Automated Elections

I. Definition and Description of Technology Computerized voting is a superior form of casting ballots. It allows for fairer and faster voting. It takes many forms with different processes but how it is implemented depends on the technological facilities allocated for the elections procedure. Automated election system (AES) is a system that uses appropriate technology to accomplish and aid such tasks as voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral process. Republic Act No. 9369, which is the Amended Elections Automation Law provides for the use of two forms of AES. The first is a paper-based election system defined as ―a type of automated election system that uses paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates, canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count.‖ It uses the Optical Mark Reader (OMR) Technology. Here, the voters have to shade the oval which corresponds to their candidate of choice using pencil in a specially scanned paper ballot. It is composed of 2 Laptops, 2 Digital Scanners, 2 card readers, 1 hub and 1 printer. The votes in the shaded ballots will then be scanned and counted using an Automated Counting Machine (ACM). This kind of technology is pretty much familiar in the Philippines. It is used in the National Secondary Aptitude Test (NSAT), formerly the National College Entrance Examination (NCEE), given by the Department of Education (DepEd), and in the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Licensure Examinations and other examinations given by the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), wherein the answer sheet is composed of ovals and the oval corresponding to the chosen answer would be shaded by the examinee. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) for its Lotto system, wherein the ovals, corresponding to the numbers being bet upon, are also shaded, employs a similar system. In all these, the answer sheets and the lotto cards are read, or counted, by the OMR. Because of its familiarity, and because it makes use of ballots which is what most Filipinos are familiar to, this system was recommended as the most suitable for the Philippine setting. The second form is the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE). It is defined as ―a type of automated election system that uses electronic ballots, records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of a computer program, records voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically.‖ voters are provided with a Voting Pad where the photos of candidates can be selected by pressing on the desired picture. Once the vote is final, a receipt is generated after pressing ‗BOTO‗. The Board of Election Inspectors keeps the receipt just in case there are complaints raised. However, DRE Technology can only be deployed in areas where communications is available and reliable. The first automated election was held in ARMM last August 11, 2008. There were a lot of ―firsts‖ during this historical event: First fraud-free election in more than half a century; first time the winning candidates were proclaimed in less than two days after election day; first to use electronic voting and transmission machines in a Philippine electoral exercise; first time election results have been uncontested; first elections with practically no reports of voter disenfranchisement; and first elections where the rate of failure of elections is less than 1 percent. Voters‘ turnout was greater than expected, reaching 90% of the expected voting population.

On February 25, UP Diliman(UPD) held its first campus-wide computerized University Student Council (USC) elections. The open source voting system, called ―Halalan‖, was created by the UP Linux Users Group (UnPLUG), a student organization at the College of Engineering (CoE). The colleges provided the computers for the elections. The voting process started with students presenting their IDs or Form-5s to attending poll clerks, who checked the list of valid voters. Students on the list then received their passwords from the poll clerks and proceeded to unoccupied voting stations. Using their student numbers and the passwords provided as login information, they opened their electronic ballots and marked the boxes of their chosen candidates. Once they clicked the confirm button, their votes were final and they were automatically logged out. The system allows voters to log in again but only to check their votes, not change them. The first working prototype of Halalan was created in January 2005 and presented to UPD student councils and student publications later that month at the Palma Hall Lobby. Its first application in the USC elections was at the CoE and the School of Statistics in 2007. A year later, the College of Business Administration, the College of Mass Communication, and the School of Library and Information Science also adopted the system. II. Providers of the Technology Computerized elections would not be possible without Republic Act No. 9369 and the lawmakers behind it. But, ultimately, this new system of voting cannot be implemented without the technology need to run the whole system. As far as the government is concerned, making such provisions is the extent of their ability to provide computerized elections. A third party is needed to fully implement the Act by providing the government and the Philippines with the technology needed to run the elections. Here is where the technology providers come in. Different firms have showed interest in providing the machinery and computers for the Philippines‘ automated elections. 11 of which are foreign companies, though only one of them will be chosen and be given the contract through a series of bidding. These are US firms Sequioa, Avante, ES/S, Hart and Scantron; Venezuela‘s Smartmatic; United Kingdom‘s DRS; India‘s Bharat; South Korea‘s DVS Korea; Gilat Solution of Israel and Spain‘s Indra System. Whoever gets the contract will be renting out about 80,000 machines that will be used for the 2010 elections. Two of these providers have already serviced the elections here in the Philippines, specifically the ARMM elections. Venezuela‘s Smartmatic provided the DRE – Direct Recording Electronic technology which uses an Automated Voting Machine (AVM) and allows voters to choose their candidates on an electronic voting pad and confirm their choices using a simple touch screen system. The Smartmatic SAES4000 system is a combination of hardware with secure software and manned by highly qualified human resources that enables it to ensure fault less elections. Smartmatic joined forces with Strategic Alliance Holdings, Inc. (SAHI), a fully Filipino owned technology provider specializing in the provision of IT solutions to both the public and private sectors, to form SMARTMATIC-SAHI Technology, Inc. Together; they provided the necessary technology and IT solutions for the automation ARMM elections and if given the contract again, they may as well provide the technology and technical expertise for the 2010 national elections. Another provider in the ARMM elections and a bidder for the contract for the 2010 elections is Avante International Technology, Inc. They provided the OMR – Optical Mark Reader technology. Their very own, AVANTE's PATENTED OPTICAL-VOTE-TRAKKER® is an optical scan system that enables scanning of

paper ballots that are captured as digital ballot images for faster, easier and error free tallying. Avante also provided Automated Counting Machine (ACM) to be used in tallying the votes. ―The AVANTE ACM system also has a patented and proven capability to detect and reject counterfeit or fake ballots‖ III. Users of the Technology Being the little brother of the United States of America in Asia, the Philippines and we, Filipinos, always had the notion of what a country should be. It should be for the people, by the people and of the people in other words, democratic. We have toppled administrations that we did not approve of and by peaceful means at that. The users of the technology, Online Elections, would be the Filipino people in general and also, in a way it can be a step by step process in which, it can be first implemented in school elections then, the local elections, and the national elections is the last step. As Filipinos, we hate knowing that we are being taken advantage of whether be it in terms elections or anything in general. We hate that we are being governed by unworthy people and people who are not deserving of the position. How then are they able to achieve such feats? We can‘t be possibly sure but a rational explanation would be that we are being cheated in the elections. And thus, by applying this technology we are able to prevent this from happening. The users will benefit from it and the country as a whole because the integrity of the elections would be objectified and strengthened. The public will also be satisfied because faster results are guaranteed by the usage of automated and online elections. The government will also be benefited because lesser costs will have to be allocated for the elections in the long run. The initial costs might be high because of the need for technology and infrastructure upgrades and manpower training, but the succeeding costs in the next elections will be lower. However, there is also one thing that is hindering us from achieving this goal of ours, which is the digital divide, mainly because of poverty. The problem with online voting systems is that those who do not have any experience or knowledge on using or manipulating computers would find it hard and tedious to vote through computers and as such will have a harder time to cast their ballots. This might lead to lesser voter turnouts, hence, lesser participation from the general public that might affect the usefulness of the elections. This might be a hindrance to our being democratic and liberal as a people because we might accidentally shut down those who are illiterate in computers by implementing an online platform for the elections. The voters should be well informed and prepared for such adaptation of technology. As Information Technology advances here in the Philippines, the group believes that, we will be able to lessen the digital divide as an effect of online voting, as a consequence of the implementation of online voting. This will be a simultaneous effect because the government and the people are now more pressured to learn and be well versed in ICT because it is now a prerequisite to exercise their voting rights. In short, it is a two-pronged spear that would have exponential benefits when implemented rightfully. IV. Technology Assessment A. Readiness of the Philippines to Adapt to an Online Platform of Elections Is the Philippines ready for automated election? Are we ready for something new? First, let us discuss the advantages and disadvantages that will emerge if our country engages with an automated election. Smartmatic (also referred as Smartmatic Corp. or Smartmatic International) is

a multinational corporation founded in 2000 that specializes in the design and deployment of complex purpose-specific technology solutions. It is organized around three business areas: Electronic voting systems, integrated security systems, and biometric systems for people registration and authentication for government applications. Smartmatic offers the Smartmatic Automated Election System (SAES), a unified voting, scrutiny, tabulation, allocation and result broadcast solution -suitable for any type of election- which was officially released in 2003. In addition to the many benefits of the SAES system, its most outstanding advantage lies in the guarantee of total transparency in any given electoral or referendum process. SAES offers the possibility to verify and audit results through different means, guaranteeing zero numerical inconsistencies between all stages covered by every single vote, from actual casting to final scrutiny. Smartmatic provides us other benefits and advantages if we will deal with automation of election. 1. Financial Savings Though automated elections deals with acquiring computer, hence will cost a large amount of money, it can still cut cost in other expenses, i.e. labor cost. Since the computer would do the counting. That means fewer laborers are needed. Normally, automation requires a large up-front investment in hardware and software, as well as expensive training of electoral workers and running educational campaigns for voters. Automated elections guarantees short- and long-term returns that can greatly compensate for the initial investment. 2. Increased speed and efficiency of electoral task and faster electoral results The computer to be used has internal tools that can increase speed and efficiency for some important works during the election. Also, using computers would make the election itself faster. Voting manually would consume time for the voters to write name of the candidates, etc. Also, with vast advancement of technology, the machine/ computer has a tool that can count the votes faster and more accurate. Using computers/machines, they would be the one to tally and transmit the votes to the electoral board without human intervention. The automated electoral system mechanisms significantly reduce the chances of errors, because vote counting is based on an internal machine count rather than on individual ballots, which can be tampered with. 3. Improved capacity to identify and prevent frauds With the system using ultra-safe encryption algorithms to store and transmit each vote from the SAES voting machine to the tabulation centers, tampering of votes will be prevented and the integrity of the elections would be higher. On the other hand, one of the disadvantages of using computers/ machine in election is the broad knowledge of man in terms of technology. Though computers may have high securities, there are many computer ―geeks‖ that can bombard the computers and the system as a whole. They have many ways to hack those computers to be used in the elections. Hackers are the number one enemy of this system. Hackers are known to infiltrate and manipulate even the most sophisticated computer programs in the world. Also, technology, though seems to be perfect, may still have errors in its components. We all know that no computer system is 100% tamper-proof, or foolproof. We are not sure that it,

the automated election, may give us the best results of the elections. Also, can this system eliminate other election-related problems like vote buying? Presented with the advantages and disadvantages, another question may arise, will the people of the Philippines be able to adapt to the new system? In the present generation, people became more literate, especially with the use of computer. Having had computer lessons during elementary and secondary education, even in public schools, people know the basics on the use of computer. One survey conducted was that about 25 million Filipinos are using computers and the internet, mostly in developed cities. Though some are underprivileged, they still have access on computers through internet cafés. However, that is in the urban area. How about in the rural and the isolated area? We all know that the Philippines is a developing country, and many areas here do not permit people to have a technology-integrated lives. ****Especially in the province, many indigenous ethnic groups do not know how to use computer, nor, do they know how to read and write. So, how can these people adapt to the new system? They need time to learn. Also, some areas here in the Philippines do not have electricity. In those areas, for sure, they would conduct manual voting.**** It is not consistent that some areas will have automated election, while some have manual elections. Actually, last August 2008, the ARMM conducted their elections. They used a new system of automation. Hence, the COMELEC said that the election was a success. COMELEC Jose Melo said he was ―very, very satisfied‖ with the conduct of the elections in the ARMM, dubbed the ―cheating capital‖ of the Philippines. And less than 24 hours, more than half of the poll results were in with the COMELEC. As what we discussed earlier, automated election would increase speed and efficiency, like what the ARMM election has experienced. Actually, this automated election in ARMM is an experiment for the 2010 National election. If the ARMM election is a success, would be the National Election on 2010 be a success with the use of computer? We‘ll find out since the President signed the law that passed Republic Act No. 9525 appropriating 11.3-billion supplemental budget for the full automation of the elections, a first in Philippine history. Hence, that is next year, we will see if the Philippines will be capable of having an automated election. B. General Feasibility of Online Elections in the Philippines Is it Feasible? If one out of ten Filipinos have no ability to read and write at the same time, is it possible for the Philippines to have automated elections? Let us remember that for the past decades, Filipinos have successfully voted even though some do not know how to read and write. Clearly, the Philippines will be pushing through with the automated elections by the year 2010. An automated election will be feasible in the Philippines with the right and proper technology or system to be used. There are certain problems that it might encounter. Electricity in the rural areas of the Philippines is not always available; if it is available it is not that reliable. If the Commission on Elections will use Direct Recording Equipment Process there would be a problem in deploying the hundreds of thousands of units to different locations all through out the Philippines. A number of technical personnel are needed to install the system. The government already provided a budget for the transmission of the machines as well as payments needed for the technical personnel. All the voters must be trained to

use the DRE system. According to Senator Gordon, Filipinos are smart enough to participate in an automated election. He also suggested that an automated election is going to be more feasible if there would be a national ID system based on Is it Feasible to be able to come up with a check and balance so that cheating would not be prevalent? It is feasible. An automated election, for a fact, cannot fully prevent cheating but only certain forms of it could be prevented through check and balance. It is also a fact that there is no system that is tamper proof. The following are plausible forms of check and balance: paper audit trail of ballots, protection of software source code, no switching of ballot boxes, the testing of the technologies, and the addition of some amendments on the Senate Bill No. 2231. The Automated Election Bill in the Philippines requires that there should be a voter verifiable paper audit trail. This feature of the bill will reduce the incidents of vote buying and increase the s ecurity and credibility of the people‘s votes. The voter verifiable audit trail enables the voters to review and edit their votes. On the same note the right amount of protection on the automated elections' software source code would prevent hackers on hacking on to the computers for counting and thus prevents the tampering on the number of votes. On the old system, manual transmissions of ballot boxes allow the possibility of ballot switching but with the new system, it would be prevented. Another way to check if it is feasible to have an automated election without cheating to be prevalent is to test the technology itself. The technology should be checked if it is efficient and if it works the way it should be to further eliminate certain problems with it. By testing the technology, COMELEC will know beforehand if the system can be tampered as well as its errors. The Senate approved Senate Bill No. 2231, the Amendment to the Election Automation Law states additional security for the random auditing of the system and system for recount. Other kinds of check and balance are instead of writing the name, voters marks the candidate of their choice, the voter should physically feed the ballot into the machine where the ballot has its picture taken, the election returns are proposed to be automatically transmitted, the OMR machines should not be equip with any kind of communication devices, there should be seven copies of the ER to be sent to different computers, COMELEC would provide PC‘s for the different parties so that they can follow the tabulation, and the statement of vote would be projected in each canvassing center so that the watchers can compare the totals.

