whe n t he pi t cher fi el ds t he
bal l and t urns to t hr ow, t he pr oper pl ay is t o t hr ow t he bal l
to t he shor t st op. The shor t st op is movi ng t owar d first base,
whi l e t he s econd bas eman is movi ng away f r om it. So t he
s hor t s t op' s mome nt um wi l l car r y hi m in t he di r ect i on t hat
t he bal l mus t be t hr own, wher eas t he s econd ba s e ma n wi l l
have t o st op, pi vot , and t hen t hr ow. The t hr ow f r om s econd
t o first is much easi er f or t he shor t st op t han for t he s econd
bas eman.
Now her e is what happened. I had j us t begun a sab-
bat i cal , and I was pl a yi ng i n a r el axed coed sof t bal l game.
Al t hough wi nni ng at al l cost s was not t he i dea in t hi s game,
t her e was one t hi ng about it t hat was not abl y mor e ser i ous
t han anyt hi ng el se. The wome n in t he game di d not want to
be pat r oni zed; t hey want ed to be t r eat ed by t he men as
f ul l - f l edged compet i t or s. So I was pi t chi ng, and t her e was
one out and a r unner on first. A gr ound bal l was hi t to me.
I f i el ded it cl eanl y and spun ar ound to begi n t he t ry for a
doubl e pl ay. Bot h t he shor t st op, a man, and t he s econd
bas eman, a woman, wer e conver gi ng on s econd base to
receive: my t hrow. I wound up to t hr ow and t hen s t opped in
my t racks. Who shoul d I t hr ow t o? I knew, as I j us t
i ndi cat ed, t hat t he "r i ght " pl ay was to t hr ow to t he shor t -
st op, but I hesi t at ed. Woul d t he woma n under s t and t hat I
was t hr owi ng to t he shor t st op ( who ha ppe ne d to be a man)
becaus e it was t he r i ght pl ay? Or woul d she t hi nk t hat I was
excl udi ng her and t hr owi ng to t he man ( who ha ppe ne d to
be t he shor t st op) becaus e I t hought he was mor e l i kel y to
cat ch i t and t hr ow accur at el y on to first t han she was?
Woul d she t hi nk t hat I r egar ded her as an obs t acl e to be
avoi ded r at her t han as a t eammat e? Woul d she t hi nk I was
an enemy of one of t he maj or soci al movement s of our
t i me?
These quest i ons f l ooded over me in what c oul dn' t
have been mor e t han hal f a second, and I st i l l ha ve n' t
ans wer ed t hem. Wh y had I been so i ndeci s i ve? Wha t was
t he r i ght pl a y? Yes, I knew t hat t he r i ght pl ay was to t hr ow
to t he ,.~hortstop, but I came to r eal i ze t hat t he r i ght ness of
t hat choi ce de pe nde d on what I t hought t he game was t hat
we wer e pl ayi ng. I f we wer e mer el y pl a yi ng sof t bal l , t hen
t he shor t st op shoul d have got t en t he t hr ow, but we wer e
pl ayi ng mor e t han sof t bal l . We wer e al so par t i ci pat i ng in a
soci al movement , one t hat was st r uggl i ng t o el i mi nat e
cer t ai n wel l - es t abl i s hed gender r ol es, and we wer e i n-
vol ved in a compl ex soci al i nt er act i on, in whi ch t he f eel -
i ngs and obj ect i ves of al l par t i ci pant s wer e to be t aken
ser i ousl y. Wh a t ' s t he r i ght pl ay in t hat ki nd of a ga me ?
When I fi nal l y t hr ew t he bal l , I f ound an i ngeni ous
t hough uni nt ended way out of my i ndeci si on. My a goni z e d
del ay had f or ced me to r ush my t hr ow, so I " s ol ve d" my
pr obl e m in deci di ng whet her t he s econd ba s e ma n or t he
shor t st op shoul d get t he bal l by t hr owi ng i t to neither of
t hem. I t hr ew it t hr ee f eet over bot h of t hei r heads i nt o
cent er f i el d. No doubl e pl ay. No si ngl e pl ay. An d t hat ' s no
Barry Schwartz, Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College.
Preparation of this article was supported by a faculty research grant
from Swarthmore College. I thank Jane Gillham and Andrew Ward for
many helpful discussions of the issues raised in this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Barry
Schwartz, Swarthmore College, 500 College Avenue, Swarthmore, PA
19081. Electronic mail may be sent to bschwarl @swarthmore.edu.
Januar y 2000 ° Ame r i c a n Ps ychol ogi s t
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003- 066X/ 00/ $5. 00
Vol. 55, No. 1, 7 9 - 8 8 DOI: 10. 1037/ / 0003-066X. 55. 1. 79
79
Barry
Schwartz
Photo by John Brodsky
way to pl ay at all. I was conf used about what to do, and I
screwed up.
Thi s experi ence of mi ne on the softball field was
trivial, but I t hi nk it is an exampl e of pr obl ems faced by
many of us that are not so trivial. Repeat edl y, peopl e are
f or ced t o ask t hemsel ves what ki nd of game t hey are
pl ayi ng, and what the fight pl ay is in t hat ki nd of game. A
lot mor e rides on the answers to t he versi ons of these
quest i ons peopl e face in real life than j ust the compl et i on of
a doubl e play.
What ki nd of game is bei ng a student? Are the obj ec-
tives of the student game to get the best grades possi bl e? I f
so, a good student will find the easy courses, bor r ow (or
buy or steal) ot her st udent s' assi gnment s, and ingratiate
hi msel f or hersel f in ever y way possi bl e wi t h the rel evant
teachers. Ar e t he obj ect i ves of the student game to prepare
for a career that will be financially rewardi ng? Are t hey to
prepare for a career that will be intellectually rewardi ng?
Ar e t hey t o prepare for a career that will serve the publ i c?
I n any of these cases, a good student will map out a
pr ogr am t hat pr ovi des appropri at e training and t hen wor k
hard to devel op t he skills necessary for success in t hat
career. Possi bl y, the obj ect i ves of the student game have
not hi ng to do wi t h careers but instead i nvol ve becomi ng a
knowl edgeabl e, sensitive, compassi onat e, commi t t ed, eth-
ical person who will be an i nf or med and responsi bl e citi-
zen. The good student at this game will l ook very di fferent
f r om the good st udent at the ot her games.
What ki nd of game is bei ng a busi nessperson? Ar e
there any limits t o what a busi nessperson shoul d do in the
servi ce of corporat e interests? I f so, who sets the limits, and
what are t hey? Shoul d busi nesspeopl e be concer ned about
ethics and fai rness? Shoul d t hey seek to provi de a good or
service that t he wor l d genui nel y needs? Shoul d t hey be
honest with their cust omers and cl i ent s? Or shoul d t hey
make what ever peopl e will buy, tell peopl e what ever t hey
think peopl e will believe, and break any l aw i f t hey think
t hey can get away wi t h it?
What ki nd of game is bei ng a spouse or a l over? To
what extent are l overs supposed to submer ge their own
interests or desires to serve the interests or desires of their
partners' ? At what poi nt does devot i on turn into subj uga-
t i on? At what poi nt does sel f-act ual i zat i on turn into
selfishness?
Most of us pl ay in several of these games simulta-
neousl y and find oursel ves t ryi ng to answer quest i ons like
these about each of t hem, because the wor l d in whi ch we
"moder n, enl i ght ened, rat i onal " peopl e live is one in whi ch
the obj ect i ves and the rules of each of our games are very
much up f or grabs. Moder ni t y has t aught us not to accept a
certain way of doi ng t hi ngs j ust because things have al ways
been done in t hat way. Nowadays, it is possi bl e, maybe
even necessary, f or individuals to make up the rules of
games as t hey go along.
Thi s moder n flexibility in the const rual and const ruc-
t i on of the obj ect i ves and the rules of the "games " we pl ay
enhances our sense of self-determination, and it is self-
det ermi nat i on t hat this article is about. The pr esumpt i on in
moder n soci et y is that sel f-det ermi nat i on is a good thing,
bot h psychol ogi cal l y and moral l y. Freedom and autonomy
are wor ds that come to mi nd as r ough synonyms. Bef or e
pursui ng this presumpt i on, it is wort h t hi nki ng a little about
what sel f-det ermi nat i on means. Does it mean det ermi na-
tion by the self, or det ermi nat i on of the self, or bot h?
Det ermi nat i on by the self, whi ch I suspect is what most
peopl e mean by sel f-det ermi nat i on, leads to the furt her
quest i on, det ermi nat i on of what ? The answer to this ques-
t i on is pret t y much det ermi nat i on of everyt hi ng. Fr om
trivial things like choi ces of ice cr eam flavors, t el evi si on
shows, cl ot hi ng styles, and obj ect i ves in softball games to
cruci al things like choi ces of careers, places to live, friends,
and lovers, there is si mpl y no such thing as t oo much
freedom. What about det ermi nat i on o f the self? What does
this mean? I think it means t hat peopl e are free t o det ermi ne
what ki nd of sel f t hey will have, what ki nd of peopl e t hey
will be. Peopl e are free to be selfish or selfless, nast y or
nice, serious or fri vol ous, and t hey are free to change the
selves t hey have as t hey see fit. Selves are like shirts. One
can di scard ol d ones and i nvent new ones. At least one
shoul d be able to, in keepi ng wi t h the goal of maxi mal
sel f-det ermi nat i on as a desirable psychol ogi cal and mor al
state. Thus, the fully sel f-det ermi ned self is one that is
compl et el y unc ons t r a i ne d- - by habit, by social convent i on,
or by bi ol ogy. Operat i ng wi t hout constraint, t he self-deter-
mi ni ng sel f makes choi ces in the wor l d to maxi mi ze his or
her preferences, in keepi ng wi t h the principles of rational
choi ce (von Neumann & Morgenst ern, 1944).
It is the central ar gument of this article that this
aspiration to sel f-det ermi nat i on, pr esumabl y t hr ough pro-
cesses resembl i ng t hose of rat i onal choi ce, is a mi st ake,
bot h as an empi ri cal descri pt i on of how peopl e act and as
a normat i ve ideal. It is a mi st ake because when self-
det ermi nat i on is carri ed to ext remes, it leads not to freedom
80 Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
of choi ce but to t yranny of choi ce. A bet t er (empi ri cal l y
mor e accurat e and psychol ogi cal l y healthier) model of
sel f-det ermi nat i on is, I think, akin to our underst andi ng of
human linguistic abilities. The capaci t y t o use l anguage is
perhaps the single most liberating charact eri st i c of human
beings. It frees peopl e in significant ways f r om the t empo-
ral and material limitations t hat afflict ot her organi sms.
Peopl e can say anyt hi ng about anyt hi ng, at any time, or in
any p l a c e - - e v e n things, times, and places that have never
e xi s t e d- - a nd t hey can be underst ood. Therefore, l anguage
is pr obabl y as vi vi d an embodi ment of human f r eedom and
sel f-det ermi nat i on as anyt hi ng. But what decades of re-
search on l anguage ability have made cl ear is that the thing
that makes the liberating feat ures of l anguage possi bl e is
that l anguage is heavi l y const rai ned by rules. The reason
peopl e can say anyt hi ng and be under st ood is that t hey
can' t say everyt hi ng. It is linguistic constraint, in the f or m
of these rules, that makes linguistic f r eedom possible. What
I suggest in this article is that exact l y the same thing may
be true in connect i on wi t h sel f-det ermi nat i on. Uncon-
strained f r eedom leads to paral ysi s and becomes a ki nd of
sel f-defeat i ng t yranny. It is sel f-det ermi nat i on within sig-
nificant cons t r ai nt s - - wi t hi n rules of some s or t - - t hat leads
to wel l -bei ng, to opt i mal funct i oni ng. The t ask f or a future
ps ychol ogy of opt i mal f unct i oni ng is t o i dent i fy whi ch
const rai nt s on sel f-det ermi nat i on are the cruci al ones.
To make this argument , I begi n by consi deri ng a few
aspects of rat i onal -choi ce t heory in some detail. There are
pr obl ems wi t h rat i onal -choi ce t heory as an empi ri cal de-
scri pt i on of how peopl e choose, and many of these prob-
l ems are a reflection of i mport ant const rai nt s on f r eedom of
choi ce that the t heory of rational choi ce leaves out and that
a posi t i ve t heor y of sel f-det ermi nat i on must include. What
we see is that these const rai nt s funct i on not to i mpede truly
rational choi ce but to enabl e it.
Preference, Choice, and Decision
Frames
Based l argel y on economi cs, rat i onal -choi ce t heory has
tried to expl ai n human preference and choi ce by assumi ng
that peopl e are rat i onal choosers. Accor di ng to the choi ce
theorist, human bei ngs have wel l -ordered pr e f e r e nc e s - -
preferences t hat are essent i al l y i mpervi ous t o variations in
the ways the alternatives t hey face are descri bed or the
ways t hey are packaged or bundl ed. Peopl e go t hr ough life
with all their opt i ons arrayed before t hem, as i f on a buffet
table. They have compl et e i nf or mat i on about the cost s and
benefits associ at ed wi t h each option. They compar e the
opt i ons to one anot her on a single scale of preference, or
value, or utility. Af t er maki ng the compari sons, peopl e
chose so as to maxi mi ze their preferences, or values, or
utilities. Wel l - bei ng is under st ood t o i nvol ve maxi mi zi ng
the possibilities for choi ce, maxi mi zi ng the number of
avai l abl e options. A sel f is j ust the bundl e of preferences
that happen to coexi st inside a single skin, and self-deter-
mi nat i on is j ust the unfet t ered pursuit of t hose preferences.
Rat i onal - choi ce t heory is l argel y silent about where
preferences come from; preferences are frequent l y de-
scri bed as exogenous t o the model of rational choi ce,
meani ng bot h that the model has not hi ng t o say about t hem
and that what ever the st ory on the ori gi ns of preferences
may turn out to be, the power and val i di t y of the model will
be unaffect ed by it. Al t hough the f or mer cl ai m may well be
true, the latter is not (see Bowl es, 1998). Human bei ngs
vi ol at e the principles of rational choi ce rout i nel y (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tver sky, 1979, 1984; Tver sky & Kahneman,
1981; see Baron, 1994; Schwart z, 1986, 1994, for di scus-
sion), and the cause and charact er of many of these vi ol a-
tions cannot be underst ood wi t hout underst andi ng t he na-
ture and ori gi ns of preferences t hemsel ves (see McCaul ey,
Rozi n, & Schwart z, 1999). Maki ng sense of peopl e' s
choi ces requires knowl edge of the cultural institutions t hat
influence their lives. Indeed, how cl osel y peopl e approxi -
mat e tile rat i onal -choi ce t heori st ' s portrait of preference
and choi ce depends on the ki nd of culture t hey inhabit.
Rat i onal -choi ce theorists tell us that rational chooser s
shoul d al ways be able to express preferences. What this
means is not that one thing will al ways be preferred to
another, but that quest i ons about preference will al ways be
intelligible. Peopl e will, for any A and B, be able to com-
pare the choi ces and say that t hey prefer A t o B, that t hey
prefer B to A, or that t hey are i ndi fferent bet ween t hem. Is
this cl ai m accurate' ? I magi ne someone who has j ust been
gi ven a gift of $100. Shoul d the person have a fine meal,
buy a few shirts, take a friend to the theater, or buy several
books? Af l er some reflection, the per son may well be able
to rank these opt i ons, whi ch is to say that he or she can
express, preferences among them.
However , these opt i ons do not exhaust the t hi ngs that
can be done with $100. It can be gi ven t o any of a number
of charities, or it can be used t o buy groceries, to have the
house cleaned, to buy school books, for part of the pl ane
fare to a vacat i on spot, for part of the cost of havi ng the
house painted, to have someone care for the lawn, or to
l ook after lhe children. The list of things one coul d do wi t h
$100 is endless. Can peopl e express preferences among all
these di fferent possibilities? Is a good meal preferred to
havi ng the house pai nt ed? Is child care preferred to a
vacat i on? Ever yone may be able intelligibly to express
preferences among some of the t hi ngs t hat can be done wi t h
$100, but no one can express preferences among al l of t he
things that can be done wi t h $100.
Indeed, nowadays the range of choi ces we f a c e - - e v e n
among similar kinds of t hi ngs - - i s over whel mi ng. We go to
the gr ocer y and stop in the cereal aisle. Shoul d we buy hot
or col d? Shoul d we buy sugarcoat ed or (relatively) un-
sweetened' ? Shoul d we buy wi t h or wi t hout bran? Shoul d
we buy all[ bran, oat bran, rice bran, corn bran, cr ackl i n'
bran, raisin bran, honey bran, or nut bran? We go to buy a
car. Shoul d we buy new or used? For ei gn or domest i c?
Aut omat i c or stick? Station wagon or sedan? Two- door or
f our - door ? Si x-cyl i nder or f our - cyl i nder ? The array of op-
tions we face is si mpl y mi nd- numbi ng. Thus, even when
we are f aced wi t h a choi ce among similar kinds of things,
the t ask is daunt i ng. When the possibilities i ncl ude things
wi t h little or not hi ng in common, the pr obl em is
over whel mi ng.
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 81
A per son woul d, of course, event ual l y do something
wi t h the $100 (and f r om the perspect i ve of an i dea in
economi cs known as the theory of revealed preference--
the economi s t ' s versi on of be ha vi or i s m- - wha t peopl e fi-
nal l y do wi t h that $100 is, by definition, what t hey prefer
over all ot her possibilities). How woul d he or she deci de to
do somet hi ng with it instead of sitting par al yzed with
uncert ai nt y whi l e the $100 accumul at es interest in a bank
account ? One way of t hi nki ng about j ust how peopl e go
about maki ng choi ces is the i dea that t hey or gani ze the
wor l d of possibilities into a set of distinct cat egori es, cat-
egori es like househol d necessities, househol d mai nt enance,
charity, one- ni ght i ndul gences, l onger t erm i ndul gences,
personal appearance. Wi t hi n each cat egory, it may be rel-
at i vel y easy to express preferences. Bet ween cat egori es,
however , expressi ng preferences is mor e probl emat i c. Ac-
cor di ng to this view, when faced with the pr obl em of
spendi ng $100, one must first deci de what cat egor y of thing
to spend it on. Once that is deci ded, one can fol l ow the
dictates of preference within a cat egory.
Thi s formul at i on raises several questions. How does
one deci de whi ch cat egori es to divide the wor l d into? How
does one deci de whi ch specific things go in whi ch cat ego-
ries? And how does one deci de whi ch cat egor y to devot e
this $100 t o? The choi ce t heori st ' s st ory about preference
and choi ce has not hi ng to say about the first t wo questions.
There are many fact ors that mi ght influence the way in
whi ch peopl e cat egori ze possibilities. Habi t is one source
of influence, t hough it is i mport ant t o not e that peopl e will
oft en be inarticulate, i f not compl et el y unaware, when
asked about their reasons for doi ng things t hat t hey do out
of habit ( somewhat like a fish in water, never not i ci ng that
it is wet). Cultural norms are anot her source of influence. I n
our culture, cl ot hi ng and hai r care may bot h be consi dered
as pert ai ni ng to matters of appearance. However , one coul d
easi l y i magi ne a cul t ure in whi ch what peopl e wear has
deep s oc i a l - - e ve n r el i gi ous- - si gni f i cance, whereas how
t hey keep their hai r is a trivial detail. In that culture, a
hai rcut and a new shirt woul d not be l umped together.
What habits and cultural nor ms do is establish the effect i ve
cat egori es within whi ch alternative act i ons will be com-
pared and ranked, and there is not hi ng about cat egor y
f or mat i on and cat egor y boundari es that the not i on of ratio-
nal choi ce can speak to. As a result, knowi ng that peopl e
are a rational chooser s reveals very little about their
choi ces. It will not reveal whi ch opt i ons t hey vi ew (o1"
shoul d vi ew) as compar abl e and whi ch t hey vi ew (or
shoul d vi ew) as i ncomparabl e. All it can reveal is how
peopl e will choose f r om within a cat egor y gi ven that t hey
have al ready est abl i shed the cat egori es, and this is not very
much to reveal.
It is i mport ant t o not e that one of the t ri umphs of
moder ni t y that we cel ebrat e as a culture is preci sel y the
br eakdown of cat egori es like these. This is at least part of
what sel f-det ermi nat i on means; peopl e get to create their
own cat egori es. In this way, mor e of the sel f is open to
sel f-det ermi nat i on t han ever before. Exact l y how choi ces
such as these can be made rat i onal l y and whet her peopl e
act ual l y experi ence this f r eedom of choi ce as liberating are
the questions. It was satisfying, 15 years ago, t o be pl ayi ng
in a coed softball g a me - - t o be engaged in politics, social-
izing, and recreat i on at the same t i me - - b u t this oppor t u-
nity br ought wi t h it ambi gui t i es that made the experi ence
less t han compl et el y successful.
To choose so that preferences are maxi mi zed, peopl e
must know what is possi bl e, and so the t heory of rational
choi ce assumes that peopl e choose with compl et e i nforma-
tion. A met aphor for choi ce wi t h compl et e i nformat i on is
the situation that peopl e conf r ont when eat i ng at a Chi nese
restaurant. There, arrayed on the menu, are count l ess dishes
along wi t h their costs. In the cl osed uni verse of the Chi nese
restaurant, compl et e i nformat i on is available. Peopl e can
deliberate about the vari ous possibilities, and when t hey
finally make a selection, it can truly be said to be prefer-
ence maxi mi zi ng.
However , perfect i nformat i on is a myt h, even in a
Chi nese restaurant. How many peopl e real l y know what
each of the dishes avai l abl e is like? How oft en do peopl e
study the menu, awed and i mpressed at the vari et y avail-
able, onl y to order ol d favori t es? Even in the cl osed and
simple wor l d of the Chi nese restaurant, fact ors ot her than
rational del i berat i on seem to gover n choi ces. One of them,
again, is habit. Aft er agoni zi ng over all the possibilities,
peopl e fall back, mor e oft en than not, on what t hey have
done before. Anot her fact or is tradition. Peopl e sit there
t ryi ng to deci de bet ween novel shar k' s fin soup and fami l -
iar hot and sour soup, and finally t hey choose one of them,
never consi deri ng the possi bi l i t y that t hey coul d have both.
One si mpl y does n' t have t wo soups at a meal. I f peopl e fall
back on habi t and tradition even in a situation where
rational deliberation wi t h full i nformat i on is possible,
i magi ne how much mor e i ncl i ned t hey are to do so in the
situations of ever yday life that are full of open- ended
uncertainty.
Moder n rat i onal -choi ce t heory has acknowl edged that
the assumpt i on of compl et e i nf or mat i on is ext remel y un-
realistic. Rat her than assumi ng that peopl e possess all the
rel evant i nformat i on f or maki ng choi ces, choi ce theorists
treat i nformat i on as i t sel f a "good, " somet hi ng that has a
price (in t i me or money) and is thus a candi dat e f or con-
sumpt i on al ong wi t h mor e traditional goods (see, e.g.,
Payne, 1982; Payne, Bet t man, & Johnson, 1993). Treat i ng
i nformat i on as a good makes the pi ct ure of rat i onal choi ce
mor e realistic, but a significant quest i on remai ns: How
much i nformat i on is it rational to col l ect before act ual l y
maki ng a consumpt i on deci si on? Therefore, t reat i ng infor-
mat i on as a good does not sol ve the pr obl em of det ermi ni ng
what is or is not a rational way to proceed.
The message here is that j ust as there is a series of
const rai nt s that makes real linguistic f r eedom possi bl e in
the domai n of l anguage, in the domai n of choi ce, there is
al so a series of const rai nt s on theoretical rational choi ce
that makes actual rational choi ce possible. Cultural insti-
tutions go a l ong way t oward telling peopl e where t hey can
choose and where t hey cannot , and within the domai ns
wher e choi ce is al l owed, these institutions det ermi ne what
the possibilities are. These const rai nt s on choi ce hel p solve
the i nformat i on probl em. They solve the pr obl em of havi ng
82 Januar y 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st
to compar e t hi ngs t hat are seemi ngl y i ncomparabl e. In
addition, and perhaps mor e significant, traditional con-
straints on choi ce may tell peopl e in whi ch domai ns of their
lives the principles of rat i onal choi ce are al l owed to oper-
ate. They may prot ect patterns of behavi or t hat are espe-
cially i mport ant t o the f unct i oni ng of the culture by r emov-
ing t hem f r om the domai n of choi ce altogether. Cultural
traditions i nvest cert ai n pract i ces wi t h a great deal of mor al
si gni fi cance so t hat peopl e will be di scour aged f r om re-
gardi ng t hem as mat t ers of i ndi vi dual choi ce at all. Tradi -
tional moral i t y serves as a ki nd of prevent i ve medi ci ne,
prot ect i ng peopl e f r om t hemsel ves (e.g., Shweder, 1990,
1991; Shweder & LeVi ne, 1984).
These are a few of the ways in whi ch the t heory of
rational choi ce presents an i naccurat e or at least an i ncom-
plete pi ct ure of human preference and choi ce. The i dea that
peopl e are rat i onal chooser s is on the one hand t oo rich, by
gi vi ng peopl e credi t for mor e cal cul at i on and flexibility
t han t hey possess, and on t he ot her hand t oo i mpoveri shed,
by failing t o appreciate a range of influences on deci si on
maki ng that are not t hemsel ves amenabl e t o rational cal-
culation. I n recent years, i nvest i gat ors of preference and
choi ce have come t o see some of t he limitations of the
rat i onal -choi ce f r amewor k and have tried t o make it mor e
realistic (see Baron, 1994, f or a review). Central t o these
efforts is the wor k of Kahneman and Tver sky (1979, 1984;
Tver sky & Kahneman, 1981) t hat hi ghl i ght s the signifi-
cance t o choi ce of the manner in whi ch alternatives are
framed.
Consi der bei ng posed wi t h this probl em:
Imagine that you have decided to see a play where admission is
$20 a ticket. As you enter the theater you discover that you have
lost a $20 bill. Would you still pay $20 for a ticket to the play?
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 347)
Al mos t 90% of peopl e asked this quest i on said yes. In
cont rast ,
Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid the admis-
sion price of $20 a ticket. As you enter the theater you discover
that you have lost the ticket. The seat was not marked and the
ticket can not be recovered. Would you pay $20 for another
ticket? (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 347).
Now, less t han 50% of peopl e said yes. What is the differ-
ence bet ween the t wo cases? Fr om one perspect i ve, t hey
seem the same; bot h i nvol ve seeing a pl ay and bei ng $40
poor er or not seeing it and bei ng $20 poorer. Yet peopl e
don' t seem to see t hem as the same. What Kahneman and
Tver sky have suggest ed is that the di fference bet ween the
t wo cases has t o do wi t h the way in whi ch peopl e .frame
their psychol ogi cal account s. Suppose that in a per s on' s
internal account i ng syst em there is a cost -of-t he-t heat er
account . In the first case, the cost of the t heat er is $20; the
lost $20 bill is not properl y char ged to that account . How-
ever, in the second case, the cost of the theater is $40 (t wo
tickets), and for many peopl e, $40 is t oo much to pay. On
the ot her hand, suppose t hat the per s on' s internal account -
i ng syst em has a cos t - of - a- day' s - out i ng account . Now the
t wo cases may well be equi val ent in t hat the l ost ticket and
the lost $20 bot h add the same amount t o the cost of the
day. So some peopl e keep narrow cost -of-t he-t heat er ac-
count s, whereas others keep br oader cost - of - t he- day ac-
counts. Whi ch of t hem is rat i onal ? What is the way in
whi ch rational deci si on makers shoul d keep their account s?
The range of possi bl e account i ng syst ems peopl e
coul d use is enor mous. For exampl e, a j our ney to the
theater coul d be j ust one entry in a much l arger a c c o u n t - -
say a get t i ng-cul t ure account , or a t hi ngs- t o- do- on- a- Fr i -
day- ni ght account , or even a meet i ng-a-pot ent i al -spouse
a c c ount - - a nd how much this ni ght at t he t heat er is "wor t h"
will depend on what account it is a part of. For t y dollars
may be a lot to spend for get t i ng culture, compar ed wi t h
awfilable alternatives, but not much t o spend to find a
spouse. The flexibility of the account i ng syst ems peopl e
can use raises an i mport ant question. I f there are no nor ms
or st andards of rationality to j udge account i ng syst ems by,
and i f the number of possi bl e account i ng syst ems really is
indefinitely large, what is it that det ermi nes whi ch account -
i ng syst ems peopl e act ual l y use?
In appr oachi ng this quest i on, a l ook at the pract i ces of
professi onal account ant s can be instructive. Professi onal
account ant s can also organi ze account s in indefinitely
many ways. What const rai ns the way t hey operat e? Ther e
are three sources of constraints. One source is the legal
system. There are tax and busi ness regul at i ons that i mpose
a set of requi rement s on how the books must be kept. A
second source is professi onal standards. The account i ng
professi on establishes certain standards that gui de how
account i ng is to be done. It mai nt ai ns t hose st andards in
part by educat i ng new account ant s to do things in j ust that
way. The final source is cust om or habit. Account ant s keep
account s in certain ways because t hey have al ways kept
t hem in those ways or because the account ant s who pre-
ceded t hem kept t hem in t hose ways. There is not hi ng
especi al l y pri vi l eged or rational about these constraints.
Legal requi rement s coul d be different, as coul d profes-
sional standards, and habits are acci dent s of history. Yet,
the constraints are there, and t hey serve to narrow and
shape the way account ant s do their work.
Preci sel y the same things coul d be said about the ways
peopl e keep their psychol ogi cal account s. They are influ-
enced by legal and social sanctions, by cust oms and tradi-
tions, and by ol d habits. These influences may al so be
unpri vi l eged and unjustified. Nevert hel ess, peopl e inherit
t hem and their effect s on the keepi ng of account s. Peopl e
don' t i ncl ude their i ncome taxes or the cost of support i ng
their chi l dren in their chari t abl e-gi vi ng account , t hough
t hey could. They don' t treat school taxes as chi l d-care
expenses. They don' t treat the money t hey gi ve to houses
of worshi p as ent ert ai nment costs. Peopl e may have good
reasons for not doi ng these things, but t hey are not reasons
that can be underst ood f r om within the perspect i ve of the
t heory of rational choi ce. These reasons st em f r om t he
influence of culture on what cat egori es peopl e establish and
what items t hey put in each cat egory. Psychol ogi cal ac-
count i ng pract i ces in di fferent cultures are quite di fferent
f r om ours, but t hey are no mor e or less reasonabl e.
January 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 83
An attempt to extend self-determination to everything
would break down the habitual accounting practices people
use. On the basis of the argument I have been sketching,
this may make rational decision making impossible. The
significant psychological consequence of this development
could be that all the choices people make leave them with
the dissatisfied feeling that they might have done better.
Rat i onal Choice and Cul tural
Const rai nt
The plausibility of the theory of rational choice depends on
the existence of markets and of money as a medium of
exchange. This is what makes sensible the notion of human
beings as perpetual choosers, with all options open and all
possibilities comparable. To the extent that things can be
priced (and the market is just the mechanism for the pricing
of all things), they can be compared with one another, or so
the theory of rational choice assumes.
However, not all social activity, or even all economic
activity, is organized around markets and exchange. Imag-
ine a small farmer living prior to the industrial revolution,
say 300 years ago. For the most part, this farmer' s activity
would not have involved exchange in the market because
there were few markets, and what markets there were rarely
reached very far afield given the limits on available trans-
port at the time. The farmer might have been engaged in
raising crops, keeping chickens for eggs and cows for milk,
doing occasional hunting and fishing, skinning animals for
clothes, spinning wool, keeping the farm buildings and
machinery in repair, caring for the plow horses, and so on.
Not an item of exchange in the lot.
It might be tempting to argue that the preindustrial
farmer was engaged in exchange. The farmer was exchang-
ing labor time for goods instead of money, but it was a
process of exchange nonetheless, no different in principle
from the activity of the modern white collar worker. How-
ever, if we try to take this argument seriously and apply
rational-choice concepts to the activity of the farmer, most
of them don' t make much sense. The amount of time that
the farmer spent at various tasks cannot be treated as a
measure of the value of their products to the farmer. Farm-
ing may take 10 times as much effort as hunting. From this,
it does not follow that the farmer' s crops were 10 times as
valuable as meat. The farmer needed them both, and the
time spent at these activities was dictated by the demands
of the activities themselves and not by any calculation of
value. The framework of rational choice is just the wrong
framework for understanding what the farmer did. Cer-
tainly, there could have been better and worse farmers,
rational and irrational ones, but rational farmers and ratio-
nal choosers are not just two sides of the same coin.
What largely eliminated many of the constraints on
economic activity that characterized the preindustrial
farmer was the industrial revolution that began in the 17th
century (see Hobsbawm, 1964; Polanyi, 1944; Schwartz,
Schuldenfrei, & Lacey, 1978). The industrial revolution
took people away from the home and sent them into the
factory (Marglin, 1976), making it difficult to engage in
subsistence farming and production for exchange (wages)
at the same time. Therefore, the notion that economic
activity is exchange and the development of markets in
which practically anything can be exchanged are very
much products of the industrial revolution. This makes the
rational chooser, as described by rational-choice theorists,
a person who exists under only a rather restricted set of
conditions that have been true only in the recent history of
our species and then in only certain parts of the world.
Thus, the market system is not made possible by
rational choosers; rather, it makes rational choosers possi-
ble. The implications of this line of argument for an ac-
count of human self-determination are significant. In the
eyes of rational-choice theorists, principles of rational
choice are not mere descriptions of particular points in
history. They are laws of human nature, fundamental
truths--both empirical and normative--about the human
condition. One way of thinking about laws in general is as
constraints on human activities. The law of gravitation is
one such constraint; it keeps people from flying about
uncontrollably. The law that prohibits going through red
lights is another such constraint; it keeps people from
driving their cars in whatever way they like. But these two
kinds of laws are obviously very different. The constraint
imposed by gravity is not human made, not self-imposed,
and it cannot be repealed no matter how much people want
to repeal it. The constraint on going through red lights, in
contrast, is self-imposed and easily repealed.
Which of these kinds of constraints are described by
the laws of rational choice? What l am suggesting is that
the laws of rational choice are like traffic laws, not like
gravity. We are almost certainly at the point in the history
of our species (thus far) where rational choice with minimal
constraints is most applicable to the human condition.
However, this abundance of choice and explosion of mar-
ket s-t hi s liberation of the individual from traditional con-
straints--is experienced by only a minority of human be-
ings. For most people in the world, individual choice is
neither expected nor sought in many domains of activity
(McCauley, et al., 1999; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, &
Park, 1997). The critical point here is that one has to be
mindful of culture-specific constraints and opportunities in
considering the operation of any particular model of choice
(see Fiske, 1991).
The constraints of culture affect not only what the
preference hierarchy of individuals will be, but even how
the individual--the self--is constituted. Markus and
Kitayama (1991) have surveyed evidence indicating that
the boundaries that separate the self from others are very
much culture dependent. In cultures like that of the United
States, the self is construed as an independent entity. The
boundaries between the self and others are clear and dis-
tinct. Independence, autonomy, and self-determination are
prized, and the values and preferences of each individual
are given a status that is independent of the values and
preferences of others. It is to explain the choices of a self
like this that the theory of rational choice was constructed.
However, in other cultures, even industrial cultures like
Japan, the self is construed as an interdependent entity.
Significant others form a part of the self, and their values
84 January 2000 • American Psychologist
and preferences are, in significant respects, one' s own. In
cultures like this, many of the conflicts Americans rou-
tinely face between doing the right thing and doing the
self-interested thing evaporate. No doubt they are replaced
by different conflicts, but these different conflicts are re-
flections of fundamentally different selves, with fundamen-
tally different notions of preference and choice. Unless we
understand how culture penetrates and defines the self, our
investigation of the nature of human preferences and of
self-determination can hardly be said to have begun. For
many people in the world, the relevant unit for making
decisions and experiencing their results is the family or the
larger social group and not the individual. For people of
these cultures, offering choices to individuals, rather than
dictating them, may be experienced as burdensome rather
than liberating (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999a).
I believe that the dominance of rational-choice theory
in the context of markets as a model for human autonomy
has had a significant effect on Americans' aspirations with
regard to self-determination. It is partly because we fit
everything into a market framework that we expect to have
choice and control in all domains of life (see Schwartz,
1997). The economist might say that this represents the
triumph of industrial capitalism. Modem Americans refuse
to have their behavior governed by tradition, and market-
driven affluence frees most of us from the dictates of
necessity. As a result, everything is a matter of choice. This
is the best of all possible worlds. Or is it?
Tyranny of Freedom: The Evidence
What I have done thus far is try to provide a plausibility
argument that choice is constrained in the way that lan-
guage is constrained, and that too much freedom from
constraint is a bad thing. I want now to turn to some
empirical evidence that I think supports this view. I begin
with a discussion of depression.
The theory of learned helplessness has taught us about
the importance of control and autonomy to mental health
(e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Abramson,
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Maier & Seligman, 1976;
Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993; Peterson & Seligman,
1984; Seligman, 1975). In particular, helplessness has
taught us that a lack of control, coupled with a certain
characteristic style of causal explanation, creates candi-
dates for clinical depression. Given that having control
over significant things in one' s life is important to prevent-
ing clinical depression, we can ask ourselves what we
might expect the incidence of depression to be like in
modem American society.
As I argued above, most of us now live in a world in
which we experience control to a degree that people living
in other times and places would think quite unimaginable.
Extraordinary material wealth enables us to consume an
astonishing quantity and variety of goods, and the magical
mechanism of the market allows us an almost limitless
array of choices. Further, this autonomy and control extend
beyond the world of material goods. In careers, there is an
enormous degree of mobility, both in career type and in
geographical location. People are not constrained to do the
work their parents did in the place where their parents did
it, nor are people constrained to have only a single occu-
pation for their entire working lives. Therefore, almost
anything is possible. In personal life, religious, ethnic,
racial, class, geographic, and even gender barriers to mate
selection are rapidly disappearing. Moreover, one is free to
choose whether to have kids or not, whether to have them
early or late, whether to bear them or adopt them, whether
to have them as part of a traditional marriage and family or
as part of any of a host of nontraditional family arrange-
ments. It is also increasingly easy to get out of marriages
that have turned sour and, having done that, to arrange
child custody in ways that suit the involved parties.
In summary, I think it is only a slight exaggeration to
say that for the first time in human history, in the contem-
porary United States large numbers of people can live
exactly the kind of lives they want, unconstrained by ma-
terial, economic, or cultural limitations. This fact coupled
with the helplessness theory of depression might lead one
to expect clinical depression in the United States to be
going the way of polio.
Instead, what we find is an explosive growth in the
number of people with depression(e.g., Klerman et al.,
1985; Robins et al., 1984). Some estimates are that depres-
sion is 10 times more likely to afflict someone now than at
the turn of the century. Thus, we have a puzzle. The
solution to this puzzle lies, I think, in several features of
modem life that are the focus of this article.
First, I think that increases in experienced control over
the years have been accompanied, stride-for-stride, by in-
creases in expectations about control. The more we are
allowed to be the masters of our fates in one domain of life
after another, the more we expect to be. Education is
expected to be stimulating and useful. Work is supposed to
be exciting, socially valuable, and remunerative. Spouses
are supposed to be sexually, emotionally, and intellectually
stimulating and also loyal and comforting. Friends are
supposed to be fun to be with and devoted. Children are
supposed to be beautiful, smart, affectionate, obedient, and
independent. Everything we buy is supposed to be the best
of its kind. With all the choice available, people should
never have to settle for things that are just good enough. In
short, life is supposed to be perfect. Excessive emphasis on
self-determination has, I believe, contributed to these un-
realistic expectations.
Second, American culture has become more individ-
ualistic than it ever was before. What this means, I think, is
that not only do people expect perfection in all things, but
they expect to produce this perfection themselves. When
they (inevitably) fail, I believe that the culture of individ-
ualism biases them toward making causal attributions that
focus on internal rather than external causal factors. That is,
I believe that the culture has established a kind of officially
acceptable style of causal explanation, and it is one that
focuses on the individual. As Seligman' s research (e.g.,
Peterson & Seligman, 1984) has led the way in demon-
strating, this kind of causal attribution is just the kind to
promote depression when people are faced with failure, and
if my first point is correct, despite their increased control,
January 2000 • American Psychologist 85
people will inevitably be faced with many occasions that by
their own lights count as failure.
Finally, the emphasis on individual autonomy and
control may be undermining a crucial vaccine against de-
pression: deep commitment and belonging to social groups
and institutions--families, civic associations, faith commu-
nities, and the like. There is an inherent tension between
being one' s own person, or determining one' s own self, and
meaningful involvement in social groups. Doing the latter
properly requires submerging one' s self. Therefore, the
more people focus on themselves--with respect both to
goals and to the means of achieving those goals--the more
their connections to others will be weakened. Robert Put-
nam (e.g., 1993, 1995, 1996) has recently attracted a great
deal of attention to this deterioration of social connection in
modem America, and in this context it is relevant to note a
study by Egeland and Hostetter (1983) that showed an
incidence of depression among the Amish of Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania, that was about half the national rate,
whereas other forms of psychopathology were much closer
to national averages. The Amish, of course, are an ex-
tremely cohesive, tightly knit, traditional community.
Thus, the current literature on helplessness, control,
and depression suggests that freedom of choice is not all
it' s cracked up to be, at least not with respect to psycho-
logical well-being. I think it is possible that a similar story
can be told about body weight and diet. Despite the com-
pelling evidence (summarized in Seligman, 1994) that peo-
ple can do rather little about their body weight, the culture
tells us that obesity is a matter of choice, personal control,
and personal responsibility. It tells us that we should aspire
to look perfect, and that if we don' t, we have only ourselves
to blame. How much of the modern epidemic of eating
disorder stems from this particular mythology I do not
know, but surely there would be less eating pathology if
people understood the shapes of their bodies to be con-
straints rather than choices.
Consistent with the evidence that choice is not an
unmixed blessing, results have begun to appear in the
literature on human decision making to indicate that adding
options for people can make the choice situation less rather
than more attractive--that indeed, sometimes people prefer
it if others make the choices for them (Beattie, Baron,
Hershey, & Spranca, 1994).
In one series of studies (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999b)
participants were more likely to purchase exotic jams or
gourmet chocolates when they had 6 options from which to
choose than when they had 30 options. In addition, those
with fewer options expressed greater satisfaction with the
choices they actually made. Further, college students were
more likely to write an extra-credit essay and wrote better
essays when they had 6 topics from which to choose than
when they had 30 options. The authors suggested several
possible factors that may underlie this effect. One is the
avoidance of potential regret. The more options there are,
the more likely it is one will make a nonoptimal choice, and
this prospect undermines whatever pleasure one may get
from one' s actual choice. There is ample evidence that
regret avoidance is a potent force in human decision mak-
ing--perhaps even more potent than the loss avoidance that
has been a significant feature of Kahneman and Tversky' s
(e.g., 1979) theory of decision making (Beattie et al., 1994;
Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomis & Sugden, 1982; Simenson,
1992; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996).
This regret avoidance may be especially potent in people
with low self-esteem (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett,
1992). For such people, every choice opportunity presents
the possibility that they will gather more evidence than they
already have that they do not know how to make good
decisions.
A second factor that may make increased choice op-
tions unattractive is that they create a seemingly intractable
information problem. It is hard enough to gather the infor-
mation and go through the deliberations needed to make the
best choice among six options. To choose the best among
30 options is truly daunting. Therefore, rather than even
try, people may disengage, choosing almost arbitrarily to
get the process over with. As a result of this disengage-
ment, many of the psychological processes that normally
are recruited to enhance the attractiveness of the choices
one makes may not be used (see Gilovich & Medvec, 1995,
for an account of some of these processes in the context of
a theory of regret).
It should be noted that from the perspective of the
norms of rational-choice theory, the demotivating effects of
added options are truly paradoxical. If one already has a
choice between Options A and B, how can adding Option
C make one worse off? One can, after all, always ignore
Option C and choose between A and B. Yet this demoti-
vating effect is precisely what seems to occur, at least
under some circumstances (see Redelmeier & Shafir,
1995). And the commercial world seems already to know
what experimental psychologists are just now discovering.
Several major manufacturers of a variety of consumer
products have been streamlining the number of options
they provide customers, in response to a modest consumer
rebellion against excessive choice. Proctor and Gamble, for
example, reduced the number of versions of its very pop-
ular Head and Shoulders shampoo from a staggering 26 to
"only" 15, and they experienced a 10% increase in sales
(Osnos, 1997).
Conclusion
This article has suggested two things. First, although we
coul d live in a world in which everything was a matter of
choice, we don' t have to, and most people in the history of
human society haven't. Second, were we to live in such a
world, our mechanisms of rational choice would be over-
whelmed rather than empowered. As I indicated at the
outset, there is a degree of freedom that now exists in many
of the most important domains of our lives that only a short
time ago would have been unimaginable. Certainly, there
are still strong vestiges of traditional constraint that remain
in all of these domains, so that many freedoms that exist for
everyone in theory can' t be realized by everyone in prac-
tice, but there is no question of the direction in which
things are moving. Every day it gets a little bit easier for
86 January 2000 • American Psychologist
individuals to do exact l y what t hey want to do and t o live
exact l y as t hey want t o live.
Obvi ousl y, all of this f r eedom f r om traditional con-
straint is cause f or cel ebrat i on, part i cul arl y f or t hose f or
whom traditional const rai nt was experi enced as pai nful and
oppressi ve. Lar gel y because traditions are authoritarian and
inflexible, moder n Amer i cans have fled f r om traditional
institutions and values. Amer i cans have chafed at bei ng
t ol d what t o do, at bei ng t ol d what was good f or them.
Tradi t i ons di d not mer el y offer order and structure to peo-
pl e' s lives; t hey insisted on it. To this inflexible insistence
many Amer i cans have said good riddance. It is much better
to make up the rules of the games you pl ay as you go al ong
than t o be forced t o pl ay t hose games by ot her peopl e' s
r ul es - - r ul es that don' t seem to serve you and make no
sense to you.
I have tried to suggest , however , t hat there is a dark
side to all this f r eedom f r om constraint, to all this emphasi s
on i ndi vi dual s as the makers of their own worlds, their own
destinies. It leaves peopl e i ndeci si ve about what t o do and
why. Fr eedom of choi ce is a t wo- edged sword, for j ust on
the ot her side of liberation sits chaos and paralysis. Thus,
there is a price f or f r e e dom- - da nge r . Ther e is a pri ce f or
enl i ght enment - - uncer t ai nt y. There is a pri ce f or bei ng able
t o change the rules of softball. You may not know what the
new rules shoul d be, and pl ayi ng by new rules may damage
what was good when you pl ayed by the ol d ones. Thus, in
aspiring as a cul t ure t o offer individuals sel f-det ermi nat i on
wi t hout constraint, we are not doi ng those individuals a
favor.
What has all this to do wi t h the future devel opment of
a posi t i ve ps ychol ogy t hat will nurture strength rat her than
repair damage? Until now, ps ychol ogy has been a signifi-
cant cont ri but or t o the ethic of i ndi vi dual sel f-det ermi na-
tion. The t ask before ps ychol ogy now, I believe, is t o pull
back f r om this s t a n c e - - b u t not i ndi scri mi nat el y. Rather,
what ps ychol ogy must do is figure out the "gr ammar " of
human life c hoi c e s - - t he set of const rai nt s that act ual l y
enabl es f r eedom rat her t han i mpedi ng it.
When the great bi ol ogi st Jacob yon Uexkul l said that
"securi t y is mor e i mport ant than weal t h" (1938/ 1954, p.
26), mor e t han hal f a cent ury ago, what he was talking
about was how evol ut i on seemed to shape or gani sms so
that their sensory syst ems were exqui si t el y at t uned to j ust
t hose envi r onment al inputs that were critical t o their sur-
vival. The forest is a much less interesting pl ace to a
squirrel t han it is t o a human being. Much that goes on in
t hat forest goes ri ght by the squirrel. Its sensory experi ence
is thus i mpover i shed relative to ours, but it not i ces what it
needs t o notice. Bi ol ogy seems t o suppl y the needed con-
straints on choi ce f or most organi sms. For peopl e, t hose
const rai nt s have t o come f r om culture. The t ask f or a fu-
ture ps ychol ogy is t o figure out what t hose const rai nt s
shoul d be.
A final comment is necessary on the use of the wor d
should in the previ ous sentence. Shoulds i mpl y cl ai ms that
are prescri pt i ve rat her t han descriptive, and psychol ogy, as
a posi t i ve rat her t han a nor mat i ve social science, has tried
t o steer away f r om shoulds. I bel i eve that i f psychol ogi st s
are serious about t urni ng ps yc hol ogy' s power t o devel op-
i ng a t heory of opt i mal funct i oni ng, t hey can no l onger
avoi d shoulds. I t hi nk that a ri chl y devel oped posi t i ve
ps ychol ogy must do mor e than t each peopl e how t o do
t hi ngs - - i t must to do mor e t han t each peopl e effect i ve
t echni ques for get t i ng what t hey want out of life. It must
al so tell t hem somet hi ng about what t hey shoul d be t ryi ng
t o get. That is, it must be i nf or med by a vi si on of what a
good human life cont ai ns. Thus, a posi t i ve ps ychol ogy will
have to be wi l l i ng to tell peopl e that, say, a good, mean-
ingful, product i ve human life i ncl udes commi t ment to ed-
ucat i on, commi t ment t o fami l y and t o ot her social groups,
commi t ment t o excel l ence in one ' s activities, commi t ment
to virtues such as honest y, l oyal t y, courage, and j ust i ce in
one' s deal i ngs with others, and so on. Not i ce how the very
not i on that ps ychol ogy mi ght articulate a vi si on of the good
life cont radi ct s the emphasi s on freedom, aut onomy, and
choi ce that are the subj ect of this article.
The: official i deol ogy of moder n Amer i ca poses an
enor mous barrier to this ki nd of cont ent ful posi t i ve psy-
chol ogy. The i deol ogy of Amer i ca is the i deol ogy of liberal
i ndi vi dual i s m- - l et peopl e deci de f or t hemsel ves what is
good. Moder n liberal culture is ext remel y rel uct ant to tell
peopl e what to do, and social sci ence has i nt ernal i zed t hat
credo: Do n ' t be j udgment al ; hel p peopl e get what t hey
want, but don' t tell t hem what t hey shoul d be want i ng.
It is one thing to encount er peopl e in ext reme ps ycho-
l ogi cal pain and to tell t hem, , gently, how to change the
cont ent of their lives to relieve that pain. Few peopl e wi l l
obj ect t o psychol ogi st s who i mpose their val ues in this way
to relieve suffering, but a posi t i ve ps ychol ogy is a whol e
ot her story. A posi t i ve ps ychol ogy will be i ndi scri mi nat e in
i mposi ng its values; it will put its values in the communi t y
wat er supply, like fluoride. Is ps ychol ogy prepared to be a
sci ence that pr omot es certain values i nst ead of one t hat
encourages sel f-act ual i zat i on? I f it is, will modern, liberal
soci et y stand for it?
To summar i ze this final point, once clinical psychol -
ogists had patients. Over the years, the discipline grew
concer ned that patient i mpl i ed illness, whi ch in turn i m-
plied a concept i on of health, a concept i on of the goal of
t herapy that the field did not real l y have. Thus, patients
became clients. Doct or s have patients. The patients come in
sick, and the doct ors make t hem well. Rest ori ng and mai n-
taining physi cal health and al l evi at i ng sufferi ng are the
goals of medi ci ne. Lawyer s, in contrast, have clients. Law-
yers don' t have goal s f or clients the way doct ors have goal s
f or patients. Rather, l awyers are there to help the clients
achi eve their own goals. Clients define their goal s in a way
that patients do not. Therefore, in movi ng f r om patients t o
clients, ps ychol ogy moved f r om havi ng the pract i t i oner
define the goal t o havi ng the reci pi ent define t he goal. What
will psychol ogi st s call the recipients of their services i f and
when a posi t i ve ps ychol ogy comes to frui t i on? I don' t t hi nk
that either patients or clients does j ust i ce to the gr and
vi si on that i nforms these begi nni ngs of a posi t i ve psychol -
ogy. The right term, I think, is students. Are psychol ogi st s
prepared to argue that it is future generat i ons of psychol -
ogists who shoul d be soci et y' s t eachers? I t hi nk that unless
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 87
we a r e p r e p a r e d t o s a y y e s t o t h i s q u e s t i o n a n d t o d e v e l o p
a r g u me n t s a b o u t t h e c o n t e n t o f a g o o d h u ma n l i f e , t h e
p o t e n t i a l a c h i e v e me n t s o f a f u t u r e p o s i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y wi l l
a l wa y s b e l i mi t e d . I a l s o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e t i me t o b e t h i n k i n g
a n d t a l k i n g a b o u t t h i s v e r y b i g a n d d i f f i c u l t i s s u e i s n o w, at
t h e b e g i n n i n g , a n d n o t l a t e r , i n t h e f a c e o f a n g r y c r i t i c s
t r y i n g t o p u t p s y c h o l o g i s t s i n t h e i r p l a c e .
