Arrest

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

ARREST

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I. NATURE AND DEFINITION
Arrest – the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1 Rule 113).
ARREST; HOW MADE.
An arrest is made by:
a. an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or
b. by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
NOTE: No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest.
The person arrested shall not be subject to greater restraint than it is for
his detention. (Rule 113 Sec 2)
DAVID ET AL VS. GMA ET AL
GR NO 171396 (2006)
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation
celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a
state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: “The
President.
.
.
whenever
it
becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces
to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout
the
Philippines,
prevent
or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated

by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that
the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some
military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
People’s Army, and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo.They considered
the aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reins of government as a
clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested
without warrants on February 24, 2006 on
their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of
the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was
perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched
without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on
February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises –
in the absence of any official of the Daily
Tribune except the security guard of the
building

were
several
materials
for
publication. The law enforcers, a composite
team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of
the warrantless arrests and the warrantless
search
and
seizure
was
Presidential
Proclamation 1017 issued by then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her
constitutional power to call out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or
suppress lawless violence.
ISSUE/S:
1. Were
the
warrantless
arrests
of
petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP
1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure
on
the Daily
Tribune’s offices
conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
RULING:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

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1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners
David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were
NOT valid.
[S]earches,
seizures
and
arrests
are normally unreasonable unless authorized
by a validly issued search warrant or warrant
of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the
following circumstances of valid warrantless
arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested
has
committed,
is
actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor
hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies
petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During
the inquest for the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the
arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing
t-shirts
with
the
invective “Oust
Gloria
Now”and their erroneous assumption that
petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor
ordered his immediate release on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject
t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact
is insufficient to charge him with inciting to
sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on
the Daily Tribune’s officesconducted pursuant
to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune
premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the
steps in the conduct of search and seizure.
Section 4 requires that a search warrant be
issued upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offence to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or
any other premise be made in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality.
And Section 9 states that the warrant must
direct that it be served in the daytime, unless
the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the day or night. All these rules
were violated by the CIDG operatives.
SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIOU
227 SCRA 637 (1993)
FACTS:
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested
the filing of appropriate charges against several
persons, including the petitioner, in connection with
the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing
of Allan Gomez.
acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors
of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez
was not present but was represented by his counsel,
Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting
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him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim
in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in
the morning of August 13,1993, and he was
immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was
positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III
Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions
implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of
Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner
was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the
Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted
an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador
Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on
Sanchez. This warrant was issued in connection with
Criminal Cases for violation of Section 8, in relation
to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith
taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame,
where he remains confined.
The respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations
charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio
Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George
Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued
a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including
the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently
expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said
cases might result in a miscarriage of justice. SC
thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the
seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were
raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven information were
amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an
aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to
quash the information substantially on the grounds
now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993,
after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied
the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of
injunction.
ISSUES:
WON the arrest of Sanchez was legal- YES (by virtue
of the jurisdiction subsequently acquired)
RULING:
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody
in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the
same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of
arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an
intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other and an intent onthe part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation
issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him
to appear at the said camp for investigation.
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a highranking military official and the investigation of
Sanchez was to be made at a military camp.
Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a
command or an order of arrest that the petitioner
could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently
cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest
(and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the
officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No.
7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are
applicable even to a person not formally arrested
but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente
Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status"
after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan
as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Respondent Zuño himself acknowledged during the
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August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of the
sworn statements of the two state witnesses,
petitioner had been "arrested."
His arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court,
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not
present when the petitioner allegedly participated in
the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal
knowledge that the petitioner was responsible
therefor because the basis of the arrest was the
sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan.
Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta
allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or
forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot
be said that the offense had "in fact just been
committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was
doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial
Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it
issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other
accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It
was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless
legal.
Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102
Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge
authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a
person
suffering
imprisonment
under
lawful
judgment.

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
PEOPLE VS SEQUINO
264 SCRA 79 (1996)
FACTS:
The witnesses present by the prosecution in its
evidence in chief were Eugenio Godinez, Jimmy
Serafin, police officers Elpidio Luna, Alfredo Mondigo
and Mario Remulta, Dr. Arturo Sormillon, Lt. Myrna
Areola, Emilio Daclan, Atty. Perpetua Socorro
Belarmino, and Presentacion vda. de Broniola, while
Olympio Lozano was presented as rebuttal witness.
Only the accused testified in their defense.
PEOPLE: Eugenio Godinez, overseer since 1952 of
Hacienda Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro
Broniola, the hacienda's bookkeeper, went to the
Medellin Rural Bank to withdraw P50,557.17 The
bank's cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and
motorcycle driver of the bank, to drive Godinez and
Broniola back to the hacienda on one of the bank's
motorcycles. Serafin drove the motorcycle with
Godinez behind him and Broniola behind Godinez.
Godinez carried the money in a money bag which he
hung over his left shoulder.
As the three were in nearing the hacienda, the
accused, armed with guns, tried to block their path
and ordered them to stop. Godinez heard a gunshot.
Broniola had fallen off the motorcycle. Serafin leapt
from the motorcycle and ran away. The motorcycle
toppled over Godinez, pinning him to the ground.
Accused Tumangan, with gun in hand, approached
Godinez, took the money from the money bag, and
fled on foot with his co-accused. With the assailants
gone, Godinez ran home, leaving Broniola behind. 8
Meanwhile, Serafin had proceeded to the house of
the Broniolas, which was near the crime scene, and
informed Broniola's wife of the incident. 9
SPO Elpidio Luna, Luna went to the crime scene
where he found an abandoned motorcycle. People
who by then had milled around the site informed
Luna "that the culprit had already fled." Luna noticed
that the "bushes were compressed" and found "a
piece of paper utilized as toilet paper with a stool on
it [which] was somewhat newly delivered." The
paper was a bio-data sheet 1with the name "
Melvida, Nenito" and the entry for the father's name

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
filled in with "Elpidio Melvida." (EEEEWWW)
Page | 5
After finding Nenito Melvida,Luna asked Melvida to
go with him to the barangay captain's house.
Melvida hesitated at first, but his companions
prevailed upon him to go with Luna.
The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took
Melvida to the police station instead. Melvida was
kept at the station the whole evening of 24 April
1991 for investigation conducted, first, by Luna,
then, by his fellow policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl.
Alfredo Mondigo and Eliseo Tepait, as Luna had to
take his supper. Melvida was allowed to go home the
next day, but only after the police had filed criminal
charges against him he had posted bail. Melvida was
not assisted by counsel during the police
investigation, although Luna assured the trial judge
that the Municipal Mayor of Medellin, who is a
lawyer, was present, While Luna claimed he asked
the Mayor to act as Melvida's counsel, he admitted
that this request did not appear in the record of the
investigation. Luna's investigation of Melvida was
not reduced into writing.
In the course of Luna's investigation, Melvida
admitted that he kept "his share from the loot" in his
house. Melvida then was brought to his house where
he got P9,000.00, in one hundred peso bills, placed
inside a shoe which he delivered to the policemen.
During the investigation conducted by SPO3 Alfredo
Mondigo, Melvida admitted that his (Melvida's)
companions during the robbery were Vicente
Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequiño, Immediately,
Mondigo
and
policeman
Proniely
Artiquela
proceeded to the house of Hones where they saw
Tumangan and Sequiño on the porch. Noticing
something bulging on the waist of Tumangan,
Mondigo and Artiquela approached Tumangan and
asked him what was that bulging at his waist.
Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the
bulge which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires
Bingham revolver with holster and four bullets.
When ask if he had a license for the firearm,
Tumangan answered in the negative. Mondigo and
Artiquela then brought Tumangan and Sequiño to
the police station. Tumangan was then investigated
in the presence of the Municipal Mayor. Tumangan

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
admitted that he was one of the hold uppers.
Mondigo further declared that the police recovered
P22,526.00, but could not explain any further how
the recovery was made and from whom. As to this
amount, SPO1 Mariano Remulta, property custodian
of the Medellin PNP station, merely declared that he
was entrusted with the P22,526.00 which, according
to the station commander, was "recovered in
connection with the highway robbery case."
The defense interposed alibi and denial and
suggested a frame-up for their exculpation.
The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's
evidence and in its decision it found the accuseds
guilty of robbery with homicide
ISSUES: Was there an arrest of the accused?
YES; Is it valid? NO Are the admissions during
the investigations valid? NO
Regardless of Luna's claim to the contrary, accused
Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest "is the taking
of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense,"
44 and it is made "by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest." 4Melvida's
voluntarily going with Luna upon the latter's
"invitation" was a submission to Luna's custody, and
Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the
robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being
held to answer for the commission of the said
offense.
Since he was arrested without a warrant, the inquiry
must now be whether a valid warrantless arrest was
effected. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure . There was NO valid warrantless arrest in
this case.
Luna had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
Melvida's guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable
suspicion. Melvida's arrest was thus illegal.
After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent
custodial investigation. The custodial investigation
commenced when the police pinpointed Melvida as
one of the authors of the crime or had focused on
him as a suspect thereof. his brought into operation

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of the
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Constitution guaranteeing the accused's rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and his right to be
informed of these rights.
There was no showing that Melvida was ever
informed of these rights, and Luna admitted that
Melvida was not assisted by counsel during the
investigation. Indisputably, the police officers
concerned flouted these constitutional rights of
Melvida and Tumangan and deliberately disregarded
the rule regarding an investigator's duties prior to
and during custodial interrogation laid down in
Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated in a catena of
subsequent cases.
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ
217 SCRA 663 (1993)
FACTS:
An information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner
with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of
Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
An order of arrest was issued in said case against
herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the
release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1
On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte
Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in
Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," which
pertinently states in part:
“As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered
extensive physical injuries which required surgical
intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically
in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to
speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she
cannot for an extended period be on her feet
because she is still in physical pain. . . . .
On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor
Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that
she be considered as having placed herself under
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes
of the required trial and other proceedings and

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the
recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is
posting in cash be accepted.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in
the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and
that by this motion, she be considered as having
placed herself under the custody of this Honorable
Court and dispensing of her personal appearance for
now until such time she will (sic) have recovered
sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.
Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully
prayed that the warrant for her arrest be
immediately recalled.”
Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash
bond for her provisional liberty without need for her
physical appearance
On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam DefensorSantiago appeared in his office in the second floor of
the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street,
Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by
a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur
Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician.
She came and left unaided, after staying for about
fifteen minutes. "
Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution, setting the arraignment of the
accused and setting aside the court's resolution
which ordered her appearance before the deputy
clerk of the First Division of said court on or before
June 5, 1991.
In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked
that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She
contended that for her to continue remaining under
bail bond may imply to other people that she has
intentions of fleeing, an intention she would like to
prove as baseless. 7
Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and
Page | 7
the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding
with Criminal Cases for violations of RA 3019 and
libel. Consequently, a temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining
the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal
cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing
said order, took into consideration the fact that
according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally
set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to
May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving
and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of
any remedial right to meet said contingency.
The Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a)
the arraignment of petitioner until further advice
from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration
of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond
until further initiative from her through counsel.
On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and
setting aside the temporary restraining order
previously issued. The motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality
in this Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.
Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992,
the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order
against petitioner which reads as follows:
The hold departure order was issued by reason of
the announcement made by petitioner, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media,
that she would be leaving for the United States to
accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she
would be addressing Filipino communities in the
United States in line with her crusade against
election fraud and other aspects of graft and
corruption.
ISSUES:
WON respondent court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of herein petitioner – YES
HELD:
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of respondent court upon the filing of her
aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance
of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought
leave "that she be considered as having placed
herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan)
for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail
bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be
duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
considered as having placed herself under the
custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be
heard to claim otherwise for, by her own
representations, she is effectively estopped from
asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it
to exercise that jurisdiction over the afore stated
pleadings she filed therein
COJUANGCO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
300 SCRA 367 (1998)

CF: DIPLOMATIC AND PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES FROM ARREST
CONSTITUTION (1987) ART VI SEC 11: A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
RPC ART 145: Violation of parliamentary immunity. — The penalty of
prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force,
intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the National
Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from attending the meetings of the
Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest
or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

the privileges specified in Article 36, paragraph 1, in respect of
articles imported at the time of first installation.

