Anwar Nasution The Surge of Short Term Capital Inflow
Content
The Surge of Short-Term Capital Inflows and Indonesian Economy Dr. Anwar Nasution, SEADI Project
June 16, 2011
1
BOP Surplus
• After suffering from a deficit in 2008, the BOP of Indonesia turned to a surplus since Q1-2009 because of surplus in both current account and capital and financial account (Table 1); • The surplus in current account is partly because of export boom due to increasing demand for energy, primary commodities and food in high-growth China and India; • Except in 2005 and 2008, the amount of portfolio investment is larger than that of long term (FDI); • Inflows of short-term capital are mainly through portfolio investment and corporate sector rather than banks. Banks are subject to foreign exchange Net Open Position at 20 percent of their capital; • Short-term capital inflows are attracted by a relatively high growth rate of the Indonesia economy and high interest rate disparity 2 between Indonesia and international markets (Graph-1).
Table 1. Indonesia: Balance of Payments, 2005 - 2010 (billions of USD unless otherwise stated)
Table 1. Indonesia: Balance of Payments, 2005 - 2010 (billions of USD unless otherwise stated)
2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Balance of payments Current account Goods balance Services balance Net income & transfers Capital & financial account
2009 Q4 Q1 4.0 3.5 1.8 1.6 6.2 -2.5 -1.9 2.4 2.1 Q2 -1.0 0.8 2.5 1.9 8.4 Q3 3.5 2.4 2.2 1.5 8.5 Q4 3.9 2.6 3.7 2.4 11.4 -4.5 -3.2 1.3 0.8 Q1 6.6 4.0 2.0 1.2 8.8 -3.6 -3.2 4.8 2.9 Q2 5.4 3.1 1.8 1.0 8.6 -3.4 -3.4 4.4 2.5
2010 Q3 6.9 3.8 1.3 0.7 9.1 -3.9 -3.9 6.5 3.5 Q4 11.3 6.1 1.1 0.6 9.2 -2.8 -5.3 9.6 5.2
2011 Q1 7.7 4.0 1.9 1.0 8.4 -2.2 -4.3 6.2 3.3
2010 30.3 4.3 6.3 0.9 31.1 -9.5 -15.3 26.2 3.7
Q1 1.0 0.8 2.8 2.3 7.5 -3.0 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2
Q2 1.3 1.0
Q3
0.6 0.3
13.9 14.1 3.8 3.0 3.3 2.4 10.9 10.5
-1.8 10.4 -0.4 0.3 0.1 2.1 10.2 2.0
-0.1 -4.2 -0.1 -3.8
% GDP 0.2 % GDP 0.1
-1.0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 5.4 5.8 4.2 -3.3 -3.2 -3.3 -3.1 -3.5 -1.6 2.5 1.9 0.9 0.6 -4.1 -3.7
17.5 29.7 32.8 22.9 34.5 -9.1 -8.1 0.3 -9.9 -11.8 -12.7 -13.8 -8.9 -10.4 -9.9 -10.5 3.0 0.8 3.6 0.8 -2.1 -0.4 4.4 3.2
-3.3 -3.5 -2.6 -2.8 -1.8 -1.4 2.5 1.7
% GDP 0.1
Direct investment (net)
Inflows Outflows Portfolio investment (net) Assets, net Liablilities, net Other investment Government Private Reserves
5.3
8.3 -3.1 4.2 -1.1 5.3 -9.4 -0.8 -8.6
2.2
4.9 -2.7 4.3 -1.8 6.1 -3.8 -2.5 -1.3
2.3
6.9 -4.7 5.6 -4.4 10.0 -4.8 -2.4 -2.4
2.0
7.9 -5.9 1.7 -1.3 3.0 -1.4
4.2
6.4 -2.2 10.3 -0.1 10.4 1.5
9.8
12.7 -2.9 15.2 -0.5 15.7 1.2 -0.2 1.4 96.2
-0.3
1.5 -1.7 2.0 2.8 -3.2 -0.4 -0.6 59
0.6
2.0
0.4
1.9
1.3
2.5
2.7
3.5 -0.8 1.9 0.1 1.8 -2.3 -0.1 -0.9
0.4
1.4
0.5
1.0
0.6
0.5
2.3
2.9 -0.6 6.2 -0.4 6.6 -3.7 0.1 -3.8
2.0
3.3 -1.3 1.1 -0.1 1.2 1.3 -0.9 2.2
2.5
3.4 -0.9 6.1 -0.1 6.2 -2.1 -0.4 -1.7
4.2
4.3 -0.1 1.4 -0.4 1.8 3.8 1.4 2.4 96.2
3.0
4.5 -1.5 3.6 -0.6 4.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 105.7
-1.4 -1.5 -1.2 4.16 0.04 -4.5 4.1 -2.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 -4.0 -1.1 0.5 -1.5
-1.0 -0.5 0.06 1.9 0.4 1.5 -2.0 3.0 -0.3 3.3 3.1 3.5 -0.3 3.8 -2.8 0.5 -3.3
-0.8 0.06 -0.06 -0.5
-6.2 -10.1 -4.7 -10.3
-4.1 -0.9 -2.1 -4.0
-1.5 -0.1
34.7 42.6 56.9 51.6 66.1
59.5 57.1 51.6
54.8 57.6 62.3 66.1
71.8 76.3 86.5
Sources: Bank Indonesia. Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues Bank Indonesia. Indonesia Balance of Payments Report, various issues
3
IMF. International Financial Statistics, various issues
10
15
20
25
0
5
Graph 1. Interest Rate Disparities
-5
Graph 1 Interest Rate Disparities
Jan-00 Apr-00 Jul-00 Okt-00 Jan-01 Apr-01 Jul-01 Okt-01 Jan-02 Apr-02 Jul-02 Okt-02 Jan-03 Apr-03 Jul-03 Okt-03 Jan-04 Apr-04 Jul-04 Okt-04 Jan-05 Apr-05 Jul-05 Okt-05 Jan-06 Apr-06 Jul-06 Okt-06 Jan-07 Apr-07 Jul-07 Okt-07 Jan-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Okt-08 Jan-09 Apr-09 Jul-09 Okt-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Okt-10 Jan-11
4
INA-JPN INA-USA INA-SGP
Appreciation of the Rupiah
• The surge of short-term capital inflows and surplus in BOP have :
caused upward pressures on the Rupiah appreciation both in nominal and real terms; ii. driven asset prices bubbles in the narrow and shallow financial markets; iii. encouraged excessive risk taking by domestic corporate sector and banks that borrow from overseas and; iv. eroded monetary autonomy to manage exchange rate, interest rate and attain the inflation targeting. • Graph 2a shows that NEER of the Rupiah appreciated by 7.03 percent between June 2005 and June 2010 while its REER eroded during the same period (Graph 2b). • The strengthening of the Rupiah has caused the Dutch disease to 5 Indonesian economy. i.
