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CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MAO ZEDONG & DENG XIAOPENG (1949-1997) AREA Ko !" (19#$-#%) DETAILS Korea had always been strategically important to China given its close proximity. The war had been started by the North Koreans, at Stalin’s bidding (he wanted a pro-Soviet regime on the whole o the penins!la". #ao really had no choice, b!t to s!pport Stalin. #ao was also worried that a $S victory and a conse%!ent $S presence on their doorstep wo!ld destabilise the &'C. #illions o Chinese troops became involved in the war. The war was a disaster or the &'C. (oolhardy Chinese tactics res!lted in the death o a million Chinese soldiers, incl!ding #ao’s own son. The North Koreans were p!shed bac) to where they had started and the $S was now convinced that it had to protect Taiwan rom a Comm!nist attac). The war !rther so!red already strained Sino-$S relations and also Sino-Soviet ones, and certainly made the Cold *ar rostier+ the North Korean dictatorship became more and more br!tal, and s!rvives to this day an increasing embarrassment to its Chinese ally. , Nationalist stronghold and ie dom o the Chiangs !ntil -.//, Taiwan is an obsession o the &'C+ above all, the &'C’s leadership is nationalist and yearns to re!nite all o China+ the &'C did (and does" not have the ability to invade the island, especially since the $S has g!aranteed its sa ety+ the &'C has always re !sed to ac)nowledge Taiwan as a sovereign state+ the replacement o Taiwan by the &'C in the Sec!rity Co!ncil in -.0- was a ma1or victory or the Comm!nists+ the &'C also wants Taiwan bac) beca!se it is s!ch a wealthy and s!ccess !l island, with a 2N& growth rate and per capita income, twice that o the &'C+ Taiwan, rom -..-, was also a m!lti-party democracy, b!t contin!ed to elect the 2#3 4a direct sn!b to the &'C+ both the &'C and Taiwan claim sovereignty over the whole o China and tho!gh there has been dialog!e, both sides re !se to b!dge on the iss!e o which is the legitimate government o the whole o China. 'elations had been so!r since -.5. and the $S’ re !sal to recognise the &'C or allow it onto the Sec!rity Co!ncil in place o Taiwan+ they were made worse by6 C7, involvement in Tibet+ the direct con lict in Korea+ the $S protection o Taiwan (to which the entire 0th (leet was allotted"+ the act that by -.85 the &'C had the ,-bomb and, by -.80, an 9ydrogen bomb, only increased tensions in the region+ combined with the ideological di erences, the Cold *ar was very m!ch alive and well in the (ar :ast. The C' and ;ietnam *ar saw tensions increase even !rther, as the &'C s!pplied the N;, and ;iet-cong+ li)e Stalin, #ao was also convinced that ,merica wanted to invade and destroy his co!ntry, to this degree he created an internal de ence system called the <Third =ine’+ relations improved in the early <0>s !nder Nixon, beca!se both sides came to regard the $SS' as their main enemy (and also both were anti-;ietnam by this stage"+ so Taiwan was replaced on the Sec!rity Co!ncil by the &'C in -.0-+ in -.0. !ll diplomatic relations were established+ the $S,, as a capitalist co!ntry, perhaps sees the val!e o having the h!gely pop!lated China as a trading partner and mar)et or its goods+ the &'C sees better relations with the $S as necessary or obtaining the technology o the *est+ Taiwan, tho!gh, remains an obstacle in the way o even better relations+ the present approach o the $S is best s!mmed !p by its present principle o <engagement witho!t endorsement’, this is why it e ectively ignored the o!trages o -./., as did an e%!ally pragmatic 2?.

T"&'"( (1949-

US-S&(o R!)"*&o(+ (1949-19,9)

Ho(- Ko((1949-97)

I(.&" (1949-19/0)

T&1!* (19#$-,9)

2&!*("3 (1979-199$+)