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88 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 * Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t
Adaptive Mental Mechanisms
Their Role in a Positive Psychol ogy
George E. Vaillant
Brigham and Women's Hospital
Psychology needs a metric f or positive mental health that
would be analogous to the IQ tests that measure above-
average intelligence. The Defensive Function Scale of the
DSM- I V offers a possible metric. In the present article the
author links the transformational qualities of defenses at
the mature end of the Defensive Function Scale---altruism,
suppression, humor, anticipation, and sublimation--to pos-
itive psychology. First, the methodological problems in-
volved in the reliable assessment of defenses are acknowl-
edged. Next, the use of prospective longitudinal study to
overcome such difficulties and to provide more reliable
definition and measurement of defenses is outlined. Evi-
dence is also offered that, unlike many psychological mea-
sures, the maturity of defenses is quite independent of
social class, education, and IQ. Last, evidence is offered to
illustrate the validity of mature defenses and their contri-
bution to positive psychology.
: the days of alchemy, humanity has been fas-
.ted with how to turn lead into gold. People are
gued by the real-life alchemy of the oyster
transforming an irritating grain of sand into a pearl.
Rumpelstiltskin spinning straw into gold is a favorite fairy
tale. In their laudable quest to relieve human suffering,
however, both psychiatry and psychol ogy have been less
interested in positive transformations. Instead, they have
been more concerned with how cold mothers and bad genes
create disease and so turn gold to lead.
In contrast to psychiatry, however, psychol ogy has
made at least some effort to measure the positive as well as
the pathological. Intelligence tests are a good example. In
contrast to intelligence, however, most facets of positive
human behavi or - - f or example, creativity, maturity, and
empat hy- - ar e extraordinarily difficult to measure. This
article discusses efforts to conceptualize the mature de-
fenses (aka, involuntary coping mechani sms and "healthy
denial"). I argue that such a schema comprises a facet of
and a possible metric for a positive psychology.
By way of introduction, there are three broad classes of
coping mechanisms. First, there are the ways in which an
individual elicits help from appropriate others: namely, seek-
ing social support. Second, there are conscious cognitive
strategies that people intentionally use to make the best of a
bad situation (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Third, there are
involuntary mental mechanisms that distort our perception of
internal and external reality to reduce subjective distress. For
semantic consistency, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) has labeled these mental mechanisms de-
fenses and has organized them in a hierarchical Defensive
Function Scale. Included within the "high adaptive level" of
DSM- I V are the defenses of anticipation, altruism, humor,
sublimation, and suppression. These adaptive mental mecha-
nisms "maximize gratification and allow conscious awareness
of feelings, ideas and their consequences" (American Psychi-
atric Association, 1994, p. 752).
In many ways, the first two classes of coping are
superior to the third. Most important, seeking social sup-
port and cognitive strategies are both under volitional con-
trol and can affect the real world. In three ways, however,
the involuntary defenses or coping processes are superior to
voluntary coping processes. First, as I demonstrate in this
article, involuntary defenses are independent of education
and social privilege. Second, they can regulate peopl e' s
perceptions of those internal and external realities that they
are powerless to change. Third, the adaptive defenses can
turn lead into gold. By this I mean such processes can serve
as transformative agents in the real world.
Let me offer an analogy. I f a person who cuts a small
artery lacks the cognitive strategies (provided to health
professionals through expensive education) to stop the
hemorrhage and lacks the social supports of access to
physicians (provided to the middle class through expensi ve
health insurance), the person can still cope with the hem-
orrhage with inborn defenses. He or she can stop the
bleeding through involuntary, transformative, and highly
compl ex clotting mechanisms. Yet, such clotting mecha-
nisms may be denied to royalty afflicted with hemophilia.
In analogous fashion, when cognitive solutions and social
supports are absent, the psychologically resilient f r om all
walks of l i f e- - achi eve similar homeostatic alchemy
through involuntary mental defenses that alter perception
of internal and external reality.
George El. Vaillant, Division of Psychiatry, Department of Medicine,
Brigham and Women' s Hospital.
This work was supported by the Division of Psychiatry, Department
of Medicine, Brigham and Women' s Hospital; by the Study of Adult
Development, Harvard University Health Services; and by Research Grant
MH 42248 from the National Institute of Mental Health.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
George E. Vaillant, Brigham and Women' s Hospital, 75 Francis Street,
Boston, MA 02115. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected].
January 2000 ° Ameri can Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc, (X)O3-066X/00/$5.00
Vol. 55, No. 1. 89-98 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X 55.1.89
89
George E.
Vaillant
For example, at age 3 l, a suicidal but only partially deaf
musician had written of his loss of heating, "Oh, if I were rid
of this affliction, 1 could embrace the world" (Forbes, 1969, p.
286). At 54, the utterly deaf but no longer suicidal musician
immortalized Schiller' s "Ode to Joy" ("Be embraced all ye
millions with a kiss for all the world") in the lyrical, life-
affirming chorus of his Ninth Symphony. But how can psy-
chology differentiate the transformative denial that Beethoven
deployed to overcome depression by writing a hymn to joy
from the mental mechanisms of psychosis such as projection
and psychotic denial? Clearly, the answer is important.
As a start, mature mental health always involves affect
recognition. Beethoven did not totally deny his real depres-
sion, nor was he overwhelmed by it. Thus, we have evidence
that Beethoven' s defensive behavior (aka, creative product)
did not reflect complete denial of affect as do less adaptive
defenses. Throughout his composition of the Ninth Symphony,
he remained conscious of his pain. For example, on a draft
version of one instrumental recitative he had scribbled, "No,
this would remind us too much of our despair" (Forbes, 1969,
p. 892). Equally important was Beethoven' s defensive use of
sublimation, which not only made him feel subjectively better,
but also was of objective value to the real world.
Adaptive defenses are essential to positive mental health.
Defenses reduce conflict and cognitive dissonance during
sudden changes in internal and external reality. I f not modi-
fied, sudden changes result in anxiety and/or depression. First,
defense mechanisms can restore psychological homeostasis
by ignoring or deflecting sudden increases in affect and in-
stinctual press. For example, when the Soviets liberated the
first Nazi death camp, Maidenek, the New York Times denied
its unbearable horror by reporting the news as a Soviet pro-
paganda ploy. Second, defense mechanisms can provide a
mental time out to mitigate changes in reality and self-image
that cannot be immediately integrated--for example, after
major surgery or promotion. Third, defenses transmute unre-
solvable conflict with important people, living or dead. Fi-
nally, defenses soften conflicts of consci ence--for example,
after putting a parent in a nursing home. In short, defenses
shield people from sudden changes in affect, reality, relation-
ships, or conscience.
For many years, defense mechanisms have been deserv-
edly unpopular in experimental psychology, because of diffi-
culty in empirical verification. Over the past 20 years, the idea
of involuntary adaptation has re-entered the literature of cog-
nitive psychology under such rubrics as hardiness (Kobasa,
Maddi, & Kahn, 1982), self-deception and emotional coping
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), and illusion (Taylor, 1989).
Defense mechanisms are clearly as important in reducing
anxiety from cognitive dissonance as they are in minimizing
anxiety from conflict between conscience and impulse.
In recent years, experimental strategies for studying
defense mechani sms have i mproved (Cramer, 1991;
Horowitz, 1988; Vaillant, 1992). Building on the work of
Norma Haan (1963) at Berkeley and Elvin Semrad (1967)
at Harvard, I have tried to operationalize defenses and to
demonstrate their predictive validity (Vaillant, 1971,
1993). Over 30 years, such efforts have met with modest
success, and the validity of an adaptive hierarchy of de-
fenses appears clear (Vaillant, 1992). However, as Phoebe
Cr amer ' s (1991) encyclopedic review of the met hodol ogy
for identifying and quantifying defenses has illustrated, no
one has yet developed a met hod for assessing defenses that
meets conventional standards for psychometric reliability.
A second reason that defenses have fallen from favor
in psychol ogy is that there is no commonl y accepted lan-
guage. For example, within 50 miles of San Francisco,
there were recently six competing, nonoverlapping nomen-
clatures for involuntary coping mechanisms. Each nomen-
clature was used by a distinguished investigator of stress
(Block & Block, 1980; Haan, 1977; Horowitz, 1988; Laza-
rus & Folkman, 1984; Moos & Billings, 1982; Weinberger,
Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). Rarely, however, did any
investigator cite the work of his or her neighbors. The
result has been semantic chaos. Recently, the DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) has offered a
terminology, a glossary, and a tentative diagnostic axis to
provide a common language.
Defenses, no matter how ingeniously assessed, reflect
value j udgment s about mental process, as do process con-
cepts in physics (e.g., forward motion and velocity). All
t hree--vel oci t y, forward motion, and def ens es - - depend
on the vantage point of the observer and involve processes
rather than static qualities like mass or intelligence. Nev-
ertheless, if peopl e wish to understand their own lives in
time and space, these are j udgment s worth making.
To overcome relativity, reliability of defense recogni-
tion requires longitudinal study. Before I can assert that the
Ninth Symphony represents the sublimation of Beet hoven' s
conflict over abusive father figures, I need objective longi-
tudinal evidence. First, I need Beet hoven' s own contem-
poraneously written diary to document both his despair and
his anger at father figures over decades. Second, for objec-
90 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
tive assessment, I need behavioral evidence of his defense:
a symphony (not just a pencil-and-paper response or a
dream report). Finally, I need objective consensus that his
creation was empathic art that others valued, not autistic
lunacy that others mocked. Thus, the documented wild
cheers of a contemporary, musically sophisticated, Vien-
nese concert audience is more convincing than the value
judgment of one 20th century, musically challenged Amer-
ican psychiatrist. Using such triangulation of real symp-
toms, autobiographical report, and contemporaneously as-
sessed biographical fact to measure invisible mental pro-
cess is analogous to surveyors using triangulation to assess
the height of mountains they cannot climb.
As a method to study defenses, I have used three diverse
50-year prospective studies of lives. Using consensus defini-
tions from the literature (Vaillant, 1971), I selected five mech-
anisms-humor, altruism, sublimation, anticipation, and sup-
pression--that, first by hypothesis and then by empirical
study, appeared adaptive in the three samples. The term adap-
tive defense, and its synonym healthy denial, have two con-
notations: The first is transformative (turning lead into gold),
and the second is making the best out of a bad situation.
Whether such a healing response is viewed as miraculous or
merely a patch-up job depends on whether optimal wound
healing is viewed as a scar or as a result of a delicate ballet of
blood clotting and fibroblast migration--neither too much nor
too little. Each adaptive or healthy defense involves the ballet
of keeping idea and affect, subject and object clearly in mind
while simultaneously attenuating the conflict (cognitive
dissonance).
In nonconflictual situations, of course, the putative
defense mechanisms of anticipation, altruism, and suppres-
sion seem quite conscious and voluntary. In highly emo-
tionally charged situations, however, such deployment of
these mechanisms can be seen as both transformative and
making the best of a bad situation. A man with a criminal
record for the first time "counting to ten" (suppression)
while consciously examining his anger, rather than impul-
sively punching a policeman; a mother rehearsing affec-
tively and realistically, rather than denying, the fact that her
child is dying (anticipation); a survivor of child abuse,
rather than abusing her own children, working in a shelter
for survivors of abuse (altruism) are such examples. Such
behaviors emerge with maturation as delicate transforma-
tive mental balancing acts and not as a result of good
advice and self-help cognitive strategies.
The Study of Adult Development
The Study of Adult Development provided the three cohorts
of individuals that were used as a prospective and empirical
means of triangulating and validating defensive behaviors.
Each cohort had been prospectively studied for over half a
century: the "College" sample born about 1920 (Heath, 1945),
the "Core City" sample of inner-city men born about 1930
(Glueck & Glueck, 1950), and the "Terman" sample of gifted
women born about 1910 (Terman, 1925).
For all three samples, the basic methodology of the
Study of Adult Development was to keep raters of psycho-
logical health and prospective behavioral outcome unaware
of defense assessment and to keep raters of defenses un-
aware of evidence of positive mental health and future
adaptation. Taken individually, these three now elderly
Caucasian samples can hardly be viewed as representative
of the general population. However, the three samples have
the virtues of being vastly different from each other and
belonging to historical birth cohorts up to 20 years apart.
Within each sample, there was considerable homogeneity.
Thus, the between-group similarities and the within-group
differences may be generalizable to some other samples.
More important, prospective study permitted defensive al-
truism to be distinguished from simple kindness and de-
fensive projection to be distinguished from the vigilant
recognition of real persecution.
The College Sample
The Grant Study (Heath, 1945; Vaillant, 1977) began at the
Harvard University Health Services in 1938. The study was
underwritten by W. T. Grant because, "Large endowments
have been given and schemes put into effect for the study
of the ill, the mentally and physically handicapped . . . .
Very few have thought it pertinent to make a systematic
inquiry into the kinds of people who are well and do well"
(Heath, 1945). Sixty years ago, then, the Grant Study
anticipated the need for a positive psychology.
In the selection process, about 40% of each Harvard
class was arbitrarily excluded for academic reasons. The
health service records of the remaining 60% of each class
were then screened, and half were excluded because of evi-
dence of physical or psychological disturbance. The college
deans then selected one third of the remaining 300 men who
they thought would do well. Between 1939 and 1942, 268
sophomores were selected for study. For half a century, all but
20 of the men have continued to participate in this study of
positive psychology with remarkable loyalty. They have re-
ceived questionnaires about every 2 years, physical examina-
tions every 5 years, and interviews about every 15 years.
Socioeconomically, the College sample men were
drawn from a privileged group but not exclusively so.
Although one third of the men' s fathers had some profes-
sional training, one half of the men' s parents never grad-
uated from college. Although one half of the men had some
private education, half of the men were on scholarship
and/or had to work during the academic term to earn
tuition. In adult life, the College sample enjoyed the in-
come and social status of corporate managers, yet they
drove the battered cars and pursued the hobbies, politics,
and lifestyle of college professors.
The Core City Sample
These 456 men represent a very different cohort but one
also chosen for relative mental health. In junior high
school, they were selected as nondelinquent controls for a
prospective study of juvenile delinquency. The study was
conducted by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck at Harvard Law
School and led to their landmark book Unraveling Juvenile
Delinquency (Glueck & Glueck, 1950, 1968). Like the
College men, the Core City men were studied originally by
a multidisciplinary team of physicians, psychologists, psy-
January 2000 • American Psychologist 91
chiatrists, social investigators, and physical anthropolo-
gists. The Core City men were interviewed at ages 14, 25,
32, and 47 (Vaillant, 1995).
The Core City sample came from the 60% of Boston
census tracts with the highest rates of juvenile delinquency.
The boys' average IQ was 95, and 61% of their parents were
foreign born. In childhood, half of the Core City men had
lived in clearly blighted slum neighborhoods. Half came from
families known to five or more social agencies, and more than
two thirds of their families had recently been on welfare. Over
the years, however, this group has experienced marked up-
ward social mobility (Long & Vaillant, 1984).
The Terman Women Sample
Through the cooperation of Robert Sears and Albert Hastorf,
I obtained access to a Stanford University (Terman women)
cohort of gifted women studied since 1920. The 90 women
that make up the current study sample are a representative
subsample of the 672 women in Terman's original cohort of
gifted California public school children (Holahan & Sears,
1995; Terman, 1925; Terman & Oden, 1959).
The high intelligence of the Terman women--mean
IQ of 151--was a social asset. Their mental health was
demonstrably better than that of their California class-
mates. They showed significantly more humor, common
sense, perseverance, leadership, and even popularity than
their school peers. Up to the age of 78, the mortality of the
Terman women has been only half of what would be
expected for White American women in their birth cohort.
Investigators followed the Terman sample by ques-
tionnaire every five years and by personal interview in
1940 and 1950. In 1987, Vaillant and Vaillant (1990a)
selected a representative subsample. Of the 90 women
selected, 29 had died and 21 of the surviving women
refused to interview, some because of poor health. We
reinterviewed the remaining 40 women.
Adapt i ve or Mat ure Defenses
Adaptive or mature defenses (altruism, sublimation, sup-
pression, humor, anticipation) are common among the
mentally healthy and become more salient as individuals
mature from adolescence to midlife (Vaillant, 1977). In
keeping with the conceptualization of positive psychology,
the association of mature defenses with mental health re-
mains whether health is measured by subjective happiness,
psychosocial maturity, occupational success, richness and
stability of relationships, or absence of psychopathology
(Vaillant, 1992). Individuals with brain damage (e.g., al-
cohol dependence, schizophrenic relapse, multiple sclero-
sis) replace adaptive defenses with more maladaptive
mechanisms, most notably projection.
Table 1 schematizes the defenses discussed in this article
within the adaptive levels suggested by DSM-1V. The table
provides an oversimplified schema for the mutually exclusive
definitions that contrast the five adaptive defenses listed above
with less adaptive mechanisms. Each defense has been char-
acterized by the extent to which it denies or distorts subject
and object and idea and affect in the experience of and
expression of impulse. For example, defense mechanisms can
allow a person to ignore the affect (isolation, intellectualiza-
tion), to ignore the cognitive representation of the affect (re-
pression), to reverse the direction of an impulse (make the self
the object; projection), or to make the object the self (suicide
or passive aggression). Each defense has also been character-
ized by the way in which it modifies the four lodestars of
conflict: affect, reality, conscience, and relationships. The
high-adaptive-level defenses provide the most balanced re-
sponse to such involuntary homeostatic distortions of inner
and outer reality.
To the beholder, adaptive mechanisms appear as con-
venient virtues, and there is rarely a therapeutic reason to
alter them. Although closer to consciousness than mecha-
nisms like projection and repression, mature mechanisms
cannot be voluntarily deployed. No one is more transparent
than someone trying to use humor or altruism; No one is
more angry looking than someone consciously suppressing
rage; and when depressed just try writing Beethoven' s
Ninth Symphony on purpose.
In keeping with positive psychology, adaptive defenses
often appear as moral to the observer as maladaptive defenses
appear immoral. The prejudice of projection and the tantrums
of acting out appear to others as sins. In contrast, doing as one
would be done by (altruism), a stiff upper lip (suppression),
planning for the future (anticipation), the ability not to take
one's self too seriously (humor), and "turning lemons into
lemonade" (sublimation) are the very stuff of which a positive
psychology should be concerned.
Let me elaborate on the ~ansformative nature of each of
five mature mental mechanisms schematically defined in Table 1.
Altruism
When used to transform conflict, altruism involves getting
pleasure from giving to others what people would themselves
like to receive. For example, victims of childhood sexual
abuse often pathologically cut themselves (turning anger
against the self), abuse children (acting out), or use "neurotic"
compromises such as becoming frigid or joining convents
(reaction formation). Alternatively, and transformatively, al-
truistic victims of child abuse might work in shelters for
battered women and in support groups or hotfines for abuse
victims. Often almaism is an adaptive outgrowth of the de-
fense of reaction formation, a mechanism that can maladap-
tively make the person's desires all bad and the needs of
others all good. Using reaction formation, an ex-drinker who
suddenly declares drinking as a filthy habit annoys his friends.
Using altruism, the ex-alcoholic who serves as a sponsor to a
new Alcoholics Anonymous member achieves a transforma-
tive process enjoyed by giver and receiver.
My wife, five months pregnant, was interviewing a
couple from the Core City sample to whom our study
offered no compensation. The greatest pain in their life was
having lost six children through Rh incompatibility. As my
wife got up to leave, the childless wife, whose grief and
envy can only be imagined, gave my wife a handsome,
handmade baby sweater. The lives of everyone in the room
had been suddenly enriched.
92 January 2000 • American Psychologist
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Sublimation
The sign of a successful defense is neither careful cost
account i ng nor shrewd compr omi se, but rather psychi c
al chemy. Upon an i nani mat e Attic vase John Keats di scov-
e r e d - a n d s ha r e d- - a n at t enuat ed yet passi onat e sexuality.
In "Ode on a Greci an Urn, " Keats conveyed a mi racul ous
concept : "Mor e happy, happy love! / For ever war m and
still to be enj oyed. / For ever pant i ng and forever young. "
Wi t h mar vel ous cont rol of l anguage Keats t urned lust,
perhaps even i mmi nent r a p e - - " Wh a t mai dens l ot h? / What
mad pursui t ? What st ruggl e to e s c a pe ? " - - i nt o mor e happy
love. A less poet i c member of the study wrote, "I have
t wi ce the sex dri ve of my wife. We adjust oursel ves by
var yi ng our sex pl ay to suit each other. We bel i eve that
l ovemaki ng shoul d be pract i ced as an art !"
Thus, subl i mat i on al l ows an indirect resol ut i on of
conflict wi t h nei t her adverse consequences nor mar ked loss
of pleasure. Unl i ke the autistic fant asy of the child and the
schi zophreni c, artists can peddl e their most private dreams
to others. In cont rast , the mechani sm of act i ng o u t - - r a p e - -
dissipates the t orrent of our unmodul at ed affect on strang-
ers, and react i on f or mat i on dams such affect expressi on
compl et el y.
Finally, sublimation does more than make affect accept-
able; it also makes ideas exciting. In terms of their Harvard
grades and tested intellectual aptitudes, the men in the College
sample with brilliant teaching careers at Stanford and Harvard
were not more gifted than fellow study members teaching
j oyl essl y at mediocre institutions. Too often the less success-
ful professors in the College sample used displacement and
isolation so compul si vel y that their cognitive interests were
stripped of affect and passion. In every facet of their l i ves - -
not just their teaching and publ i shi ng- - t he successful profes-
sors were more comfortable in coloring their ideas with the
pi gment of emotion (Vaillant, 1977).
Suppression
Suppression (~toicism) is not as elegant as sublimation be-
cause suppression always sacrifices beauty for truth. Suppres-
sion has none of the humanity of altruism or humor, and
suppression is often regarded by psychotherapists as a vice,
not a virtue. When used effectively, however, suppression is
analogous to a well-trimmed sail; every restriction is precisely
calculated to exploit, not to hide, the winds of passion.
Suppression involves the semiconscious decision to
postpone payi ng attention to a conscious impulse and/or con-
flict. A critical difference between suppression and repression,
between suppression and isolation, and between stoical sup-
pression and Spartan reaction formation is the degree to which
suppression allows all the component s of conflict to exist at
least partially in consciousness (cf. Table 1). The distinction
between suppression and Pol l yanna' s dissociation or "neu-
rotic denial" is more complex. Bot h the stoic person and the
person behaving like Pol l yanna note that clouds have silver
linings, but Pollyanna leaves her umbrella at home. Evidence
that suppression is not a conscious cognitive strategy as many
believe is provided by the fact that jails woul d empt y if
delinquents could learn to j ust say no.
As an exampl e of suppressi on, the nor mal life t empo
of one hi ghl y energet i c Col l ege sampl e man was to wor k a
60- hour week as chi ef execut i ve officer of t wo large cor-
porat i ons and then run for six miles on Sunday to relax.
However , he descri bed a navy di vi ng acci dent that t ook
pl ace duri ng Wor l d War I I in the f ol l owi ng manner: He
was 40 feet underwat er; his air val ve was j ammed; his radio
did not wor k; and he knew that onl y ei ght mi nut es of air
were left in his di vi ng helmet. He r ecogni zed t hat there was
not hi ng that he coul d do for himself. "I t hought my end had
c o me . . , st ruggl i ng woul d not have hel ped and used
maybe three times as much air. I di dn' t pray. I mer el y sat,
very much like an ol d cow, and wai t ed f or h e l p - - v e r y
unhappy. " He knew his feelings, and he knew t hey woul d
not help, so he suppressed t hem until he was rescued. The
delicate ment al bal ance i nvol ved in successful suppressi on
is as vol unt ar y and as i nvol unt ar y as wal ki ng on a tight-
rope. Such bal ance seems easy f or the accompl i shed, co-
ordi nat ed acrobat and seems utterly i mpossi bl e and anxi et y
pr ovoki ng for ever yone else.
Anticipation
As with altruism, the use of anticipation is often voluntary and
independent of conflict resolution. Rather, it is in cases of "hot
cognition" that anticipation becomes an involuntary copi ng
skill. I f suppression reflects the capacity to keep current im-
pulse in mi nd and control it, anticipation is the capacity to
keep affective response to an unbearable future in mind.
The defense of ant i ci pat i on reflects the capaci t y t o
percei ve future danger affect i vel y as well as cogni t i vel y
and by this means to mast er confl i ct in small steps. In the
1950s, as scientists began the deliberate st udy of heal t hy
adaptation, Irvi ng Janis (1958) di scover ed t hat moderat e
amount s of anxi et y before surgery pr omot ed adaptation. At
the Nat i onal Institute of Ment al Health, Davi d Hambur g
and his col l eagues (Fri edman, Chodof f , Mason, & Ham-
burg, 1963) not ed the val ue of ant i ci pat ory mour ni ng in
parents of children wi t h l eukemi a. Psychi at ri st s responsi bl e
for prepari ng Peace Corps vol unt eers not ed that vol unt eer s'
capaci t y to anticipate future affect i ve difficulty better pre-
di ct ed subsequent adapt at i on t han did their apparent emo-
tional stability on psychol ogi cal tests (Ezekiel, 1968).
Ant i ci pat i on differs in an i mport ant way f r om usi ng
i sol at i on and i nt el l ect ual i zat i on to make soot hi ng "lists. "
Ant i ci pat i on i nvol ves mor e t han j ust the ideational work of
cogni t i ve pl anni ng. Ant i ci pat i on i nvol ves bot h t hi nki ng
and feel i ng about the future. For exampl e, consi der leg-
endar y aviators, like Charl es Li ndber gh and Chuck Yeager.
They cal ml y survi ved exci t i ng fl yi ng careers by deal i ng
with stress as Mi t hradat es did with poi s on- - t a ki ng a little
at a time. To have underest i mat ed danger woul d have been
fatal. To have exaggerat ed danger woul d have been emo-
t i onal l y incapacitating. Thus, t hey worri ed in advance, t hey
made lists, and t hey practiced. Then, appreci at i ng that t hey
had prepared as well as t hey coul d, t hey relaxed. Li ke
suppressi on and altruism, ant i ci pat i on is so easy to pre-
scribe but so difficult to do.
94 Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Humo r
We all r ecogni ze t hat h u mo r ma k e s l i fe easier. As S. Fr eud
( 1905/ 1960) suggest ed, " Hu mo r can be r egar ded as t he hi gh-
est o f t hese def ens i ve pr oces s es , " f or h u mo r " s cor ns t o wi t h-
dr aw t he i deat i onal cont ent bear i ng the di st r essi ng af f ect f r o m
cons ci ous at t ent i on, as r epr es s i on does, and t hus s ur mount s
t he a ut oma t i s m o f def ens e" (p. 233). Hu mo r per mi t s t he
expr essi on o f e mot i on wi t hout i ndi vi dual di s c omf or t and
wi t hout unpl eas ant ef f ect s on ot hers. Hu mo r , l i ke ant i ci pat i on
and suppr essi on, is such a sensi bl e copi ng devi ce t hat it ought
t o be consci ous, but a l mos t b y defi ni t i on, h u mo r al ways
sur pr i ses peopl e. Li ke t he ot her mat ur e def enses, h u mo r r e-
qui r es t he s a me del i cacy as bui l di ng a hous e o f c a r d s - - t i mi n g
is ever yt hi ng. The saf et y o f humor , l i ke t he saf et y o f dr e a ms
dur i ng RE M sl eep, depends on cat apl exy. Pe opl e see all and
feel muc h, but t hey do not act.
Hu mo r k e e p s b o t h i de a and a f f e c t in mi nd. Ma t u r e
h u mo r a l l o ws p e o p l e t o l ook di r e c t l y at wh a t is pa i nf ul ,
wh e r e a s di s s oc i a t i on a nd s l a ps t i c k di s t r act p e o p l e so t hat
t he y l o o k s o me wh e r e el se. Mu c h o f h u mo r i s l os t i n t he
r et el l i ng. Thus , unl i ke B e e t h o v e n ' s s ubl i ma t i on, h u mo r i s
di f f i cul t t o i l l ust r at e. Hu mo r , l i ke a r a i n b o w, i s r eal but
f o r e v e r e v a d e s our gr as p.
Adapti ve or Health-Promoting
Defenses Ma y Be Inde_pendent of
Social Class and Gender
Th e s t udy a s s e s s e d d e f e n s e s o f t he Co r e Ci t y me n a nd o f
t he Co l l e g e me n at a g e 47 a nd o f t he T e r ma n wo me n at a ge
77. De f e n s e s we r e i dent i f i ed b y b e h a v i o r a l vi gne t t e ( Vai l -
l ant , 1992). The n, t he r a t i o o f a d a p t i v e l e ve l de f e ns e s t o
l ess a d a p t i v e d e f e n s e s wa s c a l c ul a t e d, a nd t he r at i o wa s
c o n v e r t e d t o a 1- t o- 9 scal e. Ta b l e 2 i l l us t r at es t hat s uch
qua nt i f i c a t i on o f a d a p t i v e n e s s o f d e f e n s e s wa s r e l a t i v e l y
i n d e p e n d e n t o f y e a r s o f e duc a t i on, I Q, a nd pa r e nt a l s oci al
cl as s . Ad mi t t e d l y , wi t hi n e a c h c ohor t t he r a n g e o f s oc i o-
e c o n o mi c s t at us wa s t r unc a t e d; ne ve r t he l e s s , wi t hi n t he
Cor e Ci t y c o h o r t bot h I Q a nd e d u c a t i o n p r e d i c t e d f ut ur e
o c c u p a t i o n a l pr e s t i ge and s oci al cl as s ( p < . 0 0 1 ) - - j u s t not
t he a d a p t i v e n e s s o f de f e ns e s .
Tabl e 2
Correlation of Social Antecedents With Adaptiveness
of Defenses
Adapt i veness of defenses
Col l ege Cor e Ci t y Terman
Ant ecedent (n = 154 a) (n = 189 °) I n = 40)
Years of education .13 .10 .33*
IQ .04 .14 .07
Parental social class .11 .00 .13
° Sampl e si ze is r educed. To cont r ol conf ounder s, men wi t h I Qs l ess t han 86,
depr essi on, al cohol dependence, and schi zophr eni a we r e excl uded.
* p < . 05. ( Spear man r ank cor r el at i on coef f i ci ent was used.)
I f t he t hr ee s ampl es are cont r ast ed wi t h each ot her, 34%
o f t he Te r ma n wome n, 25% o f t he pr i vi l eged Col l ege men,
and 22% o f t he l ess soci al l y and i nt el l ect ual l y pr i vi l eged Cor e
Ci t y me n mani f es t ed def ens es pr edomi nant l y at t he adapt i ve
l evel . The s e di f f er ences wer e not si gni fi cant and can be at-
t ri but ed t o di f f er ences in t he ori gi nal rul es f or sel ect i on.
Predictive Val i di t y
Longi t udi na l s t udy not onl y f a c i l i t a t e d r a t e r r e l i a bi l i t y i n
t he i dent i f i cat i on o f d e f e n s e s ( Vai l l ant , 1992), but al s o
f aci l i t at ed t he d e mo n s t r a t i o n o f p r e d i c t i v e val i di t y. Thus ,
r o u g h l y 20 y e a r s a f t e r t he r e l a t i ve a d a p t i v e n e s s o f d e f e n s e s
wa s r at ed, t he phys i c a l heal t h a nd t he p s y c h o s o c i a l adj us t -
me n t o f t he s t udy me n wa s a s s e s s e d b y r at er s u n a wa r e o f
t he c ondi t i ons o f t he p a r t i c i p a n t s ' l i ves b e f o r e a g e 50.
Se pa r a t e r a t i ngs we r e o b t a i n e d f or e v i d e n c e o f s u b j e c t i v e
and o b j e c t i v e me nt a l a nd p h y s i c a l heal t h.
Ta bl e 3 i l l ust rat es the p o we r o f scal ed adapt i venes s o f
def ens es t o pr edi ct mul t i pl e f acet s o f pos i t i ve health. For
cont rast , Ta bl e 3 al so pr es ent s the p o we r o f at t ai ned soci al
cl ass ( me a s ur e d by year s o f educat i on) and t he p o we r o f t rai t
neur ot i ci sm me a s ur e d c ont e mpor a ne ous l y at age 65 b y t he
NE O Per sonal i t y I nve nt or y ( Cos t a & Mc Cr a e , 1985; Mc Cr a e
& Cost a, 1985) t o pr edi ct the s a me var i abl es. Be c a us e ment al
illness can l ead bot h t o ma l a da pt i ve def ens es and t o poor
f ut ur e heal t h, me n wi t h al cohol dependence, ma j o r depr es s i ve
di sorder, schi zophr eni a, or I Qs l ess t han 85 wer e omi t t ed f r o m
t he t est s o f pr edi ct i ve val i di t y in Ta bl e 3. Ha d ment al l y ill
par t i ci pant s been i ncl uded, the pr edi ct i ve p o we r o f de f e ns e
choi ce woul d ha ve been great er.
As s h o wn in Ta b l e 3, p s y c h o s o c i a l a d j u s t me n t ( obj e c -
t i ve) , soci al s uppor t s ( obj e c t i ve ) , and ma r i t a l s a t i s f a c t i on
( s ubj e c t i ve ) we r e a s s e s s e d b y i n d e p e n d e n t r at er s wh o i nt e-
gr a t e d da t a f r o m s e v e n q u e s t i o n n a i r e s f r o m t he Co l l e g e and
Cor e Ci t y me n a nd t wo que s t i onna i r e s f r o m t he wi v e s o f
t he Co l l e g e me n. P s y c h o s o c i a l a d j u s t me n t f r o m a ge 50 t o
a ge 65 wa s a s s e s s e d b y e v i d e n c e o f j o b p r o mo t i o n s and
e n j o y me n t , ma r i t a l s t abi l i t y, g a me s wi t h ot her s , a nd no us e
o f ps yc hi a t r i s t s or t r a nqui l i z e r s ( Vai l l ant , Me y e r , Mu k a -
r eal , & Sol dz, 1998; Va i l l a nt & Vai l l ant , 1990b) . Soc i a l
s uppor t s f r o m a ge s 50 t o 70 we r e a s s e s s e d b y e v i d e n c e o f
c l os e r e l a t i ons wi t h wi ve s , chi l dr en, s i bl i ngs , a nd s oci al
n e t wo r k , as wel l as b y s t r engt h o f r e l i gi ous af f i l i at i on, t he
p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e o f a c onf i da nt e , a nd g a me s wi t h
f r i ends ( Va i l l a nt et al., 1998).
J oy in l i vi ng ( subj ect i ve) wa s quant i f i ed by s u mmi n g
each ma n ' s sat i sf act i on ove r the pas t 20 year s (on a 5- poi nt
scal e) in f our l i fe areas ( mar r i age, chi l dren, j ob, and f r i ends)
and by t hen addi ng his bes t scor e f r om one o f f our addi t i onal
ar eas ( hobbi es, sport s, c o mmu n i t y act i vi t i es, or r el i gi on)
(Vai l l ant , 1999). Physi cal f unct i oni ng ( subj ect i ve) f or t he Col -
l ege me n f r om ages 70 t o 75 and f or t he Cor e Ci t y me n f r om
ages 60 t o 65 wa s as s es s ed by r epeat edl y moni t or i ng i nst ru-
ment al a c t Mt i e s o f l i vi ng (e. g. , abi l i t y t o c l i mb stairs, wal k
t wo mi l es, car r y sui t cases, and dr i ve at ni ght ; Vai l l ant , Or av,
Me ye r , McCul l ough, & Rost on, 1996).
Fi nal l y, Ta b l e 3 i l l us t r at es t hat a d a p t i v e d e f e n s e s
t r a n s f o r m onl y t he p e r c e p t i o n o f r eal i t y, not r eal i t y i t sel f .
Thus , a d a p t i v e de f e ns e s p r e d i c t e d t he a b s e n c e o f subjective
J a n u a r y 2000 • Ame r i c a n Ps y c h o l o g i s t 95
T a b l e 3
Late Life Consequences of Adaptive Defenses at Ages 2 0 - 4 7
Co r e Ci t y (n = 137 °) Col l ege (n = 154 °}
Year s of Adapt i veness Years o f Adapt i veness
Evi dence educat i on of defenses Neur ot i ci sm educat i on o f defenses Neur ot i ci sm
Obj ecti ve evidence
Income (midlife) . 2 5 * * . 2 5 * * - . 0 8
Psychosocial ad ustment (ages 50- 65)
(Vai ant & Vai ant, 1990b) .16 .51 * * * .08
Social supports b (Vaillant et al., 1998) .12 . 4 4 " * * . 00
Subjective evidence
Joy in living b .14 . 37 . . . . .18
Mari tal satisfaction (midlife) .01 . 30 . . . . .16
Subjective physical functioning b . 07 . 32" * * .16
Obj ecti ve physical health c
Objective physical health decline .09 . 14 - . 0 9
.05 .28 . . . . .08
- . 01 .34 . . . . . 24* *
.13 . 3 4 * * * - . 1 5
.03 .35 . . . . . 3 4 * * *
. 09 . 18" - . 0 4
.13 . 23* - . 2 8 * *
.01 . 04 - . 1 3
N o t e . Neur ot i ci sm was measured wi t h t he N E e Personal i t y I nvent ory.
° Sampl e si ze is r educed because men wh o di ed bef or e a g e 6 5 ar e excl uded, b Measur ed at age 6 5 f or t he Co r e Ci t y men and measured at a g e 7 5 f or t he Col l ege
men. c 1 = w e l l , 2 - m i n o r i r r e v e r s i b l e i l l n e s s , 3 = c h r o n i c i l l n e s s , 4 = d i s a b l i n g i l l n e s s , 5 = d e a d ( Vai l l ant , 1979) . Measur ed at age 6 0 f or Co r e Ci t y men and
at a g e 7 0 f or Col l ege men.
* p < . 05. * * p < . 01. * * * p < . 0 0 1 . ( Spear man r ank cor r el at i on coef f i ci ent was used.)
physi cal di s a bi l i t y- - up t o 30 years l a t e r - - but such de-
fenses did not predi ct physi cal heal t h decl i ne (objective)
assessed by an i ndependent internist.
The poi nt of Tabl e 3 is that the rel at i ve adapt i veness
of defenses ( measur ement descri bed in Vaillant, 1992,
1993, and schemat i zed in the DSM- I V) may of f er as good
a met ri c for posi t i ve ment al health (Vaillant & Schnurr,
1988) as there is. For t wo very soci oeconomi cal l y diverse
sampl es of men, i ncome, obj ect i ve psychosoci al adjust-
ment, social supports, marital satisfaction, subj ect i ve phys-
ical funct i oni ng, and j oy in l i vi ng were mor e hi ghl y corre-
lated wi t h adapt i ve defenses measur ed 20 years earlier t han
with either educat i on or neurot i ci sm.
Specific Examples
Ps ychol ogy needs to know mor e not onl y about the mea-
surement of posi t i ve mental health but al so about how
peopl e exposed to severe ri sk fact ors mai nt ai n posi t i ve
ment al health. I address four maj or ri sk factors: chi l dhood
povert y, the physi cal limitations of ol d age, stressful life
events, and severe combat . First, the 70 Cor e Ci t y men who
mani fest ed the most adapt i ve defenses were j ust as likely to
have come f r om wel fare fami l i es in Soci al Class V (Hol -
l i ngshead & Redl i ch, 1958) as were the 73 men with the
least adapt i ve defenses. In contrast, as adults onl y 1% of
men wi t h the most mat ure defenses but 21% of men wi t h
the least mat ure defenses were in Soci al Class V. I n short,
adapt i ve defenses may cat al yze escape f r om povert y.
Second, Figure 1 depicts the subjective physical func-
tioning at age 65 of those Core City men who were still in
good physical health at age 50. In other words, the figure
includes onl y those men whose defense levels could not have
been impaired by prior poor health. The more domi nant their
use of adaptive defenses between ages 20 and 47, the more
likely they were at 65 to report being able to climb stairs, wal k
long distances, and engage in vi gorous physical activities that
they enjoyed. As Table 3 shows, however, their objective
physical health was uncorrelated with defense level.
Fi gur e 1
Core City Men Without Disability at Age 50 Who
We r e Still Wi t hout Disability 15 Years Af t er t he Initial
Study
n=l O
100
95
~. 90
2
85
-~ 80
75
• ~ 70
o
• " 65 r-.
6o
55
50
0-1 2 3 4 5
Us e of Ada pt i ve De f e ns e s
N o t e . The per cent age of men wi t h no si gni f i cant di sabi l i t y wa s based on a
subjective di sabi l i t y score o f 10 t hr ough 14. This meant t hat t he men had not
gi ven up any ma j o r act i vi t y and we r e still abl e t o move heavy f urni t ure a n d / o r
c hop w o o d , wa l k t wo miles, and cl i mb t wo flights of stairs wi t hout resting, al bei t
sometimes mor e sl owl y. Use o f a d a p t i v e defenses was r at ed on a scal e f rom 0
( u n i m p o r t a n t o r a b s e n t ) t o 5 ( s t y l e d o m i n a n t ) .
96 Januar y 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Fi gure 2
Likelihood of Depression Covaried With Total Life
Stress and With Adaptiveness of Defenses
100
9 0
8 0
7O
6 0
ca
Ca 5 0
ca
40
t t l
~, 30
20
10
I - O - M e n w i t h t o t a l l i f e s t r e s s s c o r e s > 2 0 I n = 4
I
- - x - M___en w i t h t o t a l l i f e s t r e s s s c o r e s < 2 1 Ii ~ )
n = 5
X )( X X
n = 1 5 n = 1 4 n = 1 5 n = 7 n = 3 n = 2
5 4 3 2 1 0
Us e o f A d a p t i v e D e l ? n s e s
N o t e . Use of adapt i ve defenses was rated on a scale from 0 ( u n i m p o r t a n t o r
absen 0 to 5 [style d o m i n a n t ) .
Third, the number of stressful life events in the adult
lives of the College men from ages 20 to 60 was studied
prospectively (Cui & Vaillant, 1996). The number and sever-
ity of such life events both pr e di c t e d- a nd resulted f r om- - t he
occurrence of maj or depressive disorder. Figure 2 illustrates
that maj or depressive disorder occurred only among men with
high life stress scores. However, the men who depl oyed the
most adaptive defenses could still experience multiple stress-
ful life events without risk of maj or depression.
Fi nal l y, adapt i ve defenses also mi t i gat ed the strong
associ at i on bet ween severe combat and later sympt oms of
post -t raumat i c stress di sorder (PTSD) among the Col l ege
sample. (In our study, s ympt oms of PTSD coul d be al most
entirely expl ai ned by severi t y of Wor l d War II combat
careful l y quantified in 1946; Lee, Vaillant, Torrey, & El-
der, 1995; Wel l s & Woods , 1946.) Of t he 33 Col l ege men
who experi enced the most severe combat , the 16 men who
depl oyed most adapt i ve defenses report ed an average of
0. 19 PTSD sympt oms. The 17 men wi t h less adapt i ve
defenses who had had similarly hi gh combat exposure
report ed an average of 1.70 PTSD sympt oms, t(31) = 2.75,
p = . 0t , two-tailed. It is significant that pri or t o the war, the
t wo groups of men did not differ in physi cal sympt oms
with stress, and in late mi ddl e life t hey did not differ in
neurot i ci sm.
How Do Defenses Wor k?
How do mature defenses work to promot e a positive psychol -
ogy (enhanced ability to work, love, and play) and at the same
time to reduce conflict and cognitive dissonance? Table 1
presented a range of defenses rank ordered as in the DSM-IV.
The DSM-1V suggests that the mechani sms at "the high adap-
tive level" not only maxi mi ze gratification but also "promot e
an opt i mum balance among conflicting mot i ves" (Ameri can
Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 752). Again, whether one
views such a response as making the best of a bad situation or
as transformative depends on the vantage point of the ob-
server. Thus, unlike less adaptive mechanisms, mature de-
fenses synthesize and attenuate rather than deny and distort
conflicting sources of human behavior like conscience, reality,
interpersonal relations, and emotions. The best-of-a-bad-situ-
ation point of view woul d note that predominant use of
adaptive defenses simply means that such individuals did not
cope by using less balanced mechanisms like schizoid fantasy
and projection, which are strongly predictive of poor out-
comes. Unlike acting out. which denies conscience, or reac-
tion formation, which denies emotion, or schizoid fantasy
which denies real people, or projection, which denies the
subject, or psychotic defenses, which deny objective reality,
mature defenses elegantly balance and attenuate these multi-
ple sources of conflict. Ballet dancing, Albert Rot henberg' s
"Janusian creativity," Beet hoven producing a symphony
fueled by despair and rage, people with physical disabilities
deriving hope and self-esteem from helping others with dis-
abilities all reflect the transformative nature of achieving psy-
chic balance.
Beyond the above suggestions, psychol ogy really does
not know how defenses work. Do adaptive defenses reflect
inborn traits te.g., perfect pitch or a capacity for higher math-
ematics)? Or do adaptive defenses reflect traits that are ac-
quired through education and maturation (e.g., good diction or
a graceful backhand)? Should psychol ogy view adaptive de-
fenses as virtues (like empat hy and creativity)? Or should
psychol ogy view such defenses as adaptive self-deceptions to
resolve conflict as did Anna Freud when she quipped that
altruism came not from the goodness "but from the badness of
his heart" (Sandler & Freud, 1985, p. 176)? I believe that the
correct answer to all four questions is yes, but more research
is needed.
As Tabl e 2 shows, the et i ol ogy of adapt i ve defenses is
as obscure as the et i ol ogy of creat i vi t y or athletic prowess.
Al t hough genes, social envi ronment , and the absence of
brain disease undoubt edl y each pl ay a role, the associ at i on
of adapt i ve defenses with posi t i ve ps ychol ogy is most
pr onounced among individuals f r om dysfunct i onal families
(Vaillant, 1993). The best definition of c r e a t i vi t y- - or of an
adapt i ve def ens e- - i s putting somet hi ng of value in the
wor l d that was not there before. It is the t ransformat i ve,
creat i ve qual i t y that makes the adapt i ve defenses mor e than
j ust heal t hy wound healing.
Conclusion
This article raises quest i ons that must be sol ved i f psychol -
ogists are to devel op a sci ence of posi t i ve psychol ogy.
First, how shoul d ps ychol ogy quant i fy posi t i ve ment al
heal t h? At present, ps ychol ogy has no metric except per-
haps scores of great er than 85 on the DSM-1V' s Axi s V
(Gl obal Assessment of Funct i oni ng). I f mor e reliable met h-
January 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st 97
ods for assessi ng t he rel at i ve mat uri t y of def enses can be
devel oped, ps ychol ogy may gai n a means of quant i f yi ng
t he t heoret i cal f or mul a for posi t i ve ment al heal t h that
Mar i e Jahoda (1959) of f er ed to ps ychol ogy 40 years ago.
She suggest ed t he same synt hesi s bet ween affect i ve life
and pract i cal real i t y that is refl ect ed in t he concept ual i za-
t i on of adapt i ve- l evel def enses. Jahoda suggest ed that men-
tally heal t hy i ndi vi dual s shoul d be or i ent ed t owar d t he
fut ure and effi ci ent in pr obl em sol vi ng. They shoul d be
resi st ant to st ress and per cei ve real i t y wi t hout di st ort i on.
They shoul d pos s es s empat hy and be abl e to l ove and to
pl ay as wel l as to work. They shoul d r emai n in t ouch wi t h
t hei r own feel i ngs. In short, t hey shoul d mani f est ant i ci pa-
tion, suppr essi on, al t rui sm, humor , and subl i mat i on.
In addi t i on, ps ychol ogy needs to under st and how best
to faci l i t at e t he t r ansmut at i on of l ess adapt i ve def ens es i nt o
mor e adapt i ve def enses. My own suggest i ons (Vai l l ant ,
1995) have been first to i ncr ease social suppor t s and inter-
per sonal safet y and second to faci l i t at e t he i nt act ness of t he
cent ral ner vous s ys t em (e. g. , rest, nut ri t i on, and sobri et y).
However , t he newer f or ms of i nt egrat i ve psychot her api es
al so can cat al yze such change, and t hr oughout this j our nal
i ssue t her e are furt her cl ues.
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98 January 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Psychological Resources, Positive Illusions,
and Health
Shelley E. Tayl or and Margaret E. Kemeny
Geoffrey M. Reed
Julienne E. Bower and Tara L. Gruenewald
University of California, Los Angeles
American Psychological Association
University of California, Los Angeles
Psychological beliefs such as optimism, personal control,
and a sense of meaning are known to be protective of
mental health. Are they protective of physical health as
well? The authors" present a program of research that has
tested the implications of cognitive adaptation theory, and
research on positive illusions f or the relation of positive
beliefs to disease progression among men infected with
HIV. The investigations have revealed that even unrealis-
tically' optimistic beliefs about the f ut ure may be health
protective. The abili~' to f i nd meaning in the experience is
also associated with a less rapid course of illness. Taken
together, the research suggests" that psychological beliefs
such as meaning, control, and optimism act as resources,
which may not only preserve mental health in the context of
traumatic or life-threatening events but be protective of
physical health as well.
O
Ptimism, a sense of personal control, and the
ability to find meaning in one s life experiences
are valuable psychological resources long be-
lieved to be associated with mental health (Frankl, 1963;
Seligman, 1998; Taylor, 1989). These psychosocial re-
sources become especially important when people are
faced with challenging or threatening events (Taylor,
1983). They may act as reserves, enabling people to cope
more effectively with such events. In this article, we ad-
dress a related question: Can the psychological resources of
optimism, personal control, and meaning not only buffer
peopl e psychologically against adverse responses to illness
but actually influence health in a beneficial direction?
Our work on this issue began with the formulation of
cognitive adaptation theory (Taylor, 1983), which evolved
from an interview study with breast cancer patients (e.g.,
Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984). We were originally
guided by an effort to identity those resources that would
help women return to their previous level of functioning
after going through a traumatic and potentially life-threat-
ening event. The emotional and poignant interviews re-
vealed that rather than getting back to normal, most of the
women reported that their lives had changed, in some ways
for the better. Some noted that they had a new sense of
themselves as being strong and resilient. Others talked
about their ability to reestablish priorities and to make time
for the activities that were most important to them. Most
noted that certain social relationships, such as those with
their family and close friends, took on particular signifi-
cance and became the activities to which they devoted most
of their time and attention.
A surprising, somewhat startling finding of the re-
search was that some of the positive beliefs these women
developed about their breast cancer experience were illu-
sory (Taylor, 1983). Many women expressed the bel i ef that
they could personally control the cancer and keep it f r om
coming back. Others insisted they had been cured, although
their records showed t hem to have progressing illness.
Despite the fact that these beliefs were inconsistent with
objective medical evidence, they were associated with the
criteria normally associated with mental health and not
with psychological distress (Taylor, 1983; Tayl or et al.,
1984). Moreover, there was no evidence that when these
beliefs were disconfirmed by subsequent illness progres-
sion, the women were left worse off for their overly posi-
tive perceptions. Since that time, we have uncovered sim-
ilar findings in studies with peopl e infected by HIV or with
AIDS (Reed, Kemeny, Taylor, Wang, & Visscher, 1994)
and with heart disease (Helgeson & Taylor, 1993); other
researchers have also observed that life-threatening events
often confer surprising advantages (Leedham, Meyerowitz,
Muirhead, & Frist, 1995; Petrie, Buick, Weinman, &
Booth, in press; Rose, Derry, & McLachlan, 1995; Shifren,
1996).
The disconcerting illusory component of these beliefs,
however, remained a mystery. There was little precedent in
the mental health literature for understanding this finding,
inasmuch as most theories of mental health consider con-
tact with reality to be a critical aspect of positive mental
Shelley E. Taylor, Margaret E. Kemeny, Julienne E. Bower, and Tara L.
Gruenewald, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los
Angeles; Geoffrey M. Reed, Practice Directorate, American Psychologi-
cal Association.
The research described in this article was supported by National
institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Grant MH 42918, National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases Grant N01-A1-72631, NIMH Research
Scientist Development Award MH00820, Universitywide AIDS Research
Program New Investigator Award K92LA013, NIMH Training Grant MH
15750, and funds from the MacArtbur Foundation's Network on Socio-
economic Status and Health. NIMH Grant MH 056880 provided support
for the preparation of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Shelley E. Taylor, Department of Psychology, University of California,
405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1563. Electronic mail may
be sent to [email protected].
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association. inc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00
Vol. 55, No. I. 99-109 DOI: 10. I037//0003-066X.55.1.99
99
She!ley E.
Taylor
functioning (e.g., Jahoda, 1958). The social cognition lit-
erature, however, provided considerable evidence that nor-
mal human perception is marked by three mild and robust
positive illusions, that is, beliefs that represent mild posi-
tive distortions of reality (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Self-
enhancement, unrealistic optimism, and an exaggerated
perception of personal control often characterize normal
thought (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Positive illusions appear
to have protective psychological effects generally that may
become especially important in the context of severely
threatening events. Our more recent empirical efforts have
focused on the implications that positive illusions may have
for physical health, especially for course of disease.