Graph 2a Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, 2005-2010
140
120
100
80 NEER Rupiah 60
NEER RMB
40
20
0
6
20
40
60
80
Graph 2b Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
100
120
140
0
Real Effective Exchange Rate 2005 - Apr 2011
Jan-05 Mar-05 Mei-05 Jul-05 Sep-05 Nop-05 Jan-06 Mar-06 Mei-06 Jul-06 Sep-06 Nop-06 Jan-07 Mar-07 Mei-07 Jul-07 Sep-07 Nop-07 Jan-08 Mar-08 Mei-08 Jul-08 Sep-08 Nop-08 Jan-09 Mar-09 Mei-09 Jul-09 Sep-09 Nop-09 Jan-10 Mar-10 Mei-10 Jul-10 Sep-10 Nop-10 Jan-11 Mar-11
REER RMB
REER Rupiah
7
Costs of the Dutch disease
• There are four costs of the Rupiah appreciation to Indonesia economy, namely: – erodes external competitiveness of the economy. Competitiveness of Indonesian economy further eroded due to undervaluation of the Chinese RMB, inadequate infrastructure and bad investment and business climate; – reduces efficiency of the economy as the stronger Rupiah provides incentive for mobility of resources from more productive traded sector economy to less productive non-traded sector. The shift ignites bubble of assets including land and property markets. Traditional policy instrument such as high interest rate may dampen the bubble but exacerbate the imbalance and capital inflows; – creates regional disparity as the booming natural resources are mainly produced off Java island while the affected agriculture and manufacturing sectors are primarily located on the labor surplus island of Java; – make financial system less efficient and encourage them to take excessive risks as their source of funding are more relied on seemingly low cost foreign 8 borrowings.
Limited Capability To Sterilize And Control The Capital Inflows
• Partly due to the narrowness and shallowness of Indonesia’s money and capital markets and their less integration with global markets, Bank Indonesia alone has a limited capability to either:
i. ii. iii. iv. reduce the volume of capital inflows; alter the composition of capital flows towards longer maturities; reduce the exchange rate pressures to avoid the Dutch disease; maintain independent monetary policy.
• In addition, the financial costs of sterilization operation are also high for the central bank as well as the opportunity costs for the whole economy. BI buy the foreign currency by issuing SBI at 6.75 percent interest rate and invest the reserve mainly in the US Government bonds that earn very low yields at 3 percent. The high opportunity costs are the forgone returns on development projects, including infrastructure. • Another issue associated with portfolio in foreign currencies is the potential 9 losses from currency appreciation.
Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves
• Under the IMF Program in 1997-2003, Indonesia shifted to independent floating in 1997, supported by inflation targeting as a monetary policy operating strategy. This means that an exchange rate target is no longer used as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. • In theory, flexible exchange rate requires a smaller war chest of foreign reserves as the system reduces the need for market intervention. The need for self-insurance is also reduced with the availability of credit in case of need after the revision of the IMF conditionality, multilateralization of Chiang Mai Initiative and bilateral currency swap agreements between central banks. • In reality, for a number of reasons, Indonesia and other Asian countries accumulating large international reserves following the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. Table 1 shows that during the past ten years, 2000-2010 nominal value of the reserve position of Indonesia has risen more than double, although the percentage share of GDP has gone down from 15 percent of GDP in 2003 and 12 percent in the second quarter of 2010 10 (Table 2).
Table 2 - Foreign Reserve and Currency in Circulation, 1998-2011
Year MB Foreign Reserve as % of PSD SBI GDP Currency in Circulation as % Inflation Shortof (%) Run Interest MB PSD GDP Rate (%) 64.57 71.29 71.41 71.42 71.19 67.73 63.62 60.42 60.11 58.17 76.7 69.39 50.19 47.02 13.97 31.56 36.23 42.64 45.81 49.79 45.81 45.64 39.22 5.08 6.6 6.45 5.54 5.4 5.6 5.53 5.22 5.35 5.59 5.34 4.97 4.05 3.76 59.55 2.13 8.99 11.91 9.62 4.4 6.23 16.21 6.41 6.41 11.16 2.75 6.96 5.98 39.68 12.52 13.59 17.85 12.45 8.55 7.42 13.44 9.63 7.79 11.49 6.7 6.06 6.10
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011*
316.8 208.8 197.1 225 215.8 187 162.8 140.5 131.3 137.1 145.3 170.8 168.7 186.2
38.58 80.74 84.28 93.15 108 94.32 112.8 153.36 155.3
556.4 337.1 414.1 518.3 386.9 295.4 316 466.5 188.1 212.1 282.5 277.2 437.00 415.7
24.9 19.32 17.81 17.46 16.37 15.46 14.14 12.15 11.68 13.17 10.12 12.24 13.61 14.9
Sources: Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues; International Financial Statistics, May 2011 issue. Notes: MB = Monetary Base; PSD = Public Sector Debt which is the total of government bonds plus Treasury Bills (data for 1998-2003 are not available), and 11Rate = Shariah Base Government Bonds issued in international market; SBI = Bank Indonesia’s Certificate; GDP = Gross Domestic Product; Short-Run Interest JIBOR 1 Month *Data MB, PSD, SBI using April data; GDP denominator using GDP data in 2010; Inflation using May data; interest rate and currency using Feb data
Fear of Floating (1)
• There are least four reasons why emerging economies, including Indonesia, accumulating large international reserves (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000 and Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil, 2008). • First, as tools for intervention in the exchange market to avoid large exchange rate fluctuations and prevent adverse impacts on their economies. Graph 3 shows large proportions of both the Rupiah denominated SBI and SUN (government bonds) owned by foreign investors. This is because domestic institutional investors (such as insurance companies and pension funds) are at the early stage in Indonesia. Unlike in Japan, Indonesia has no Postal Savings that can mobilize low cost domestic saving to absorb the sovereign bonds. The second biggest holders of SBI and SUN are the domestic bank. • The crises at the peripheries of the euro zone indicates that securities denominated in domestic currencies are shielded from 12 currency risk but not from interest rate risks.