Page | 8

ART 31:
1.

A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity
from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
a.

a real action relating to private immovable property
situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he
holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of
the mission;

b.

an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic
agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or
legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the
sending State;

c.

an action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
State outside his official functions.

2.

A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.

3.

No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic
agent except in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs (a), (b)
and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, and provided that the
measures concerned can be taken without infringing the
inviolability of his person or of his residence.

4.

The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the
receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the
sending State.

ART 37
1.

The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of
his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State,
enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles 29 to 36.

2.

Members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission,
together with members of their families forming part of their
respective households, shall, if they are not nationals of or
permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges
and immunities specified in Articles 29 to 35, except that the
immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
State specified in paragraph 1 of Article 31 shall not extend to acts
performed outside the course of their duties. They shall also enjoy

3.

Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals
of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall enjoy
immunity in respect of acts performed in the course of their duties,
exemption from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive
by reason of their employment and the exemption contained in
Article 33.

4.

Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not
nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, be
exempt from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by
reason of their employment. In other respects, they may enjoy
privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted by the
receiving State. However, the receiving State must exercise its
jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as not to interfere
unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.

VFA ART VII

PEOPLE VS SIAO
327 SCRA 463 (2000)

II. TYPES OF ARREST
A. WITH WARRANT OF ARREST
1. When and how warrant issued:
a. Constitution (1987) Art III Sec 2: The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures or
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Note:
DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURE :

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

a. personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
| 9 regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
by Page
the fiscal
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest or
b. if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of the
witness to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
PLACER VS VILLANUEVA
126 SCRA 463 (1983)
FACTS:
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court
and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima
facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
informations, respondent judge set the hearing of
the criminal cases to determine propriety of
issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing,
respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to
submit to the court affidavits of prosecution
witnesses and other documentary evidence in
support of the informations to aid him in the
exercise of his power of judicial review of the
findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners
petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel
respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They
contended that the fiscal’s certification in the
informations of the existence of probable cause
constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to
issue warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may,
for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel
the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting
affidavits
and
other
documentary
evidence
presented during thepreliminary investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification
for the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such
certification does not bind the judge to come out
with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a
mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of

judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate.
Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the
judge must satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If
on the face of the information, the judge finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s
certification and require submission of the affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion
as to existence of probable cause.
Petition dismissed
PEOPLE VS INTING
187 SCRA 788 (1983)
FACTS:
Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against
OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros
Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring
her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the
office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote
barangay and without obtaining prior permission or
clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s
complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case.
Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the
respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of
section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against
the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30,
1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of
arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and
before the accused could be arrested, the trial court
set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the
ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court
later on quashed the information. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a
Provincial Election Supervisor involving election

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial
Page | 10
Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take
cognizance of the investigation and determine
whether or not probable cause exists?
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to
conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the purpose of helping the
Judge determine probable cause and for filing an
information in court. This power is exclusive with
COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in
bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure
the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections,
failure of which would result in the frustration of the
true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of
the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in
achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing
these principles in mind, it is apparent that the
respondent
trial
court
misconstrued
the
constitutional provision when it quashed the
information filed by the Provincial Election
Supervisor.
ALLADO VS DIOKNO
232 SCRA 192 (1994)
FACTS:
On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a
discharged
Philippine
Constabulary
named
Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement
implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and
Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm
of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He accused them
as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and
slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national. Based on that confession of Umbal, a
search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios
of the RTC of Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant
issued separately raided the dwellings of police
officers who were also pointed by Umbal as the
perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and
ammunitions were found in the raid including Van
Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and
their other co-defendants were charged with illegal
possession
of
firearms
and
ammunitions,
carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and
usurpation of authority. Their case was referred by
the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.
After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto
Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant
of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the
issued warrants of arrests. They claim that Judge
Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable
cause for him to issue the warrants. They further
contend that the judge did not personally determine
the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence
where the investigation was based from.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a warrant of arrest without bail can
be set aside and the case be dismissed for lack of
probable cause even if the accused was not in the
custody of the court.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
therein from further proceeding in the case on the
ground of lack of probable cause. As with other
earlier cases resolved by the high court, the accused
is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative
relief. Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement
that the accused be in the custody of the law.
Various reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court
to accused even if they are not in the custody of the
law.
SALONGA VS CRUZ PANO

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
134 SCRA 438 (1985)

Page | 11

FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila
area in the months of August, September and
October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor
Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen
from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself
and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result
of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at
the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's
possession by police and military authorities were
several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the
birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza
held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles
suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among
those whose likenesses appeared in the group
pictures together with other guests, including Lovely.
As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely
was brought by military and police authorities to the
AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital)where he was
place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P.
Madella, under the over-all direction of General
Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and
Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr.
Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar
Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal
possession of explosives, and damage to property.
Bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila
including one which resulted in the death of an
American lady who was shopping at Rustan's
Supermarket in Makati and others which caused
injuries to a number of persons. The President's
anniversary television radio press conference was
broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely,
Romeo, was presented during the conference. The
next day, newspapers came out with almost
identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had
been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's
intensive care unit and transferred to the office of
Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for
some time. More bombs were reported to have
exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs
injured 9 people. A meeting of the General Military

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
Council was called for 6 October 1980. Minutes after
the President had finished delivering his speech
before the International Conference of the American
Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine
International Convention Center, as mall bomb
exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search,
and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against
persons, including Salonga, who were apparently
implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings
in Metro Manila. Elements of the military went to the
hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical
Center where he was confined due to his recurrent
and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed
him under arrest. The arresting officer showed
Salonga the ASSO form which however did not
specify the charge or charges against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision
when the lower courts have dropped the case
against petitioner Salonga.
HELD:
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases,
of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved
by the Bill of Rights for the individual as
constitutionally protected spheres where even the
awesome powers of Government may not enter at
will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The
Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling
constitutional
principles,
precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees. In
dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner
who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as
excessive
and,therefore,
constitutionally
void,
escaped from the provincial jail while his petition
was pending. The petition became moot because of
his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not
the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be
created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter
pursuant to the President's legislative powers under

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
martial law. Still, the Court discussed the
Page | 12
constitutional mandate on the preservation and
development of Filipino culture for national identity.
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59
SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26
petitioners were released from custody and one
withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner
was facing charges of murder, subversion, and
illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the
petition was moot and academic did not prevent the
Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
promulgating one of the most voluminous decision
sever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution
evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie
case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a
destabilization plan to overthrow the government or
as an officer or leader of any subversive
organization. The respondents have taken the
initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga.
The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the
Court will not validate the filing of an information
based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found
in the records.
LIM VS FELIX
194 SCRA 292 (19910
FACTS:
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate
Domestic
Airport,
located
at
the
municipality of Masbate province of Masbate,
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security
escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked
and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another
security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr.
survived the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the
incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary
investigation, the designated investigator filed an
amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the
court issued an order concluding that a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of named accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate
informations of murder against the twelve (12)
accused with a recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr.
and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for
change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC
of Masbate to the RTC of Makati to avoid miscarriage
of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56
presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with
the respondent court several motions and
manifestations, among others was an order be
issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records
of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted
by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the
best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its
personal determination of the existence of a
probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to
the mandatory mandate of the constitution
that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing
magistrate shall have himself been personally
convinced of such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of
merit the motions and manifestations and issued
warrants of arrest against the accused including the
petitioners herein.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant
of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation that
a probable cause exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of
the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records
of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has
not personally determined probable cause. The
determination
is
made
by
the
Provincial

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

Prosecutor.The constitutional requirement has not
Page | 13
been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR
159 SCRA 475 (1999)
FACTS:
The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert
that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest
against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the
Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants
should particularly describe the persons or things to
be seized.
ISSUE: Whether said warrant is valid
HELD: No.
Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50)
“John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature
of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long
proscribed
as
unconstitutional
and
once
anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty
of
the
subject.”[30] Clearly
violative
of
the
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest
should particularly describe the person or persons to
be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its
unidentified subjects, be voided.
WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld
and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of
the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent
that it is issued against fifty (50) “John Does.” The
respondent Judge is directed to forward to the
Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the
preliminary investigation of the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further
appropriate action.
DOJ-NPS PART VI SEC 1: Definition of probable cause as a ground
for an arrest or issuance of a warrant of arrest. - Probable cause is
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.

2. How effected
RULE 113:
Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an
arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a)
Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. — It shall be the duty of the
officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver
him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.
(3a)
Section 4. Execution of warrant. — The head of the office to whom
the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the
warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt.
Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer
to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the
judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the
warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor. (4a)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

Section 6. Time of making arrest. — An arrest may be made on any
Page
| 14
day
and at
any time of the day or night. (6)
Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. —
When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall
inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of
the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when
he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so
inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the
arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at
the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested
so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as
practicable. (7a)
PEOPLE VS LUMAYOK
139 SCRA 1 (1985)
*The confession was acquired by torturing and
maltreating the accused.
FACTS:
Lumayok was charged with the crime or Rape with
Murder for allegedly raping Gloria Belmos and killing
her to conceal the commission of the crime. (denied
by the accused) Mansueto Bemos went to the house
of Edwin Rico and told him that his daughter was
missing. The handbag of the victim was found and
some 100 meters away from it, a black comb
belonging to accused Lumayok was also found.
Eventually, the body of the victim was found. The
accused admitted to the police officer that he raped
the victim and that he killed her after. He said that
he did so because his bride-to-be (another girl) left
him. (version of the accused) -he was playing
basketball with Edwin Rico and other companions.
Edwin Rico borrowed his black comb and never
returned it (the comb found near the victim’s
handbag). He said that he went home right after and
that Edwin Rico went to his house in the evening and
asked him to help in the search for Gloria Bemos.
Edwin Rico’s group found the body of the victim.
-The policemen on a pretext that they needed Lucio
Lumayok to accompany them in buying petroleum,
invited him. He readily went with them. -He denied
the accusation regarding the rape and murder of
Gloria Bemos but he was maltreated and tortured.
-The investigating policemen burned his penis and

his pubic hair. They shaved his head and threatened
that they would get the skin off his head if he
wouldn’t tell them that he did that. They told him
that they would help him in court if he signs. -He put
his thumbmark on the paper without knowing the
contents as he was illiterate.
ISSUE: WON the admission of the accused may be
used as evidence and establishes his guilt.
HELD: No. -The accused was not informed of his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination or that
he was afforded opportunity to avail himself of
assistance of a counsel. -The purported confession is
in English and there is no mention that the question
answered by the accused had been translated by
anyone. -The confession was not submitted to the
Municipal Judge. -The following requisites were not
observed: 7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, ... . He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel
and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have
the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means-by telephone if possible- or by letter of
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall
be inadmissible in evidence. - It was a mistake for
the trial court to accept the testimony of Sanciano
Satorre saying that he burned the accused’s pubic
hair and that the accused allowed him to do so. Such
is beyond basic human instincts and the ordinary

