Auto Accident Jury Instructions
Content
Auto accident jury instructions
Plaintiff’s Request for Jury Instructions
Source publication: Massachusetts Tort Law Manual Publication Date: 11/04/2009 EXHIBIT 10D-Plaintiff’s Request for Jury Instructions 1. Negligence is the failure to exercise the degree of care that a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances. Morgan v. Lalumiere, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 267, review denied, 398 Mass. 1103 (1986). 2. A negligent party is liable for the actual and proximate consequences of his or her negligent act. Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 251, 254-55 (1935). 3. When a negligent party causes injury to an individual who has a preexisting disease or weakened physical condition, and that injury aggravates the preexisting disease or weakened physical condition, the negligent party is liable for the resulting aggravation of the preexisting disease or weakened physical condition McGrath v. G & P Thread Corp., 353 Mass. 60, 63 (1967); Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 251, 256 (1935). 4. An individual may recover from a negligent party when the negligent party’s actions triggered a worsening of the individual’s diseased or weakened physical condition, even though such a worsening of that individual’s physical condition would have occurred at no very remote date from other causes. Edwards v. Warwick, 317 Mass. 573, 577-78 (1945). 5. A negligent party is responsible for the harmful results of the combined effects of his or her negligent acts and an individual’s preexisting disease or weakened physical condition. McGrath v. G & P Thread Corp., 353 Mass. 60, 63 (1967); Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 252, 256 (1935). 6. If you find that one or all of the injuries alleged by the Plaintiff were caused either solely by the Defendant’s negligence or as a result of the combined effect of the Defendant’s negligent act and Plaintiff’s preexisting disease and/or weakened condition, you must award damages to the Plaintiff for medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of function and loss of earning capacity both incurred from the date of the accident and reasonably likely to persist in the
future. Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279 (1943). 7. If you find that the Defendant negligently caused the injury or aggravation of a preexisting disease or condition as a result of this accident, then the Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the following money damages: a. The Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable value of medical expenses incurred since the date of the accident, and those reasonably expected to be incurred by him or her in the future. Berube v. Selectmen of Edgartown, 336 Mass. 634 (1958). b. The Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for his or her loss of earning capacity since the date of the accident, and for loss that is reasonably likely to persist into the future. Nisbet v. Medaglia, 356 Mass. 580 (1970); Truong v. Wong, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 868, 876 (2002). • The Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated an amount of money that would fairly, justly and fully compensate him or her for all the pain and suffering, both physical and mental, that the Plaintiff has suffered and will reasonably continue to suffer as a result of this accident. Cochran v. City of Boston, 211 Mass. 171 (1912). •
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8. "The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, have due regard to the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and condition of the highway." 720 C.M.R. § 9.06(7). 9. If you find that the Defendant violated a statute, rule or regulation in the operation of a motor vehicle, it is evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant as to all consequences that the statute, rule or regulation was intended to prevent. Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 516 (1929). 10. The violation of a statute, rule or regulation in the operation of a motor vehicle may be the cause of a person’s injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident where the unlawful or forbidden element in the operator’s conduct complained of is found to be the cause of the accident and resulting injuries. Stowe v. Mason, 289 Mass. 577 (1935). 11. In a rear-end collision between the front of the Defendant’s automobile and the rear of the Plaintiff’s vehicle, a finding of the Defendant’s negligence may be warranted on slight evidence of circumstances. Lech v. Escobar, 318 Mass. 711, 713 (1945); Jennnings v. Bragdon, 289 Mass. 595, 597 (1935); Hendler v. Coffey, 278 Mass. 339 (1932).
12. If you find that the Defendant failed to use reasonable care in all the circumstances by operating his or her motor vehicle at such a speed and at such a distance behind the Plaintiff’s vehicle that he or she was unable to stop and avoid a collision when he or she knew or ought to have anticipated that said vehicle had stopped or might stop, then you may find that the Defendant was negligent. Murphy v. New England Transportation Co., 273 Mass. 275, 276 (1930). 13. The Defendant owed a duty to use reasonable and ordinary care in all the circumstances with respect to the operation of a motor vehicle. Murphy v. New England Transportation Co., 273 Mass. 275, 276 (1930). 14. Reasonable care has been described as such care as person of reasonable, ordinary sense, prudence and capacity would exercise under similar circumstance. Inhabitants of Shrewsbury v. Smith, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 177 (1853); Anderson v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., 56 Mass. App. Ct. 919 (2002). 15. The reasonable person of ordinary prudence never takes unreasonable risk. Liability in negligence is founded on unreasonable risk taking. Luz v. Stop & Shop Inc., of Peabody, 348 Mass. 198 (1964). The circumstances of an automobile collision may create a reasonable inference, based on common experience, that it would not nave occurred if the operator of the colliding vehicle had been careful. Harrington v. Central Greyhound Lines Inc., 336 Mass. 436 (1957). 1. You may draw reasonable inferences from the facts that you find based on the evidence. 2. A plaintiff who has sustained physical injuries through the fault of a defendant is entitled to recover fair compensation for the injuries sustained, which include past, present and future pain and suffering endured by him or her, mental distress, emotional distress and apprehension arising from the injuries; and reasonable expenses incurred by him or her for medical care and treatment of his or her injuries, loss of function, the loss of amenities of life and the diminution of earning capacity. Rodger v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 280 (1943); Choicener v. Walters Amusement Agency, Inc., 209 Mass. 341, 343-44 (1929); Adams v. United States, 964 F. Supp. 511, 525 (D. Mass. 1996). 3. A defendant takes his or her victim as he or she finds him or her. If you find that the automobile collision was the fault of the Defendant and that, as a result of the collision, a preexisting condition of the Plaintiff was aggravated, then the Defendant is still liable. Pierce v. Nawn, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 226 (1977).
