Cases 2
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JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al.[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000.]PURISIMA, J.:FACTS: • Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; an appendix) of Aleja Belleza, was instituted devisee of Lot No.1 3 9 2 w i t h a n a r e a o f 5 1 1 , 8 5 5 s q u a r e m e t e r s w i t h t h e obligatio n to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein private respondent every year during the latter's lifetime. • The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not onlyon the instituted heir but also to his successors-in-interestand that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shallseize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants." • Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children,one of whom is herein petitioner. • Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to complywith their obligation, filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject property to the survivingheirs of the testatrix. • During the pret r i a l , a c o m p r o m i s e a g r e e m e n t w a s concluded between the parties wherein the lessee of thep r o p e r t y a s s u m e d t h e d e l i v e r y o f 1 0 0 p i c u l s o f s u g a r t o private respondent; however, only partial delivery was made. • The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, “While there may be the nonperformanceo f t h e c o m m a n d a s m a n d a t e d , e x a c t i o n f r o m t h e m ( t h e petiti oners), simply because they are the children of JorgeRabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, do esnot warrant the filing of the present complaint.” • The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of D r . R a b a d i l l a i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f a m o d a l i n s t i t u t i o n a n d a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose whenpetitioner failed to comply with their obligation under thec o d i c i l , a n d i n o r d e r i n g t h e r e v e r s i o n o f L o t 1 3 9 2 t o t h e estate of testatrix. Thus, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has a legally demandableright against the petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. HELD: YES.It is a general rule under the law on succession thats u c c e s s i o n a l r i g h t s a r e t r a n s m i t t e d f r o m t h e m o m e n t o f death of
the decedent and compulsory heirs are called tosucceed by operation of law. The legitimate children anddescendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and thew i d o w o r w i d o w e r , a r e c o m p u l s o r y h e i r s . T h u s , t h e petition er, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of theinstituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter byoperation of law, without need of further proceedings, andthe successional rights were transmitted to them from themoment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.U n d e r A r t i c l e 7 7 6 o f t h e N e w C i v i l C o d e , i n h e r i t a n c e incl udes all the property, rights and obligations of a person,not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rightsDr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil weretransmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. Andsince obligations not extinguished by death also form part of t h e e s t a t e o f t h e d e c e d e n t ; c o r o l l a r i l y , t h e o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon hisdeath.In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Bell eza devised Lot No.1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that theu s u f r u c t t h e r e o f w o u l d b e d e l i v e r e d t o t h e h e r e i n p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e nt every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights andt i t l e o v e r s a i d p r o p e r t y , a n d t h e y a l s o a s s u m e d h i s (dec edent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involvedto herein private respondent. Such obligation of the institutedh e i r r e c i p r o c a l l y c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e r i g h t o f p r i v a t e respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performanceof which is now being demanded by the latter through theinstitution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondenthas a cause of action against petitioner and the trial courterred in dismissing the complaint below.