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
normal behavior of persons. -The initial reaction of
Page | 15
the accused was to deny having committed the
crime. HE signed the confession with a thumbmark,
but denied again during trial. It goes to show that he
did not understand the confession.
PAGALUNAN VS ALBIOR
163 SCRA 332 (1988)
FACTS:
The accused, together with other men, was charged
with Robbery with Homicide with Rape. They
allegedly robbed the house of Florencio Garces in
Project 8, Quezon City and raped Dana Garces.
-Albior pleaded not guilty. After trial, the trial court
found Albior guilty and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. -Agent Teofilo Jamela
of the CIS Investigation Section testified that Albior
and Vasquez (his co-accused) admitted that they
served as lookouts while Bernardo Reyes entered the
victim’s room. Vasquez stated that Manansalang and
Reyes related to him that earlier that day they
robbed the house of the victim, and in the course of
the robbery, Reyes raped and killed the victim.
-Agent Dayco stated that he interrogated the
persons to whom the typewriter stolen from the
Garces residence was sold and that the first buyer
pointed to Manalangsang and Vasquez as the
persons who sold it to him. -Sgt Prado testified that
the panty of the victim and the stolen Adidas shoes
were found in Vasquez’s house. -Albior testified that
he was at the house of his cousin in Baesa, Quezon
City when the crime was being committed. He said
that he did not understand Tagalog, the dialect tin
which the confession was written, and signed it only
because he was told he’d be released if he signed it.
-Vasquez testified that during a drinking spree where
accused Manalangsang and Albior were also present,
Bernardo
Reyes
recounted
how
he
and
Manalangsang robbed the house of the victim, and
how he hit her with a baluster when she awoke.
Reyes brought out the panty of the victim. Vasquez
denied having sold the stolen typewriter and said
that it was Manalangsang who sold it. He said that

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
he signed the extra-judicial confession because he
was threatened at the CIS headquarters with
physical violence. -The trial court held that the
extrajudicial confession of Albior was voluntarily and
freely given.
ISSUE: WON the extra-judicial confession of Albior
was valid. Held: No. -7. At the time a person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... . He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means-by telephone if possible- or
by letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall
be inadmissible in evidence. -lack of assistance of
counsel in Albior’s waiver of his right -It must also be
noted that although Albior hardly speaks Tagalog,
Cebuano being his native dialect, the sworn
statement is in Tagalog (Exh. "N"]. It does not suffice
that an interpreter, an agent of the CIS, was present
during the interrogation (as stated in the sworn
statement) because by virtue of its being written in
Tagalog, Albior was deprived of the opportunity to
comprehend through his own reading what he was
signing. Finally, the testimony of Albior that he
agreed to sign the sworn statement because he was
promised that he would be released adds to the
conclusion that he did not understand what he was
signing. No reasonable person would believe the
promise that he would be released if he knows that
he had just signed a statement admitting his

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

participation in the commission of a very serious
Page | 16
offense.
3. Assistance; breaking into and out of building or enclosure
RULE 113
Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. — An officer making a
lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems
necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so
summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest
when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself.
(10a)
Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. —
An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant,
or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any
building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is
reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto,
after announcing his authority and purpose. (11a)
Section
12.
Right
to
break
out
from
building
or
enclosure. — Whenever an officer has entered the building or
enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break
out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself.
B. WARRANTLES
1. When justified
RULE 113
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
(IHE: IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO, HOT PURSUIT,ESCAPEE)

PEOPLE VS TUDTUD
412 SCRA 142 (2003)
FACTS:
Sometime during the months of July and August
1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a
report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier
about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his
neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who
was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1
Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their
superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the
Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station,
conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in
Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in
illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999,
Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new
stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as bigbodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around
4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of PO1
Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur
Highway to await Tudtud’s arrival. All wore civilian
clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a
bus and helped each other carry a carton marked
“King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the
men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that
one of the men fit Tudtud’s description. The same
man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1
Desierto then approached the suspects and
identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto
informed them that the police had received
information that stocks of illegal drugs would be
arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s
description denied that he was carrying any drugs.
PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents
of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.”
Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion
looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish,
beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a
striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They
Page | 17
contained what seemed to the police officers as
marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud
and his companion, informed them of their rights
and brought them to the police station. The two did
not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratoryfor examination. Forensic tests on
specimens taken from the confiscated items
confirmed the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic
bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves
while the newspapers contained another 890 grams.
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were
subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused
pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved
their right to question the validity of their arrest and
the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial
ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges
against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the
prosecution’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt,
the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused
as charged and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo
Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in
evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim
were seized in violation of their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
Tudtud’s
implied
acquiescence
(Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all right” when the police
officers requested that the box be opened) be
considered a waiver.
HELD:
The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless
search of appellants’ belongings under the first
exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A
search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by
the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the
search in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
search;
the
process
cannot
be
reversed.
Nevertheless,
a
search
substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police have probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search. The question,
therefore, is whether the police herein had probable
cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule
in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of
consistency, is that “reliable information” alone is
not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he “has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.” For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113
to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable
information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no
sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers
that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be
described as “personal,” having learned the same
only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part,
testified that he obtained his information only from
his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Solier’s
information is hearsay. Confronted with such a
dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it
necessary to conduct their own “surveillance.” This
“surveillance,” it turns out, did not actually consist
of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of
plying his illegal trade, but of a mere “gathering of
information from the assets there.” The police
officers who conducted such “surveillance” did not
identify who these “assets” were or the basis of the
latter’s information. Clearly, such information is also
hearsay, not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is
an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures only if the following requisites
are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist;
(2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the
Page | 18
second and third requisites. Records disclose that
when the police officers introduced themselves as
such and requested Tudtud that they see the
contents of the carton box supposedly containing
the marijuana, Tudtud said “it was alright.” He did
not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtud's
implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under
coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus,
considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's
lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or
a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not
come under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained
thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is
no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the
arresting officers and their informant, the conviction
of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.
PEOPLE VS CHUA
396 SCRA 657 (2003)
FACTS:
On Sept 21, 1996, police officers of PNP Angeles
received a report from their confidential informant
that accused-appellant Chua was about to deliver
drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in
Balibago, Angeles City
On the basis of this lead, a team of police operatives
was formed to accost Chua. They positioned
themselves across the street fronting Thunder Inn
Hotel
At around 11:45pm, a car driven by Chua arrived
and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn
Hotel
After Chua alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-O juice box walking towards the entrance of
the Hotel, police officers hurriedly accosted him and
introduced themselves as police officers
In the course of said arrest, a small transparent
plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
from Chua’s pocket. Forthwith, police officers
subjected him to a “body search” which yielded 20
pieces of live .22 caliber bullets; same officer also
peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, and saw
that it contained a crystalline substance (arrest
preceded the search)
The police confiscated the small transparent plastic
bag, the Zest-O juice box, the bullets, and Chua’s
car; said items were brought to the PNP
Headquarters in Angeles City
Initial field test conducted at the PNP Headquarters
(not at the crime scene) revealed that the seized
items were methamphetamine hydrochloride/shabu
Thereafter, these items were subjected to further
examination at the PNP Crime Lab where, after due
testing, it was concluded that the crystalline
substances yielded positive results for shabu
Appellant Binad Sy Chua was then charged with
violation of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659,
and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two
separate Informations
He pleaded “not guilty” on arraignment and the
cases were jointly tried
The defense presented an entirely different version
of the facts9 which, in sum, intimated frame-up
RTC of Angeles City rendered judgment acquitting
Chua for Illegal Possession of ammunition but
convicting him for Illegal Possession of Prohibited
Drugs, hence, this appeal
ISSUE:
WON warrantless arrest of Chua and the subsequent
search of his person which yielded material
evidence against him (shabu) were conducted in a
lawful and valid manner
HELD:
NO. The decision of the RTC of Angeles City
convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad
Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt
RATIO:
RTC, in convicting Chua, ruled that the warrantless
arrest was valid as Chua was accordingly arrested in
flagrante delicto while then carrying prohibited
drugs, hence, the subsequent search of his person
was also valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

and akin to “stop-and-frisk” this is UNTENABLE
Page | 19
The RTC confused two principles on warrantless
searches, i.e. search incidental to a lawful arrest (in
flagrante delicto) and “stop-and-frisk”
These two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of (1) the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and (2) in their
allowable scope
Searches in flagrante Stop-and-frisk
delicto
Searches

Arrest
precedes
search

Probable
cause
(personal knowledge) is
required
 arresting officer may
search the person of the
arrestee
and
the
surrounding area where
evidence
may
be
located; he may also
seize any property found
which was used in the
commission
of
the
crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which
may
be
used
as
evidence

 Search precedes
arrest
 Probable cause is
not
required;
wellgrounded suspicion is
enough, provided that
according
to
the
surrounding conditions
and
the
officer’s
experience, a person
of suspect behavior
may be reasonably
believed
to
be
potentially dangerous
 limited search of
outer clothing of a
person for weapons or
contraband

A warrantless search incidental to an arrest in
flagrante delicto is necessary because the suspect
has already been caught red-handed while
committing, has just committed or will commit a
crime at the presence/within the view of the
arresting officer
“Stop-and-frisk,” on the other hand, is defined as
the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or
contraband
Common elements of a stop-and-frisk are: (1) the
police officer firstly introduces himself properly and
make initial inquiries; (2) then approach and restrain
a person who manifests unusual and suspicious

conduct; and (3) check the latter’s outer clothing for
possibly concealed weapons
It serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection;10 and
(2) the interest of safety and self-preservation
Inapplicability of in flagrante delicto and stop-andfrisk
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante
delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest
and consequent search and seizure made by
the police operatives on Chua
For a valid arrest in flagrante delicto, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer  both elements are not present in this case
The records of the case reveal that there was no
overt manifestation that Chua has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime (he was merely entering a hotel clutching a
sealed Zest-O box which is not a suspicious activity)
Also, it has been held that “reliable information”
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest
leading to the only conclusion that there could
have been no in flagrante delicto arrest
preceding the search of Chua
Further militating the case of the prosecution is the
fact established by the arresting officer’s testimony
on trial to the effect that they have already known
and investigated Chua’s drug-dealing activities for
two years prior to his actual arrest  this only
means that whatever information the civilian asset
relayed to the police on the night of the arrest was
not an “on-the-spot” tip which may excuse them
from obtaining the proper warrant of arrest
All circumstances considered, there was also
no valid “stop-and-frisk” in the case of Chua

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
For one, he was first arrested before the search and
Page | 20
seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession (contrary to established stop-and-frisk
principle that requires the search to precede the
arrest)
Also, the fact reveals that the police operative failed
to make any initial inquiry into Chua’s business in
the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box
he was carrying; they merely identified themselves
as policemen but this was when they have already
arrested Chua
Further, Chua was not exhibiting any unusual and
suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense
with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and
the law on stop-and-frisk
Inapplicability of Other Valid Means of Warrantless
Searches
Search (of evidence) In Plain View – (1) there
was no valid intrusion; (2) the evidence, i.e., the
plastic bag, the Zest-O box which contained shabu
and the pieces of .22 caliber ammunition, were not
inadvertently discovered (the police intentionally
searched for these items and were not “in plain
view”)
In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as
a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
warrantless search, or a customs search. It
cannot also fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015