Plaintiff’s Request for Jury Instructions
Source publication: Massachusetts Tort Law Manual Publication Date: 11/04/2009 EXHIBIT 10D-Plaintiff’s Request for Jury Instructions 1. Negligence is the failure to exercise the degree of care that a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances. Morgan v. Lalumiere, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 267, review denied, 398 Mass. 1103 (1986). 2. A negligent party is liable for the actual and proximate consequences of his or her negligent act. Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 251, 254-55 (1935). 3. When a negligent party causes injury to an individual who has a preexisting disease or weakened physical condition, and that injury aggravates the preexisting disease or weakened physical condition, the negligent party is liable for the resulting aggravation of the preexisting disease or weakened physical condition McGrath v. G & P Thread Corp., 353 Mass. 60, 63 (1967); Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 251, 256 (1935). 4. An individual may recover from a negligent party when the negligent party’s actions triggered a worsening of the individual’s diseased or weakened physical condition, even though such a worsening of that individual’s physical condition would have occurred at no very remote date from other causes. Edwards v. Warwick, 317 Mass. 573, 577-78 (1945). 5. A negligent party is responsible for the harmful results of the combined effects of his or her negligent acts and an individual’s preexisting disease or weakened physical condition. McGrath v. G & P Thread Corp., 353 Mass. 60, 63 (1967); Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 252, 256 (1935). 6. If you find that one or all of the injuries alleged by the Plaintiff were caused either solely by the Defendant’s negligence or as a result of the combined effect of the Defendant’s negligent act and Plaintiff’s preexisting disease and/or weakened condition, you must award damages to the Plaintiff for medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of function and loss of earning capacity both incurred from the date of the accident and reasonably likely to persist in the
future. Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279 (1943). 7. If you find that the Defendant negligently caused the injury or aggravation of a preexisting disease or condition as a result of this accident, then the Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the following money damages: a. The Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable value of medical expenses incurred since the date of the accident, and those reasonably expected to be incurred by him or her in the future. Berube v. Selectmen of Edgartown, 336 Mass. 634 (1958). b. The Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for his or her loss of earning capacity since the date of the accident, and for loss that is reasonably likely to persist into the future. Nisbet v. Medaglia, 356 Mass. 580 (1970); Truong v. Wong, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 868, 876 (2002). • The Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated an amount of money that would fairly, justly and fully compensate him or her for all the pain and suffering, both physical and mental, that the Plaintiff has suffered and will reasonably continue to suffer as a result of this accident. Cochran v. City of Boston, 211 Mass. 171 (1912). •
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8. "The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, have due regard to the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and condition of the highway." 720 C.M.R. § 9.06(7). 9. If you find that the Defendant violated a statute, rule or regulation in the operation of a motor vehicle, it is evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant as to all consequences that the statute, rule or regulation was intended to prevent. Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 516 (1929). 10. The violation of a statute, rule or regulation in the operation of a motor vehicle may be the cause of a person’s injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident where the unlawful or forbidden element in the operator’s conduct complained of is found to be the cause of the accident and resulting injuries. Stowe v. Mason, 289 Mass. 577 (1935). 11. In a rear-end collision between the front of the Defendant’s automobile and the rear of the Plaintiff’s vehicle, a finding of the Defendant’s negligence may be warranted on slight evidence of circumstances. Lech v. Escobar, 318 Mass. 711, 713 (1945); Jennnings v. Bragdon, 289 Mass. 595, 597 (1935); Hendler v. Coffey, 278 Mass. 339 (1932).
12. If you find that the Defendant failed to use reasonable care in all the circumstances by operating his or her motor vehicle at such a speed and at such a distance behind the Plaintiff’s vehicle that he or she was unable to stop and avoid a collision when he or she knew or ought to have anticipated that said vehicle had stopped or might stop, then you may find that the Defendant was negligent. Murphy v. New England Transportation Co., 273 Mass. 275, 276 (1930). 13. The Defendant owed a duty to use reasonable and ordinary care in all the circumstances with respect to the operation of a motor vehicle. Murphy v. New England Transportation Co., 273 Mass. 275, 276 (1930). 14. Reasonable care has been described as such care as person of reasonable, ordinary sense, prudence and capacity would exercise under similar circumstance. Inhabitants of Shrewsbury v. Smith, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 177 (1853); Anderson v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., 56 Mass. App. Ct. 919 (2002). 15. The reasonable person of ordinary prudence never takes unreasonable risk. Liability in negligence is founded on unreasonable risk taking. Luz v. Stop & Shop Inc., of Peabody, 348 Mass. 198 (1964). The circumstances of an automobile collision may create a reasonable inference, based on common experience, that it would not nave occurred if the operator of the colliding vehicle had been careful. Harrington v. Central Greyhound Lines Inc., 336 Mass. 436 (1957). 1. You may draw reasonable inferences from the facts that you find based on the evidence. 2. A plaintiff who has sustained physical injuries through the fault of a defendant is entitled to recover fair compensation for the injuries sustained, which include past, present and future pain and suffering endured by him or her, mental distress, emotional distress and apprehension arising from the injuries; and reasonable expenses incurred by him or her for medical care and treatment of his or her injuries, loss of function, the loss of amenities of life and the diminution of earning capacity. Rodger v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 280 (1943); Choicener v. Walters Amusement Agency, Inc., 209 Mass. 341, 343-44 (1929); Adams v. United States, 964 F. Supp. 511, 525 (D. Mass. 1996). 3. A defendant takes his or her victim as he or she finds him or her. If you find that the automobile collision was the fault of the Defendant and that, as a result of the collision, a preexisting condition of the Plaintiff was aggravated, then the Defendant is still liable. Pierce v. Nawn, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 226 (1977).