150.000
200.000
250.000
100.000
50.000
-
Graph 3 Foreign Ownership of SUN and SBI
Sources: Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues
Foreign Ownership of Government Bonds (SUN) and SBI (in billions Rupiah)
Feb-04 Apr-04 Jun-04 Agust-04 Okt-04 Des-04 Feb-05 Apr-05 Jun-05 Agust-05 Okt-05 Des-05 Feb-06 Apr-06 Jun-06 Agust-06 Okt-06 Des-06 Feb-07 Apr-07 Jun-07 Agust-07 Okt-07 Des-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Jun-08 Agust-08 Okt-08 Des-08 Feb-09 Apr-09 Jun-09 Agust-09 Okt-09 Des-09 Feb-10 Apr-10 Jun-10
13
SBI
SUN
Fear of Floating (2)
• The second reason for accumulating foreign exchange reserves is to prepare for a defense against speculative attack and foreign exchange instability due to shortfalls in exports and capital flow reversals. • Third, the less volatile exchange rate minimizes currency risks and provides incentives for overseas borrowing, particularly when international interest rates are lower than domestic interest rates. • The fourth reason is to provide for a fiscal space when facing economic crisis. Because they were treated badly when they sought help during the crisis in 1997, Asian countries are quite reluctant to turn to the IMF.
14
Tools For Controlling And Mopping Up Short-Term Capital
• There are three groups of tools have been used by Bank Indonesia and government to indirectly discourage and mop up capital inflows, namely: – regular prudential rules of the banking system; – market instruments to influence interbank money market and to do sterilization operation by buying foreign currency to accumulate foreign exchange reserves; – non-market instrument; • The first group of policy instruments include i. reserve requirement ratio ii. NOP (net open position), which is now 20 percent of bank’ capital iii. limiting LDR (loan-to-deposit ratio) to raise cost of banking operation funded by foreign borrowings. 15
Reserve Requirement
• For a number of reasons, reserve requirement gained popularity in emerging economies with narrow and shallow money and capital markets, such as Indonesia. • The first reason is because the reserve requirement system can be effectively used to reduce the volume of capital inflows and to alter their composition towards longer maturities. To control capital inflows, in 1990, Chile imposed 20 percent non remunerated reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank for a period of one year on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing firms. • Second, because it can be used as a tool to slow down the growth of bank credit. For this objective, BI raised the reserve requirement ratio of Rupiah deposit from 5 % to 7.5% in 2008 and now 8 percent. • Third, it can complement monetary policy as raising reserve requirement is a substitute for raising interest rates to dampen bubble in the real estate sector. • Fourth, the reserve requirement can be used to contain liquidity risks particularly during the downswing. • On the negative side, however, the reserve requirement taxes the banking system that encourages market disintermediation. 16 • To ease the financial cost of the reserve requirement, starting from 2008, BI offers remuneration at below market interest rate.
Market Instruments (1)
• The market based tools at BI disposal are: – SBI (Bank Indonesia’s certificate of deposits); – FASBI, remunerated overnight placement of banks’ excess liquidity at the central bank; – FTO (fine tuning operations). • SBI is the primary money market instrument available for open market operation to sterilize the short-term capital inflow. The maturities of SBIs are ranging from 1 month to 12 months.
17
Market Instruments (1)
• To prolong placement of short-term capitals in Indonesian securities, BI requires to hold SBI at least for 1 month. In addition, the central bank stop issuing SBI for 1 and 3 months and replace them with term deposits with same maturity; • At present, Indonesia has neither put a limit on access of foreign investors to domestic securities nor imposed taxes on foreign capital inflows nor exit levy on capital outflow. • The proportion of government bonds (SUN), T-bills, SBI and FASBI to monetary base and GDP are, respectively, shown in Table 3.
18
Table 3 – Money Market Instruments, 1998-2009
Government Bonds FASBI as % of Year 1998 1999 MB PSD GDP MB 56.93 61.94 SBI as % of PSD GDP 4.47 5.73 MB as % of PSD GDP MB T-Bills as % of PSD GDP -
2000 2001 2002
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
15 11.3 25.77
17.72 25.94 23.86 13.99 12.89 1.23 8.21 17.76 4.18
3.66 12.87 14.31 9.93 10.15 0.8 5.42 14.96 3.35
1.36 0.88 1.96
1.46 2.25 2.06 1.24 1.24 0.09 0.59 1.43 0.33
47.59 43.4 55.78
63.31 51.51 30.13 69.81 64.63 51.44 61.62 38.60 44.79
13.06 25.55 18.07 49.53 50.91 33.39 40.68 32.51 35.81
4.3 3.37 4.23
5.23 4.47 2.6 6.21 6.21 3.58 4.41 3.11 3.58
242.4 201.6 166.8 141 125.9 151.2 141.8 112.97 119.90
50 100 100 100 99.13 98.11 93.61 95.16 95.86
20.04 17.51 14.41 12.54 12.09 10.52 10.16 9.12 9.59
1.1 2.9 6.14 5.75 5.17
0.87 1.89 4.05 4.84 4.14
0.11 0.2 0.44 0.46 0.41
Sources: Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues Notes: MB = Monetary Base; PSD = Public Sector Debt which is the total of government bonds plus Treasury Bills (data for 19 1998-2003 are not available); SBI = Bank Indonesia’s Certificate which is the total of SBI 1 month, 3 month, and 6 month; GDP = Gross Domestic Product
Long-Term Sovereign Bonds
• The government began to issue long-term bonds in 1998 and a small amount of short-term Treasury bills (T-bills) in 2007. • The long-term government bonds issued in 1998-2000 were mainly for recapitalizing the collapsed domestic banks during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. Small amount of the bond was used for financing budget deficit that has been controlled between 1 to 2 percent of GDP. Indonesia reenter international bond markets in 2004 and Samurai bond market in 2008. • The law bans BI to buy long-term government bonds in primary market. They are also not being used by the 20 central bank as an instrument for OMO.