PEOPLE VS MENDEZ
GR NO 147671 (2002)
FACTS:
Appellants Renante Mendez and Rene “Baby”
Cabagtong were charged with the crime of rape with
homicide of one Candy Dolim

Upon arraignment, they pleaded “not guilty” and
then trial ensued

The prosecution’s theory (supported by its
witnesses’ testimonies): On the morning of Dec
8, 1996, Candy was asked by her father to go



out and collect bets for the PBA endings game
from the local residents. She never returned that
evening and her relatives looked for her in vain.
She was to be found only on Dec 12, brutally
molested and lifeless 
Later, the victim’s father heard reports that a
certain Ronnie Cabagtong was involved in the
killing of his daughter, hence, he filed a
complaint against Ronnie
This caused Ronnie’s warrantless arrest (and
detention) together with appellant Mendez; but
while Ronnie was being investigated at the
police station, his mother Aurea arrived and
declared that she knew what really happened to
Candy and offered to be a witness. She pointed
to appellants Mendez and Baby Cabagtong as
the perpetrators
Aurea testified that on the night of Dec 8,
appellants went to her house looking for Ronnie
and that her son asked her to let the two inside.
She testified that she saw appellants washing
their clothes to remove bloodstains on them
when the two spent the night in her house
Ronnie Cabagtong, for his part, claimed to be an
eyewitness to the crime. He testified that on the
evening of Dec 8, he was in a local Betamax
screening place where the victim and the
appellants were also present. He said that Candy
left early and that appellants followed her. He
himself left the place 5 minutes later and on the
way home, he allegedly saw from 3 meters away
appellants raping Candy. It was raining and there
was no moonlight, but Ronnie said he recognized
appellants because of a lantern which
illuminated the place. After witnessing the crime,
he casually proceeded home and went to sleep
only to be awakened by appellants coming to his
house (and the rest in Aurea’s story)
Ronnie’s statement, however, was never put into
writing, but he was released from custody as a
result thereof. And by the strength of his and
Aurea’s testimonies, appellant Mendez was kept
in custody, supposedly for “further investigation”
while a manhunt for Baby Cabagtong was
ordered

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE


Baby Cabagtong was subsequently arrested, but
Page
| 21
not by the police but by a civilian (barangay
tanod). His arrest, like Mendez’s was without
warrant

Investigating officer SPO2 Cernio testified that
the arrest of appellant Mendez without a warrant
was based on their knowledge of his guilt

The tanod who arrested Baby Cabagtong, also
without warrant, testified that his conduct was
sanctioned by the citizens’ arrest law and that
he based his arrest of Baby from the statement
of Aurea Cabagtong

The defense, on the other hand, presented a
theory diametrically opposed to that of the
prosecution’s – that the crime was committed by
one Randy Gomba, and not by appellants

This is supported by their own “eyewitness,” one
Josefina Bernas who testified that on the night of
the crime, while she and her husband were
making copra, they heard a woman crying.
When Josefina went to see what it was, she saw
a girl being raped by a man. Josefina recognized
the assailant to be Randy Gomba

The RTC was swayed by the prosecution’s case
(giving particular weight to Ronnie and Aurea
Cabagtong’s
testimonies)
and
convicted
appellants of the crime and sentenced them
accordingly

Upon appeal, the appellants raise the following
issues:
ISSUES:
1.) WoN RTC erred in finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
2.) WoN their warrantless arrests were valid
HELD:
YES, the RTC committed an error in finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged; and NO, the warrantless arrests
made against appellants were NOT VALID. The
decision of the RTC Loaogan, Northern Samar is
REVERSED and accused-appellants Renante Mendez
and Rene “Baby” Cabagtong are ACQUITTED of the
crime of rape with homicide on the ground of

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
reasonable doubt RATIO: Issue #1: Error in the
Finding of Guilt
 The RTC favored the prosecution by giving
credence to Ronnie and Aurea Cabagtong’s
testimonies. It should not have, because certain
circumstances make these testimonies suspect! For
one, it is highly doubtful how Ronnie could have
witnessed the rape considering that it was raining
and there was no moonlight. His contention that
there was a lamp illuminating the area is belied by
the testimony of another prosecution witness who
described the crime scene as uninhabited and
surrounded by thick foliage. Thus, there could not
have been any lamps in the area. Also, Ronnie’s
behavior after he allegedly witnessed the crime, if
he is to be believed, is contrary to normal human
reaction (he casually proceeded home and went to
sleep as if nothing happened). The police also took
at face value Ronnie’s and Aurea’s testimony against
appellants without considering (or overlooking) the
ulterior motive that the former has in pointing to
appellants as the culprits
PEOPLE VS DORIA
301 SCRA 668 (1999)
FACTS:
In November 1995, members of the North
Metropolitan District PNP Narcotics Command
(Narcom), received information from two civilian
informants (CI) that a certain "Jun" was engaged in
illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City

Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest
"Jun" in a buy-bust operation, so they arranged a
meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun"
scheduled on Dec 5, 1995 in Mandaluyong
through their CI

Members of Narcom prepared marked money
worth P1,600 as payment to the supposed drugdealer; PO3 Manlangit was to be the poseurbuyer

At 7:30 in the morning of Dec 5, "Jun" appeared
and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as
interested in buying one kilo of marijuana. PO3

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

















Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills and
Page
| 22
"Jun" instructed them to wait for him at the
corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street
while he got the marijuana from his associate
An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed
place and took out from his bag an object
wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1
Badua (back up police) rushed to help in the
arrest
They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked
bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he
left the money at the house of his associate
named "Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to
Neneth's house nearby at Daang Bakal
The buy-bust team found the door of Neneth's
house open and the woman inside. "Jun"
identified the woman as his associate
As SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the
marked bills, PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house; and standing by the door, he
noticed a carton box under the dining table
One of the box's flaps was open and inside the
box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper appeared similar to the wrapper
of the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun"
PO3 Manlangit's suspicion was aroused, hence,
he entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of
the box. He peeked inside the box and found
that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1
Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth."
The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took
"Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its
contents and the marked bills and turned them
over to the investigator at headquarters. It was
only then that the police learned that "Jun" is
appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado while
"Neneth" is appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama
After trial, the Pasig RTC convicted the accusedappellants. The trial court found the existence of
an "organized/syndicated crime group" and
sentenced

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015



both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine
of P500,000.00 each
Upon this appeal, the appellants raised the
following issues:

1. WoN the “buy-bust” operation was valid – YES
2. WoN the consequent warrantless arrest and
search of appellants were valid – as to Doria, YES,
but as to Gaddao, NO.
HELD: The “buy-bust” operation was valid absent
any showing of ill-motives or abuse of power on the
part of the arresting officer, hence, DORIA'S
warrantless arrest and search arising from such
lawful exercise is UPHELD. His conviction perforce
must be AFFIRMED. The warrantless arrest and
subsequent search of Gaddao, on the other hand, is
tainted with fatal procedural irregularities which
merit her ACQUITTAL based on reasonable doubt
RATIO: On Buy-Bust Operation (Entrapment v.
Inducement)

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
employed by peace officers as an effective way
of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense

It evolved12 from the increasing use of
informers and undercover agents in the
detection of crimes, particularly liquor and
narcotics offenses

Unlike in the American jurisdiction, entrapment
is not a defense available to an accused in our
jurisdiction; instead, it is inducement/instigation
that is a possible defense in cases such as this
one

 The distinction between entrapment and
instigation has proven to be very material in
anti-narcotics operations because recently, it
has
become common practice for law
enforcement officers to engage in buy-bust
operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offender
CADUA VS CA

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

312 SCRA 703 (1999)

Page | 23

FACTS:



Central Police District were patrolling the vicinity of
Fairview, QC when they received a radio dispatch
requesting them to proceed to an address where a
holdup of 2 women has just been reported
 At said address, police officers found the women
who stated that the alleged hold-uppers had just
fled; the police officers requested the victims to
board the patrol unit in order to facilitate the search
for the hold-uppers

While patrolling the area in the direction where
the victims pointed the hold-uppers ran toward,
the policemen noticed 2 men walking alongside
each other and as the officers slowed down to
get a closer look, the victims identified them as
the hold-uppers, one of whom is petitioner Doria

The police officers stopped, alighted from the
vehicle, and called out to the suspects. As they
approached the suspects, petitioner Cadua was
about to pull something tucked at the right side
of his waist. The officers promptly pointed their
firearms at Cadua and warned him not to move

An officer thereafter frisked Cadua and found in
his possession a .38 caliber "paltik" revolver
while the search of Cadua's companion (Aguilar)
yielded a fan knife. Cadua and companion were
then arrested

Verification of the confiscated firearm revealed
that Cauda was not a valid license holder thereof

Complaints for Robbery, Concealment of a
Deadly Weapon and Illegal Possession of
Firearms were filed by the police with the City
Prosecutors Office

However, the prosecutor found only the case for
Illegal Possession of Firearms warranting the
filing of an Information because the case for
Robbery is wanting probable cause due to the
victims’ later doubts as to the identity of the
respondents

The information for Illegal Possession was then
filed and upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded
















not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued, resulting in
Cadua’s conviction
Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the CA,
which affirmed in toto the assailed decision
The CA ruled that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was based on probable cause and that
the police officers had personal knowledge of
the fact which led to his arrest. The subsequent
search was therefore an incident to the arrest,
making the firearm found in his possession
admissible in evidence
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner contends that his arrest is null and
void, hence, the search conducted by the police
officers as an incident to his arrest is likewise
defective
According to him, the police officers incorrectly
premised their action to justify his warrantless
arrests
(i.e. that he was the hold-upper); and that since
the victims later on disclaimed petitioner's
identity as the holdupper and that no case of
robbery was filed against him, any probable
cause or personal knowledge thereof alleged by
the arresting officers had been totally negated
Thus, petitioner now posits that, absent probable
cause or personal knowledge by the arresting
officers, the arrest and the incidental search are
illegal; hence, the "paltik" they seized is
inadmissible in evidence
Petitioner also imputes ill-motives on the part of
the police officer for sustaining his warrantless
arrest by planting evidence of the “paltik”
against him in view of the supposed “blunder”
they have committed in apprehending him when
he turned out not to be the hold-upper
He cites findings on record which showed that he
was negative for powder burns, although the
"paltik" at the time of its confiscation was
positive for gun powder residue

People’s Arguments

At the time that petitioner was arrested, the
police officers had probable cause to arrest him

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE







based on the information given by the hold-up
Page
| 24
victims. Petitioner Cadua and his companion,
Aguilar, were positively identified by both
women as the perpetrators of the robbery even
before the police officers alighted from the car.
When the police officers effected the arrest, they
already have probable cause and personal
knowledge that petitioner was a suspect in an
offense just committed
As a logical consequence, the search incidental
to the arrest is valid, and the revolver recovered
admissible in evidence
Also, the finding that petitioner was negative for
powder burns is immaterial because whether or
not petitioner fired the gun is not pertinent to
the charge of illegal possession of firearms. It
also does not follow that just because a person
is found negative for powder burns, he did not
fire a gun
The People also asserts that petitioner Cadua’s
warrantless arrest is valid because, in the
presence of the arresting officer, he was
attempting to commit an offense (he made an
attempt to pull the revolver which was tucked in
his waist)