, ?ritish colony since the -/5>s, 9K was handed bac) to China in -..0+ as an imperialist colony its possession had always !nderstandably ran)led, b!t given China’s own imperialism we sho!ld ind this more than a little hypocritical+ the &'C wanted it or both nationalist reasons and beca!se <the pearl o the orient’ is so prospero!s+ the area has special stat!s and will contin!e to be molly-coddled or a n!mber o years yet (!ntil @>50"+ rom -.5., 9K had been a centre or those Chinese opposed to the &'C+ perhaps by its s!ccess it also served to show !p the limitations o the <socialist !topia’ across the border+ the -./5 agreement, which incorporated 3eng’s pragmatic principles o <one co!ntry, two systems’, was largely a Chinese s!ccess+ a placatory 2? was prepared to ma)e the deal to g!arantee its contin!ed access to China’s one billion person mar)et place+ 7nitially, Sino-7ndian relations were good6 both had achieved independence aro!nd the same time+ both were anti-colonial in o!tloo)+ both had been exploited by the ?ritish+ the Tibetan invasion, given Tibet bordered with 7ndia, was to so!r relations+ to get to Tibet more easily the &'C started b!ilding a road thro!gh 7ndian territory in -.A8+ 7ndia granted sanct!ary to the 3alai =ama in -.A., angering ?ei1ing+ in -.8@ a !ll-scale war bro)e o!t along the disp!ted border, which 7ndia lost+ relations between the two most pop!lo!s co!ntries in the world remain strained to this day+ once again, the &'C had shown its interests to be primarily nationalist and territorial when it came to oreign policy. The &'C has always claimed that Tibet is an integral part o China+ historically, c!lt!rally, ling!istically and ethnically tho!gh, Tibet is not 9an Chinese+ instead it is an occ!pied co!ntry+ invaded by the &=, in -.A>, it con irms once again how #ao saw himsel in the image o an emperor and as a Chinese nationalist irst and oremost+ a policy o Bc!lt!ral genocideC was introd!ced 4Tibet was to be orced to become 9an Chinese+ any signs o dissent .as in -.A." were r!thlessly p!t down+ ?!ddhist temples were destroyed+ mon)s and n!ns imprisoned+ the mid-late />s saw n!mero!s Sino-Tibetan clashes+ the &'C has certainly lost the propaganda war over the iss!e+ 3eng’s policy had been as hardline as #ao’s, i a little more s!btle at times, at least when the world was watching+ =i)e Korea, ;ietnam’s close proximity means it has important strategic importance to China+ China may have s!pported ;ietnam d!ring its war with the $S, b!t only !ntil more pragmatic considerations became dominant (an agreement with the $S"+ in -.0., the &=, invaded ;ietnam ostensibly or ideological reasons (;ietnam was a close ally o the rival $SS'", b!t more prosaically over territorial disp!tes and the act that China’s close ally, &ol &ot’s Cambodia was involved+ the &=, per ormed badly in the res!lting con lict and the Chinese were orced to withdraw+ the &'C has also seen ;ietnam as a rival in the &aci ic rim area, and the two have clashed violently over the Spratly 7slands in the So!th China Sea, an area China regards as within its sphere o in l!ence. China has seen itsel as the oremost anti-colonial power in the world and conscio!sly tried to displace the $SS' in , rica and elsewhere (sponsoring the TanDanian-Eambian railway in the time o Eho!, e.g."+ it also tried to replace the $SS'’s in l!ence in :!rope b!t s!cceeded only in ,lbania+ in =atin ,merica, it s!bsidised Castro’s C!ba, b!t had little impact elsewhere+ Eho! :nlai’s statesmanship did create a n!mber o admirers and riends (incl!ding Nehr!, initially", b!t ew sta!nch allies+ China lac)ed the economic and military reso!rces to be an e ective and respected leader+ the C' (d!ring which the 7ndonesian and ?ritish embassies were b!rnt down, and Eho! was removed rom o ice", the perceived arrogance and isolationism o ex-patriate Chinese comm!nities, and the &'C’s r!thless policy in Tibet, also won it ew riends+ the &'C was never able to replace the $SS' as the leader o <world revol!tion’.

T4! D!5!)o6&(7o ). (1949-19,9)

S&(o-So5&!* R!)"*&o(+ (1949-1991)

'elations had so!red since the (irst (F&+ historically, '!ssia and China had been cent!ries-old rivals in east ,sia anyway, especially as they shared a 5,A>> mile border, m!ch o which was disp!ted+ Stalin, the wannabe Tsar, had always had coveto!s eyes on #anch!ria, and had e ectively looted and pl!ndered the area o G@ billion worth o plant and machinery, a ter **77+ the last Soviet ootholds in China were only relin%!ished when the conciliatory Khr!schev came to power+ #ao stressed the ideological di erences between him and the post-Stalinist leadership o the $SS', b!t really it was territorial disp!tes li)e the ,m!r-$ss!ri border incidents in the -.8>s, that almost led the two Comm!nist giants into direct con lict+ #ao had hated Stalin, beca!se o Stalin’s policies o !sing China in his Cold *ar str!ggle (and the almost disastro!s advice he had given d!ring the civil war", as a so!rce o !nds (depleting China’s gold reserves", and or personal reasons 4 he had, in #ao’s eyes, not shown eno!gh personal respect towards the Chinese leader+ Khr!schev’s accession to power and criticism o Stalinism and its <c!lt o personality’, #ao also elt to be a direct criticism o him and his policies+ also i Stalinism was discredited so too, by implication, wo!ld #aoism+ the m!t!al 1ealo!sy between the $SS' and the &'C as great powers ar exceeded, in my opinion, their ideological disp!tes+ it is even tho!ght today that Stalin p!rposely ca!sed the Korean *ar to drag on - in order to exha!st the ChineseH Khr!schev’s overt!res to the *est (’peace !l coexistence’" also rightened #ao, as they promised to isolate the more hardline &'C and s!bvert the tr!e ongoing revol!tionary nat!re o Comm!nism+ #ao and Khr!schev personally did not get on either+ the $SS' withdrew its advisers and s!pport in the late <A>s+ the &'C started s!pporting #oscow’s enemies li)e ,lbania+ in -.8- diplomatic relations were bro)en o , to be res!med only !nder 2orbachev+ the -.8@ war with 7ndia saw the $SS' give its s!pport to the s!b-continent+ d!ring the C!ban #issile Crisis in -.8@, China acc!sed the Soviets o <advent!rism’ and then <capit!lationism’+ both sides also introd!ced racial overtones into their disagreements+ #ao’s assertion that China co!ld easily s!rvive a n!clear con lict, given its siDe, !rther alarmed the Soviets+ ?reDhnev’s accession to power hardly improved relations between the two powers and in -.8. the two co!ntries came close to war+ the death o #ao in -.08 I ?reDhnev in -./@ led to considerably better relations and an easing o tension !nder the more pragmatic 3eng+ 3eng has abandoned the pretences o ideology in avo!r o a policy o re-creating the power o a once historically dominant nation.

SUMMARIES OF MAO AND DENG8S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS

MAO8S MOTI2ES

DENG8S MOTI2ES

:M; 6!o6)!SUCCESSES <"))!. 3! *4! G !"* MAO8S FAILURES MAO8S : M"o Z!.o('"+ " >"&)? ! &( " (?31! o> " !"+= H!)3+3"(9 I "<4&!5!.=

MAO8S ECONOMIC9 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

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