V. Conclusion The paper discussed the advent of online elections that would probably dawn on us, Filipinos, next elections. It provided a background on the basics of online/automated elections, the components needed to make it possible, the methods that would be employed to guarantee the integrity safety of the votes, a discussion on the general feasibility as grounded to the advantages and disadvantages of the technology, and everything was then contextualized to fit the circumstances of the Philippines. It can then be concluded that online/automated/computerized elections can be possible in the Philippines if sufficient training and preparations are employed in spearheading it. The long-term benefits of the said platform for voting greatly exceed the initial technological and training costs that it would entail making it a feasible investment in the future for our country. But even if this new voting platform is grounded on technology and is streamlined by modernity, it is still

not foolproof. Many problems were discussed regarding the possibility of hacking and the crashing of the system but it can still be considered safer than the manual voting system that we have been implementing for so long now. The problem of digital divide was also alluded to the discussion. The Philippines, as a developing country, has regions and groups of people that are deprived of technology and proper training and education. This might lead to an accidental and virtual exclusion of these people and towns from the up and coming online elections, which might possibly make lessen the voters‘ turnout and the whole democracy of ou r elections. It can also be deduced that the implementation of the online elections will not only strengthen the integrity of our votes but in the process close the digital divide that we are experiencing right now. By training our people to use ICT, we are making them ready to use it for more things to come-not just for mere electoral usage. To end, our country might be a long way to go from being industrialized and fully prepared to reap the benefits of ICT in every major part of our everyday lives, but the conduct of the 2010 online/automated elections is a still a big step forward towards the achievement of a truly democratic and honest elections and the closure of the digital divide as a whole. Our infrastructures might not be at par to other countries and our people might not be fully informed and trained yet, but these shortcomings can be greatly remedied if we are equipped with the willingness to learn and adapt to our ever-changing world. Election Automation -- Motivations This section we will discuss a variety of reasons for automating various parts of the electoral process. In order to make the best use of technology in a given jurisdiction, it is important to understand the motivations that are driving automation initiatives. It is also important to remember that automation cannot solve all electoral problems. Indeed there are many situations in which automation is not necessary or even useful. One aspect that too often is neglected when discussing the pros and cons of election automation is the EMBs importance as educator of the representative democratic system. It is true that under certain conditions automation of the electoral process and the work of the EMB are valid. But we should not ignore the short-and long-term affect that having ordinary people involved in the electoral process has on the elections. By employing vast number of people as registrants and verifiers of signatures for candidates and parties; registration clerks of the voters' roll, and members of local election committees all over the country the EMB is reaching into a very large number of households in a country. What they learn during their training and experience in their work is shared and discussed with families and friends at dinner tables and social events for months leading up to election day. We sometimes tend to forget that in many countries, the EMBs are indirectly conveying a bulk of the voter education and voter information messages via their temporary employees. Hence, when introducing new technologies in an electoral process in emerging democracies resulting in a reduction of the workforce, we must be aware that the voter education and voter information budget have to be adjusted too. Some common motivations for election automation include:
 

saving money increasing the speed and efficiency of election-related tasks

    

increasing the speed of obtaining election results improving the accuracy of election results improving the ability to identify and prevent fraud improving public confidence in the electoral process demonstrating 'high-tech' capabilities32

Saving Money Election automation can potentially save money by reducing labor costs associated with an election. Cost savings can be realized through automated vote counting as well as automating other election-related tasks. In the future systems that let voters vote from home, business, or public-access computers may reduce costs associated with setting up and staffing polling locations. However, it is important for election administrators to do a comprehensive cost analysis before assuming that automation will save them money. Automation requires a significant initial investment in computer hardware and software as well as expenses to train election personnel and educate voters. Computer equipment requires ongoing maintenance and will need to be periodically upgraded or replaced. Computers that are used only on election day will need to be safely stored between elections. And equipment may need to be transported from storage to voting and tallying sites on election day. Increasing the Speed and Efficiency of Electoral Tasks At various stages of the electoral process, election administrators are required to handle large quantities of data, and under tight deadlines. Therefore they should constantly be on the lookout for potential improvements. There are a variety of tools that can increase the speed and efficiency ofelection-related tasks. Vendors offer technology solutions that can:
        

automate election planning, managing, budgeting, and record keeping draw precinct boundaries and assign voters to precincts verify and count signatures on petitions provide information to candidates, parties, and voters monitor and prepare reports on campaign contributions and spending register voters and create voter identification cards authenticate voters at voting sites manage absentee voting, including verifying signatures on absentee ballot envelopes record votes, count ballots, and transmit local tallies to central tallying facilities



disseminate election results33

Increasing the Speed of Obtaining Election Results Election automation can greatly reduce the time it takes to count ballots and obtain election results. If voters enter their votes directly into a computer or ballots are tallied at precinct locations, precinct tallies may be automatically transferred to tallying centers and results obtained almost immediately after the polls close. Even if ballots are not tallied locally, automated methods of ballot counting provide great time savings over hand counting. Improving the Accuracy of Election Results One of the core issues resulting in heated discussions in the courtrooms and TV studios in the US in the end of 2000 was the accuracy of the various counting techniques employed in the different counties. President George W. Bush's Director of Communication argued that hand counting votes was not a reliable method, and should be discouraged. Too much subjectivity was involved in that process, and therefore machine counts should be used, it was alleged. In order for technical machines to live up to our high expectation they however must be thoroughly tested and maintained, and the administrators and voters using them must be adequately trained in order to operate them correctly. If this is the case, then machines could potentially be able to provide more accurate results than can be provided by hand-counted ballots. Furthermore, when voters enter their votes directly into a computer, inaccuracies introduced as a result of voters' unclear ballot marks can be eliminated. It is important to remember, however, that problems with computer hardware or software may also introduce extensive errors. Improving the Ability to Identify and Prevent Fraud Automated systems can reduce opportunities for some kinds of election fraud. Fraud may be reduced if voted ballots need not be physically transported, if computerised voter registration logs make it easier to identify people who should not be registered or who attempt to vote using someone else's registration, or if all computer system accesses are thoroughly logged. Of course, computerised voting opens up opportunities for new types of voting fraud. Computer files can be destroyed due to viruses or erased by hackers. In addition, it is much more difficult for local and international observers to verify and control that data has not been manipulated. Thus, it is essential that extensive precautions be taken. Improving Public Confidence in the Electoral Process If members of the public trust technology and believe that its use will prevent fraud, they may have more confidence in the electoral process. If people distrust technology, however, or if technology used in an election proves difficult to use or fails, people are likely to lose confidence in the electoral process. Demonstrating 'High-Tech' Capabilities Many elected officials are enthusiastic about computerised voting simply because they want to project a 'high-tech' image for their administration or for their state or country. This is not a good

reason for automation if it is the only one for automation. When accompanied by other reasons, however, this motivation may help drive financial allocations and legislation that might be necessary to realise election automation. I. Introduction

It is a proven fact that during Philippine elections a lot of comments occur. The kind of election here in the Philippines is very different from the others. We were astonished to the US presidential election last year which Barack Obama won. It was an astonishing event that the world has ever seen. But, what made us astonished is that it took only few hours to proclaim the next president of the most powerful nation in the world. Polls were computerized, everything was so organized. Now it made us think that if computerized voting system is being forwarded for approval in the Philippines for the 2010 election. To us, it will be a nice move by the government to gain back the trust of the nation. Every election in the Philippines was seemed to be dirty and bloody. And with that computerized voting scheme, the upcoming election won‘t repeat what happened to the previous years. Votes back them were counted manually by underpaid public school teachers. And when evening comes, the next day, people would hear in news that a precinct staff was murdered and the ballot box stolen. This is actually so common here. And even before the election a candidate would be in the news, ambushed, murdered and forced to step down. That is how dirty politics here. Now back to the computerized election, it is a very great idea to keep the election clean. We are now living in a high technology world and it is about time that the country makes use of high-tech equipment to significantly reduce the many problems that Philippine‘s suffered during election. Statement of the problem

1. What is a computerized election system? 2. When was the first computerized election used in the Philippines? 3. What is the difference between a manual and computerized election? 4. What are the three methods of voting? 5. How does a computerized election work? 6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using a computerized election?

Objective of the study

1. To inform the students on what is a computerized election system. 2. To know what is the difference and which is better between manual and computerized election. 3. To know how it would lessen the burden during Philippine election. 4. To know the advantages and disadvantages of computerized election. 5. To know how computerized election work.

Importance of the study

Every election in the Philippine was seemed to be dirty and bloody. The kind of election we don‘t want to, for it is now the time to change the level of voting here in the Philippines. Computerized election could be a turning point for the country to be successful in many elections to come. This study will prove on how computerized election could help the kind of election, that Philippine has. In addition, this study can show the different reasons why computerized election is important to the country. However, this study could also show the disadvantages of using computerized election. The main purpose of this study is to inform every voter on how computerized election helps the kind of election that Philippine has.

Review of Related Literature

A. Definition of computerized election Computerized election system is defined as vote counting process using electronic devices such as computers. According to an act authorizing the Commission on Elections, they should conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and pilot-test it in March 1996 election in the ARMM and for other purposes (http://www.COMELEC.com). A. Difference between manual and computerized election To differentiate manual from computerized election, let us first define manual election. Manual election is defined as a system that count votes using paper audits stored by a ballot box. In addition, manual election usually takes a long time before proclaiming the winning candidate. It is a time consuming system, for it takes more than a month before the results are transmitted to the COMELEC. Lastly, manual election is counted by underpaid public school teachers, while computerized election is a system that counting and voting process is done by using a sufficient installed program into the computers. Unlike manual election, computerized election is easy and fast for the transmission of results is done by computers. In addition, computerized election usually takes a short period of time before proclaiming the winning candidate.

B. History of Computerized Election 1. The first computerized election happened during the presidential election of George W. Bush last November 02, 2004. Computerized voting machines were used to count the majority of the votes which the machines were built for and programmed by the companies such as DIEBOLD and ES&S tabulated the results in record time, showing, just minutes after the polls closed. ―This is an extraordinary achievement in grass -roots politics‖, said by some political analyst (http://www.confusionroad.com/article.php?). 2. Despite threats of postponement and intermittent skirmishers between rebel and government troops, the country‘s first computerized election has been conducted smoothly-though only in some parts of the troubled Mindanao region. The automated polls proceeded with minor problems on August 11, 20008, with about 85 percent of 10.5 million

registered voters casting their vote, according to election officials. The landmark election was confined within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an aggregation of areas n the southern island populated mostly by Muslim inhabitants. The Philippine government spent some 600 million pesos in the computerized election which served as a test-pilot for the country‘s general election in 2010. The COMELEC said, a few voting machines malfunctioned during the election but these were fixed promptly by the local contractors and it is declared a successful election. The COMELEC used two electronic voting systems for the polls: DRE (Direct Recording Electronics) system for the province of Maguindanao, and OMR (Optical Mark Reader) technology for the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Shariff Kabunsuan and Lanao del Sur. COMELEC spokesperson James Jimenez said in a blog post that ARMM poll was a significant milestone in the country‘s election reform, noting that voters showed enthusiasm in using automated voting machines amid security problems. In general, the first computerized election in the Philippines was successful and declared a milestone (http://www.completefirst.com)

II. Three methods to vote A. Paper ballots are still used as the primary way f voting in a number of countries. Voters mark their ballot by hand with an indelible marker (a marker that cannot be erased) or pen and place their finished ballot in a ballot box. Local election officials then count the votes by hand. B. Optical Scan Voting Systems enable votes to mark their choices on pre-printed ballots by either connecting ―arrows‖, or filling in ―bubbles‖ next to the candidates‘ names. The paper ballot is then counts the married ―bubbles‖ or ―arrows‖ on each ballot and automatically computes the total of each candidate and/or issue. C. DRE‘s (Direct Record Electronic System) enable voters to record their choices electronically directly into the machine. There are several types of DRE‘s (some have a dial while others use a touch screen) but, essentially they all enable voters to move back and forth between screens (ballot pages) to select the candidates and/or issues to whom they wish to vote. Once a voter has made his or her choices, the DRE provides a summary screen that presents those choices and gives the voter the ability to go back and make any changes before the pressing the ―vote‖ or ―cast ballot‖ button. One of the benefits of a DRE System is that prevents ―over voting‖ that is, it stops the voter from selecting two candidates or options in a race were only one is allowed. As well a DRE gives the voter an opportunity to correct ―under voting‖ or when he/she fails to select any candidate or option in race.

III. Process of computerized election

A. The validation system process The commission shall take such steps as many are necessary for the security and implementation of system promulgate for of computerized election. The commission shall take the security of the voters and the votes. Votes shall take the validation system to ensure the requirement in voting in a computer machine.

There are two factors to consider being valid for voting: 1. ID System It is the process that allow voters to have its ID card to make sure that the voter is valid. It could also be a proof that the voter is registered and legal to vote. 2. Scanning It is the process that computers check the identification of the voter to ensure the validation of the registered voter. Scanning can be considered as a double checker process, for it double the information of the voter. A. The tabulation process Tabulation process deals with the counting of the votes and the process of the transmission of the results. These include the consultation/canvassing and transmission of results. Two steps to consider in tabulating process: 1. The first step On election night at the central tabulation center, the memory card from each precinct as ballot box is entered into a computer. This computer takes the records of each ballot from the memory card and sorts them by precinct into separate files, one each for city, council, school committee and ballot question. The complete ballot files for each race or question are then copied unto a computer disk. Each ballot record consists of the candidates selected by the voter and the order in which they were ranked. 2. The second step The computer disk with the ballot files is installed in a second computer. This computer contains the software which contains the ballots. The software has been programmed to follow the ―Cambridge rules‖. By computer, the same process formerly carried out manually by more than a hundred counters over the course of a week is conducted in a matter of seconds by the electronic sorting, counting and transfer of votes. A. Election result process An ―unofficial first count of number one votes of each candidate for city council and school committee will be available on election night within minutes of receipt of the memory card from the last reporting precinct. This count is referred to as ―unofficial‖ because it does not

contain all ballots. The complete ballots records are then copied and read into the tabulation software were they are tallied. The software produces an ―unofficial first count‖ and then proceeds to distribute surplus and eliminate candidates with the least number of votes until all seats have been filled, the election commissioners declare the results.

IV. Advantages and Disadvantages of computerized election A. Advantages of computerized election 1. Initial recording of voter information Initial records of voter are stored to the program that is use for the voting process. With the help of computers, information of the voters can be easily traced by the Comelec official. 2. Secure storage of votes Through computers, the security of votes has been keep and protected for votes were safety saved by a memory card. This memory card can‘t be deleted easily by anyone. With the help of the machine the votes are secured and the retrieval process can be done easy and fast. 3. Maintaining the continuous list The continuous list of the voter‘s information was maintained, for the secure list of voters information was saved by the computers. 4. Printing copies of preliminary voter‘s list The printing copies of preliminary voter‘s list can be given directly to the area where voter‘s can vote. There would be an easy access for the voter‘s and without any delays the list can be shown to the voters. 5. Data entry to revise the preliminary voter‘s list The preliminary voter‘s list can be revise easily if ever there is a need for revision of the voter‘s list. 6. Maintaining record of the materials inventory The records of the materials inventory can be save and edited, with the help of the programs installed to the computers. 7. Printing copies of the final voters list The final copy of the voters list can be printed easily and fast to be given right away to the area it is assign. 8. General record keeping and maintenance The computer can keep records and maintenance safety by using the right program that protects the general records of the voters and the votes. 9. Identifying duplicate registrations

The computer can detect duplicate registration for the voters information is saved by the computers. 10. Producing statistics on voter registration The computer helps producing statistics on voter by geographic area, as well as by gender, age, etc. 11. Low cost and without wasting paper The computer helps in not wasting too much of paper, for the format of voting is done by computer. In addition, the cost of the election can be minimize for the computers counts votes easy and fast. 12. Keeping an audit trail of the changes made to each voter record. The audit trail of the changes made to each voter record can be quickly. For example, by whom a change was made, on the basis of what source information, what data were changed, which record attributes were affected. 13. Easy and Fast voting With computerized voting you would have several ways to vote. If you don‘t have a computer you would go to the place where you vote how and vote on the computers provided you to vote on. Voting at the polls will be as easy as it ever was, even easier. The computers at the polls will be set up easy to use. Within minutes after the polls close the computer totals the votes and the winner is displayed. Information is instantly available about what the totals were to each area. No waiting into the night for the results to be counted. The computers count it all up instantly. B. Disadvantages of computerized election 1. Fraud If wrong results can occur accidentally, they can also happen intentionally. Rigging has been suspected in various elections, but law suits have been unsuccessful. In many other cases, fraud could easily have taken place. For many years in Philippines, manual system overrides were necessary to compute the processing of no computerized precincts. With the adoption of computerized election the more tampering can occur. Computerized elections are being run or considered but it does not answer the problem of cheating during election. 2. Erroneous results Computer-related error occurs with alarming frequency in elections. Computerized elections can cause erroneous results for there is a possibility to attribute ―human error‖ and not ―computer error‖, and were presumably due to operators and hot programmers; however in the absence of dependable accountability, who can tell? Existing Standards for designing, testing, certifying, and operating computerized vote-counting system are inadequate and

voluntary, and provide few hard constraints, almost no accountability and no independent expert evaluations. 3. Privacy and confidentiality The transparency of voting can cause detection by those who want to cheat. The confidentiality of the votes won‘t be confidential anymore, for the results are done publicity. 4. Risk of theft Computerized elections can be a risk of theft, especially to those desperate candidates who can hire an expert. Hacking can be a problem in computerized election for there is a possibility in manipulating the votes. 5. Cost The cost of computerized election is expensive, that is why it is difficult for the country.