Non-Market Instrument
• In 1987 and 1991 the Minister of Finance gave orders to transfer large amounts of deposits owned by the government agencies and large state-owned enterprises at state-owned banks to central bank. The transfer immediately reduced stock of monetary based without cost to the central bank. • At that time, government sector’s deposits at central bank were unremunerated. The cost of such operation was borne by the owners of the deposits and the banks that lost funding. Such a non-market intervention affects the efficiency of resource allocation. 21
Balance Sheet of Bank Indonesia
• As shown in Table 4, there are two major items on the asset side of central bank’s balance sheet, namely: – foreign exchange reserves, and – domestic credit of the central bank to (a) buy government securities; (b) provide loans and discounts to commercial banks and (c) others. • The are three kinds of central bank liabilities, namely: – monetary liability, which is currency in circulation. By law the central bank has a monopoly right to print money and receives seigniorage from it, which is the difference between the face value of the money and its production cost; – non-monetary liabilities such as central bank securities (SBI). The central bank pays interest on its securities; – deposits owned by (a) the government, (b) commercial banks 22 (including required reserves and excess reserves) and (c) others.
Table 4 Bank Indonesia’s balance sheet
Assets (Sources of Monetary Base) Foreign Exchange Reserves
Liabilities (Uses of Monetary Base) Currency in circulation
Domestic credit
Government securities Loans and discounts to banks Net other assets
Central bank securities (SBI)
Deposits Government Commercial banks Others Equity capital
Monetary base (sources)
Monetary base (uses)
23
Impacts of sterilization operation on BI’s balance sheet
• Sterilization operation of BI alters the composition of its balance sheet. It buys foreign currency either by crediting commercial banks balance sheet at BI or issuing new Rupiah, the domestic currency. To mop up the liquidity BI selling SBI, the main monetary instrument at its disposal. • At the end of transaction, the stock of both foreign exchange reserve and SBI increase by the same amount. In the process, BI exchanges SBI, its high cost interest bearing non-monetary liability, with foreign currency assets that, at present, earn much lower yields. 24
Expensive Cost of Sterilization Operation
• Graph 4 shows the rising cost of financial costs of open market operation for BI as it mops up more liquidity. • The central bank has to: • issue more interest bearing security (SBI); • pay interest rates to larger amounts of FASBI and FTO; • invest more in foreign portfolio that earns low returns. The decline in the exchange value of the US dollar further reduces the earnings from portfolio denominated in that currency; • sell foreign currencies at lower rates. • The larger financial losses from holding bigger foreign assets negatively affect liquidity position of the central bank that may erodes the equity capital of BI from the minimum Rp2 trillion.
25
Expensive Cost Of Sterilization
• In 2009, Bank Indonesia suffered from losses of Rp1.1 trillion as compared to a surplus of Rp28 trillion in 2008. Around 73 percent of Bank Indonesia’s outlays in 2009 was for monetary operation, around 13 percent each for payment system and general expenses and the other 0.5 percent for bank regulation and supervision. • The central bank law says that the government injects additional capital to meet the minimum capital requirement. • Recapitalization, however, tarnishes reputation and 26 independency of the central bank.
Graph 4 Increasing cost of OMO
OMO Outstanding, 2000 - Apr 2011 (in billions Rupiah)
600.000
500.000
400.000
FTO SBIS/Wadiah
300.000
FASBI
SBI 9 bulan SBI 6 bulan SBI 3 bulan SBI 1 bulan
200.000
100.000
Mei-00 Mei-02 Mei-03 Mei-04 Mei-05 Mei-06 Mei-07 Mei-08 Mei-09 Sep-00 Sep-01 Sep-02 Sep-03 Sep-04 Sep-05 Sep-06 Sep-07 Sep-08 Sep-09 Mei-10
Mei-01
Sep-10
Jan-03
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
Jan-09
Jan-10
Sources: Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues
Jan-11
27
Recommendation
• There are a number of policies can be introduced to alter capital flows composition towards longer maturity, such as:
i. privatization of infrastructure to allow private sector participation (PPP) in this sector; ii. to issue long-term bonds for financing modernization and expansion of the existing infrastructure facilities such as electricity, road, seaport, airport, drinking water and waste treatments; iii. to establish Export Processing Zones (EPZ) particularly on Java to create employment for the 28 surplus uneducated and unskilled labor force.
References:
•
• • • • •
•
Bergsten, Fred C.2010. “A Proposal Strategy to Correct the Chinese Exchange Rate”, Testimony before Hearing on the Treasury Department’s Report on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, US Senate. September 16. Calvo, G . And C.M. Reinhart. 2002. “Fear of Floating”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 117:379-408. Cecchetti, Stephen G and Piti Disyatat. 2010. “Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages”. Federal Reserve Bank of NY Economic Policy Review. 16(1): 29-42. Gochocco-Bautista, Maria S, J. Jongwanich and J-W. Lee. 2010. How Effective are Capital Controls in Asia?. ADB Working Paper Series No. 224. October. Rodrik, Dani. 2010. “Making Room for China in the World Economy”. Papers and Proceedings of the 122 Annual Meeting of the AEA, Atlanta, Ga., January 4-6, 2010. AER: 89-93. Ruiz-Arranz, Marta and Milan Zavadjil. 2008. Are Emerging Asia’s Reserves Really Too High? IMF Working Paper. No. WP/08/192. August. Schaechter, Andrea. 2001. Implementation of Monetary Policy and the Central Bank Balance Sheet. IMF Working Paper No; WP/01/149. October.