Psychological Resources and Course
of Disease
There are several reasons to believe that positive beliefs,
such as those that form the core of positive illusions, might
influence the course of physical disease. For example,
positive beliefs may have an impact on emotional states,
which may affect the physi ol ogy and neuroendocrine un-
derpinnings of disease states. Although few studies have
investigated the relation of positive mental states to disease
course, a number of negative emotional states have been
tied directly to physiological changes prognostic for illness
and to the devel opment of several chronic diseases (Cohen
& Herbert, 1996; Frasure-Smith, Lesperance, & Talajic,
1995; Friedman & Boot h-Kewl ey, 1987; Herbert & Cohen,
1993). Such psychological states as depression and anxiety,
for example, have a variety of physiological concomitants
and have been related to altered i mmune processes (Herbert
& Cohen, 1993) and to the devel opment and course of
coronary heart disease (Boot h-Kewl ey & Friedman, 1987;
Frasure-Smith et al., 1995). In both cross-sectional and
longitudinal research, chronic dysphoric emotion has pre-
dicted vulnerability to a broad array of illnesses, as well as
a risk of early mortality (Friedman & Boot h-Kewl ey, 1987;
Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988). Although positive
and negative affective states are not polar opposites, often
being only modestly correlated in these investigations,
there is independent evidence that positive emotional states
are linked to positive physiological changes in both exper-
imental studies (Futterman, Kemeny, Shapiro, & Fahey,
1994) and longitudinal studies (Stone, Cox, Valdimarsdot-
tir, Jandorf, & Neale, 1987). Perhaps, then, positive beliefs
are tied to physiological changes by positive affect. This
pathway gains credence from a study by Segerstrom, Tay-
lor, Kemeny, and Fahey (1998), who found that an asso-
ciation between opt i mi sm and higher numbers of CD4
(helper) T cells in stressed law school students was medi-
ated partially by the positive mood associated with
optimism.
Positive beliefs also may be connected to physical
disease by promot i ng better health behaviors. People who
have a positive sense of self-worth, bel i ef in their own
control, and opt i mi sm about the future may be more likely
to practice conscientious health habits and to use services
appropriately. Taylor, Kemeny, Aspinwall, Schneider,
Rodriguez, and Herbert (1992), for example, found that
men who were unrealistically optimistic about their ability
to stave of f the progression of the AIDS virus nonetheless
practiced better health habits than did their more pessimis-
tic counterparts.
A third basis for predicting a relationship between
positive beliefs and course of illness is based on the fact
that positive emotional states are believed to be associated
with good social relationships (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Optimistic, self-confident people with a sense of personal
control may have more social support or be more effective
at mobilizing it during times of stress (Taylor & Brown,
1994; but see Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995, for an
alternative view).
Finally, maj or stressors such as illness often produce
additional stressors, such as j ob loss, financial concerns,
caregiving responsibilities for others, or loss of social sup-
port, that may, in turn, exacerbate the course of illness;
such co-occurring stressors may be better managed by
people with well-developed psychosocial resources. For
example, optimism, a sense of personal control, and self-
est eem have been tied to active coping efforts (Aspinwall
& Taylor, 1997; Tayl or et al., 1992), which enable peopl e
to guard against or offset stressful events before their full
implications may be felt. Such abilities to cope actively and
proactively with respect to health may minimize adverse
physiological effects of stress.
H IV as a Disease Model for Studying
the Effects of Psychosocial Resources
on Health
Kemeny' s research program in psychoneuroi mmunol ogy
provided a venue for examining these important issues.
Much of Kemeny' s research has used HIV infection as a
disease model for understanding psychosocial influences
100 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
Margaret E.
Kemeny
on disease course, a model that has been useful for exam-
ining these processes for several reasons. First, there are a
large number of i nfect ed individuals who can be identified
early in the disease process at the asympt omat i c stage, so
one can chart the course of disease from the sympt om- f r ee
peri od forward. Wi t h many other diseases, such as cancer
and heart disease, researchers are t ypi cal l y less able to
identify participants at the asympt omat i c stage and instead
must wait until the disease is manifest.
Second, because the popul at i on with HI V is more
yout hful than is the case with many ot her chroni c diseases,
many of the difficulties inherent in exami ni ng psychosoci al
predictors of disease in ol der popul at i ons can be avoided.
In particular, with HIV, probl ems of comor bi di t y are few,
at least in the early stages of infection, and so the difficulty
of unravel i ng the influence of one chroni c probl em on
anot her often does not emer ge until quite late in the disease
process.
Third, there are known cofact ors that can be reliably
measured and cont rol l ed in statistical analyses to rule out
potential conf oundi ng fact ors in the study of psychosoci al
influences on the course of disease. In the case of HI V
infection, for exampl e, cont rol l i ng for age, al cohol con-
sumption, drug use, sleep, and medi cat i on use, as well as
ot her potential conf oundi ng variables, lends a preci si on to
the analytic phase that cannot be obt ai ned with diseases for
whi ch the cofact ors remai n l argel y elusive.
Fourth, being able to fol l ow a disease over a l ong
peri od of time, f r om the asympt omat i c peri od t hrough
death, enabl es one to evaluate several established routes
that may medi at e bet ween a psychosoci al variable of in-
terest as a predi ct or of disease course (Taylor, Repetti, &
Seeman, 1997). As j ust noted, these include changes in
affect i ve states, such as depressi on or anxiety; changes in
social support; differential practice of health habits or treat-
ment -seeki ng behavi ors and their potential role in the onset
o1" exacerbat i on of sympt oms; and differential exposure to
stressors, whi ch may chal l enge the i mmune syst em and
produce a more rapid course of illness.
Fifth, unlike many other chroni c diseases, HI V infec-
tion has meani ngful ordinal scales of disease progressi on.
These include the number of CD4 T l ymphocyt es and viral
load. The opport uni t y to l ook at these bi ol ogi cal markers of
disease progress is a significant advant age to health psy-
chol ogi st s attempting to pl ot dose- r esponse relationships
or to study the psychosoci al pr edi ct or - di sease course rela-
tionship over different stages in the course of disease.
A sixth advant age of HI V as a disease model is that
there are meani ngful clinical markers identified with HI V
infection: in particular, sympt om appearance, the di agnosi s
of AI DS, and ultimately death itself. Seventh, to the extent
that we underst and the psychosoci al factors that may be
related to disease course, there is a potential to devel op
interventions based on such data. Keepi ng peopl e heal t hy
as l ong as possible is an i mport ant goal for AI DS research-
ers; by underst andi ng the role of psychosoci al fact ors in
disease course, one may intervene with the hope of sl owi ng
disease progressi on (for an ext ended di scussi on of this
issue, see Col e & Kemeny, 1997, in press; Kemeny, 1994).
Finally, HI V as a disease model has the capaci t y to
silence, or at least subdue, critics of this line of wor k on
several fronts. Immunol ogi st s, for exampl e, are not neces-
sarily i mpressed when a psychosoci al fact or is seen to
produce changes in i mmunol ogi cal parameters, such as
natural killer cell activity or T cell cyt ot oxi ci t y. A glass of
wi ne or a brisk wal k can produce similar i mmunol ogi cal
changes. However, when they can see an effect on disease
course, t hey are more impressed. The reverse is often true
of health psychol ogi st s, who are not particularly surprised
to see a relationship bet ween a psychosoci al predi ct or and
a health out come, such as death, but are quite i mpressed by
changes in i mmunol ogi cal paramet ers that provi de clues
to the pat hways by whi ch such relationships may be
understood.
HI V is now more limited in its usefulness as a disease
model for such purposes because of recent devel opment s in
its management . The di scovery of protease inhibitors and
their wi despread use by peopl e infected with HI V leads at
least to disjunctions in the course of illness and often to the
elimination of the downwar d course of disease in peopl e
who adhere to treatment. The work report ed in this article
was devel oped in advance of these exciting devel opment s
and, as such, is unaffect ed by them.
Psychosocial Predictors and Course of
Illness in Men With HIV Infection
An analysis of the course of disease among peopl e infected
with HI V is a valuable cont ext for exami ni ng the benefits
of psychosoci al resources, such as positive illusions, be-
cause it provi des an opport uni t y to exami ne criticisms of
the t heor y' s framework. Some have suggest ed that posi t i ve
illusions may be beneficial as l ong as t hey remai n unchal-
lenged, but in ci rcumst ances when di sconfi rmat i on of
overl y optimistic beliefs is likely, those beliefs may lead to
January 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 101
Geoffrey M.
Reed
Photo by Cecilia
Jacobson
mal adj ust ment , specifically, psychol ogi cal distress and
other adverse consequences. Advanci ng or terminal disease
constitutes a severe chal l enge to the unrealistic opt i mi sm
and exaggerat ed sense of personal cont rol that mi ght oth-
erwise buffer an individual f r om the adverse consequences
of advanci ng disease.
Moreover, alternative theories have mai nt ai ned that
such beliefs as posi t i ve illusions may not be adapt i ve at the
final stages of life. Specifically, in her t heory of adj ust ment
to terminal illness, Kfibler-Ross (1969) charact eri zed ac-
cept ance as the final stage in adj ust ment to death, whi ch
oft en i mmedi at el y precedes it. She suggest ed that the ac-
cept ance stage is charact eri zed by a tired and peaceful
al t hough not necessari l y pleasant psychol ogi cal state and
by resi gnat i on to the prospect of death. In 1987, she ex-
plicitly ext ended these ideas to peopl e with AI DS, argui ng
that accept ance is psychol ogi cal l y adaptive, permi t t i ng
peopl e to come to terms with the inevitable, to make final
preparat i ons for their departure, and to use the time to say
their good- byes to fami l y and friends. Al t hough there has
been little empi ri cal support for Kt i bl er-Ross' s position
(Silver & Wor t man, 1980), her wor k has had great influ-
ence on public thinking and especially on clinical practice,
and so the merit of her posi t i on warrants attention.
The positive illusions f r amewor k makes quite differ-
ent predictions, argui ng that mi l dl y but unrealistically pos-
itive beliefs may be more adaptive than realistic beliefs,
even in the case of advanci ng disease. Moreover, such
beliefs are quite common. In a study of adj ust ment to HIV,
Tayl or et al. (1992) f ound that HIV-seroposi t i ve gay men
who were unrealistically optimistic about the future course
of their i nfect i on were better adjusted and coped more
act i vel y with their situation than those who were less
optimistic. Moreover, these unrealistically optimistic be-
liefs did not compr omi se their health behavi ors or risk-
related sexual behavior. The frequent but by no means
ubiquitous evi dence of these beliefs at the final stage of life
provi des an opport uni t y to compar e and evaluate these
quite different account s of what may constitute psychol og-
ical adj ust ment when faci ng the prospect of death. More-
over, as noted earlier, t hey provi de an opport uni t y to ext end
and test the rel evance of the positive illusions f r amewor k to
physi cal health as well.
Realistic Expectations and the Course
of AIDS
In a first study that tested these compet i ng f r amewor ks
(Reed et al., 1994), we recruited 78 gay men who had been
di agnosed with AI DS. These men were all participants in
the Multicenter AI DS Cohor t St udy (MACS), a multisite
col l aborat i ve longitudinal i nvest i gat i on of the natural his-
t ory of HI V infection and AI DS. Because the data were
col l ect ed in the late 1980s, the life expect ancy for these
men was not long, and consequent l y our sample was small.
The men we recruited were most l y White, had an average
age of 38 years, and were wel l -educat ed; at the time of the
study, they had been di agnosed with AI DS for about one
year. At the close of the study, t wo thirds of the men had
died. As part of Kemeny et al . ' s (1994) psychosoci al sub-
study with the MACS, these men compl et ed an extensive
quest i onnai re assessing their self-reported health status,
psychol ogi cal adjustment, psychol ogi cal responses to HI V
(items based on Fol kman & Lazar us' s, 1980, Ways of
Copi ng measure), and a number of st andardi zed scales,
such as the Li fe Orientation Test (LOT; Schei er & Carver,
1985), a measure of dispositional opt i mi sm, the Index of
Wel l - Bei ng (Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976), the
Hopel essness Scale (Beck, Wei ssman, Lester, & Trexler,
1974), and the Rosenber g Sel f-Est eem Scale (Rosenberg,
1965).
Of particular interest were the results of a fact or
analysis of copi ng responses to "t he effects of AI DS on
your health and the life-threatening nature of the illness."
One of the identified copi ng fact ors assessed realistic ac-
cept ance of one' s own death. Specifically, the items on this
factor, whi ch we called Realistic Accept ance, were "I tried
to accept what mi ght happen, " "I prepare mys el f for the
worst , " "I go over in my mi nd what I will say or do about
this probl em, " and the reverse-coded item "I refuse to
bel i eve that this probl em has happened. " Those who score
high on this fact or are essentially acknowl edgi ng the like-
l i hood of their risk for death, whereas those who score low
on it are not engaged psychol ogi cal l y or behavi oral l y with
the final stage of life. Compar i ng individuals who scored
hig_h on this fact or with those who scored l ow on it enabl ed
us to compar e Kubl er-Ross' predictions regardi ng adjust-
ment to the prospect of death with our own. Participants
were divided into high and l ow Realistic Accept ance on the
basis of a medi an split, and a survival analysis was
conduct ed.
Realistic accept ance of one' s own death did i ndeed
predict l ongevi t y. The men who scored hi gh on Realistic
Accept ance t ypi cal l y died nine mont hs earlier than those
102 January 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Julienne E.
Bower
who scored low. The analysis was repeated, controlling for
a wide variety of potential predictors of death, including
age, level of education, time since diagnosis, self-reported
health status, number of AIDS-related symptoms, level of
CD4 T helper cells, psychological distress, depression,
fatigue, presence or absence of suicidal ideation, initial
diagnosing condition, neuropsychological impairment, and
the use of zidovudine (AZT), which, at the time, was the
only treatment available to these men. The relation between
Realistic Acceptance and length of survival remained sig-
nificant when these variables were statistically controlled.
Through a second set of analyses we examined
whether any of the known pathways relating psychosocial
resources to disease course could account for the relation-
ship between realistic acceptance and more rapid course of
death. Specifically, a first plausible hypothesis is that peo-
ple who are accepting of their own death may engage in
poorer health behaviors that contribute to diminished sur-
vival time. However, analyses in which we controlled for
health habits rendered this route implausible as a mediator.
A second possibility is that people who are not accepting of
their death have high levels of social support, which pro-
longs life. This hypothesis, too, was not supported. A third
possibility is that realistic acceptance may lead people to
ignore relevant symptoms, to fail to seek prompt medical
attention, or to comply poorly with medical treatment.
However, analyses suggested that men high in realistic
acceptance were as careful as the men low in realistic
acceptance to take care of their health and were somewhat
more rather than less likely to be taking AZT. A fourth
possibility is that realistic acceptance might work its effect
on survival time by altering mood or emotional states. That
is, those accepting their death may greet that realization
with depression, whereas those who maintain unrealistic
optimism may be happier. However, analyses that con-
trolled for psychological distress--including the emotions
of hopelessness, anger, anxiety, guilt, and depressi on--
suggest this route is not accounting for the longer time to
death either.
The results of this study suggest, then, that the cus-
tomary explanations for the effects of psychosocial factors
on the course of illness cannot address this pattern of
results. Instead, cognitive beliefs reflecting the realistic
acceptance of the likelihood of death are associated with a
faster course of disease, and unrealistically optimistic be-
liefs are associated prospectively with somewhat greater
longevity. Further, there is no evidence that unrealistic
optimism simply prolonged the final stages just before
death. All of the men were weakening and had somewhat
restricted their activities, but there was no evidence that the
unrealistically optimistic men remained in the last phase of
life longer than those with a rapid course of death. The
study also suggests that a previously unexplored variable in
the relation of psychosocial predictors, namely positive
versus negative expectations about one' s illness, is related
to disease course. Because this concept is grounded in an
established model of psychological adjustment to illness, it
provides a strong theoretical position from which to design
subsequent investigations.
HIV Infection, Bereavement, Negative
Expectations, and Symptom Onset
To pursue these issues further, we (Reed, Kemeny, Taylor,
& Visscher~ 1999) conducted a prospective six-year longi-
tudinal investigation of the psychosocial predictors of dis-
ease progression, also with the MACS, that enrolled men
infected with HIV who were asymptomatic. The study had
several purposes. The first was to see if a relationship
between realistic acceptance and HIV progression could be
observed at other points in the disease process, and espe-
cially whether expectations constitute a psychosocial pre-
dictor of more rapid disease course in those who have not
experienced symptoms previously.
A second purpose was to explore these relations in the
context of bereavement. As noted earlier, intensely stress-
ful events such as illness are often associated with corre-
lated stressors, which may themselves exacerbate the
course of disease. One of the most common correlated
stressors among men with HIV infection is bereavement,
and so examining these issues in the context of bereave-
ment permits an examination of another pathway by which
psychosocial resources and illness progression may be re-
lated. Previous work has suggested that AIDS-related be-
reavement may be associated with disease progression in
HIV-infected individuals (Kemeny et al., 1995; Kemeny &
Dean, 1995). At the very least, these findings suggest the
importance of controlling for bereavement when examining
the relation of realistic acceptance to health outcomes in the
context of HIV, because reactions to bereavement may
exacerbate the course of disease or psychological states
related to lhe course of disease, such as depression.
A more intriguing possibility, suggested by Kemeny' s
research on bereavement and immune changes in men with
January 2000 • American Psychologist 103
Tara L.
Gruenewal d
HI V infection (Kemeny et al., 1994), is that the experience
of losing close friends or a partner to AIDS might poten-
tiate the effects of negative expectations. That is, the par-
ticipants in this study were infected with HIV, but they
were asymptomatic, and consequently their negative ex-
pectations, although present, may not have l oomed very
large in their lives. However, among those who had been
bereaved and who had direct, firsthand experience with a
close friend or partner who had died of AIDS, negative
expectations may have taken on a strength, clarity, and
specificity that had psychological significance and ulti-
mat el y significance for health outcomes as well.
For this study (Reed et al., 1999), we expanded our
assessment of negative expectations based on a factor anal-
ysis of scales measuring psychological responses to the risk
of HI V progression. From this analysis, we derived a
general measure of expectations, including the original four
realistic acceptance items, as well as conceptually related
items that included the perceived risk that one' s disease
would progress, perceived control over the risk of disease
progression (reverse scored), confidence that the disease
would progress, and AIDS-specific opt i mi sm (reverse
scored). A person with a high score on the negative HIV-
specific expectancies factor, then, perceives hi msel f to be at
high risk for disease progression, believes that he has little
control over that risk, experiences a low level of confidence
regarding the risk of disease progression, reports that he
accepts and prepares for the possibility of deteriorating
health, and has a low level of opt i mi sm regarding the future
course of his illness. We expected that high scores on this
measure would predict a more rapid onset of HIV-rel at ed
sympt oms among these previously asympt omat i c men over
the three-year time period, either alone or in conjunction
with bereavement.
To obtain the sample, we screened members of the
MACS to include men who knew they were HI V seropos-
itive, had CD4 T l ymphocyt e data over a two-and-a-half- to
three-and-a-half-year follow-up period, and were asymp-
tomatic initially with respect to HI V symptoms. Seventy-
two men met these criteria. Thirty-seven of the 72 partic-
ipants were bereaved, having experienced the death of a
close friend or primary partner within the 12 months prior
to the psychosocial assessment. The psychosocial assess-
ment consisted of the same questionnaires as described in
the first study, which included the HIV-rel at ed expectan-
cies measures. In addition, we had data from the Profile of
Mood States (POMS; which assesses current mood state)
and the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression
Scale (CES-D; as a measure of depression). Hierarchical
regression analyses were conducted to identify predictors
of sympt om appearance during the follow-up period. About
halt" the sample showed illness progression through the
appearance of one or more criterial sympt oms associated
with advancing disease, including persistent diarrhea, un-
intentional weight loss, persistent fevers, and persistent
night sweats.
Among bereaved participants, high scores on the neg-
ative HIV-specific expectancies measure were associated
with a greater likelihood of sympt om devel opment during
the follow-up period. Specifically, about two thirds of the
men in this group developed sympt oms, compared with
between 40% and 50% in all other conditions. This relation
is not changed when i mmune parameters, AZT, substance
abuse, depression, or high-risk sexual behavi or is entered
into the equation.
In this study, then, we found that negative HIV-spe-
cific expectancies were a significant predictor of the onset
of prognostically relevant sympt oms for AIDS among pre-
viously asympt omat i c HIV-seroposi t i ve gay men, but pri-
marily among those who had also been bereaved. This
pattern of findings supports the hypothesis that the experi-
ence of AIDS-related bereavement can potentiate the ef-
fects of negative expectations, leading to adverse health
effects.
As in the previous study, there was little evidence that
the pattern was mediated by the traditional routes that have
been studied by health psychologists seeking to understand
the effects of psychosocial variables on disease progres-
sion. Controlling for health habits does not diminish the
effect, nor is the pattern affectively mediated: Controls for
mood and for depression yielded no evidence that these
relations were mediated by affective changes. The study,
then, suggests that negative as opposed to positive expec-
tations are associated not only with a more rapid progres-
sion toward death among those diagnosed with AIDS but
with a more rapid onset of sympt oms in those who had
previously been asymptomatic.
Our findings thus far reveal the importance of psycho-
social resources that guard against the devel opment of
negative expectations. They suggest that a realistic ap-
praisal of one' s si t uat i on--namel y, the potential for dete-
riorating heal t h--cont ri but es to a more rapid course of the
very condition that is most feared. However, these studies
104 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
have not pr ovi ded an i ndi cat i on of what psychol ogi cal
states may be most prot ect i ve of health. We now t urn to
this issue.
Discovery of Meaning and Illness
Progression
I n a 1983 article on cogni t i ve adaptation, Tayl or (1983)
suggest ed that posi t i ve illusions may be adapt i ve in the face
of l i fe-t hreat eni ng illnesses, in part because t hey help peo-
ple find meani ng in the experi ence (cf. Frankl, 1963;
Yal om, 1980). The possi bi l i t y that stressful life event s may
pr ovoke posi t i ve psychol ogi cal changes, i ncl udi ng finding
meani ng f r om the experi ence, has gai ned i ncreasi ng r ecog-
nition in the literature on r ecover y f r om t r auma (e.g.,
Affl eck & Tennen, 1996; I ckovi cs & Park, 1998; Janoff-
Bul man & McPher son Frantz, 1997; Schaefer & Moos,
1992; Tedeschi & Cal houn, 1995; Tedeschi , Park, & Cal-
houn, 1998). Al t hough there is substantial evi dence that the
ability t o find meani ng in a t raumat i c or stressful event,
i ncl udi ng a serious illness, is oft en psychol ogi cal l y adap-
tive (Mendol a, Tennen, Affl eck, McCann, & Fitzgerald,
1990; Schwart zberg, 1993; Thompson, 1991), there has
pr evi ousl y been little effort to relate the di scover y of mean-
ing t o disease states. In essence, then, we turned the ques-
tion t hat gui ded the pr evi ous i nvest i gat i ons on its head:
Negat i ve expect at i ons may exacerbat e di sease course; can
posi t i ve ment al states sl ow it down?
There is some evidence that finding meani ng is related to
disease course. Affleck and his associates (Affleck, Tennen,
Croog, & Levine, 1987) found that men who had sustained a
heart attack and who perceived that they had obtained some
benefits from that heart attack, including a change in their
philosophy of life or values, were less likely to have a subse-
quent attack. They also exhibited less cardiac morbidity over
an eight-year fol l ow-up period. Because of the nature of the
study design, however, it was not possible to l ook at the
intervening physi ol ogy or the specific mechanisms by which
these protective effects t ook place.
Cogni t i ve pr ocessi ng of the i mpl i cat i ons of a t rauma
may also have posi t i ve effects on adjustment. Hor owi t z
(1986), f or exampl e, argued that t raumat i c events oft en
provi de new i nf or mat i on about onesel f or the wor l d that
may disturb one' s exi st i ng schemas and that such experi-
ences must be wor ked t hr ough until the schemas evol ve to
mat ch the reality of the events. Janof f - Bul man (1992) and
Silver, Boon, and St ones (1983) have descri bed the effects
that t raumat i c experi ences can have on basic assumpt i ons
about the sel f and the world, whi ch may l ead to ext ensi ve
cogni t i ve processi ng and ment al rumi nat i on in an effort to
make sense of the experi ences. Not abl y, their findings
emphasi ze the pot ent i al l y deleterious effects that rumi na-
tive t hought can have in the absence of finding meani ng in
the event. Among ot her implications, these di vergent pat-
t ems of empi ri cal findings suggest the i mport ance of dis-
t i ngui shi ng bet ween finding meani ng, whi ch appears to be
beneficial t o adj ust ment , and cogni t i ve processi ng mor e
general l y, whi ch may be either beneficial or deleterious f or
adjustment.
For this study, we (Bower, Kemeny, Tayl or, & Fahey,
1998) identified 40 HI V- ser oposi t i ve men who had recent l y
experi enced the loss of a cl ose fri end or a part ner t o AI DS.
We expl ored bereavement , because it is a t raumat i c event
that is known to have adverse effect s on the i mmune
system, bot h in heal t hy popul at i ons and among t hose wi t h
HI V ( Kemeny et al., 1994, 1995). Mor eover , in the st udy
j ust described, we had f ound that ber eavement pot ent i at ed
the adverse effects of negat i ve expect at i ons on health, and
as such bereaved HI V- s er opos i t i ve men appear to represent
a hi gh-ri sk gr oup for whom finding meani ng may be an
especi al l y val uabl e process. That is, i f an HI V- i nf ect ed
bereaved man can find meani ng in the ber eavement expe-
rience, it coul d pot ent i al l y prevent negat i ve expect at i ons
f r om devel opi ng or f r om t aki ng hol d and consequent l y be
prot ect i ve against det eri orat i ng health.
The dat a came f r om an intensive i nt ervi ew st udy of
these bereaved men that dealt with their ber eavement ex-
peri ence and the effects it had had on t hem ( Bower et al.,
1998). The interviews were t ranscri bed and coded for ev-
i dence of cogni t i ve processi ng and meani ng. Cogni t i ve
processi ng was operat i onal l y defined as verbal statements
reflecting deliberative, effortful, or l ong-l ast i ng t hi nki ng
about the death. For exampl e, evi dence of cogni t i ve pro-
cessi ng i ncl uded such statements as "I think, in a spiritual
way, I tried to underst and it" and " I ' m muddl i ng t hrough
nay own feel i ngs of what coul d have been, what was, and
what is, and I ' m t hi nki ng of my fut ure. " A si mpl e st at ement
like "I think about hi m once in a whi l e" woul d not be coded
as an exampl e of cogni t i ve processi ng, whereas t he state-
ment " I ' ve t hought a lot about what his death mi ght mean
for me" woul d be.
Meani ng was defined as a maj or shift in values, pri-
orities, or perspect i ve in response to the loss. St at ement s
reflecting meani ng i ndi cat ed such changes as a great er
appreci at i on for the l oved one, an enhanced sense of l i vi ng
in the present, a percept i on of life as fragile and preci ous,
or a commi t ment t o enj oyi ng life. Specific exampl es are
"What his death di d was snap a certain val ue i nt o my
behavi or, whi ch is, ' Li st en, you don' t know how l ong
y o u ' v e gol. You' ve j ust lost anot her one. Spend mor e t i me
with the peopl e who mean somet hi ng to y o u ' " and "I woul d
say that his death lit up my faith. "
A part i ci pant was classified as l ow in cogni t i ve pro-
cessi ng i f he had no or one cogni t i ve processi ng st at ement
and as hi gh if he had t wo or more. Participants were
classified as no on di scover i ng meani ng i f t hey had no
meani ng slatements and as y e s if t hey did. The reliability of
these classifications was accept abl e f or bot h cogni t i ve pro-
cessi ng (K = .67, p < .01) and di scover y of meani ng (K =
.60, p < .01 ). To assess the effects of cogni t i ve processi ng
and finding meani ng on course of illness, we related the
cogni t i ve pr ocessi ng and meani ng measures prospect i vel y
to levels of CD4 T l ymphocyt e cells over a t wo- to three-
year f ol l ow- up peri od and to AI DS- r el at ed mort al i t y over a
four- to ni ne-year f ol l ow- up period. In addition, as in the
previ ous studies, we exami ned whet her mood, depressi on,
health behaviors, and ot her pot ent i al l y conf oundi ng psy-
chosoci al fact ors mi ght explain the relations bet ween cog-
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 105
nitive processing, finding meaning, and progression of
disease.
Sixty-five percent of the participants had engaged in
active, deliberative, or long-lasting thinking about the death
of the person for whom they were grieving and were
classified as high in cognitive processing. A smaller num-
ber, 40%, had made shifts in their values, priorities, and
perspectives in response to the loss. All but two of those
who had found meaning in the experience were high in
cognitive processing, but only some of those who had
engaged in cognitive processing had found meaning, yield-
ing three compari son groups.
Only the men who found meaning in the experience
maintained their CD4 T helper cells over the follow-up
period. Those who did not engage in cognitive processing
or who engaged in cognitive processing but failed to find
meaning showed a decline in CD4 T helper cells over the
follow-up period. Cognitive processing in the wake of a
traumatic event, then, is not sufficient to produce beneficial
health effects, consistent with work by Janoff-Bulman,
Silver, and others. Instead, benefits were confined to those
who found meaning in the experience. Moreover, these
effects remain significant when a variety of other variables
are controlled for, including predictors of HIV progression
(e.g., number of HIV-rel at ed sympt oms and initial CD4 T
helper cell levels), health habits (e.g., sleep, sexual prac-
tices, cigarette smoking, and alcohol consumption), and
affective states (e.g., depression and loneliness). In all
cases, the relationship between finding meaning and CD4 T
helper cell decline remained significant. Cognitive process-
ing and finding meaning were also not related to opt i mi sm
or to negative affectivity. This pattern suggests that the
relationship of finding meaning to the maintenance of CD4
T helper cells among the HIV-seroposi t i ve men is not
emotionally mediated.
We also exami ned whether the discovery of meaning
was associated with a lower rate of AIDS-related mortality.
The association was significant. Only 3 of the 16 men who
had found meaning in the bereavement experience died
during the fol l ow-up period, whereas hal f of those who had
not found meaning died.
In summary, then, those men who had been able to
find meaning in the bereavement experience involving a
partner or friend appeared to be biologically protected.
They showed a lower level of CD4 T helper cell decline,
and they were less likely to die during the follow-up period.
These findings suggest that to the roster of psychosocial
states believed to be health protective should be added the
ability to construe meaning from adverse circumstances: to
be able to take an experience that, although tragic and
upsetting, can nonetheless lead an individual to find per-
sonal lessons in the experience that will help that individual
live the remai nder of his or her life with an enhanced sense
of purpose and an appreciation for the value of life.
Positive Psychology and Health
Observers of the human condition have long maintained
that positive states of mind can lead not only to a more
meaningful life but to a healthier one. Until the past decade,
however, these thoughtful observations were largely intrac-
table to scientific efforts. With the devel opment of rigorous
methodological standards, including longitudinal research,
appropriate measurement, and proper controls for biologi-
cal and psychosocial confounds, it is now possible to test
these ideas empirically.
Most of the research that has related psychosocial
factors to changes in disease states has focused on negative
psychological states, including depression, stress, grief, and
loneliness. Yet, philosophers and, increasingly, scientists as
well have noted that exposure to trauma and other stressful
life events does not inevitably lead to depression and de-
spair. Such experiences can also act as catalysts for reeval-
uating one' s goals and priorities and for reestablishing a
sense of self (Frankl, 1963; O' Lear y & Ickovics, 1995;
Schaefer & Moos, 1992). Increasing evidence indicates that
the array of positive outcomes that may result from stress-
ful events includes finding meaning in life, developing
better coping skills, enhancing one' s social resources, es-
tablishing important personal priorities, and recognizing
the value of social relationships (Leedham et al., 1995;
Petrie et al., in press; Rose et al., 1995; Shifren, 1996). To
date, our work represents one of few efforts to document
the beneficial effects of such experiences on physical health
outcomes, although many researchers have noted the value
of such experiences for restoring or maintaining mental
health in the face of trauma.
What determines whether one has the ability to re-
spond to stressful or traumatic events not with despair,
depression, and purposelessness but with resilience and a
renewed sense of purpose? As yet, the answers to such
questions are not fully known (Ryff & Singer, 1998). Our
work on cognitive adaptation to life-threatening events and
on positive illusions (Taylor, 1983; Tayl or & Brown,
1988), however, suggests that normal human perceptions,
marked by a positive sense of self, a sense of personal
control, and an optimistic, even unrealistically optimistic,
view of the future, may represent reserve resources that not
only help people manage the ebb and flow of everyday life
but that assume special significance in helping people cope
with intensely stressful and life-threatening events. Consis-
tent with this perspective, in several studies researchers
have found a relationship between dispositional opt i mi sm
and reports of positive changes, benefits, or "growt h" fol-
lowing stressful events (Curbow, Somerfield, Baker, Win-
gard, & Legro, 1993; Davis, Nol en-Hoeksema, & Larson,
1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Tennen, Affleck, Ur-
rows, Higgins~ & Mendola, 1992). In the case of life-
threatening illness, these resources may act as buffers
against the reality of advancing disease and death to the
point that people face such experiences not only with
psychological benefits but also with more resilient physical
resources as well. As the investigations described in this
article indicate, realistic expectations about one' s disease
and its downward course appear to be associated with a
more rapid course of disease, helping to bring about the
reality those expectations embody. The ability to remain
optimistic, even unrealistically optimistic, in the face of
deterioration (Reed et al., 1994, 1999; Tayl or et al., 1992)
106 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
and the ability to find meaning i n adverse experiences
appear to be physiologically protective (Bower et al.,
1998).
Import ant questions remain about exactly how such
effects are mediated. As yet, a viable neuroimmunological
model of how positive psychosocial states exert these phys-
ically protective effects has not been tested, although the
literature offers some hints as points of departure (e.g.,
Eppel, McEwen, & Ickovics, 1998; Futterman et al., 1994).
In addition, the psychosocial routes are not entirely under-
stood. In our investigations, we attempted to evaluate the
most probable routes by which psychological states may
exert their effects on course of illness. These include the
practice of health habits that may enhance health, such as
exercise, or that may reduce it, such as smoking and alco-
hol consumption, or the appropriate use of health care
services. The ability to develop or enlist available social
support has been shown to protect health in other contexts
(e.g., House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Sarason, Sarason,
& Gurung, 1997; Seeman, 1996), and we have evaluated it
in preliminary fashion as a mode by which the health-
protective effects of these cognitive changes, namel y neg-
ative expectations and finding meaning, may have oc-
curred. Finally, it is possible that positive psychosocial
states are associated with affective states that, in turn, lead
to a physiological state conducive to maintaining health.
Indeed, much of the work in which psychosocial states and
their relation to health outcomes have been examined has
focused on affective states, such as depression, hostility, or
anxiety (e.g., Frasure-Smith et al., 1995; Friedman &
Boot h-Kewl ey, 1987; Herbert & Cohen, 1993; Miller, Mis-
chel, O' Lear y, & Mills, 1996). The implicit rationale for
such a model is that depression, hostility, anxiety, and other
emotional states are known to have physiological concom-
itants that provide hints about the pathways by which
psychosocial states may affect bodily functioning and, in
turn, the progress of disease.
None of our investigations provide support for any of
these hypothesized routes (cf. Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, Viss-
cher, & Fahey, 1995; Segerstrom et al., 1998). To be sure,
the psychosocial states we have studied are affectively
valenced, and so affective processes may still be implicated
in these effects. For example, finding meaning may induce
a state of peacefulness or cal m that may produce effects on
the autonomic nervous system, leading to the beneficial
effects on immunity that we have found. Similarly, nega-
tive expectations may not result in full-blown depression
but might produce a sense of discouragement that has
physiological concomitants. However, given the consis-
tency of the pattern and the failure to find evidence for
affective mediation, the most likely explanation is that
cognitive variables in their own fight have health-related
significance, at least in the progression of HIV. These
variables include realistic acceptance in the first study, an
expanded measure of negative expectations in the second
study, and a conceptually related variable, finding meaning,
in the third investigation. That is, cognition appears to
represent an alternative route to the biology of disease
progression by as-yet largely uncharted pathways (see Ke-
meny & Gruenewald, in press, for a discussion of this
issue).
A remaining issue concerns the relation of positive
and negative psychological states to each other. In the past,
researchers have focused heavily on negative psychological
states that compromi se both mental and physical function-
ing. An emphasis on positive psychological states, as pro-
tective of mental and physical health, is a more recent
focus, especially the relation of positive psychological
states to illness outcomes. One question that arises is
whether these states are polar opposites of each other or
whether they represent qualitatively different responses.
From an empirical standpoint, positive and negative psy-
chological states, whether affective or cognitive, are typi-
cally negatively correlated but not at levels so high as to
suggest redundancy. The neural circuitries of positive and
negative affective and cognitive responses overlap but also
diverge somewhat (see Panksepp, 1998, for a review). As
the neural pathways by which both positive and negative
psychological states interact with and exert effects on bio-
logical processes are increasingly uncovered, our under-
standing of the relationship between positive and negative
psychological states will be improved.
Conclusions
The psychologically and physiologically protective func-
tions of positive beliefs are only beginning to be under-
stood. Rigorous research investigations from a variety of
laboratories have now provided evidence, however, that
such resources as meaning, a bel i ef in personal control, and
optimism not only help people adapt to stressful events
more successfully but actually protect health. Although as
yet we do not fully understand the biopsychosocial path-
ways by which such protective effects occur, the evidence
is strong enough to justify considering these resources
important weapons in the arsenal of prevention.
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J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t 1 0 9
Emoti onal States and Physi cal Health
Peter Salovey
Alexander J. Rothman
Jerusha B. Detweiler and Wayne T. Steward
Yale University
Universit)' of Minnesota, Twin Cities Campus
Yale Universi~
Positive emotional states may promote healthy perceptions,
beliefs, and physical well-being itself To explore potential
mechanisms linking pleasant feelings and good health, the
authors consider several lines of research, including (a)
direct effects of positive affect on physiology, especially the
immune system, (b) the information value of emotional
experiences, ( c ) the psychological resources engendered by
positive feeling states, (d) the ways in which mood can
motivate health-relevant behaviors, and (e) the elicitation
of social support. As anticipated by the Greek physician
Hippocrates, positive emotions and healthy outcomes may
be linked through multiple pathways.
T
hat the arousal of emotion might have consequences
for physical health is not a new idea. Hippocrates,
the father of clinical medicine, posited four bodily
fluids (humors) that when out of balance led to various
physical maladies. The humoral imbalances thought t o
cause illness, also, in his view, produced characteristic and
chronic emotional st at es--bl ack bile led to sorrow, phlegm
to sleepiness, blood to sanguine feelings, and yellow bile to
anger. Thus, Hippocrates linked emotion and disease by
virtue of their common antecedents. Although Hippocrates
n o doubt had the details wrong, he provided prescient
guidance regarding possible connections between e mo t i o n
and health.
Psychotherapists and practicing physicians similarly
have recognized the comorbidity of psychological and
physical disorders. Rates of mood and anxiety disorders are
considerably higher among medical inpatients compared
with the general population (Katon & Sullivan, 1990).
Depressed individuals report somatic ailments in greater
numbers than do nondepressed individuals (Katon, 1984)
and appraise their health status less positively (Maddox,
1962; Tessler & Mechanic, 1978). When health plans offer
psychological services through which individuals presum-
ably can have their psychological distresses attended to,
use of medical services for relief of physical symptoms is
reduced (Cummings & Follette, 1976; Follette & Cum-
mings, 1967; Jones & Vischi, 1979).
Although the comorbidity of depressed mood and
increased reports of physical complaints is well docu-
mented, our understanding of the specific mechanisms that
link emotional states and physical health is less certain. The
premise that the onset of a physical illness that interferes
with pleasurable daily activities or causes considerable pain
could result in depressed mood is noncontroversial (Keefe,
Wilkins, Cook, Crisson, & Muhlbaier, 1986; Rodin &
Voshart, 1986; Turk, Rudy, & Stieg, 1987). Somewhat
more controversial is the premise that both on-going and
acute emotional experiences can produce changes in phys-
ical health (Cohen & Rodriguez, 1995; Herbert & Cohen,
1993). This article examines the influence of emotional
states on physical health and considers a range of physio-
logical, cognitive, social, and behavioral factors that may
serve to link emotional experience and health. First, we
examine the direct effects of positive and negative emo-
tional experiences on physiology, especially of the immune
system, and their implications for health outcomes. Next,
we turn to the informational value of emotional experiences
and examine its influence on people' s perceptions of and
decisions regarding their physical health. Third, we de-
scribe the evidence that positive emotional experiences
provide people with psychological resources that enable
them more effectively to prevent or deal with health prob-
lems. Fourth, we explore whether people use healthy and
unhealthy behaviors as mood regulatory strategies. Finally,
we consider the role of emotion in the complex relation
between social support and health.
In keeping with the theme of this special issue of the
American Psychologist, we place special emphasis on pos-
itive feelings and good health. However, because the re-
search literature has so often focused on the opposite, we
review how negative emotions might be associated with
sickness too, especially when this work provides clues
about how emotional resilience might have more salubrious
consequences.
Direct Effect of Emotional States on
I mmuni ty and Illness
The physiological consequences associated with emotional
experiences provide one mechanism by which emotional
states may influence physical health. Although health psy-
Peter Salovey, Jerusha B. Detweiler, and Wayne T. Steward, Department
of Psychology, Yale University; Alexander J. Rothman, Department of
Psychology, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities Campus.
Preparation of this article was facilitated by the following grants:
American Cancer Society Grant RPG-93-028-05-PBP, National Cancer
Society Grant RO1-CA 68427, and National Institute of Mental Health
Grant PO1-MH/DA 56826. We thank Shelley Taylor and Brian Bedell for
their comments on earlier versions of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Peter
Salovey, Department of Psychology, Yale University, P.O. Box 208205,
New Haven, CT 06520-8205. Electronic mail may be sent to
peter.salovey @yale.edu.
110
January 2000 ° American Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X100/$5.00
Vol. 55, No. I, 110-121 DOI: 10A037//0003-O66X.55.1.110
Peter Salovey
Photo by Michael
Marsland
chologists have often proposed that negative emotional
experiences cause one to be more vulnerable to illness
(e.g., Friedman & Boot h-Kewl ey, 1987), it has been only in
the past 15 years or so that investigators have been able to
test these predictions directly. In general, negative emo-
tional states are thought to be associated with unhealthy
patterns of physiological functioning, whereas positive
emotional states are thought to be associated with healthier
patterns of responding in both cardiovascular activity and
the i mmune system, although the data concerning negative
states are more plentiful (e.g., Boot h-Kewl ey & Friedman,
1987; Herbert & Cohen, 1993). We will focus primarily on
the i mmune syst em here, as the cardiovascular conse-
quences of emotional arousal (especially anger) have been
discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Friedman, 1992; Ka-
marck & Jennings, 1991; Smith, 1992).
Reported positive and negative affect has been shown
to be associated with the release of secretory i mmunogl ob-
ulin A (S-IgA), the antibody considered the first line of
defense against the common cold, so that positive moods
would appear to enhance i mmune syst em responding, but it
is compromi sed by negative moods (Stone, Cox, Valdi-
marsdottir, Jandorf, & Neale, 1987; Stone et al., 1994;
Stone, Reed, & Neale, 1987). Moreover, the increased
frequency of desirable (but not undesirable) events predicts
higher levels of i mmune response on subsequent days, even
after controlling for the frequency of desirable events on
the same day as the i mmune response was assessed (Stone
et al., 1994). Several studies have also revealed a lagged
relation between the low frequency of desirable events and
the onset of respiratory illness (Evans & Edgerton, 1991;
Stone, Reed, & Neale, 1987). In their most recent experi-
ments, Stone and his collaborators have found that unde-
sirable events lower S-IgA levels by increasing negative
mood, but desirable events increase S-IgA levels by de-
creasing negative mood rather than by affecting positive
mood (Stone, Marco, Cruise, Cox, & Neale, 1996). Green
and Salovey, however, have argued that one should not
expect differentiation of positive and negative moods as
mediators when both mood measures are included in the
same statistical model, because the two are negatively
correlated, once nonrandom error is taken into account
(Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993; Green, Salovey, &
Truax, 1999).
Cohen and his colleagues have provided strong evi-
dence that negative mood states increase peopl e' s suscep-
tibility to illness (Cohen et al., 1995). In a laboratory
paradi gm in which people are exposed systematically to a
respiratory virus, individuals who experienced greater neg-
ative mood at the time of the investigation developed a
more severe illness in response to the virus than those
whose moods were more positive (Cohen et al., 1995). The
current challenge is to demonstrate that these links between
negative mood and illness are mediated by changes in
i mmune parameters.
Laboratory studies that manipulate peopl e' s moods
experimentally provide some converging evidence regard-
ing the causal influence of affective states on i mmune
syst em functioning. Labott and her colleagues asked
healthy college women to view two videotapes, one that
was funny and one that was sad (Labott, Ahleman,
Wolever, & Martin, 1990). S-IgA level increased after
watching the humorous video, suggesting enhanced im-
mune syst em activity; but it dropped after viewing the sad
video, indicating suppressed i mmune syst em activity.
These differences, however, were obtained only i f partici-
pants had been instructed to express their mood overtly (we
will return to this point shortly). Dillon, Minchoff, and
Baker (1985-1986) have similarly demonstrated, among
both men and women, that viewing a humorous video
resulted in greater S-IgA compared with that obtained after
viewing a neutral video.
However, several investigators have found that in-
duced pleasant and unpleasant mood states have similar
effects on i mmune functioning. Knapp et al. (1992) found
that induced pleasant and unpleasant affective states were
each associated with decreased l ymphocyt e proliferation to
two common mitogens. When a group of actors was asked
to experience pleasant and unpleasant moods of varying
levels of arousal on different days, all moods affected
natural killer cell activity and the ratio of suppressor to
cytotoxic T cells similarly, regardless of their valence or
level of arousal (Futterman, Kemeny, Shapiro, & Fahey,
1994). However, the proliferative response to the mitogen
phytohemagglutinin was sensitive to the valence of the
induced mood; it increased after positive moods and de-
creased after negative moods (but see Futterman, Kemeny,
Shapiro, Polonsky, & Fahey, 1992).
We should note that some of the tests of the effects of
emotional experiences on i mmune syst em function are
methodologically compromised. One of the important te-
nets of psychoneuroi mmunol ogy is that i mmuno-suppres-
sion or i mmuno-enhancement should be assessed through
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 111
Al e xa n d e r J.
Ro t hma n
Photo by Tom Foley
multiple assays because the various measures of immune
system functioning are not always closely related to each
ot her ( Tayl or , 1999). However, the studies cited above in
which positive affect appears to be associated with better
immune functioning usually are based on a single measure,
secretory IgA. Furthermore, the Labott et al. (1990) and
Dillon et al. (1985-1986) experiments relied on methods of
data collecting (timed salivary flow) and laboratory anti-
body analysis (radial diffusion) now considered flawed.
The work by Stone and his colleagues (1994, 1996) gen-
erally is based on better methods (e.g., saliva collected
directly from the parotid allowing for better control over
salivary flow).
Although the expression of emotions can have imme-
diate effects on some aspects of the immune system, it is
not clear how long such effects last and whether differences
in chronic mood actually lead to clinically significant dif-
ferences in disease resistance. There is some evidence that
the chronic use of coping styles that promote either positive
or negative moods is associated with a range of health
outcomes. For example, baseline levels of S-IgA are pos-
itively correlated with the reported frequency with which
people use humor as a coping mechanism (Dillon et al.,
1985-1986). Similarly, the more older women cry as a
coping mechanism, the greater the number of health prob-
lems they report (Labott & Martin, 1990). The immuno-
logical consequences associated with negative mood states
may also serve to explain the finding that people who are
dealing with severe stressors for longer than a month are
substar~tially more susceptible to experimentally induced
colds (Cohen et al., 1998). The observed relation between
physical health and dispositional styles such as optimism
(Peterson, Vaillant, & Seligman, 1988; Scheier & Carver,
1992; Scheier et al., 1989), hostility (Miller, Smith, Turner,
Guijarro, & Hallet, 1996), and hardiness (Kobasa, 1979;
Kobasa, Maddi, & Kahn, 1982) may be due in part to the
chronic mood states engendered by the personality style
and their resultant impact on physiological functioning
(e.g., Segerstrom, Solomon, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998;
Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998).
Given that negative emotional states are associated
with lowered immune activity and increased susceptibility
to disease, one might conclude that people would benefit
from minimizing or suppressing any negative feelings they
might have. In fact, women who were instructed to sup-
press their emotional reactions to a sad film evidenced
minimal change in their S-IgA levels (Labott et al., 1990).
Although there may be some immediate immunological
benefits to be obtained from suppressing one' s negative
feelings, the suppression or inhibition of negative emo-
tional states can result in adverse physiological and health
outcomes that may outweigh any short-term gains (Gross,
1998). Actively suppressing one' s negative (or positive)
emotional experience heightens the sympathetic activation
of the cardiovascular system (Gross & Levenson, 1997).
Emotional suppression has been hypothesized to be related
to the development of coronary heart disease (Pennebaker,
1992) as well as the progression of cancer (Gross, 1989;
Jensen, 1987; Temoshok, 1987), although such relation-
ships have been difficult to demonstrate empirically (e.g.,
Joffres, Reed, & Nomura, 1985; Keene, 1980; Suls, Wan,
& Costa, 1995).
In addition to the potential adverse health conse-
quences associated with emotional inhibition, Pennebaker
and his colleagues (reviewed in Pennebaker, 1989; Penne-
baker & Traue, 1993) have demonstrated that interventions
that help people process and confront traumatic life events
produce significant improvements in health functioning,
including fewer self-reported health problems (e.g., Green-
berg & Stone, 1992; Greenberg, Wortman, & Stone, 1996;
Pennebaker, Barger, & Tiebout, 1989), lower use of health
services (e.g., Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker,
Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988), and enhanced immune
system activity (e.g., Esterling, Kiecolt-Glaser, Bodnar, &
Glaser, 1994; Pennebaker et al., 1988; Petrie, Booth, Pen-
nebaker, Davison, & Thomas, 1995). These benefits have
been obtained despite the fact that people experience con-
siderable negative affect during the time they are writing or
talking about the trauma. In fact, Kelley, Lumley, and
Leisen (1997) found that patients with rheumatoid arthritis
who talked about the stressful events in their lives not only
reported better physical functioning three months after
disclosure, but the magnitude of improvement was posi-
tively related to the degree to which the disclosure process
had induced a negative mood.
However, the paradigm developed by Pennebaker and
others does not merely involve the expression or release of
pent-up negative emotions. The effectiveness of the writing
or verbalization task is believed to be based on its ability to
help people work through the traumatic event. Although
data regarding specific mediational mechanisms are lim-
ited, there is some evidence that people report greater
health changes i f during the writing task they used more
112 January 2000 • American Psychologist
Je r u s ha B.
De t we i l e r
Photo by Michael
MarsLand
positive emotion words and over time engaged in more
causal and insightful thinking (Pennebaker & Francis,
1996; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997). To the extent
that disclosure helps people to repair their traumatic expe-
riences, it may share important features with the mood
regulatory strategies that people use on an on-going basis
(Gross, 1998; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai,
1995). People who report that they are generally able to
regain and maintain positive emotional states are less likely
to get sick or to use medical services when faced with a
stressful life experience (Goldman, Kraemer, & Salovey,
1996; see also Catanzaro & Greenwood, 1994). There
would appear to be direct, physiological benefits derived
f r om experiencing and expressing positive emotional
states. However, the health consequences of negative emo-
tional states depend upon peopl e' s ability to work through
and manage them. To the extent that peopl e- - becaus e of
dispositional or situational const rai nt s--are unable to re-
pair their negative moods, the persistent expression of
negative affect may have adverse health consequences.
Informational Val ue of
Emotional States
Peopl e' s behavioral practices are a primary determinant of
their physical health, and change in human behavior is
likely the most efficient way to reduce disease morbidity
a n d premat ure mortality (U.S. Depart ment of Health a n d
Human Services, 1991). A premise of nearly all theories of
health behavi or (e.g., Becker et al., 1977; Janz & Becker,
1984) is that peopl e decide to adopt or maintain a particular
pattern of behavi or based on an analysis of the relevant
costs and benefits associated with each behavioral option
(for a review see Salovey, Rothman, & Rodin, 1998).
Gi ven that peopl e rely on their emotional states as a source
of information about how they are doing and that their
emotions can alter the ease with which information comes
to mind (Schwarz & Clore, 1996), peopl e' s assessment of
their health status as well as different patterns of behavi or
may vary depending on their moods. Because these beliefs
guide behavioral decisions, the influence of emotion on
judgment offers a path by which emotional experiences c a n
affect physical health.
Does a person' s mood influence the recognition or
interpretation of physical sympt oms? Are peopl e more
likely to interpret a physiological response as a health
concern if they are in a negative mood? To answer this
question, peopl e' s mood states have been manipulated sys-
tematically in the laboratory and the effects on sympt om
reports examined. Across studies, people made to feel sad
report more physical sympt oms than those made to feel
happy (Croyle & Uretsky, 1987; Salovey & Birnbaum,
1989), and those placed in a sad mood also attribute greater
discomfort to their sympt oms (Salovey & Birnbaum,
1989).