V. Conclusion Providing sufficient measures for computerized election we therefore conclude that: 1. Computerized election is a great idea to keep the election clean. 2. Computerized election is an opportunity to promote good, quality and clean voting process. 3. Computerized election will promote easy and fast voting unlike manual system. 4. Computerized election is a sufficient system to use in voting and counting process. 5. Computerized election helps eliminating manipulation of votes. 6. Computerized election will help in processing votes easy and fast.

7. Computerized election has more advantages than disadvantages. 8. Computerized election has disadvantages in conducting election. 9. Computerized election won‘t be sufficient if it will mis handled. 10. Computerized election in the Philippines will change the way of votinng process to a great way. There are advantages gained last time. But did it outweigh the disadvantages?

Automated Election: Are we ready? The Malacañang's Department of Budget and Management produce the P11.9 billion supplemental budget for this coming election which will be automated. Christian Monsod has been explaining how the Open Election System method of automation works. ―Monsod stressed that the proposed OES-based automated election system, combined with an optical mark recognition (OMR) technology, could cost government about P8 billion for the equipment and operations. If Comelec prefers getting the OES automated election system alone, it will cost around P4 billion." And he added that "The choice of automation technology and its successful implementation is key to the credibility of the elections." What was really the "Automated Election"? Based on the Senate Bill No. 2231: (13th Congress) which entitled: AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881, AS AMENDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTIONS LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. On section 2 on the said article defines the automated election system as: A system using appropriate technology for voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, transmission of election results and other processes in the conduct of electoral exercises. Equipments or components that are being used for Automated Election: 1. Counting machine - a machine that uses an optical scanning mark-sense reading 2. Data storage device - a device used to electronically store counting and device of any similar advanced technology to count ballots; canvassing results, such as, memory pack or diskette;

3. Computer set - a set of equipment containing regular components, i.e., monitor, central processing unit or CPU, keyboard and printer; 4. National Ballot - refers to the ballot to be used in the automated election system for the purpose of the May 1998 elections. This shall contain the names of the candidates for president, vice-president, senators and parties, organizations or coalitions participating under the party-list system; This ballot shall be counted by the counting machine: 5. Local Ballot - refers to the ballot on which the voter will manually write the names of the candidates of his/her choice for member of the House of Representatives, governor,vice-governor, members of the provincial board, mayor, vice-mayor, and members of the city municipal council. 6. Board of Election inspector - there shall be a Board of Election Inspectors in every precinct composed of three (3) regular members who shall conduct the voting, counting and recording of votes in the polling place. Many questions and complains arise from this issue such as:


How reliable can be the automated election system be? Some people said that anything that is being done through computerized would be easier to falsify. In the side of indigenous people it would be hard for them to vote if the election will be done automatically because some of them are illiterate.



Advantages of the system to this coming 2010 election:
  

There will be no ballot box snatching as the ERs are transmitted electronically for canvassing There is less work for the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) If all precincts are connected, national results can be produced within one hour after the close of voting There is automated tally of votes at the city/municipal level The DRE can include an automated voter validation system Canvassing at the city/municipal and provincial levels is almost instantaneous There is an instantaneous tally of votes at the precinct level Ballots are pre-printed and voters simply mark choices

    

Incoming Philippine Elections Pros and Cons of Automation The whole system itself will be more gullible to sabotage and nationwide fraud, in which the country is not proud to have a colorful background of. Certain methodology of nationwide cheating in the elections will be a lot easier compared when it is manual. In a simple click or

push of a button it is possible to completely alter the results in favor of a specific party. The sacred votes will be treated as data flowing through the air, which in this states becomes gullible and easy to manipulate especially in today's advancement in technology. Smartmatic--the official company responsible for automation--did a great job in designing the machines but it is not full proof. I may say it is a little disappointing. I applaud their design of incorporating back up plan in case of sabotage, nationwide blackout and other events but the ballot itself worries me. Their campaign ion educating the voters about the proper way of voting may be effective yet it is not enough. I hate to say it, but there will always be a small percentage of voters who will be intimidated about the system that they may not vote anymore because frankly the ballot is very complicated and sensitive. And there is another part of the system which may never both because of their inability to do so.

****It will make the elections faster because machines are a lot faster than human, but humans are more efficient than machines.**** The point here is we should watch for the balance of speed and efficiency to determine the election's transparency. POINTS: 1.The automation will be our milestone towards technological advancement and probably political transparency.

OPINION: The whole system of automation maybe a breakthrough in our society but it is not a full proof plan. We should keep our eyes open for sabotage because of our history. We should protect the election and keep its sacredness.

SUPER KADUPER!!!!! XD A SECOND LOOK ON THE 2010 PHILIPPINE AUTOMATED ELECTIONS By Romeo Cayabyab “Such success (of the 2010) elections is a credit to the hard work of Comelec and Smartmatic as well as the commitment of the people of the Philippines toward increasingly transparent elections. . . The creation of a comprehensive election law encompassing the amendments

regarding electoral technology would improve the transparency and efficiency of future election processes.― In short and reading between the lines of the Carter report, the 2010 automated elections were not transparent enough, nor efficient. On these conclusions and on other recommendations presented by the Carter Center, GFN fully agrees. The Carter Center recommended the following steps which according to it were aimed to improve transparency and efficiency of the automated election system (AES): That the Commission of Elections (Comelec) and its board of election inspectors (BEIs) increase their technical capacity in administering polls using automated election system; 1. That the election calendar provides adequate time for implementation of all stages of automation; 2. That pre-election testing in a real-world setting is conducted at an earlier date to ensure adequate time to correct any issues identified; 3. That there is a third-party certification authority to generate the public and private keys used in result transmission; 4. That procedures are amended to ensure secrecy of the ballot; 5. That measures to increase security meet their ends; 6. That the number of polling stations are expanded and larger clustered precincts are divided to minimize delays in the voting process; 7. That the process and quality of random manual audit is improved; and 8. That the participation of candidates and political parties in pre-election testing of the AES is increased. For the Carter Center to make these recommendations, it must have found the AES wanting, if not defective. The Carter Center and GFN Observations: Side by Side Going over my notes, here are some points where the Carter Center and GFN reports and observations meet:

1. Technical capacity of Comelec and BEIs in administering the AES On national televisions, in media conferences, in a foreign observers’ briefing on May 6, 2010, and even during the first day of national canvassing of votes at the PICC on May 11, 2010, Smartmatic and Comelec officials were like inseparable twins, so to speak, with a Smartmatic officer mostly taking the lead as a spokesperson. It is no wonder that in its report, the Carter Center observed, “While the unfamiliarity of the AES required significant input and oversight from Smartmatic in 2010, in future elections COMELEC, as the legally mandated election management body of the Philippines, should seek to increase its capacity to oversee the technical aspects of the process. Smartmatic officials often conducted press interviews and voter education efforts, responsibilities more clearly mandated as Comelec’s…― 2. No pre-election testing of AES The Carter Center report recommends that “adequate time†• be allowed to conduct “pre-election testing in a real-world setting― in order to rectify any issues like that which required all 76,000 compact flash cards to be reconfigured due to an error detected one week before election day. We agree that Comelec ran out of time to test the AES, however the issue of pre-election testing is more related to non-compliance with the legal requirements. In our GFN report, we wrote that the AES was implemented live without the appropriate field testing, and law-specified testing in actual elections. The field tests are specified by Sec 6 of RA 9369, “for the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after effectivity of this Act (in 2007), the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao …― and “In succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented nationwide.― We also highlighted in our report that there are specifications set out in the Bid Specifications, Annex E which required that as many field tests shall be conducted until the requirements for the tests have been satisfied provided that the tests shall not go beyond December 5, 2009. The Bid Specifications also required tests of live transmission of precinct results.

“No such tests were conducted by December 5, 2009. In fact, a precinct test using 10 sample ballots were conducted in selected precincts starting in February 2010,†• we wrote in the GFN report. “No field tests in an entire municipality, city and even province were conducted. This is further aggravated by the fact that 4,690 polling centers have no cell phone signal from telecommunication firms affecting about 5 million registered voters. “Worse, on May 3, seven days before elections, Comelec and Sma rtmatic discovered malfunctioning of Compact Flash cards with erroneous votes for local elections. They hurriedly imported new ones and reconfigured all 76,340 CF cards for use on May 10.†• 3. Digital signatures in transmitting election returns removed The absence of a third party who should be charged with generating the public and private keys in the digital signatures to be used in transmitting results was highlighted by the Carter Center. We agree on that point. The lack of an independent third party in generating encryption keys was a basic and fundamental system flaw. What made that worst was that the requirement for digital signatures in transmitting results was actually abandoned. No one can doubt that with no digital signatures, the risk of falsifying election returns was very high. The importance of digital signatures in maintaining data integrity and security had been recognized, in fact, by enabling RA 9369 (Sec 19A) when it prescribed thus: ―Within one hour after the printing of the election ret urns, the chairman of the board of election inspectors or any official authorized by the Commission shall, in the presence of watchers and representatives of the accredited citizens‘ arm, political parties/candidates, if any, electronically transmit the precinct results…― and ―The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate.‖ The importance of digital signatures cannot be overemphasized. As highlighted in our report, digital signatures serve two purposes, namely, to identify the BEI personnel and the precinct number from which the election returns came, and to ensure that the precinct election returns are not modified in any way by dagdag-bawas. 4. System security measures to protect the integrity of AES were abandoned

In addition to the legally required digital signatures in transmitting election returns being set aside, critical AES security features were abandoned or disabled. Ultra violet reading function disabled: The UV-reading functionality of the PCOS machine to authenticate a ballot was disabled, and replaced with a hand-held UV lamp. We also noted during our observation of election proceedings in selected Pampanga precincts the BEIs were not provided with UV lamps. Voter paper audit trail removed: The requirement for voter verified paper audit trail to ensure that the machine registered the voter’s choice correctly was not complied wit h. Voter was only notified in the PCOS screen that his/her vote is read. Only the word “CONGRATULATIONS―was shown in the PCOS LCD. The Carter Center also raised these security deficiencies in its report. 5. Possible disenfranchisement of voters due to delays in the voting process The Carter Center noted in its report, “In 2010, the number of polling stations was reduced to 76,347 in an effort to reduce costs so that each precinct could have its own PCOS machine. The reduction of polling stations by approximately 75 percent produced a corresponding increase in the number of voters per station… a sizable increase from the approximately 200 voters per precinct in previous elections… As a result, Carter Center observers noted significant congestion in polling centers… This congestion caused long waits for voters throughout the country, often longer than three hours. “ GFN observers agree with the Carter Center observation that the clustering of more than 320,000 polling stations into 76,000+ clustered precincts contributed to delays in the voting process. In addition to the Carter group’s observation, we also noted that (a) the actual process of notifying the voters where their new precinct is located caused not only delays but also confusion among the voters, and (b) the delays and long wait could have impacted on the result of the elections. Here is an extract of the GFN report: “Voters Lists were posted on the walls outside the clustered precincts (with a maximum of 1000 registered voters) only on voting day. “Although precinct assignments were mailed to individual voters by barangay captains, most received theirs late in the voting day or not at all. Voters have great difficulty in locating and

identifying their clustered precincts. Long queues developed with voters waiting several (from one to six) hours before voting. As a result, many, especially women and the elderly, decided to forego voting. “Comelec‘s consultant on queue management estimates the number of disenfranchised voters to range from 2 million to 8 million. “This number can easily affect the results in the presidential, vice presidential and senatorial race especially the close one.― 6. Non-Compliant Random Manual Audits On the following assessment of RMAs from the Carter Center, we totally agree: “A lack of transparency and a general inefficiency in how officials actually administered and conducted audits plagued the postelection audit process, however. While random manual audits were to occur on election night, in practice, results of such audits were in some cases still unknown weeks after the election.― The legislative basis for random manual audits is found in Sec 24 of RA 9369, “Where the AES is used, there shall be a random manual audit in one precinct per congressional district randomly chosen by the Commission in each province and city. Any difference between the automated and manual count will result in the determination of root cause and initiate a manual count for those precincts affected by the computer or procedural error.†• The difference referred to in RA 9369 is defined in the Bid Bulletin Specifications thus, “Component 1B-PCOS Machine â€― 10. The system shall count the voter’s vote as marked on the ballot with an accuracy of at least 99.995%―. Clearly, only a maximum 0.005% is considered by law as an acceptable error rate. At 12 noon of election day, Comelec raffled the RMA precincts from the 76,340 precincts nationwide but the choice of the RMA precincts was made public only after the close of voting. As it happened, the RMAs and the rigid specifications for tolerable error contained in RA 9369 were good only on paper. In our interim report, we wrote “As observed in Pampanga, the RMA (Random Manual Audit) in one precinct in Telabastagan was started at 8pm election day and the results were not disclosed to the observers. The results of 30 RMA precincts were released and announced as of 15 May 2010. Last 20 May, Comelec announced results of about 300 RMA precincts were completed with few

discrepancies. PPCRV and Comelec announced some 0.07% discrepancies in about 400 ERs audited as of 21 May. No target completion was announced.†• GFN observers asked: If the 400 ERs audited disclosed a 0.07% discrepancy, how much more discrepancy could be expected for the rest of the 76,340 ERs? And in precincts where discrepancies were found to be outside the tolerable error rate, were manual counts carried out to comply with the legal requirements of a manual count? Additionally, why did Comelec municipal, provincial and regional officers refuse to show the results of the random manual audits even to election observers claiming that they could not provide copies of the audits because they were in sealed envelopes and they had no copies? In summary, There is no doubt that there had been a noticeable improvement in the peace and order aspects of the elections compared to past national elections. But actions on the part of Comelec ~ which to a large extent had also been highlighted by other observers group like the Carter Center ~ had put to question the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, veracity and accuracy of the vote counts in the ERs. The dark cloud rose from disabling critical, legally-specified security features, particularly the digital signatures in transmitting election returns, the UV scanners in authenticating ballots, and the voter verification audit trail in ensuring that the voter’s choice had been correctly registered by the machine. These pre-election system modifications and inadequate system testing, coupled with the last minute rush to reconfigure and redistribute nationwide more than 76,000 compact flash cards due to an error detected one week before election day plus the unnecessary delays and long wait on election day for voters to cast their ballot which could have translated to at least 2 million voters being disenfranchised, had practically reduced next to zero whatever confidence was left in us in the integrity of AES. Even the post-election proceedings which could have given the elections a semblance of integrity were rendered questionable. The data that Comelec showed the public were the percentages of precincts reporting â€― which were meaningless â€― and not the actual votes tallies. The consolidation of the RMA reports took almost two weeks to complete â€― prompting the impression that they were “Random Manual Edits― and, even then, the consolidated results fell short of the minimum threshold mandated by law.