ISSUES: 1.) WoN CA erred in affirming his conviction
- NO
2.) WoN the search of the “paltik” was valid as an
incident of a lawful arrest15 - YES
HELD: There is no cogent reason to disturb the
findings by the trial court as affirmed by the
appellate court. The CA did not err in affirming
Cadua’s conviction and the warrantless arrest and
consequent search on him were valid. The decision
of the CA is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
(lesser sentence). However, since petitioner has
already served more than 7 years, 5 months in
prison, which is now beyond the maximum principal
penalty now imposed for his offense (subsidiary
penalty for unpaid fine is included), he is hereby
ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being
held for any other lawful cause RATIO: On Finding
of Guilt

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Suffice it to say that both elements of the crime
of Illegal Possession of Firearms are present and
proved in this case: (1) that such a firearm
existed and (2) the accused did not have a
license/permit to possess the same.
On Frame-up
 Petitioner’s cry of frame-up to the effect that the
police made up charges for illegal possession just so
they would not go “empty-handed” because their
original apprehension of him for robbery was a
“blunder” is not persuasive. The uncorroborated
claim of the Cadua that he had been framed is selfserving and baseless
On Warrantless Arrest

There was sufficient reason to justify a
warrantless arrest of petitioner for illegal
possession of firearms

The findings of the trial court, accepted by the
appellate court, show the pertinence of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec 5, Rule 11316

In the case at bar, through police dispatch to the
scene of a crime report and in the presence of
victims, it was ascertained that a robbery had
just been committed, and the arresting officers
had personal knowledge that petitioner was
directly implicated as a suspect by the victims

Therefor, as to the element of personal
knowledge, the officers could not be faulted.
They clearly acted with reasonableness and on
probable cause  there was a legitimate,
verified
complaint
by
the
victims
and
consequently, they formed a reasonable
suspicion that the persons pointed out at the
scene by the victims were the perpetrators of
the offense

This in itself is sufficient justification for the
officers to call the attention of the accused at
that point in time when he was identified as a
suspect by the complainants

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of
facts", in arrests without warrant must be based

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE















upon probable cause, which means an actual
Page
| 25
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion
Peace officers may pursue and arrest without
warrant any person found in suspicious places or
under suspicious circumstances reasonably
tending to show that such person has
committed, or is about to commit, any crime or
breach of the peace
Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is
such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by
circumstances
sufficiently
strong
in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in
believing the accused to be guilty
Petitioner also failed to dispute the arresting
officer’s testimony that he was attempting to
draw out the unlicensed gun when the former
called on and approach him. Actual possession
of an unlicensed firearm, which petitioner
attempted to draw out, by itself, amounts to
committing an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer contemplated in Sec 5(a), Rule
113
The fact that the robbery case was never
brought to trial does not mean that the legality
of the arrest was tainted, for such arrest does
not depend upon the indubitable existence of
the crime
It is not necessary that the crime should have
been established as a fact; the legality of
apprehending the accused would not depend on
the actual commission of the crime but upon the
nature of the deed, where from such
characterization it may reasonably be inferred
by the officer to whom the law at the moment
leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of
suspending the liberty of the citizen
On Warrantless Search
Given the warrantless arrest of Cadua has
already been established to be lawful and valid,
the incidental search and subsequent seizure of
the unlicensed firearm in question is likewise
lawful and valid pursuant to Sec 12, Rule 12617
Clearly, it falls among the exceptions to the
necessity for a search warrant, which is the
warrantless search and seizure as an incident to

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015







a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto)
Warrantless search incident to an arrest in
flagrante delicto includes that of searching the
person of one who is arrested, in order to find
and seize things connected
with the crime as its fruits or as the means for
its commission
In the instant case, when petitioner was
searched contemporaneously with the arrest,
the "paltik" was
Found in his possession, and seized. Moreover,
at that moment of search and seizure, there was
in the mind of the arresting officer more than a
mere suspicion that petitioner was armed

PEOPLE VS MONTILLA
285 SCRA 1 (1998)
FACTS:

Ruben Montilla alias "Joy," was charged for
violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the
RTC. RTC convicted him and imposed the
extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was
further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.

Evidence of the prosecution: Montilla was
apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. near a waiting
shed by members of the Cavite PNP Command
based in Dasmariñas. Montilla, according to the
two officers, was caught transporting 28
marijuana bricks contained in a travelling bag
and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a
total weight of 28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that
they were aided by an informer in the arrest of
appellant. That informer had informed them the
day before arrest that a drug courier, whom said
informer could recognize, would be arriving
somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmariñas
from Baguio City with an undetermined amount
of marijuana. It was the same informer who

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant
Page
| 26
when the latter alighted from a passenger
jeepney.

Montilla disavowed ownership of the prohibited
drugs. He claimed that while he indeed came all
the way from Baguio City, he travelled to
Dasmariñas, Cavite with only some pocket
money and without any luggage. His sole
purpose in going there was to look up his cousin
who had earlier offered a prospective job at a
garment factory in said locality, after which he
would return to Baguio City. He never got around
to doing so as he was accosted by the police. He
further averred that when he was interrogated at
a house in Dasmariñas, Cavite, he was never
informed of his constitutional rights and was in
fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had
with him.

Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated Montilla's
testimony about the job offer in the garment
factory where she reportedly worked as a
supervisor, although, as the trial court observed,
she never presented any document to prove her
alleged employment.

Montilla disputes the trial court's finding that he
was legally caught in flagrante transporting the
prohibited drugs.
ISSUE
1. WON the trial court erred in convicting Montilla on
the basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was
produced that he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of
dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers only
testified on the alleged transporting of Marijuana.
2. WON the failure to present the informant is fatal
to the case of the prosecution.
3. WON the marijuana bricks were confiscated
in the course of an unlawful warrantless
search and seizure.
4. WON the imposition of the death penalty is
proper.
RATIO
1. NO. Prosecution adduced evidence clearly
establishing that he transported marijuana from

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of
transporting the illicit drugs, Montilla had already
run afoul of that particular section of the statute.
Section 418 could be violated by the commission of
any of the acts specified therein, or a combination
thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering,
giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or
transporting, and the like. The governing rule with
respect to an offense which may be committed in
any of the different modes provided by law is that an
indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to
have been committed in one, two or more modes
specified therein. This is so as allegations in the
information of the various ways of committing the
offense should be considered as a description of only
one offense and the information cannot be
dismissed on the ground of multifariousness.
2. NO. The non-presentation of the informer in this
instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error.
The testimony of said informer would have been, at
best, merely corroborative of the declarations the
arresting officers before the trial court, which
testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon
matters in which they had personally taken part. As
such, the testimony of the informer could be
dispensed with by the prosecution, more so where
what he would have corroborated are the narrations
of law enforcers on whose performance of duties
regularity is the prevailing legal presumption.
Besides, informants are generally not presented in
court because of the need to hide their identities
and preserve their invaluable services to the police.
Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to
present in court as its witnesses, and not for the
defense to dictate that course. Finally, Montilla could
very well have resorted to the coercive process of
subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear
before the court below, but which remedy was not
availed of by him.
3. NO. The search and seizure was justified as
a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Montilla contends that the marijuana bricks were
confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
search and seizure. The police authorities had
Page | 27
already been apprised by their informer of his
impending arrival, hence those law enforces had the
opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their
misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search
for and seizure of marijuana, as well as his arrest.
Search Warrant
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the
general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant, absent which such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. Evidence secured on the
occasion of such an unreasonable search and
seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however,
an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs
searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented
searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
and (6) "stop and frisk" measures have been
invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In this case, the information relayed by the civilian
informant to the law enforcers was that there would
be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a
courier coming from Baguio City in the "early
morning" of June 20, 1994. The informant did not
know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at
which particular part of the barangay there would be
such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise
time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of
transportation, the container or contrivance wherein
the drugs were concealed and whether the same
were arriving together with, or were being brought
by someone separately from, the courier. The
information relayed was too sketchy and not
detailed enough for the police officer to obtain the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there
is an indication that the informant knew the courier,
the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
In determining the opportunity for obtaining
warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
but all the coincident and ambient circumstances
should be considered, especially in rural areas. In
fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and
to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to
Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day
notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early
morning" arrival of the courier. If the courts of justice
are to be of understanding assistance to our law
enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a
realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical
problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing
them from the placid and clinical environment of
judicial chambers.
Lawful Arrest
The search on his belongings and the consequent
confiscation of the illegal drugs was justified as a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that
provision, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
A
legitimate
warrantless
arrest,
as
above
contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize
from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2)
those that may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense. On the other hand, the apprehending
officer must have been spurred by probable cause in
effecting an arrest which could be classified as one
in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests
set out in Section 5(a). These instances have been
applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in
flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that
probable cause, while largely a relative term the
determination of which must be resolved according
to the facts of each case, is understood as having
reference to such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man
to believe and conclude as to the commission of an
offense, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In the case at bar, as soon as Montilla had alighted
Page | 28
from the passenger jeepney the informer at once
indicated to the officers that their suspect was at
hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1
Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag
and carton box which appellant was carrying at the
time. The officers thus realized that he was their
man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly
innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects.
Accordingly, they approached Montilla, introduced
themselves as policemen, and requested him to
open and show them the contents of the traveling
bag, which Montilla voluntarily and readily did. Upon
cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded
the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further
search the box, they brought appellant and his
luggage to their headquarters for questioning.
There were sufficient facts antecedent to the search
and seizure that, at the point prior to the search,
were already constitutive of probable cause, and
which by themselves could properly create in the
minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable
belief that Montilla was in the act of violating the
law. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that
Montilla was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his
arrest and the search of his belongings without the
requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, Montilla consented to the search when
he opened the bag without being forced or
intimidated to do, which should properly be
construed as clear waiver of his right to be secure
from unreasonable search.
4. NO. Reculsion perpetua is the proper imposable
penalty.
The law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death.
In the present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code consequently provides the rules to be
observed in the application of said penalties. Since
there were neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances attending Montilla's violation of the
law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63must
necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.
Furthermore, there was neither a minor victim nor a
consequent death of any victim.
DISPOSITION The judgment of the RTC is MODIFIED
in the sense that Montilla shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE VS BURGOS
144 SCRA 1 (1986)
NATURE Appeal from RTC decision convicting Ruben
Burgos of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms
in Furtherance of Subversion
FACTS

Prosecution version: Upon obtaining information
from one Cesar Masamlok, who personally and
voluntarily surrendered to the Davao del Sur
police HQ stating that accused Ruben Burgos
forcibly recruited him to join the NPA with the
use of a firearm against his life, a team was
dispatched the following day to arrest Burgos.
Through the help of Pedro Burgos, the brother of
accused, the team was able to locate Ruben
Burgos, who was plowing his field at the time.

When asked about the firearm, the accused
denied possession of it, but after questioning the
accused’s wife, the police were able to locate
and retrieve the said firearm, a .38 caliber S &
W, buried in the ground below their house. The
police, after accused pointed them to the
location, were also able to retrieve alleged
subversive documents (a notebook and a
pamphlet) hidden underground a few meters
away from the house.