Vda. De Tupas vs. RTC of Negros Occidental (October 3, 1986)FACTS:Epifanio R. Tupas owned lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre,his private capital. On August 2, 1977, he donated the foregoing properties tothe Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots. Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978, childless, leaving his widow, PartenzaLucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a will dated May 18, 1976. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839.Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible by one-half. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint because: (1) the properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his deathon August 20, 1978; (2) the donated properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate;
and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsoryheir, the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 1061, C.C.HELD:The Trial Court is WRONG. A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation morethan he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to itstaking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits ofthe thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable, that is, its value is in imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate. Thisis true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collationto the latter class of donations. `Collationable gifts' should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, so that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated should be considered part of the donor's estate.The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim ofinofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but thathe gave more than what was within his power to give. In order to find out whether a donation is inofficious or not, the rules are: (1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of thetestator's death;(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities,giving rise to the hereditary estate;(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of donations subject to collation; and (5)the determination of the amount of the l e g i t i m e s b y g e t t i n g f r o m t h e t o t al thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective compulsory heir.Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
Go ong vs. ca
Facts: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City are in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was registered. On June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered. On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was processed the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the interest of the loan. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL. Ruling: Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for after all, she was the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of any heir or anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the government. Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was
intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570). NOCEDA V. CA 313 SCRA 504 FACTS: Directo together with her nephew and another, extrajudicially partitioned the land donated to them. On the same date, she donated in favor of Noceda a part of her land. On her share of the land, she fenced it and constructed three huts therein. On a later date, Noceda removed the fence, entered the premises and used the three lots. Despite demands for him to vacate, he refused to do so, prompting Directo to file a case against him and revoke the donation made by her. Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOT 1121 SHOULD BE PARTITIONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT DATED 17 AUGUST 1981. HELD: In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. 24 Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. 25 The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each coowner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. 26 And one way of effecting a partition of the decedent's estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially. The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-interest The acts of Noceda are acts of usurpation which is an offense against the property of Directo and considered an act of ingratitude of a donee against a donor. The law doesn’t require conviction of the donee, it is enough that his offense is proved in the action for revocation. Baritua vs. ca Facts: the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6 as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer — Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) — Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario,
received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7 about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9 issue: hether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it. ruling: It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her
co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners. Uriarte vs CA Facts: Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. [2] Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica. Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justa’s father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers.[3]Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte. The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio.[4] The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva’s brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase.[5] Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa’s tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest.[6] He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.[7] Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs.[8] In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa [9] but the latter’s heirs entitled to her entire land. They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo,[10] their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio’s nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908.[11] Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third.[12] The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it.[13] They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, [14] the original owner of the property.
Issue: who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justa’s estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code. Ruling: In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa. On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa’s cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa’s half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa’s nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.[23] That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt’s heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, “The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.”[24] Bagunu vs. piedad Facts: petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court. Issues: whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention;
whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law ruling: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifthdegree relative of the decedent. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. Corpus vs corpus Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 29, 1939. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Osssorio, (3) Amelia Corpus, Jose A.V. Corpus and Ramon l. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus. The daughter of his half brother Jose Corps, Juanita died in October, 1944. Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose corpus. On October 6, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the CFI of Manila to recover bar supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in Yangco’s will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under Article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and therefore, the descendant’s estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Juliana Corpus the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother’s supposed intestate share in Yangco’s estate? HELD: It is disputably presumed “that a man and a women deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage”, “that a child born in Lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bad and board, is legitimate”, and “that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life”. Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco’s estate. Diaz vs IAC Facts: that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa. Issue: who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? Ruling: It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Viado vs ca] Facts: Pascual Facts: Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent. Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud. Issue: lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed, notwithstanding the existence of inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence that the will was not signed by all the witnesses in the presence of one another, in violation of the requirement of the law. Ruling: It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a Will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure or influence, for we have numerous instances where strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her Will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz. DE APARICIO Fatcs; Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she was almost four (4) months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace from the public she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Father Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4, 1924. 1They never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days
after the marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by her birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. 2On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests. 3 This was duly probated in the Court of First Instance of Bohol on June 11, 1938 and on appeal it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 4 Soon after reaching the age of majority Consolacion filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her father Fr. Lumain and for damages. Issue: II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE IS A NATURAL CHILD OF THE LATE REV. FR. FELIPE LUMAIN. Ruling: However, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of appellee Consolacion in this case. In the last will and testament of Fr. Lumain he not only acknowledged appellee Consolacion as his natural daughter but designated her as his only heir. Said will was duly probated in Court. As Fr. Lumain died without any compulsory heir, appellee Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will. 12 One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.13
Santos vs. Buenaventura Facts: Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased. Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed on November 28, 1956 an opposition to the probate of said will. Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.2
Issuedid Flora's actuations, under the facts and circumstances herein, amount to a violation of the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will; Ruling: But the most important single factor that should engender reasonable doubt as to the physical and mental capacity of a person to execute a will, was the condition of Maxima Blas as gleaned from the records of the case. She was an old woman more than 86 years old who suffered from various ailments like rheumatoid arthritis, catarrh of the eyes, jaundice, cirrhosis of the liver, anemia, edema of the lower legs and fracture in the vertebrae. From August 1, 1956 to September 23, 1956 she received seven blood transfusions, as follows: one on August 1; two on September 22 (the alleged date of the execution of the will), with barely three hours intervening; one each on September 24, 25, 26 and 29, 1956. She was also given dextrose vinoclysis on September 22, because she could not take food through the mouth; and on September 23, 1956 she started to bleed by mouth, compelling her doctor to cancel her trip to the United States scheduled for September 25, 1956. Several documents executed by her before the alleged date of execution of the will, were no longer signed but merely thumbmarked by her,7whereas the will appealed to have been signed. From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations impaired the true intention of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will. Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the speedy probation of the will. Since the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's evidence. Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention.