Studies that have examined whether naturally occur-
ring variations in mood lead to sympt om reporting provide
a more complex set of results. Some investigators have
found that the chronic tendency to experience a particular
mood state (e.g., negative affectivity; Wat son & Penne-
baker, 1989) but not situational variations in mood predicts
sympt om reporting independent of illness severity (e.g.,
Cohen et al., 1995; Watson, 2000). However, others have
found measures of state negative affect to be better predic-
tors of sympt om reports than measures of trait affect (e.g.,
E. A. Leventhal, Hansell, Diefenbach, Leventhal, & Glass,
1996). Some investigators even observe that sympt om re-
porting is independent of prior reports of negative af-
fect (Diefenbach, Leventhal, Leventhal, & Patrick-Miller,
1996). Significant differences in the met hodol ogy and mea-
sures used across these studies render any interpretation of
the conflicting pattern of results difficult. However, the
consistent effect of induced mood on sympt om reporting
does suggest that there are conditions under which mood
c a n systematically alter sympt om reports.
The presence of physical sympt oms is but one factor
motivating individuals to attend to their health or to seek
treatment. Perceptions of personal vulnerability are an im-
portant antecedent to the adoption of appropriate behav-
ioral practices (Weinstein, 1993). Mood can influence peo-
pl e' s perceptions of risk for an unwanted health problem,
so that peopl e in a happy mood believe themselves to be
less vulnerable than do those in a sad mood (e.g., Johnson
& Tversky, 1983; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans,
1992; Mayer & Volanth, 1985; Salovey & Birnbaum,
1989). Treat ment decisions are also affected by peopl e' s
beliefs about their capacity to engage successfully in salu-
brious behaviors (i.e., self-efficacy) and their expectations
that such behaviors will alleviate illness or maintain health
(i.e., response efficacy; Bandura, 1977, 1997; for a review
see Salovey et al., 1998).
Salovey and Bi rnbaum (1989) demonstrated that
mood states can influence peopl e' s beliefs regarding their
ability to carry out health-promoting behaviors. As corn-
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 113
Wayne T.
Steward
Photo by Michael
Marsland
pared with sad individuals, those who were happy per-
ceived themselves as better able to engage in health-pro-
moting behaviors and had greater confidence that these
behaviors would relieve their illness. Individuals who are
ill and are experiencing sad moods may thus be caught in
a bind, On the one hand, they appear to experience their
sympt oms as more frequent, intense, and discomforting.
On the other hand, they believe that there is little they can
actually do to make themselves feel better. Such malaise
may make the sad individual especially unlikely to adhere
to treatment recommendations.
Like Darwin (1872), many scholars have recognized
that emotional states offer people information about their
environments. Positive emotional states signal that one' s
environment is safe, whereas negative emotional states
indicate that there are aspects of one' s environment that
must be addressed and corrected (Schwarz & Clore, 1996).
The informational value of emotional states may have
implications for the decision to seek care for a health
problem. Del ays in care seeking are a function of a number
of psychological factors that guide how peopl e interpret
and evaluate physical sympt oms (Andersen, Cacioppo, &
Roberts, 1996; Dracup et al., 1995; Safer, Tharps, Jackson,
& Leventhal, 1979). However, the relation between emo-
tional states and care seeking has focused primarily on the
i mpact of stressful life events (e.g,, Cameron, Leventhal, &
Leventhal, 1993, 1995).
To the extent that positive emotional states are taken
to indicate the absence of probl ems that need to be ad-
dressed, when people are feeling happy they may be less
likely to recognize signs of physical distress and conse-
quently may be less likely to seek medical care. On the
other hand, negative emotional states may engender greater
vigilance or concern among people who are experiencing
physical distress, which may in turn facilitate contact with
a medical professional. However, investigators have yet to
test directly the effect of pleasant and unpleasant moods on
care seeking. The observation that peopl e in pleasant emo-
tional states typically rely on less effortful, heuristic-based
cognitive processing strategies (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly,
1996; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991) and are motivated
to act in ways that enable t hem to sustain that emotion state
(Wegener & Petty, 1994; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995)
provides a framework that is consistent with the predicted
effect of positive mood on care-seeking. Yet, there appear
to be situations in which feeling positive about either
oneself or one' s future provides peopl e with the psychic
resources enabling t hem to process more thoroughly threat-
ening information (Aspinwall, 1998; Aspinwall & Brun-
hart, 1996; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Trope & Pomerantz,
1998). Whether the greater willingness to consider infor-
mation about a potential health concern translates into a
similar willingness to recognize a sign of current physical
distress is an empirical question that needs to be addressed.
Of course, the benefits associated with faster decisions
to seek care are contingent on the accuracy with which
people distinguish between sympt oms that are and are not
disease related. It is possible that negative emotional ex-
periences may heighten feelings of concern to such an
extent that people become significantly more likely to seek
help in situations in which medical care is, in fact, not
needed (Stretton & Salovey, 1998).
Negat i ve emotional experiences may not always fa-
cilitate care-seeking. When ambiguous physical sympt oms
and stressful life events co-occur, the sympt oms may be
considered part of one' s emotional reaction to the life
stressor and are less likely to prompt a decision to seek
medical attention (Cameron et al., 1995). Any difficulty
people have identifying the source of their physical distress
may be exacerbated by the fact that negative emotional
states shift peopl e' s attention toward themselves and away
from their external environment. Evidence that sadness
increases attentional focus on to the sel f has been obtained
in both correlational studies (reviewed by Ingrain, 1990;
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Salovey & Rodin, 1985)
and experiments (Salovey, 1992; Sedikides, 1992; Wood,
Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990). Because focusing attention
on the body increases perceptions of sympt oms and sensa-
tions (Pennebaker, 1982; Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980),
people may become highly sensitive to the contingent
relation between negative emotional events and physical
sympt oms and consequently develop explanatory theories
that serve to integrate these psychological events. In line
with H. Levent hal ' s common-sense model of illness (H.
Leventhal, Nerenz, & Steele, 1984), the specific content of
the theories people develop should determine whether
physical sympt oms are likely to be (mis)attributed to stress-
ful life events.
Emotional States and Psychological
Resilience
Appropriate health practices are often difficult to carry out
and psychologically taxing. In order to adopt precautions,
114 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
people must first recognize the possibility that they are at
risk for an unwanted health problem. Yet, people actively
strive to maintain their optimistic sense of their personal
risk (e.g., Weinstein & Klein, 1995) and resist acknowl-
edging that they have health concerns (e.g., Ditto & Lopez,
1992). People who use illness screening or detection prac-
tices must be willing to run the risk of learning that they
have a health problem. Noncompl i ance with screening
guidelines often reflects an unwillingness to face this risk
(Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Positive emotional states can
facilitate healthy behavioral practices by providing the
resilience that people may need to confront the possibility
that they might have or develop a serious health problem.
In line with this perspective, Fredrickson (1998) has argued
that the pri mary function of positive emotional experience
is that it facilitates the availability of personal resources
that afford innovation and creativity in thought and action
(see also Isen, 1987). Positive emotional states may offer
people the opportunity to consider and plan for future
outcomes, whereas negative emotional states orient people
to respond to proximal, immediate events (Frijda, 1986).
Although there are no data that directly confirm the
predicted link between positive emotional experiences and
the increased availability of psychological resources, there
are empirical findings that are consistent with this perspec-
tive. For example, humor has been shown to help people
cope more effectively with life stressors. Expression of
humor appears to moderate associations between negative
life events and mood disorders (Martin & Lefcourt, 1983;
Nezu, Nezu, & Blisset, 1988) and increases peopl e' s tol-
erance for higher levels of physical discomfort (e.g.,
Cogan, Cogan, Waltz, & McCue, 1987). Also, positive
experiences engendered, for example, by recalling one' s
past acts of kindness, allow individuals to accept health-
risk information less defensively, even when it is quite
self-relevant (M. B. Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; see also
Trope & Pomerantz, 1998).
The health benefits associated with both domain-spe-
cific opt i mi sm (e.g., Tayl or et al., 1992; see also Taylor,
Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000, this issue)
and dispositional opt i mi sm (e.g., Peterson, 1988; Scheier &
Carver, 1985, 1992; see also Peterson, 2000, this issue)
may reflect, in part, the psychological resources afforded
by the bel i ef that one will experience good instead of bad
outcomes. Optimists who are coping with a health problem
or are undergoing a medical procedure may be better able
to focus on and plan for future outcomes. For example,
Scheier et al. (1989) reported that in a sample of men who
underwent coronary artery bypass surgery, those who were
dispositionally optimistic were more likely to cope by
focusing on postoperative goals. Five years after surgery,
optimists reported healthier habits, such as regular use of
vitamins, eating lunches with less fatty foods, and enroll-
ment in a cardiac rehabilitation program (study by Scheier,
Matthews, Owens, Magovern, & Carver as cited in Scheier
& Carver, 1992).
A positive state of mind may enable people to con-
sider personally unfavorable information. People who hold
optimistic beliefs about their health spend more time read-
ing information about health risks than about more favor-
able health concerns and, subsequently, have better mem-
ory for that information (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996).
Moreover, the relation between opt i mi sm and information-
seeking is even stronger when the information is personally
relevant and, thus, presumabl y more threatening. The ten-
dency to be hopeful when considering future life events
may also enable people to become more informed about
potential health outcomes (Snyder, 1994; Snyder, Irving, &
Anderson, 1991). For example, in an investigation of hope
and college women' s cancer-related health practices, hope-
lul women were better informed of the negative health
effects of behaviors such as smoking (Irving, Snyder, &
Crowson, 1998). Individuals high in hope also reported
they would be more willing to visit health professionals and
to perform detection behaviors (such as skin cancer exams
and breas! examinations; Irving et al., 1998). Consistent
with the premise that positive emotional states facilitate
healthy behavioral practices, positive affectivity mediated
the relation between hope and intended cancer-related
behaviors.
Although the tendency to experience positive emo-
tions may be a function of stable individual differences in
dispositions such as opt i mi sm or hope, it can also be
manipulated by activities or interventions that elicit posi-
tive affect. People coping with a serious illness spontane-
ously ,engage in downward social comparison (i.e., com-
pare themselves to someone who is worse off than they are;
e.g., Wood, 1989; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985). Be-
cause downward social comparison generally engenders
feelings of positive affect (Taylor & Lobel, 1989), it may
be that people engage in this pattern of comparisons to
regulale their mood, and the positive affect associated with
downward social comparison provides them with the psy-
chological resources they need to cope effectively with
their heallh problems. This analysis suggests that down-
ward social comparison may not only provide short-term
benefits (i.e., mood regulation) but also indirectly facilitate
long-term coping.
Before closing our discussion on the relationship be-
tween positive affect, psychological resources, and health,
we would like to highlight the health-care worker' s role as
one who can inspire hope in others. Freud (1953) described
that patients' expectancies, "colored by hope and faith," are
"an effective f o r c e . . , in all our attempts at treatment and
cure" Ip. 289). The link between such hopeful expectations
and health outcomes becomes both clear and convincing
through the investigation of the placebo, a pharmacologi-
cally inert substance given to patients in place of an active
medication. Approxi mat el y 35% of patients report symp-
tom relief in response to a placebo (estimate based on a
review of the literature by Hafen, Karren, Frandsen, &
Smith, 1996). Frank (1974) concluded that by raising the
pat i ent ' s level of hope, the health care professi onal ' s pos-
itive expectations (even when administering a placebo ther-
apy) can have a concrete impact on the health of the
patient. The positive mood experience that comes from a
renewal of hope, particularly among those who are strug-
January 2000 • American Psychologist 115
gling with illness, reaps health benefits that cannot be
underemphasized.
Changes in Mood and
Health-Relevant Behaviors
Individuals may use behaviors relevant to their health as
mood regulation strategies. For example, peopl e might
choose to eat, use tobacco, or exercise in response to an
upsetting event. There is considerable evidence, for exam-
ple, that peopl e use and abuse alcohol because of their
expectations about how it will influence their emotional
state (Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995; Gustafson,
1991; Wills & Shiffman, 1985). Cooper et al. (1995) have
argued that peopl e consume alcohol to satisfy two distinct
functions that are closely tied to their emotional states:
People drink because they believe it will help them to
escape or regulate negative feelings, or they drink because
they believe it will heighten or stimulate positive feelings
(see Sayette, 1993; Stritzke, Lang, & Patrick, 1996).
Negat i ve emotional experiences are an important an-
tecedent to tobacco use (Brandon, 1994). Rates of smoking
are considerably higher among peopl e who have been
diagnosed as clinically depressed (e.g., Gl assman et al.,
1990). Studies that have manipulated peopl e' s affective
experiences experimentally have provided evidence that is
consistent with the epidemiological data; compared with
people in either a control or a positive mood condition,
peopl e placed in a negative mood report greater cravings
for cigarettes and subsequently smoke more (e.g., Brandon,
Wetter, & Baker, 1996; Payne, Schare, Levis, & Colletti,
1991). Finally, peopl e report that the desire to repair or to
i mprove their mood is a primary reason that they smoke,
and the situations most likely to trigger a relapse during a
quit attempt are those that involve an unpleasant emotional
experience (e.g., Brandon, Tiffany, Obremski, & Baker,
1990; Shiffman, 1982).
Although peopl e are attracted to many health-relevant
behaviors because of a desire to avoid or blunt a negative
emotional experience, some behaviors are attractive be-
cause of their ability actually to induce positive feelings.
Kelly and Kal i chman (1998) have reported that the plea-
sure associated with unprotected sex predicted the contin-
ued practice of unprotected anal intercourse, even after
controlling for peopl e' s attitudes and intentions regarding
safer sex. Another form of physical activity, exercise, in-
creases positive feelings and reduces negative feelings
(e.g., Byrne & Byrne, 1993; Steptoe & Cox, 1988), al-
though peopl e' s affective state before exercise may atten-
uate the actual change in emotional experience (e.g., Gau-
vin, Rejeski, & Norris, 1996; Rejeski, Gauvin, Hobson, &
Norris, 1995). The emotional benefits obtained from regu-
lar exercise may be of such value that interference with
habitual patterns of exercise behavi or can precipitate mood
disturbances (e.g., Mondin et al., 1996).
Peopl e' s behavi or may be mot i vat ed by the desire to
i mprove their mood, but the processes by which the behav-
ior alters mood is unclear. Specifically, research is needed
to tease apart the relative influences of physiological
changes associated with the behavi or and cognitive expec-
tancies regarding the influence of the behavi or on emo-
tional experience. In addition, investigators may need to
attend to a broader array of emotional states when assessing
the degree to which a behavi or successfully made peopl e
feel better. For example, a diary study of self-defined
chocolate addicts and nonaddicts found that the so-called
addicts tended to eat more chocolate when they were in
depressed moods (Macdiarmid & Hetherington, 1995).
However, bad moods were not ameliorated by eating choc-
olate; the chocolate addicts experienced increased levels of
guilt. Feelings of guilt or shame may reflect regret over
having relied on unhealthy behavioral practices to repair a
mood state.
If behaviors such as eating or drinking do not actually
i mprove mood, why are they mot i vat ed by upsetting situ-
ations? Baumeister (1991) argued that a number of behav-
iors, including drinking and binge eating, provide a person
with an opportunity to escape from one' s self. While en-
gaging in the behavior, peopl e' s attention is directed upon
the act itself with little attention allocated to the probl ems
that motivated the action or its consequences. In line with
this perspective, Baumeister presented evidence suggesting
that during an escape from the self, a person also experi-
ences a blunting of emotion, including any unpleasant
emotions that elicited the need for escape (see also Leith &
Baumeister, 1996).
Mood and the Elicitation of
Social Support
The impact of interpersonal relationships on peopl e' s emo-
tional states and the recursive effect that these states have
on the availability of interpersonal contact offers a final
path through which emotional states can affect health. The
influence of social support on health is well-established
(Cohen & Syme, 1985; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1996). Social
support is related to lower mortality (Berkman, 1985),
greater resistance to communi cabl e diseases (Cohen,
1988), lower prevalence and incidence of coronary heart
disease (Seeman & Syme, 1987), and faster recovery from
hearl disease and heart surgery (Ruberman, Weinblatt,
Goldberg, & Chaudhary, 1984). In general, individuals
who have minimal psychosocial resources appear to be
more prone to illness and mood disturbances when faced
with increased stress levels than individuals with consid-
erable social support (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus,
1988).
There are two ways in which social support can affect
health (Cohen & Syme, 1985; Cohen & Wills, 1985;
Stroebe & Stroebe, 1996). The buffering hypothesis argues
that peopl e benefit from social support only when they
experience a stressful life event, whereas the direct effect
hypothesis argues that social relationships promot e health
and well-being regardless of the individual' s stress level.
Both buffering and direct effects are possible, depending
on the nature of the stressor. In either case, the relation
between social support and health may be mediated, in part,
by changes in peopl e' s emotional experience. Social sup-
port may thus lead the individual to experience a lesser
degree of stress in the face of a challenging situation.
116 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
Soci al r el at i ons hi ps ma y al so al l ow i ndi vi dual s t o f eel
secur e wi t h t he knowl e dge t hat hel p wi l l be pr ovi de d when
and i f necessar y. Thi s f eel i ng of secur i t y ma y i ncr ease t hei r
r es i l i ence to phys i cal i l l ness ( Cohen & Syme, 1985). Fi -
nal l y, soci al suppor t may keep peopl e f r om f eel i ng l onel y,
a condi t i on t hat is as s oci at ed wi t h somat i c compl ai nt s ,
depr essi on, and gener al f eel i ngs of di st r ess ( Pepl au, 1985).
Me di c a l st udent s who des cr i bed t hems el ves as l onel y have
l ower nat ur al ki l l er cel l act i vi t y t han l ess l onel y st udent s,
and r es pond wi t h a weaker i mmune r es pons e to a hepat i t i s
B vacci ne t han t hose wi t h a l ar ger soci al suppor t net wor k
( Gl as er et al. , 1992; Ki e c ol t - Gl a s e r & Gl aser , 1992).
Ther e is l i kel y to be a r eci pr ocal r el at i on bet ween
emot i onal exper i ence and soci al suppor t : Not onl y does t he
pr ovi s i on of soci al suppor t i nf l uence o n e ' s emot i onal state,
but a pe r s on' s emot i onal st at e al so i nf l uences t he l i kel i hood
t hat soci al suppor t is pr ovi ded, We woul d expect t hat
peopl e woul d be mor e l i kel y to pr ovi de on- goi ng assi st ance
t o ot her s who mai nt ai n a mor e pos i t i ve out l ook on life.
Sever al cr os s - s ect i onal st udi es have obs e r ve d a pos i t i ve
r el at i on bet ween mood and t he per cei ved number of f r i ends
and f ami l y member s who coul d be count ed on and t he
act ual number of peopl e who had pr ovi de d hel p over t he
cour se of a year ( Eckenr ode, Kr uger , Cer kovni k, 1986,
ci t ed in Cohen, 1988; see al so Cohen et al. , 1982). Si gns of
emot i onal di st r ess si gnal one ' s need to pot ent i al pr ovi der s
of soci al suppor t . However , t he pr ol onged expr es s i on of
negat i ve emot i on det er s peopl e f r om hel pi ng out ( Penne-
baker , 1993; St r oebe & St r oebe, 1996).
Al t hough di r ect empi r i cal suppor t for t he cl ai m t hat
pos i t i ve mood medi at es t he r el at i on bet ween soci al suppor t
and heal t h is not avai l abl e, we are conf i dent t hat pos i t i ve
mood is a cr i t i cal c ompone nt of soci al i nt er act i ons. We
agr ee wi t h Cohen and Sy me ' s (1985) suggest i on t hat soci al
suppor t , t hr ough t he st abi l i t y, pr edi ct abi l i t y, and cont r ol
t hat it pr ovi des, l eads peopl e to feel pos i t i vel y about t hem-
sel ves and t hei r envi r onment . These f eel i ngs, in turn, mo-
t i vat e peopl e to want to t ake car e of t hemsel ves, i nt er act
mor e pos i t i vel y wi t h ot hers, and demons t r at e r es i l i ence in
t i mes of st ress. The combi nat i on of t hese f act or s f aci l i t at es
cont i nued phys i cal and ps ychol ogi cal heal t h and furt her
st r engt hens t he i ndi vi dua l ' s soci al net wor k. I ndi vi dual s
who are happy fi nd it easi er to devel op a ri ch net wor k of
soci al suppor t as c ompa r e d wi t h t hose who are mor e dour.
We are l i kel y at t r act ed to peopl e who are pl easant , t hus
pr ovi di ng t hem wi t h t he heal t h benefi t s of soci al suppor t .
Conclusion
I n t hi s speci al i ssue of t he A me r i c a n Ps y c h o l o g i s t , we
cel ebr at e t he accompl i s hment s of t he fi el d of ps yc hol ogy as
we ent er t he year 2000 by f ocusi ng on pos i t i ve aspect s of
human behavi or . As we r ecogni ze t he val ue of f ocusi ng on
opt i mal exper i ences and t he good l i f e mor e gener al l y, we
st i l l need t o r ecogni ze t hat our under s t andi ng of how pos-
i t i ve ment al st at es af f ect phys i cal heal t h has been i nf or med
not onl y by st udyi ng t he posi t i ve, but by f ocus i ng on t he
negat i ve as wel l . For i nst ance, Ha r va r d' s f a me d phys i ol o-
gi st , Wa l t e r Cannon (1957), spent sever al decades docu-
ment i ng what he cal l ed v o o d o o deat h, st or i es in var i ous
cul t ur es about peopl e who becaus e of s ome maj or t r oubl i ng
emot i onal exper i ence ( of t en ext r eme f r i ght ) s uddenl y di ed.
Cannon even t r aced a r eas onabl e pa t hophys i ol ogy t hat st i l l
sensi bl y pr ovi des an expl anat i on f or how a per son l i t er al l y
coul d be scar ed to deat h. Such fi ndi ngs hel p t o i l l umi nat e
mechani s ms connect i ng al l emot i ons, pl eas ant and unpl eas-
ant, to var i ous phys i cal heal t h endpoi nt s f r om wel l - bei ng t o
mor t al i t y.
Ther e has been l ong r ecogni t i on t hat an opt i mi s t i c
mi nd and exhi l ar at ed spi r i t a c c ompa ny a heal t hy body.
Ki ng Sol omon s ugges t ed t hat "a mer r y hear t doet h good
l i ke a medi ci ne" ( Pr over bs 17:22), and ever y st udent of
heal t h ps yc hol ogy has hear d t he st ory of how j our nal i s t
Nor man Cousi ns (1979) at t r i but ed hi s r ecover y f r om an-
kyl os i ng spondyl i t i s, a pot ent i al l y l i f e- t hr eat eni ng col l agen
di sease, to hi s act i ve use of l aught er . Cous i ns be l i e ve d t hat
t en mi nut es of l aughi ng pr ovi ded hi m wi t h t wo hour s of
pai n- f r ee sl eep and t hat i nf l ammat i on in t he af f ect ed t i ssues
was r educed aft er t hese l aughi ng sessi ons. Wha t is won-
der f ul at t hi s j unct ur e is t hat t heor et i cal and me t hodol ogi c a l
advances in r ecent year s have al l owed us to move f r om
t hese anecdot al account s to r i gor ous t est i ng of t he ef f ect s of
emot i ons on phys i ol ogi cal f unct i oni ng and heal t h. In t he
comi ng cent ur y, t he bi ops yc hos oc i a l mechani s ms account -
i ng for t hese r emar kabl e cor r el at i ons l i kel y wi l l be unt an-
gl ed, and t hese sci ent i fi c br eakt hr oughs coul d t hen ser ve to
expand t he basi s for r el evant cl i ni cal pr act i ce.
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J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t 121
Wi s dom
A Metaheuristic (Pragmatic) to Orchestrate Mi nd
and Virtue Toward Excellence
Paul B. Baltes and Ursula M. Staudinger
Max Planck Institute f or Human Development
The primary f ocus of this article is on the presentation of
wisdom research conducted under the heading of the Berlin
wisdom paradigm. Informed by a cultural-historical anal-
ysis, wisdom in this paradigm is defined as an expert
knowledge system concerning the fundamental pragmatics
of life. These include knowledge and judgment about the
meaning and conduct of life and the orchestration of hu-
man development toward excellence while attending con-
jointly to personal and collective well-being. Measurement
includes think-aloud protocols concerning various prob-
lems of life associated with life planning, life management,
and life review. Responses are evaluated with reference to
a family of 5 criteria: rich factual and procedural knowl-
edge, lifespan contextualism, relativism of values and life
priorities, and recognition and management of uncertainty.
A series of studies is reported that aim to describe, explain,
and optimize wisdom. The authors conclude with a new
theoretical perspective that characterizes wisdom as a cog-
nitive and motivational metaheuristic (pragmatic) that or-
ganizes and orchestrates knowledge toward human excel-
lence in mind and virtue, both individually and collectively.
W
Visdom is generally considered the pinnacle of
insight into the human condition and about
the means and ends of a good life (P. Baltes,
Smith, & Staudinger, 1992; Kekes, 1995; Staudinger &
Baltes, 1996b). In the positive-psychology spirit of this
special issue of the American Psychologist, our interest in
wisdom has been spurred by a motivation to identify and
highlight the best of what society and humans can accom-
plish concerning their own development and that of others.
As has been true several times throughout the millennia (P.
Baltes, 1999; Kekes, 1995; Rice, 1958), the current schol-
arly discourse about the structure and function of wisdom
evinces another period of rejuvenation. Occasionally, re-
searchers argue that such historical periods of rejuvenation
follow the principle of societal need for reflection about its
own attainments, status, and future direction.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First and most
important, we present an overview of our work on the
psychology of wisdom. Proceeding from a general theoret-
ical framework, we have developed an empirical research
paradigm to study wisdom (P. Baltes, Dittmann-Kohli, &
Dixon, 1984; P. Baltes & Smith, 1990; P. Baltes et al.,
1992; P. Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Dittmann-Kohli &
Baltes, 1990; Dixon & Baltes, 1986; Smith & Baltes, 1990;
Staudinger & Baltes, 1996b). Second, to embed our work
in a larger context, we begin by summarizing briefly the
work of other psychologists interested in the topic of wis-
dom (see also, Clayton & Birren, 1980; Holliday & Chan-
dler, 1986; Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990; Pasupathi & Baltes,
in press; Staudinger & Baltes, 1994; Sternberg, 1990, 1998;
Taranto, 1989).
Historically, it has been mainly the fields of philoso-
phy and religious studies that have served as the central
forum for discourse about the concept of wisdom (Ass-
mann, 1994; P. Baltes, 1993, 1999; Kekes, 1995; Oelmtil-
ler, 1989; Robinson, 1990; Rudolph, 1987; Welsch, 1995).
For the current historical moment, however, renewed in-
terest in the topic of wisdom is evident in a wide spectrum
of disciplines, ranging from the traditional mentors of
wisdom, philosophy, and religious studies, to cultural an-
thropology, political science, education, and psychology
(Agazzi, 1991; Arlin, 1993; Assmann, 1994; P. Baltes,
1993, 1999; Cook, 1993; Lehrer, Lum, Slichta, & Smith,
1996; Maxwell, 1984; Nichols, 1996; Nozick, 1993;
Staudinger & Baltes, 1996b; Sternberg, 1990; Welsch,
1995).
Because of the culturally rich meaning and heritage of
wisdom, defining and operationalizing the concept of wis-
dom as a scientifically grounded psychological construct is
Paul B. Baltes and Ursula M. Staudinger, Center for Lifespan Psychology,
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany.
Ursula M. Staudinger is now at the Department of Psychology,
Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany.
We would like to acknowledge the many contributions of earlier
colleagues in the Wisdom Project at the Max Planck Institute for Human
Development. Earlier collaborators included, foremost, Freya Dittmann-
Kohli, Roger Dixon, and Jacqui Smith. We also thank Monisha Pasupathi
for her valuable comments.
We thank especially Irmgard Pahl, who, as editorial assistant, has
participated with the utmost competence, care, and curiosity in examining
cultural-historical and philosophical works regarding their treatment of
wisdom.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul B.
Bakes, Lifespan Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Develop-
ment, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany. Electronic mail may be
sent to [email protected] or to [email protected]
dresden.de.
122 January 2000 • American Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/00l$5.00
Vol. 55, No. 1, 122-136 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.55.1.122
Paul B. Baltes
not easy. Wi sdom may be beyond what psychological
methods and concepts can achieve. The first president of
the Ameri can Psychological Association, G. Stanley Hall
(1922), was one of the first psychologists to tackle this task,
originally in an anonymous article published in 1921 in the
Atlantic Monthly. Subsequently, it was primarily the life-
span model of Erikson (1959; Clayton & Birren, 1980;
McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998) and the emergence of
lifespan psychol ogy (P. Baltes, Staudinger, & Linden-
berger, 1999) that kept wi sdom in the domain of psycho-
logical analysis.
It was not until the 1980s that a more diverse group of
psychological scholars and researchers began to engage
themselves with the topic of wisdom, although most work
was theoretical rather than empirical. A book edited by
Sternberg (1990) was a signal of this growing interest in
wisdom, as are entries on wi sdom in a variety of behav-
ioral-science-oriented encyclopedias (e.g., P. Baltes &
Staudinger, 1998; Pasupathi & Baltes, in press; Staudinger
& Baltes, 1994).
Implicit and Explicit Psychological
Theories of Wisdom
Not surprisingly, because of the multidisciplinary nature of
the wi sdom concept, including its integrative feature of
linking mind to virtue, psychological research on wi sdom
is multifaceted. Aside from issues such as the nature of
met hodol ogy applied and the content range that is assigned
to the psychological sphere of wi sdom (Birren & Fisher,
1990), two maj or branches can be distinguished: implicit
theories and explicit theories of wi sdom (Sternberg, 1990).
Implicit Theories
The first branch of this sphere, implicit theories of wisdom,
consists of psychological research that is associated with
fol k-psychol ogi cal or common-sense approaches, a line of
work initiated by Clayton (Clayton & Birren, 1980), Hol-
liday and Chandler (1986), Sternberg (1985, 1986), Orwoll
and Perlmutter (1990), and Sowarka (1989). At stake here
is the question of how the t erm wisdom is used in everyday
language and how wise persons are characterized.
In our assessment, results on implicit conceptions of
wi sdom and wise persons permit five conclusions about the
concept of wisdom: (a) Wi sdom is a concept that carries
specific meaning that is widely shared and understood in its
language-based representation. For example, wi sdom is
clearly distinct from other wisdom-related psychological
concepts such as social intelligence, maturity, or creativity.
(b) Wi sdom is j udged to be an exceptional level of human
functioning. It is related to excellence and ideals of human
development. (c) Wi sdom identifies a state of mind and
behavi or that includes the coordinated and balanced inter-
play of intellectual, affective, and motivational aspects of
human functioning. (d) Wi sdom is viewed as associated
with a high degree of personal and interpersonal compe-
tence, including the ability to listen, evaluate, and to give
advice. (e) Wi sdom involves good intentions. It is used for
the well-being of oneself and others.
In many ways, as is true for many achievements of
human devel opment (Cole, 1996; Shweder, 1991), such
implicit and fol k-psychol ogi cal characterizations of wis-
dom are mainly the product of cultural history and its
impact on current society (see also, Csikszentmihalyi &
Rathunde, 1990). There is a saying that states, "Cultural
memor y is the mother of wi sdom. " Individuals partake in
this culture-produced concept of wisdom.
Consistent with this view, a more comprehensi ve
characterization of wi sdom can be deduced from cul t ural -
historical and philosophical analyses of the wi sdom con-
cept (Assmann, 1994; P. Baltes, 1993, 1999; Kekes, 1995;
Lehrer et al., 1996). To illustrate, P. Baltes (1993, 1999, see
Appendix A) identified seven properties of wi sdom that
emerge when analyzing and synthesizing cultural-histori-
cal and philosophical work: (a) Wi sdom represents a truly
superior level of knowledge, j udgment , and advice; (b)
wi sdom addresses important and difficult questions and
strategies about the conduct and meaning of life; (c) wis-
dom includes knowl edge about the limits of knowl edge and
the uncertainties of the world; (d) wi sdom constitutes
knowl edge with extraordinary scope, depth, measure, and
balance; (el) wi sdom involves a perfect synergy of mind and
character; that is, an orchestration of knowl edge and vir-
tues; (t) wi sdom represents knowl edge used for the good or
well-being of oneself and that of others; and (g) wisdom,
although difficult to achieve and to specify, is easily rec-
ognized when manifested.
When compari ng the results of modern-day research
on subjective beliefs of wi sdom (see above) with these
more general perspectives on wi sdom that can be deduced
from philosophical and cul t ural -hi st ori cal analyses, there
is much overlap (P. Baltes, 1999). I f anything, however, the
phi l osophi cal -hi st ori cal analysis of wi sdom is more gen-
eral, as it integrates the beliefs held by many individuals
into a common set of properties about which there is much
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 123
Ursula M.
Staudinger
collective and scholarship-based intersubjectivity. The be-
liefs of single individuals, in other words, are usually less
developed (comprehensi ve and organized) than those of-
fered by philosophical and cultural-historical analyses.
Explicit Theories
Explicit psychological theories of wi sdom go beyond the
characterization of wi sdom and a wise person in terms of
language-based descriptions. They focus on behavioral
manifestations or expressions of wisdom. In psychol ogy,
such explicit theories of wi sdom refer to theoretical con-
structions of wi sdom that lend themselves to empirical
inquiry in terms of quantifiable operationalization as well
as the identification of relevant antecedents, correlates, and
consequences of wi sdom and wisdom-related concepts.
Implicit and explicit psychological theories of wi sdom
are intertwined of course. For example, the information
provided by implicit theories of wi sdom and the cul t ural -
historical work on wi sdom offers a frame within which
explicit psychological work can be evaluated. Specifically,
one can ask whether explicit and behavior-oriented work
on the psychol ogy of wi sdom sufficiently agrees with the
language-based construction of wi sdom as reflected in cul-
tural history, philosophy, and folk psychology.
Theoretical and empirical work on explicit psychol og-
ical theories of wi sdom can be roughly divided into three
groups: (a) the conceptualization of wi sdom as a personal
characteristic or constellation of personality dispositions
(e.g., Erikson, 1959; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998), (b)
the conceptualization of wi sdom in the neo-Piagetian tra-
dition of postformal and dialectical thought (e.g., Alex-
ander & Langer, 1990; Labouvi e-Vi ef, 1990), and (c) the
conceptualization of wi sdom as an expert system dealing
with the meaning and conduct of life (P. Baltes & Smith,
1990; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger &
Baltes, 1994).
This third category of explicit theories guides our own
empirical work and serves as the basis for the psychol og-
ical paradi gm of wi sdom presented in the following. For
another well-elaborated psychological theory of wi sdom
(although largely theoretical rather than empirical), the
reader can refer to a recent work by Sternberg (1998).
Specifically, Sternberg conceptualized wi sdom as the ap-
plication of tacit knowl edge toward the achievement of a
common good through a balance among multiple personal
(intra-, inter-, and extrapersonal) interests and environmen-
tal conditions. There is much similarity between our re-
spective theories.
The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm:
Wisdom as Expertise in the
Fundamental Pragmatics of Life
To prevent a possible misunderstanding, we begin by mak-
ing explicit that our own empirical approach is only one
way to operationalize our general perspectives on wi sdom
(see Appendix A and Figure 1). We do not argue that this
line of empirical operationalization covers the entire mean-
ing space of wisdom. Wi sdom as a theoretical and cultural
construct is more than any given empirical met hod can
achieve.
Because of the emphasis of wi sdom on excellence, we
define wisdom as an expertise in the conduct and meaning
of life. In this vein, wi sdom is a key factor in the construc-
tion of a "good life" (M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996; P.
Baltes et al., 1992; Staudinger, 1999b). An important step
toward the further explication of this definition of wi sdom
as expertise was a specification of the content that can
properly be said to fall within the category of wi sdom (cf.
P. Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 1993). To
this end, we introduced the concept of the fundamental
pragmatics of life. With fundamental pragmatics, we mean
knowledge and j udgment about the essence of the human
condition and the ways and means of planning, managing,
and understanding a good life.
Included in the fundamental pragmatics of life are, for
example, knowledge about the conditions, variability, on-
togenetic changes, and historicity of life devel opment as
well as knowl edge of l i fe' s obligations and life goals;
understanding of the socially and contextually intertwined
nature of human life, including its finitude, cultural condi-
tioning, and incompleteness; and knowl edge about oneself
and the limits of one' s own knowl edge and the translation
of knowl edge into overt behavior. Equally central to wis-
dom-related knowledge and j udgment are the "spiritual"
incomprehensibilities of life, such as the mi nd- body dy-
namics or the existence of a divine being.
These exampl es illustrate that the territory of inquiry
that we label as the fundamental pragmatics of life is very
different from other domains that have been identified in
research on expertise. For the most part, past research on
expertise has concentrated on well-defined systems of fac-
tual and procedural knowl edge such as physics or chess.
124 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
F i g u r e 1
A-Research Framework Describin.cl Antecedent Factors and Mediatin~ Processes for the Acquisition and
Maintenance of Wisdom-Related-Knowledge and Skills Across the LiFe Span
FACTORS
e.g., Cognitive Mechanics
Mental Health
Cognitive Style
Creativity
Openness to Experience
Ego Strength
I EXPERTISE-SPECIFIC I
~- FACTORS ~-
Experience in Life Matters
Organized Tutelage
Mentorship in Dealing with
Life Problems
Cognitive Heuristics
Motivational Dispositions
(e.g., Strive for Excellence,
Generativity)
e.g.,
FACILITATIVE [
EXPERIENTIAL CONTEXTS
ORGANIZING PROCESSES:
EXAMPLES
e.g.,
Life Planning
Life Management
Life Review
GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Wisdom as Excellence in Mind and Virtue
PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
Wisdom as Excellence in the Conduct and
Meaning of Life
BERLIN WISDOM PARADIGM
Wisdom as Expert Knowledge and Judgment in
the Fundamental Pragmatics of Life
BASIC CRITERIA
Factual Knowledge, Procedural Knowledge
META CRITERIA
Lifespan Contextualism, Value Relativism,
Recognition/Management of Uncertainty
Age
Education
Parenthood
Providing Mentorship I[
Profession/Work Context
Historical Period
Note. The likelihood of attaining expert levels of performance in thi s prototypi cal domai n of the cogni ti ve pragmatics of the mind is assumed to depend on an
effective coal i ti on of life-contexl expertise-specific, and general person-related factors.
Wisdom, contrariwise, is an area that in itself represents an
open and ill-defined body of knowledge. Nonetheless, we
assume that wi sdom has a core and that wisdom-related
manifestations, if and when they occur, can be evaluated in
terms of indicators of quality and quantity. Our empirical
research results support this assumption. Many people,
after some training, are capable of reaching a high consen-
sus in the evaluation of wisdom-related products of
performances.
A F ami l y o f Five_ Cri teri a f o r Assessing the
Qual i ty o f Wi s dom-R el ated P erformanc e
In our work, the quality of wi sdom and the capacity for
j udgment in the fundamental pragmatics of life are defined
through a set of five criteria listed in the bot t om part of
Appendix A. As described in more detail elsewhere (e.g.,
P. Baltes et al., 1984, 1992; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes,
1990; Smith & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996a,
1996b), this set of criteria builds on the theoretical and
empirical approaches mentioned above: that is, research on
expertise, lifespan psychol ogy of cognition and personal-
ity, the neo-Piagetian tradition of adult cognitive develop-
ment, as well as cul t ural -hi st ori cal analyses of wisdom.
The two general, basic wi sdom criteria (factual and
procedural knowledge) are characteristic of all types of
expertise and stem from the tradition of research in exper-
tise. Applied to the present subject area, these criteria are
(a) rich factual (declarative) knowl edge about the funda-
mental pragmatics of life and (b) rich procedural knowl-
edge about the fundamental pragmatics of life. The factual
knowledge part concerns knowl edge about such topics as
human nature, life-long development, variations in devel-
opmental processes and outcomes, interpersonal relations,
social norms, critical events in life and their possible con-
stellations, as well as knowl edge about the coordination of
the well-being of oneself and that of others. Procedural
knowl edge about the fundamental pragmatics of life in-
volves strategies and heuristics for dealing with the mean-
ing and conduct of l i f e- - f or example, heuristics for giving
advice and for the structuring and weighing of life goals,
ways to handle life conflicts and life decisions, and knowl-
edge about alternative back-up strategies if devel opment
were not to proceed as expected.
In addition to these two basic criteria, we have for-
mulated three meta-criteria that in their separate and joint
expression, we consider specific for wisdom. These criteria
st em primarily (but not entirely) from the lifespan psychol-
ogy of cognition and personality (e.g., Alexander &
Langer, 1990; P. Baltes, 1987, 1997; P. Baltes et al., 1999).
The first metacriterion, lifespan contextualism, is meant to
identify knowl edge that considers the many themes and
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 125
contexts of life (e.g., education, family, work, friends,
leisure, the public good of society, etc.), their interrelations
and cultural variations, and in addition, incorporates a
lifetime temporal perspective (i.e., past, present, and fu-
ture). Another feature of lifespan contextualism is the his-
torical and social location of individual lifespan develop-
ment as well as the idiographic or nonnormative events that
operate in human development (Bandura, 1982).
The second wisdom-specific metacriterion, relativ-
ism of values and life priorities, deals with the acknowl-
edgment of and tolerance for value differences and the
relativity of the values held by individuals and society.
Wisdom, of course, is not meant to imply full-blown
relativity of values and value-related priorities. On the
contrary, it includes an explicit concern with the topic of
virtue and the common good. However, aside from the
recognition of certain universal values (Kekes, 1995),
value-relative knowledge, judgment, and advice are part
of the essence of wisdom.
The third meta-criterion, the recognition of and man-
agement of uncertainty, is based on the ideas (e.g., Baron,
1988; Dawes, 1988; Gigerenzer, 1996; Nisbett & Ross,
1980; Simon, 1983; Stich, 1990) that (a) the validity of
human information processing itself is essentially limited
(constrained), (b) individuals have access only to select
parts of reality, and (c) the future cannot be fully known in
advance. Wisdom-related knowledge and judgment are ex-
pected to offer ways and means to deal with such uncer-
tainty about human insight and the conditions of the world,
both individually and collectively.
For space limitations, we are not able to explicate how
our family of wisdom criteria relates to work conducted by
others who are also engaged in the study of wisdom or
related topics. Aside from Sternberg's (1998) important
recent effort mentioned earlier, with its focus on tacit
knowledge dealing with a balanced integration of intra-,
inter-, and extrapersonal interests, we note especially works
by Arlin (1993) on the ability of mature thinkers to identify
problems, by D6rner (1983) on complex problem solving,
by Kitchener and Brenner (1990) on the concept of toler-
ance for ambiguity, by Eriksonian researchers on generat-
ivity and other gains of adulthood (McAdams & de St.
Aubin, 1998), by researchers interested in the self-based
regulation of cognition and emotion during adulthood
(Blanchard-Fields & Hess, 1996; Carstensen, 1995; Labou-
vie-Vief, 1995), and conceptual and empirical work by
Riegel (1973) and Basseches (1984) on dialectical thinking
as a postformal mode of adult reasoning. Such lines of
inquiry are very relevant, and we have benefited from their
consideration. In the contex~ of our own approach, how-
ever, perhaps with the exception of Sternberg (1998), these
various approaches each represent only one important com-
ponent or facet of the wisdom-related domain of expertise
that we attempt to articulate and study.
The Empirical Assessment of Wi s dom-Rel ated
P erformance
The five qualitative criteria for the evaluation of wisdom-
related knowledge and judgment are suited for application
to a wide array of person-specific as well as social mani-
festations of wisdom. This topical array ranges from state
constitutions or works in the religious sphere on spiritual-
ity, to personal documents such as biographies and autobi-
ographies, to the way people assess and respond to tasks of
life planning, life management, and life review, whether it
be their own or that of another. Wisdom is located in many
sources and to achieve its highest level of manifestation, it
is likely that these sources need to be interrelated and used
as an ensemble.
In our work, we primarily have focused on, to date,
searching for manifestations of wisdom in individual
minds by asking people to respond to various problems
of life (for a more detailed description, see, e.g.,
Staudinger & Baltes, 1996a). Specifically, and as illus-
trated in Appendix B, study participants are confronted
under standardized conditions with difficult life prob-
lems of fictitious people, such as the following example:
"Someone receives a telephone call from a good friend
who says that he or she cannot go on like this and has
decided to commit suicide. What might one/the person
take into consideration and do in such a situation?"
Another example is as follows: "In reflecting over their
lives, people sometimes realize that they have not
achieved what they had once planned to achieve. What
should they do and consider?" The participants are then
asked to reflect out loud on the presented dilemma.
The responses are recorded on tape and transcribed.
Before the tasks are administered, participants are given
practice in thinking aloud (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) and
thinking about a hypothetical person. Appendix B contains
an excerpt from a high- and low-rated response to the
question of what to consider and do in the case of a
15-year-old girl who wants to get married right away.
For the purpose of obtaining quantified scores, a select
panel of judges, who are extensively trained and calibrated
in applying the criteria, evaluates the protocols of the
respondents in light of the five wisdom-related criteria
using a 7-point scale. The training proceeds on the basis of
a manual. The reliability of this rating method is very
satisfactory. In the empirical research conducted so far, the
intercorrelation between the five criteria has always been
high, approaching values between .50 and .77; test-retest
correlations over 12 months range in adults between .65
and .94; and the multidimensional measurement space that
is based on multiple tasks of wisdom conforms to the
five-criterion framework outlined (P. Baltes & Staudinger,
1993: Staudinger, Raykov, B6hmig-Krumhaar, & Baltes,
1999).
In general, we speak of a "wise" protocol only if it has
received a high rating in all five areas (e.g., a rating greater
than 5 for each criterion on the 7-point scale). As is the case
in research on other expert systems, it is an open question
to what degree the development of wisdom reflects the
accumulation of quantity or also the acquisition of new
qualities. Our general approach, which is consistent with
many cultural-historical views of wisdom (P. Baltes,
1999), is to view wisdom as more or less (quantitative) a
126 January 2000 • American Psychologist
phenomenon wi t hout excl udi ng t he possi bi l i t y that its final
achi evement is a qual i t at i vel y new step.
Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences
of Wisdom
Treat i ng wi s dom as an expert syst em associ at ed wi t h the
f undament al pragmat i cs of life suggest s a number of con-
ditions under whi ch wi s dom is likely to devel op (Bl oom,
1985; Er i csson & Lehmann, 1996). For emost are four
theoretical perspect i ves. First, like any expertise, the ac-
qui si t i on and refi nement of wi s dom i nvol ves an ext ended
and intense process of learning, pract i ce, as well as the
mot i vat i on to strive t owar d excellence. Second, wi sdom is
a compl ex and mul t i facet ed phenomenon. Therefore, a
vari et y of mi cro- and macr of act or s and processes need to
col l aborat e to generat e wi sdom. Third, because of the in-
t egrat i ve aspects of wi sdom in linking knowl edge wi t h
virtue, it is likely that the ant ecedent s of wi sdom are
gr ounded in the orchest rat i on of several characteristics:
cogni t i ve, mot i vat i onal , social, interpersonal, and spiritual.
Fourt h, as wi t h any ot her hi gh-l evel expertise, gui dance by
ment ors or ot her wi sdom- enhanci ng "voi ces" of soci et y as
well as t he experi ence and mast ery of critical life experi-
ences are likely necessary.
Fi gure 1 summari zes some of our anal yt i c efforts at
translating these general theoretical perspect i ves into a
testable f r amewor k. The f r amewor k descri bes a series of
ont ogenet i c condi t i ons and processes that, as distant and
pr oxi mal factors, need to wor k t oget her "syner get i cal l y" so
t hat somet hi ng like wi s dom can devel op. Specifically, we
di st i ngui sh three cat egori es of condi t i ons t hat are rel evant
t o the devel opment of wi sdom: (a) general personal char-
acteristics, (b) charact eri st i cs and experiential cont ext s t hat
are specific t o the acqui si t i on of expertise in the area of the
f undament al pragmat i cs of life, and (c) macrost ruct ural
cont ext s t hat are l i nked to certain const el l at i ons of wi sdom-
related experi ence. Movi ng t owar d wi s dom requires some
orchest rat ed coal i t i on of these factors. It is likely, however ,
t hat there is not a single pat hway; rather, we pr oceed in our
wor k wi t h the i dea of mul t i pl e but const rai ned pat hways to
wi sdom.
Because of the visibility of Er i kson' s (1959) t heory of
wi s dom (e.g., Cl ayt on & Bi t t en, 1980; McAdams & de St.
Aubi n, 1998), we add some observat i ons t o prevent possi -
bl e mi sunderst andi ngs and to differentiate our own concep-
tion f r om his. I n our view, the Eri ksoni an appr oach t o
wi sdom, wi t h its lifespan-, self-, and mot i vat i on- based con-
cept i on of wi sdom, pr ovi des one i mport ant set of const el -
lations that we consi der critical f or the underst andi ng of
wi sdom. However , our concept i on of wi s dom differs in
significant ways. First, Er i ks on' s t heory does not expl i cat e
many of t he ot her expert i se-rel at ed fact ors and processes
that, in addi t i on to personal i t y-rel at ed fact ors, are at the
f oundat i on of the acqui si t i on and refi nement of wi sdom.
Second, our concept i on of wi s dom entails mor e t han the
mi nd and personal i t y of individuals. I n our concept i on,
wi s dom is f undament al l y a cultural and col l ect i ve pr oduct
in whi ch i ndi vi dual s participate. Indi vi dual s are onl y some
of the carriers and out comes of wi sdom. Third, the sub-
stantive cont ent of Er i kson' s wi s dom t heory, wi t h its pri-
mar y emphasi s on sel f-referenced i nt egri t y and generat i v-
ity, represents but a subset of the territory t hat we pr opose
t o demarcat e as wi sdom. Ot her subsets i nvol ve, f or in-
stance, the heuristics of knowl edge organi zat i on and deci -
sion maki ng that are associ at ed wi t h wi sdom- r el at ed
behavi or.
At the cent er of the ont ogenet i c schema (cf. Fi gure 1),
we hi ghl i ght some of the processes that we consi der as the
perpet ual and or gani zi ng regul at ors of the devel opment of
wi sdom. Finally, on the ri ght -hand side of Fi gure 1, there is
a schemat i c present at i on of the inferential processes that
we engaged in as we translated the general cul t ural l y and
phi l osophi cal l y l egi t i mat ed concept i on of wi s dom into our
specific psychol ogi cal operat i onal i zat i on. I n the l ower part
of the ri ght col umn, assumpt i ons about the sequential
course of devel opment of the five criteria for wi s dom are
suggested. In line wi t h the model f or the devel opment of
expertise suggest ed by Ander son (1987), for exampl e, we
pr opose that in the course of devel opment of expertise, a
shift of emphasi s takes pl ace f r om decl arat i ve (factual) to
procedural knowl edge. Fr om this foundat i on, we expect the
body of ~i sdom- const i t ut i ve knowl edge t o emer ge that is
capt ured wi t h the three metacriteria: l i fespan cont ext ual -
ism, relativism in val ues and life priorities, and recogni t i on
and management of uncert ai nt y.
We have and are consi deri ng addi ng to this f ami l y of
five criteria anot her feat ure of wi sdom. We now t hi nk t hat
it may be i mport ant to make mor e explicit t he mot i va-
t i onal - emot i onal ori ent at i on associ at ed wi t h t he use of
wi sdom, that is, that wi sdom is (a) i nt ended f or the well-
bei ng of onesel f and others and (b) i nvol ves an effect i ve
coordi nat i on of mi nd and virtue. So far, we had i ncl uded
this mot i vat i onal - emot i onal aspect of wi s dom as a corre-
late of pract i cal l y all criteria. Such an approach, however ,
may not be expl i ci t enough and, therefore, coul d fal sel y
generat e the i mpressi on t hat our model does not consi der
mot i vat i onal - emot i onal di mensi ons and the not i on that
wi sdom deals with the personal and c ommon good or
well-being. Not hi ng coul d be furt her f r om our intentions.
Empirical Findings: Berlin Wisdom
Paradi gm
In the fol l owi ng, we summar i ze some of the mai n findings
obt ai ned when translating our par adi gm into empi ri cal re-
search. Studies in whi ch we conf r ont ed i ndi vi dual s wi t h the
ki nd of life pr obl ems descri bed in Appendi x B are most
promi nent . More recent l y, we have added to this appr oach
an additional met hodol ogi cal and concept ual frame. I n this
new facet of research, we f ocused on a t heory of successful
lifespan devel opment that defines the three processes of
selection, opt i mi zat i on, and compensat i on as the key ele-
ment s l eadi ng to devel opment al advances (M. Baltes &
Carst ensen, 1996; P. Baltes, 1997; Freund & Baltes, in
press; Marsi ske, Lang, Baltes, & Baltes, 1995). We con-
sidered knowl edge about these processes as part of the
domai n of wi sdom (P. Baltes et al., 1992). In this work, we
used proverbs to exami ne whet her individuals had knowl -
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 127
I
F i g l u r e 2
Adult Developmental Age Gradients for Prototypical Measures of the Cognitive Mechanics (Working Memory;
Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997) and the Cognitive Pragmatics (Wisdom; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996bJ
3
3.
Cognitive Mechani cs Cognitive Pragmati es I
Example: Wi sdom I
2 ~ o . . " • Exampl e: Wor ki ng M e m o r y • 2 ~ *g •.* * ' • o • • I
l ~ * * e &• ~_ ~ 1- . _~_, | e • • , 1 • %• 1 ~ ~. I
? . . . - : , . . I
o • • o.