29
Terima Kasih
30
June 16, 2011
1
BOP Surplus
• After suffering from a deficit in 2008, the BOP of Indonesia turned to a surplus since Q1-2009 because of surplus in both current account and capital and financial account (Table 1); • The surplus in current account is partly because of export boom due to increasing demand for energy, primary commodities and food in high-growth China and India; • Except in 2005 and 2008, the amount of portfolio investment is larger than that of long term (FDI); • Inflows of short-term capital are mainly through portfolio investment and corporate sector rather than banks. Banks are subject to foreign exchange Net Open Position at 20 percent of their capital; • Short-term capital inflows are attracted by a relatively high growth rate of the Indonesia economy and high interest rate disparity 2 between Indonesia and international markets (Graph-1).
Table 1. Indonesia: Balance of Payments, 2005 - 2010 (billions of USD unless otherwise stated)
Table 1. Indonesia: Balance of Payments, 2005 - 2010 (billions of USD unless otherwise stated)
2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Balance of payments Current account Goods balance Services balance Net income & transfers Capital & financial account
2009 Q4 Q1 4.0 3.5 1.8 1.6 6.2 -2.5 -1.9 2.4 2.1 Q2 -1.0 0.8 2.5 1.9 8.4 Q3 3.5 2.4 2.2 1.5 8.5 Q4 3.9 2.6 3.7 2.4 11.4 -4.5 -3.2 1.3 0.8 Q1 6.6 4.0 2.0 1.2 8.8 -3.6 -3.2 4.8 2.9 Q2 5.4 3.1 1.8 1.0 8.6 -3.4 -3.4 4.4 2.5
2010 Q3 6.9 3.8 1.3 0.7 9.1 -3.9 -3.9 6.5 3.5 Q4 11.3 6.1 1.1 0.6 9.2 -2.8 -5.3 9.6 5.2
2011 Q1 7.7 4.0 1.9 1.0 8.4 -2.2 -4.3 6.2 3.3
2010 30.3 4.3 6.3 0.9 31.1 -9.5 -15.3 26.2 3.7
Q1 1.0 0.8 2.8 2.3 7.5 -3.0 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2
Q2 1.3 1.0
Q3
0.6 0.3
13.9 14.1 3.8 3.0 3.3 2.4 10.9 10.5
-1.8 10.4 -0.4 0.3 0.1 2.1 10.2 2.0
-0.1 -4.2 -0.1 -3.8
% GDP 0.2 % GDP 0.1
-1.0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 5.4 5.8 4.2 -3.3 -3.2 -3.3 -3.1 -3.5 -1.6 2.5 1.9 0.9 0.6 -4.1 -3.7
17.5 29.7 32.8 22.9 34.5 -9.1 -8.1 0.3 -9.9 -11.8 -12.7 -13.8 -8.9 -10.4 -9.9 -10.5 3.0 0.8 3.6 0.8 -2.1 -0.4 4.4 3.2
-3.3 -3.5 -2.6 -2.8 -1.8 -1.4 2.5 1.7
% GDP 0.1
Direct investment (net)
Inflows Outflows Portfolio investment (net) Assets, net Liablilities, net Other investment Government Private Reserves
5.3
8.3 -3.1 4.2 -1.1 5.3 -9.4 -0.8 -8.6
2.2
4.9 -2.7 4.3 -1.8 6.1 -3.8 -2.5 -1.3
2.3
6.9 -4.7 5.6 -4.4 10.0 -4.8 -2.4 -2.4
2.0
7.9 -5.9 1.7 -1.3 3.0 -1.4
4.2
6.4 -2.2 10.3 -0.1 10.4 1.5
9.8
12.7 -2.9 15.2 -0.5 15.7 1.2 -0.2 1.4 96.2
-0.3
1.5 -1.7 2.0 2.8 -3.2 -0.4 -0.6 59
0.6
2.0
0.4
1.9
1.3
2.5
2.7
3.5 -0.8 1.9 0.1 1.8 -2.3 -0.1 -0.9
0.4
1.4
0.5
1.0
0.6
0.5
2.3
2.9 -0.6 6.2 -0.4 6.6 -3.7 0.1 -3.8
2.0
3.3 -1.3 1.1 -0.1 1.2 1.3 -0.9 2.2
2.5
3.4 -0.9 6.1 -0.1 6.2 -2.1 -0.4 -1.7
4.2
4.3 -0.1 1.4 -0.4 1.8 3.8 1.4 2.4 96.2
3.0
4.5 -1.5 3.6 -0.6 4.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 105.7
-1.4 -1.5 -1.2 4.16 0.04 -4.5 4.1 -2.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 -4.0 -1.1 0.5 -1.5
-1.0 -0.5 0.06 1.9 0.4 1.5 -2.0 3.0 -0.3 3.3 3.1 3.5 -0.3 3.8 -2.8 0.5 -3.3
-0.8 0.06 -0.06 -0.5
-6.2 -10.1 -4.7 -10.3
-4.1 -0.9 -2.1 -4.0
-1.5 -0.1
34.7 42.6 56.9 51.6 66.1
59.5 57.1 51.6
54.8 57.6 62.3 66.1
71.8 76.3 86.5
Sources: Bank Indonesia. Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues Bank Indonesia. Indonesia Balance of Payments Report, various issues
3
IMF. International Financial Statistics, various issues
10
15
20
25
0
5
Graph 1. Interest Rate Disparities
-5
Graph 1 Interest Rate Disparities
Jan-00 Apr-00 Jul-00 Okt-00 Jan-01 Apr-01 Jul-01 Okt-01 Jan-02 Apr-02 Jul-02 Okt-02 Jan-03 Apr-03 Jul-03 Okt-03 Jan-04 Apr-04 Jul-04 Okt-04 Jan-05 Apr-05 Jul-05 Okt-05 Jan-06 Apr-06 Jul-06 Okt-06 Jan-07 Apr-07 Jul-07 Okt-07 Jan-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Okt-08 Jan-09 Apr-09 Jul-09 Okt-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Okt-10 Jan-11
4
INA-JPN INA-USA INA-SGP
Appreciation of the Rupiah
• The surge of short-term capital inflows and surplus in BOP have :
caused upward pressures on the Rupiah appreciation both in nominal and real terms; ii. driven asset prices bubbles in the narrow and shallow financial markets; iii. encouraged excessive risk taking by domestic corporate sector and banks that borrow from overseas and; iv. eroded monetary autonomy to manage exchange rate, interest rate and attain the inflation targeting. • Graph 2a shows that NEER of the Rupiah appreciated by 7.03 percent between June 2005 and June 2010 while its REER eroded during the same period (Graph 2b). • The strengthening of the Rupiah has caused the Dutch disease to 5 Indonesian economy. i.