the decedent and compulsory heirs are called tosucceed by operation of law. The legitimate children anddescendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and thew i d o w o r w i d o w e r , a r e c o m p u l s o r y h e i r s . T h u s , t h e petition er, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of theinstituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter byoperation of law, without need of further proceedings, andthe successional rights were transmitted to them from themoment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.U n d e r A r t i c l e 7 7 6 o f t h e N e w C i v i l C o d e , i n h e r i t a n c e incl udes all the property, rights and obligations of a person,not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rightsDr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil weretransmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. Andsince obligations not extinguished by death also form part of t h e e s t a t e o f t h e d e c e d e n t ; c o r o l l a r i l y , t h e o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon hisdeath.In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Bell eza devised Lot No.1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that theu s u f r u c t t h e r e o f w o u l d b e d e l i v e r e d t o t h e h e r e i n p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e nt every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights andt i t l e o v e r s a i d p r o p e r t y , a n d t h e y a l s o a s s u m e d h i s (dec edent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involvedto herein private respondent. Such obligation of the institutedh e i r r e c i p r o c a l l y c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e r i g h t o f p r i v a t e respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performanceof which is now being demanded by the latter through theinstitution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondenthas a cause of action against petitioner and the trial courterred in dismissing the complaint below.
Vda. De Tupas vs. RTC of Negros Occidental (October 3, 1986)FACTS:Epifanio R. Tupas owned lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre,his private capital. On August 2, 1977, he donated the foregoing properties tothe Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots. Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978, childless, leaving his widow, PartenzaLucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a will dated May 18, 1976. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839.Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible by one-half. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint because: (1) the properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his deathon August 20, 1978; (2) the donated properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate;
and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsoryheir, the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 1061, C.C.HELD:The Trial Court is WRONG. A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation morethan he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to itstaking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits ofthe thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable, that is, its value is in imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate. Thisis true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collationto the latter class of donations. `Collationable gifts' should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, so that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated should be considered part of the donor's estate.The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim ofinofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but thathe gave more than what was within his power to give. In order to find out whether a donation is inofficious or not, the rules are: (1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of thetestator's death;(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities,giving rise to the hereditary estate;(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of donations subject to collation; and (5)the determination of the amount of the l e g i t i m e s b y g e t t i n g f r o m t h e t o t al thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective compulsory heir.Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
Go ong vs. ca
Facts: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City are in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was registered. On June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered. On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was processed the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the interest of the loan. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL. Ruling: Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for after all, she was the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of any heir or anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the government. Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was
intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570). NOCEDA V. CA 313 SCRA 504 FACTS: Directo together with her nephew and another, extrajudicially partitioned the land donated to them. On the same date, she donated in favor of Noceda a part of her land. On her share of the land, she fenced it and constructed three huts therein. On a later date, Noceda removed the fence, entered the premises and used the three lots. Despite demands for him to vacate, he refused to do so, prompting Directo to file a case against him and revoke the donation made by her. Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOT 1121 SHOULD BE PARTITIONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT DATED 17 AUGUST 1981. HELD: In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. 24 Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. 25 The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each coowner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. 26 And one way of effecting a partition of the decedent's estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially. The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-interest The acts of Noceda are acts of usurpation which is an offense against the property of Directo and considered an act of ingratitude of a donee against a donor. The law doesn’t require conviction of the donee, it is enough that his offense is proved in the action for revocation. Baritua vs. ca Facts: the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6 as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer — Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) — Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario,
received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7 about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9 issue: hether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it. ruling: It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her
co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners. Uriarte vs CA Facts: Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. [2] Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica. Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justa’s father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers.[3]Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte. The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio.[4] The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva’s brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase.[5] Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa’s tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest.[6] He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.[7] Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs.[8] In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa [9] but the latter’s heirs entitled to her entire land. They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo,[10] their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio’s nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908.[11] Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third.[12] The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it.[13] They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, [14] the original owner of the property.