To prove accused’s subversive activities,
Masamlok testified that accused came to his
house and told him to join the NPA or his family
will be killed along with him. The threat to his life
and family forced Masamlok to join the NPA. He
later attended an NPA seminar where Burgos,
the first speaker, said very distinctly that he is
an NPA together with his companions, to assure
the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE





group to overthrow the government. To prove
Page
| 29
illegal possession, a person in charge of firearms
and explosives of the PC HQ in Davao testified
that accused was not among the list of firearm
holders
On the other hand, accused-appellants claims
that he was taken to the PC barracks and when
he denied ownership of the gun, he was beaten,
tortured, mauled and subjected to physical
agony. He was forced to admit possession or
ownership of the gun. 2 witnesses as well as
Ruben’s wife Urbana, were presented by the
defense in support of the accused’s denial of the
charge against him. Urbana claimed that it was
Masamlok who left the firearm there.
The RTC after considering the evidences
presented by both prosecution and defense
convicted accused Ruben Burgos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of
subversion. The RTC justified the warrantless
arrest as falling under one of the circumstances
when arrests may be validly made without a
warrant, under Rule 113 Sec.6 of the Rules of
Court. It stated that even if there was no warrant
for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that “the
authorities received an urgent report of
accused's involvement in subversive activities
from a reliable source (report of Cesar
Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even
without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the
ambit of Sec. 6(a) of Rule 113 and applicable
jurisprudence on the matter.” If the arrest is
valid, the consequent search and seizure of the
firearm and the alleged subversive documents
would become an incident to a lawful arrest as
provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12. “A person
charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.”

ISSUES
1. WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of
his house and the subsequent confiscation of a
firearm and documents conducted in a lawful

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
manner.
2. WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD 1. NO Art.III Sec.2 of the Constitution
safeguards against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to
his person, papers and effects. In this case, the
arrest was made without warrant and since it does
not fall within the exceptions of arrests that can be
made without a warrant, it is unlawful and therefore,
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies.
Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a
person who has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. There
is no such personal knowledge in this case.
Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by Burgos’ wife. At the time of
arrest, Burgos was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the
time.
The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be
considered lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test of
reasonableness. The SolGen submits that the info
given by Masamlok was sufficient to induce a
reasonable ground that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. In
arrests without a warrant under Sec.6(b), however, it
is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable
ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator. In this case, the accused was arrested
on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the
Page | 30
accused had committed a crime. They were still
fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained.
The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on
the basis of information from the lips of a frightened
wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest
without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is
made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit
of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted. More
important, We find no compelling reason for the
haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to
first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of
arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed a
crime. There is no showing that there was a real
apprehension that the accused was on the verge of
flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that
the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer
was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was
not required to subscribe his allegations under oath.
There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully
his charges under pain of criminal prosecution.
Consequently, the need to go through the process of
securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest
becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused
while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest
being unlawful, the search and seizure which
transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed
legal as being mere incidents to an illegal arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver,
or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To
constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the
right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that
the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein.
2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the
firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
inadmissible in evidence, the only remaining proof to
sustain the charge is the testimony of Masamlok,
which is inadequate to convict Burgos beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although it is true that the trial court found
Masamlok’s testimony credible and convincing, the
SC is not necessarily bound by the credibility which
the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As
stated in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it
comes to question of credibility the findings of the
trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal
for the obvious reason that it was able to observe
the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But We have also said
that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there
would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal.
We must reject the findings of the trial court where
the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by
the trial court. In the instant case, Masamlok’s
testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering
that Masamlok surrendered to the military, certainly
his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated
with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be
charged with subversion. Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. His testimony
cannot be said to be free from the opportunity and
temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated
for it was intended to secure his freedom. Moreover,
despite the fact that there were other persons
present during the alleged NPA seminar who could
have corroborated Masamlok's testimony that the
accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive
activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the
prosecution never presented any other witness.
DISPOSITION Judgment of conviction is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS JAYSON
282 SCRA 166 (1997)
FACTS:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
 Wenceslao Jayson was charged with violation of
Page | 31
P.D. No. 1866 in the RTC of Davao City. The
information alleged the possession of a .38 caliber
revolver without the necessary license to possess
the same. In addition, the same .38 caliber revolver
was used by Jasyon in killing one Nelson Jordan.
 Evidence of the prosecution: Jayson, then a
bouncer at the “Ihaw-Ihaw” nightclub, shot one
Nelson Jordan. He was arrested after he had been
pointed by eyewitnesses as the gunman. Recovered
from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial
number 91955, four live bullets, and one empty
shell. The firearm and ammunition were covered by
a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by
Major Francisco Arquillano, Deputy Commander of
the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the
Davao Metropolitan District Command. The mission
order authorized accused-appellant to carry the said
firearm and twelve rounds of ammunition “to
intensify intelligence coverage” and was for a threemonth duration subject to several restrictions.
 March 1991 - Jayson was initially charged with
murder in an information RTC but after plea
bargaining, he was allowed to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide.
 July 15, 1991 – Jayson was charged with illegal
possession of firearm.
 September 1991 – the trial court found Jayson
guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced him to
imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
 October 1991 – the information charging him of
illegal possession was amended in order to allege
that the firearm subject of the charged had been
used in the killing of one Nelson Jordan.
 June 1993 – he was found guilty of the crime of
illegal possession by the RTC and sentenced him to
20 years of imprisonment. The RTC found that Jayson
acted in good faith, believing that the mission order
and memorandum receipt issued to him were valid.
 CA - increased the penalty on to reclusion
perpetua and, in accordance with Rule 124, §13 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure  Jayson maintains

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
that he acted in the good faith belief that he was
authorized to carry the firearm. He argues that the
failure of the prosecution to present as witness the
government official who had certified that he was
not a holder of a firearms license is fatal to the
prosecution of this case.
ISSUES
1. WON the warrantless arrest and search were
valid.
2. WON Jayson is guilty of illegal possession of
firearm.
3. Whether the provisions of the recently enacted
R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866, can be
applied to this case on the theory that it is more
favorable to Jayson.
RATIO
1. YES.
 Jayson’s arrest and the seizure from him of the
firearm were made without any warrant from a
court.
 SPO1 Tenebro testified that at around 10:00 in the
evening of March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen
Camotes and Racolas were patrolling in their car,
they received a radio message from their camp
directing them to proceed to the “Ihaw-Ihaw” on
Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting.
Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there
saw the victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to
Jayson as the one who had shot Jordan. They then
arrested Jayson. Seized from him was a .38 caliber
revolver with serial number 91955. The firearm was
covered by a mission order and memorandum
receipt.
 The case at bar falls under Rule 113, §5(b) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure19: There was a
shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of
the crime found the victim. Jayson was pointed to
them as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. In fact Jayson had not gone very far (only
ten meters away from the “Ihaw-Ihaw”), although he
was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted
on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of
the victim and of facts indicating that Jayson was the
assailant.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
 The subsequent search of accused-appellant’s
Page | 32
person and the seizure from him of the firearm was
likewise lawful under Rule 126, §1220.
2. YES.
 Jayson: the gun is covered by a memorandum
receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco
Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of the
CivilMilitary Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the
Davao Metropolitan District Command.
 Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue
mission orders to civilian agents of the AFP as he
was not any of the following officers mentioned in
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No.
1866, §5(a). Major Arquillano claimed, however, that
Colonel Franco Calida, had authorized him to
exercise this function so that people would not be
“swarming in Calida’s office.” Full faith and credit
cannot be given to such bare assertion. Not only was
there no written delegation of authority to Major
Arquillano, it is even doubtful whether Col. Calida,
who, as commander of the unit had authority to
issue mission orders, could delegate this authority to
his deputy.
 Nor was accused-appellant qualified to be issued a
mission order because he was a mere reserve of the
Citizen Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without
regular monthly compensation. In fact he worked as
a “bouncer” in a nightclub, and it was as a
“bouncer” that he used the gun seized from him. 
Even assuming that the issuance to Jayson of the
mission order was valid, it is clear that, in carrying
the firearm inside the nightclub where he was
working as a “bouncer,” Jayson violated the
restrictions in the mission order. These restrictions
prohibited him from carrying firearms in places
where people converge unless on official mission.
 Nor can Jayson claim to have acted in the good
faith belief that the documents issued to him
sufficed as legal authority for him to carry the
firearm. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, good
faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid
defenses because the offense committed is malum
prohibitum punishable by special law.
3. NO

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
 Even though the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm has been reduced in the new law, the latter
cannot be applied in this case so as to favor Jason in
view of the proviso in §1 that the first paragraph,
providing for lighter penalty, does not apply to cases
where another crime has been committed. Nor can
the third paragraph be applied by considering the
illegal possession of firearm as a mere aggravating
circumstance because, although the gun seized was
used in the commission of a crime, this case
concerns solely the charge of illegal possession of
firearm. The criminal case for homicide is not before
us for consideration.
 Consequently, this case must be decided in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Quijada, that
a person who kills another with the use of an
unlicensed firearm is guilty of homicide or murder as
the case may be under the Revised Penal Code and
aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D.
No. 1866, §1, par. 2. DISPOSITION The decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
TERRY VS OHIO
392 US 1 (1968)
FACTS:
 A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown
beat which he had been patrolling for many years,
observed two strangers (petitioner and another man,
Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed
alternately back and forth along an identical route,
pausing to stare in the same store window, which
they did for a total of about 24 times. Each
completion of the route was followed by a
conference between the two on a corner, at one of
which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who
left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job,
a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them
rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front
of a store. The officer approached the three,
identified himself as a policeman, and asked their
names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon
McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his
outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer
Page | 33
ordered the three into the store. He removed
petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and
ordered the three to face the wall with their hands
raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton
and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside
overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the
outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing
in his pat-down which might have been a weapon),
or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments
until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the
police station.
 Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress
the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the
prosecution theory that the guns had been seized
during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court
denied the motion to suppress and admitted the
weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer
had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton
were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was
warranted, and that the officer, for his own
protection, had the right to pat down their outer
clothing having reasonable cause to believe that
they might be armed. The court distinguished
between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and
between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons
and a full-blown search for evidence of crime.
 Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an
intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground
that "no substantial constitutional question" was
involved.
ISSUES WON the search and seizure in this case
violates Fourth Amendment. NO
RATIO Exclusionary Rule
 The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated. This inestimable
right of personal security belongs as much to the
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the
homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his
secret affairs. The specific content and incidents of

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
this right must be shaped by the context in which it
is asserted. For what the Constitution forbids is not
all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures. Unquestionably petitioner
was entitled to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment as he walked down the street in
Cleveland.
 For the issue is not the abstract propriety of the
police conduct, but the admissibility against
petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search
and seizure. Ever since its inception, the rule
excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment has been recognized as a principal
mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. The
only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the
criminal context, and that without it the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of
words serves another vital function--'the imperative
of judicial integrity.'
 Thus in our system evidentiary rulings provide the
context in which the judicial process of inclusion and
exclusion approves some conduct as comporting
with constitutional guarantees and disapproves
other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting
evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the
necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which
produced the evidence, while an application of the
exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional
imprimatur. Exclusionary rule has its limitations,
however, as a tool of judicial control. It cannot
properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate police investigative techniques on the
ground that much conduct which is closely similar
involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional
protections. When is a person seized and what
constitutes a search
 Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the
station house and prosecution for crime--'arrests' in
traditional terminology. It must be recognized that
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized'
that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
of the English language to suggest that a careful
Page | 34
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons is not a 'search’. It is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it
is not to be undertaken lightly. When the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred. In this case
there can be no question, then, that Officer
McFadden 'seized' petitioner and subjected him to a
'search' when he took hold of him and patted down
the outer surfaces of his clothing. What is
reasonable
 It is necessary 'first to focus upon the
governmental interest which allegedly justifies
official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen,' for there is 'no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search (or seize) against the
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails. And in
justifying the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. In
making that assessment it is imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard: would
the facts available to the officer at the moment of
the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action
taken was appropriate Whether the stop and frisk of
Terry was reasonable
 We consider first the nature and extent of the
governmental interests involved. One general
interest is of course that of effective crime
prevention and detection. It was this legitimate
investigative function Officer McFadden was
discharging when he decided to approach petitioner
and his companions He had observed Terry, Chilton,
and Katz go through a series of acts, each of them
perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together
warranted further investigation.
 There is the more immediate interest of the police