Graph 2a Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, 2005-2010
140
120
100
80 NEER Rupiah 60
NEER RMB
40
20
0
6
20
40
60
80
Graph 2b Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
100
120
140
0
Real Effective Exchange Rate 2005 - Apr 2011
Jan-05 Mar-05 Mei-05 Jul-05 Sep-05 Nop-05 Jan-06 Mar-06 Mei-06 Jul-06 Sep-06 Nop-06 Jan-07 Mar-07 Mei-07 Jul-07 Sep-07 Nop-07 Jan-08 Mar-08 Mei-08 Jul-08 Sep-08 Nop-08 Jan-09 Mar-09 Mei-09 Jul-09 Sep-09 Nop-09 Jan-10 Mar-10 Mei-10 Jul-10 Sep-10 Nop-10 Jan-11 Mar-11
REER RMB
REER Rupiah
7
Costs of the Dutch disease
• There are four costs of the Rupiah appreciation to Indonesia economy, namely: – erodes external competitiveness of the economy. Competitiveness of Indonesian economy further eroded due to undervaluation of the Chinese RMB, inadequate infrastructure and bad investment and business climate; – reduces efficiency of the economy as the stronger Rupiah provides incentive for mobility of resources from more productive traded sector economy to less productive non-traded sector. The shift ignites bubble of assets including land and property markets. Traditional policy instrument such as high interest rate may dampen the bubble but exacerbate the imbalance and capital inflows; – creates regional disparity as the booming natural resources are mainly produced off Java island while the affected agriculture and manufacturing sectors are primarily located on the labor surplus island of Java; – make financial system less efficient and encourage them to take excessive risks as their source of funding are more relied on seemingly low cost foreign 8 borrowings.
Limited Capability To Sterilize And Control The Capital Inflows
• Partly due to the narrowness and shallowness of Indonesia’s money and capital markets and their less integration with global markets, Bank Indonesia alone has a limited capability to either:
i. ii. iii. iv. reduce the volume of capital inflows; alter the composition of capital flows towards longer maturities; reduce the exchange rate pressures to avoid the Dutch disease; maintain independent monetary policy.
• In addition, the financial costs of sterilization operation are also high for the central bank as well as the opportunity costs for the whole economy. BI buy the foreign currency by issuing SBI at 6.75 percent interest rate and invest the reserve mainly in the US Government bonds that earn very low yields at 3 percent. The high opportunity costs are the forgone returns on development projects, including infrastructure. • Another issue associated with portfolio in foreign currencies is the potential 9 losses from currency appreciation.
Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves
• Under the IMF Program in 1997-2003, Indonesia shifted to independent floating in 1997, supported by inflation targeting as a monetary policy operating strategy. This means that an exchange rate target is no longer used as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. • In theory, flexible exchange rate requires a smaller war chest of foreign reserves as the system reduces the need for market intervention. The need for self-insurance is also reduced with the availability of credit in case of need after the revision of the IMF conditionality, multilateralization of Chiang Mai Initiative and bilateral currency swap agreements between central banks. • In reality, for a number of reasons, Indonesia and other Asian countries accumulating large international reserves following the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. Table 1 shows that during the past ten years, 2000-2010 nominal value of the reserve position of Indonesia has risen more than double, although the percentage share of GDP has gone down from 15 percent of GDP in 2003 and 12 percent in the second quarter of 2010 10 (Table 2).
Table 2 - Foreign Reserve and Currency in Circulation, 1998-2011
Year MB Foreign Reserve as % of PSD SBI GDP Currency in Circulation as % Inflation Shortof (%) Run Interest MB PSD GDP Rate (%) 64.57 71.29 71.41 71.42 71.19 67.73 63.62 60.42 60.11 58.17 76.7 69.39 50.19 47.02 13.97 31.56 36.23 42.64 45.81 49.79 45.81 45.64 39.22 5.08 6.6 6.45 5.54 5.4 5.6 5.53 5.22 5.35 5.59 5.34 4.97 4.05 3.76 59.55 2.13 8.99 11.91 9.62 4.4 6.23 16.21 6.41 6.41 11.16 2.75 6.96 5.98 39.68 12.52 13.59 17.85 12.45 8.55 7.42 13.44 9.63 7.79 11.49 6.7 6.06 6.10
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011*
316.8 208.8 197.1 225 215.8 187 162.8 140.5 131.3 137.1 145.3 170.8 168.7 186.2
38.58 80.74 84.28 93.15 108 94.32 112.8 153.36 155.3
556.4 337.1 414.1 518.3 386.9 295.4 316 466.5 188.1 212.1 282.5 277.2 437.00 415.7
24.9 19.32 17.81 17.46 16.37 15.46 14.14 12.15 11.68 13.17 10.12 12.24 13.61 14.9
Sources: Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues; International Financial Statistics, May 2011 issue. Notes: MB = Monetary Base; PSD = Public Sector Debt which is the total of government bonds plus Treasury Bills (data for 1998-2003 are not available), and 11Rate = Shariah Base Government Bonds issued in international market; SBI = Bank Indonesia’s Certificate; GDP = Gross Domestic Product; Short-Run Interest JIBOR 1 Month *Data MB, PSD, SBI using April data; GDP denominator using GDP data in 2010; Inflation using May data; interest rate and currency using Feb data
Fear of Floating (1)
• There are least four reasons why emerging economies, including Indonesia, accumulating large international reserves (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000 and Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil, 2008). • First, as tools for intervention in the exchange market to avoid large exchange rate fluctuations and prevent adverse impacts on their economies. Graph 3 shows large proportions of both the Rupiah denominated SBI and SUN (government bonds) owned by foreign investors. This is because domestic institutional investors (such as insurance companies and pension funds) are at the early stage in Indonesia. Unlike in Japan, Indonesia has no Postal Savings that can mobilize low cost domestic saving to absorb the sovereign bonds. The second biggest holders of SBI and SUN are the domestic bank. • The crises at the peripheries of the euro zone indicates that securities denominated in domestic currencies are shielded from 12 currency risk but not from interest rate risks.