-2 -2-
-3 -3
3 b ' s ' o ' 7 ' o ' 9 ' o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 9 0
30 50 70
A g e A g e
edge that is consistent with this theory of successful
development.
Empirical Findings 1: The Role of
Chronological Age
Ori gi nal l y, because of our interest in the search for
posi t i ve aspect s of human aging, our research i ncl uded a
focus on age- compar at i ve anal yses of wi sdom- r el at ed
per f or mance (Smi t h & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger, 1999a).
As for the rol e of age, Fi gure 2 present s a summar y of
four studies wi t h adults. In total, the findings are based
on 533 peopl e who ranged in age f r om 20 to 89 years and
represent ed di verse educat i onal and soci oeconomi c
backgrounds.
Ignoring the possibility of cohort effects, the maj or
finding was that for the age range from about 25 to 75 years
of age, the age gradient is zero. The data also tentatively
suggested that there may be a limit to the level of wisdom-
related performance in old age, beginning on average
around 75 years of age. This finding is understandable in
light of studies on the fluid mechanics of cognitive aging.
Beyond the age of around 75, one observes a more broadly
based decline in cognitive status (Lindenberger & Baltes,
1997; Schaie, 1996) that is likely to i mpose increasing
"mechani cal " limits on level of functioning in response to
the kind of wi sdom tasks that are used. Recent research
with adolescents (Pasupathi, Staudinger, & Baltes, 1999)
has suggested that the maj or period of acquisition of wis-
dom-related knowl edge and j udgment before early adult-
hood is the age range from about 15 to 25 years.
On the one hand, this finding of no age gradient across
most of adulthood may disappoint those who expect, in line
with subjective theories of lifespan development, a higher
level of functioning in wi sdom tasks as people move
through midlife into old age. Indeed, i f one examines the
relative proportion of people in the top 20% performance
category by age across multiple studies, there is some
evidence that if age and facilitative experiential contexts
collaborate, more older than younger participants are in the
top 20% (P. Baltes, Staudinger, Maercker, & Smith, 1995;
Staudinger, 1999b). This has led us to predict that the
"world record" in wi sdom may be held by someone in his
or her 60s.
On the other hand, however, the finding of no maj or
age differences during middle adulthood offers support for
two of our key assumptions. First, when contrasting find-
ings on the cognitive pragmatics (for which wi sdom is a
prototype) to research on the fluid mechanics, results indi-
cate that wisdom-related knowl edge and j udgment are fac-
ets of human devel opment that do not show signs of
deterioration beginning in earlier stages of adulthood. Sec-
ond, as we suggested in our developmental causal model of
wi sdom (Figure 1), having lived longer in itself is not
sufficient for acquiring more knowl edge and j udgment
capacity in the wi sdom domain. Other factors need to enter
into a coalition that, as an ensemble, is generative of
wisdom.
Empirical Findings 2: The Role of Professional
Experience (Clinical Psychology)
Another research project involved persons for whom we
j udged to have experienced a constellation of life processes
that were conducive to wisdom. In two studies, clinical
psychologists were taken as an exampl e of professional
specialization for which both training and practice consist
of intensified contact and engagement with questions of
128 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
life planning, life management , and life review (Smith,
Staudinger, & Baltes, 1994; Staudinger, Smith, & Baltes,
1992). The clinical psychologists were compared with
young and old adults of similar educational level and age
whose professional training, however, had no particular
emphasis in the domai n of the fundamental pragmatics of
life.
As predicted, clinical psychologists showed higher
levels of wi sdom-rel at ed performance than controls. This
was also true for the top range of performances. As we also
predicted, however, their performances did not approach
expert levels, as j udged by our theory-based measurement.
On the 7-point scale we devel oped and applied, the group
of clinical psychologists received an average score of 3.8
for the two studies, only slightly above the scal e' s mean
value.
In interpreting this result, one must consider the pos-
sibility that it is people with a particular personality con-
stellation and motivational structure who become clinical
psychologists. To estimate the contribution of such selec-
tion-into-clinical-psychology-profession effects, we exam-
ined measures of intelligence and personality. Communal -
ity analyses that are based on hierarchical models of re-
gression, which have wisdom-related performance as a
dependent variable, allowed us to quantify the joint and
separate effects of professional specialization versus intel-
lectual and personality dispositions (Staudinger, Maciel,
Smith, & Baltes, 1998). Professional specialization turned
out to be important; in fact, it was the largest unique
predictor, accounting for 15% of the variance in wi sdom-
related performance.
E mpi ri cal Findings 3: Wi s do m- R el ated
P erformanc e Requires the I nter pl ay o t
Intel l i gence, Cogni ti ve S tyl e, and l ~ers anal i ty
A maj or theoretical aspect of our approach (see also Stern-
berg, 1998) is that wi sdom requires and reflects integration
and balancing of several spheres of human functioning. On
the level of personal characteristics, this includes the or-
chestration of cognitive and behavioral style and personal-
ity attributes. To examine this question, we conducted one
study (Staudinger, Lopez, & Baltes, 1997) in which a large
number of relevant measures were considered as predictors
of wi sdom performance. Specifically, a total of 33 psycho-
metric indicators (that were based on 14 tests) marked the
sectors of psychomet ri c intelligence (4 indicators), person-
ality-intelligence interface such as cognitive style and cre-
ativity (17 indicators), and personality dispositions (12
indicators). Of these 33 indicators, 10 turned out to be
significant predictors of wi sdom and were considered in the
analyses reported below.
Our general expectation was that none of these mea-
sures by themselves would be powerful predictors of wis-
dom. Moreover, we expected that to achieve a salient
prediction, a large number of predictors would be neces-
sary. Finally, we predicted, to test the uniqueness of the
wi sdom construct, that a significant amount of remaining
variance in wisdom-related performance would be predict-
able only by consideration of parallel tests of wi sdom
rather than other predictors. The results of hierarchical
regression models with fol l ow-up communal i t y analyses
supported each of these predictions.
In total, 40% of the variance in wisdom-related per-
formance could be predicted by considering the 10 signif-
icant predictors. First, none of the indicators taken alone,
however, accounted for more than 18% of the variance in
wisdom-related ratings. Second, the results showed that
even after all (33) of the predictors were brought into the
prediction equation, the parallel tests of wisdom-related
performance added a relatively large amount of additional
variance (19%). This finding indicates that even within a
differentiated and rather comprehensi ve psychometric
sphere, our wisdom-related measures possessed a high de-
gree of unique variance. Wi sdom is more than the en-
semble of 33 indicators used to mark the predictor do-
mains of intelligence, personality-intelligence interface,
and personality.
What was the specific configuration of predictors of
wisdom-related performance? First, there was a significant
overlap between all three predictor domains pointing to the
coordinative nature of wisdom. Specifically, the predictors
from all domains shared 9% of the predictive variance.
Second, the unique prediction of intelligence and person-
ality was relatively small (2% each). Most important, the
intelligence-personality interface indicators (e.g., cognitive
style, creativity) contributed the largest unique share
(15%). Within the framework of the interface instruments
applied in this study, it was cognitive style (e.g., Steru-
berg' s, 1996, measure of thinking styles) and creativity that
particularly showed a positive connection to wisdom-re-
lated performance. Among St ernberg' s thinking styles, the
judicial style (which implies the evaluation and compari son
of issues at stake) and the progressive style (which implies
movi ng beyond existing rules and being tolerant of ambig-
uous situations) were the most salient predictors.
Figure 3 summarizes the main findings from all stud-
ies where we examined predictive correlates of wi sdom as
measured in the Berlin wi sdom paradigm. These results
indicate that wisdom-related knowledge and j udgment are
not simply another variant of intelligence or personality.
Rather, wi sdom implies a coordinating configuration of
multiple attributes, including knowl edge associated with
specific life experiences. The out come is the orchestration
of mind and virtue toward excellence. In this vein, the
findings are also in accordance with the results of research
on implicit theories of wi sdom mentioned above.
E mpi ri cal Findings 4: The S tudy o f P ersons
No mi nated as Wi s e
It might be supposed that the superior performance of
clinical psychologists is less a manifestation of their greater
wi sdom than of the fact that psychologists fare better than
nonpsychologists in a "wi sdom theory" devel oped by
members of their own profession. To examine this argu-
ment of professional self-enhancing bias, we compared
clinical psychologists with other people who were not
psychologists but who had been nominated as wise by a
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 129
F!gure 3
The Pattern of Predictive Correlates of Wisdom-Related Performance in Adults
Intelligence (4 Scales)
e.g.,
Fluid Intelligence
Crystallized Intelligence
Personality-Intelligence
Interface (17 Scales)
e.g.,
Creativity
Cognitive Style
Social Intelligence
Personality Traits
(12 Scales)
e.g..
Openness to Experience
Personal Growth
Psychological-
Mindedness
35% (15%)~
Age (Adulthood)
I L ife Experience 1
Ggneral Life Experience
Specific Professional
Experience
Note. The pattern oF predictive correlates of wisdom-related performance in adults illustrates the notion that wisdom is the result of a coal i ti on of multiple s o u r c e s
and attributes orchestrated t owar d the integration of mind and virtue. Values in parentheses i ndi cate unique predictive contributions that are based on communality
analysis (joint representation of data from P. Baltes et al., 1995; Staudinger et al., 1997; Staudinger, Maci el , et al., 1998).
panel of nonpsychologists, independently of our definition
of wisdom (P. Baltes et al., 1995).
The wisdom nominees were figures of public distinc-
tion who survived an intensive Delphi-like nomination
process by a rater panel. Initially, 156 persons were con-
sidered. In the end, 21 were chosen as fulfilling the stated
criteria. None of the 21 wisdom nominees was a psychol-
ogist. Although the range of ages for those nominated as
wise was relatively broad (41-79 years), the majority were
older adults (M = 64 years).
The wisdom-related performance of nominees was
compared with clinical psychologists of the same age range
and, in addition, with both young (25-35 years) and old
control adults ( 60- 80 years) who were advanced college
graduates but worked outside the field of the professional
human services. The participants from all four groups
responded to two wisdom-related tasks each. The first task
posed a problem of life planning (cf. Smith et al., 1994) and
the second was a problem of existential life management
involving the potential suicide of a friend (Maercker,
B6hmig-Krumhaar, & Staudinger, 1998).
Overall, wisdom nominees performed at least as well
as clinical psychologists and this applied to the top range of
performances as well. In fact, for the task most closely
tapping into the core of wisdom, that is a task of existential
life management, wisdom nominees evinced the highest
level of performance, and this included quite a few in the
age range from 50 to 70 years. Thus, the conception of
wisdom advanced by us is not one where nonpsychologists
would not be able to perform well.
Empirical Findings 5: The Interactive-Minds
(Social-Collaborative) Aspect of Wisdom
One of our central theoretical postures is that wisdom is a
collectively anchored product and that individuals by them-
selves are only "weak" carriers of wisdom (P. Baltes &
Smith, 1990, Staudinger, 1996). To examine the role of
collaborative or interactive-minds conditions, we con-
ducted a study in which groups of people performed on
wisdom tasks under varying conditions of social support
and collaboration. Specifically, we compared people who
responded to wisdom tasks alone with (a) those who dis-
cussed the problem with a significant other before respond-
ing individually, (b) those who engaged in a virtual-inter-
nal dialogue about the wisdom problem with a person of
their choice, or (c) a group who just had some free time to
think about the problem by themselves before responding
(Staudinger & Baltes, 1996a).
The outcome was fully supportive of the view that
social collaboration, whether internal or external, facilitates
130 January 2000 • American Psychologist
wisdom-related performance if, afterwards, persons had the
time to reflect about the discourse. This included the con-
dition where the discourse involved an inner voice, that is,
private conversations with a person considered by the per-
son to be a model of human functioning. The increase in
performance was close to one standard deviation. In line
with our interactive-minds and collective approach to wis-
dom was the finding that combining individual thinking-
time with an interactive-minds condition was of much
importance.
From a lifespan point of view, the finding that, when
compared to young adults, older adults benefited more
from the actual dialogue condition was especially signifi-
cant. This is one of the very few findings in research on
adult development and aging where older adults profited
more from a given intervention than young adults. We
interpret this as evidence that with age, when it comes to
topics such as wisdom, people acquire a knowledge base
that is conducive to input from interpersonal consultation
or dialogue.
Empirical Findings 6: Wi s dom in P roverbs
Most recently, we extended our inquiry concerning wisdom
to the study of proverbs and their relevance in accessing
wisdom-related knowledge (P. Baltes & Freund, 1999).
This research follows the notion of folk psychology (Ha-
selager, 1997; Mieder, 1993) that much of a culture's
historically acquired knowledge is stored in proverbs and
that accessing this body of knowledge is a major facilitator
in achieving and interpreting a good life.
In this instance, we focused on the use of proverbs that
reflect the three strategies of life management that Margret
Baltes, Paul Baltes, and their colleagues have identified as
the foundation to successful life development: selection,
optimization, and compensation (M. Baltes & Carstensen,
1996; P. Baltes, 1997: Freund & Baltes, in press; Marsiske
et al., 1995). Selection involves goals, optimization con-
cerns the means to reach goals, and compensation denotes
means that are invoked when established means fail to
reach a given goal. Examples of such proverbs are as
follows: "Jack of all trades, master of none" (selection),
"practice makes perfect" (optimization), and "when there is
no wind, grab the oars" (compensation).
To test the availability of such proverb-related knowl-
edge, we presented adults who varied in age from early to
late adulthood with life problems that require the use of a
particular strategy of problem solving (P. Baltes & Freund,
1999). We asked adults to choose between two proverbs for
each problem situation, one that denoted one of the three
key processes (selection, optimization, compensation) and
another that described an alternative proverbial strategy
(e.g., "everything comes to he who waits").
The outcome was clear and consistent with our expec-
tation that people have access to proverb-based strategies
of practical wisdom. Study participants chose the target
proverbs of selection, optimization, and compensation
more often than the control proverbs. In addition, although
older adults typically are much slower in reaction-time
tasks, in this instance older adults performed as fast as
young adults. We interpret this finding as evidence that
with age, people gain wisdom-related knowledge that is
captured in proverbs and can be activated when coping
with difficult problems of life.
In the future, we intend to extend this line of inquiry
in several ways. First, we have plans to examine the degree
to which expertise in the use of proverbs correlates with
alternative indicators of wisdom such as being nominated
as wise, being an effective counselor, or demonstrating
high levels of performance in think-aloud wisdom tasks.
Furthermore, we plan to conduct experiments in which
proverbs are studied that reflect more directly the three
metacriteria that we have identified as essential to wisdom:
lifespan contextualism, relativism of values and life prior-
ities, and recognition-management of uncertainty. Peng
and Nisbett (1999), for example, compared Chinese and
American students in relevant work. They studied individ-
ual preferences for proverbs that varied in the degree to
which they expressed maxim-like prescriptions or reflec-
tion-based uncertainty and oppositional information. Chi-
nese students, compared with American students, preferred
proverbs that, in line with our conception of wisdom, were
more oppositional and contradictory in context.
Wi s d o m as a Cogni t i v e a n d . .
Mo t i v a t i o n a l - E mo t i o n a l Heur i shc
( Pr a gma t i c ) t o Or c h e s t r a t e Mi n d
a n d Vi r t u e
In this section, we describe one new line of work that we
are initiating to explore another facet of the general con-
ception of wisdom. With this work, we intend to examine
more fully to what degree and how wisdom-related knowl-
edge and judgment can serve the function of planning and
optimizing human development.
For this purpose, we consider the use of methods
associated with the study of cognitive heuristics and prag-
matic schemata of reasoning. In general terms, a heuristic
can be defined as a highly automatized and organized
strategy for directing search processes or for organizing
and using information in a certain class of situations
(Baron, 1988; Dawes, 1988; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC
Research Group, 1999; Haselager, 1997; Kahneman,
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nozick,
1993; Simon, 1983). In the context of the tasks of everyday
life, a functionally similar concept is that of a pragmatic in
the sense of a pragmatic reasoning schema (Holyoak &
Spellman, 1993; Smith, 1996).
Considering this general approach to the study of
behavior, one of us (P. Baltes, 1999) has advanced the idea
that one feature of the concept of wisdom is its role as such
a heuristic or pragmatic. The direction of the collaborative
organization generated by the concept of wisdom would be
human excellence in the conduct of life. Specifically, the
special focus of this wisdom heuristic would be the acti-
vation, organization, and collaborative enlisting of knowl-
edge that directs one' s attention to the integration and
optimization of mind and virtue.
January 2000 • American Psychologist 131
What are the definitional elements of this wi sdom
heuristic? A first set of implications follows from the
meaning space of wi sdom described above. For example,
we suggest that invoking the concept of wi sdom coordi-
nates knowl edge and j udgment s about the fundamental
pragmatics of life around such properties as (a) strategies
and goals involving the conduct and meaning of life; (b)
limits of knowl edge and uncertainties of the world; (c)
excellence of j udgment and advice; (d) knowl edge with
extraordinary scope, depth, and balance; (e) search for a
perfect synergy of mind and character; and (f) balancing
the good or well-being of onesel f and that of others.
There are additional features of the wi sdom heuristic
(P. Bakes, 1999). One is the role of wi sdom in what is
called the "binding" probl em associated with the issue of
integration versus fragmentation of bodies of knowledge.
As Stich (1990), for instance, has argued, one of the maj or
deficits of knowl edge systems can be their fragmentation or
lack of goal- or outcome-oriented binding and collabora-
tion. To counteract such fragmentation of bodies of knowl-
edge, the wi sdom heuristic would function as an organizing
selector and activator of otherwise more independent bod-
ies of knowl edge about the means and ends of a good life.
Other characteristics of the wi sdom heuristic are its
generality, flexibility, and efficiency in application. Similar
to a general purpose heuristic and what Hatano (1988)
identified as an adapt i ve-fl exi bl e expertise-related heuristic
(compared with routine heuristics), we suggest that the
wi sdom heuristic has wide applicability. Most issues of the
meaning and conduct of life are approachable by this
heuristic. Moreover, we submit that the heuristic is highly
efficient, considering the compl exi t y of information asso-
ciated with the domain of the fundamental pragmatics of
life. In this vein, and using Gi gerenzer' s and his col-
l eagues' t ermi nol ogy (Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer et al.,
1999), we would classify the wisdom heuristic as a "fast
and frugal" heuristic, as one where within the frame of
bounded rationality, highly compl ex sets of information
about the meani ng and conduct of life are reduced quickly
to their essentials without peopl e being lost in the never-
ending process of information search that were to occur i f
wi sdom were treated as a case of unbounded rationality.
Finally, we suggest that wi sdom is a metaheuristic,
that is, a heuristic that organizes, at a high level of aggre-
gation, the pool (ensemble) of bodies of knowledge and
commensurat e, more specific heuristics that are available to
individuals in planning, managing, and evaluating issues
surrounding the fundamental pragmatics of life. Such an
approach to the psychol ogy of wi sdom is consistent with
work by philosophers, who, in their search for an interdis-
ciplinarily guided vi ew of the nature of human rationality,
have begun to attend to work on heuristics and pragmatic
schemata in cognitive psychol ogy; foremost to mention are
philosophical pragmatists (Bratman, 1987; Fletcher, 1995;
Rorty, 1998; Stich, 1990).
As a cognitive and motivational metaheuristic, then,
wi sdom is the embodi ment of the best "subjective beliefs
and laws of life" that a culture and individuals have to
offer. Without wi sdom as a metaheuristic, individuals'
knowl edge and j udgment about the conduct and meaning ot
life would be manifested at a l ower level of quality, with a
greater degree of fragmentation and without the proactive
directionality toward optimization that the concept of wis-
dom prefigures. Moreover, if the wi sdom heuristic was
acquired systematically and repeatedly over time, the ex-
pectation would be that developing individuals would be
able to reach more advanced levels of wisdom-related
knowl edge and j udgment than is true to date. It might also
be useful to consider the wi sdom heuristic in efforts at
i mprovi ng training in clinical, educational, and applied
psychol ogy (P. Baltes, 1999; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996a).
Summary
In sum, then, we suggest that adding the concept of wi sdom
to psychological inquiry is a worthwhile challenge. As a
concept and as a heuristic, it highlights the j ewel s and
peaks of cultural evolution and human ontogenesis. In its
application to human development, wi sdom makes explicit
the goal of orchestrating mind and virtue toward human
excellence and the common good.
There are many open questions, of course. Of much
interest is the link of wi sdom as a knowl edge-based exper-
tise in the fundamental pragmatics of life to actual behavi or
involving onesel f and others. Currently, aside from our
work on wi sdom nominees and the correlative patterns
observed when linking wisdom-related performance to fac-
ets of intelligence and personality, there is no relevant
empirical evidence to make explicit the link between
knowl edge and behavior. For example, to what degree do
peopl e who excel in our wi sdom tasks also demonstrate
superior outcomes in their own life management ? Is the
kind of wisdom-related knowl edge and j udgment studied
by us effective as a life-guiding and life-advancing
method? Furthermore, to what degree are peopl e who dis-
play wisdom-like knowledge sought out as advisors? What
is the behavi or they display? These are important questions
for future research (e.g., the concept of successful aging in
M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996, or the concept of art of
living in Staudinger, 1999b).
In the ancient history of the concept of wisdom, the
sage was often invoked as the only carrier of wisdom, and
there were few (Assmann, 1994; P. Baltes, 1999; Hadot,
1995; Oelmtiller, 1989). At the same time, it was suggested
that sages represent guideposts of excellence for the vast
majority of people who themselves would never reach the
pinnacle of wisdom. On the one hand, we share in this
ancient (e.g., Spinoza) view that wisdom, like "all excellent
things, is as difficult as it is rare" (Hadot, 1995, p. 261). On
the other hand, when thinking of and about wisdom, indi-
viduals are offered a sense of directionality and positive
agency. By reference to wisdom, we can participate, for a
fleeting moment at least, in the personal utopia of an
otherwise unreachable level of excellence.
Elevating the notion of wi sdom to an overall life
orientation, however, goes beyond the fleeting moment of
the present. Maki ng the ensemble of attributes associated
with wi sdom as explicit as possible, translating it into a
more regularly available heuristic (pragmatic), and thereby
132 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
i ncorporat i ng it i nt o t he cons t ruct i on and opt i mi z at i on o f
human de v e l o pme nt , i ndi vi dual l y and c ol l e c t i ve l y, ma y be
a cri ti cal step for reachi ng i ncreas i ngl y hi gher l e ve l s o f
f unct i oni ng as the l i f es pan unf ol ds . In our v i e w, then, the
perenni al po we r o f wi s d o m i s its rol e as a remi nder, a
source, and a be nc hmar k i n the ques t for e x c e l l e nc e (P.
Bal t es, 1999) .
As a Ch i n e s e w i s d o m pr o v e r b s a y s , "Ev e n a v e r y
l o n g j o u r n e y b e g i n s wi t h a s i ng l e st ep. " We add, "And
t hi s s t ep i s mo r e e f f e c t i v e t he mo r e it i s a st ep i n t he ri ght
di r e c t i on. " In f act , i f t he di r e c t i onal mo v e me n t i s cor-
rect, s uc h as i s true f or t he di r e c t i on and de s t i nat i on o f
wi s d o m, we c an e v e n af f ord s l o w pr ogr e s s . To i l l ust rat e,
we recal l a quot at i on f r o m an a nc i e nt Ro ma n ( Marc
Aurel ) : "It' s bet t er t o l i mp s l o wl y a l o ng t he ri ght pat h
t han wa l k s t ri dent l y i n t he wr o n g di rect i on. " Ho w e v e r
s l o w and hard, f ut ure wo r k on t he p s y c h o l o g y o f w i s d o m
s e e ms t o be a c o r ne r s t o ne o f t he f o u n d a t i o n o f what t he
e di t or s o f thi s s pe c i a l i s s ue c l a i m t o be the cal l f or a
p o s i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y .
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Appendi x A
General Criteria Derived Fro_m Cultural-Historical Analysis
and Specific Criteria(Berlin Wisdom Paradi gm) Used
to Anal yze Wisdom-Related Products
General Criteria Outl i ni ng the Nature of Wi s dom
Wi s dom addresses important and difficult questi ons and strategies about the conduct and meani ng o f life.
Wi s dom i ncl udes knowl edge about the limits o f knowl edge and the uncertainties o f the world.
Wi sdom represents a truly superior level of knowledge, judgment, and advice.
Wi sdom constitutes knowl edge with extraordinary scope, depth, measure, and balance.
Wi sdom involves a perfect synergy o f mi nd and character, that is, an orchestration of knowl edge and virtues.
Wi sdom represents knowl edge used for the good or well-being of oneself and that of others.
Wi sdom is easily recognized when manifested, although difficult to achieve and to specify.
Criteria Us ed in Berlin Wi s dom P aradi gm to Operati onal i ze Wi s dom a s Expertise in the
F undamental P ragmatics of L ife
Ri ch factual knowl edge about l i fe
Ri ch procedural knowl edge about life
Li fespan cont ext ual i sm
Rel ati vi sm o f val ues and life priorities
Recogni t i on and management of uncertainty
(Appendixes continue)
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 135
Appendix B
Berlin Wisdom Parad! gm: I_llustration of a
Wisdom- Related Task With Examples of
Extreme Responses ( Abbreviated)
A 15-year-ol d girl wants to get marri ed right away.
What shoul d one/ she consi der and do?
Low Wisdom-Related Score
A 15-year-ol d girl want s to get marri ed? No, no way, mar r yi ng at age 15 woul d be utterly
wrong. One has to tell the girl that marri age is not possible. (Aft er furt her probi ng) It
woul d be irresponsible to support such an idea. No, this is j ust a cr azy idea.
High Wisdom-Related Score
Well, on the surface, this seems like an easy probl em. On average, marri age for 15-year-
old girls is not a good thing. But there are situations where the average case does
not fit. Perhaps in this instance, special life ci rcumst ances are i nvol ved, such that the girl
has a terminal illness. Or the girl has j ust lost her parents. And also, this girl may live in
anot her culture or historical period. Perhaps she was raised with a value syst em different
f r om ours. In addition, one has to think about adequate ways of talking with the girl and
to consi der her emot i onal state.
136 January 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi s
States of Excel l ence
David Lubinski and Camilla Persson Benbow
Vanderbilt University
Research from the individual-differences tradition perti-
nent to the optimal development of exceptional talent is
reviewed, using the theory of work adjustment (TWA) to
organize findings. The authors show how TWA concepts
and psychometric methods, when used together, can .facil-
itate positive development among talented youth by align-
ing learning opportunities with salient aspects of each
student's individuality. Longitudinal research and more
general theoretical models of (adult) academic and intel-
lectual development support this approach. This analysis
also uncovers common threads running through several
positive psychological concepts (e.g., effectance motiva-
tion, flow, and peak experiences). The authors conclude by
underscoring some important ideals from counseling psy-
chology for fostering intellectual development and psycho-
logical well-being. These include conducting a multifac-
eted assessment, focusing on strength, helping people make
choices, and providing a developmental context for bridg-
ing educational and industrial psychology to facilitate pos-
itive psychological growth throughout the life span.
S
ince the beginning of recorded history, the extraor-
dinary gifts that some individuals possess and the
ways these gifts are nurtured have fascinated peo-
ple. This may be particularly true for those intellectual
attributes that manifest precocity in rate of devel opment
and terminal level of performance. How does such precoc-
ity emerge? Are there ways to cultivate its manifestation?
Are there barriers in place that attenuate its devel opment
into exceptional adult attainment? These are among the
most critical questions being addressed by investigators
interested in talent development.
Although there are many ways to approach these
issues from various disciplinary perspectives, in this article
we show how traditional individual-differences measures,
used within the theory of work adjustment (TWA; Dawis &
Lofquist, 1984) framework, can facilitate optimal develop-
ment of talent. We also synthesize basic but widely scat-
tered findings in the psychological literature to reveal the
many converging lines of evidence that support this prac-
tice. Detailing exact interventions or procedures for adjust-
ing educational curricula (Benbow & Lubinski, 1996; Ben-
bow & Stanley, 1996; Lubinski & Benbow, 1995; Winner,
1996) is, however, beyond our scope here. Rather, we limit
ourselves to demonstrating how findings in positive psy-
chology provide foundational support for tailoring a
school ' s curriculum to match individual differences among
talented students. We begin with a revi ew of early ap-
proaches to talent devel opment within the individual-
differences tradition: this sets the stage for using ability and
preference assessments to design optimal learning environ-
ments for intellectually talented youth.
Early Wo r k
Around the t i me the science of applied psychol ogy began,
scholars were intrigued by the possibility that in-depth
studies of exceptionally able students might help answer
the questions posed above. Even staunch empirical outlets
like the Journal of Applied Psychology devoted space to
some case history reports (e.g., Coy, 1918; Garrison,
Burke, & Hollingworth, 1917, 1922; Hollingworth, 1927).
These students were seen as so fascinating and their intel-
lectual devel opment as so remarkable (and of eventual
value to society) that they were worth idiographic (N = 1)
profiling. What these case histories revealed, among other
things, was that the terms intellectually gifted or highly
talented are imprecise. The breadth of diversity found
within this special population was profound across both
intellectual and nonintellectual attributes. The students
were anything but a categorical type. Hence, no single
environmental manipulation would address the needs of all
talented youth. There was no "silver bullet."
Upon reflection, this finding was unsurprising. One
third of the total range on any given normally distributed
dimension is found within the top one percent (a common
arbitrary criterion for classifying an individual as "gifted").
Scores marking the top one percent on general intelligence,
as measured by conventional psychomet ri c (IQ) assess-
ments, begin at an IQ of approximately 137. Yet, IQs can
extend beyond 200. Individual differences within the upper
segment of this over 70 point IQ range lead to huge
differences in the educational environments required for
ensuring optimal development.
Although Leta Hol l i ngwort h' s (1942) vol ume Chil-
dren Above 180 IQ helped solidify this conclusion, there
were other voices. Many early pioneers of applied psychol-
This article was supported by an anonymous funding agency and the
Kennedy Center at the College of Education and Human Development,
Vanderbilt University. We are grateful to John B. Carroll, Rene V. Dawis,
Linda Dunn, Robert Hogan, Arthur R. Jensen, Paul E. Meehl, Martha J.
Morelock, Frank k. Schmidt, Lynne Schoenauer, Daniel L. Shea, Julian C.
Stanley, Auke Tellegen, and Rose Mary Webb for providing us with
feedback oft an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to either
David Lubinski or Camilla Persson Benbow, Department of Psychology
and Human Development. Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203.
Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected] or to
camilla.benbow @vanderbilt.edu.
January 2000 ° Ameri can Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00
Vol. 55, No. 1, 137-150 DOI: 10, 1037/ 10003- 066X. 55. | . 137
137
Da vid
Lubinski
ogy stressed the heterogeneity in gifted populations; they
pointed out the concomitant necessity of and benefits for
structuring these students' educational curriculums at a
level and pace commensurate with their rate of learning.
Thus. by the 1950s, when the Bingham Lecture Series
entitled "The Discovery and Development of Exceptional
Abilities and Capacities" began (all of the lectures in this
series were published in the American Psychologist), al-
most every contribution to the series underscored the em-
pirical evidence for this perspective (e.g., Ghiselli, 1963;
Paterson, 1957; Stalnaker, 1962; Terman, 1954; Wolfle,
1960). Moreover, most contributors promoted educational
acceleration to respond to the unique educational needs of
these gifted children. It is important to point out before
leaving this topic, however, that educational acceleration
is a misnomer, as students are not hurried along but rather
placed in existing curricula roughly at the point where they
are naturally functioning. Thus, we prefer the term appro-
priate developmental placement because it is a more accu-
rate descriptor of the process. Regardless, the academic,
emotional, and social advantages of "educational acceler-
ation" for the highly talented have been confirmed in every
decade since the 1920s (Benbow & Stanley, 1996; Pressey,
1946a; Seashore, 1922; Terman, 1925, 1959).
Over most of the 20th century, however, assessing
intellectual precocity largely pertained to using general
intellectual abilities for forecasting general academic
achievement and placement. Although this was an impor-
tant first step, which has been validated over long time
frames (Cronbach, 1996; Holahan & Sears, 1995), it is not
useful for tailoring educational interventions toward spe-
cific needs. Recent advances stemming from more refined
individual-differences measures appear to offer much
more.
Mo der n Empirical Advances
During the past two decades, some consensus has emerged
regarding the nature and structural organization of cogni-
tive abilities (Carroll, 1993; Gustafsson & Undheim, 1996),
interests (Day & Rounds, 1998; Holland, 1996), and per-
sonality (Goldberg, 1993; McCrae & Costa, 1997) in adult
populations. More recently, verisimilitude for these models
has generalized to intellectually gifted young adolescents.
It seems that the intellectually precocious are precocious in
many ways. For them, results of conventional psychometric
assessments of cognitive abilities, interests, and personality
appear to be similar to those of adults (Achter, Lubinski, &
Benbow, 1996; Achter, Lubinski, Benbow, & Eftekhari-
Sanjani, 1999; Benbow, 1992; Benbow & Lubinski, 1997;
Lubinski, Benbow, & Ryan, 1995; Lubinski, Schmidt, &
Benbow, 1996; Schmidt, 1998; Schmidt, Lubinski, & Ben-
bow, 1998). Because of this, psychometric assessments
initially designed for adults can facilitate positive develop-
ment among gifted youth.
Abilities
Most importantly, the hierarchical organization of cogni-
tive abi l i t i es--a general factor supported by a number of
group factors (e.g., mathematical, spatial, verbal )--reveal s
the same structure among intellectually talented young
adolescents as it does in random samples of adult popula-
tions. The intellectually talented tend to develop the even-
tual adult structure at an early age (hence, the label preco-
cious). Moreover, although we have known for decades
that individual differences within the top one percent of
general intelligence have important educational implica-
tions, we now know that the same is true for some specific
abilities (Benbow, 1992). Mathematical, spatial, and verbal
reasoning abilities have differential and incremental valid-
ity for predicting relevant educational-vocational criteria
beyond general intelligence (Achter et al., 1999; Hum-
phreys, Lubinski, & Yao, 1993).
Stanley (1996; Keating & Stanley, 1972) was among
the first to extend the early efforts of Hollingworth and
Terman, who focused on intensity appraisals of general
intelligence (IQ), to appraising specific abilities (group
factors). Through his Study of Mathematically Precocious
Youth (SMPY), beginning in 1971, Stanley documented
the importance of more refined intellectual assessments.
SMPY used the College Board Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) to examine the intensity of precocity among 12-
year-olds who were "bumping their heads" on the ceilings
of age-calibrated tests routinely administered to them in
their schools. Prior to the 1970s, having 12- or 13-year-olds
take the SAT for educational planning was essentially
unheard of, but today, largely in response to Stanley' s
groundbreaking work, approximately 200,000 seventh and
eighth graders take the SAT annually and have their abil-
ities profiled.
Organizers of talent searches seek out seventh and
eighth graders scoring in the top two to five percent on
age-calibrated standardized tests to take the SAT (or other
college entrance exams; Benbow & Stanley, 1996). Inter-
138
January 2000 * American Psychologist
Ca mil l a Persson
Benbo w
Photo by Peyton Hoge
Photos
estingly, these students generate SAT score distributions
indistinguishable from random samples of high school se-
niors (Benbow, 1988). Similarly, the SAT is differentially
valid for these students, just as it is for college-bound high
school students. Students whose talents are primarily in
mathematical relative to verbal reasoning tend to gravitate
toward quantitatively demanding areas, whereas students
primarily talented in verbal relative to mathematical rea-
soning tend to seek out disciplines more in line with their
intellectual strength. Of course, there are exceptions.
When gifted students are placed in environments cor-
responding to their abilities (e.g., summer residential pro-
grams conducted by talent-search organizers), amazing
achi evement can emerge. For over 25 years it has been
shown that highly able students routinely assimilate a full
year of a rigorous high school course (e.g., chemistry,
Latin, mathematics) in three weeks. These accomplish-
ments have been replicated widely and are well docu-
mented (Benbow & Lubinski, 1996; Benbow & Stanley,
1996). Such programs receive positive subjective reports
from participants (Benbow, Lubinski, & Suchy, 1996)
and demonstrate positive l ong-t erm benefits (e.g., Swiatek
& Benbow, 1991a, 1991b). We believe, however, that even
better outcomes can be achieved if preferences are
also considered when matching students to educational
environments.
Preferences
Recent empirical findings allow us to refine appropriate
developmental pl acement beyond multiple abilities. That
is, j ust as work over the 1970s and 1980s documented the
utility of assessing specific abilities among the gifted (for
educational planning), research during the 1990s demon-
strated the same potential for certain nonintellectual at-
tributes. Educational and vocational interests seem to be
sufficiently differentiated (Achter et al., 1996), longitudi-
nally stable (Lubinski et al., 1995, 1996), and construct
valid (Achter et al., 1999; Schmidt et al., 1998) to be useful
for this special population by the time its members reach
the age of 12 years. We can forecast not only what gifted
youth are likely to be best at but also what they are most
likely to enjoy. Because exceptional achi evement is more
likely to emerge when individuals follow their "passion, "
this advance has important implications for nurturing pos-
itive development.
Hol l and' s (1996; Day & Rounds, 1998) robust hex-
agonal model for describing the structure of adult voca-
tional interests can be applied to intellectually gifted ado-
lescents (Lubinski et al., 1995; Schmidt et al., 1998). The
acronym RIASEC in Hol l and' s model is the dominant out-
line of vocational interests today. RIASEC stands for re-
alistic (works with things and gadgets, works outdoors),
investigative (academically orientated, interested in scien-
tific pursuits), artistic (prefers unstructured environments
and opportunities for self-expression), social (enjoys peo-
ple contact and working with and doing things for people),
enterprising (is persuasive or a corporate climber, takes on
leadership roles), and conventional (conforms to office
practices, prefers structure and knowl edge of what is ex-
pected). These dimensions are multifaceted and, for many
purposes, important to decompose (Schmidt et al., 1998).
However, as a general outline, RIASEC works well for
adults and intellectually talented adolescents in locating
environments where passions are likely to be reinforced
and actualized.
Although cognitive abilities are more multidimen-
sional than general intelligence supported by quantitative,
spatial, and verbal abilities, and although interests extend
beyond the six RIASEC dimensions discussed here, these
personal attributes are among the most significant personal
determinants of educational and vocational choice (Dawis,
1992; Lubinski, 1996). Collectively, they provide a way to
think about the multifaceted nature of cognitive and moti-
vational issues found in highly able adolescents. For this
special population, we suggest that educational counseling
begin with assessment of at least these individual differ-
ences. Some may argue that to do so at an early age
pigeonholes students, but that is not necessarily so. Rather,
these dimensions are tools for evaluating choices and op-
portunities for personal devel opment that are present at an
earlier age. Although interest profiles can and do change
among the gifted from early adolescence to adulthood,
there is enough stability and validity to consider t hem
flexible guideposts. In the contexts of other attendant life
pressures, some of which may conflict (e.g., peers, parents,
teachers) with one' s self-concept (see below), this infor-
mation may be clarifying. Because intellectually talented
adolescents appear to think seriously and meaningfully
about educational and career choices at an earlier than
typical age (Achter et al., 1996), these assessments provide
a conceptual framework for evaluating their experiences
across contrasting learning and work settings. Next, we
provide a synthetic model for combining ability and inter-
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 139
est information in a cohesive and theoretically meaningful
way.
TWA
TWA was designed for adult populations and the world of
work. TWA is useful for organizing psychometric findings
on ability and interest dimensions to facilitate optimal
devel opment (see Figure 1). To the left of the conventional
TWA model in Figure 1 (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984), we
have two well-supported models of cognitive abilities and
interests. On the top left side is a familiar arrangement of
the maj or dimensions of cognitive abilities: numer i cal -
quantitative, spat i al -mechani cal , verbal-linguistic, and
their communality, general intelligence (using radex scal-
ing; Lubinski & Dawis, 1992; R. E. Snow & Lohman,
1989). On the bot t om left side of Figure 1 is Hol l and' s
(1996) RIASEC model.
Because the same variables determine educational and
vocational adjustment and, as we saw above, because in-
tellectually talented young adolescents are devel opmen-
tally mature, we combi ned information from both sources
to view the gifted more multidimensionally. Specifically,
we have aligned cognitive abilities and interests with TWA
and extended this amal gamat i on to the educational plan-
ning for precocious youth (Achter et al., 1996; Benbow &
Lubinski, 1997). Next, we describe how TWA works.
According to TWA (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984;
Lofquist & Dawis, 1991), educational and vocational ad-
j ust ment involves two maj or dimensions of correspon-
dence: sat i sf act ori ness (competence) and sat i sf act i on (ful-
fillment). The former is determined by the correspondence
between abilities and the ability requirements of the envi-
ronment. The latter is determined by correspondence be-
tween personal needs and rewards provided by the envi-
ronment. To the extent that satisfactoriness and satisfaction
co-occur, the person and environment are said to be in
harmony. Both are mot i vat ed to continue to interact with
one another, because it is to their mutual advantage, and
t enure (a longitudinally stable per son- envi r onment rela-
tionship) occurs. Take, for example, the situation of stu-
dents who are heavily recruited (by environments) and the
educational institutions that are highly sought after (by
students). Both work hard to "'find" each other (Zuckerman,
1977), and both work hard to "keep" each other.
One important feature of TWA is that it places equal
emphasis on assessing the person and assessing the envi-
F i g u r e |
The Theory o f Wor k Adjustment (TWA) Co mb i n e d Wi t h the Radex Scaling o f Cognitive Abi l i t i es (Upper Left)
and the RIASEC Hexagon of Interests (Lower Left) for Conceptualizing Personal Attributes Relevant to Learning
and Wor k
Spatial -
Mechanica I
Numerical -
Q uantitative
A b i l i t i e s
i L
V e r b a l -
inguistic
I
I n t e r e s t s
Realistic~.~ Investigative I
Co° . ° t i o° a, (
Theory of Work Adjustment
C o r r e s p o n d e n c e )
( A b ilitie s ) ~ ~ ( ~
L R A b i l i t y "1
e q u i r e m e n t s J
nvironmen
~ C I n t e r e s t s ) ~ , ~ C ReinfOrcer System )
( C o r r e s p o n d e n c e )
r'~ C s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s )
/
N o t e . The d o t t e d l i n e r u n n i n g d o w n t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d e n v i r o n m e n t sectors o f T W A illustrates t h a t T W A places e q u a l e mp h a s i s o n assessing t h e p e r s o n a l attributes
( a b i l i t i e s a n d interests) a n d assessing the e n v i r o n m e n t ( a b i l i t i e s requirements a n d r e w a r d structure). RIASEC is an a c r o n y m f o r realistic, i n v e s t i g a t i v e , artistic, s o c i a l ,
e n t e r p r i s i n g , a n d c o n v e n t i o n a l ; v o c a t i o n a l interests c o v a r y t o t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e y share p r o x i m i t y . For c o g n i t i v e a b i l i t i e s , V = v e r b a l - l i n g u i s t i c , N =
n u m e r i c a l - q u a n t i t a t i v e , a n d S = s p a t i a J - m e c h a n i c a l content; subscripts w i t h these letters represent l h e l e v e l o f c o m p l e x i t y , w i t h l a r g e r subscripts reflecting g r e a t e r
c o m p J e x ity , g = g e n e r a l i n t e l l i g e n c e . C o g n i t i v e a b i l i t i e s c o v a r y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y s h a r e c o n t e n t a n d c o m p l e x i t y .
140 January 2000 ° Ameri can Psychologist
ronment. Ideal environments are those that match the per-
sonal attributes of individuals. Optimal development oc-
curs when peopl e' s needs are met and their abilities are
appropriately challenged. Students who are primarily
strong in verbal reasoning versus quantitative or spatial
reasoning tend to gravitate toward domains (e.g., disci-
plines, occupations) that require appreciable levels of their
most salient talent. For example, fields like engineering
tend to attract people with primary strengths in spatial
visualization and quantitative reasoning abilities, whereas
the humanities tend to attract people with primary strengths
in verbal abilities (Achter et al., 1999; Humphreys et al.,
1993). Sometimes, however, interests can motivate educa-
tional and vocational choices that do not draw on strengths.
It is not unusual for people to strongly desire to do things
that they cannot do (e.g., singing when they lack a fine
voice); simultaneously, most people are competent at many
things that they would prefer not to do. Yet, for most
well-adjusted students and employees, their ability and
preference constellation aligns with the ability require-
ments and rewards of their learning or work purview.
TWA is also helpful in illuminating other psycholog-
ical concepts useful in analyzing how people approach
contrasting learning and work environments (Dawis,
1996a) such as self-concept, self-efficacy, internal locus of
control, and self-esteem. All of these concepts involve
perceptions of self. To a large extent, what we mean by a
self-concept reflects our perceptions of our abilities and
skills and our beliefs about our needs and values. Self-
concept is dependent on behaviors we value (competen-
cies) and people or things we care about (personal needs).
Behaviors, people, and things we are indifferent to are
irrelevant to our self-concept. Beliefs about the extent to
which our abilities are effective (i.e., self-efficacy beliefs)
in meeting our needs are critical to our self-concept. This,
in turn, involves the perception of the locus of control for
reinforcement (i.e., events that meet needs). An internal
locus of control develops to the extent that individuals
perceive themselves as instrumentally effective in getting
their needs met.
One' s personal evaluation of how these aspects of
sel f i nt erconnect , or the evaluation of self, engenders
feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with oneself,
whi ch constitute one' s level of self-esteem. Provi di ng
i nt el l ect ual l y talented students with valid psychomet ri c
i nformat i on about their abilities and interests imparts
critical i nformat i on on how one' s sel f-concept is being
defined. Making devel opment al l y appropriate learning
opportunities available for the gifted, opportunities that
are congruent with valid i nformat i on and responsi ve to
the students' di fferent i al learning rates, is likely to lead
to feelings of satisfaction with sel f and the devel opment
of an internal locus of control. Hence, TWA provi des
students with tools for not onl y a better understanding of
t hemsel ves (and their contrasting reactions to di fferent
envi ronment s) but also a framework for taking charge of
their personal devel opment .
Empowerment in the area of personal development
has long been one of the major goals of educational and
vocational counseling from the individual differences tra-
dition (Dawis, 1992, 1996b; Lubinski, 1996; Tyler, 1992).
Assessing the salient personal attributes of clients, focusing
on strengths (while acknowledging relative weaknesses),
and using these aspects of self to solidify life values (Tyler,
1992; Williamson, 1965) are the conceptual antecedents
from which TWA evolved. Knowledge about enduring
psychological characteristics is critical in evaluating con-
trasting environments for development and making deci-
sions about which opportunities are likely to be most per-
sonally meaningful. When these ideas are combined with
developmental work on niche building (Bouchard, 1997;
Scarr, 1992, 1996) - - how people seek out and strive to
create learning, social, and work environments correspond-
ing to their personal attributes (Bouchard, 1997)--we be-
gin to gain a purchase on how precocious cognitive devel-
opment unfolds. Perhaps we also come to understand how
it should be nurtured.
Intellectual Development: TWA
Informed by PPIK Theory
Ackerrnan (1996; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) has pro-
posed an intriguing model of adult intellectual development
that is relevant to our discussion. It orchestrates abilities-
as-process with personality and interest dimensions to con-
ceptualize the acquisition of cognitive content (i.e., knowl-
edge) throughout the life span. Here, content denotes the
pedagogical aspects of learning (i.e., knowledge), whereas
process is more restricted to the psychological power of
intellect (i.e., general intelligence, or possibly working
memory capacity; Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990; Kyllonen
& Christal, 1990). Ackerman' s (1996) theory is called
PPIK, because it integrates intelligence-as-process, person-
ality, interests, and intelligence-as-knowledge. Interests
and personality attributes serve to channel the development
of knowledge structures down differential paths (e.g., C. P.
Snow' s, 1967, two cultures, "humanists" vs. "scientists"),
whereas intelligence-as-process determines the complexity
of knowledge assimilated (i.e., one' s general potential for
intellectual sophistication).
Teaming interests and personality dimensions with
intelligence-as-process has empirically confirmed differen-
tial predictions regarding the developmental trajectory of
crystallized abilities (i.e., specific knowledge structures).
Moreover, this model is also insightful for understanding
why individuals with similar cognitive profiles can and
frequently do vary widely in the particulars of their knowl-
edge base. They do so because they differ on noncognitive
personal attributes relevant to the development of specific
skills and knowledge; they also have different opportuni-
ties. To support these ideas, Ackerman (1996; Ackerman &
Heggestad, 1997) has compiled ability-interest, ability-
personality, and interest-personality correlates from the
psychological literature on adult populations. Through nar-
rative review, meta-analytic inquiry, and investigations of
self-reported strengths, four (across-attribute) ability-inter-
January 2000 • American Psychologist 141
est-personality trait complexes were identified: social, cler-
ical/conventional, science/math, and intellectual/cultural.t
The science/math and intellectual/cultural trait com-
plexes provide empirical support for C. P. Snow' s (1967)
two cultures: Intellectual/cultural, for example, consists of
light correlations between measures of verbal ability and
aesthetic and investigative interests, whereas science/math
consists of light correlations between math and spatial
abilities and realistic, investigative, and social (reversed)
interests. This patterning has recently been replicated in
intellectually gifted young adolescents (Schmidt et al.,
1998). These trait complexes, although comprising modest
positive and negative correlations (.25-.30), nevertheless
generate ostensibly different subpopulation "types" when
identification is restricted to one specific ability (mathemat-
ical, spatial, or verbal reasoning) and selection is stringent
(see below).
According to PPIK theory, for most students, through-
out the preadult years, general intelligence tends to over-
ride other predictors of academic performance because
academic criteria are relatively uniform from kindergarten
through 12th grade (i.e., all students are exposed to essen-
tially the same educational curriculum). However, as peo-
ple mature, they are allowed to make more choices and
move more freely into and out of various environmental
niches as a function of their own choices. In contrast to
adolescence, adulthood brings more freedom of choice, and
people begin to specialize. According to a number of
developmental theorists (Bouchard, 1997; Reiss, Neider-
hiser, Hetherington, & Plomin, 2000; Rowe, 1994; Scarr,
1992, 1996), choices are made to conform to one' s rela-
tively enduring personal attributes. As people select niches
tailored to their enduring psychological characteristics, the
particular competencies and knowledge structures acquired
become more dependent on the level and patterning of
cognitive abilities, interests, and personality.
Moreover, with adulthood people not only become
freer to make choices about their development, but the
intensity of their development also comes more under their
control. How people develop becomes less dependent on a
standard curriculum and more a function of the types of
environmental niches chosen to migrate from, enter into,
and operate within. This is precisely why PPIK theory
holds appeal for intellectually talented youth: With rela-
tively little effort, they are able to master the typical edu-
cational curriculum quickly, relative to their chronologi-
cally age-matched peers. This opens up an array of possi-
bilities for further development. Yet, precisely how the
gifted choose to develop (when developmentally appropri-
ate learning opportunities are freely provided) is not (and
should not be) random: It is psychologically systematic.
The development of gifted students tends to be driven by
the same underlying individual differences found in adults
and is predictable with conventional psychometric tools.
Making explicit the attributes that structure these students'
development is likely to help them make better choices and
reduce the number of false starts.
Further, PPIK theory shows how TWA works within
a developmental context to explain the emergence of em-
inence. Because eminent individuals tend to find their
career paths early and must spend huge amounts of time
mastering their domain (Roe, 1952; Walberg, 1969; Zuck-
erman, 1977), using TWA to help talented youth make wise
decisions becomes good practice. To be sure, not all tal-
ented youth become eminent--and many should probably
not be encouraged to do so--but those who do tend to
begin the talent development process early. To more fully
appreciate creative, high-achieving individuals, however,
we need at least one other class of variables: Conative
determinants are critical for understanding truly excep-
tional accomplishments.
Magnitude of Development
Both TWA and PPIK theory stress conative factors for
conceptualizing individual differences in development.
These determinants are related to individual differences in
drive and energy--not the substance of behavior per se but
rather its intensity and temporal dynamics. Familiar labels
include capacity f or work, industriousness, perseverance,
and zeal. Across almost all disciplines and occupations,
conative attributes are among the most conspicuous factors
that distinguish truly exceptional performers from their
professional peers. Even in less glamorous arenas, this
class of variables is important in understanding perfor-
mance more generally (e.g., under- and overachievement in
routine educational settings).
Clearly, there are individual differences in the amount
of energy that people can or are willing to invest in their
development. To assess these differences, Ackerman has
discussed and developed a measure for a construct he calls
typical intellectual engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992).
In a similar vein, TWA has offered four aspects of person-
ality style (Dawis & Lofquist, 1976) to characterize the
temporal characteristics of behavior: celerity, endurance,
pace, and rhythm. In both PPIK theory and TWA frame-
works, concentrated effort, time on task, and energy in-
vested play a large role in the development of expertise and
knowledge structures. In the psychological literature, con-
sideration of conative variables goes back to at least
Webb' s (1915) formulation of will, but Galton (1869) also
discussed zeal and the capacity for work as critical com-
ponents for truly exceptional performance. Essentially all
modern psychologists studying the topic of talent develop-
ment have noted the intense devotion to practice, study, and
work that exceptional performers manifest (Ericsson, 1996;
Eysenck, 1995; Gardner, 1993; Jackson & Rushton, 1985;
Simonton, 1988, 1994). Yet, the magnitude of individual
differences manifested on these volitional attributes is fre-
quently underappreciated.