To date after two years, the legitimacy of the 2010 elections remains a contest and a big question mark. (All rights reserved.) Will Automated Elections in the Philippines Increase Public Confidence? Share on emailShare on facebookShare on twitterShare on googleShare on diggShare on deliciousMore Sharing ServicesShare May 5, 2010 By Tim Meisburger In the past, Philippine elections have frequently been marred by allegations of widespread cheating and other electoral malpractice. The most famous (or perhaps infamous) method of cheating is called dagdag/bawas (add-subtract), when votes are subtracted from the opposition candidate and added to a favored candidate, and vice versa. Concerns over election credibility have been exacerbated by the typically long period between voting and the official announcement of results. Delays were caused in part by an antiquated polling procedure that required voters to remember candidate names and write them on a ballot paper, leaving polling officials to decipher the handwriting of all voters, including some less than fully literate, all the while dealing with complaints from watchful party officials who were ―certain‖ that the illegible scrawl was a vote for their candidate. A local woman examines a mock ballot during a voter education seminar on the new automated technology. Increasing public frustration prompted the Philippine government to propose in the mid-1990s that the polling process be automated to decrease cheating and simplify polling and vote-counting. Some supported this because they believed automation would serve as an effective check on cheating, while others saw modernization as a means to finally do away with the infamous write-in ballot process. After several false starts, automated elections were finally tested in the 2008 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elections. The tests were generally viewed as successful (although some disputed that conclusion), and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) went ahead with plans for an automated May 10, 2010 National Elections. But as the Philippines finally seems poised to complete its 15-year automation odyssey, doubts are being raised. Automation, which was once seen as a panacea for election-related problems, is increasingly being viewed as potentially a source, rather than the solution, for the problems weakening the integrity and credibility in the election process. Recently, a widely-respected international risk assessment firm published a highly critical report, which builds on concerns previously expressed by local and international election watchdogs and local IT associations, predicts a high probability of ―failure of elections‖ due to ―automation uncertainties.‖ The paper, distributed to top embassy officials, watchdogs, and political parties, further concludes that ―the bid to automate the 2010 elections increases the pressure signifi cantly

and adds strain to a country that has historically experienced elections mismanagement, corruption and fraud.‖ So what does ―automation‖ actually mean in the Philippine elections context? Voters will receive a pre-printed ballot and will shade an oval next to each candidate they choose. The voter will then feed the ballot into a Precinct Count Optical Scanner (PCOS) located above the ballot box. As the ballot passes through the scanner into the box, the PCOS will save the marks in its internal memory. This is not actually new technology; the shading and scanning process has been used by educators for standardized tests since the 1960s. And it is not truly automated voting, since voters still mark their choices by hand on a paper ballot, rather than pushing a button or tapping a computer screen. So, where exactly then, is the automation? The clue is in the name of the machine that scans the ballots: Precinct Count. During the polling process the PCOS stores the votes, and at the end of election day, automatically adds the votes, then prints out a paper form listing the totals for each candidate, and automatically transmits those totals through an internal cell phone to servers at the municipal and national COMELEC headquarters and political party offices. There are many advantages to this system. It is simple and understandable by the average person. The technology involved, at least in the scanning process, is tested and proven, and consequently unlikely to result in counting error. If there are doubts about the accuracy of the machine count, the paper ballots can be manually recounted to confirm results. And, because ballots are pre-printed with the candidate names, this system does away with the myriad of problems with handwritten ballots. However, despite the proven technology, some say they are unclear how well it will work and say they worry that the machines will not accurately record the votes, either because they are unreliable or because they have been rigged. A series of problems with the machines have helped fuel this uncertainty. For example, to prevent the use of fake ballots, the PCOS contain an ultraviolet scanner that can read a special code printed in ultraviolet ink on authentic ballots (similar to the watermarks used on some currency to help prevent counterfeiting). In pilot testing, however, the ultraviolet scanner was rejecting too many authentic ballots, and that feature had to be disabled. The problem is likely to do with the printing of the mark rather than with the machine itself, and glitches like this are to be expected with new technology. However, small, unrelated problems can easily undermine confidence in the system. Unfortunately, during one of the final rounds of testing on May 3, widespread glitches appeared again, requiring reprogramming of the machines and postponement of further tests to May 7, just three days before the election. Despite fears that the problems might be part of a plot to induce a failure of elections, COMELEC staunchly maintains that the election can go ahead on Monday, May 10, across the nation. (UPDATE: On May 6, the military announced that at least 80 percent of the vote-counting machines in Metro Manila have been delivered to their respective precincts, but the reconfigured memory cards may not be able to reach 5 percent of the country, mostly in Mindanao, until election day.) Locals feed ballots into the scanning machines during a mock election in Cotabato City.

Many people also say they worry that the results will be manipulated, either inside the PCOS or after transmission. Although no one has yet demonstrated how this might be done, a lack of transparency related to the proprietary software of the PCOS and the processes surrounding vote aggregation fuel unease. The history of electoral cheating has made some citizens less likely to trust this process, or any process. Apart from technological concerns (which I feel are probably overblown), there are legitimate concerns with the potential failure of associated election logistics. Because the new polling system is expected to handle significantly more voters per hour than the old manual system, the number of precincts (polling stations) has been reduced from 250,000 to under 80,000. Even if this works technically, poll locations can have a considerable effect on turnout. Two out of three voters will go to a new station location, and for some of the 50 million registered voters in the Philippines, this could lower turnout or cause confusion on election day. Filipino polling officials do have a reputation for effective improvisation, and run mostly credible elections when faced with confusing instructions, lack of materials, and a stressful political environment. But even this may not be enough to overcome our last concern: public perception. Even if voters and officials understand the process, the machines are accurate, and the transmission of results precise, doubts will persist. The new process is just that: new; and it is less transparent than the old, while the intensity of political rivalries has not decreased. Every time a race is close, or the outcome goes against conventional wisdom, the losing candidate is likely to cry foul and blame the new system. Whether or not these allegations have traction will depend on public perception of the process. If they find their polling station easily, have no problems marking the ballot, and see that local results more or less reflect their expectation, then Filipinos are likely to have confidence in the process, and the first national automated elections will be viewed as a historic advance. If, on the other hand, chaos reigns on election day, allegations of malpractice (whether or not it occurs) will spread, and the elections may be seen as a historic failure. Personally, I expect a result somewhere in the middle. There will be problems and solutions, positives and negatives, and the Filipino people will muddle through somehow, as they have so often in the past. Filipinos witnessed a new page in the Philippines' history following the successful completion of the country's first automated election on Monday amid technical problems and reported cases of violence nationwide. Even before polling stations officially opened at 7 a.m., some of the 50 million registered voters have already started forming queues at the 76,000 precincts nationwide, ignoring the scorching heat caused by the El Nino dry spell. The Commission on Election (Comelec) had hoped to entice at least 85 percent of the registered voters to participate in this year's election. As of press time, the Comelec is already counting the ballots as the 90 million Filipinos eagerly await the results.

While things went generally well in most parts of the country, the same problems that hounded Philippines' past elections were still present on Monday. Birth pains caused by the vote-counting machines were also experienced delays, prompting the Comelec to extend voting hours by another hour to 7 p.m. "So far, the election has been peaceful and successful. We have already expected violence to erupt in certain parts of the country especially in provinces that are traditionally torn by (these disturbances)," Earl Parreno, a political analyst at the Institute for Political and Electoral Reforms, said in an interview. Vote buying remains to be a persistent problem despite the country's switch to optical scanning machines from the manual method meant to reduce the risk of cheating. Envelopes containing money were seen in some of the polling stations as candidates attempt to make a last-minute influence in voters' decision. Cases of election-related violence were also reported, especially in the war-torn provinces of Mindanao in Southern Philippines where leftists have been harassing both the military and the civilians. Grenades exploding, unidentified armed men opening fire at a poll station and government troops exchanging fire with gunmen were just among the cases reported in the hot spot southern Maguindanao, the same province where 57 people were brutally murdered in infamous political massacre on Nov. 23 of last year. Herbert Yambing, chief of the armed forces and national police Joint Security Coordinating Center, said the attacks were seemingly initiated to scare away voters from Monday's polling as they were done at secluded sections of the towns. According to police sources, at least nine people died and 12 others were injured in about 37 election-related violent incidents throughout the country as the Filipino people cast their votes for the presidential and local elections. "So far, this has been the most peaceful (election) if we will compare it to the previous elections...We hope this would hold until tonight and throughout until the counting (of the votes) is over," Armed Forces of Philippine Task Force spokesman Ricardo Nepomuceno said. Around mid-Monday afternoon, Comelec has already recommended a failure of election to be declared in nine towns -- situated in Lanao del Sur and Basilan -- in Mindanao while election has been declared to have failed in two towns in Central Philippines. Disenfranchisement among voters were also heavy, according to the Center for People Empowerment in Governance, which puts the blame on the malfunctioning of the precinct count optical scan ( PCOS) machines that had caused severe delays in some polling precincts.

Other problems, like mix-up in the delivery of ballots, long queues due to slow voting, ballot feeding jams and generally, ill- trained members of the Board of Election Inspectors, have also irritated some voters who abandoned voting altogether. Despite the setbacks, Filipinos can no longer do anything but wait the results of Philippines' first automated election which will seal the country's fate in the next six years. Preliminary results are expected to be released Monday night, significantly faster than the manual vote counting done in the past and which usually takes weeks and sometimes months before results come out. Survey results have shown Liberal Party standard-bearer Senator Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III to be Filipinos' favorite, followed by actor-turned-politician Joseph "Erap" Ejercito Estrada and Nacionalista Party standard-bearer Manuel "Manny" Villar. "I ran a good campaign and is prepared whether I win or lose," Gilbert "Gibo" Teodoro, administration candidate, said. Teodoro and his first cousin Aquino voted in their home province in Northern Philippines while Villar and Estrada voted in their bailiwick in Metro Manila. While things went smoothly for Teodoro, Villar and Estrada who finished the entire process in less than 15 minutes, Aquino meanwhile had to wait for more than four hours before he was able to cast his vote following technical glitches. "This election is crucial because Filipinos are hoping that ( the Philippines) will (finally) have credible, acceptable election results now that (it) has switched to the PCOS machines. Although technical problems were reported, the theory is that if we lessen human intervention, chances of manipulating the results will be ( slimmer)," Parreno said. Election Commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal had reported more than 300 defective machines nationwide, which Parreno said remains "manageable" since there are 76,000 PCOS machines deployed nationwide and 6,000 machines are on standby. Whoever will win this year's election will face myriad of issues from insurgency problems that have hindered economic growth in southern Philippines and certain areas in Luzon to addressing deeply-entrenched corruption and red tapes in various government bodies that have caused massive distrust among Filipinos. Comelec spokesperson James Jimenez says that a lot of the discrepancies that cropped up was not due to inconsistencies in the automated elections system, but human error. "Automation was never really autonomous from human participation... That‘s [human participation] where the errors are cropping up... The system itself worked perfectly, which is the reason why there are significantly fewer errors and significantly more results available from the precinct transmission." (BASAGIN!)

The election results may have been ―fast‖ to cite Comelec and Smartmatic but this claim should not gloss over the fact that over and above the poll outcome is the need to establish the integrity of such results and to determine whether automation did promote democracy and address the systemic problem of fraud. Seven days after May 10, reports of incidents on the automated elections are now coming in. 1. The Pagbabago! People's Movement for Change disputed Melo's assessment, citing the Comelec's own admission that there are discrepancies between the electronic election returns and their printed versions. The discrepancies affect some 150,000 voters from 196 precincts in different provinces. 2. Ernesto Maceda present documents, furnished to him by former Manila Mayor Lito Atienza, showingelection returns in Manila dated not May 10 but April 28, May 4 and May 9, to support allegations of poll pre-programming. 3. Joseph Estrada‘s lawyer George Garcia questioned the hasty delivery of reconfigured flash cards the week prior to the elections as logistically improbable. “Were the 76,000 flash cards really returned and reconfigured or were the so -called substitutes already prepared and ready for delivery in the short period of three days. And if there was really nothing irregular going on, why is it that the Comelec did not allow the presence of media and party watchers during the reconfiguration?” 4. There are 51,317,073 registered voters in the country and the total number of voters who voted is 35,276,524. Everybody was stunned when the original copy of the national canvass report by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) showed that the number of registered voters was pegged at 153 million. Comelec immediately ―acknowledged the error and blamed a script bug in the report generating programme for the wrong statistic. The agency explained further that its computer added the number of registered voters coming from three servers which multiplied the number of voters by three.‖ 5. Ernesto Maceda received reports of ―agents‖ approaching candidates before the elections offering electoral victories in pre-programmed compact flash cards and memory cards in exchange for stiff fees of as much as P30 million. Comelec dared the camp of former President Joseph Estrada to show evidence to back its allegation of massive selling of compact flash (CF) cards used by precinct-count machines to read votes during the May 10 automated polls. 6. Three sacks of election material—including ballots, election returns and memory cards.dumped in a junk shop in Cagayan de Oro. 7. The number of disenfranchised voters in last Monday‘s election may r ange from 2 million to 8 million, a figure that could have changed the picture of the vice presidential and senatorial races, according to Marvin Beduya, Commission on Elections‘ consultant on queue management. 8. The Eighty six foreign observers who constituted the Peoples‘ International Observers‘ Mission says that contrary to rosy reports coming out in the dominant press about the ―successful‖ conduct of May 10 elections, it was ―neither fair nor honest.‖ They added that

―Despite the government‘s rhetoric, actual practice showed that it is not committed to free and honest elections.‖ Marvin Beduya thinks that ― we should celebrate the success of the automated voting soberly and with the thought that it may not have delivered the true will of the people, the key purpose of elections, in a manner that is very difficult to prove.‖ Cenpeg‘s monitoring through reports from field researches and reliable sources reveal more incidents which Blog Watch confirms with their reports from the team of bloggers in various precints.
 