150.000
200.000
250.000
100.000
50.000
-
Graph 3 Foreign Ownership of SUN and SBI
Sources: Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues
Foreign Ownership of Government Bonds (SUN) and SBI (in billions Rupiah)
Feb-04 Apr-04 Jun-04 Agust-04 Okt-04 Des-04 Feb-05 Apr-05 Jun-05 Agust-05 Okt-05 Des-05 Feb-06 Apr-06 Jun-06 Agust-06 Okt-06 Des-06 Feb-07 Apr-07 Jun-07 Agust-07 Okt-07 Des-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Jun-08 Agust-08 Okt-08 Des-08 Feb-09 Apr-09 Jun-09 Agust-09 Okt-09 Des-09 Feb-10 Apr-10 Jun-10
13
SBI
SUN
Fear of Floating (2)
• The second reason for accumulating foreign exchange reserves is to prepare for a defense against speculative attack and foreign exchange instability due to shortfalls in exports and capital flow reversals. • Third, the less volatile exchange rate minimizes currency risks and provides incentives for overseas borrowing, particularly when international interest rates are lower than domestic interest rates. • The fourth reason is to provide for a fiscal space when facing economic crisis. Because they were treated badly when they sought help during the crisis in 1997, Asian countries are quite reluctant to turn to the IMF.
14
Tools For Controlling And Mopping Up Short-Term Capital
• There are three groups of tools have been used by Bank Indonesia and government to indirectly discourage and mop up capital inflows, namely: – regular prudential rules of the banking system; – market instruments to influence interbank money market and to do sterilization operation by buying foreign currency to accumulate foreign exchange reserves; – non-market instrument; • The first group of policy instruments include i. reserve requirement ratio ii. NOP (net open position), which is now 20 percent of bank’ capital iii. limiting LDR (loan-to-deposit ratio) to raise cost of banking operation funded by foreign borrowings. 15
Reserve Requirement
• For a number of reasons, reserve requirement gained popularity in emerging economies with narrow and shallow money and capital markets, such as Indonesia. • The first reason is because the reserve requirement system can be effectively used to reduce the volume of capital inflows and to alter their composition towards longer maturities. To control capital inflows, in 1990, Chile imposed 20 percent non remunerated reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank for a period of one year on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing firms. • Second, because it can be used as a tool to slow down the growth of bank credit. For this objective, BI raised the reserve requirement ratio of Rupiah deposit from 5 % to 7.5% in 2008 and now 8 percent. • Third, it can complement monetary policy as raising reserve requirement is a substitute for raising interest rates to dampen bubble in the real estate sector. • Fourth, the reserve requirement can be used to contain liquidity risks particularly during the downswing. • On the negative side, however, the reserve requirement taxes the banking system that encourages market disintermediation. 16 • To ease the financial cost of the reserve requirement, starting from 2008, BI offers remuneration at below market interest rate.
Market Instruments (1)
• The market based tools at BI disposal are: – SBI (Bank Indonesia’s certificate of deposits); – FASBI, remunerated overnight placement of banks’ excess liquidity at the central bank; – FTO (fine tuning operations). • SBI is the primary money market instrument available for open market operation to sterilize the short-term capital inflow. The maturities of SBIs are ranging from 1 month to 12 months.
17
Market Instruments (1)
• To prolong placement of short-term capitals in Indonesian securities, BI requires to hold SBI at least for 1 month. In addition, the central bank stop issuing SBI for 1 and 3 months and replace them with term deposits with same maturity; • At present, Indonesia has neither put a limit on access of foreign investors to domestic securities nor imposed taxes on foreign capital inflows nor exit levy on capital outflow. • The proportion of government bonds (SUN), T-bills, SBI and FASBI to monetary base and GDP are, respectively, shown in Table 3.
18
Table 3 – Money Market Instruments, 1998-2009
Government Bonds FASBI as % of Year 1998 1999 MB PSD GDP MB 56.93 61.94 SBI as % of PSD GDP 4.47 5.73 MB as % of PSD GDP MB T-Bills as % of PSD GDP -
2000 2001 2002
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
15 11.3 25.77
17.72 25.94 23.86 13.99 12.89 1.23 8.21 17.76 4.18
3.66 12.87 14.31 9.93 10.15 0.8 5.42 14.96 3.35
1.36 0.88 1.96
1.46 2.25 2.06 1.24 1.24 0.09 0.59 1.43 0.33
47.59 43.4 55.78
63.31 51.51 30.13 69.81 64.63 51.44 61.62 38.60 44.79
13.06 25.55 18.07 49.53 50.91 33.39 40.68 32.51 35.81
4.3 3.37 4.23
5.23 4.47 2.6 6.21 6.21 3.58 4.41 3.11 3.58
242.4 201.6 166.8 141 125.9 151.2 141.8 112.97 119.90
50 100 100 100 99.13 98.11 93.61 95.16 95.86
20.04 17.51 14.41 12.54 12.09 10.52 10.16 9.12 9.59
1.1 2.9 6.14 5.75 5.17
0.87 1.89 4.05 4.84 4.14
0.11 0.2 0.44 0.46 0.41
Sources: Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues Notes: MB = Monetary Base; PSD = Public Sector Debt which is the total of government bonds plus Treasury Bills (data for 19 1998-2003 are not available); SBI = Bank Indonesia’s Certificate which is the total of SBI 1 month, 3 month, and 6 month; GDP = Gross Domestic Product
Long-Term Sovereign Bonds
• The government began to issue long-term bonds in 1998 and a small amount of short-term Treasury bills (T-bills) in 2007. • The long-term government bonds issued in 1998-2000 were mainly for recapitalizing the collapsed domestic banks during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. Small amount of the bond was used for financing budget deficit that has been controlled between 1 to 2 percent of GDP. Indonesia reenter international bond markets in 2004 and Samurai bond market in 2008. • The law bans BI to buy long-term government bonds in primary market. They are also not being used by the 20 central bank as an instrument for OMO.