J Trait complexes are akin to R. E. Snow's (1991; R. E. Snow, Corno,
& Jackson, 1996) aptitude complexes for examining different treatment
modalities in educational settings and Dawis and Lofquist's (1984) taxons
of ability and preference constellations used to conceptualize the person
component of the interaction between individuals and environments. All
of these ideas highlight the importance of combining affective and cog-
nitive variables for both basic and applied research as well as practice.
142 January 2000 • American Psychologist
Figure 2
Two Questions About Work Taken From the Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth's 20-Year Follow-Up
Questionnaire
A •
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
g .
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1972 - 1974 Talent Search Participants 1976 - 1979 Talent Search Participants
< 40 40-49 50-59 60-69 >_70 < 40 40--49 50-59 60-69
Hours Hours
>_70
m
I I
< 40 40 50 60 70 > 70 < 40 40-49 50-59 60--69 _>70
Hours Hours
Not e. Participants were identified at age 13 as having quantitative reasoning abilities within the top one percent of their age group. At age 33, they were asked
(A) how many hours per week they typically worked, by gender (excluding homemakers), and IB) how many hours per week they wer e willing to work, given their
job of first choice, by gender. Please note that the 1972- 1974 participants were given six temporal options, whereas the 1976- 1979 participants were provided
with five choices.
To highlight this point, we present Figure 2, which
contains data from over 1,700 participants from SMPY' s
20-year follow-up (Lubinski & Benbow, 1994). All partic-
ipants were assessed with the SAT before they were 13
years old, during the 1970s; they scored in the top one
percent in quantitative reasoning ability for their age group
(many had even more exceptional SAT-Verbal scores). At
age 33, the participants were asked how much they would
be willing to work in their "ideal j ob" and how much they
actually do work. These data reveal huge individual differ-
ences. For better or worse, these individual differences will
surely engender different performance and work-related
outcomes.
The Emergence of Eminence
When dealing with exceptionality, one is sometimes moved to
consider different kinds of intelligence or different models,
because the kinds of problems encountered when moving
across contrasting disciplines (e.g., art, chemistry, and litera-
ture) are so different. Extraordinary accomplishments within
these spheres serve only to underscore their uniqueness. They
appear qualitatively different. Given this, might it make sense
to think of Picasso, Curie, and Shakespeare as having different
kinds of minds (Gardner, 1993)? What about Gandhi or
Freud, with the unique problems they addressed and the way
they approached life more generally? Perhaps different types
of intelligence are necessary to conceptualize their spectacular
achievements. There is probably some truth to this, especially
given what we know about the cerebral organization and
cognitive functioning of gifted individuals with different
strengths and relative weaknesses (Dark & Benbow, 1991;
Nyborg, 1994; O' Boyle, Benbow, & Alexander, 1995). Yet, it
would still be good to see how far the psychology of individ-
ual differences can take us (Messick, 1992). It is quite possible
that when exceptional performances undergo critical analysis,
what is uncovered is not unique qualities but rather more of
certain qualities (e.g., affective, cognitive, conative) that lead
to qualitative differences in knowledge content and, perhaps,
different types of eminence.
Consider the following illustration. If we assume true
correlations between quantitative, spatial, and verbal rea-
January 2000 • American Psychologist 143
soning abilities are all around .75, this leaves much room
for profile variability. Indeed, appreciable variability is
expected, particularly when selection is stringent and ex-
clusively restricted to one ability dimension. For example,
someone four standard deviations above the norm on verbal
reasoning abilities, or who is the top 1 in 30,000, would
clearly be in possession of the specific cognitive ability for
greatness in law, literature, or philosophy, among other
verbal-linguistic disciplines. Yet, this individual might not
be distinct from many colleagues at maj or universities on
other specific abilities. The mean expectation for this per-
son' s quantitative and spatial reasoning abilities (with
RVQ = R v s = . 7 5 , and with V four standard deviations
above the norm) is three standard deviations above the
norm (i.e., .75 X 4 -- 3), or the top 1 or 2 in 1,000.
Now, to be sure, being among the top 1 or 2 in a group
of 1,000 is impressive, but it is not nearly as impressive as
being the top 1 in 30,000 and really is not so awfully rare
at maj or universities. This amount of intellectual diversity
is the expectation for anyone so verbally exceptional. It
also would be the amount of diversity anticipated (under
the same assumptions) for someone as exceptional in quan-
titative or spatial reasoning. Three groups of individuals,
selected for their exceptionality in quantitative, spatial, or
verbal reasoning appear quite distinct from one anot her - -
and in some important respects they are. However, their
distinctiveness may overshadow their common generic
stock.
Is it possible that creators of exceptional intellectual
products are not nearly so enigmatic as typically supposed?
Can measures associated with maj or dimensions of cogni-
tive abilities capture their distinctiveness quantitatively?
Might they also explain how quantitative differences in
individual-differences profiles develop into qualitative dif-
ferences in knowl edge structures? Plausibility for this idea
is intensified when it is recalled that specific abilities "pull"
with them unique clusters of noncognitive personal at-
tributes (Ackerman, 1996; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997;
Ackerman & Rolfhus, 1999), somet i mes in diametrically
opposed ways. Recall Acker man' s (1996) cultural/intellec-
tual and science/math trait complexes, which have recently
been replicated in gifted adolescents.
In Schmidt et al . ' s (1998) study of gifted adolescents,
spatial abilities covaried approximately .25 with realistic
interests (working with things) and - . 2 5 with social inter-
ests (working with people). I f spatially talented students are
selected, using a cutting score of merel y two standard
deviations above the mean, the following would be antic-
ipated: The resulting sample will average hal f a standard
deviation above the mean in interests in working with
things (2 X .25 = .50) and hal f a standard deviation bel ow
the mean in interests in working with peopl e (2 × - . 2 5 =
- . 50) . Collectively, these two patterns would cover a full
standard deviation difference in interests for people versus
things (see the RIASEC component in Figure 1). These
differences would be conspicuous enough to motivate cat-
egorical considerations. They would certainly generate ste-
reotypic impressions of "different t ypes" if compared with
members of highly talented groups selected on verbal or
quantitative abilities, which covary more deeply with other
interests. Now consider the result if the cutting score had
been 4 rather than 2 standard deviations above the norm.
Selecting two groups at the extremes on any pair of
the maj or markers of general intelligence (math/verbal,
math/space, verbal/space) eventuates in multiple group dif-
ferences on other maj or individual-differences dimensions.
Moreover, such group differences are often sufficiently
pronounced to stimulate reasonable observers to consider
discontinuities. Yet, as we have seen, these constellations
could stem from continuous gradations within an underly-
ing multivariate space of systematic sources of individual
differences with no discrete boundaries. It could turn out
that exceptional achievements are "si mpl y" outcomes of
optimal blends of extraordinary levels of normat i ve at-
tribules (affective, cognitive, and conative) that found their
way to developmentally supportive environments. These
considerations prompt two questions: What is a supportive
environment, and how do supportive environments operate
to sustain positive psychological growth over extended
time frames?
Corresp.ondent L earning Environments Foster
P sychological Well-Being; Discorrespondent
L earning Environments Foster
P sychological P ain
For environments to support the amount of psychological
growth needed for the emergence of eminence, positive
psychological experiences are required to nurture the de-
vel opment of expertise, skill, and knowledge structures
through a fairly i mmedi at e mechanism. Several investiga-
tors have estimated that this devel opment takes approxi-
mat el y 10 years of concentrated effort. For example, a
decade of up to 70-hour work weeks is required before
someone with the proper configuration of attributes (Ey-
senck, 1995; Jensen, 1996) develops the crystallized skills
needed for movi ng the boundaries of a discipline forward
(Ericsson, 1996; Gardner, 1993; Simonton, 1988, 1994;
Zuckerman, 1977). How might these sustaining mecha-
nisms operate? Consider the following: To the extent that
students are placed in correspondent learning and work
environments, they are more likely to experience a greater
density of reinforcing events and, simultaneously, are less
likely to experience punishing events, including boredom.
These environments encourage maxi mal positive develop-
ment. More specifically, they enhance the likelihood of
experiencing psychological well-being (the affective con-
comitant of reinforcing operations) and attenuate the
chances of experiencing psychological pain (the affective
concomitant of punishing operations).
What events constitute punishment versus reinforce-
ment depends on the individual. Just as learning environ-
ments may be considered highly challenging or boring
depending on the student, the same envi ronment may be
seen as exciting or aversive from a mot i vat i onal - - r ei n-
forcement or puni shment - - poi nt of view. This is why it is
important to assess individual differences in abilities and
interests initially. To the extent that satisfaction and satis-
factoriness are not achieved, two forms of psychological
144 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
di st r ess ensue: one as s oci at ed wi t h pr obl e ms ( when per f or -
mance is uns at i s f act or y) , t he ot her as s oci at ed wi t h pai n
( when needs ar e not met ) . Ther ef or e, ps yc hol ogi c a l pr ob-
l ems ar e char act er i st i c of a l ack of cor r es pondence bet ween
t he i ndi vi dua l ' s abi l i t i es and t he abi l i t y r equi r ement s of t he
envi r onment , a mi s ma t c h causi ng pr obl e ms f or t he i ndi vi d-
ual and t he envi r onment . Ps ychol ogi cal pai n, on t he ot her
hand, r esul t s f r om a l ack of cor r es pondence bet ween t he
i ndi vi dua l ' s needs and t he r ewar ds me di a t e d by t he
envi r onment .
Fi gur e 3 depi ct s a wel l - r epl i cat ed t wo- di mens i onal
f r a me wor k f or st udyi ng af f ect def i ned by pos i t i ve and
negat i ve emot i onal i t y, t wo r el at i vel y i ndependent di men-
si ons ( Tel l egen, Wat s on, & Cl ar k, 1999; Wa t s on & Tel l e-
gen, 1985). Pos i t i ve and negat i ve emot i onal i t y are st abl e
i ndi vi dual - di f f er ences di mens i ons as s oci at ed wi t h pos i t i ve
and negat i ve affect , but never t hel es s t hey can mani f es t
wi de st at e var i at i ons ( Zevon & Tel l egen, 1982). Fl uct ua-
t i ons in af f ect s ys t emat i cal l y covar y wi t h r ei nt br ci ng and
puni s hi ng st i mul i . Thes e t wo di mens i ons are hel pf ul for
under s t andi ng changes in af f ect as s oci at ed wi t h r ei nf or ce-
ment ( wel l - bei ng) and puni s hment (pai n). One goal of
educat i onal and vocat i onal couns el i ng f r om a T WA f r ame-
wor k is to ma xi mi z e t he f or mer and mi ni mi z e t he latter.
Ps ychol ogi cal l y, t her e ar e at l east t wo component s to
pain and t wo component s to well-being ( see Fi gur e 3).
Ps ychol ogi cal pai n f ol l ows t wo ki nds of puni s hi ng condi -
F i g u r e 3
C o n s e n s u a l M o o d S t r u c t u r e
H i g h
P o s i t i v e A f f e c t
joy
÷
Pleasure. ~
. , 3
. - I ~ - Reinforcement , "
° i
Z , "
Disengagement"
Strong
Engagement
, • Z
"" .~ ,,4 ~,, ~.~ ~-.
• . + Punishment ~ . n ~ e ~ j ,
I 'D
" . ~ = 1 "
"Pain
Depression
Low
P o s i t i v e A f f e c t
No t e . Adapt ed from Watson and Tellegen's (1985) outline of the structure of
affect, with the addi ti ons of two contingencies of punishment (+ for positive
punishment and - for negative punishment) and reinforcement (+ for positive
reinforcement and - for negative reinforcement). These punishment and rein-
forcement contingencies illustrate how exogenous events serve to moderate
affect. Specifically, this figure is adapt ed from "Toward o Consensual Structure
of Mood, " by D. Watson and A. Tellegen, Psychological Bulletin, 85, p. 221.
Copyri ght 1985 by the American Psychological Association. Adapt ed with
permission.
t i ons, namel y, positive and negative punishment, whi ch are
t he pr esent at i on of aver s i ve st i mul i ( anxi et y) and t he re-
mova l of appet i t i ve st i mul i ( depr essi on) , r es pect i vel y. Psy-
chol ogi cal wel l - bei ng, on t he ot her hand, f ol l ows t wo ki nds
of r ei nf or ci ng condi t i ons, namel y, positive and negative
reinforcement, t hat is, t he pr es ent at i on of appet i t i ve st i mul i
( j oy) or t he r emoval of aver si ve st i mul i (rel i ef).
TWA can hel p in i dent i fyi ng envi ronment s that are i de-
al l y t ai l ored t owar d augment i ng one' s overal l psychol ogi cal
wel l - bei ng whi l e si mul t aneousl y at t enuat i ng the l i kel i hood of
experi enci ng pain. Mor e specifically, one ' s affect fluctuates as
a funct i on of t he densi t y of puni shi ng and rei nforci ng event s
experi enced. Cor r espondent l earni ng envi ronment s t end to
mi ni mi ze the f or mer and maxi mi ze the latter. Pl aci ng students
in l earni ng envi ronment s congeni al wi t h t hei r abi l i t i es and
interests has mul t i pl e di rect advant ages. For exampl e, the
curri cul um moves at a pace commensur at e wi t h l earni ng rates,
so mor e l earni ng occurs and mot i vat i on builds. Al so, the
t opi cs of most interest are i nt roduced at devel opment al l y
appropri at e times, so mor e enj oyment is experi enced, whi ch
augment s mot i vat i on. Mor eover , such envi ronment s al so fos-
ter advant ageous i ndi rect benefits, by pl aci ng t al ent ed students
who enj oy academi c chal l enges in social mi l i eus where t hey
feel free to express t hei r genui ne l ove of l earni ng and r ecei ve
peer support rather than ri di cul e for doi ng so ( Benbow &
St anl ey, 1996). In sum, sat i sfact i on and sat i sfact ori ness oper-
ate to maxi mi ze posi t i ve and negat i ve r ei nf or cement and
mi ni mi ze posi t i ve and negat i ve puni shment (see Fi gur e 3).
Herei n is the mechani sm that sustains commi t ment to devel -
opi ng skills over ext ended t i me frames. Thi s appl i es not onl y
to the devel opment of emi nence but al so to less not ewort hy
accompl i shment s l i ke securing an advanced degree.
Suppor t for t hese i deas is f ound in t he s ubj ect i ve
r epor t s of i nt el l ect ual l y t al ent ed st udent s who have had an
appr opr i at e devel opment al pl acement exper i ence ( Benbow
et al. , 1996; Benbow & St anl ey, 1996). 2 The r epor t s t end to
be ove r whe l mi ngl y posi t i ve. In addi t i on, our exper i ence
over t he past l 0 year s wi t h s umme r r esi dent i al pr ogr ams
f or t he gi f t ed has r eveal ed t hat 40% of t he par t i ci pant s
r et ur n t he f ol l owi ng s ummer for f ur t her educat i onal expe-
r i ences t ai l or ed t owar d t hei r capabi l i t i es and i nt erest s. We
2 For evaluating meaningful outcomes for gifted youth, some remarks
about realistic criteria are in order. The study of extraordinary intellectual
abilities invariably turns to genius, an infinitely small subset of the
intellectually talented population (e.g., Einstein, Picasso, and Eliot). They
represent approximately one in a million people. Even so, some have
considered the forecasting of genius to be a critical goal of talent devel-
opment procedures. However, this criterion is unrealistic. The base rate
tbr genius is simply too miniscule (and the chance factors too harsh) to
make doing so justifiable. What is more, all of the necessary endogenous
and exogenous factors conducive for this degree of development have to
co-occur in the proper zeitgeist; the culture has to be receptive to the
products generated. To be sure, spurred on by optimism spawned by the
early testing movement, Terman (1925; Terman & Oden, 1959) probably
fostered this criterion himself by unfortunately calling his longitudinal
study Genetic Stud)" of Genius. We now know that there is much more to
genius than simply ability. Models are available for better understanding
how genius does indeed come about, however; interestingly, there is a
consensus about certain attributes (Eysenck, 1995; Gardner, 1993; Jensen,
1996; Simontom 1988, 1994; Zuckerman, 1977).
Januar y 2000 • Ame r i c a n Ps ychol ogi s t 145
do, however , obser ve a robust gender di fference t hat is
nat i onal l y charact eri st i c of summer residential pr ogr ams
for t he gifted. Al t hough bot h boys and girls eval uat e these
opport uni t i es posi t i vel y, gifts t end to report mor e posi t i ve
effects. Our interpretation of this finding is t hat peer pres-
sure on gi ft ed gifts is harsher in cont rast to the pressure
experi enced by gi ft ed boys. Hence, when talented girls are
pl aced in an envi r onment where the pressure not to achi eve
is essent i al l y absent, t hey not onl y enj oy the rei nforci ng
experi ence but al so are especi al l y rel i eved by the absence
of puni shment . Indeed, t hey oft en report finally bei ng able
to "be t hemsel ves. "
Conceptual i zi ng States of Excellence
I n Ni chol as Hobbs ' s (1958, p. 595) list of criteria for
becomi ng "t he compl eat counsel or, " he lists first " become
a good general psychol ogi st " and remarks, "I have been
i mpressed over and over agai n by the f r equency with whi ch
pure sci ence ps ychol ogy pr ovi des new directions f or vari-
ous kinds of applied endeavor s. " In this spirit, we at t empt
to tie the t hread runni ng t hr ough TWA' s cor r espondence
di mensi ons, sat i sfact i on and satisfactoriness, to ot her con-
cepts in psychol ogi cal literature.
Satisfaction, Satisfactoriness, and Other
Psychological Concepts
We suspect that sat i sfact i on and satisfactoriness cut across
mul t i pl e aspects of life; i f we are correct their i mpl i cat i ons
coul d be very broad. Lof qui st and Dawi s (1991) support ed
this i dea by l i nki ng these t wo out comes t o Fr eud' s pleasure
principle (peopl e seek to avoi d pai n and achi eve gratifica-
tion, or TWA' s satisfaction) and reality principle (i.e., the
demands and requi rement s of the external worl d, or TWA' s
satisfactoriness). Tel l egen (1981) has spelled out a distinc-
t i on bet ween t wo similar ment al sets: experiential (or re-
spondent ) and instrumental (or operant). As one mi ght
i nfer f r om Tel l egen' s distinction, whi ch builds on a Skin-
nerian f r amewor k, Premack' s principle runs t hrough these
concept s (and is al so embedded in TWA) : To predi ct whi ch
envi r onment s an individual is likely to enter, wor k in, and
thrive in, you must not onl y know what t hey can do (their
abilities, or capabilities), you must al so know what t hey
want (their interests, needs, or mot i ves).
These di st i nct i ons all cont rast a posi t i ve experi ence,
hi ghl y rei nforci ng in and of itself (uncondi t i onal l y, often
out si de of any pragmat i c utility), wi t h one of mor e striving,
pl anni ng, deci si on maki ng, and act i ve pursuit. Ot her dis-
t i nct i ons l oosel y coupl ed with the f or egoi ng i ncl ude Ba-
kan' s (1966) communion and agency, Fr o mm' s (1979)
receptive and active modes, Koc h' s (1956) intrinsic and
extrinsic modes, Ma s l ow' s (1968) B-Cognition (for being)
and D-Cognition (for doing), and Parsons and Bal es' s
(1955) expressiveness and instrumentality. Can these sets
of cont rast i ng concept s hel p in bet t er underst andi ng the
report s of worl d-cl ass performers about their subjective
experi ences duri ng or after a brilliant accompl i shment ?
How about ot her subj ect i ve "hi ghs" t hat co- occur wi t h less
spect acul ar achi evement s but nevert hel ess require vi gor ous
concent r at ed efforts to devel op?
The f ami l i ar i l l ust r at i on t hat c ome s t o mi nd ( f ound
in s ome i nt r oduct or y ps yc hol ogy t ext s) is t he s i de- by-
si de phot ogr aphs used t o exempl i f y sel f - act ual i zat i on.
One is of a young boy, pr oudl y hol di ng hi s pet r abbi t and
t he bl ue r i bbon t hey j ust ear ned at t he fair. The phot o-
gr aph next t o this is t ypi cal l y t hat o f a Nobel l aur eat e
and t he t r ophy f or this achi evement . The adj acent pho-
t ogr aphs poi gnant l y i l l ust rat e how si mi l ar af f ect i ve
st at es can c o- oc c ur wi t h hi ghl y di spar at e accompl i s h-
ment s. Yet , t hese achi evement s are devel opment al l y ap-
pr opr i at e and t ai l or ed t o t he abi l i t i es and i nt erest s o f t he
par t i ci pant s; t hey al so undoubt edl y share si mi l ar af f ec-
t i ve qual i t i es. Can t he model we have been devel opi ng
shed l i ght on such phe nome na ? We t hi nk so.
Effectance Motivation
Whi t e (1959) has argued that pr ol onged bout s of pr obl em-
sol vi ng behavi or di rect ed t owar d a distant goal serve to
generat e acqui red mot i ves:
I shall argue that it is necessary to make competence a motiva-
tional concept; there is a competence motivation as well as
competence in its more familiar sense of achieved capacity.
Moreover, when this behavior gives satisfaction it involves the
transaction of person and environment (the effect each has on the
other). (p. 318)
Whi t e (1959) refers to the devel opment of the t ype of
mot i vat i on (mot i vat i on that devel ops f r om havi ng an in-
strumental effect on the envi ronment ) cal l ed effectance.
Import ant l y, effect ance is sel f-generat ed endogenousl y
rat her than bei ng exogenousl y admi ni st ered. It appears t o
be an emer gent per s on- envi r onment phenomenon:
It is constantly circling from stimulus to perception to action to
effect to stimulus to perception, and so on around; or, more
properly, these processes are all in continuous action and contin-
uous change. Dealing with the environment means carrying on a
continuing transaction which gradually changes one' s relation to
the environment. Because there is no consummatory climax,
satisfaction has to be seen as lying in a considerable series of
transactions, in a trend of behavior rather than a goal that is
achieved. It is difficult to make the word "satisfaction" have this
connotation, and we should do well to replace it by "feeling of
efficacy" when attempting to indicate the subjective and affective
side of effectance. (pp. 321-322)
Hence, genui ne feel i ngs of sel f-effi cacy are the result of
many behavi or - dependent pr oduct s or, mor e specifically,
product s dependent on compet ent (effective) behavi or.
Thi s support s Al l por t ' s (1946) insight: posi t i ve devel op-
menl unfol ds not onl y because of what individuals do but
al so because of the effects their behavi ors have on the
envi ronment . We hypot hesi ze that t eami ng domi nant abil-
ities wi t h regnant interests and concent rat i ng devel opment
t owar d a correspondent goal enhances the devel opment of
effect ance mot i vat i on.
Csi kszent mi hal yi (1993) has not ed i nt erconnect i ons
bet ween his concept of f l ow and many ot her concept s,
i ncl udi ng Ma s l ow' s (1968) peak experiences. Coul d it be
that underpi nni ng much of what is meant by experi enci ng
flow or havi ng a peak experi ence is the subj ect i ve experi-
146 Januar y 2000 ° Amer i can Psychol ogi st
ence of effect ance mot i va t i on- - mor e specifically, an expe-
riential state engender ed when compl ex per f or mances
emer ge in hi ghl y cor r espondent envi ronment s, perfor-
mances t hat requi re an ext raordi nary commi t ment of con-
cent rat ed effort to devel op and f or whi ch these extraordi-
nary efforts cont ri but e to the devel opment of sustaining
opponent processes (Landy, 1978; Sol omon, 1980)? Thi s
seems t o fol l ow f r om Whi t e' s (1959) posi t i on on the de-
vel opment of effect ance mot i vat i on, somet hi ng not unlike a
"mechani s m becomes dri ve" phenomenon, whi ch engages
concur r ent l y wi t h or after a seemi ngl y effortless but i m-
pressi ve performance.
Educational Implications
I f the above anal ysi s has merit, it suggest s that educat ors
shoul d concent rat e on devel opi ng st udent s' sat i sfact ory
behavi ors, whi ch are structured around st udent s' most sa-
lient attributes, and finding envi ronment al niches within
whi ch t hey are l i kel y t o be genui nel y rei nforced (for de-
vel opi ng their capabilities) rather than f ocusi ng on feel i ngs
(and rei nforci ng i ndi scri mi nat el y). Fl ow experi ences woul d
t hen engender cascades of indirect effects, not onl y f or t he
gi ft ed but for all students, because i f this anal ysi s is correct,
it woul d be i mpossi bl e to feel depressed or have l ow
sel f-est eem while experi enci ng flow. Maybe educat ors who
shifted away f r om the devel opment of skills to the devel -
opment of "posi t i ve feel i ngs" di d students a disservice. At
least Whi t e (1959) appeared to bel i eve that in their most
genui ne form, feel i ngs of sel f-effi cacy co- occur wi t h or
result f r om t he devel opment and execut i on of compl ex
skills. Perhaps educat ors shoul d concent rat e on r ecogni zi ng
and rei nforci ng successi ve approxi mat i ons t owar d instru-
ment al l y effect i ve skills. That is, t hey shoul d f ocus on
devel opi ng the capaci t i es to do the same t hi ng a little better
ever y day, or cont i nuous i mpr ovement , whi ch the Japanese
call kaizen (Secretan, 1997, p. 49).
Wi t h respect to devel opi ng true excel l ence, there
pr obabl y will never be any qui ck fixes. Excel l ence takes
time. Perhaps it woul d be good f or educat ors and pol i cy
makers to acknowl edge this mor e frequent l y, as others
al ready have. For exampl e, when it was poi nt ed out to
I gnat z Jan Paderewski (the great Pol i sh pianist) that he was
a genius, his r esponse was "Yes, and before that I was a
drudge. "
Educat or s pr obabl y shoul d f ocus not on the aforemen-
t i oned uncondi t i onal feel i ng states but rat her on their con-
ditional i nst rument al count erpart s whose devel opment nat-
ural l y engenders them. Bei ng interested in devel opi ng ef-
fect i ve behavi or s and rei nforci ng their occur r ence is likely
to fost er posi t i ve psychol ogi cal devel opment . Bei ng un-
wi l l i ng t o differentiate bet ween effect i ve and i neffect i ve
per f or mances and unwi l l i ng to di fferent i al l y rei nforce t hem
is l i kel y to fost er somet hi ng else.
Broader Issues in Counseling and
Educating the Gifted
Fact ors ot her t han empi ri cal evi dence oft en cont ri but e t o
whet her sound research findings are i mpl ement ed in prac-
tice. I n this regard, Hobbs ' s (1958) "The Compl eat Coun-
sel or" is part i cul arl y wor t h reading. Not i nfrequent l y, at-
t endant social issues det ermi ne how educat i onal and
psychol ogi cal servi ces are react ed to and distributed
(Col eman, 1990- 1991; Cronbach, 1975b; Humphr eys,
1991). Hobbs (1958) r ecommended that we attend to issues
such as the cultural cl i mat e and the t enor of the time.
Appreci at i on of these det ermi nant s is not onl y likely to
enhance our effect i veness as practitioners, but doi ng so
may even attenuate the i nt ensi t y of Cr onbach' s (1975a)
pessimistic appraisal of empi ri cal general i zat i ons in the
social sciences (i.e., their "short half-life"). Act ual l y, the
ps ychol ogy of individual di fferences has amassed an i m-
pressi ve array of empi ri cal general i zat i ons (Lubinski, 1996,
2000), f or whi ch hi ghl y effi caci ous i nt ervent i ons t hat meet
the special needs of intellectually t al ent ed students are but
one exampl e.
In many respects, soci et y has had a volatile relation-
ship with the gifted t hr oughout most of this cent ury (Ben-
bow & Stanley, 1996). One likely reason for this is that
educat i onal syst ems are conf r ont ed wi t h an array of over-
whel mi ng negat i ve psychol ogi cal exi genci es. I n the con-
t ext of a soci et y replete wi t h drug runni ng, t een pr egnancy,
and gross under achi evement among vari ous demogr aphi c
groupi ngs, the gi ft ed do not surface as a priority. Rel at i vel y
speaki ng, the gi ft ed appeared to be doi ng j ust fine. How-
ever, t hey coul d have been doi ng much better ( Benbow &
Stanley, 1996), and soci et y likely woul d have profited f r om
it. Dur i ng the 1950s, a lot was known about t he special
needs of gi ft ed students (Witty, 1951), and di st i ngui shed
educat ors and psychol ogi st s laced their professi onal writ-
ings with this i nformat i on. They not ed not onl y the direct
effects of t ai l ori ng educat i onal curri cul um to individual
di fferences in l earni ng rates (Hol l i ngwort h, 1926, 1942)
but also the posi t i ve indirect effect s f or soci et y (Paterson,
1957; Pressey, 1946a, 1946b; Terman, 1954). I n di scussi ng
the conspi cuous negl ect of gi ft ed students and how it was
in soci et y' s best interest to correct for this, Hobbs (1958)
suggest ed that counsel i ng psychol ogi st s shoul d t ake a lead-
ership role:
The compleat counselor will also be asked to help in the devel-
opment of new generations of people trained to levels commen-
surate with their abilities. We have been prodigal of talent in
America, being content to let lie fallow or refuse to cultivate much
of our human potential. But things were changing even before the
launching of the satellites [Sputnik], and gifted children, after
years of neglect in education, are all the rage. One cannot but
welcome this change in attitude. Though we suddenly see in
teachers' magazines and popular periodicals altruistically toned
articles stating the case for the gifted child, we should recognize
that this sudden interest in intelligence springs from concern with
prospects for national survival. I would hope that our compleat
counselor would be one of the most effective people in identifying
talented youngsters and in helping to plan educational programs
to ensure their fullest development. (p. 598)
These remarks poi nt to some cor ol l ar y social benefits
of i nvest i ng in gi ft ed students while hi ghl i ght i ng soci et y' s
self-interest in respondi ng f avor abl y t o their precoci t y; it is
also the t hought ful t hi ng to do f or t he individual gifted
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st 147
child. This midcentury recognition of gifted students was
stimulated by Wi t t y' s (1951) The Gi f t ed Chi l d, within
which Hobbs (1951) made a forceful case for their under-
appreciation as a human capital resource:
Citizens and experts alike have not generally become aware of the
community's significance, for good or ill, in the life of the gifted
child. Perhaps the most promising contribution that this volume
can make is to bring the potentialities and the particular needs of
the gifted child into prominence. (pp. 164-165)
Wi t t y' s (1951) vol ume was indeed successful in this regard
(see Terman, 1954, p. 227) and became a landmark in the
gifted literature.
Writings such as these and others were synthesized
and enlarged in Wi l l i amson' s (1965) Voc at i onal Couns el -
ing. This vol ume provided a solid foundation (empirical,
philosophical, and theoretical) for facilitating talent devel-
opment for all students. It provided the connecting fiber
bi ndi ng applied individual-differences research in educa-
tional and industrial psychology, conjoined their powerful
per son- envi r onment models, and traced their conceptual
antecedents to Paterson, Schneidler, and Wi l l i amson' s
(1938) St ude nt Gui danc e Te c hni que s and Viteles' s (1932)
I ndus t r i al Ps y c hol ogy . Wi l l i amson (1965) is an excellent
exemplar of positive psychology. He was especially in-
sightful in his description of how to counsel and design
learning envi ronment s for future intellectual leaders, par-
ticularly through the way he drew on philosophical con-
cepts from the Greeks (e.g., e udai moni a, doing excellence).
Yet, looking back, it appears that the compelling ex-
igencies of the 1960s and 1970s shifted focus. Neither
Hobbs' s (1958) recommendations nor Wi l l i amson' s (1965)
systematic compilation of prior decades of applied individ-
ual-differences research were widely assimilated by the
next generation of scholars. Although important, the work
of Hobbs and Wi l l i amson was not seen as a priority.
Ironically, this turned attention away from those most
equipped to solve the most challenging problems encoun-
tered in a highly technical, multicultural, ever-changing
society. Nevertheless, research on talent development
within this t radi t i on--namel y, the individual-differences
t r adi t i on- - has continued (Dawis, 1992; Lubinski, 1996):
abilities, interests, and personality are assessed to build
models for facilitating positive development (Benbow &
Stanley, 1996; Dawis, 1996b; Scarr, 1996).
Today, we know much more about the dimensionality
of relevant individual differences dimensions germane to
the development of exceptional achievements, as well as
how to utilize this information in practice (Benbow, 1991;
Benbow & Lubinski, 1996, 1997; Benbow & Stanley,
1996; Lubinski & Benbow, 1995; Wi nner, 1996). This
special issue marks a good time to take stock in what we
now know about this special population and the magnitude
of psychological diversity within it. In all likelihood, this
population contains the most promising human capital for
solving the social exigencies facing us. Moreover, the
TWA framework provides a cogent model for conceptual-
izing how all applied psychological specialties, when seen
in their most ideal form, might be construed: as sequential
complements of one another covering the full range of life
span development (through lifelong learning). Namely,
when contiguously aligned, the applied psychological pre-
cincts appear to form a developmental cont i nuum: educa-
tional --~ counseling --~ industrial. Child and adult clinical
psychology also form a developmental cont i nuum but fo-
cus on maladaptive behavior within or in transitioning
between stages. Yet, all of these specialties share a com-
mon goal: the scientific study of i mpl ement i ng contrasting
opportunities, based on individual differences, with the aim
of maxi mi zi ng positive psychological growth at different
stages of life span development. That is the essence of
talent development.
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1 5 0 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t
Creativity
Cognitive, Personal, Developmental, and Social Aspects
Dean Keith Si mont on
University of California, Davis
Although many psychologists have expressed an interest in
the phenomenon of creativity, psychological research on
this topic" did not rapidly expand until after J. P. Guilford
claimed, in his 1950 APA presidential address, that this
topic deserved f ar more attention than it was then receiv-
ing. This article reviews the progress psychologists have
made in understanding creativity since Guilford' s call to
arms. Research progress has taken place on 4 fronts: the
cognitive processes involved in the creative act, the dis-
tinctive characteristics of the creative person, the develop-
ment and manifestation of creativity across the individual
life span, and the social environments most strongly asso-
ciated with creative activity. Although some important
questions remain unanswered, psychologists now know
more than ever before about how individuals achieve this
special and significant f orm of optimal human functioning.
C
reat i vi t y is cert ai nl y among the most i mport ant and
pervasi ve of all human activities. Homes and of-
rices are filled wi t h furniture, appliances, and ot her
conveni ences t hat are the product s of human i nvent i veness.
Peopl e amuse t hemsel ves with the comi cs in the dai l y
paper, take novel s wi t h t hem to while away the hours on a
plane or at t he beach, go t o movi e theaters t o see the latest
bl ockbust ers, wat ch t el evi si on shows and commer ci al s,
pl ay games on the comput er, attend concert s f r om cl assi cal
and j azz t o r ock and soul, visit mus eums that di spl ay the
artistic artifacts of cul t ures and ci vi l i zat i ons - - agai n all
i mpl i ci t l y beari ng ampl e t est i mony to the consequences of
the creat i ve mind. The bui l di ngs peopl e enter, the cars t hey
drive, the cl ot hes t hey we a r - - e v e n the musi c t hey hear in
el evat or s - - ar e all exempl ars of some f or m of creativity.
The onl y way t o escape this phenomenon is to wal k stark
naked deep within some pri meval forest, and even then a
per son must t ake care not t o hum a single tune, not to recall
even one line of poet ry, or not t o even t o l ook up in the sky
f or fear of seei ng some j et or its contrail.
Not surprisingly, creat i vi t y is seen as a good attribute
f or peopl e to possess. Teachers expect their students to
di spl ay some creat i vi t y in their sci ence proj ect s and t erm
papers. Execut i ves at hi gh-t ech firms expect their research
and devel opment units to devi se new pr oduct s and their
market i ng units to concei ve novel strategies t o pr omot e
t hose product s. At a mor e personal level, creat i vi t y is oft en
seen as a si gn of ment al health and emot i onal wel l -bei ng.
I n fact, vari ous art and musi c therapies have emer ged that
pr omot e psychol ogi cal adj ust ment and gr owt h t hrough cre-
ative expression. In a nutshell, creativity can be count ed
among t hose very special ways t hat human bei ngs can
di spl ay opt i mal funct i oni ng.
Despi t e the significant and omni pr esent nature of cre-
ativity, psychol ogi st s have sel dom i f ever vi ewed it as a
central research t opi c (St ernberg & Lubart , 1996). For
exampl e, of all the numer ous recipients of AP A' s Awar d
for Di st i ngui shed Scientific Cont ri but i ons since 1956, onl y
one, J. P. Gui l ford, can be credi t ed wi t h devot i ng a sub-
stantial part of his career to the psychol ogi cal st udy of
creativity. To be sure, ot her recipients of this hi gh honor
have addressed this topic as a side excur si on of their
pri mary investigations. Exampl es i ncl ude figures as di verse
as Wol f gang Kr hl er , Carl Rogers, B. F. Skinner, Jer ome
Bruner, James E. Birren, Herbert A. Si mon, Donal d T.
Campbel l , and Davi d C. McCl el l and. Nevert hel ess, prob-
abl y onl y Gui l ford can be said to enj oy si mul t aneous pr om-
i nence in psychol ogi cal sci ence in general and in the mor e
specialized domai n of creativity research. Indeed, in his
classic 1950 presidential address before the Amer i can Psy-
chol ogi cal Associ at i on, Gui l ford made a pl ea on behal f of
maki ng creativity a mor e focal poi nt of psychol ogi cal in-
qui ry (Guilford, 1950). Fort unat el y, many psychol ogi st s
responded to the call, and creat i vi t y research real l y boome d
in the 1960s and early 1970s. Mor eover , after a slight lull
of a decade or so, psychol ogi st s have shown a r enewed
interest in the phenomenon. Al t hough not yet a mai nst r eam
research topic, psychol ogi st s now know far mor e about
creativity than ever before. That knowl edge reveal s a great
deal about ant ecedent s, correlates, and consequences of this
particular f or m of opt i mal human funct i oni ng. I n fact, this
literature has now become so vast and ri ch t hat this article
can accompl i sh no mor e than a revi ew of the mere
highlights,
Ov e r v i e w
The literature on creat i vi t y spans several of t he core sub-
disciplines of psychol ogy. Thi s breadt h is i mmedi at el y
apparent ill the four mai n t opi cs di scussed bel ow: cogni t i ve
processes, personal characteristics, life span devel opment ,
and social context.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dean Keith
Simonton, Department of Psychology, One Shields Avenue, University of
California, Davis, CA 95616-8686. Electronic mail may be sent to
dksimonton(,~ ucdavis.edu.
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Copyri ght 2000 by the Ameri can Psychological Association, Inc. 0003- 066X/ 00/ $5. 00
Vol . 55, No. 1, 151- 158 DOI: 10. 1037//0003 066X. 55. 1. 151
151
Dean Kei th
Si monton
Cognitive Processes
The creative act is often portrayed as a myst eri ous and even
mystical process, more akin to divine inspiration than to
mundane thought. This view dates back to the ancient
Greeks, who believed that creativity required the interven-
tion of the muses. One of the principal goals of psycho-
logical studies has been to try to remove this mystery,
replacing it with a deeper scientific understanding. For
example, Sigmund Freud and other psychoanalytic thinkers
at t empt ed to accompl i sh this end by explicating creativity
in terms of pri mary-process thinking (Gedo, 1997). How-
ever, with the advent of cont emporary cognitive science,
psychol ogy has come much closer to appreciating the men-
tal processes that must participate in the creative act. Re-
cent devel opment s in four areas of research--i nsi ght ful
probl em solving, creative cognition, expertise acquisition,
and comput er si mul at i on- - deser ve special mention.
Insightful problem solving. The Gestalt psy-
chologists were the first psychologists to study creativity
through the process of insight. Cognitive psychologists
have built upon this early tradition by devel opi ng new
experimental methodologies and theoretical models (Stern-
berg & Davidson, 1995). By manipulating priming stimuli,
assessing feel i ng-of-knowi ng states, using protocol analy-
sis, and appl yi ng other techniques, psychologists better
understand how creative insights emerge during the incu-
bation period. Especially striking is the empirical demon-
stration of intuitive information processing as a regular
manifestation of the cognitive unconscious (e.g., Bowers,
Farvolden, & Mermigis, 1995; Schooler & Melcher, 1995).
The magi c behind the sudden, unexpected, and seemingly
unprepared inspiration has now been replaced by the law-
ful operation of subliminal stimulation and spreading
activation.
Creative cognition. One of the more significant
events in recent cognitive psychol ogy is the emergence of
the creative cognition approach (Smith, Ward, 8,: Finke,
1995). According to this research program, creativity is a
mental phenomenon that results from the application of
ordinary cognitive processes (see also Ward, Smith, &
Vaid, 1997). In addition, just as laboratory experiments
have provi ded tremendous insights into human cognition,
the same met hodol ogy can be applied to the study of
creative thought. Particularly provocat i ve are the experi-
mental studies showing how visual i magery can function in
the origination of creative ideas (Finke, Ward, & Smith,
1992). Another exciting feature of these experiments is the
use of open-ended probl ems that demand genuine creativ-
ity, in contrast to much laboratory research that relies on
probl ems that have fixed solutions. Nevertheless, these
investigations concur with those on insightful probl em
solving in one fundamental message: The optimal function-
ing embodi ed by creativity entails ordinary cognitive pro-
cesses, and hence creative thought is accessible to al most
anyone.
Expertise acquisition. Recent research has am-
ply demonstrated that exceptional talents are less born than
made (Ericsson, 1996). Whet her the domai n is competitive
sports, chess, or music performance, it usually requires
about a decade of extensive deliberate practice before a
person can attain world-class proficiency. Furthermore,
evidence increasingly shows that to a certain extent, cre-
ativity demands a comparabl e level of systematic training
and practice. Even the creative genius cannot escape this
inherently laborious period of apprenticeship (Hayes, 1989;
Simonton, 1991b). Creative individuals do not produce
new ideas de novo, but rather those ideas must arise from
a large set of wel l -devel oped skills and a rich body of
domai n-rel evant knowledge. Like the work on creative
cognition, this conception of creative expertise has rather
egalitarian implications regarding the ability of anyone to
acquire this f or m of optimal functioning (see Howe, Da-
vidson, & Sloboda, 1998).
Computer simulation. A final devel opment
that has great promi se is the increased use of comput ers to
test explicit cognitive models of the creative process
(Boden, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 1993). For instance, Newell
and Si mon' s (1972) classic theory of human probl em solv-
ing has inspired the emergence of several "di scovery pro-
grams" that purport to uncover laws and principles from
empirical da t a - - of t e n using the same raw data to make the
same discoveries made by eminent scientists (Langley,
Simon, Bradshaw, & Zythow, 1987; Shrager & Langley,
199/)). Other comput er programs have endeavored to re-
produce creative behavi or in art, literature, and music,
somet i mes with remarkabl e success (Boden, 1991). Addi-
tional strategies that have promi si ng futures are genetic
algorithms and genetic pr ogr ammi ng (Martindale, 1995).
Although originally designed by comput er scientists to
solve practical probl ems, it is becomi ng increasingly ap-
parent that these programs may eventually provi de valuable
theoretical model s of how the creative process operates in
the human mind (Simonton, 1999b).
152 January 2000 * Ameri can Psychologist
In the long term, as the simulations of these comput er
models become ever more convincing, psychologists may
eventually understand how best to increase the creative
potential of all human beings.
Personal Characteristics
Psychologists have long been interested in the individual
attributes that enable some persons to display more creativ-
ity than others do. The empirical literature, both classic and
current, falls naturally under two headings: intelligence and
personality.
I ntel l i gence, Many investigators have been inter-
ested in the extent to which creativity requires superior
intelligence, a tradition that dates back to the pioneer work
of Galton (1869) and Yerman (1925). Using performance
on standard IQ tests as the gauge of intellectual capacity,
the early research indicated that a certain threshold level of
intelligence was required for the manifestation of creativity
but that beyond that threshold, intelligence bore a minimal
relation with creative behavi or (Barron & Harrington,
1981). More critical was the realization that the simplistic,
exclusive, and unidimensional concept of intelligence had
to be replaced by a more complex, inclusive, and multidi-
mensional conception. Exampl es include Gui l ford' s (1967)
structure-of-intellect model, St ernberg' s (1985) triarchic
theory of intelligence, and Gardner' s (1983) theory of
multiple intelligences. The last theory is especially provoc-
ative insofar as it includes abilities that are not a stan-
dard part of psychomet ri c tests (e.g., musical, bodi l y-
kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligences).
Moreover, each intelligence is associated with a specific
manifestation of creativity, such as painting, choreography,
or psychol ogy (Gardner, 1993).
Personali~¢o It has been long recognized that cre-
ativity is as much a dispositional as an intellectual phe-
nomenon (e.g., Dellas & Gaier, 1970). This was made quite
apparent, for example, in the early research on the creative
personality conducted at the Institute for Personality As-
sessment and Research at the University of California,
Berkeley (e.g., Barron, 1969; MacKinnon, 1978). Although
interest in the dispositional correlates of creativity waned
somewhat with the arrival of the cognitive revolution,
personality research has seen a revival in recent years. As
a result, researchers have now compiled a fairly secure
profile of the creative personality (e.g., Martindale, 1989;
Simonton, 1999a). In particular, such persons are disposed
to be independent, nonconformist, unconventional, even
bohemian, and they are likely to have wide interests,
greater openness to new experiences, a more conspicuous
behavioral and cognitive flexibility, and more risk-taking
boldness.
Particularly fascinating is what the research has con-
tributed to the long-standing mad-genius controversy.
There is now sufficient evidence showing that creativity
often tends to be associated with a certain amount of
psychopat hol ogy (e.g., Eysenck, 1995; Jamison, 1993;
Ludwig, 1995). At the same time, this association is not
equivalent to the claim that creative individuals must nec-
essarily suffer from mental disorders. On the contrary,
research has shown that (a) numerous creators, even of the
highest order, have no apparent tendencies toward psycho-
pathology; (b) the incidence rates vary according to the
domain of creative activity, with some domains showing
rather low rates; (c) those creators who seemingly exhibit
sympt oms usually possess compensat ory characteristics
that enable them to control and even channel their procliv-
ities into productive activities; and (d) many characteristics
that appear abnormal may actually prove quite adaptive to
the individual' s lifelong adjustment (see, e.g., Barron,
1969; Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Ludwig, 1995; Rothenberg,
1990). In fact, the creative personality often provides a fine
illustration of how supposed psychological weaknesses can
somet i mes be converted into a form of optimal functioning.
Life Span Development
Creativity is more than a cognitive and dispositional attri-
bution in which individuals may vary. It is also an activity
that develops over the course of the human life span.
Researchers into the developmental psychol ogy of creativ-
ity have focused on two aspects of this longitudinal trans-
formation. First, investigators have exami ned what child-
hood and adolescent experiences appear to be associated
with the devel opment of creative potential. Second, re-
searchers have scrutinized how that potential is actualized
during the course of the creat or' s adulthood and final years.
Many of the studies in either category have concentrated on
the devel opment of individuals who have attained some
acclaim for their creative achievements, albeit there is no
shortage of inquiries into the emergence of more everyday
forms of creative behavior.
The acquisition of creative potential. A
very large inventory of developmental antecedents has
been documented over the past several decades of research
(Simonton, 1987). A great number of these influences
concern the family environments and circumstances that
seem to most favor the emergence of creative personalities.
These factors include birth order, early parental loss, mar-
ginality, and the availability of mentors and role models.
Other developmental variables refer to an individual' s ex-
perience and performance in primary, secondary, and
higher education. Perhaps the most remarkabl e generaliza-
tion to be drawn from both sets of developmental influ-
ences is that exceptional creativity does not always emerge
from the most nurturant environments (e.g., Eisenstadt,
1978; Goertzel, Goertzel, & Goertzel, 1978; Simonton,
1984). On the contrary, creative potential seems to require
a certain exposure to (a) diversifying experiences that help
weaken the constraints imposed by conventional socializa-
tion and (b) challenging experiences that help strengthen a
person' s capacity to persevere in the face of obstacles
(Simonton, 1994). These developmental inputs may be
especially important for artistic forms of creative behavior.
In any case, it is startling testimony to the adaptive powers
of the human being that some of the most adverse child-
hoods can give birth to the most creative adulthoods.
One other maj or movement in the recent literature
deserves mention. Back in 1869, Galton first introduced the
notion that exceptional creativity might have a genetic
January 2000 ° Ameri can Psychologist 153
foundation. With the advent of modern behavioral genetics,
this possibility has received increased attention (Lykken,
1998; Simonton, 1999c; Waller, Bouchard, Lykken, Telle-
gen, & Blacker, 1993). Although it is still too early to tell
exactly how much individual variation in creativity owes
its existence to genetic endowment, there is no doubt that
certain intellectual and dispositional traits required for cre-
ativity display respectable heritability coefficients (Bou-
chard, 1994; Eysenck, 1995). It is becomi ng increasingly
clear that the acquisition of creative potential requires the
simultaneous contribution of both nature and nurture.
The actual i zati on of creative potenti al .
Many investigators have been fascinated with how creativ-
ity is manifested during the course of a person' s career
(e.g., Gardner, 1993; Root-Bernstein, Bernstein, & Gami er,
1993). Especially notable is the evolving systems approach
of Howard Gruber (1989) and his colleagues. Taking ad-
vantage of laboratory notebooks, sketchbooks, diaries, and
other archival sources, these researchers have examined
how creative ideas emerge and develop in a compl ex and
dynamic interaction between the creat or' s personal vision
and the sociocultural milieu in which that creativity must
take place (see Wallace & Gruber, 1989). A distinctive
feature of these inquiries is their emphasis on the qualita-
tive and idiographic case-study method, an approach that
permits an in-depth understanding of how creativity works
in individual lives.
However, large-sample quantitative and nomothetic
investigations on this topic are also abundant. The question
that has received the most attention has been the relation
between creativity and age (Simonton, 1988). Somet i mes
this issue is addressed by gauging how performance on
psychomet ri c measures of creativity changes across the
adult life span (e.g., McCrae, Arenberg, & Costa, 1987),
but the more common approach is to assess how the output
of creative products changes as a function of age (e.g.,
Lehman, 1953; Lindauer, 1993b). Because this research
has consistently found that creativity is a curvilinear (in-
verted backward J) function of age, one might conclude that
older individuals would not be creative. However, the
empirical and theoretical literature shows that such a pes-
simistic conclusion is unjustified (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997;
Dennis, 1966; Simonton, 1991a, 1997a). Numerous factors
operate that help maintain creative output throughout the
life span. Indeed, it is actually possible for creators to
display a qualitative and quantitative resurgence of creativ-
ity in their final years (Lindauer, 1993a; Simonton, 1989).
Considering these findings, the picture for creativity in the
later years of life is optimistic rather than pessimistic.
Gi ven that the 21st century will see a huge generation of
"baby boomers" entering their golden years, this particular
generalization about optimal functioning will acquire even
more importance.
Social Context
The original research on creativity tended to adopt an
excessively individualistic perspective. Creativity was
viewed as a process that t ook place in the mind of a single
individual who possessed the appropriate personal charac-
teristics and devel opment al experiences. Beginning in the
late 1970s, however, more psychologists began to recog-
nize that creativity takes place in a social context (e.g.,
Harrington, 1990). Indeed, in the 1980s, an explicit social
psychol ogy of creativity emerged to supplement the cog-
nitive, differential, and developmental perspectives (e.g.,
Amabile, 1983). The methods adopted in this burgeoning
field range from laboratory experiments and field observa-
tions to content analytical and historiometric studies. These
investigations have also looked at a diversity of external
conditions, with perhaps the greatest emphasis on the in-
terpersonal, disciplinary, and sociocultural environments.
Interpers onal envi ronment. Although there
has long existed the popular image of the lone genius, it is
clear that much creativity takes place in interpersonal set-
tings. The student may be expected to display creativity on
a term paper or essay exam, or the worker may be expected
to exhibit some creativity on the job. The particular nature
of the interpersonal expectations may then serve to either
enhance or inhibit the amount of creativity shown by the
individual. A good illustration of the possibilities may be
found in the research of Amabile and her associates (e.g.,
Amabile, 1996) on the repercussions of rewards, evalua-
tion, surveillance, and other circumstances. Particularly
valuable are their inquiries into the i mpact of intrinsic and
extrinsic incentives for performi ng a task. Creativity usu-
ally appears more favored when individuals perform a task
for inherent enj oyment rather than for some external reason
that has little to do with the task itself. However, circum-
stances also occur in which the extrinsic motivation can
contribute to the amplification of individual creativity (Am-
abile, 1996; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). This research
has obvious implications for how to best nurture creativity
in both schools and the workplace.
Before advancing to the next variety of social context,
I should at least mention the current status of research on
brainstorming. This technique was first introduced as a way
of stimulating the production of creative ideas in probl em-
solving groups (Osborn, 1963). In a sense, brainstorming
purports to generate creativity from an interpersonal rather
than an intrapersonal process. Brainstorming has become a
very popular approach in industrial and organizational set-
tings (Farr, 1990). Unfortunately, although the research
literature is not uniform in its assessment of the met hod' s
validity, it is clear that brainstorming has utility only with
rather specific types of instructions and guidance (e.g.,
Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). At present, it is impossible to say
whether this method will be rendered more effective by the
current research on electronic brainstorming in which the
interactions occur through comput er mediation (e.g., Roy,
Gauvin, & Li mayem, 1996).