Malfunctioning, shutting down and even destruction of PCOS machines, CF cards unable to function,paper jams and power outages in many areas Failure of transmission from the clustered precints forcing Bureau of Election Inspectors (BEI) to bring the CF cards or even PCOS machines to the municipal canvassing centers (manual transmission). They have received reports from May 10-15 of failures of transmission from many municipalities and provinces; a number of clustered precints resorted to manual count due to



PCOS and CF card failures. Delayed canvassing and random manual audits (RMAs) in many areas with the results of completed RMAs remaining undisclosed. CenPEG in a press conference on Monday added that even before the May 10 election, the AES was already stripped of the legal processes, safeguards and minimum industry standards as mandated by the election law and Comelec‘s Terms of Reference. Urgent proposals and recommendations raised by CenPEG , the AES watchdogs for a source code review, the enabling of voters verifiability feature, digital signature, and private keys to be generated solely by Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) adequate and timely voters education and BEI training, the holding of real mock elections, and accuraten field tests remained unheeded up until the final stretch of election preparations. As mandated by law, all these were absolutely necessary in order to establish the integrity of the AES and the election results.

The Compact Flash Cards James Jimenez, Comelec spokesman was quoted in the Philippine Star article , ―Comelec to Erap: Prove allegations‖ on May 16 about the CF Cards. Jimenez said the Comelec will act on these accusations—―which he dismissed only as speculations—only if the Estrada camp shows proof of the alleged offer by unidentified persons before the elections to sell pre-programmed CF cards that would be deployed to favor certain candidates.‖ Jimenez futher explains that the ―compact flash cards have nothing to do with the count, all it does is say that ―you machine, you are for this precint‖. Basically, what a compact flash card does is to customize a machine so that it is specific to a particular locality and that‘s all that it does. It has nothing to do with the counting logic‖

Dr. Pablo Manalastas, fellow and IT consultant for the CenPEG says ―that the CF c ard has nothing to do with the counting logic is the biggest lie ever to come from Comelec‖. The CF card contains data that are the very heart and soul of the counting logic, such that use of the wrong CF card produces wrong counts and puts to question the entire results of the May 10, 2010 automated election.

I asked him if it is possible to have pre-programmed CF cards and he said that only Comelec and Smartmatic has access to them. Dr. Manalastas can only surmise an educated guess (because Comelec has never been transparent according to him) on the mismatch between ballots and CF cards on May 3. Smartmatic-Comelec must have gone through several iterations of ballot design and CF card production, considering that it changed the ballot design from vertical enumeration for a position , to horizontal enumeration and considering that new names had to be added to the ballot from time to time, to accommodate new decisions about candidates made by the Supreme Court and Comelec itself. Smartmatic-Comelec produced the final version of the ballot, but forgot to produce the CF cards for the new ballot design. Instead, Smartmatic-Comelec shipped the latest ballot design with the old CF cards. So during, the May 3, 2010 final testing and sealing (FTS) step, almost all PCOS machines failed in NCR, and Comelec had to stop the FTS, and Smartmatic promised that a new batch of 76,000 + CF cards will be produced and delivered to the precints in time for election on May 10. To date, Comelc has not reported to the Filipino people how many of the 76,000 + new CF cards reached the correct destination precints AND successfully passed FTS before 7:00 AM on election day because only in these precints will the count be correct. (read the technical analysis of CF cards) Comelec just doesn't have the right to destroy valuable items (CFCs) needed for auditing and examination of the poll automation conduct by their representatives, independent poll watch dogs, and other advocacy groups,‖ said Bobby Tuazon. Sec. 27 of Republic Act 9369 (Amended AES Law) provides for a review and assessment of the AES technology used after the elections. This clip is a portion of the Documentary called "Hacking Democracy." The video represents a similar situation during the May 10, 2010 Philippine Elections. This video does not intend to accuse any Candidate of election fraud but to shed light on how election results can be manipulated to favor those who can afford. Perhaps this can help open the minds of the Filipino people to the vulnerabilities of Automated Elections in an unfortunately corrupt country.

Should we believe the Comelec Tabulation/canvass? Comelec must prove beyond reasonable doubt that it only used election returns from consolidated precints that used only CF cards that passed FTS, because only such precints will produce correct

counts. It dos not matter whether the paper ballots were fed to the PCOS machine by the voters themselves on election day, or batch-fed by the BEI to the PCOS machine after election day because the CF card arrived late and was tested later, as long as there are voters, watchers, and party representatives to witness the process and authorized people to sign the printed election return.

Poll Issues and concerns There are issues and concerns that Comelec should answer to test its claim of ―success‖ and ―celebration of democracy‖ of the May 10 election. Data is very much needed in the documentation of the automated elections in the spirit of fully disclosing the following:
   

Failure to fully cleanse the voters‘ registration lists, with many legitimate voters de -listed from their polling precints and many others unable to vote. The actual number of PCOS machines that successfully transmitted and how ―transmissions‖ were done from polliung centers with many machines unable to transmit or failed to transmit altogether The magnitude of PCOS breakdowns, malfunctioning CF cards, and other technical problems The real reasons for the malfunctioning CF cards in the May 3 final testing and sealing (FTS) and whether the new CF cards were correctly reconfigured. How many of the reconfigured CF cards reached their destinations before election and how many did not? The problem arising from incorrectly configured CF cards that Comelec discovered on May 3 and the haste and limited material time for the Smartmatic to re-do the process would contribute to the erroneous counting of votes. Whether a final FTS was done prior to the election and if so, how many of the 76,340 clustered precints were able to conduct the FTS and what is the percentage of success or accuracy. In relation to this, was the FTS in the clustered precints witnessed by poll watchers and election watchdogs? Why the use of the 30 million worth of UV scanners was not fully complied with and why the Comelec website reveals only summarized election returns (ERs). The accuracy of the ERs cannot be verified unless the digitally-signed, consolidated returns from the clustered precints are transparent on the website. Why did Comelec chairman Jose Melo start reading before the media the ―first transmitted results‖ at 6:30 p.m. May 10 even if the polls were to be closed at 7:00 p.m.? Comelec should explain the discrepancy in the ―first transmitted results‖ from Western Samar and Zamboanga Sibugay when the first transmissions were officially registered from a different province at 7:30 p.m.? Western Samar was able to transmit results only on May 14. Was it simple oversight or just a case of incompetence or was there an evil scheme to rig election results in the case of the highly-irregular storage of 67 PCOS machines in Antipolo and the reported Cagayan de Oro elections returns (ER) junk shop discovery?









Call to action

We lose nothing by investigating Smartmatic and the way that the election and the count went. An investigation would not undermine the idea that the automated election was a success. If anything, it will prove that automation is a technology that we should adopt and that the old manual voting should be left in our past, never again to be used. Dr. Pablo Manalastas‘ tentative findings are that national positions may have been accurate and that local positions are easier to cause fraud. Bobby Tuazon added that the Hocus PCOS is possible because the AES is vulnerable to fraud. Many questions need to be answered. In the tight race for the vice presidency , the anxious 10th to the 12th spot for the senate, the party-list contest, the fiercely disputed local posts, one cannot ascertain that the electoral problems and issues are over and done with. 1. Comelec and Smartmatic should provide or make available to every interested voter, candidate or entity engaged in electoral advocacy, all documents- electronic and hardcopy , by which assessment could be accomplished with reasonable accuracy and transparency. 2. CenPEG calls for the formation of an independent, non-partisan, and impartial citizens‘ body to review and assess the conduct of the May 10 automated elections, including the processes and procedures taken and the budget use in preparing for the elections and thereafter. 3. The Joint Congressional oversight committee must also act now to exercise its statutory mandate to require Comelec and Smartmatic to reveal all information or data in whatever form so that the citizens‘ body could very well perform its intended duties. While the call to action is in progress, concerned citizens group are already doing their share. 1. The Integridad sa Halalan initiated an online central clearinghouse where the Filipino people can report anomalies in the recently conluded 2010 automated elections. The site encourages all freedom-loving Filipinos to submit with as much detail and accuracy as possible actual, confirmed incidents. 2. The Halalang Marangal encourages every candidate who lost – and won – in the machine-counted 2010 elections should demand thorough post-election testing and audit for accuracy of every counting machine and its results. 3. The Peoples‘ International Observers‘ Mission encouraged the Filipino people to call for an investigation and to make the Comelec, Smartmatic, the military and the Arroyo administration accountable for the bungled preparations for the elections, the numerous rights violations perpetrated in relation to the elections, and numerous ―glitches‖ that had made voting and countin g difficult, dangerous and doubtful for many Filipinos. 4. Kontra Daya listed down seven suggestions for Comelec to consider, including a review of the clustering of precincts which resulted in long lines at the polling areas, more intensive training for those manning the polls, conducting additional mock elections, probing the faulty CF cards and the reason why ultraviolet lamps were not used in some precincts (to check the seal of the ballots), surveying the number of disenfranchised voters, and examining reports of malfunctioning Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. 5. Atty. Lorna Kapunan at the CenPEG press conference stated that there is a judicial remedy through the Writ of Habeas Data . Comelec can't just deny the irregularities just because

PCOS machines were running. Kapunan said Comelc would have to produce the documents and other materials that would show that there was no fraud. The general rule handed down to the#juanvote netizen‘s guide is that ―each eligibile voter should be allowed to vote freely and that those votes be counted quickly and accurately‖. ‖. We note the a big disconnect between what we all witnessed during the May 10 elections and all the claims of success. The results from the random manual audit must be awaited, and ―the issues that may arise from it resolved. Questions that were unsatisfactorily addressed before election day and especially about the CF memory card fiasco must be answered." The Filipino people want a successful election so badly, that it is easy to get carried away by a flood of incoming election returns. The supporters of the winning candidate may not be inclined to pursue the transparency of the Comelec. Many want to believe that a clean and speedy election actually took place. The public euphoria at the speed of counting should not erase the persistent concerns about the process

Watchdog fears pirated technology in 2013 automated elections By MARC JAYSON CAYABYAB, GMA NewsOctober 25, 2012 2:13pm A pirated technology for Philippine elections. Election watchdog Automated Elections System Watch (AES) raised this possibility as it expressed fears that poll machine supplier Smartmatic-Total Information Management would resort to ―pirated‖ technology following its legal fight with Dominion Voting Systems, the software owner for the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. ―The big question is not if the Commission on Elections pushes through with the PCOS system despite the termination of the licensing agreement. In light of the legal complaint, Smartmatic would be using a system that can be described as pirated,‖ AES co -convenor Bobby Tuazon told GMA News Online in a phone interview. Smartmatic Asia president Cesar Flores refused to grant GMA News Online an interview, but sent a statement saying they would continue with the automation despite the business rift with Dominion. ―Smartmatic is fully capable of providing all support to Comelec and all customers, regardless of any rifts with any of its providers,‖ the statement said. Smartmatic has an ongoing legal battle with Dominion after the latter cancelled a 2009 license agreement with it last May. The agreement enabled Smartmatic to be Dominion‘s legitimate representative in the country. According to AES, ―the termination denies Smartmatic access to technical support and assistance;‖

thus, Smartmatic might not get Dominion‘s proprietary source code and other ―escrowed materials‖ that the Comelec could use to enhance the PCOS system. Dominion owns the technology used by Smartmatic. ―[Smartmatic] had already been denied to use the system. If Comelec still decides to use the system then the Philippine elections will be using a pirated computer tech nology,‖ Tuazon said. All systems go Smartmatic said it will enhance the PCOS machines — the same technology used in the 2010 elections — in time for the 2013 polls. ―For the Philippines, we draw on our extensive experience, and we will incorporate the modifications and enhancements to the election system purchased by COMELEC that were requested and completed in 2011,‖ it said in the statement. The company went on to say that ―it‘s all systems go for the 2013 automated elections.‖ ―As in 2010, Filipinos can depend on the PCOS machine for transparent elections next year and in the years to come. Business as usual,‖ Smartmatic said. Even Comelec chair Sixto Brillantes Jr. is confident that automation will push through next year. ―Whatever happens, we‘re going automations in 2013… We‘re very confident that the issue of Smartmatic and Dominion would be settled,‖ he said. Brillantes had earlier said that only minor enhancements on the PCOS machines would be affected by the business rift, but he refused to elaborate. Asked about the possibility of having pirated technology, Brillantes only smirked and said: ―Bayaan niyo na silang gumawa ng ingay.‖ ―Hindi kami nag-aalala. May ginagawa naman kami. Hindi muna naming sasabihin sa inyo,‖ he said. No contingency measures But Tuazon was not assured, saying Comelec doesn‘t seem to have contingency measures in case Smartmatic fails to improve the glitches of their PCOS machines. ―[The elections] is six months away. And we‘re hoping that Comelec already adopt re medial or contingency measures. Kasi ‗yung kaso makes the 2013 elections in limbo,‖ said Tuazon, who was

also the director for policy studies of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance. Instead of settling with Smartmatic as supplier, Comelec should review the purchasing agreement with Smartmatic to find alternative options, Tuazon said. ―It looks like Smartmatic can no longer comply with the provisions of the purchase agreement – the modifications and enhancements that needed to be made,‖ he said . Comelec has earlier said it will not pay for the 82,000 PCOS machines, worth P1.8 billion, if Smartmatic fails to make the enhancements. What Comelec could do, Tuazon said, is design an alternative voting system in the country to replace Smartmatic. ―We have a very competent IT community who can help. The question is, is there still time? According to our IT consultants, there is still time,‖ he said. Transparency issue? More than being an issue of credible and accurate elections, the Smartmatic business fight could also reflect Comelec‘s transparency. For elections reform advocate Atty. Luie Guia, the Comelec should strive for transparency in the Smartmatic legal dispute to avoid speculations about the 2013 midterm polls. ―Sometimes, Comelec brush aside all these issues being raised especially sa issue ng Dominion at Smartmatic. I think it‘s important for Comelec to improve the transparency of the process to show that they‘re asking Smartmatic what this is and how it can affect the process,‖ said G uia, the executive director of the Legal Network for Truthful Elections (Lente), in a separate phone interview with GMA News Online. ―Tapos sila (Comelec) na mismo ang magpapaliwang sa publiko in detail kung ano ba ang implications nito,‖ the lawyer added. Guia said groups tend to speculate on the impact of the business fight of Smartmatic precisely because of the lack of information issued by Comelec on the issue. ―What we can do right now is to speculate. Precisely because there‘s no explanation coming from those who are privy to the case,‖ Guia said. ―Kung legal ito, ano ba ‗yung legal? It‘s a matter of public concern that the public would know kung ano ‗yung issue ng Dominion at Smartmatic. That‘s transparency,‖ the lawyer added.