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
officer in taking steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him. We cannot blind ourselves to the need
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves
and other prospective victims of violence in
situations where they may lack probable cause for
an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear
to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and
to neutralize the threat of physical harm. Distinction
between a search incident to an arrest and a limited
search for weapons
 The former, although justified in part by the
acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting
officer from assault with a concealed weapon, also
justified on other grounds and can therefore involve
a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A
search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest, however, must, like any other
search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation. It should be limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons
which might be used to harm the officer of others
nearby, and may realistically be characterized as
something less than a 'full' search, even though it
remains a serious intrusion.
 An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal
prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's
interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably
accompanied by future interference with the
individual's freedom of movement, whether or not
trial or conviction ultimately follows.
 The protective search for weapons, on the other
hand, constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person. It does not follow that because an officer
may lawfully arrest a person only when he is
apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that
the person has committed or is committing a crime,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of
Page | 35
evidence, in making any intrusions short of an
arrest.  Our evaluation of the proper balance that
has to be struck in this type of case leads us to
conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons
for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain
that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would
be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger. And in determining whether
the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances,
due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to
draw from the facts in light of his experience.  The
actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with
McFadden's hypothesis that these men were
contemplating a daylight robbery--which, it is
reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the
use of weapons--and nothing in their conduct from
the time he first noticed them until the time he
confronted them and identified himself as a police
officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that
hypothesis.  The sole justification of the search in
the present situation is the protection of the police
officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be
confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other
hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer.  We conclude that the revolver seized from
Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him.
At the time he seized petitioner and searched him
for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable
grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and
dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection
of himself and others to take swift measures to
discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of
harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully
restricted his search to what was appropriate to the

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
discovery of the particular items which he sought.
Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be
decided on its own facts.
DISPOSITION Affirmed.
2. Method of arrest by the officer
RULLE 113
Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. — When making an
arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested
of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either
engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its
commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has
opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest.
CF: PEOPLE VS MAHINAY
302 SCRA 455
FACTS:
 Larry Mahinay accused of Rape with Homicide of a
12- year-old girl (Ma. Victoria Chan) o RTC convicted
him and sentenced him to death, hence the
automatic review
 Accused and victim lived in the same
neighborhood. On the day of the crime, Mahinay,
who was a houseboy, asked permission from his
employer (Isip) to go out with his friends.
Apparently, he and his friends went on a drinking
spree (in Mahinay’s version of facts, he said that
they consumed, like, 3 cases of Red Horse..
 Mahinay was seen by different people at different
times that day at different places within the
neighborhood. Victim, too.
MAHINAY
8AM: drinking spree 10
AM:
already
drunk,
asked permission from
Isip to go out with
friends

VICTIM

Around 4PM, seen by
Isip’s
sister-in-law

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Page | 36
Around
6-7PM,
Sgt.
Roberto Suni, who went
to his in-law’s house,
met appellant along
Dian
St.
(their
neighborhood) while on
his way
9PM  showed up at
Norgina’s store to
buy
lugaw
according
to
Norgina,
he
appeared
uneasy,
deep in thought hair
disarrayed,
drunk, walking in a
dazed manner
Isip: appellant failed to
show up for supper that
night
2AM the next day 
boarded
a
jeep,
alighted at the top of
the bridge of NLEx
and
then
disappeared
Police tried to find
Mahinay, even going to
Caloocan, but was futile

[Norgina
Rivera]

catching birds inside
Isip’s unfinished house
Between 8-9PM, Sgt.
Suni
saw
victim
standing in front of the
gate of the unfinished
house

Meanwhile,
victim’s
mom noticed that her
daughter was missing
[around 9PM]

7:30AM the next day 
someone found victim’s
body inside septic tank

When they returned at
the scene of the crime,
found different items of
clothing
positively
identified by victim’s
mom as the victim’s
Near the septic tank,
items
belonging
to
Mahinay
were
also
found

 Police report filed + referral slip addressed to
Valenzuela Prosecutor’s Office
 After a series of follow-up operations, Mahinay was
finally arrested in Ibaan, Batangas

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
o Brought to Valenzuela Police Station, and
with assistance of counsel, executed an
extra-judicial
confession
wherein
he
admitted to committing the crime and
narrated how it happened.
o Pointed to 2 of his friends as coconspirators.
 When Information was filed, he pleaded not guilty.
Issue
1: W/N circumstancial evidence enough to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Held/Ratio
1:  Absence of any direct evidence relative to the
commission of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not
necessarily absolve him from any liability because
under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled
jurisprudence,
conviction
may
be
had
on
circumstantial evidence provided that the following
requisites concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
 Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. Facts and circumstances
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative
force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect
upon the court.
 In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence
to several circumstantial evidence, which upon
thorough review of the Court is more than enough to
prove appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of
reasonable doubt.
Issue 2: W/N extra-judicial confession admissible
Held/Ratio: Yes. No proof that Mahinay was, as
alleged by him, coerced to execute EJC.
CRIMPRO RELEVANT [hindi ko talaga malaman kung

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
saan nanggaling ito. As in bigla na lang isinama ng
Page | 37
court. adik. Although I think, it’s because at that
time, the SC was still queasy with the death penalty
law, and would like to sentence as few accused as
possible.]
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in
order to ensure that the evidence against and
accused were obtained through lawful means, the
Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays
down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the
arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer
or his companions must do and observe at the time
of making an arrest and again at and during the time
of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No.
7438: It is high-time to educate our law enforcement
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or
indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the Court must
update in the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under
custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent and that any statement he makes may be
used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be
assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or
cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a
lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except
in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver
has been made;

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at
any time, he has the right to communicate or confer
by the most expedient means – telephone, radio,
letter or messenger – with his lawyer (either retained
or appointed), any member of his immediate family,
or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by
him or by any one from his immediate family or by
his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government
organization. It shall be the responsibility of the
officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to
waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure
that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right
to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be
done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void
even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that
he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage
of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if the
same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation
must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his
initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to
counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or
evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation
of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
GUIDELINES, PROCEDURES AND DUTIES OF OFFICERS SRRESTING,
DETAINING, INVITING OR INVESTIGATIONG AT THE TIME OF THE
ARREST OR AT CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
3. Method of arrest by private person

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

RULE 113

Page | 38

Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. — When making an
arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested of
the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the
latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is
pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees,
or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has
opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest.
4. Post-arrest procedure
Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. —
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an
offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint
or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such
investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of
an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended
party or a peace office directly with the proper court on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
defense as provided in this Rule. (7a; sec. 2, R.A. No. 7438)
5. Exceptions construed strictly
DAVID VS GMA
GR NO 17196 (2006)
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation
celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017,
implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of

national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was
the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as
a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without
warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily
Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was
searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on
February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the
absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except
the security guard of the building – were several
materials for publication. The law enforcers, a
composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as
basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless
search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation
1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to
Page | 39
call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence.
ISSUE/S:
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners
David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on
the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP
1017 valid?
RULING:
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David,
et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches,
seizures
and
arrests
are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a
validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot
pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner
David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for
the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was
their observation that some rallyists were wearing tshirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now”and their
erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the
leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt
and even if he was wearing it, such fact is
insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on
the Daily Tribune’s officesconducted pursuant to PP
1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune
premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the
conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires
that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offence to be
determined
personally
by
the
judge
after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section
9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. All these
rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
304 SCRA 140 (1999)
FACTS:
Crime: illegal transport of marijuana buds/leaves in
violation of Sec. 4 of RA 6245 (DDA of 1972)
 In the morning of September 1, 1994, SPO1
Bernardo Mariano was in the Municipality of Banaue,
Ifugao waiting for a ride to report for work in
Lagawe, Ifugao.
 A civilian asset approached him and intimated that
an Ilocano person was ready to transport marijuana.
This asset described to him the physical appearance

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
of the suspect as thin and possessing a green bag.
Page | 40
 Mr. Mariano invited the asset and together they
proceeded to Barangay O-ong, Hingyon, Ifugao. 
There they alighted and stopped an ordinary
Dangwa passenger bus bound for Baguio City. 
Aboard on this bus, they did not find the person
concerned and reaching Barangay Pitawan, Hingyon,
Ifugao, they stepped out of the vehicle and waited
for the air conditioned Dangwa bus bound for
Manila.
 When this bus arrived, Police Officer Mariano
bearded the aircon bus and looked for that person
from among the passengers and noticed him holding
the green bag. He immediately ordered the person
to get out of the bus. This fellow followed holding the
bag.  Once outside, he further ordered the suspect
to open the bag and saw a water jug colored red and
white and a lunch box. He told this man to open the
jug and the lunch box and when opened, he saw
marijuana leaves as contents.
 At this time, suspect revealed his name to be
Samuel Yu Valdez. With this discovery, the asset was
left behind and Peace Officer Mariano escorted the
accused to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Provincial Headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao. He
turned over the accused including the contents of
the green bag to his superiors for further
investigation Accused’s version
 He came from a friend’s birthday celebration and
was only returning to Nueva Ecija. He said that he
had a hang-over, fell asleep with someone else
beside him, who allegedly was the one carrying the
green bag. When he woke up, guy beside him was
gone, green bag still there.
Issue: W/N the arrest was constitutional and legal.
Held/Ratio:
YES.  Settled is the rule that no arrest, search and
seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued
by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It further
decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of
said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
any proceeding.
 The abovementioned constitutional provisions
serve
as
safeguards
against
wanton
and
unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a
citizen as to his person, papers and effects. The right
of a person to be secure against any unreasonable
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty
is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule
or situation which allows exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant
must be strictly construed. We cannot liberally
consider arrests or seizures without warrant or
extend their application beyond the cases
specifically provided or allowed by law. To do so
would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a
basic right so often violated and yet, so deserving of
full protection and vindication.
 Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure
of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving
vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances.
 On the other hand, a lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
person under the following circumstances: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
 In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante
since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his
arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal
Page | 41
effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the
foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it
is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a
search warrant when the search was conducted over
the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless,
under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said police officer to
believe that appellant was then and there
committing a crime
In the instant case, police officer Mariano was tipped
off by a civilian "asset" that a thin Ilocano person
with a green bag was about to transport marijuana
from Banaue, Ifugao. Said information was received
by SPO1 Mariano the very same morning he was
waiting for a ride in Banaue to report for work in
Lagawe, the capital town of Ifugao province. Thus,
faced with such on-thespot information, the law
enforcer had to respond quickly to the call of duty.
Obviously, there was not enough time to secure a
search warrant considering the time involved in the
process.
 Evidently, there was definite information of the
identity of the person engaged in transporting
prohibited drugs at a particular time and place.
SPO1 Mariano had already an inkling of the identity
of the person he was looking for. As a matter of fact,
no search at all was conducted on the baggages of
other passengers. Hence, appellant's claim that the
arresting officer was only fishing for evidence of a
crime has no factual basis.
PEOPLE VS BURGOS
144 SCRA 1
(SUPRA)

6. RCJL
Section 6. Burden of Proof of Age. - Any person alleging the age of
the child in conflict with the law has the burden of proving the age
of such child.