Di sci pl i nar y envi r onment . Most creators do
not function in isolation from other creators, but rather their
creativity takes place within a particular artistic, scientific,
or intellectual discipline. For example, in the systems vi ew
put forward by C sikszentmihalyi (1990), creativity requires
the dynamic interaction between three subsystems, only
one of which entails the individual creator. The second
subsystem is the domain, which consists of the set of rules,
154 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
the repertoire of techniques, and any other abstract at-
tributes that define a particular mode of creativity (e.g., the
paradi gm that guides normal science, according to Kuhn,
1970). The third subsyst em is the field, which consists of
those persons who work within the same domain, and thus
have their creativity governed by the same domain-specific
guidelines. These colleagues are essential to the realization
of individual creativity, according to the systems view,
because creativity does not exist until those making up the
field decide to recognize that a given creative product
represents an original contribution to the domain.
Once psychologists recognize that creativity emerges
out of an interaction of individual, field, and domain, then
the phenomenon becomes far more complex. One illustra-
tion of this compl exi t y may be found in Mart i ndal e' s
(1990) research on stylistic change in the arts, especially in
poetic literature. Although the poet wants to reach as wide
a public as possible, Martindale argued that the most im-
portant audience for poetry is fellow writers (as well as a
few select critics), who play the maj or part in evaluating
whether an aut hor' s poetry qualifies as creative. That eval-
uation is based on two considerations. First, the poetry
must conform to the stylistic rules of the time, rules that
define the acceptable form and content for that particular
domain of creativity. Second, the poetry must be original,
rather than merel y rehashing what has already been said. In
the early history of a particular style, poets can attain this
second end by ever more extensive use of what Martindale
called "primordial thought" (i.e., pri mary-process thinking
in psychoanalytic terms), but as time goes on, originality
can only be obtained by stretching, even outright violating,
the various rules of the game. After a few generations, the
stylistic conventions begin to break down, and the domain
loses its coher ence- - whi ch means it becomes increasingly
difficult for anyone to j udge what is good and bad among
cont emporary poems. Fortunately, a new style usually
emerges, with distinctive sets of form and content prescrip-
tions, and the whole cyclical process begins once again.
Martindale has empirically documented this progression
not j ust in poetry, but in most other forms of creativity as
well, including music and painting.
Needless to say, once psychologists acknowledge that
creativity is a systemic rather than a totally individualistic
phenomenon, it becomes far more difficult to study using
the more commonpl ace methods of psychology. Experi-
mental studies of human probl em solving become far less
enlightening to the extent that the laboratory cubical iso-
lates the person from a disciplinary domain and field.
Psychometric inquiries into the creative personality are
likewise rendered less insightful to the degree that the
creator has been unrooted from his or her disciplinary
matrix. To ci rcumvent these limitations, psychologists
have adopted a number of strategies. Some, like Martindale
(1990), have taken advantage of archival data to study the
interplay between creators and their disciplines (see also
Simonton, 1992b). Others have engaged in some form of
participant observation, such as Dunbar' s (1995) provoca-
tive in situ examination of scientific discovery in biomed-
ical research laboratories. Although these alternative meth-
ods are much more arduous than the more commonpl ace
experimental and psychomet ri c investigations, they have
contributed findings that could not be acquired in any other
way. In particular, such investigations have ampl y proven
that creativity cannot be divorced from its disciplinary
context.
Sociocultural environment. Beyond the realm
of interpersonal and disciplinary interactions, there exists
the larger external milieu. Sociologists and anthropologists
have long argued that creativity is most l y i f not entirely a
sociocultural phenomenon (e.g., Kroeber, 1944), but only
in the past couple of decades have psychologists begun to
scrutinize the extent to which creative achievements de-
pend on the impersonal and pervasi ve zeitgeist (Simonton,
1984). Two findings warrant special mention here:
1. It has become increasingly clear that certain polit-
ical environments affect the degree of creativity manifested
by the corresponding population. Some of these political
influences operate directly on the adult creator, such as
when warfare depresses the output of creative ideas (Sim-
onton, 1984). Other political effects function during the
developmental stages of an individual' s life, either encour-
aging or discouraging the acquisition of creative potential.
Thus, on the one hand, growing up in times of anarchy,
when the political world is plagued by assassinations,
coups d' dtat, and military mutinies, tends to be antithetical
to creative devel opment (e.g., Simonton, 1976). On the
other hand, growing up when a civilization is fragment ed
into a large number of peacefully coexisting independent
states tends to be conducive to the devel opment of creative
potential (e.g., Simonton, 1975). In fact, nationalistic re-
volts against the oppressive rule of empire states tends to
have a positive consequence for the amount of creativity in
the following generations (Kroeber, 1944; Simonton, 1975;
Sorokin, 1947/1969). Many nations have experienced
golden ages after winning independence from foreign dom-
ination, with ancient Greece providing a classic example.
2. The rationale for the last mentioned consequence
may be that nationalistic rebellion encourages cultural het-
erogeneit~y rather than homogenei t y (Simonton, 1994).
Rather than everyone having to speak the same language,
read the same books, follow the same laws, and so on,
individuals are left with more options. This suggests that
cultural diversity may facilitate creativity, and there is
evidence that this is the case. Creative activity in a civili-
zation tends to increase after it has opened itself to exten-
sive alien influences, whether through immigration, travel
abroad, or studying under foreign teachers (Simonton,
1997b). By enriching the cultural environment, the ground
may be laid for new creative syntheses. This finding is
consistent with a host of other empirical results, such as the
creativity-augmenting effects of ethnic marginality, bilin-
gualism, and even exposure to ideological or behavioral
dissent (e.g., Campbell, 1960; Lambert, Tucker, &
d' Angl ej an, 1973; Nemet h & Kwan, 1987; Simonton,
1994).
These and other sociocultural forces are potent enough
that they can compl et el y extinguish creativity in a given
nation, somet i mes producing a dark age that may last for
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 155
generations (Simonton, 1984). However, it requires empha-
sis that zeitgeist factors serve to raise or lower the general
level of creative activity at a given time and place, but
cannot easily account for individual differences in the
devel opment and manifestation of creativity. For example,
the general milieu may largely explain why the Renais-
sance began in Italy but not why Michelangelo towered
over his Italian contemporaries.
Conclusion
Although psychologists have made tremendous progress in
the understanding of creativity, much work remains to be
done. Certainly, many substantive questions demand con-
siderably more empirical scrutiny. Consider, for example,
the following three desiderata:
1. Psychologists still have a long way to go before
they come anywhere close to understanding creativity in
women and minorities (see, e.g., Helson, 1990). So far,
creativity in such groups seems to display a complex pat-
tern of divergence and convergence relative to what has
been observed in majority-culture male study participants
(e.g., Simonton, 1992a, 1998). The details of these differ-
ences and similarities must be empirically documented
before psychologists can be said to understand how this
form of optimal functioning operates in the entire human
race.
2. Psychologists must carry out more ambitious lon-
gitudinal studies that examine how creativity develops dur-
ing the course of childhood, adolescence, and adulthood.
Ter man' s (1925) classic investigation followed a cohort of
intellectually gifted children throughout their life courses,
but most current work has been obliged to scrutinize a
narrower slice of the life span (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi,
Rathunde, & Whalen, 1993; Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi,
1976; Subotnik & Arnold, 1994). Although such investi-
gations have told psychologists much about creative devel-
opment, only more extensive studies can complete the
picture of the origins of creative potential.
3. Psychologists also need to carry out more research
on the attributes of the creative product. Ironically, al-
though psychologists have made considerable advances in
their understanding of what contributes to the success of an
aesthetic composition (e.g., Martindale, 1990; Simonton,
1980), they still know very little about what determines the
creativity of a scientific contribution (e.g., Shadish, 1989;
Sternberg & Gordeeva, 1996).
Beyond expanding the scope of empirical inquiries,
more attention must be devoted to the devel opment of more
comprehensi ve and precise theories of creativity. At
present, two theoretical movement s l ook the most promis-
ing: (a) economic models that examine the individual' s
willingness to invest in "human capital" and to engage in
risk-taking behaviors (see, e.g., Rubenson & Runco, 1992;
Sternberg & Lubart, 1995); and (b) evolutionary models
that have elaborated Campbel l ' s (1960) variation-selection
model of creativity into more compl et e explanations of the
creative process, person, and product (see, e.g., Eysenck,
1995; Simonton, 1999b). Both the economi c and evolution-
ary theories have supported the emergence of mathematical
models that make predictions susceptible to empirical tests
(e.g., Simonton, 1997a).
Finally, and perhaps most important, the scientific
understanding of creativity should be extended to lead to
ever more useful applications. To the world at large, cre-
ativity is not j ust an interesting psychological phenomenon
but a socially and personally valued behavi or besides. It is
partly for this reason that there are so many workshops and
self-help books that purport to enhance personal creativity;
yet the gap between scientific knowl edge and practical
interventions is often so wide that doubts are cast on both
science and practice. However, if creativity research con-
tinues to expand and diversify, a t i me will come when
scientific theories prove their utility by successfully stim-
ulating creativity in the everyday world. Ultimately, ever
more human beings may be able to display optimal func-
tioning through creativity.
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158 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 • Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t
The Origins and Ends of Giftedness
El l en Wi nner
Boston College and Project Zero, Harvard Graduate School of Education
Five issues about giftedness are discussed. First, the ori-
gins of giftedness are explored. The view that gifiedness is
entirely a product of training is critiqued. There is indirect
evidence f or atypical brain organization and innate talent
in gifted children: Many gifted children and savants have
enhanced right-hemisphere development, language-related
difficulties, and autoimmune disorders. Second, the intense
motivation of gifted children is discussed. Third, it is ar-
gued that gifted children have social and emotional diffi-
culties that set them apart. Fourth, evidence f or the often
uneven cognitive profiles of such children is presented.
Finally, the relationship between childhood g(ftedness and
"domain" creativity in adulthood is discussed. Few gifted
children go on to become adult creators because the skills
and personality factors required to be a creator are very
different f rom those typical of even the most highly gifted
children.
G
ifted chi l dren and prodi gi es di spl ay near-adul t
P level skills and interests. They may begi n t o read
fluently at the age of three or four, wi t hout any
ext ended i nst ruct i on; t hey may pl ay a musi cal i nst rument
as skillfully as a hi ghl y trained adult; t hey may turn every-
day experi ences i nt o mat hemat i cal pr obl ems to pl ay with,
movi ng f r om arithmetic to al gebra before their peers have
l earned to car r y number s in addition (cf. Fel dman, 1991;
Radford, 1990; Wi nner, 1996a).
Psychol ogi st s have al ways been interested in the de-
viant. As a result we know much mor e about devi ance at
the negat i ve t han at the posi t i ve end of the spect rum. Just
as we know mor e about depressi on and fear than we do
about happi ness and courage, we also know far mor e about
ret ardat i on and l earni ng pr obl ems t han we do about gift-
edness. Resear ch on ret ardat i on is mor e advanced and mor e
i nt egrat ed i nt o the field of ps ychol ogy t han is research on
giftedness. Resear ch on ret ardat i on is mor e likely t o find its
way i nt o mai nst r eam devel opment al j our nal s t han is re-
search on gi ft edness, whi ch is oft en to be f ound in special-
i zed and hence less wi del y read j ournal s. Thi s phenomenon
is part of the wi der phenomenon of ps yc hol ogy' s focus on
the pat hol ogi cal rat her than the heal t hy. It al so surely
reflects the vi ew t hat ret ardat i on is a pr obl em researchers
may event ual l y learn to alleviate, whereas gifts are privi-
leges t o be admi red or envi ed rat her t han probl ems in need
of solutions.
I n previ ous wor k I have exami ned the myt hs and
mi sconcept i ons hel d by l aypeopl e and psychol ogi st s alike
about the gi ft ed (Wi nner, 1996a). Here I consi der the
current state of knowl edge about giftedness, f ocusi ng on
five issues. The first and maj or focus of this article con-
cerns what is known about the ori gi ns and causes of gift-
edness. I di scuss and critique the vi ew t hat gi ft edness is
ent i rel y a pr oduct of training and pract i ce and argue t hat
there is indirect evi dence f or at ypi cal brai n or gani zat i on
and innate talent in gi ft ed children. The same cl ai m is made
as well for savants, autistic and ret arded i ndi vi dual s wi t h
ext remel y hi gh levels of ability, usual l y in onl y one area. I
argue t hat the i ndi rect evi dence suggest s that many gi ft ed
chi l dren and savants have enhanced r i ght - hemi spher e de-
vel opment , concomi t ant l anguage-rel at ed difficulties, and
aut oi mmune disorders.
In the second section, I briefly di scuss the mot i va-
tional charact eri st i cs of gi ft ed children, showi ng t hat these
chi l dren are far mor e intrinsically dri ven t han are average
children. Third, I discuss the part i cul ar social and emo-
tional difficulties of gi ft ed chi l dren t hat set t hem apart f r om
others. Fourt h, I descri be what is known about the oft en
uneven cogni t i ve profiles of gi ft ed children.
I concl ude by pr oposi ng three ways t o t hi nk about the
"ends" of giftedness. The end of gi ft edness has a deliber-
ately triple meani ng. I use this t erm in a posi t i ve sense to
refer to the adult endpoi nt of the devel opment of a gifted
child. I use it in a negat i ve sense to refer to the pot ent i al
di sappearance of gi ft edness after chi l dhood. Finally, I use
it to refer to the goal s I bel i eve we shoul d expect gi ft ed
chi l dren in part i cul ar t o fulfill i f we are t o gi ve t hem extra
societal resources.
Origins and Causes of Giftedness
The Disputed Role of Training
The topic of gi ft edness i nevi t abl y awakens the nat ur e-
nurture debate. Most peopl e in our culture subscri be to the
nativist vi ew of giftedness, in whi ch gi ft edness is bel i eved
to be a pr oduct of i nborn hi gh ability. However , this fol k
ps ychol ogy vi ew of the ori gi ns of gi ft edness has recent l y
come under sharp attack by psychol ogi st s who argue that
giftedness (in any domai n) is ent i rel y a pr oduct o f what is
referred to as goal -di rect ed hard work, or deliberate prac-
Ellen Winner, Department of Psychology, Boston College, and Project
Zero, Harvard Graduate School of Education.
Some of the research reported here was supported by a grant from the
International Dyslexia Association. I thank Julian Stanley for his insight-
ful comments on an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ellen
Winner, Department of Psychology, Boston College, McGuinn Hall, 140
Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3807.
Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association. Inc. 0003- 066X/ 00/ $5. 00
Vol. 55, No. I. 159- 169 DOE IO. I0371IOlN)3-O66X.55,1.159
159
Ellen Wi n n e r
Photo by Jerry Bauer
tice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993; Ericsson &
Lehman, 1996; Howe, Davidson, & Sloboda, 1998; Howe,
Davidson, Moore, & Sloboda, 1995; Sloboda, Davidson, &
Howe, 1994). Ericsson et al. (1993) showed that levels of
expertise in piano, violin, chess, bridge, and athletics cor-
relate directly with the amount of deliberate practice. They
also argued that there is no systematic and verifiable evi-
dence for high abilities emerging prior to extensive periods
of deliberate practice. They discounted as unreliable anec-
dotal reports about the childhood feats of prodigies such as
Mozart, Gauss, and Menuhin.
Ericsson and Faivre (1988) have also sought to ac-
count for savant gifts in terms of deliberate practice. Sa-
vants are individuals who are retarded (with IQs between
40 and 70) and also either are autistic or show autistic
symptoms. Savants are typically found in the domains of
arithmetic calculation, music, and realistic drawing, and
they often surpass child prodigies in their level of achieve-
ment. For instance, at ages three and four, the drawing
prodigy Nadia drew more realistically than any known
"normal" child prodigy at the same age (Selfe, 1977).
Savants work obsessively in their area of ability, and it is
the countless hours they spend drawing, doing mental
calculation, or playing an instrument that have led to the
suggestion that the savant' s skills are the product of delib-
erate practice.
Consistent with this contemporary nurture view of
giftedness are several other earlier findings. First, case
studies of creative people such as those by Csikszentmi-
halyi (1996), Gardner (1993a), and Gruber (1981) show
that all great achievement is associated with years of deep
and prolonged work. For example, Gruber (1986) pointed
out that it took Newton 20 years to go from his preliminary
ideas to his magnum opus, Principia Mathematica. How-
ever, does this mean that hard work is all that is needed or
that anyone can engage in the kind of hard work that will
lead to Newt on' s creative breakthroughs?
Second, Roe (1951, 1953a, 1953b) found that out-
standing achievement in science was predicted by the par-
ticipants' capacity for endurance, concentration, and com-
mitment rather than their level of intellectual ability. How-
ever, Roe' s scientists were all high in intellectual ability to
begin with. Her studies thus show that high ability is not
sufficient for exceptional achievement; rather, one needs
both high ability and perseverance.
Third, Bloom (1985) showed that eminent adults in a
variety of domains did not achieve high levels of perfor-
mance without a long and intensive period of training.
Their training began in early childhood with warm and
loving teachers, who were then supplanted by more de-
manding and rigorous master teachers. Bl oom' s study
might be taken as evidence that the high levels of achieve-
ment attained were entirely the result of the rigorous train-
ing. However, a careful look at the descriptions of these
eminent individuals as children shows that at a very young
age, prior to any regimen of training or deliberate practice,
signs of unusual ability were present. The musicians were
described as quick to learn the piano, and both their parents
and their teachers recognized they were special. The sculp-
tors said that they drew constantly as children, usually
realistically. The mathematicians recalled being obsessed
with gears, valves, gauges, and dials and were considered
"brilliant" as children. Thus, Bl oom' s work, like that of
Roe (1951, 1953a, 1953b), allows us to conclude only that
intensive training is necessary for the acquisition of exper-
tise; it does not sufficiently explain children' s high level of
achievement.
The same criticism can be leveled at the work of
Ericsson and his colleagues (Ericsson et al., 1993). Hard
work and innate ability have not been unconfounded.
Those children who have the most ability are also likely to
be those who are most interested in a particular activity,
who begin to work at that activity at an early age, and who
work the hardest at it. Ericsson' s research demonstrated the
importance of hard work but did not rule out the role of
innate ability.
Although Ericsson and his colleagues (Ericsson et al.,
1993) consider the stories of early (pretraining) achieve-
ments of child prodigies to be unreliable, there are simply
too many such reports that are too consistent with one
another for them to be easily discounted. In addition, these
reports come not only from potentially biased parents but
also from careful case studies of young prodigies (cf.
Feldman, 1991; Milbrath, 1998; Winner, 1996a). If excep-
tional abilities emerge prior to intensive instruction and
training, then these abilities are likely to reflect atypical,
innate potential.
The claim that savants achieve their astonishing level
of performance because they have practiced their skill for
countless hours leaves unexplained the fact that, like gifted
children, savants show extremely high abilities right from
the start, before they have spent much time working at their
gift. In addition, this claim cannot explain why savants are
160 January 2000 • American Psychologist
found only in domains that are highly rule governed and
structured rather than in looser domains such as higher
mathematics, abstract painting, philosophy, or creative
writing. Thus, it seems more likely that savants and gifted
children owe their gifts at least in part to innate abilities
that in turn reflect atypical brain organization. Recently,
Miller (1999) has made the same point: The motivation of
savants may be the result rather than the cause of high
ability.
Indirect evidence indicates that gifted children and
savants have atypical brain organization (whether as a
result of genetics, the in utero environment, or after-birth
trauma). First, giftedness in mathematics, visual arts, and
music is associated with superior vi sual -spat i al abilities,
and children with mathematical gifts show enhanced brain
activity in their fight hemisphere when asked to recognize
faces, a task known to involve the fight hemisphere
(O' Boyl e, Alexander, & Benbow, 1991; O' Boyl e & Ben-
bow, 1990). Thus, giftedness in these domains may involve
enhanced right-hemisphere development. Second, individ-
uals with gifts in mathematics, visual arts, and music are
disproportionately nonright-handed. Again, this finding
suggests atypical brain organization, because nonright-
handedness is a rough index of anomal ous brain dominance
(Annett, 1985; Geschwi nd & Galaburda, 1987).Third, stud-
ies have shown that mathematically and musically gifted
individuals have a more bilateral, symmetrical brain orga-
nization than is usual, with the right hemisphere participat-
ing in tasks ordinarily reserved for the left hemisphere
(Gordon, 1970, 1978, 1980; Hassler & Birbaumer, 1988;
O' Boyl e, Gill, Benbow, & Alexander, 1994). Fourth, gift-
edness in spatial areas is accompani ed by a disproportion-
ate incidence of language-related learning disorders such as
dyslexia, a finding reported for artists (Winner & Casey,
1993; Winner, Casey, DaSilva, & Hayes, 1991), inventors
(Colangelo, Assouline, Kerr, Huesman, & Johnson, 1993),
and musicians (Hassler, 1990), Finally, youths with very
high IQs have an increased incidence of autoimmune prob-
lems (Benbow, 1986; Hildreth, 1966; Kolata, 1983; Tem-
ple, 1990); a link between i mmune disorders and giftedness
in music has been suggested but not firmly established
(Hassler & Birbaumer, 1988; McNamara, Flannery, Obler,
& Schachter, 1994; but see Hassler & Gupta, 1993). In
summary, giftedness in abilities that involve the right hemi-
sphere may be associated with enhanced right-hemisphere
devel opment and hence with anomalous brain dominance.
Individuals with such gifts are more likely to be nonright-
handed, to have language represented bilaterally, and to
have language-related and i mmune syst em disorders.
These disparate signs and sympt oms are accounted for
by Geschwi nd and Gal aburda' s (1987) theory of the pa-
thology of superiority, in which an association between
spatial (right-hemisphere) gifts, linguistic (left-hemisphere)
deficits, nonright-handedness, and i mmune disorders is ar-
gued to be a consequence of testosterone-induced alter-
ations of the fetal brain. Testosterone is argued to inhibit
some areas of the brain while stimulating other areas. This
theory has come under sharp attack (cf. Bryden, McManus,
& Bulman-Fleming, 1994), and the evidence in support of
the model is inconsistent. However, whether or not the
Geschwind and Galaburda model best accounts for the
associations just described, we cannot discount the exis-
tence of these associations, which suggest gifted children,
child prodigies, and savants are not made from scratch but
are born with unusual brains that enable rapid learning in a
particular domain.
The Role of Families
The notion that giftedness is a product of intensive training
reflects an overly optimistic view of the power of nurture.
A more negative view of the power of nurture is reflected
in another common claim: that gifted children are created
by driving, overambitious parents, There is concern that the
end result of such extreme pushing will be disengagement,
bitterness, and depression. Parents of gifted children are
advised to let their children have a normal childhood.
However, most gifted children do not become bitter
and disaffected. Moreover, it is impossible to drive an
ordinary child to the kinds of high achievements seen in
gifted children. In addition, gifted children typically report
that their family played a positive, not a negative, role in
their devel opment (Van Tassel-Baska, 1989). Today we
know quite a bit about the fami l y characteristics of gifted
children, at least of those in our society. These character-
istics are positive ones, as described below, but the research
does not allow us to conclude that particular family char-
acteristics play a causal role in the devel opment of gifted-
ness. There are two reasons why no causal conclusions can
be drawn from the existing data. First, there is the lack of
relevant control groups. Second, if causality exists, its
direction could be either from parent to child or from child
to parent.
The families of gifted children are child centered,
meaning that fami l y life is often totally focused on the
chi l d' s needs (e.g., Freeman, 1979; Winner, 1996a). How-
ever, the fact that parents spend a great deal of t i me with
their gifted children does not mean that they create the gift.
It is likely that parents first notice signs of exceptionality
and then respond by devoting themselves to the develop-
ment of their chi l d' s extraordinary ability. Of course, we
have no information on the number of child-centered fam-
ilies that do not produce gifted children (i.e., the control-
group problem).
Gifted children typically grow up in enriched fami l y
environments with a high level of intellectual or artistic
stimulation (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, & Whalen,
1993; Freeman, 1979; Gottfried, Gottfried, Bathurst, &
Guerin, 1994; Moss, 1990). Of course, these findings are
correlational. We cannot conclude that stimulation and
enrichment lead to the devel opment of giftedness. First,
gifted children may need an unusual amount of stimulation
and may demand enriched environments, a demand to
which their parents respond. Thus, the chi l d' s inborn ability
could be the driving force, leading the child to select
enriched environments (cf. Scarr & McCartney, 1983).
Again, how many children of enriched environments dis-
play no signs of giftedness?
January 2000 • American Psychologist 161
Parents of gifted children typically have high expec-
tations and also model hard work and high achievement
themselves (Bloom, 1985; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993;
Gardner, 1993a). It is logically possible that gifted children
have simply inherited their gift from their parents, who also
happen to be hardworking achievers. Parents of children in
performance domains like music and athletics are the most
directive; parents of children in the visual arts are the least
directive; parents of children gifted in an academic domain
fall somewhere in between (Bloom, 1985). To achieve in a
performance domain, one must submit to rigorous and
early training; even the most gifted children might not stick
to such a rigorous schedule without a directive parent who
insists that time be spent on practice. Families of children
gifted in the visual arts may be the least directive because
of the low value our culture places on being an artist.
Parents of gifted children grant their children more
than the usual amount of independence (Colangelo & Dett-
man, 1983; Karnes, Schwedel, & Steinberg, 1984; Terman
& Oden, 1947). However, we do not know whether grant-
ing independence leads to high achievement, or whether it
is the recognition of the child' s gift that leads to the
granting of independence. It is also possible that gifted
children are particularly strong willed and single-minded
and thus demand independence.
Gifted children who grow up in "complex" families--
those that combine both stimulation and nurturance--are
happier, more alert, more engaged, and more goal directed
than are gifted children who grow up in families with only
one or neither of these traits (Csikszentmihalyi et al.,
1993). Gifted children from complex families report more
states of flow and high energy and were rated by teachers
as original, independent, and working up to their potential.
Youths who dropped out of their domains of talent reported
having parents who were either too directive or too unin-
volved. However, we do not know whether a combination
of stimulation and nurturance causes gifted children to
remain engaged, because we do not know whether the
parents are reacting to the child, or the child to the parents.
Implications for Education and Child Rearing
Research on the nurture hypothesis has failed to demon-
strate that giftedness is a product of hard work and inten-
sive training or that any particular kind of family environ-
ment causes giftedness. Nonetheless, the research just re-
viewed has implications for the nurturance of giftedness.
To be sure, no research has demonstrated that hard work,
perseverance, and practice is sufficient to explain the exis-
tence of giftedness. Yet, these qualities have been shown to
be necessary for high achievement, because we have no
documented cases of high achievement reached in the
absence of long training and many cases showing the
association of high achievement with training.
Thus, parents and schools ought to hold and model
high expectations if gifted children are to reach their po-
tential. All too often, American schools do not sufficiently
challenge their students. International comparisons show
that American children, no matter what their ability level,
perform below the levels of comparably aged students in
most European and East Asian nations (Mullis et al., 1998).
The gap between American students and others is greatest
for those at the highest levels of ability. According to a
widely cited government report, about half of the top one
percent of our students are underachieving (Ross, 1993).
Any educational solution for the gifted should be
made in the context of educational reform for all students
(Winner, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a). Standards and expecta-
tions are not only too low for the gifted, they are also far
too low for the rest of our students. If our schools were as
rigorous as those in Western Europe and East Asia, then
many of our moderately gifted students, who are currently
bored, tuning out, and underachieving, would be appropri-
ately challenged. Those still not challenged enough ought
to be able to take advanced classes in their domain of gift.
Such advanced classes exist in high schools (e.g., advanced
placement courses), but they should be available at all
levels.
Schools are not the only agents that should hold gifted
children to high standards. Parents also play a critical role.
Too often parents fear pushing their children too hard.
They fear they may rob their children of a normal child-
hood if they make them work too much and instead allow
their children unlimited access to television, video games,
malls, and such (Damon, 1995). To be sure, many gifted
children are so driven than they focus on work in the area
of their ability or talent whether or not their parents push
them to do so. However, we do not know how many more
high-potential children never develop their ability because
they are not challenged but are instead captured by the
potent messages from their peer culture to avoid work and
be like everyone else.
Similarly, although we cannot conclude that any par-
ticular kind of family can create a gifted child, the corre-
lational findings reported by Csikszentmihalyi et al. (1993)
certainly suggest that given a high-potential child, certain
kinds of family constellations are most likely to succeed in
maintaining and nurturing the gift. Although it is not
proven that complex families, which combine nurturance
and stimulation, are causally implicated in maintaining and
developing a gift, it is also not proven that they are not
causally implicated. Unless we have evidence to show that
family environment plays no causal role, it seems prudent
to urge families to strive to combine the two qualities most
typically associated with gifted youths who remain en-
gaged in their area of ability.
Motivational Aspects of Giftedness
Gifted children have a deep intrinsic motivation to master
the domain in which they have high ability and are almost
manic in their energy level (Winner, 1996a, 1997b). Often
one cannot tear these children away from activities in their
area of giftedness, whether they involve an instrument, a
computer, a sketch pad, or a math book. These children
have a powerful interest in the domain in which they have
high ability, and they can focus so intently on work in this
domain that they lose sense of the outside world. They
combine an obsessive interest with an ability to learn easily
in a given domain. Unless social and emotional factors
162 January 2000 • American Psychologist
interfere, this combination leads to high achievement. This
intrinsic drive is part and parcel of an exceptional, inborn
giftedness.
This "rage to mast er" characterizes children we have
traditionally labeled gifted: children with high IQs who
excel in school. It also characterizes children we have
traditionally classified as t al ent ed, children who excel in
art, music, or athletics.
The distinction in terminology between gifted and
talented suggests two different subtypes of children, but
this is a distinction with no basis. No matter what the
domain, gifted or talented children show a rage to master:
Musically gifted children spend hours voluntarily working
at their instrument, artistically gifted children draw when-
ever they are allowed, just as mat hemat i cal l y gifted chil-
dren willingly spend their time solving existing mat h prob-
lems and discovering new ones (Winner, 1996a, 1997b).
The intense drive characterizing gifted children should
be recognized, celebrated, and cultivated, not destroyed.
When children are not sufficiently challenged in school, as
so often happens to gifted children, they somet i mes lose
their motivation and become underachievers. When parents
and schools try to force single-minded, driven children to
be well-rounded by curtailing activity in the children' s
domai n of giftedness and having the children spend time on
more "normal " activities, they may end up stifling the
children' s drive. All children, not only the gifted, would be
better educated if teachers sought to find out what moti-
vates and excites individual students and then harnessed
this drive toward learning.
The Social and Emot i onal Lives of
Gi f t ed Chi l dren
The study of giftedness began in earnest in the early part of
this century, when Lewis Terman initiated a large-scale
longitudinal study of over 1,500 high-IQ children. The first
vol ume about this group appeared in 1925 (Terman, 1925),
a 40-year follow-up appeared in 1968 (Oden, 1968), and a
vol ume describing the survivors in their 80s appeared in
1995 (Holahan & Sears, 1995). Ter man' s goal was to
dispel the myt h that gifted children are maladjusted and
emotionally troubled. Terman tried to use his evidence to
show that the participants in his study were, in his words,
"superior to unselected children in physique, health and
social adjustment; [and] marked by superior moral attitudes
as measured by character tests of trait ratings" (Subotnik &
Arnold, 1994, pp. 17-18).
To understand how Terman came to this conclusion, it
is necessary to understand how the children were selected
for the study. The first cut came from teacher nominations
of the brightest children and also the youngest children in
their classes. Nomi nat ed students who scored in the top one
percent of the school population on an intelligence test
were then admitted to the study. For students under high
school age, this meant a score of at least 140 on the
Stanford-Binet IQ test; for high school students, this meant
a score within the top one percent on the Terman Group
Test of Mental Ability. Personality and social and emo-
tional adjustment were assessed by asking teachers to rate
students on a variety of scales. Teachers may welt have
been subject to a halo effect, perceiving the students they
had nominated as gifted as being generally better on all
dimensions. In addition, because almost a third of the
Terman children were drawn from professional, middle-
class families, giftedness was confounded with social class.
Another early researcher of gifted children, Let a
Hollingworth, argued that children with profoundly high
IQs (over 180) had special social and emotional probl ems
(Hollingworth, 1942). In a more recent report it was esti-
mated that the rate of social and emotional difficulties
experienced by profoundly academically gifted children is
about twice the rate found among the nongifted, with
almost a quarter of such children having such difficulties
(Janos & Robinson, 1985). Extreme levels of giftedness
lead to isolation. Hence, in middle childhood profoundly
gifted children may try to hide their abilities in the hopes of
becomi ng more popular. Academi cal l y gifted girls are
more apt to do this than boys, and such girls report more
depression, lower self-esteem, and more psychosomat i c
sympt oms than do academically gifted boys (Gross, 1993).
Teenagers with gifts in the visual arts, music, and
athletics have as many difficulties with their peers as do
those gifted in academic areas (Csikszentmihalyi et al.,
1993). These teenagers have been shown to be atypical
socially and emotionally in a number of respects: They are
highly driven, nonconforming, and independent thinkers.
Gifted children in all domains also tend to be intro-
verted. They spend more time alone than do ordinary
adolescents. They gain stimulation from themselves more
than from others and report liking solitude far more than do
most other peopl e (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993). Gifted
children are not only solitary because of their rich inner
lives, but also because solitude is requisite for the devel-
opment of their talent. Whereas ordinary children come
home after school to play, gifted children come home after
school eager to paint, play music, work on math problems,
read, or write.
Despite liking solitude more than do ordinary chil-
dren, gifted adolescents also report a preference to be with
others rather than alone (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993).
Thus, although they gain more from solitude than do oth-
ers, they still yearn for peer contact. It is difficult for these
atypical children to find like-minded peers.
The desire for like-minded peers is one of the stron-
gest arguments for placing gifted children in advanced
classes. Advanced classes for gifted students are almost
nonexistent at the elementary level, infrequent at the mid-
dle school level, and common at the secondary level. Such
opportunities come in the form of honors classes, advanced
pl acement classes, and college-level courses. Because
meta-analyses of research show that ability grouping helps
students academically and does not harm t hem socially
(Kulik & Kulik, 1997), schools should be increasing their
offerings of advanced coursework and allowing such
courses even at the elementary school level. Yet, all too
often today schools are disbanding such offerings in the
name of egalitarianism.
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 163
Advanced courses also exist in summer or weekend
programs at many universities around the country (Stanley,
1988). Since 1979, over 100,000 students have participated
in programs across the country now run by the Institute for
the Academi c Advancement of Youth at the Johns Hopkins
University (Johns Hopkins University, 1999). Students are
selected on the basis of a high Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) or Ameri can College Testing (ACT) score earned as
early as late elementary school. (Students also participate
in various annual regional talent searches based on the
same model. In some of these talent searches students all
the way down to the second grade are tested using down-
ward extensions of the SAT and the ACT. ) Students take
courses in their area of high ability, and they find the
experience to be very positive, particularly because meet-
ing like-minded peers means they feel less isolated (Ben-
bow & Lubinski, 1997; Enersen, 1993). There are now
about a dozen residential state-supported high schools for
the gifted, as well as an equal number of residential early-
entrance-to-college programs; these make it possible for
highly gifted children to mix with equally gifted peers
(Boothe, Sethna, & Stanley, in press).
Cognitive Profiles of Gifted and
Prodigious Children
Psychologists typically assess academic giftedness with an
I Q test that yields subtest scores as well as an overall,
global number. Children are usually defined as gifted if
their global IQ score rises above some arbitrary cut off point
(often 130). The assumption underlying the use of a global
score is that academically gifted children are generally
gifted in all academic subjects. Some children justify this
assumption perfectly by demonstrating giftedness in read-
ing, math, and logical analytic thinking. These kind of
children are n o t a t i o n a l l y g i f t e d , able to mast er rapidly the
two kinds of notational symbol systems valued in school:
language and numbers.
Although globally gifted children certainly exist,
many other academically gifted children present a much
less balanced picture; unevenness between verbal and
mathematical abilities may be the rule, not the exception.
Many of Ter man' s participants had greater strengths and
interests in either reading or math. Terman, however, ar-
gued that the unevenness in ability among the gifted was no
more marked than the unevenness found in the general
population: "The ' one-si dedness' of precocious children is
myt hi cal " (Terman, 1925, p. 339).
More recent research suggests Terman was wrong.
When assessed with difficult tests without low ceilings,
academically gifted children often reveal j agged profiles,
and a gift in one scholastic area does not i mpl y a gift in
another area. For example, Detterman and Daniel (1989)
have found that the higher the IQ, the lower the correlation
among subtests of the IQ test. Thus, it is more common to
find mathematical ability far higher than verbal ability in a
hi gh-IQ individual than in a l ow-IQ individual. Wilkinson
(1993) reported sharp discrepancies between verbal and
performance IQ scores in children with IQs of 120 or
higher. In a large-scale study of gifted adolescents, Achter,
Lubinski, and Benbow (1996) found that 42% of students
scoring in the top 0.5% on the SATs had math and verbal
SAT scores over one standard deviation apart, whereas
72% of students scoring in the top .01% had such a differ-
entiated profile. When the personal interests of the individ-
ual children were added into the same equation, 82% and
94%, respectively, had differentiated profiles. Some math-
ematically gifted children identified by the Study of Math-
ematically Precocious Youth (SMPY; Stanley, 1988) are
more gifted in math than verbal ability, although extreme
cases of such discrepancies are not typical (J. C. Stanley,
personal communication, January 7, 1999). For further
evidence of unevenness of abilities associated with gifted
IQs, see Benbow and Minor (1990); Lewis (1985); Muel-
ler, Dash, Matheson, and Short (1984); and Silver and
Clampit (1990).
It is not surprising that unevenness exists, because the
abilities that underlie mathematical giftedness differ
sharply from those that underlie verbal giftedness. Under-
lying mathematical but not verbal giftedness are spatial
abilities (Benbow & Minor, 1990; Benbow, Stanley, Kirk,
& Zonderman, 1983; Casey & Brabeck, 1989; Gardner,
1983; Hermelin & O' Connor, 1986; Krutetskii, 1976).
Mathematically gifted children show stronger recall for
numerical and spatial information than for linguistic infor-
mation, whereas verbally gifted children show the reverse
pattern (Dark & Benbow, 1991).
Jagged profiles also characterize children gifted in
music and art. A gift in music or art can exist alongside an
average or even a subnormal IQ. Correlations between
musical ability and IQ are positive but low: Above an
average IQ, intelligence is not particularly predictive of
musical ability. In the same vein, high musical ability is not
predictive of a high IQ (Shuter-Dyson, 1982). Further, the
existence of musical savants, individuals who are retarded
and autistic but who have exceptional musical ability,
shows decisively that a high IQ is not a necessary compo-
nent of giftedness in music (Miller, 1999; Treffert, 1989).
Yet, musically gifted children typically do very well
academically (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993). One possible
explanation for this conflicting set of findings is that all that
our knowl edge of the relation between music, IQ, and
academic skills comes from studies of children taking
classical music lessons. These children are likely to come
from educated parents who provide enriched family envi-
ronments. In addition, such children learn to read music
and practice regularly, two activities that might transfer to
school performance. Whether children who perform rebel-
lious antiauthority music (rock, rap, etc.) and who do not
read music also do well academically has not been inves-
tigated, but I speculate that such children would not excel
in school-related activities.
Children gifted in the visual arts and in athletics
typically show a lack of interest in academic achievement,
with those gifted in the visual arts even less commi t t ed
academically than those in athletics (Csikszentmihalyi et
al., 1993). Savants who excel in drawing provide clear
evidence 1or the possible dissociation between giftedness in
the visual arts and IQ (Miller, 1999; Treffert, 1989).
164 January 2000 • American Psychologist
A gift in the vi sual -spat i al area may bring with it a
language-based learning disability. Gifted children may
perform at an average level in some academic domain.
Others are gifted in one domai n and learning disabled in
another. Davis and Ri mm (1985) estimated that there are
between 120,000 and 180,000 Ameri can schoolchildren
who are both gifted and learning disabled. A recent study
by Reis, Neu, and McGui re (1995) found that all of the
academically gifted students in a University of Connecticut
program for learning disabled students had a language-
based learning disability. It is certainly not uncommon to
encounter high-IQ children who are also dyslexic.
It has also been argued that dyslexia is often accom-
panied by gifts in the vi sual -spat i al arena, a view consis-
tent with Geschwi nd and Gal aburda' s (1987) pat hol ogy of
superiority theory, and anecdotal reports on this association
abound (Galaburda & Kemper, 1979; Rimland & Fein,
1988; Sano, 1918; West, 1991). Consistent with this claim
of association is the finding that there are disproportion-
ately more dyslexics in populations of artists than in the
population at large (Winner & Casey, 1993; Winner et al.,
1991). Also consistent is Bl oom' s (1985) report that none
of the 20 world-class mathematicians he studied had
learned to read before attending school (even though most
academically gifted children do read by that time) and that
6 had had trouble learning to read. A retrospective study of
inventors (who are presumabl y individuals with high me-
chanical and spatial aptitude) showed that as children these
individuals struggled with reading and writing (Colangelo
et al., 1993). Also, late-talking children have been found to
have high spatial abilities and to have relatives in spatial
professions such as engineering (Sowell, 1998).
Despite these intriguing findings, however, systematic
studies of the spatial abilities in dyslexic populations have
revealed mi xed and inconsistent findings (for a review, see
von Karolyi, 1998a). Individuals with dyslexia show no
spatial advantage on a wide variety of spatial tasks, includ-
ing spatial visualization, mental rotation, spatial memory,
visual scanning, and spatial orientation (Malinsky & Win-
ner, 1999; Wi nner et al., 1999; for an exception, see yon
Karolyi, 1998b, 1999).
Educational programs for the academically gifted that
rely on global IQ scores as an entrance criterion are likely
to miss children who are unevenly gifted. Of course, ad-
mission by overall IQ means that children with mat hemat -
ical gifts are treated identically to those with verbal gifts. It
would make far more sense to admit children to special
programs that are tailored to the domain in which they are
gifted (Stanley & Benbow, 1986).
Although our schools do little for the academically
gifted, with those choosing the curriculum often insisting
that all children are gifted and hence none need special
classes, our schools do even less for the musically or
artistically gifted child. It is assumed that schools nurture
academic but not artistic or musical abilities. Children with
gifts in an art form are expected to get extracurricular
training. This is particularly true in the case of music,
whereas children gifted in the visual arts are likely to
experiment on their own time in their field of talent, not
receiving formal training outside of school until or unless
they elect to attend an art school. Schools ought to offer
rigorous and advanced training in the arts as well as in
academics so that gifted children can advance in an art
form and have their gift taken as seriously as is academic
ability.
The Ends of Gi ftedness
There are at least three senses in which to consider the ends
of giftedness: (a) the most positive endpoint of childhood
giftedness, (b) the end or loss giftedness in adulthood, and
(c) the end or goals that we should expect gifted children to
fullfil. In the following paragraphs I consider each of these
in turn.
When Giftedness Ends in Big-C Creativity
The highest possible endpoint of childhood giftedness is
certainly creativity in the sense of domain-altering innova-
tion (which I refer to here as big-C creativity). Ter man' s
children typically became experts in a well-established
domain (e.g., medicine, law, business, the academy). Al-
though they may have been creative in the little-c sense
(e.g., coming up with innovative approaches to problems),
they did not become maj or creators. That is, they neither
created a new domain nor revolutionized an old domain.
Yet, expertise as an endpoint should not be lightly dis-
missed. Society needs experts, and we can neither expect
nor hope that all prodigies will become creators. Many
gifted children grow up to become happy and well-adjusted
experts in their fields.
However, only a fraction of gifted children eventually
become revolutionary adult creators. Those who do so must
make a painful transition from a child prodigy (a child who
learns rapidly and effortlessly in an established domain) to
an adult creator (a person who disrupts and ultimately
remakes a domain; Gardner, 1993a, 1993b; Simonton,
1977).
It is not surprising that most gifted children, even most
child prodigies, do not go on to become adult creators. All
young children, whether typical or gifted, think divergently
and engage in fantasy play (cf. Richards, 1996, for a
discussion of divergent thinking in ordinary children).
However, this kind of universal creative thinking is quite
different from the kind of big-C creativity that is involved
in reshaping a domain. Individuals who are creative in this
big-C sense have a personality structure different from that
of the typical gifted (and nongifted) child: They are rebel-
lious, they have a desire to alter the status quo, and they
have often suffered childhoods of stress and t rauma (Gard-
ner, 1993a; M. G. Goertzel, Goertzel, & Goertzel, 1978; V.
Goertzel & Goertzel, 1962; Sulloway, 1996). Their fami-
lies are often a far cry from the compl ex families of
engaged gifted adolescents (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993).
The disproportionate incidence of manic depression in cre-
ative individuals also suggests a link (although not a nec-
essary one) between creativity and psychopat hol ogy (Jami-
son, 1993: Ludwig, 1995).
The biggest issue for profoundly gifted children is
maki ng the transition from precocity and technical exper-
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 165
tise t o the i nnovat i on of the bi g- C creator. Consi der the
ver y di fferent situation of a pr odi gy in an academi c or
artistic domai n as compar ed wi t h an athletic prodi gy. An
at hl et e' s career is over rel at i vel y earl y in life because
physi cal strength and agility are so important. Al so, in
sports, creat i vi t y pl ays far less of a rol e than it does in an
art f or m or in a schol ast i c area such as mat hemat i cs. In
sports there is no transition to be made f r om t echni cal
perfect i on to creat i ve interpretation. For the athlete, t ech-
nical perfect i on is most, i f not all, of the story. I n contrast,
in musi c, mat hemat i cs, writing, or the visual arts, the
situation is much mor e difficult f or t he prodi gy. For exam-
ple, a hi gh- I Q si x-year-ol d who can mul t i pl y t hree-di gi t
number s in her head or sol ve al gebrai c equat i ons wi ns
accl ai m. However , as a young adul t she must come up with
a new way to sol ve some unsol ved mat hemat i cal pr obl em
or di scover some new pr obl ems or areas to i nvest i gat e to
make her mar k in the domai n of mat hemat i cs. Al t hough
she may r emai n in the domai n of mat hemat i cs f or her
whol e life as an excel l ent teacher, an account ant , an engi-
neer, or a mat h professor, she will not have become a
creat or in the domai n. Al t hough she may not drop out of
the field entirely, she will not fulfill the hi ghest level of
pot ent i al that a gi ft ed chi l d may reach, bi g-C creativity.
The situation is t he same in art or music. Techni cal per-
fect i on wi ns the pr odi gy adoration, but i f the pr odi gy does
not event ual l y go beyond t echni cal perfect i on i nt o origi-
nality, he or she sinks i nt o obl i vi on.
There are a number of reasons f or pr odi gi es' failure to
r emake t hemsel ves into bi g-C creators. Two are inevitable,
but t wo are wi t hi n our cont rol and hence chal l enge us t o
change how prodi gi es are nurt ured so we may hel p t hem
make this transition.
One i nevi t abl e reason is that the funnel is small. There
is si mpl y not enough r oom at t he t op f or all prodi gi es to
become creators. Therefore, there is an inevitable weedi ng
out of t hose who do not make t he cut, so to speak. Any
domai n woul d be in chaos i f there were as many creat i ve
adult i nnovat ors as there are chi l d prodigies.
A second i nevi t abl e reason is t hat the skill of bei ng a
pr odi gy is not t he same as the skill of bei ng a bi g- C creator.
A pr odi gy is someone who can easi l y and rapi dl y mast er an
al ready-est abl i shed domai n wi t h expertise. A creat or is
s omeone who changes a domai n. Personal i t y and will are
cruci al fact ors in becomi ng an i nnovat or or revol ut i oni zer
of a domai n. Creat ors have a desire to shake things up.
They are restless, rebellious, and dissatisfied wi t h the status
quo (Csi kszent mi hal yi , 1996; Gardner, 1993a; Si mont on,
1994; Sul l oway, 1996). They are cour ageous (cf. Gr uber ' s,
1981, di scussi on of Dar wi n' s cour age) and i ndependent
(Al bert & Runco, 1986). They are able t o manage mul t i pl e
rel at ed proj ect s at the same time, engagi ng in what Gr uber
(1981) calls a "net wor k of ent erpri se" (p. 105).
For these t wo reasons, we shoul d never expect a
pr odi gy t o go on to become a creator. The ones who do
make this transition are the except i on, not the rule.
When Gi f tednes s Ends
One noni nevi t abl e reason that prodi gi es may fail to make
the transition is t hat t hey have become f r ozen i nt o exper-
tise. This is part i cul arl y a pr obl em for t hose whose wor k
has become publ i c and has won t hem accl ai m, such as
musi cal performers, painters, or chi l dren who have been
publ i ci zed as "whi z ki ds. " Expert i se won t hem f ame and
adorat i on as chi l d prodigies. It is t hen difficult to break
away f r om expertise and take the kinds of risks requi red t o
be creative.
A second noni nevi t abl e reason is that some wi t h the
potential to make the transition do not do so because t hey
have been pushed so hard by their parents, teachers, and
manager s that t hey l ose their intrinsic mot i vat i on (Elkind,
1981; Wi nner, 1996a). At adol escence t hey begi n to ask,
" Who am I doi ng this f or ?" I f the answer is that t hey are
pursui ng their gift for a parent or a t eacher but not for
t hemsel ves, t hey may deci de that t hey do not want to do it
anymor e and drop out (cf. Bamber ger , 1986). The case of
Wi l l i am James Sidis, a mat h pr odi gy pushed rel ent l essl y by
his father, is one such case among many (Mont our, 1977).
These last t wo reasons show us what can happen when
cul t ure and greed overt ake nature and st amp it out. Parents,
teachers, and psychol ogi st s all have an obl i gat i on to nur-
ture prodi gi es t hrough the pot ent i al transition f r om exper-
tise t o creat i ve i nnovat i on and to help t hem avoi d four
dangers:
1. The danger of pushi ng so hard that the intrinsic
mot i vat i on and rage t o mast er these chi l dren start out wi t h
become a cravi ng f or the extrinsic rewards of fame.
2. The danger of pushi ng so hard t hat these chi l dren
later feel t hey mi ssed out on havi ng a nor mal chi l dhood.
3. The danger of freezi ng a pr odi gy i nt o a safe, t ech-
ni cal l y perfect but noni nnovat i ve way of per f or mi ng be-
cause this is what he or she has been rewarded f or doi ng so
well.
4. The danger of the psychol ogi cal wound caused by
the fall f r om bei ng a f amous pr odi gy who can per f or m
perfect l y to a forgot t en adult who can do no mor e than
per f or m perfectly.
The Ends , o r Goal s , That Gi f ted Chi l dren
S ho ul d Be Hel d To
I have argued here and el sewhere (Wi nner, 1996a, 1996b,
1997a) that we shoul d provi de extra resources for the
educat i on of our most able students. The traditional argu-
ment for this has been a utilitarian one. These chi l dren are
our national resources, and we shoul d cul t i vat e t hem so
t hey can become our future leaders and i nnovat ors. How-
ever, there is al so a nonut i l i t ari an reason for intervention:
We need to i nt ervene for the happi ness and ment al health
of gi ft ed students. For their emot i onal wel l -bei ng, students
need an appropri at e level of chal l enge. Ot herwi se, t hey are
not onl y bor ed (whi ch can lead to under achi evement ) but
al so soci al l y isolated, and t hey feel di fferent f r om ever yone
else. School s can meet t he needs of gi ft ed students wi t hout
vi ol at i ng egalitarianism. School s cannot be truly egalitarian
unless t hey acknowl edge l earni ng di fferences, i ncl udi ng
t hose di fferences possessed by students of hi gh ability.
166 Januar y 2000 • Amer i can Psychol ogi st
However, i f our schools are to provide specialized
education for the most able, then the most able must also
learn to give back to the society that grants them extra
resources. Thus, one of the ends of giftedness might be
argued to be service. Today there is a one-sided emphasis
on the self-actualization of the gifted child. All of the
educational research on the outcomes of ability grouping,
acceleration, pull-out programs, and so on focuses on one
primary issue: whether the gifted do better on some cog-
nitive or emotional measure when given such education.
An altogether different emphasis can be found at the Israel
Academy of Art and Science, a school for gifted adoles-
cents in which students not onl y develop their abilities but
also participate in community service, making use of the
kinds of abilities in which they are gifted (Gardner, 1998).
The moral value of service, of giving back to a society that
has devoted extra resources to the gifted, ought to be
considered as important as the value of self-actualization of
the gifted. All children should be taught the value of
service, and gifted children are no exception.
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J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 ° Ame r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t 169
Toward a Psychol ogy of Positive Youth Devel opment
Reed W. Larson
University of lllinois at Urbana-Champaign
This article analyzes the development of initiative as an
exemplar of one of many learning experiences that should
be studied as part of positive youth development. The
capacity f or initiative is essential f or adults in our society
and will become more important in the 2l s t century, yet
adolescents" have f e w opportunities to learn it. Their typical
experiences during schoolwork and unstructured leisure do
not reflect conditions f or learning initiative. The context
best suited to the development of initiative appears to be
that of structured voluntary activities, such as sports, arts,
and participation in organizations, in which youths expe-
rience the rare combination of intrinsic motivation in com-
bination with deep attention. An incomplete body of out-
come research suggests that such activities are associated
with positive development, but the developmental processes
involved are only beginning to be understood. One prom-
ising approach has recorded language use and has f ound
that adolescents participating in effective organizations
acquire a new operating language that appears to corre-
spond to the development of initiative.