Comelec could thus share the responsibility of handling the elections with the public if they are transparent in their operations, Guia said. ―When you are transparent, binibigyan mo ng datos at information ang publiko, you spread the responsibility of running the elections. Alam ng publiko na ganito ang nangyayare, ganito ang kakulangan. You give the public a responsibility to do their share,‖ Guia said. Brillantes previously said the fight between Smartmatic and Dominion are ―legal issues‖ and should not affect the technical aspect of the elections, adding that Dominion should still enforce Smartmatic ‗s contract with Comelec in the past ―at the time Smartmatic was still their legitimate agent.‖ ―We don‘t care if there was a cancellation. Dominion cannot get out of their commitments signed before May just by canceling (Smartmatic‘s) license. Kailangan sundan pa rin ng Dominion ‗yun legally,‖ Brillantes had said. Smartmatic has earlier claimed that the 82,000 PCOS machines purchased by Comelec for P1.8 billion could last even until the 2016 elections. "These machines are for a particular purpose. They are still good even for the next elections. They are not like laptops that are very powerful, but are prone to wear-and-tear,‖ Smartmatic product development specialist Marlon Garcia had said in a hearing with the House committee on suffrage and electoral reforms late July. The Comelec has said some 50,000 PCOS units passed the technical tests, 1,000 were rejected, and about 30,000 were set aside for having "dirty‖ adaptors. — KBK/HS, GMA News III. Presentation of Data A P7.2 billion deal was made between the COMELEC and Smartmatic and Total Information Management (TIM). The contract is posted online because according to Rene Sarmiento, "Making the poll automation contract available to everyone online shows our policy of transparency, even in the operationalization of the contract." Sarmiento also stated that, "At any rate, Comelec has been transparent from the very start and Comelec is ready to defend the poll automation contract." Being people of a third-world country, the Filipinos along with the Philippine government want to catch up with the quick expansion and creation of technology and the future. One of our attempts to catch up with the other countries who experience new types of technology is the automation of elections. The machines being used for the election are very essential to the success or failure of the elections since the voters will use them to directly vote who our country's next president shall be. With the machines, the voting and countine proccess which used to take weeks and even months will now take only days. The brand of PCOS (Precinct Count Optical Scan) machine will be the SAES (Smartmatic Auditable Elections System) 1800, which is a type of optical mark reader

machine. This type of technology is like the ones used to count the results of computerized examinations, such as the NCEE, where the examinee shades a circle to mark his or her answer in a multiple choice test. The counting, tally, transmission and consolidation of votes will be done by the computers. When the poll closes, a Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) will perform a "close function" by touching the appropriate button on the machine's LCD screen. Doing so will prevent the insertion of additional ballots after voting has ended. After the machine closes the poll at a particualr precinct, it automatically counts all the votes cast and thereafter, an Election Returen (ER) will be printed, which is a report on the result of voting in each precinct wherein the total votes cast for each candidate are tallied. After the ERs are printed, the transmission cable is connected to the PCOS machine for the electronic transmission of results from a particular precinct to the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) via canvassing/consolidation machines (CCMs), which will consolidate the results from all precincts within the city or municipality. Results will also be transmitted electronically to the Comelec central office. The same process will take place from the city or municipality to the province, then from the province to Congress and Comelec. The 82,200 machines will be stored and secured away from anyone in their respective precincts until the day of the elections and they will not be connected to any transmission lines to prevent any hackers from having any access to them. But there are many problems concerning the upcoming automated elections this May in 2010. There are suspicions that cell phone jammers, which are not illegal in the Philippines, could affect the processes and results of the election by disrupting the signal of the machines being used for the elections. There was a shipment of 5,000 jamming devices a few weeks ago. This roused the suspicion of the COMELEC. There is also the fear of delay. The machines will arrive on Feb. 28. That leaves only 2 months to prepare for the upcoming elections. This election will also be a nightmare for the logistics part of it. There are 1630 municipalities. That's 1630 sets of names of local officials printed on 1630 different ballots that are going to be read by 1630 machines. Each of those 1630 machines will have to be customized to compensate for each of the local changes. And remember, the COMELEC has only TWO MONTHS to do all this. There is also the problem and doubt with the machines themselves. According to a survey from the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 47% of respondents say that the machines might be sabotaged while only 44% trust the COMELEC to secure their votes being cast. There is also a 30% chance that the machines will fail. According to another survey, 49% of Filipinos say that if the elections do not work out, there will be another people power while only 22% disagreed with this statement.

IV. Interpretation of Data In our opinion, the Philippines isn't ready for an automated election. There is a huge delay in the schedule because we only have 2 months after the delivery of the machines to program them and check them. It is only 3 months to the elections and still there are so many problems that the COMELEC is encountering and there are still more popping up. The threat of jammers, sabotage etc. cannot be dealt with in that time span. There is also the threat of a 30% chance failure rate. Our government is paying 7.2 billion taxpayer's Pesos on a 30% chance of failure . It is not only the machines with the problems. Cheating is very rampant in our society. There are so

many threats to this election and a failure might lead to a revolution. Though we think that an automated election is the future of this country, we do not see it now as the right future in 2010.

V. Conclusions 1. The Philippines is not ready for the automation of elections since we do not have much experience with this type of technology in the past. 2. The automation of elections is not worth the time and money of the Republic of the Philippines because we still have to go through many expensive security options to make the election a success and we have just months before the elections. 3. The COMELEC is doing what it can to make sure that the elections will be fair. 4. Even if the public has been assured many times that the elections will succeed and people with the intention to manipulate the election process will be able to do so little does not make the people sure about its success. 5. There is a time for everything and now is not the right time for this type of technological advancement. We will have to automate the elections eventually but as of now, it does not look like the government's plans will push through until before the deadline. 6. The whole processes involved in the elections including the voting, tallying and presentation of results will be shortened with the automation of elections. 7. Being Filipinos, we know that somewhere, somehow, we will make a big mistake while we try to push automated elections. As the saying goes, new technology plus old habits equals unknown consequences. 8. If and when the elections fail and it is discovered that cheating and tampering with the machines that are part of the election are discovered, chaos and civil unrest will fall over the nation.

Massive cheating feared as Comelec summarily dismisses unresolved automated election problems PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 20, 2013

―Clearly, automation does not magically solve the issues perpetually hounding the conduct of the elections in the country. Instead, the AES even gives more room for doubt and electoral fraud.‖ – Kabataan Party-list

MANILA – The election campaign is already heating up but many groups expressed fears that the votes may not be accurately counted. Openings for massive cheating seem to still abound and the people remain to have little recourse in guarding their votes once their ballots are fed into the multi-million peso PCOS machines. ―Unlike what Comelec Chair Sixto Brillantes wants the public to believe, there is indeed cause for alarm with regard to the upcoming automated polls,‖ said Kabataan Partylist President Terry Ridon in a statement. His group is urging the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to directly confront problems besetting PCOS machines and other AES-related issues, instead of ―sidestepping issues hounding the automated election system (AES).‖ Yesterday, Brillantes, chairman of Comelec, posted in his Twitter account: ―The continued assertion of falsehood by AES Watch, CENPEG et al aims nothing but to sow public mistrust and sabotage the upcoming elections.‖ Days before that, Brillantes had been all over the media claiming he is already tired of cr itics‘ repeated charges against the Comelec‘s preparations and that the Comelec had supposedly addressed much of these. But according to these critics, the most crucial problems besetting the automated election system (AES) are still there, and these have even gotten worse compared to when it was first used in the country in 2010 elections. Last 2010 election, watchdog AES Watch gave the system a grade of 1.40, or in danger; for 2013 elections, it graded it 0.29— a failure. ―They had three years since May 2010 to do some fixing and reforming but they just repeated the same mistakes that we saw in 2010,‖ said Bobby M. Tuazon, co -convener of AES Watch and director for policy studies of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG). Comelec‘s call of faith in election prep ‗baseless‘ Sixto Brillantes said the Comelec has adopted improvements and corrected deficiencies in the system for the 2013 elections. But these are empty placatory statements to election watchdogs who have raised the following significant issues which, until now, they say, the Comelec has not adequately addressed: - ‗Pirated‘ software for PCOS machines - Unfixed bugs in PCOS machines - Ballot design-CF cards data mismatch - The disabling of voter verification system in PCOS machines - The lack of digital precautions against election return tampering (e.g. digital signing) - Errors in transmission programs - The issue of signal jammers or the remote manipulation of election result transmission

- Lack of clear mechanisms for election protests - Hardware problems including faulty and damaged machines For these, the AES Watch has given the COMELEC‘s preparations for the 2013 elections a failing mark. Instead of responding by way of addressing the problems, Comelec chairman used ―gutter language‖ against the election watchdog. (See: Use facts not gutter language, Brillantes told) The automated election system has been touted to bar cheating because of the speed of its counting. But the way the machines expected to count it are being prepared by the Comelec, it appears it could only speed up cheating and disenfranchisement, and just as easily hide the hocus-pocus on votes. ―Clearly, automation does not magically solve the issues perpetually ho unding the conduct of the elections in the country. Instead, the AES even gives more room for doubt and electoral fraud,‖ Ridon said. ―Instead of answering pertinent issues raised by AES Watch, CENPEG and Kontradaya, all Brillantes have to offer are baseless accusations of sabotage. These election watchdogs are only raising valid issues against the AES with the aim of improving the integrity of the upcoming polls,‖ Ridon said. He dared Comelec to ―stop beating around the bush and act immediately to resolve these issues.‖ Lack of source code review, single biggest cause of doubt on AES Recently, Comelec has also announced that it would push through with the automated elections even without the source code review. The source code is the readable program that details how the PCOS machines will run on election day. RA 9369 (the law enabling automated elections system) stipulates that the source code should be opened for review 90 days before the elections. It is considered an essential step for safeguarding the PCOS machines from digital manipulation. Due to an ongoing standoff between Smartmatic and rival Dominion Voting Systems, the source code for the PCOS machines has yet to be released. ―Brillantes is saying that there is no need for us to wait for the source code or conduct another mock election because the AES‘ Technical Evaluation Committee has forwarded a ‗favorable review‘ of the system. This is despite the fact that the past mock election was marred with PCOS errors and problems,‖ Ridon said. In a statement released to the media, former Comelec Commissioner Gus Lagman pointed out that without the source code review, the public cannot verify if the PCOS machines are counting votes correctly.

Earlier, Lagman had also questioned the Comelec‘s decision to purchase the said used PCOS machines, when there were cheaper, more reliable or trustworthy alternatives. Brillantes just laughed it off when asked about it in an AM radio interview. With regard to Comelec‘s refusal to review the source code, Brillantes told DZRH late last week that as a safeguard or a way of determining if there had been cheating, we ha ve the ―random manual audit.‖ But for critics checking to see if the Comelec is following the prescribed safeguards for AES – and meeting disappointments at nearly every turn – this is like being asked to have blind faith in the Comelec. ―Giving a go-signal to the AES without the source code review casts a heavy cloud of doubt on the accuracy and integrity of the results of the upcoming polls. This issue alone is already a cause for alarm,‖ Ridon said. Echoing the warnings of election watchdogs, Ridon said that ―If this issue is not resolved immediately, it can open the floodgates for massive electoral cheating.‖

Use facts not gutter language, Comelec told PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 20, 2013 By MARYA SALAMAT Bulatlat.com MANILA — The Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch) refused ―to go down to the level of arguments with the prominent use of gutter language by the head of a Constitutional body – Comelec Chairman Sixto Brillantes.‖ In a strongly worded statement, Bobby M. Tuazon, co-convener of AES Watch and director for policy studies of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), condemned the Comelec chair‘s ―offensive remarks‖ against election critics. Comelec has accused AES Watch, whose chair emeritus is former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and CenPEG, headed by National Artist Bienvenido Lumbera, of ―election sabotage.‖ Tuazon also scored Brillantes‘ ―sexist remarks‖ and macho order to women leaders of AES Watch, who include AES Watch women co-conveners, Ms Maricor Akol, a reputable IT expert involved in IT professionals certification, and Ms Evita Jimenez, executive director of CenPEG and project research head of the popular Corruptionary publication. Tuazon fired back that in fact, it is the Comelec, under Brillantes, that has failed to build public trust and confidence in the election system by its ―repeated failure to comply with the election law and its fixation to a technology proven to be defective, unlicensed, and with a dismally-low accuracy.‖

Worse, the Comelec is only repeating the mistakes already pointed out in 2010 elections, Tuazon said. Comelec disdain of problem solvers scored Tuazon said they are not just problem-oriented, as Comelec‘s Brillantes has repeatedly insinuated. AES Watch has, in fact, been offering the Comelec solutions to its problems. ―Since the last elections, we have sought dialogs with the Comelec, gone to congressional hearings with proposed legislative enhancements for poll automation, studied meticulously the automation with reports copy furnished all major election stakeholders, and gone to the high court several times as well.‖ ―Non-disclosure of the source code to political parties and interested groups for independent review as provided for in the Poll Automation law for reasons only Chairman Brillantes knows is a major concern that should alarm stakeholders in the coming election,‖ Tuazon said. Political parties like PDP-Laban for example had gone to the Comelec last January 2013 to exercise this right, only to be told that the source code is not available for review. Brillantes, quoted by the media, argued, ―There is no review if there is no source code,‖ adding that ―the law does not provide for source code review in order for elections to proceed.‖ The Comelec chairman‘s inconsistent statements are themselves adding to confusion and uncertainties in the coming automated elections, Tuazon said. As far as AES Watch is concerned, Brillantes‘ actions and statements fit more accurately his own accusations of election sabotage. Comelec and Brillantes apparently just wanted to hold the 2013 elections using their flawed system – anybody who pointed at these flaws are ―saboteurs.‖ As Lito Averia, IT security expert, Congress resource person on IT matters, and election observer for more than 20 years, asked, ―How does the Comelec chair define ‗election sabotage?‘‖ He reiterated that they are ―merely asking questions and raising issues which the Comelec continues to ignore.‖ Questionable software to be used in 2013 elections The Comelec chairman today insisted that the Philippine government owns the PCOS machines per the option to purchase signed with Smartmatic in March 2012. This does not mean though that the Philippine government is also the owner of the software the machine will use. ―Brillantes is the one who is ignorant, especially in software licensing,‖ Averia said.

Even non-lawyers in the IT industry, said Averia, understand that proprietary software like MSOffice, for instance, is not sold with the machine, though one has paid for it. ―What one buys is a license to use. Comelec cannot claim to have bought the software that came with the PCOS in March 2012. It is only a user of the software AND only for the 2010 national and local elections at that.‖ ―The basic civil law principle is you cannot sell what you do not own. If the owner gives you authority to sell, there is still a limit to what you can sell, depending on what is written in the authorization,‖ AES Watch also clarified. With the 2009 agreement – where the license to use the poll technology was given to Smartmatic only for 2010 – having been terminated in May 2012 by the real owner of the technology, Dominion Voting Systems, the Venezuelan sales company (Smartmatic) has lost its right to the software, AES Watch said. Smartmatic has also lost its access to the program system that is critically needed to correct the program errors and bugs that both Comelec and Smartmatic reluctantly admitted only in 2012, Tuazon said. Because of these circumstances, Brillantes announced last week that Comelec will use instead the program system designed for the aborted 2011 ARMM election reportedly supplied by Smartmatic. But the use of the 2011 program is not covered by the 2009 licensing agreement precisely because the latter only spoke of the 2010 elections, Tuazon explained. In a forum held Monday at UP Alumni center, AES Watch distributed information materials like Primers, Alerts and Poll watch guides on the automated elections for May 13, 2013. ―Rather than go down to the level of gutter language, AES Watch and its members have agreed to help provide information materials to help guide voters and poll watchers,‖ Tuazon added. Election failure Meanwhile, AES Watch yesterday said that the Comelec might commit a ―potentially impeachable offense‖ if the PCOS machines do not work. ―Is the repeated failure to comply with the automation law and the fixation to use the defective Smartmatic-provided system setting the stage for a possible election failure? If this is so, the Comelec has nobody to blame but itself for what are potentially impeachable offenses. It should stop pointing the finger at the usual suspected culprits like the teachers, poll watchdogs, and the voters themselves,‖ the AES Watch said in a statement.