Non-Market Instrument
• In 1987 and 1991 the Minister of Finance gave orders to transfer large amounts of deposits owned by the government agencies and large state-owned enterprises at state-owned banks to central bank. The transfer immediately reduced stock of monetary based without cost to the central bank. • At that time, government sector’s deposits at central bank were unremunerated. The cost of such operation was borne by the owners of the deposits and the banks that lost funding. Such a non-market intervention affects the efficiency of resource allocation. 21
Balance Sheet of Bank Indonesia
• As shown in Table 4, there are two major items on the asset side of central bank’s balance sheet, namely: – foreign exchange reserves, and – domestic credit of the central bank to (a) buy government securities; (b) provide loans and discounts to commercial banks and (c) others. • The are three kinds of central bank liabilities, namely: – monetary liability, which is currency in circulation. By law the central bank has a monopoly right to print money and receives seigniorage from it, which is the difference between the face value of the money and its production cost; – non-monetary liabilities such as central bank securities (SBI). The central bank pays interest on its securities; – deposits owned by (a) the government, (b) commercial banks 22 (including required reserves and excess reserves) and (c) others.
Table 4 Bank Indonesia’s balance sheet
Assets (Sources of Monetary Base) Foreign Exchange Reserves
Liabilities (Uses of Monetary Base) Currency in circulation
Domestic credit
Government securities Loans and discounts to banks Net other assets
Central bank securities (SBI)
Deposits Government Commercial banks Others Equity capital
Monetary base (sources)
Monetary base (uses)
23
Impacts of sterilization operation on BI’s balance sheet
• Sterilization operation of BI alters the composition of its balance sheet. It buys foreign currency either by crediting commercial banks balance sheet at BI or issuing new Rupiah, the domestic currency. To mop up the liquidity BI selling SBI, the main monetary instrument at its disposal. • At the end of transaction, the stock of both foreign exchange reserve and SBI increase by the same amount. In the process, BI exchanges SBI, its high cost interest bearing non-monetary liability, with foreign currency assets that, at present, earn much lower yields. 24
Expensive Cost of Sterilization Operation
• Graph 4 shows the rising cost of financial costs of open market operation for BI as it mops up more liquidity. • The central bank has to: • issue more interest bearing security (SBI); • pay interest rates to larger amounts of FASBI and FTO; • invest more in foreign portfolio that earns low returns. The decline in the exchange value of the US dollar further reduces the earnings from portfolio denominated in that currency; • sell foreign currencies at lower rates. • The larger financial losses from holding bigger foreign assets negatively affect liquidity position of the central bank that may erodes the equity capital of BI from the minimum Rp2 trillion.
25
Expensive Cost Of Sterilization
• In 2009, Bank Indonesia suffered from losses of Rp1.1 trillion as compared to a surplus of Rp28 trillion in 2008. Around 73 percent of Bank Indonesia’s outlays in 2009 was for monetary operation, around 13 percent each for payment system and general expenses and the other 0.5 percent for bank regulation and supervision. • The central bank law says that the government injects additional capital to meet the minimum capital requirement. • Recapitalization, however, tarnishes reputation and 26 independency of the central bank.
Graph 4 Increasing cost of OMO
OMO Outstanding, 2000 - Apr 2011 (in billions Rupiah)
600.000
500.000
400.000
FTO SBIS/Wadiah
300.000
FASBI
SBI 9 bulan SBI 6 bulan SBI 3 bulan SBI 1 bulan
200.000
100.000
Mei-00 Mei-02 Mei-03 Mei-04 Mei-05 Mei-06 Mei-07 Mei-08 Mei-09 Sep-00 Sep-01 Sep-02 Sep-03 Sep-04 Sep-05 Sep-06 Sep-07 Sep-08 Sep-09 Mei-10
Mei-01
Sep-10
Jan-03
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
Jan-09
Jan-10
Sources: Indonesia Financial Statistics, various issues
Jan-11
27
Recommendation
• There are a number of policies can be introduced to alter capital flows composition towards longer maturity, such as:
i. privatization of infrastructure to allow private sector participation (PPP) in this sector; ii. to issue long-term bonds for financing modernization and expansion of the existing infrastructure facilities such as electricity, road, seaport, airport, drinking water and waste treatments; iii. to establish Export Processing Zones (EPZ) particularly on Java to create employment for the 28 surplus uneducated and unskilled labor force.
References:
•
• • • • •
•
Bergsten, Fred C.2010. “A Proposal Strategy to Correct the Chinese Exchange Rate”, Testimony before Hearing on the Treasury Department’s Report on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, US Senate. September 16. Calvo, G . And C.M. Reinhart. 2002. “Fear of Floating”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 117:379-408. Cecchetti, Stephen G and Piti Disyatat. 2010. “Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages”. Federal Reserve Bank of NY Economic Policy Review. 16(1): 29-42. Gochocco-Bautista, Maria S, J. Jongwanich and J-W. Lee. 2010. How Effective are Capital Controls in Asia?. ADB Working Paper Series No. 224. October. Rodrik, Dani. 2010. “Making Room for China in the World Economy”. Papers and Proceedings of the 122 Annual Meeting of the AEA, Atlanta, Ga., January 4-6, 2010. AER: 89-93. Ruiz-Arranz, Marta and Milan Zavadjil. 2008. Are Emerging Asia’s Reserves Really Too High? IMF Working Paper. No. WP/08/192. August. Schaechter, Andrea. 2001. Implementation of Monetary Policy and the Central Bank Balance Sheet. IMF Working Paper No; WP/01/149. October.
29
Terima Kasih
30
