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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIO AMIGO alias “BEBOT”, accused-appellant.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 2 9, 1989, in the City of o f Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:

“MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO

LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.” 

thus performing all the acts of execution ex ecution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and able medical me dical assistance immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.

(p.1, Rollo.)

 

  to which he pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the ccrime rime of murder, to wit:

That on or about December 29, 2 9, 1989, in the City C ity of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Say, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.

(p.

3, Rollo.)

After trial on the merits, mer its, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime c rime of  MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual ac tual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

(p.

32, Rollo.)

Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the trial t rial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.

The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General and as borne out by the evidence, are as follows:

 

  On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at the their ir store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of o f Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one o ne together with his two year old son, w who ho were all seated at the front seat beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at tthe he back of the said ve vehicle. hicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the corner of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and 13)

With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling’s vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.

Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damage to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 3 31, 1, 1992, p. 4)

Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver’s seat and confronted Virgilio 

Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, 19 91, p. 5)

Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, “You were not looking,” to which Virgilio retorted, “I did not see you.” (TSN, April 29, 1991, p.16) 

While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a passenger of  Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of o f the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor acc accident. ident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16 16-18)

 

A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. (Ibid., p. 7)

Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; “You are Chinese, is it you?” With a ready answer Benito said; “Yes, I am a Chinese and why?” Patricio in turn replied; “So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while,” then left. (Ibid., pp. 7 and 19) 

Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapse of about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once again, “You are a Chinese, is it not?” To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative. 

(Ibid., pp. 7, 19-20)

Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled “Ah, so you yo u are a Chinese,” and suddenly took a five inch

knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (ibid., p. 20)

After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio Patr icio wielding the same knife and not content with the injuries he had already alre ady inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim v ictim several times, the last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body. (Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 22)

It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, Fie ra, pleading for mercy to spare he herr father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid., p. 10)

Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since there were wer e already several people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help he lp them. (Ibid., pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) 21 -22) Only after her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid., p. 12)

 

After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several people, he fled. (Ibid., p. 22)

Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased c hased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she was not able to overtake him, thus, she instead decided to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he was attended to at the Emergency Room. (Ibid., p. 13)

While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, o peration, he was subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)

In a last ditch effort to t o save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese C hinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH - SEPSIS SEPS IS (an overwhelming infection). This means that the infection has already circulated in the blood all over the t he body. (Ibid., pp.6-7)

(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death deat h penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, ye ars, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Reasons out accused-appellant:

. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and killing happened, the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no modifying circumstances present (p. 5

 

Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Rev Revised ised Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

(p. 10, Appellant’s Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)  

The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muñoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:

In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the t he Court that “in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,” thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the t he Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum maxi mum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, I ndeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods per iods in keeping with the three-grade scheme sc heme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that t hat Article III, Se Section ction 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty

 

shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.

It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state st ate it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another or - strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere - did not say enough.

The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases case s represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members at that time t ime still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and tan, for the tenets t enets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing grow ing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing te sting a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.

Accordingly, with the hope that “as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks,” w whatever hatever that means, we

hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal

 

Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to t o reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium me dium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

The Court realizes that this interpretation interpre tation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman wo rkman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained c omplained because he felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: “Friend, I do you no wrong. Did

you not agree with me for a penny?” 

The problem in any event is addressed not to t o this Court but to the Congress. P Penalties enalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise r evise their range as determined exc exclusively lusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the t he medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code w which, hich, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three t hree murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.

(at pp. 120-125.)

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parojinog P arojinog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).

Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to t o plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply

 

the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

 

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In I n May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.

Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. S aldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1

It likewise appeared in the course co urse of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness w itness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the t he loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.

Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or

 

on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these findings. 2

After due hearing, the Labor L abor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received rece ived were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. P50,000.00 . 3

On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period pe riod of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.

On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.

The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee em ployee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e t h.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial r emedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the

 

Management." Instead, she went directly to the t he Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.

But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.

What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job which, w hich, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of  an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An em employee ployee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, em ployments, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.

Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)

 

Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the t he Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the priority pr iority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of  such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights. 9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of o f all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)

Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:

Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, self -organization, collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11

To be sure, both Charters Charter s recognize "security of tenure" as one of tthe he rights of labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least

 

greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.

It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the t he special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national development." 12

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a  just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article artic le on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor L abor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the t he lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which ttook ook effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every ever y right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of  backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give he herr back the income lost during the period of  unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."

Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted w when hen reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

 

Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the t he facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of  the long passage of time (22 years year s of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the t he parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or o r that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution exe cution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22

In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24

In the case at bar, the law is on the t he side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, rece dendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.

A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is

 

an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization or ganization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between betwee n the parties as a result re sult of litigation. That is human nature. 33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal leg al act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could co uld be easily separated from the service, by merely me rely paying his separation pay on the pretext that t hat his relationship with his employer had already become strained. 34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is o one ne that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been be en unlawfully dismissed.

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of  company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.

However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of o f trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed

 

on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we w e should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the t he bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of o f Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the t he records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. 1984 . Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., concurs in the result.

 

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)

Narvasa C.J., concurs

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

 

  I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)

Narvasa C.J., concurs

Footnotes

1 Records, pp. 34-43.

2 Records, p. 22.

3 Ibid, p.121.

4 Rollo, p. 149.

5 Soriano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124.

6 Pres. Decree No. 442, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715.

7 LABOR CODE (1991), Book VI, Rule 1, Secs. 2 and 3.

8 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. (1).

 

9 CONST., Art. XIII.

10 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 3, pars. (1) and (2)

11 CONST. (1973), Art. II, Sec. 9.

12 CONCOM Record, Vol. 2, p. 681.

13 The following provision on security of tenure is embodied in Article Ar ticle 279, Labor Code, reproduced re produced herein but with the amendments inserted by Republic Act No. 6715 approved on March 2, 1 1989 989 in bold type:

In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of-an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights AND OTHER PRIVILEGES and to his FULL backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his ACTUAL reinstatement. r einstatement.

14 The application of Article 279 is illustrated in the following cases: Santos Salao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 9O786, September 21, 1991; Morales v. NLRC, G.R. 91501, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 295; Carandang v. Dulay, G.R. 90492, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 792; and Santos v. NLRC, No. 76721, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166.

15 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary.

16 Balaquezon EWTU v. Zamora, Nos. L-46766-7, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA 5.

17 San Miguel Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor and Employmet, No. 58927, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 204.

 

  18 Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation v. Pagalibuan, G.R. 62909, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 404.

19 Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, No. 77859, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 528.

20 Gubac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81946, July 13, 1990, 187 SCRA 412

21 Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, Occtober 5, 1990, 190 SCRA 347.

22 Commercial Motors Corporation v. Commissioners, G.R. No. 74762, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 191; DeVera v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93212, November 22, 1990, 191 SCRA 632; Orcino v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92864, October 18, 1990, 190 1 90 SCRA 815; Maglutac v. NLRC/ Conmart v. NLRC,G.R. No. 78637, September 21, 1990,189 SCRA 767; Carandang v. Dulay, G.R. No. 90942, August 20, 1990, 188 SC RA 792; Esmalin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67880, September 15,1989, 177 SCRA 537; Fernandez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84302, August 10, 1989, 176 SCRA 269; Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 7971822, April 12,1989, 172 SCRA 88, Bautista v. Inciong, No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665; Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, No.75740, January 15, 1988, 1 988, 157 SCRA 87; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople No. 56398, July 23, 1987, 1987 , 152 SCRA 219; and Divine Wor Word d High Schol v. NLRC, No. 72207, August 6, 1986, 143 SCRA 346

23 Chua Qua v. Clave, G.R.No. 49549, August 30,1990,189 SCRA 117; Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86000, September 21, 1990 189 SCRA 881 ; ALU v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 83886-87, September 20,1990, 189 SCRA 743; and Pizza Inn v. NLRC, No. 74531, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 773.

24 Maglutac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 767; Conmart v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78637, 189 SCRA 767; De Vera v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93212, November 22, 1990, 191 SCRA 632; Commercial Motors Corp. v. Commissioners, G.R. No. 74762, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 191; Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, October 5, 1990, 190 SRCA 347.

25 LABOR CODE, Art. 279.

 

26 R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p 94 (1990).

27 Aparri v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 30057, January 31, 1984 231 SCRA 241

28 Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, No. 569393, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219

29 Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, No. 75740, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 87

30 Bautista v. Inciong, No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665.

31 Esmalin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67880, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 537.

32 Maglutac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 767.

33 Anscor Transport and Terminals v. NLRC, G.R. No. 85894, September 28, 1990, 190 SCRA 147.

34 Sibal v. Notre Dame of Greater Manila, G.R. No. 75093, February 23, 1990 182 SCRA 538.

35 Reyes v. Zamora, No. L-46732, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 92; De Vera v. NLRC and BPI, G.R. No. 93070, August 9, 1991.

36 Rollo, pp. 29 and 35.

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