The election watchdog raised concern on how the poll body is preparing for the upcoming midterm election and if it is complying with provisions under Republic Act 9369 or the Automated Election Law. The group mentioned the problems that surfaced during the May 2010 national and local elections such as ballot rejections, transmission failure, inaccuracy of the vote count, election returns and certificates of canvass not digitally signed as required by law. The problems reportedly came out during the mock elections conducted by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms at the House of Representatives on July 24 and 25, 2012 and in 10 cities and municipalities last Feb. 2. ―The same problems and issues, regarded by Comelec as minor glitches, are highly likely to resurface during the midterm election which could result in inaccurate vote counts and tallies and disenfranchisement of voters,‖ it said.– With Evelyn Macairan

Comelec failed again – election watchdog Written by Jing Villamente And Johanna M. Sampan Reporters Poll watchdog Automated Election System (AES) Watch on Monday gave the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a failing mark in its preparation for the upcoming May polls, as it issued the second release of its comprehensive assessment of the commission.

In a forum held at the University of the Philippines, the poll watchdogs said that they used the system trustworthiness, accountability and readiness, or STAR Card, to comprehensively assess and rate the implementation of the second automated election by the commission, Smartmatic-TIM and other providers. Prof. Bobby Tuazon, director for Policy Study of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), said that they will hold Comelec Chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr. to his promise in September 2011 that he will resign within a year if no reforms will happen to his commission. ―He‘s been there for two years and still, there are no reforms,‖ Tuazon said. Poll watchdog also said that poll officials may be committing ―potentially impeachable offenses,‖ especially if the precinct count optical scan (PCOS) machines will fail on election day. ―Is the repeated failure to comply with the automation law and the fixation to use the defective Smartmatic-provided system setting the stage for a possible election failure? If this is so, the Comelec has nobody to blame but itself for what are potentially impeachable offenses,‖ the po ll watchdog said in a statement.

―It should stop pointing the fingers at the usual suspected culprits like the teachers, poll watchdogs and the voters themselves,‖ it added. Same problems They said that proof of the commission‘s failure is the continued presence of the ―same problems‖ observed in the May 2010 national and local elections. These problems include ballot rejection, transmission failures, inaccuracies of the vote counting and election returns and certificates of canvass not digitally signed as required by law. The group lamented that these problems continue to be regarded by the poll body as ―minor glitches.‖ ―The right to suffrage is the people‘s sovereign right to elect officials upon whom they confer the authority to serve the public responsibly, transparently, with accountability and on a full-time basis. For this reason, it is imperative that the electoral process is credible, trustworthy, reliable and accurate in serving as the instrument of the people‘s will. We have to demand from Co melec, our election manager, full accountability and transparency,‖ the AES Watch said. Tuazon cited the report made by a team they sent to the United States to observe its automated election in 2012. While the US automated poll system also had some technical glitches, the difference is that Americans were quick to address these problems. Evita Jimenez, AES executive director, who led the observer team, said that they came up with ―10 Alerts‖ for the coming election to guard against ―modern day cheating.‖ ―This is our guide for everyone to guard diligently the elections this year. It will be one of the most fraudulent elections, kung di tayo magbabantay,‖ she added. They urged voters to watch all precincts, which will be ―the center stage‖ on election d ay. ―It‘s better for the media and other watchdog organizations if precincts are covered by CCTVs [closed-circuit televisions],‖ Jimenez said. Watchdogs and poll observers should also watch out for ―pre -shaded ballots,‖ discrepancies in the voters‘ list. Jimenez said that poll watchers and voters have the right to ask the board of election inspectors to exhibit every ballot to the public before giving it to the voter. ―Distinguish the official precinct-assigned PCOS from the fake ones, or ‗contingent‘ P COS. Because certification and testing are anything but arbitrary, there is no way to know if the PCOS machine at the precinct is authorized precinct-assigned PCOS machine,‖ the group said.

It warned that PCOS buying, or PCOS control, are the new forms of cheating that everybody must be wary of. The group also warned against the switching of compact flash cards prior to, or in the course of voting. Jimenez said that cheating could also occur during the transmission of votes, since any problem during transmission can change the number of votes. Brillantes lashed out at his critics, saying that they are out to sow public mistrust and sabotage the upcoming polls. In his Twitter account—@ChairBrillantes, the commission chief said that poll watchdogs and CenPEG intend to disrupt the holding of successful election.

COMELEC spokesman JAMES JIMENEZ--a prolific writer, blogger and speaker in his own right--has been having a running debate with the Center for People Empowerment in Governance over the ongoing 2010 election automation project. Personally, I think that James Jimenez's intelligent sense of humor is the perfect antidote to the Y2K-bug-like tendentiousness and fearmongering to which the worst of CenPeg's "analyses" descend. In its May, 2009 "Policy Critique," the Center for People Empowerment in

Governance(CenPeg) questioned the TRANSPARENCY of the proposed 2010 automated election system: The Precinct Count Optical Scan-Optical Mark Reader (PCOS-OMR) technology chosen by the Comelec goes against the basic democratic principle of ―secret voting and public counting.‖ This is because the OMR system makes the counting, canvassing and consolidation of election results hidden from public eye and, hence, lacks any transparency as the Constitution and RA 9369 require. The proclamation of winners will be done in 2-3 days making it extremely impossible to file any election protest which is expected to be widespread – and poll watching almost futile. Here is what JAMES JIMENEZ wrote in a recent Facebook Note in response to many of the points raised by CenPeg and lawyer Harry Roque in a suit to TRO the automated election contract with Smartmatic/TIM. I am happy to share it with readers and writers of Philippine Commentary because of its uhmm, transcendental importance. I would have said everybody a watch-dog, but that term has always carried - for me at least - the unfortunate connotation that someone, somewhere is gonna turn rabid. So, "everyone a quick-counter" it is; because that's how it's going to be.

But before we get to that, this is how the canvassing flows - bottom up. Start from the precinct where a paper report is generated in the form of election returns. The ERs are then delivered physically to the first canvassing level which is at the city or municipality. The city or municipality canvassing board then produces its own reports: the certificate of canvass and a statement of votes by precinct. Each city or municipal canvassing board then sends its report to the next canvassing level: the provincial. Provincial produces its own COC and SOV then reports to the National Board of Canvassers. The National Board canvasses the results for Senators and Party-List, while Congress canvasses results for President and Vice-President. The problem with this process is that it takes too long. Delivering the reports can take days, sometimes even a week or more. In the meantime, people get antsy and worried that the reports are being manipulated or altered in some way. Especially worrisome is when the outcome of the elections is made to hinge on reports that haven't been canvassed yet; the fear being that the manipulators are waiting to see just how much padding or shaving they need to do. So time, essentially, can be a tool for manipulators and a very destabilizing factor in the mandate of whoever emerges the winner. Obviously, the solution is electronic transmission. Electronic transmission drastically cuts down the time necessary to transmit election results from level to level. But, naturally, in order for electronic transmission to be possible, the data - essentially the written reports generated by each level in the process - has to be in electronic form. How to do that? One solution is to manually count the votes, manually prepare the election returns, and then encode the election returns into a computer with electronic transmission capabilities. Sounds simple enough. But let's examine that a little closer. Manual Counting A manual count has its benefits, foremost would be that there would be no need to teach voters how to vote. The ballot will be the usual thing - a long sheet of paper with the names of the positions being voted on (what I call the "races") followed by blank lines where the voter can write the names of the candidate he's voting for. So that's good, right? Well, yes. In the sense that inertia is your friend. But that kind of voting runs into all sorts of problems all the time. First, there's the problem of illegible handwriting. Then there's the issue of voters who don't write the full name of the candidate. And of course, there are instances when some candidates have the same name, and the voter isn't specific enough with his choice. All these problems add up to questions of voter appreciation. The teachers engage in adhoc interpretations of what the ballot is actually trying to say about the intent of the voter. It's a guessing game, really,

where the main players are the lawyers of the candidates. Not the voter - his part is done. It's the lawyers trying to outdo each other in convincing the BEI to see things their way. Another result of this is that it draws out the time needed to complete the count; hence the counting proceeds in fits and starts until dawn the following day. And again, time can become a tool for subverting the vote. During the wee hours, when non-partisan people are mostly no longer around to watch the proceedings, all sorts of attempts are made to subvert the vote count: power outages, intimidation, thuggery, bribery .. you name it. Teacher's lives are put at risk, the integrity of the ballot is challenged mightily, and the outcome of the elections becomes suspect. IS THE PRECINCT VOTE COUNT EASY TO SECURE? Over the past few weeks, you've probably heard a lot of people saying that the vote count is the easiest thing in the world to secure; that the vote count is the cleanest part of the process; that a manual count is the best because it is witnessed by the public. HAH! The vote count is the most difficult part of the process to secure for the following reasons: first, the sheer scale of it. You're talking about counting going on more-or-less simultaneously in more than 250 thousand locations throughout the country. Second, it takes too long. Counts run up to 12 hours during which time any number of attacks on the integrity of the elections can ensue. And third, the majority of the counts all over the country, as well as a significant chunk of the counting process itself, are NOT watched by the public: there are simply too many counts going on at the same time, and too many non-partisan observers simply cannot stay all night. In the end, many watchers simply come back the following day to claim copies of ERs that they can nitpick about. ER Preparation Manual ER preparation has its share of problems, naturally. The most significant being the mis-recording of the data. Let's forget about fraud for awhile and just focus on fatigue induced error. On election day, the members of the BEI are up and about by 4 am, getting their election supplies. Elections run from 7am to 4pm. Counting usually starts at 6 pm and runs till 6 am the following day. Which means that by the time the ERs are being prepared, the teachers doing the job will have been up nearly 24 hours. Fatigue is inevitable, and when people get tired, people make mistakes. How inevitable is error? It is so inevitable that when an ER is presented and shows no erasures or errors of any kind, it's perfection is considered a good indicator of fraud. Chew on that for awhile. Our system is so prone to error that if no errors are evident, we suspect that something fishy is going on. How twisted is that? Nevertheless, it is a sound observation. Because of the strain placed on teachers, fatigue is one of the most significant causes of error through inadvertence. Add to that, deliberate error brought about by coercion or corruption and you realize that ERs prepared manually are probably not as pristine as some people might want you to believe. And

that's where the lawyers come in. A lawyer's job is to make sure that his candidate wins. This means, if you're being brutally frank about it, that a lawyer will try everything he can to influence the way the results are reported. He can influence it during preparation of the ER, or he can influence it by challenging the number of votes reported for his candidate. Either way, under a regime of manual preparation of ERs, lawyers will exert an inordinate amount of influence in the way the vote is reported, and they will also contribute mightily to the delay in the reporting. ER Encoding So, the ER - whose faithfulness in reflecting the will of the people will, by now, have been diluted now has to be encoded to produce an electronically transmittable document. The most straightforward solution is to have someone reading from the ERs while someone sits and encodes everything he hears. Now it's obvious that neither can check what the other is doing. The encoder can't verify everything the reader tells him, just as the reader cannot check whether his words are being tapped into the computer accurately. This sets up two points of vulnerability: the reader (who can be coerced or bribed into dishonesty) and the encoder (who, by the way, can be coerced or bribed into dishonesty). Ironically however, despite these vulnerabilities - from counting to ER preparaton to ER encoding there are some quarters who would rather see us stuck rather than try out the other way for getting the ERs ready for electronic transmission. The other way The other way is automated counting. If you automate the counting, then the counting machine presents the count in two ways: a paper election return report, and an electronic version of the same report. Kinda like having a print-out of that word document you typed. You have a hard and a soft copy. With the electronic version generated at the same instant the count is completed, the transmission can then proceed seamlessly, with no need for anyone to interpret any ballots or to encode anything. You save time and you ensure that there will be no discrepancies mediated by human error or human malice. Now there are those who would belittle the importance of saving time with the electronic count. With all due respect but very little fondness, let them tell that to the teachers who have to stay up

more than 24 hours just to complete the counting and preparation of ERs; let them tell that to the teachers who have to spend the night wondering whether the next hour will bring goons with guns; let them tell that to the teachers who have to turn away bribes, knowing full well that there may be adverse repercussions arising from their nobility. And of course, there are those who will belittle the trustworthiness of the COMELEC in conducting the automated counting. Fair enough, I would say. Don't trust the COMELEC, but don't let that distrust consign the rest of the country to repeating the same old processes with the same old vulnerabilities; don't let that distrust get in the way of getting the teachers out of harm's way; and don't let that distrust become a stumbling block to the improvement of the electoral system. On another level, don't use that mistrust to mislead the people. People with avowed distrust for the COMELEC like saying that the machines can be programmed to count wrongly; to favor this or that candidate; to ensure a pre-determined outcome. People who distrust the COMELEC slam the system for a supposed lack of transparency. A hand-count is not the only route to transparency. First, all a hand-count really does is show that ballots are actually being read. It does not guarantee any individual voter that "his vote is being counted accurately." All it does is give people - the BEI, the lawyers - the opportunity to argue about what the voter intended. And since no one can actually say for certain that the ballots are being read according to each voter's intent, how can a hand count guarantee anything? If you think about it, the ability of lawyers to question the accuracy of the vote ultimately rests on the uncertainty of how to interpret the source document - the ballot. Remove that uncertainty and the ability to question the accuracy of the count evaporates. Now consider an automated election system where the ballots unequivocally show voter intent and where the resulting machine count can be verified against the actual ballots? Sure, you don't see ballots actually being read, but that doesn't put you in a worse position vis-a-vis a hand count. Besides, any re-count will still go through the same process of lawyers trying to outdo each other in convincing the authorities that the voter voted this way and not that. With the automated system, however, the hand re-count is much easier and much more definitive precisely because there is no mistaking voter intent. If the oval is shaded, it's a vote. If not, then not. There are those who argue saying that by the time a hand recount of the modern ballot is undertaken, the winners will have been proclaimed. I may have missed something, but isn't that how it is with a hand count? Second, the automated system has the advantage of being tamper-evident. Tamper evident

Tamper-evident only means that if someone monkeys around with something, the monkeying is obvious. Like meds. No one seriously believes that those flimsy foil things prevent tampering with the pill inside. The main strength of the foil is that if someone does try to get to the pill inside, the damage to the foil will be so obvious that no one in his right mind is gonna think that everything's okay. Once you know that the pill has been tampered with, you know right away to chuck it in the trash. It's kinda the same with the automated election system. Unlike a foil pack, the design is such that the speed of counting and consolidation make it very difficult to tamper with the results; but just like a foil pack, the design also ensures that any unauthorized tampering is immediately obvious.