Issue: who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justa’s estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code. Ruling: In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa. On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa’s cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa’s half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa’s nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.[23] That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt’s heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, “The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.”[24] Bagunu vs. piedad Facts: petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court. Issues: whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention;
whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law ruling: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifthdegree relative of the decedent. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. Corpus vs corpus Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 29, 1939. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Osssorio, (3) Amelia Corpus, Jose A.V. Corpus and Ramon l. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus. The daughter of his half brother Jose Corps, Juanita died in October, 1944. Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose corpus. On October 6, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the CFI of Manila to recover bar supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in Yangco’s will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under Article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and therefore, the descendant’s estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Juliana Corpus the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother’s supposed intestate share in Yangco’s estate? HELD: It is disputably presumed “that a man and a women deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage”, “that a child born in Lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bad and board, is legitimate”, and “that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life”. Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco’s estate. Diaz vs IAC Facts: that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa. Issue: who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? Ruling: It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Viado vs ca] Facts: Pascual Facts: Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent. Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud. Issue: lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed, notwithstanding the existence of inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence that the will was not signed by all the witnesses in the presence of one another, in violation of the requirement of the law. Ruling: It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a Will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure or influence, for we have numerous instances where strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her Will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz. DE APARICIO Fatcs; Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she was almost four (4) months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace from the public she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Father Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4, 1924. 1They never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days
after the marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by her birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. 2On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests. 3 This was duly probated in the Court of First Instance of Bohol on June 11, 1938 and on appeal it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 4 Soon after reaching the age of majority Consolacion filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her father Fr. Lumain and for damages. Issue: II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE IS A NATURAL CHILD OF THE LATE REV. FR. FELIPE LUMAIN. Ruling: However, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of appellee Consolacion in this case. In the last will and testament of Fr. Lumain he not only acknowledged appellee Consolacion as his natural daughter but designated her as his only heir. Said will was duly probated in Court. As Fr. Lumain died without any compulsory heir, appellee Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will. 12 One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.13
Santos vs. Buenaventura Facts: Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased. Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed on November 28, 1956 an opposition to the probate of said will. Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.2
Issuedid Flora's actuations, under the facts and circumstances herein, amount to a violation of the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will; Ruling: But the most important single factor that should engender reasonable doubt as to the physical and mental capacity of a person to execute a will, was the condition of Maxima Blas as gleaned from the records of the case. She was an old woman more than 86 years old who suffered from various ailments like rheumatoid arthritis, catarrh of the eyes, jaundice, cirrhosis of the liver, anemia, edema of the lower legs and fracture in the vertebrae. From August 1, 1956 to September 23, 1956 she received seven blood transfusions, as follows: one on August 1; two on September 22 (the alleged date of the execution of the will), with barely three hours intervening; one each on September 24, 25, 26 and 29, 1956. She was also given dextrose vinoclysis on September 22, because she could not take food through the mouth; and on September 23, 1956 she started to bleed by mouth, compelling her doctor to cancel her trip to the United States scheduled for September 25, 1956. Several documents executed by her before the alleged date of execution of the will, were no longer signed but merely thumbmarked by her,7whereas the will appealed to have been signed. From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations impaired the true intention of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will. Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the speedy probation of the will. Since the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's evidence. Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention.