If the age of the child is contested prior to the filing of the
information in court, a case for determination of age under
summary proceeding may be filed before a court which shall
render its decision within 24 hours from receipt of the appropriate
pleadings of all the parties. (n)
In all cases involving a child, the court shall make a categorical
finding as to the age of the child.
Section 7. Exemption from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen years
of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall
be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program as provided for in Republic
Act No. 9344 when consented to by the child and the parents. (a)
Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from
civil liability which shall be enforced in accordance with the
provisions of Article 221 of the Family Code in relation to Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. If the act or omission of the child involves a
quasi-delict, Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall apply.
C. “JOHN DOE WARRANTS”
PEOLE VS VELOSO
48 PHIL 169
FACTS:
 Jose Ma. Veloso was found guilty by the CFI of
Manila of the crime of resistance of the agents of the
authority (A252, Penal Code).
 A building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City
of Manila, was used by an organization known as the
Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time
a member of the House of Representative of the
Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of
the club.
 The police of Manila had reliable information that
the socalled Parliamentary Club was nothing more
than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J.
F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had
been to the club and verified this fact.
 As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres
Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila,
applied for, and obtained a search warrant from
Judge Garduño of the municipal court. The search

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
warrant had “John Doe” as defendant.
Page | 42
 Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the
Parliamentary Club a little after three in the
afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found
the doors to the premises closed and barred.
Accordingly, one band of police including policeman
Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter
a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by
Townsend, broke in the outer door.
 Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty
persons were apprehended by the police. One of
them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked
Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed
him the search warrant.
 Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was
Representative Veloso and not John Doe [idk if he
thought that John Doe was actually a name and not
an alias. If he did, ang bobo, takte.], and that the
police had no right to search the house. Townsend
answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.
 As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained
gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show
him the evidence of the game, however Veloso
insistently refused. When the police lost patience,
they took hold of him, but he fought back, injuring
one of the officers.
 In the end, Veloso was finally laid down on the
floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte,
cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his
pockets.
 In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the
persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling.
All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of
First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole
exception of Veloso.
Issue: W/N the search warrant was valid.
Held/Ratio: YES.  Commonwealth v. Crotty, C.J.
Bigelow:
o It was always necessary to express the
name or give some description of a party to
be arrested on a warrant; and if one was
granted with the name in blank, and without
other designation of the person to be
arrested, it was void.

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
o This rule or principle does not prevent the
issue and service of a warrant against a
party whose name is unknown. In such case
the best description possible of the person
[descriptio personae] to be arrested is to be
given in the warrant; but it must be
sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to
be served, by stating his occupation, his
personal appearance and peculiarities, the
place
of
his
residence,
or
other
circumstances by which he can be identified.
 In the first place, the affidavit for the search
warrant and the search warrant itself described the
building to be searched as "the building No. 124
Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands."
This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of
the premises to be searched.
o The police officers were accordingly
authorized to break down the door and enter
the premises of the building occupied by the
so-called Parliamentary Club.
o When inside, they then had the right to
arrest the persons presumably engaged in a
prohibited game, and to confiscate the
evidence of the commission of the crime.
o It has been held that an officer making an
arrest may take from the person arrested
any money or property found upon his
person, which was used in the commission of
the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or
which may furnish the person arrested with
the means of committing violence or of
escaping, or which may be used as evidence
on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise.
(Moreno vs. Ago Chi)
 The affidavit and the search warrant did state that
"John Doe has illegally in his possession in the
building occupied by him, and which is under his
control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain
devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling
Law." o As the search warrant stated that John Doe
had gambling apparatus in his possession in the
building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo,
City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
Page | 43
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without
difficulty. o It must be remembered that No. 124
Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club
purposes. It was not the home of Veloso; not the
place of abode of the family, which the law carefully
protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially
public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged
club with a high sounding name calculated to
mislead the police, but intended for nefarious
practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the
home, there would commonly be varying occupancy,
a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose
names would be unknown to the police.
PADANGANAN VS CASAR (SUPRA)
DOJ CIRCULAR BO 50 29 OCT 1990
CF: RA 7438; PROCLAMATION 1017 (2006)

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Page | 44

A. SOURCE, DEFINITION, SCOPE AND PROCEDURE
A. DEFINITION
"Custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation"
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of law.
PEOPLE VS PASUDAG
GR NO, 128822 (2001)
FACTS:
On 26 September 1995, at around 1:30 p.m., SPO2
Pepito Calip of the PNP Sison, Pangasinan, went to
Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng operations. He
urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public
school. About 5 meters away, he saw a garden of
about 70 square meters. There were marijuana
plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He
inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned
the house with the garden. The storeowner told him
that Alberto Pasudag y Bokang owned it. SPO2 Calip
went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of
Police Romeo C. Astrero. The latter dispatched a
team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3
Alcantara and PO3 Rasca) to conduct an
investigation. At around 2:30 p.m., the team arrived
at Brgy. Artacho and went straight to the house of
Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for Pasudag and
asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden
which was about 5 meters away. Upon seeing the
marijuana plants, the policemen called for a
photographer, who took pictures of Pasudag
standing beside one of the marijuana plants. They
uprooted 7 marijuana plants. The team brought
Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police
station. On 17 December 1996, 4th Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan Emiliano M.
Matro filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan,
Urdaneta an Information charging Pasudag with
violation of RA 6425, Sec. 9. On 10 February 1997,
the trial court arraigned the accused. He pleaded not
guilty. Trial ensued. The Regional Trial Court,

Pangasinan, Branch 46, Urdaneta found Pasudag
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal cultivation
of marijuana and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without
subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the law.
Pasudag appealed.
ISSUE: WON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS VALID
HELD:
As a general rule, the procurement of a search
warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly
search or seize the person, house, papers or effects
of any individual. The Constitution provides that "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable." Any evidence
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible.
Herein, the police authorities had ample opportunity
to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2
Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He
was acquainted with marijuana plants and
immediately recognized that some plants in the
backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time
was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the
plants. They were three months old and there was
no sufficient reason to believe that they would be
uprooted on that same day. With the illegal seizure
of the marijuana plants, the seized plants are
inadmissible in evidence against Pasudag
PEOPLE VS ZUELA
323 SCRA 589
FACTS:
The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y
de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito
Zuela y Morandarte from the decision of the RTC,
Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Br. 24, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: WON the extra-judicial confessions were
executed in accordance with the provisions of the
1973 Constitution?
HELD: The right to counsel attaches the moment an
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
information on the crime from the suspected
Page | 45
offender.. In other words, “the moment there is a
move or even urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information
which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, from said suspect, he should then and there be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but
the waiver shall be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
There was no evidence that Maximo executed a
waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these facts,
we are constrained to rule that Maximo Velarde’s
extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in evidence.
An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a
valid waiver of the right to counsel – that is, in
writing and in the presence of counsel – is
inadmissible in evidence. Contrary to the ruling of
the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito
and Nelson was not cured by their signing the extrajudicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa.?
Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants’
sworn statements did not leave a void in the
prosecution’s case. Accused-appellant Maximo
repeated the contents of his sworn statement to
Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in
court. Such declaration to a private person is
admissible in evidence against accused-appellant
Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the
Rules of Court stating that the “act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.” The trial court,
therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to
Romualda’s testimony.
And in the recent case of People vs. Andan, the
Court reiterated the doctrine enunciated in
the Maqueda case. In Andan, the Court said that
“when the accused talked with the mayor as
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime.”

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
Treachery was not alleged in the information but the
suddenness of the assault upon Hegino and Maria
from behind was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As such, treachery may be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Treachery exists when an
adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years
and causes his death.
The crime committed is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide defined and penalized in
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
correctly considered the crime as robbery with
homicide and not “robbery with triple homicide” as
charged in the information. The term “homicide” in
Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense, embracing
not only the act which results in death but also all
other acts producing anything short of death.
Neither is the nature of the offense altered by the
number of killings in connection with the robbery.
The multiplicity of victims slain on the occasion of
the robbery is only appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous
situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of
the offense, robbery with one killing would be
treated in the same way that robbery with multiple
killings would be.
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
314 SCRA 25 (2000)
FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the
RTC of Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya finding accusedappellant Abe Valdez guilty for violation Section 9 of
Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6245). He was accused of
planting and (maybe) manufacturing marijuana.
During trial, one of the witnesses, SPO3 Marcelo
Tipay testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of
September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an
unnamed informer about the presence of a
marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant
at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The
prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to
appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R.
Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
Page | 46
operatives to verify the report. The team was
composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G.
Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao
gave them specific instructions to "uproot said
marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same.
The following day, said police team, accompanied by
their informer, went to the site where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. The police found
appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant
had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering
marijuana
plants
in
two
rows,
approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.PO2
Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited
plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted
that they were his. The police uprooted the seven
marijuana plants for evidence. The police took
photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants. Appellant was then arrested.
Meanwhile, the accused-appellant contended that at
around 10:00am of September 25, 1996, he was
weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a
person whose identity he does not know. He was
asked to go with the latter to "see something." He
was brought to the place where the marijuana plants
were found, approximately 100 meters away from
his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and
they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He
was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any
knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him
and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana. The police then took
a photo of him standing in front of one of the
marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot five
of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut,
where another photo was taken of him standing next
to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. Finding
appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held
appellant liable as charged for cultivation and
ownership of marijuana plants.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search.

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015
First, the records show that the law enforcers had
more than ample time to secure a search warrant.
Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. For the appellee, the Office of the
Solicitor General argues that the records clearly
show that there was no search made by the police
team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the
marijuana plants in question were grown in an
unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet
tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact,
immediately spotted by the police officers when they
reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were,
thus, in plain view of the police officers. The instant
case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless
lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search was lawful.
HELD: No. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least
one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's
farm. Their informant had revealed his name to
them. The place where the cannabis plants were
planted was pinpointed. From the information in
their possession, they could have convinced a judge
that there was probable cause to justify the issuance
of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they
uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused
on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. In the instant case, it was held
that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained
during an illegal search and seizure. As to the
admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for
the prosecution, the SC found that said plants
cannot, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They
are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. The
Constitution lays down the general rule that a search
and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is
deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such
evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PCGPINEDA, RN, MAN 2015

purpose in any proceeding.
Page | 47
The voluntary confession of ownership of marijuana
was in violation of the custodial rights because of
the absence of competent and independent counsel,
and thus, inadmissible too. In sum, both the object
evidence and the testimonial evidence as to the
appellant’s voluntary confession of ownership of the
prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant’s
guilt failed to meet the test of constitutional
competence. Without these, the prosecution’s
remaining evidence did not even approximate the
quantum of evidence necessary to warrant
appellant’s conviction. Hence, the presumption of
innocence on his favor stands.

PEOPLE VS MULETA
309 SCRA 148 (1999)

PEOPLE VS TAN
286 SCRA 600 (2000)
PEOPLE VS BANIQUET
341 SCRA 600 (2000)
2. Duty of police during custodial investigation; procedure
CONST (1987) ART III SEC 12

PEOPLE VS RODRIGUEZ
341 SCRA 25 (2000)

MIRANDA VS ARIZONA
384 US 436 (1966)

PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO
305 SCRA 740 (1999)

PEOPLE VS OBRERO
332 SCRA 190

RA 7438 SEC 2 PAR 2 "Custodial investigation" shall include the practice of
issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Cf: BABST VS NIB
132 SCRA 31 (1984)

PEOPLE VS DUERO
104 SCRA 379
Cf; PEOPLE VS ORDONO
334 SCRA 673 (2000)

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