The results, you see, are transmitted directly out of the precinct and sent to several recipients all at once: to the municipal canvassing center, to the COMELEC central server, to the servers of the dominant majority, the dominant minority, the accredited citizen's arm, and the KBP. And yes, it will also be sent to a publicly accessible website. That's seven different recipients of the same data, all in one go. And that's not even counting the 30 hard copies of election returns that will be made available to practically everyone. Now if someone were to tamper with one of those results, for whatever reason, the discrepancy with all the other copies available makes the tampering immediately discoverable. So, if your shenanigans are immediately obvious, why bother doing it at all? You won't make a difference in the final result and you're likely to be found quickly. Bottom line, the widespread availability of precinct results makes fraud more trouble than it's worth. Even better, having the results published on the web essentially democratizes quick-counting. Literally anyone with internet access and a calculator can do exactly what Namfrel used to do, can do exactly what the COMELEC is doing. Everyone becomes a quick-counter! Irony And this is why I can't help but shake my head at the irony of people trying to derail automation. In one breath, they thump their chests and proclaim themselves concerned only with the cleanliness of elections, and yet in the next, they do everything they can to scupper this excellent opportunity we have to actually improve the cleanliness of elections. PH elections become pawn in Smartmatic-Dominion dispute

by RG Cruz, ABS-CBN News Posted at 02/13/2013 9:22 PM | Updated as of 02/13/2013 9:23 PM MANILA - The 2013 Philippine mid-term elections have become the latest casualty in an ongoing exchange of legal cases and bitter rivalry between 2 foreign companies. Commission on Elections (Comelec) Chairman Sixto Brillantes noted that the impasse over the source code of the Precint Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines bought by the Comelec for the 2013 election came after earlier battles between Smartmatic and Dominion Voting Systems Inc. overseas. ―That's in fact the case in Delaware, the fight in Puerto Rico and Mongolia. Nasabit ang Pilipinas. 'Di ko naman minamasama masyado. I'm still talking to them," he said. The source code is the human readable instruction software for the PCOS machines, as well as the consolidation and canvassing systems that will be used in the election. The Automated Election Law requires that the source code be open to review 90 days before the polls. However, third-party reviewer Systest Labs Inc. has not released the source code and its certification because of the legal battle between Smartmatic and Dominion, which owns the original software. Asked if he thought the legal battle was a portent of Dominion's possible entry into the Philippines as provider of election systems in the 2016 elections, Brillantes said, "they're only interested in one thing -- money." Lawsuits Based on documents sent to ABS-CBN News by election watchdogs, 2 cases are pending in Delaware -- a collection suit filed by Smartmatic against Dominion for what it believes was the illegal termination of its software license agreement for the PCOS machines in the Philippines with Smartmatic, and a counterclaim filed by Dominion against Smartmatic for alleged breach of contract. In both cases, both companies also traded accusations of unfair competition in securing election supplier contracts in Mongolia and Puerto Rico. "Dominion International's conduct in Mongolia and Puerto Rico appear to be consistent with a pattern of activity designed to interfere with Smartmatic's prospective business relationships and prejudice Smartmatic International‘s ability to compete," according to one of the documents. Smartmatic's collection suit, which was filed in September 11, 2012, accused Dominion of, among others:

(1) improperly purporting to terminate the License Agreement based upon an incorrect and pretextual interpretation of the geographic scope of the Agreement‘s non-compete clause; (2) failing to deliver fully functional technology for use in the 2010 Philippines national election; (3) failing to provide timely technical support during and after the Philippines election; (5) failing to provide Smartmatic with information relating to the Licensed Technology, including new developments to the licensed technology; (6) intentionally frustrating Smartmatic's right to market, lease, and sell the licensed technology; and (7) failing to place in escrow the required source code, hardware design, and manufacturing information. Smartmatic questioned Dominion's basis for terminating the license agreement because of an alleged breach by Smartmatic of a non-compete clause with Dominion in the US. Defective technology The complaint further held Dominion liable for a defect in the technology, with the latter's software allegedly failing to correctly read and record the paper ballot during a test of the automated voting system conducted shortly before the election. "This relates to the problems encountered one week before the Elections in May 2010, where the software provided by Dominion was producing inaccurate results of the testing and sealing ballots," Smartmatic's Cesar Flores said. This prompted Smartmatic to redeploy a new set of CF cards with the corrected configuration. "Smartmatic spent millions of dollars to save the automated elections in the Philippines, and we have been requesting Dominion to reimburse the costs that we incurred due to the defect in their technology," Flores added. "Even though Smartmatic is entitled by the licensing agreement to make adjustments and modifications to the licensed software, we did prefer in the interest of time to commission Dominion for said improvements," he said. "Dominion tried to keep Smartmatic hostage and force us to waive our claims from the CF card rescue operation. Smartmatic could not allow this attempt by Dominion to hijack the elections in the Philippines." Smartmatic argued this was the case in Mongolia, where Dominion ended up supplying the needs of the Mongolian election administration despite competition from Smartmatic.

"Dominion has acknowledged that it demonstrated certain critical functionality relating to the Cyrillic language before the Mongolian election authorities, but refuses to provide Smartmatic International with sufficient information regarding such functionalities," the complaint filed by Smartmatic said. It also accused Dominion of misrepresenting itself in securing the election supply contract for Puerto Rico. "Smartmatic recently learned that Dominion informed the (Puerto Rico) Commission that Smartmatic does not have access to the latest Certificated PCOS technology developed by Dominion," it added. In its reply to the complaint, Dominion flatly denied Smartmatic‘s allegations. It also argued that while the license agreement was in effect through May 23, 2012, Smartmatic was only entitled to market licensed products and technology, and not all voting systems developed by various Dominion entities. "This is an inaccurate statement from Dominion," Flores said. "Dominion did include the Cyrillic language into the licensed technology and denied access to that upgrade to Smartmatic with the intention to sabotage our commercial efforts in Mongolia." Flores said Dominion does not deny a flaw in their system that prompted the redeployment of CF cards in 2010. "They are basically saying that Smartmatic should have tested the licensed technology even more, which is a clear confession of their lack of confidence in their own technology." In October 2012, Dominion filed its own counterclaim for damages, arguing that "because Smartmatic and Dominion were competitors, Dominion made clear that any license for its PCOS technology would be limited in nature and, in particular, would not include Canada and the United States." License fees Dominion maintained that its contract was limited so that Smartmatic "would not modify, enhance or otherwise make any changes to Dominion International's PCOS voting systems without prior written agreement; and would pay Dominion International a license fee for each voting machine delivered by Smartmatic to a third party." In addition, Dominion alleged that despite numerous requests by Dominion International, Smartmatic International refused to provide information to Dominion International about payments by the Comelec. "Smartmatic International was not forthcoming with accurate information about the Comelec payments, and only upon a notice of default from Dominion International did Smartmatic International eventually pay the fees it owed to Dominion International," the company said.

Flores, however, said "Smartmatic has never denied payment to Dominion International." "However, in May 2013, two months after the option to purchase was exercised, Dominion attempted to terminate the license agreement," he added. "We expect the Delaware court to decide now if that termination is actually legal, as Dominion did not follow the clauses stipulated in the licensing agreement for terminations." Dominion in its complaint also said that "on June 14, 2012, Dominion International, through counsel, wrote to Smartmatic International to advise it that, due to the termination of the license agreement, Smartmatic International was no longer licensed to provide those 81,000 machines to Comelec, and that Dominion had no obligation to undertake the upgrades." Flores argued, "that is also inaccurate, even if the termination of the licensing agreement was legal -- which Smartmatic maintains is not -- Dominion has to honour their obligations as defined by said agreement." "Dominion knew that Comelec was entitled to the full access and support to the technology, and now they are legally bound to provide all support to this perpetual license that Comelec finally purchased two months before the alleged termination of the licensing agreement," he added. ABS-CBN News has sent an email to Dominion for its comments but no response has so far been received. Smartmatic suit may doom 2013 elections – AES Watch The election watchdog Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch) today urged anew Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago to convene the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) and look into reports that the Smartmatic company will not be able to correct its voting system‘s deficiencies. Failure to correct the PCOS system‘s program errors and bugs may doom the coming 2013 mid-term elections. Prof. Bobby Tuazon, AES Watch co-convener and CenPEG‘s director for policy studies, issued the urgent appeal to the JCOC, which oversees the automated election system, after receiving a damning evidence showing the Venezuelan marketing company‘s failure to correct the defects of the PCOS machines which were used in the 2010 national elections. Tuazon said that the U.S.-based Dominion Voting Systems, which supplied the election technology to Smartmatic for the Philippine elections, terminated its 2009 license agreement with the latter on May 23, 2012. As a result, the termination denies Smartmatic access to technical support and assistance as well as to Dominion‘s proprietary source code and other ―escrowed materials‖ which are vital to correcting and ―enhancing‖ the PCOS system upon request of Comelec in March this year. Dominion is the real owner of the election technology – a fact which Smartmatic refused to divulge during the 2010 elections.

The contract termination, Tuazon said, explains why Smartmatic can no longer correct the PCOS errors and defects that are causing erratic counting, among other problems. Comelec, headed by Chairman Sixto Brillantes, Jr., said it will not pay Smartmatic for the purchase of its 60,000 PCOS voting machines unless the system is corrected – or ―enhanced,‖ as the poll body would put it. Comelec bought the machines last March 30 subject to the said condition and other terms. Dominion did not release the vital materials because Smartmatic refused to accede to the higher fees demanded by the U.S. election technology manufacturer. In a subsequent suit it filed against Dominion last Sept. 11 before the Delaware court of chancery in the U.S., Smartmatic International accused the former with unilaterally repudiating the 2009 license agreement and undermining its election projects in Mongolia and Puerto Rico. In the complaint – a copy of which was obtained by CenPEG – Smartmatic said Dominion‘s alleged ―breach of contract and tortious interference in Smartmatic‘s business‖ has caused the Venezuelan company immediate and irreparable harm‖ and imperils its ―standing in the marketplace.‖ Smartmatic also admitted system errors of its technology in the compact flash card (CFC) fiasco during the May 3, 2010 final testing and sealing (FTS) or a week before the May 2010 elections in the Philippines. It blamed Dominion‘s software for failing to correctly read and record the paper ballots. The FTS failure nearly stopped the May 10, 2010 elections with a Comelec contingency plan to revert to manual system. Smartmatic is also demanding damages from Dominion for incurring huge financial losses and for suffering ―reputational harm‖ with many voters casting doubt on the credibility of the elections. ―It nearly affected the 2010 Philippine elections,‖ Smartmatic said in a statement last Sept. 18. Likewise, the Venezuelan company revealed that Dominion breached the 2009 license agreement by failing to deliver ―fully functional technology‖ for the 2010 Philippine elections, and failing to place in escrow the required source code, hardware design, and manufacturing data. Dr. Pablo Manalastas, AES Watch co-convener and CenPEG Fellow for IT, said this constitutes an explicit admission by Smartmatic of the ―failure of its system to function fully, resulting in glaring errors, most of which were documented‖ by CenPEG and AES Watch in 2010. ―Does Dominion‘s failure automatically imply Smartmatic‘s failure to do the escrow required by the election law (RA 9369),‖ Manalastas added. ―Do these actions by Smartmatic constitute a criminal intent to cheat, a criminal intent to avoid its contractual obligations with Comelec and with the Filipino people?‖ the IT programmer guru asked. Tuazon said the JCOC has been asked several times from as early as June 2010 by AES Watch to convene immediately in order to assess the May 2010 elections and propose an alternative automation technology for the next election.

The JCOC members, he said, should probe into why Smartmatic had been saying persistently that its system was 100% perfect contrary to the scientific studies of Filipino IT experts and scholars. In a July 2012 mock elections administered by the House suffrage and electoral committee, Smartmatic claimed a perfect counting accuracy (the law mandates 99.9995% accuracy). But subsequent reviews by AES Watch‘s IT resource persons re vealed an average of 97% accuracy rating thus exposing the system‘s erratic counting, with millions of votes being missed out from counting in an actual election. Smartmatic is now vulnerable to being charged with perjury for lying through its teeth, Tuazon said. ―What other truths is Smartmatic hiding from Filipino voters?‖ he said. The Philippines is hemmed in by a financial war between Smartmatic and Dominion, Tuazon. But in the end, the Philippines‘ electoral process in 2013 will be put in jeopardy, he added. Comprising 40 groups and NGOs, the citizens election watch group AES Watch monitored the May 2010 elections and is continuing its documentation in preparation for the May 2013 elections. Last April, individual AES Watch members led by its President Emeritus, former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr. filed a TRO case against Comelec and Smartmatic before the Supreme Court for the illegal purchase of PCOS machines for use in the next elections. Automated Election for 2010??? Is automated election the answer for a clean and honest election? Is it credible? Is Philippines ready for it?… These are some of the queries whirling inside my mind when automated election brought into topic. Elections in the Philippines have always been a manual process with the results for national positions often being announced more than a month after election day, but this coming May 2010 it will shift into automated election. An attempt to rectify this was done by the Commission on Elections by automating the process of counting the votes. What is Automated Election System? Automated election system (AES) is a system that uses appropriate technology to accomplish and aid such tasks as voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral process. Republic Act No. 9369, which is the Amended Elections Automation Law provides for the use of two forms of AES. The first is a paper-based election system defined as ―a type of automated election system that uses paper ballots, record s and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates, canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count.‖ It uses the Optical Mark Reader (OMR) Technology. Here, the voters have to shade the oval which corresponds to their candidate of choice using pencil in a specially scanned paper ballot. It is composed of 2 Laptops, 2 Digital Scanners, 2 card readers, 1 hub and 1 printer. The votes in the shaded ballots will then be scanned and counted using an Automated Counting Machine (ACM). This kind of technology is pretty much familiar in the Philippines. The second form is the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE). It is defined as ―a type of automated election system that uses electronic ballots, records votes by means of a ballot display provided

with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of a computer program, records voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically.‖ voters are provided with a Voting Pad where the photos of candidates can be selected by pressing on the desired picture. Once the vote is final, a receipt is generated after pressing ‗BOTO‗. However, DRE Technology can only be deployed in areas where communications is available and reliable. These technologies proved that IT in the Philippines is fastly growing and developing. Who will provide?… This new system of voting will not be implemented without the technology need to run the whole system. The Smartmatic, a world-class leading supplier of electoral solutions and services, won the bid to carry out the 2010 Election project in the Philippines. The contract was worth approximately $150 million, that Smartmatic is to deploy 82,200 SAES1800 voting machines across a sizable proportion of the 7,107 thousand islands comprising the territory of the Philippines, and transmit all results electronically to over 1,700 canvassing and consolidation centers. Smartmatic has successfully deployed its electronic voting technology in multiple electoral processes in the United States, Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, accurately counting over 150 million votes, always with the provision of an auditable paper trail, and open source-code reviews. Last year, the Smartmatic electoral technology was used in the election in the ARMM region in the Philippines, an event the COMELEC regarded as very satisfactory, and first of its kind in South East Asia. Smartmatic is a multinational company that designs and deploys technological solutions aimed at helping governments fulfill, in the most efficient way, their commitments with their citizens. It is one of the largest cutting-edge technology suppliers, with a wide and proven experience in the United States, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Automated election has several advantages, some of these are: Financial Savings, though automated elections deal with computers and will cost large amount of money, it will still cut the cost, like labor cost. Since computer will do the counting, it means fewer laborer needed. Another advantage is, increased speed and effiency of electoral task and results. Using computers would make the voting and the counting faster and acccurate than manual process of election. It has also improved capacity to identify and prevent frauds., tampering of votes will prevented and the integrity of the election would be higher. There are so many advantages but the question is, Are Filipinos ready for this? Even automated election provide high security, there are still computer geeks that can bombard the whole system or hack the computers and manipulate the results. There is also a possibility that cheaters would come from the people who developed the system. And wee can‘t deny the fact that some Filipinos doesn‘t know how to use computers especially in the ru ral area, will they be able to adapt this new process? In my own opinion, the main problem with automated election is ―transparency‖. People won‘t able to see the actual process of counting the votes and several will doubt if the results are really correct.

Our country might be a long way to go from being industrialized and fully prepared to reap the benefits of Information Techbology in every major part of our everyday lives, but the conduct of the 2010 automated elections is a still a big step forward towards the achievement of a truly democratic and honest elections and the closure of the digital divide as a whole. Our infrastructures might not be at par to other countries and our people might not be fully informed and trained yet, but these shortcomings can be greatly remedied if we are equipped with the willingness to learn and adapt to our ever-changing world.