I
t cannot be said, as for other domains of psychology,
that developmental psychology has neglected the pos-
itive. Development, after all, is a process of growth and
increasing competence. In the important subdomain of so-
cial and emotional development, however, we are often
more articulate about how things go wrong than how they
go right. We have a burgeoning field of developmental
psychopathology but have a more diffuse body of research
on the pathways whereby children and adolescents become
motivated, directed, socially competent, compassionate,
and psychologically vigorous adults. Corresponding to
that, we have numerous research-based programs for youth
aimed at curbing drug use, violence, suicide, teen preg-
nancy, and other problem behaviors, but lack a rigorous
applied psychology of how to promote positive youth
development.
The place for such a field is apparent to anyone who
has had contact with a cross section of American ado-
lescents. In such a group, one encounters a surprising
number of youth who appear to be bored, unmotivated,
and unexcited about their lives. This malaise was
brought home to me when we obtained a random sam-
pling of self-reports on 16,000 moments in the daily
experience of a representative sample of White, work-
ing- and middle-class young adolescents--a group that
seemingly has everything going for them. These youth
reported feeling bored for 27% (4,300!) of these random
moments (Larson & Richards, 1991). Of course, indi-
viduals differed in these rates, but what was surprising
was that honor students were as likely as those involved
in delinquent activities to be among those reporting high
rates of boredom, in many cases for more than 50% of
the random moments. The litany of explanations for this
boredom--"al gebra sucks," "I ' m always bored on Sun-
day," "there' s nothing to do," "the Odyssey is bor i ng"- -
reads like a script from Bart Simpson. They communi-
cate an ennui of being trapped in the present, waiting for
someone to prove to them that life is worth living.
High rates of boredom, alienation, and disconnection
from meaningful challenge are not signs of psychopathol-
ogy, at least not in most cases, but rather signs of a
deficiency in positive development. The same might be
said for many cases of problem behavior, such as drug use,
premature sexual involvement, and minor delinquency--
that they are more parsimoniously described, not as re-
sponses to family stress, emotional disturbance, or real-
adaptive cognitions, but rather to the absence of engage-
ment in a positive life trajectory. Many youth do their
schoolwork, comply with their parents, hang out with their
friends, and get through the day, but are not invested in
paths into the future that excite them or feel like they
originate from within. A central question of youth devel-
opment is how to get adolescents' fires lit, how to have
them develop the complex of dispositions and skills needed
to take charge of their lives. This calling is made particu-
larly difficult by the absence of a well-developed body of
relevant theory and research regarding these dispositions
and skills.
In this article, I am going to focus on adolescents'
development of initiative, which I see as a core quality of
positive youth development in Western culture. The con-
struct initiative is closely related to capacity for agency or
for autonomous action that others have discussed (Brandt-
st~idter, 1998; Deci, 1995; Ryan, 1993). It consists of the
ability to be motivated from within to direct attention and
effort toward a challenging goal. In addition to being an
important quality in its own right, I believe that initiative is
a core requirement for other components of positive devel-
opment, such as creativity, leadership, altruism, and civic
engagement.
Work on this article was partly supported by National Institute of Mental
Health Grant 1RO1 MH57938.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Reed
W. Larson, University of Illinois, 1105 West Nevada Street, Urbana, IL
61801. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected].
170 January 2000 ° American Psychologist
Copyright 2000 by the Ameri can Psychological Association, Inc. 0003- 066X/ 00/ $5. 00
Vol. 55, No. I, 170- 183 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X,55.1.170
Reed W.
Larson
How does initiative develop? After situating this ques-
tion in a cultural context, in the first section, I argue that
initiative must emerge at least partly from adolescents'
daily experiences, from the sparks of excitement and ab-
sorption that occur in their ordinary lives. In the following
section, I examine how adequately the dominant daily
activities of adolescents--schoolwork and unstructured lei-
sur e- pr oduce the requisite elements. I conclude, as the
boredom findings suggest, that Western adolescent life
does not provide abundant daily opportunities for the ex-
perience and development of initiative.
In the middle part of the article, my focus turns to
youths' experiences in structured leisure activities, such as
arts, sports, hobbies, and participation in organizations.
These activities account for only a small fraction of ado-
lescents' time, but preliminary evidence suggests they are a
context in which the elements of initiative often coalesce
and an operating language of initiative develops. Readers
may know that there is a loosely defined field of practice
called youth development that is concerned with these types
of activities and that positive youth development is cur-
rently a hot term in this field (Carnegie Council on Ado-
lescent Development [Carnegie], 1992). But, regrettably,
this field has evolved separately from developmental psy-
chology (partly because we psychologists have had little to
offer) and has not had a strong base of research and theory,
especially regarding positive youth development (Brown,
1988; Dubas & Snider, 1993; Oden, 1995; Roth, Brooks-
Gunn, Murray, & Foster, 1998). The final section of this
article envisions a new domain of developmental knowl-
edge that is integrated with this applied field and is aimed
at facilitating positive development.
I ni ti ati ve in a West ern Cultural
Context
Given the renewed ideology of enterprise capitalism in
U.S. and Western society, the importance of initiative
hardly needs selling. The economic, social, and political
order of our society presupposes an individual who is
capable of autonomous action. Furthermore, we are moving
into a new millennium in which changes in the occupa-
tional, interpersonal, political, and moral realms will de-
mand new reserves of adaptation and creativity. In the last
50 years, we have already seen the wage value of rote,
repetitive, and manual labor fall, as much of this labor is
replaced by machines, and daily behavior, it appears, is less
shaped by shared normative habits and goals than in the
past (Oettingen, 1997). In the emerging heterogeneous
global society where job demands and basic life course and
life-style decisions are not preconfigured, adolescents will
need to acquire the motivation and skills to create order,
meaning, and action out of a field of ill-structured choices.
Individuals will need the capacity to exert cumulative effort
over time to reinvent themselves, reshape their environ-
ments, and engage in other planful undertakings. A gener-
ation of bored and challenge-avoidant young adults is not
going to be prepared to deal with the mounting complexity
of life and take on the emerging challenges of the 21st
century.
Yet although the capacity for initiative is a presuppo-
sition of adult membership in our society, it is by no means
a guaranteed result of our childhood and adolescence. In
fact, it has been argued that the route to becoming an
autonomous, agentic adult in our culture is problematic.
The anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1938) observed that
many traditional societies provide a progressive set of steps
that socialize youth into the roles and responsibilities of
adulthood, whereas in Western society there is marked
discontinuity between what we expect of children and what
we expect of adults, especially with regard to initiative.
Benedict pointed out that children in our society are treated
as dependent and given few responsibilities, whereas adults
are required to be independent and suddenly take charge of
all parts of their l i fe--t o a much greater degree than in
other societies (cf. Sampson, 1988). In a similar vein,
anthropologists Schlegel and Barry (1991) found that
American and European adolescents carry less responsibil-
ity and are given fewer occasions to engage in consequen-
tial and planful action than are adolescents in most other
societies of the world. They experience little societal sup-
port or scaffolding to practice and develop initiative. They
have few experiences of "preparing, planning, executing,
and assessing" an endeavor (Heath, 1999, p. 64). It is not
surprising, then, that young adults in our society fail to
carry through on a high rate of the intentions they set for
themselves (GoUwitzer, 1999).
One way that initiative might be instigated would be if
adolescents were "pulled" by appealing images of adult-
hood. They might then be motivated to set themselves on a
course of action aimed at reaching adult goals. Except for
sports heros, however, adolescents have few models of
January 2000 • American Psychologist 171
adults they seek to emulate (Balswick & Ingoldsby, 1982;
McCormack, 1984); the prospect of current adult car eer s - -
for example, becomi ng a systems analyst, marketing spe-
cialist, or health t echni ci an--i s not likely to inspire initia-
tive. Recent comment at ors have also noted that the path
into adult occupations is opaque to young people. Many
poor and minority youth have little contact with successful
adult models (Wilson, 1996) and perceive the transition
into middle-class adulthood to be blocked (Ogbu, 1991).
Yet, even for advantaged middle-class Ameri can youth, the
steps required to gain entrance to many occupations are
opaque (Hamilton, 1994; Schneider & Stevenson, 1999).
Whereas an optimistic vision of the future can be an im-
portant influence on adolescents' choices (Nurmi, 1991;
Seligman, 1990), images of adult careers do not have
enough magnetic pull, in and of themselves, to motivate
most adolescents to begin taking control of their lives.
The devel opment of initiative, I believe, needs to at
least partly originate from adolescents' experiences in the
present moment. Rather than j ust being pulled, it needs to
be propelled. Especially given that the future is unstable
(e.g., that many current occupations may not exist in 20
years), it is better i f adolescents are mot i vat ed by the
process of initiative, rather than by anticipated long-term
rewards. For this to happen, adolescents need a series of
experiences and opportunities, a la Benedict (1938), that
build their devel opment of this capacity.
What opportunities do youths have? In what contexts
do Western adolescents experience elements of initiative in
their daily lives? First, let me elucidate what I think these
elements are. I see three elements as crucial. To begin with,
initiative involves i nt ri nsi c mot i vat i on, the experience of
wanting to be doing an activity and being invested in it.
Agency entails the experience that one' s thoughts and
actions originate voluntarily from the self (Ryan, 1993;
Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). But intrinsically
mot i vat ed action in a vacuum, or the confines of a solip-
sistic, self-created, or delusional world does not constitute
initiative.
The second requirement is that this intrinsic motiva-
tion be experienced in association with concer t ed engage-
ment in t he envi ronment , with exertion of constructive
attention in a field of action involving the types of con-
straints, rules, challenge, and compl exi t y that characterize
external reality. In defining this second element, I draw on
various constructs from Csikszentmihalyi (1978, 1993,
t996; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). Attention means
devotion of thought and effort. Constructive attention
means that this thought and effort is not random but di-
rected toward creating some form of order, synergy, or
negentropy. And this order or negentropy must be definable
within an objective universe, within a field of externally
recognizable challenge and complexity.
The third requirement is that this motivation and con-
certed engagement occur over time. Initiative involves a
t emporal arc of effort directed toward a goal, an arc that
might include setbacks, re-evaluations, and adjustment of
strategies. It is the capacity to carry out what Brian Little
(1983, 1998) describes as a "serial" or "personal project."
Despite its root in initiate, initiative is not j ust starting
things but sticking with them. To be an agentic adult, one
needs to be able to mobilize one' s attention, one' s mental
powers, on a deliberate course of action, without being
deterred by the first obstacle one encounters. Initiative is
the devotion of cumulative effort over time to achieve a
goal.
For initiative to develop, I believe that all three of
these elements need to come together. An individual needs
to experience the three in consort and learn to regulate
them. Adolescence may be a particularly valuable time for
the devel opment of initiative, because the acquisition of
hypot het i co-deduct i ve or f or mal - oper at i onal reasoning
facilitates the growth of metacognitive strategies for self-
regulation of psychological states and action over time
(Brandtst~idter, 1998; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981).
Contexts of Adolescents" Dai l y
Experience
Where do these elements of initiative occur in adolescents'
lives? In what contexts might these three elements come
together? My colleagues' and my research provides a broad
view of the different experiential contexts that fill adoles-
cents" waking hours and includes data bearing on the first
two elements of initiative.
One maj or block of adolescents' daily experience is
schoolwork. Schools are institutions deliberately created by
society to prepare youth for adulthood, so one mi ght hope
they would foster this important capacity. In the United
States and Europe, schoolwork, including cl asswork and
homework, accounts for an average of 25- 30% of adoles-
cents' waking hours (Larson & Verma, 1999). However,
our data and that of many others indicate that this is a
limited context for experiencing the elements of initiative.
The limits of the school context are evident in the
psychological states adolescents report during schoolwork.
In our research, we have had adolescents carry electronic
pagers or alarm watches for one week and report on their
activities and experiential states at random times when
signaled by the pagers, following the procedures of the
experience sampling method. We find that during class-
work and homework, adolescents experience high levels of
concentration (Figure 1), as well as high challenge. To me,
this is evidence (albeit incomplete) of the second element
of initiative: that they are exerting effort in an environment
of challenge and complexity. But although this element is
present, the first element is not. During schoolwork, ado-
lescents report low intrinsic motivation (Figure 1). They
also report high rates of boredom, and, although they report
high concentration, they report difficulty in concentrating.
Research by others using the same met hodol ogy also finds
this pattern of concentration without intrinsic mot i va-
tion during schoolwork (Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, &
Whalen, 1993; Leone & Richards, 1989; Carli, Delle Fave,
& Massimini, 1988). This is a context of what Gi bson and
Rader (1979) called "other-directed attention." It is mental
effort that is under the control of incentives and structuring
provided by adults.
172 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
F i g u r e !
High-School-Aged Adolescents Average Ratings of
Their Psychological States in Class andWith Friends
C l a s s Experience
0 . 5
0 . 4 T
° - i t
0.2
o ° 0.
-0. 1
- 0 . 2 I I
- 0. 3
- 0. 4
- 0. 5
k
Intrinsic
Motivation
Concentrati on
Experi ence Wi t h Friends
0. 6-
0. 5-
0 . 4 -
0 . 3 -
~= o.2-
O
o 0 . 1 -
,= o ,
N - 0 . 1
- 0 . 2 :
- 0 . 3
- 0 . 4 ~-
- 0, 5
Intrinsic Concentrati on
Motivation
Note. Data are from Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1984).
This comparat i ve absence of intrinsic motivation sug-
gests that schoolwork is usually not a context conducive for
the devel opment of initiative. Indeed, the profile of expe-
rience just described appears to become less favorable as
children advance into adolescence. We found that 15-year-
olds reported lower levels of concentration and intrinsic
motivation during schoolwork than 10-year-olds, both on
an absolute scale and in comparison with other domains of
their daily experience (Larson, Ham, & Raffaelli, 1989;
Larson & Kleiber, 1993b). Other studies confirm the re-
duction in intrinsic motivation between the elementary and
junior high school grades (Eccles, Wig field, & Schiefele,
1998) and provide behavioral evidence of reduced effort,
showing a decline in school grades across this period
(Eccles & Midgley, 1991; Si mmons & Zhou, 1994). In
observational research, Eccles and Midgley (1991) found
that junior high classrooms provided fewer opportunities
for student decision maki ng than elementary schools. Al-
though students are older and more capable of maki ng
decisions, the junior high school envi ronment appears to
provide fewer, not more, opportunities for the exercise of
initiative.
My aim here is not to be critical of schools. There are
many constraints on teachers, including large class sizes
and an obligation to cover a broad ranging curriculum, that
make it difficult to give students latitude to steer their own
course. A number of researchers have suggested and dem-
onstrated ways that schoolwork can be made to be intrin-
sically motivating (Anderman & Maehr, 1994; Csikszent-
mihalyi, 1993; Deci & Ryan, 1985). And there are parts of
adolescents' schoolwork in which many do experience all
three elements of initiative, for example, in doing indepen-
dent research projects (Larson, 1985). But in the current
reality, we need to l ook to other contexts of adolescents'
lives to find consistent convergence of the elements of
initiative.
Besides schoolwork, the other maj or bl ock of adoles-
cents' waking time is leisure. In the United States and
Europe this discretionary activity accounts for a large ex-
panse of time, 40- 50% of waking hours during the school
year and more during the summer (Larson & Verma, 1999).
Because leisure is self-controlled, one might expect that it
provides unique opportunities for the devel opment of per-
sonal agency (Silbereisen, Noack, & Eyferth, 1986). One
large segment of this time, however, is watching TV,
accounting for 7- 14% of the average adolescents' waking
hours (Larson & Verma, 1999). Adolescents typically re-
port high intrinsic motivation when watching TV, however,
they do not report high concentration or challenge (Larson
et al., 1989; Larson & Kubey, 1983), nor is it associated
with effort over time. So it is hardly a context of initiative.
A large proportion of Western adolescents' leisure
time is spent in activities with peers, mai nl y talking and
hanging out. Might this be a context for the experience and
devel opment of initiative? Our data indicate that, on aver-
age, this context does yield some of the requisite features of
subjective experience. Adolescents report high intrinsic
motivation (Figure 1), as well as ease of concentration. But
they report low concentration (Figure 1), as well as low
challenge. In Dewey' s (1913) terminology, this is "spon-
taneous attention," a type of engagement that children
show in play. It is intrinsically mot i vat ed but does not
involve concerted effort in a domain of challenge and
complexity. Our data suggest that interactions with friends
resemble positive feedback systems; ongoing feedback
from friends is open, accepting, and uncritical, thus i mpos-
ing limited reality constraints (Larson, 1983). Although
there are certainly higher order challenges in negotiating
peer relationships, most i mmedi at e interactions with
friends do not appear to involve concerted engagement
with challenge and complexity.
In conclusion, the great majority of adolescents' time
is spent in two opposite experiential situations. In school-
work, they experience concentration and challenge without
being intrinsically motivated. In most leisure, including
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 173
watching TV and interacting with friends, they experience
intrinsic motivation but not in a context of concentration
and challenge. Neither provides the combination of both of
these elements necessary for the experience and develop-
ment of initiative. There is, however, one small segment of
adolescents' time that combines intrinsic motivation and
concerted attention.
St r uct ur ed V o l u n t a r y Act i vi t i es
This one exception is a category we call structured volun-
tary activities, or youth activities for short. It includes
activities that are organized by adults, such as extracurric-
ular school activities and communi t y youth activities, as
well as structured activities that youth participate in on
their own- - s uch diverse things as hobbies, writing poetry,
constructing a web site, or playing in a band with a group
of friends. Our defining criteria for this category is activi-
ties that are voluntary (i.e., not required for school) and
involve some structure, that is, where students' participa-
tion occurs within a syst em involving constraints, rules,
and goals. Sports are the most frequent activity in this
category, accounting for an average of 4 - 6 hours per week
of U.S. adolescents' time (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson,
1984; Kirshnit, Ham, & Richards, 1989) and somewhat less
in most European countries (Alsaker & Flammer, 1999).
Other activities, including arts, music, hobbies, and partic-
ipation in organizations, account for a total average of 1-2
hours per week, with variations across Western nations
(Larson & Verma, 1999). These rates, it should be noted,
do not include summert i me, when structured voluntary
camps, classes, and sports leagues fill a larger portion of
time for adolescents from middle-class and affluent
families.
As Figure 2 shows, the i mmedi at e experience associ-
ated with these activities includes both high intrinsic mo-
tivation and concentration. We see this for sports and for
arts, hobbies, and organizations. In both contexts, students
also reported that concentration was easier than at other
times and reported experiencing very high average chal-
lenge (Larson & Kleiber, 1993a). This conjoint pattern has
been replicated in our study of urban African-American
young adolescents (Richards & Larson, 1998) and in other
studies of adolescents (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993; Lar-
son & Kleiber, 1993a). This co-occurrence of motivation
and attention, suggests what Dewey (1913) called "volun-
tary attention" and Gibson and Rader (1979) called "self-
generated attention": attention that adolescents themselves
direct. In an interview about experiences during this type of
activity, one 9th grader described feeling "real strong and
in control, like I could do anything." Adolescents' subjec-
tive i nvol vement in these activities also resembl es what
Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1990) calls flow; another 9th
grader said, "You change, you forget everything around
yOU."
This profile of experience, then, fits my first two
criteria for initiative, intrinsic mot i vat ed effort in a context
of complexity. Adolescents are highly mot i vat ed paying
attention within a domain of challenges. We also found that
the correlation between reported motivation and attention
F i g u r e 2
High-School-Aged Adolescents Average Ratings of
Their Psychological States During Structured Voluntary
Activities
Experience During Sports
m
i
0. 6
0. 5
0. 4
0. 3
0. 2
O
o 0.1
0
" -o.1
- 0 . 2
- 0 . 3
- 0 . 4
- 0 . 5
Intrinsic
Motivation
Concentration
Experience During
Arts, Hobbies, and Organizations
0. 6
0. 5
0. 4
0. 3
0. 2
O
o 0. 1
0
- 0 . 1 T
-0.2~
-0.3 T
-0. 4 T
-0. 5
Intrinsic Concentration
Motivation
Note. Data are from Larson and Kleiber (1993a) and Csikszentmiholyi and
Larson (1984).
increased with age during these activities, which suggests
that adolescents may be learning to coordinate these two
elements (Larson et al., 1989). Indeed, in interviews, older
adolescents reported exerting more control and self-regu-
lation of these elements than did younger adolescents.
Our moment ary sampling data do not provide direct
substantiation of the third element of initiative: an arc of
effort over time. But this arc is inherent in many of these
activities. Many involve cumulative planning and action
for the duration of a project or season (Heath, 1994; Larson
& Kleiber, 1993b). They have the quality of Li t t l e' s (1983)
"personal projects," involving concerted effort over time
toward an outcome.
A richer picture of this temporal arc of agentic action
is provided by Rogoff, Baker-Sennett, Lacasa, and Gold-
174 January 2000 * Ameri can Psychologist
smi t h' s (1995) observations on the experience of Girl
Scouts engaged in a campai gn to sell cookies. They ob-
served that these girls, both singly and in small groups,
developed plans for their sales that included rehearsal of
their sales pitch and devel opment of spatial routes through
the neighborhoods. As they gained experience, they then
adjusted their plans and strategies. Sales pitches became
more refined, their methods for keeping track of orders
became more systematic, and they took over responsibili-
ties initially held by their mothers. The temporal course of
their i nvol vement included monitoring their activities and
self-regulation: They modified their strategies in response
to feedback from their experiences. Rogof f et al. also
emphasi zed that this process of learning was collabora-
t i v e - wi t h parents, peers, and cust omer s- - and they pro-
vided a useful warning that devel opment of initiative is not
necessarily an individual process, but rather often involves
this type of collaborative agency.
As a whole, these findings begin to suggest that struc-
tured voluntary activities are a context that is particularly
suited to the devel opment of initiative. The presence of
intrinsic motivation, concerted engagement, and, in many
cases, a t emporal arc, suggests that participants in these
activities are having experiences of directing and regulating
their actions in pursuit of a goal. Such experiences, I
believe, are likely to stimulate the learning of initiative
dispositions and skills. The process of creating order or
negentropy within the activity, I suspect, promotes second-
ary processes of change within individuals (personal ne-
gentropy), change that facilitates this type of endeavor in
the future.
For me, the phenomenol ogi cal profile that we discov-
ered for these activities inspires further theorizing. The
unique combination of psychological states, intrinsic mo-
tivation with concentration, suggests that adolescents are
awake, alive, and open to developmental experiences in a
way that is less common in other parts of their daily lives.
Research suggests that positive states are associated with
more global and integrative thinking (Isen, 1987; Isen &
Means, 1983) and that they can be "organizers of develop-
ment " (Collins & Gunnar, 1990; Hauser & Smith, 1991). I
believe that this unique combination of agentic states may
make these activities a fertile context for adolescents to
develop and teach themselves a wide range of positive
competencies, in addition to initiative.
Such unbridled enthusiasm, however, has a long his-
tory in the discussion of youth activities and has often
strained credibility. Proponents have frequently made un-
critical claims that youth activities build character, redirect
aggressive impulses, and promot e initiative, without sub-
jecting these claims to the test of falsifiability. We must
ask, then, where is the beef? What is the evidence that
participation in these activities is related to measurable
developmental change?
Outcome Research
Existent evaluation research on structured youth activities
has typically dealt with the question of outcomes in general
terms. It has exami ned outcomes from activity participation
for broad, generic adjustment variables, without specifi-
cally focusing on initiative, and often without any theoret-
ical base.
The history of these studies provides a t ext book ex-
ample on the difficulties of conducting truly critical out-
come research. A substantial fund of cross-sectional, cor-
relational research at first blush would seem to substantiate
the claims that youth activities are related to positive de-
velopmental change. Participation in school extracurricular
activities and communi t y youth organizations has been
found to be correlated with higher self-esteem, feelings of
control over one' s life, lower rates of delinquency, and
higher educational aspirations and achi evement (Holland &
Andre, 1987; Larson, 1994). The probl em with these cor-
relational relationships, however, is that research also sug-
gests that yout hs' participation in these activities is selec-
tive. Participation is greater among higher socioeconomic
status (SES) and higher ability-tracked students, who have
more parental support (Butcher, 1985; Carnegie, 1992;
Holland & Andre, 1987; McNeal, 1995; Winnie & Walsh,
1980). These are factors that predict positive outcomes on
their own, so they represent a confound in the interpretation
of correlational findings. Once these factors are controlled,
the relationships between participation and positive out-
comes are reduced in strength and in some cases disappear
(Agnew & Petersen, 1989; Holland & Andre, 1987; Scha-
fer, 1969).
The claim that structured youth activities promot e
positive developmental outcomes is more adequately tested
by longitudinal studies. These, however, are few and many
of them suffer the same possibility of confounding self-
selection variables as the cross-sectional research. A num-
ber of studies analyzing data over long time periods suggest
impressive long-term effects. They have found associations
between high school and adult participation in political
organizations (DeMartini, 1983), the arts (Bloom, 1985),
and sports (Howell & McKenzie, 1987) but do not ade-
quately control for the possibility that prior, unmeasured
third variables were driving these relationships. Studies
that control for some of the variables that affect high school
participation, such as SES, grade point average (GPA), and
academic ability, still find effects, though modest in size.
Hanks and Eckland (1978) found that youth who partici-
pated in extracurricular activities in high school were more
likely to be involved in voluntary associations at age 30,
even with controls for initial SES and academic aptitude.
Glancy, Willits, and Farrell (1986) found participation in
extracurricular activities to be associated with occupational
attainment 24 years later, with controls for parent s' SES
and high-school GPA.
The most rigorous test of the thesis is provided by
shorter term longitudinal studies in which dependent vari-
ables are measured on multiple occasions. This design
allows investigators to assess whether participation in
youth activities is related to within-person change for these
dependent variables. Using this approach with a sample of
1,259 middle-class youth, Eccles and Barber (1999) found
that participation in structured youth activities in 10th
grade predicted positive changes in GPA between 10th and
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 175
12th grade. They also found that participation in t eam
sports was related to a comparat i ve increase in use of
alcohol. Anal yzi ng longitudinal data from a sample of
10,000 youths in the Hi gh School and Beyond Study,
Marsh (1992) found significant relationships between par-
ticipation in extracurricular and communi t y activities and
positive changes in self-concept, schoolwork, and educa-
tional and occupational aspirations from 10th to 12th grade.
Marsh noted that the effect sizes were small, under one
percent. But this may be because the i mpact of effective
programs or activities is diluted by the lack of impact
among weaker ones.
Effects can, in fact, be much larger for specific struc-
tured youth activities, as is demonstrated by research eval-
uating adventure programs, such as Outward Bound. Ad-
venture programs are not the prototypic structured youth
activity; they involve experiences of intense mental, phys-
ical, and interpersonal challenge in a wilderness setting,
typically for a period of two to four weeks. They are,
however, structured and voluntary. What is more, they
easily lend themselves to rigorous pr e- post evaluation.
Hattie, Marsh, Neill, and Richards (1997) conducted a
meta-analysis of evaluation data from 151 samples of par-
ticipants, approxi mat el y one hal f of whom were school-
aged adolescents. Aggregating findings for 40 different
types of out come variables, they found a mean effect size
of .34 across all samples and .26 for the adolescent sam-
ples. In a similar, although less comprehensi ve meta-anal-
ysis, Cason and Gillis (1994) found a mean effect size of
.31 for adolescents. The strongest effect sizes in Hattie and
associates' meta-analysis were for variables dealing with
self-control, such as independence (.47), self-efficacy (.31),
assertiveness (.42), internal locus of control (.30), and
decision maki ng (. 47)--vari abl es that relate to my con-
struct of initiative. The most striking finding of their meta-
analysis was that, unlike in most program evaluations,
effect sizes increased rather than diminished in the 25
months following participation in the program. This sug-
gests that participants may have acquired some new qual-
ity, such as initiative, that is generative of additional,
post program positive growth.
This research on adventure programs is clearly the
most compelling body of evidence that structured voluntary
activities can have powerful, sustainable, positive effects
on development, including what looks like devel opment of
initiative. But the differences in effect sizes between this
and other youth activities also highlights how little we
really know about what actually accounts for these
changes. Several authors have lamented the absence of
theory in this research and the lack of attention to process
(Brown, 1988; Holland & Andre, 1987; Oden, 1995). Most
of this outcome research does not allow us to conceptualize
or discriminate what processes or experiences create posi-
tive devel opment in some activities but not in others.
The one set of processes that is discussed in some of
this research, but not rigorously tested, is the sociological
phenomenon of social integration into a group (Eccles &
Barber, 1999; Youniss, Yates, & Su, 1997). Classic socio-
logical theory recognizes that joining a group leads to
processes of secondary socialization, which include assim-
ilation of the gr oup' s norms and internalization of an iden-
tity associated with group membershi p (Berger & Luck-
mann, 1966). In the case of youth activities, not only does
a teen join the team, club, or activity group, but frequently
other participants become part of the t een' s peer friendship
network (Brown, 1990), thus redoubling the opportunity
and impetus for hi m or her to be socialized into group
norms. Eccles and Barber suggested that the sequence is
typically reflexive, that the choice to enter an activity may
both grow out of and reinforce an adol escent ' s norms and
emerging identity. Ethnographic studies provide in-depth
descriptions of this socialization into group norms (Eder &
Parker, 1987; Fine, 1983, 1987).
The most extensive and most psychological discus-
sion of these processes of social integration are provided by
Youniss, Yates, and their colleagues, who have focused on
how participation in service activities, an important sub-
category of youth activities, is related to adolescents' de-
vel opment of civic participation. They argued that service
activities provide a context for youth to observe and prac-
tice basic roles and processes of civic engagement
(Youniss, McLellan, & Yates, 1997). They also proposed
that the formation of relationships with group members and
adult leaders furnishes adolescents with valuable social
capital (Youniss, Yates, & Su, 1997). Furthermore, they
suggested that experiences in service activities can provide
provocat i ve reflective material at a critical juncture in iden-
tity devel opment that adolescents incorporate into their
identity work (Youniss, McLellan, Su, & Yates, 1999;
Youniss & Yates, 1997).
These processes of social integration are useful for
maki ng sense of outcome findings regarding normat i ve
behavior. Reduced delinquency, increased self-esteem,
greater career aspirations, and even athletes' increased al-
cohol use may reflect socialization into group mores and
identity, and the social capital acquired in an activity may
facilitate continued participation and advancement in that
activity after high school. As a psychologist, however, I
find these processes less useful for explaining what seem
like organismic developmental changes, such as the acqui-
sition of initiative. With the exception of Youniss and
Yat es' s (1997) discussion of identity development, these
accounts do not seem very useful for explaining changes
that increase after group membershi p ends, such as the
rising effect sizes that follow participation in adventure
programs. Recent research by Shirley Brice Heath (1999)
provides a window on processes that are more internal,
organismic, and better suited to explaining the develop-
ment of initiative.
A Language of Agency
As a linguist, Heath has been interested in the oral com-
munications of adolescents while they participate in struc-
tured voluntary activities. The speech samples she obtained
provide a direct view of changes in adolescents' thought
processes that reflect learning of initiative. Heat h' s re-
search, conducted in collaboration with Milbrey McLaugh-
fin and others, deals with youth participating in organiza-
176 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
tions that youth themselves have identified as being partic-
ularly attractive and effective (Heath, 1993; Heath &
McLaughlin, 1993; McLaughlin, Irby, & Langman, 1994).
Thei r sample of organizations included art and drama
groups, sports teams, Boys and Girls Clubs, YMCA gang
intervention programs, and other communi t y organizations.
All were in l ow-i ncome neighborhoods, serving multieth-
nic groups of youth in urban, small-city, and rural settings.
The researchers observed activities, interviewed partici-
pants, and recorded their language use.
Before discussing developmental changes in the
yout hs' language, it is essential to provide a bri ef descrip-
tion of the psychological environments these organizations
provided. These environments appeared to be structured to
facilitate the three elements of initiative. First, these re-
searchers found that all of these effective organizations
were youth based: Although the original impetus for the
groups came from adults, the motivation, direction, and
goals of the groups' activities came from the participants.
Adult leaders skillfully avoided assuming responsibility for
the direction of the group, insisting that those decisions be
made by participants (McLaughlin et al., 1994). Agentry
was placed with the youth. Thus, rather than working
toward goals set for t hem by adults, the participants held
responsibilities for setting goals and identifying what prob-
lems needed to be solved. They held responsibility for
raising money, writing grants, handling budgets, setting
rules, and deciding schedules. These organizations de-
pended upon the participants being intrinsically motivated,
otherwise they quite literally went under (Heath, 1997).
A second feature of these effective organizations was
that all of t hem engaged youth in an envi ronment of real-
world constraints, and the leaders did not blanch from
articulating these constraints. The coach of one Little
League t eam that Heath studied repeatedly restated the
rules of the game, including the constitutive rules of base-
ball and informal rules of strategy and good sportsmanship.
He also continually asked players to recite these rules to
encourage their internalization (Heath, 1994). In all of the
organizations, the groups' work eventually led to some
form of what Heath (1997) called "authentic evaluation, "
assessment of the gr oup' s product by an outside evaluator,
criteria, or test. In other words, to the extent that partici-
pants devoted attention to the activity, they were required
to engage with challenge and complexity.
Third, all of the organizations studied involved an arc
of activity over a period of time. In some cases it was a
season, in others the period of time required to devel op a
production or perlbrmance. As a result, all involved stages
of planning, practice, or rehearsal, followed by production,
performance, or achievement of a goal (Heath, 1994; Heath
& Langman, 1994). This arc of activity frequently i nvol ved
setbacks, obstacles, and emerging challenges, such as los-
ing games, funding shortages, toilets overflowing in the
organi zat i on' s building, or the challenge of how to get 11
band members into a van when the insurance only covered
9 peopl e (Heath, 1997). Therefore, youths were required to
monitor and regulate the cumulative course of their actions.
These organizations, then, provided an environment
of possibilities for planful action, for initiative. They pro-
vided a context that demanded self-directed constructive
attention over time. What emerged within these environ-
ments was a language of agency. When adolescents first
joined these organizations, they exhibited a type of lan-
guage fitted to the bored youth that I described at the
beginning of this article. They changed topics of conver-
sation frequently, with few instances of sustained focus on
a single topic. Their statements included almost no conjec-
tures about future events and reflected a passive and self-
defensive orientation that vi ewed acts of initiative as inev-
itably doomed to failure. However, Heath (1997, 1999)
reported marked changes in the language of young peopl e
in these organizations within their first three to four weeks
of participation. Four types of language use increased that
reflect skills to think about the world as a field of action.
To begin with, Heath found a dramatic increase in the
use of conditionals, statements taking the form "I f A, B &
C, then X, Y & Z. " These statements often laid out hypo-
thetical scenarios for discussion and analysis. "Let ' s imag-
ine that . . . . then what?" Scenarios typically situated the
individual or group as actors. They dealt with likely out-
comes that might ensue from different courses of action. "I f
we spend our budget on set design, how much money will
we have left for cost umes?" Or they dealt with types of
actions that might be required should certain situations
arise.
Along with more frequent conditionals, new partici-
pants increased their use of modals, such as "should,"
"could," and "would. " "Could we do so and so? Would it
work out?" Heath observed a dramatic increase in proba-
bilistic thinking. Their language reflected a weighing of
hypothetical possible actions against realistic likelihoods
that those actions would have desired versus undesired
consequences. They were developing the language skills of
contingency thinking.
Next, new participants increased their use of strategies
for getting clarification from others. In discussion with
each other, or with outside people with whom they were
engaged, they more often sought to sharpen their under-
standing of conditionals: "You mean if I do X, t h e n . . . ?"
This reflects increased value placed on precise knowl edge
of consequences. For example, "I f we rent the band shell,
will the city give us access to electric j acks and bath-
rooms?" Contingency thinking requires accurate informa-
tion about likely outcomes of actions.
Finally, Heath found that new participants expanded
their use of varied genres and voices in their speech. They
more frequently shifted registers in their statements, in-
cluding adapting the perspective and language of board
members, business leaders, reporters, and other adult
worlds with which they interacted. Depending on the situ-
ation, they might use legalese, a care-giving register, or
probl em-sol vi ng language. In short, they became more able
to play a variety of roles and take multiple perspectives
(Heath, 1997, 1999). Heath (1993) reported that, when
adapting the role of someone else, even shy youth showed
January 2000 ° Ameri can Psychologist 177
an assertive confidence not evident when speaking as
themselves.
What unites all four of these changes is the represen-
tation of thought and action in a world of contingencies and
possibilities. These teens had learned to think of the world
as similar to a chess board in play. They learned to perceive
the array of strategic options and to estimate probable
consequences associated with these options. In other terms,
they had devel oped what I would call an operating lan-
guage for initiative, with tools for anticipating, planning,
adapting to others, monitoring progress, and adjusting be-
havior over time to achieve a goal. For most of the groups
Heath studied, this language was learned in group contexts,
reflecting the injunction from Rogof f et al. (1995) that the
devel opment of agency in these contexts often involves
collective participation.
What Heat h' s work does, then, is begin to open the
black box to internal transformations within participants,
providing a window on what they are actually learning. It
begins to make the processes of developmental change
more tangible, including some of the processes that corre-
spond to the devel opment of initiative. These changes can
be seen partly as secondary socialization: Leaders and older
members modeled this operating language and new mem-
bers, eager to be part of the group, internalized it (Heath,
1991, 1999; Heath & Langman, 1994). But these changes
also involve organismic, devel opment al processes. Partic-
ipants did not merel y acquire a language, they learned to
adapt and use it generatively. Although the sociological
account elucidates processes of social integration, this lin-
gui st i c-psychol ogi cal account gives us a handle on pro-
cesses of personal integration. New participants appeared
to undergo a paradi gm shift in their way of thinking,
reflecting qualitative developmental change. They ap-
peared to have devel oped skills for implementing plans, for
directing and regulating their activities over time. They
ingested a new mode of action. Along with it, they reported
feeling more self-efficacious, more confident in their ability
to affect the world (Heath, 1997). Such a paradi gm shift
could provide an explanation of why youth in adventure
programs show sustained and increased effects after the
program is over; they acquire an operating language that is
generative.
It is too soon to be certain how much this language
change corresponds to actual behavioral change. As of yet,
there is not evidence regarding its association with acts of
initiative or anything else. Devel opment of other constructs
from the emerging social psychological literature on
agency, such as implementation intentions and emotional
self-regulation (Gollwitzer, 1999; Mischel, Cantor, & Feld-
man, 1996), mi ght also be fruitfully tested in this context.
Nonetheless, Heat h' s work provides a very promi si ng start.
Conclusion: Yout h Acti vi ti es as
Devel opment al Contexts
The thesis of this article has been that structured voluntary
youth activities provide a fertile context for positive devel-
opment, particularly the devel opment of initiative. First, I
showed that during youth activities, adolescents experience
a unique combination of intrinsic motivation and concen-
tration that is rarely present during their daily experiences
in schoolwork and unstructured leisure. These two compo-
nents of experience, I proposed, represent two critical ele-
ments of initiative, and when they occur in activities in-
volving a temporal arc of action toward a goal, as is the
case with many youth activities, all three elements for the
experience and learning of initiative are in play. Second, I
revi ewed a range of outcome research that begins to con-
firm that such activities are indeed associated with posi-
tive outcomes, such as diminished delinquency, greater
achievement, and increased self-control and self-efficacy.
Some of these positive outcomes may be attributable to
important sociological processes, such as secondary social-
ization into a group, but these processes were not adequate
for explaining changes that appeared to be more internal
and organismic. Thus, last, I presented Heath and col-
l eague' s work demonstrating that activity participation, at
least in some cases, is related to acquisition of an operating
language of agency. This gives us a window on organismic
processes that might lie behind the positive outcomes as-
sociated with participation in structured youth activities,
particularly the devel opment of initiative. It suggests pro-
cesses of personal integration that may work in tandem
with the sociological processes of social integration.
The conditions that make structured youth activities a
fertile context for the devel opment of initiative, I believe,
also make them a rich context for the devel opment of an
array of other positive qualities, from altruism to identity.
Children and adolescents come alive in these activities,
they become active agents in ways that rarely happen in
other parts of their lives. This makes youth activities an
invaluable laboratory for the study of processes of positive
development, one that deserves much more scientific atten-
tion. Of course, positive devel opment occurs across con-
t ext s- - i n school, with families, and with pe e r s - - but I
hypothesize that this is a context in which there is often a
higher density of growth experiences.
To advance knowl edge of positive development, one
useful avenue for developmental psychol ogy would be to
give youth activities equivalent status to school, family,
and peers as a focal context of development. This might
include comparabl e research funding and a separate chapter
in developmental textbooks. True, this context accounts for
much less of yout hs' daily time, but knowl edge of devel-
opmental processes in this domain has the potential to have
equal or greater impact on practice. It is essential, of
course, that research on this context be done in collabora-
tion with youth devel opment professionals, for there to be
the type of interaction between science and practice
that has been called for in applied developmental science
(Fisher & Lerner, 1994). I should also call attention to
fruitful visions developed by others for such a field of
research and practice (American Youth Policy Forum,
1997; Hamburg, 1997; Roth et al., 1998).
An alternative avenue would be to envision positive
youth devel opment as a parallel (and closely aligned) field
to developmental psychopat hol ogy, one that deals with
positive devel opment regardless of context. This mi ght also
178 January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist
be envisioned as a National Institute of Mental Health
study section and a separate chapter in developmental
textbooks. It would seek to integrate research on resiliency,
initiative, emotional regulation, self-efficacy, identity, pro-
social behavior, and moral development, among other top-
ics. Although I do not want to diminish this later alternative
(indeed, I would like to see both taken up), I spend the
remainder of this conclusion drawing out the first proposal,
because I think its focus on a specific context gives it more
potential as a cohesive project. Here are some of the issues
I see as foundational.
Contexts
A key to conceptualizing structured youth activities as
developmental contexts is identifying the processes that
occur in them, from learning an operating language to
developing emotional skills to overcome disappointments.
A maj or challenge to research and theory, however, is
dealing with the heterogeneous array of extracurricular,
communi t y, and self-directed activities that can be included
as youth activities, each harboring distinct opportunities
and processes. From aerobics to service activities to creat-
ing a web site, the "t reat ment " is ext remel y varied. Some
activities are collective and demand coordination with oth-
ers, whereas others are solitary. Activities differ in the
degree to which the goals and criteria for desirable perfor-
mance are prescribed (gymnastics, school band) versus
those in which participants have much freedom to create
their own standards (plastic arts). Adolescents' activities on
comput er systems are particularly diverse in form, with
some being structured and goal oriented and others requir-
ing little cumulative effort over time. How do we catego-
rize this array?
A useful starting point for conceptualizing and cate-
gorizing youth activities would be descriptive research that
simply enumerates what types of process experiences par-
ticipants typically have across different types of activities.
How often do youth in swi mmi ng versus drama clubs
versus service organizations have the experience of setting
their own goals, developing plans, or empathizing with
people from a dissimilar background to theirs? In gathering
such enumeration, it would be useful to obtain parallel data
for activities such as schoolwork, work at a job, and un-
structured leisure activities, in order to test whether rates of
these process experiences are indeed higher during youth
activities.
Developmental and Individual Differences
The occurrence of devel opment al processes in a given
setting, of course, is not just a function of the context, but
is a joint function of the context and the individual. What
would be beneficial is theory and research that helps iden-
tify individuals' preparedness to engage in specific devel-
opmental processes. How might age, personality, culture,
gender, and SES, among other factors, shape initial dispo-
sitions and how youths experience and participate in an
activity?
The starting point for much developmental research
has always been identifying ages at which specific skills are
and can be mastered. For example, at what age are children
or adolescents able to acquire the various elements of an
operating language for initiative, such as the use of
modals? Rogof f et al. (1995) observed that with age and
experience, Girl Scouts had diminished needs for adult
scaffolding in structuring their activities. Indeed, i f one
looks at the current array of structured activities available
to youth, one sees that there is already a loose progression
from activities in childhood, such as Brownies and Cub
Scouts, that are highly structured by adults, to activities in
high school, such as publishing a school newspaper, in
which youths take much more responsibility for directing
their action. More specific data on the ages at which youths
are ready to master specific skills would be beneficial to the
design of activities and, eventually, to knowl edge that helps
place individual youths in activities suited to their zone of
proximal development. Other individual factors besides
age need to be considered as well. For example, how do
cultural differences in the construction of agency (Markus,
Ki t ayama, & Heiman, 1996) affect yout h' s participation
and learning?
Leading~Coaching
Knowl edge of the interplay between contexts and persons
leads to the applied question of how leaders of structured
voluntary activities can best facilitate developmental pro-
cesses. Leaders face a fundamental problematic of allowing
participants' actions to be self-directed, voluntary, and
intrinsically motivated, yet also structured and challenging
enough that participants are stretched into new domains of
complexity. Leaders of Heath and col l eagues' successful
organizations tenaciously insisted that youths hold respon-
sibility for maj or decisions of the organization, even when
those decisions threatened the existence of the organiza-
tion. But at the same time, these leaders pl ayed a role in
defining the situation and modeling the language of agency.
They laid out probl ems in the form of "what i f ' and "i f
then" contingencies. They prompt ed participants to think
through alternative scenarios and hypothetical situations,
posing open-ended dilemmas that required reflection, anal-
ysis, and drawing on past experience (Heath, 1991; Heath
& Langman, 1994; McLaughlin et al., 1994).
Research in coaching sports is the furthest along in
providing empirically tested paradigms for addressing this
fundamental problematic. Roberts and colleagues have
found that many youth coaches create a performance-ori -
ented motivational climate that is not conducive to devel-
opment because it focuses at hl et e' s attention on winning,
public recognition, and performance relative to others. Ath-
letes adapting this performance-focused orientation tend to
think of talent as a native endowment and practice less, and
their motivation flags when feedback suggests that they are
less endowed with talent than others (Roberts & Treasure,
1992; Roberts, Treasure, & Kavussanu, 1997). In contrast,
another set of coaches create a mastery-oriented climate
that focuses athletes' attention on their devel opment of
skills relative to individualized standards. Athletes adapt-
ing this mastery orientation are more likely to see talent as
something that results from practice, are more likely to
January 2000 • Ameri can Psychologist 179
persist in the face of difficulty, and show more skill devel-
opment over the course of a season. These findings have
had a direct impact on practice, leading to the development
of techniques for coaches to work with athletes in setting
goals for personal skill development that are independent
of winning and losing (Roberts & Treasure, 1992; Roberts
et al., 1997). Coaches learn to support self-direction, while
encouraging structures suited to mastery of new skills.
A next step is to evaluate how well this and other
knowledge of coaching can be applied to leadership in
nonsport youth activities. In addition, we might ask, how
much existing knowledge about good teaching and good
parenting can be applied? For example, are good leaders
like authoritative parents, like child-centered teachers?
Outcomes
Outcome research is often a necessary evil that is done
before anyone knows what to look for, and that has been
the case in this domain as well. Evaluative data have been
needed to justify funding for youth activities, even though
we are not yet sure what the independent and dependent
variables for this evaluative research should be. From a
scientific perspective, the first priority needs to be descrip-
tive and process research, done in collaboration with youth
professionals, that helps to conceptualize what the devel-
opmental phenomena are. What is especially needed is
longitudinal action research and qualitative research that
follows the same individuals over time in order to develop
models of change processes. A useful strategy for some
types of activities would be to identify individuals and
groups whose participation in an activity showed exem-
plary objective progress, then look backwards to these
longitudinal data to see how their processes differed from
those exhibited by individuals and groups who spun their
wheels and showed less progress.
When the field is ready for quantitative outcome stud-
ies, they need to use a higher level of critical rigor than has
often been the norm. This calls for research that evaluates
the occurrence of processes as a function of activity, par-
ticipants' developmental stages, and leadership variables,
and how these processes are related to progressive change
over time. Researchers must study and control for self-
selection characteristics. Evaluations need to assess possi-
ble negative effects of participation in youth activities as
well as positive ones. For example, research on participa-
tion in competitive sports suggests that they are associated
with increased competition anxiety (Smoll & Smith, 1996)
and acquisition of more self-centered moral reasoning
(Bredemeier & Shields, 1996). Might these negative out-
comes also occur in other demanding and competitive
activities, such as in music competition?
The most strenuous evaluation research would test
whether participation in an activity is related to effects
outside the activity itself. I have argued that youth activities
are a context for development of qualities and skills, like
initiative, that have general applicability across domains of
life. In a similar vein, Youniss, Yates, and Su (1997)
hypothesized that participation in youth activities creates
personal confidence that increases the participants' likeli-
hood of engaging in public service in other contexts. Re-
search evaluating these types of generalized, cross-context
effects will be the most difficult to conduct, but will pro-
vide the most persuasive evidence.
Practice
The large applied discipline of psychotherapy currently
exists to treat psychological problems. Imagine, if you will,
a field of psychological practitioners whose knowledge,
skills, and status are comparable with those of clinical
psychologists, who have advanced training in diagnostics,
mentoring, and program design, and who draw upon a
well-developed body of research to provide guidance and
counseling on positive human development. Such a field
does not need to start de novo, as there are currently many
youth development professionals. But it does need to
evolve to incorporate a cumulative body of research and
theory. One role of these practitioners would be to help
place children, adolescents, and perhaps adults too in struc-
tured voluntary contexts that are suited to individuals'
personality, developmental stage, and ability level. Another
would be to provide process mentoring, to help keep people
"in the envelope" of intrinsically motivated challenge and
learning. Yet another role would be to design and run
programs that maximize individual and group growth.
Rather than leaving positive development in the hands of
nonprofessionals, self-help gurus, and for-profit, Club-
Med-type chains, we need a science and art, comparable
with psychotherapy, regarding how to help people realize
their full capacities across ages.
Research on coaching provides an example of the
impressive payoffs that can result from a research-based,
applied discipline of positive development. In observa-
tional studies, Smith and Smoll (1990) found favorable
psychological outcomes to be greater for boys in Little
League Baseball whose coaches engaged in high levels of
positive reinforcement for both desirable performance and
effort, who responded to mistakes with encouragement and
technical instructions, and who emphasized the importance
of fun and personal improvement over winning (Curtis,
Smith, & Smoll, 1979; Smith & Smoll, 1990). On the basis
of these and other findings, they then designed a three-hour
training workshop for new coaches. Three hours is ex-
tremely short compared with most interventions; nonethe-
less, they found that athletes playing for the trained coaches
reported substantially and significantly more enjoyment
than did control participants, showed increases in self-
esteem and decreases in performance anxiety over the
course of the season, and were more likely to return the
next season, with the biggest effects being for athletes who
were low in self-esteem (Smith & Smoll, 1997; Smoll,
Smith, Barnett, & Everett, 1993). If a three-hour interven-
tion can have such long-term impact, imagine what might
be accomplished with a body of research comparable in
size and sophistication with that for developmental
psychopathology.
As someone with a special interest in adolescence, my
vision for the 21 st century is a society in which youth have
a rich range of expertly staffed structured activities to
180 January 2000 * American Psychologist
c h o o s e f r o m, r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r SES, g e n d e r , e t h n i c i t y ,
s e x u a l o r i e n t a t i o n , a bi l i t y l e ve l , a n d t y p e o f i nt e r e s t . Th i s
wo u l d i n c l u d e a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g t he s c h o o l y e a r a n d s u m-
me r , a n d a c t i vi t i e s wi t h l i n k s t o b u s i n e s s e s , p r o f e s s i o n a l
ar t s, a n d c i vi c o r g a n i z a t i o n s , so t h a t y o u t h s d e v e l o p c o n -
n e c t i o n s t h a t i n t e g r a t e t h e m i nt o a dul t s oc i e t y. Pa r t i c i p a t i o n
i n t h e s e a c t i vi t i e s wo u l d b e s e l f - d e t e r mi n e d b u t s u p p o r t e d
a n d g u i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o age, s t age, l e a r n i n g s t yl e, a n d
a bi l i t y, s o t h a t y o u t h s ar e s t r e t c h e d t o t h e i r f ul l pot e nt i a l .
Ea c h a c t i vi t y wo u l d h a v e e n o u g h s t r u c t u r e s o t h a t y o u t h s
ar e c h a l l e n g e d , b u t a l s o e n o u g h f l e xi bi l i t y so t ha t , as y o u t h s
g a i n e x p e r i e n c e , t h e y a s s u me r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or t he di r e c -
t i o n o f t he a c t i vi t y. As a r es ul t , p a r t i c i p a n t s p r o g r e s s i v e l y
l e a r n t o i n t e r n a l i z e a n o p e r a t i n g l a n g u a g e f or s u s t a i n i n g
t h e i r o wn mo t i v a t i o n a n d d i r e c t i n g a n d mo n i t o r i n g t h e i r
a c t i o n s o v e r t i me , a l a n g u a g e t h a t i s g e n e r a t i v e a n d t h a t
c a r r i e s ove r , h e l p i n g t h e m t o c r e a t e or der , me a n i n g , a n d
d i r e c t i o n wh e n t he y e n c o u n t e r i l l - s t r u c t u r e d c h o i c e s i n
o t h e r pa r t s o f t h e i r l i ves .
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