Comprehensive Case List

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Comprehensive Comprehensi ve Case List 9/11 Fund (pg. 549) o Afer 9/11, Congress capped the liability that airlines and other deendants might ace i sued by survivors or the amilies o vicms -- no more than $6 billion could be collected o A vicm compensaon und was also collected where aggrieved pares could apply or relie i they agreed not to sue the airlines, the WTC or other potenal deendants 

Payments were madewere to nearly 5,560 claimants totaling than billion Ninety-our lawsuits led by people who opted outmore and all but$7 our seled The und compensated or lost earnings and or "non-economic" losses They used exisng ederal programs or public saety ocers who were injured or killed as a model or the program o This is not an ordinary ligaon There can not normally be comparisons or similar ligaons, but in this case the vicms are rom the same incident and horizontal inequies in their awards would be too visible In order to avoid this inequity the awards were somewhat standardized to ensure equity This approach also osters administrave eciency  Adams v. Bollack Bollack (227 N.Y. 208) (1919) (pg. 145) o Facts 













A boy a bridge is swinging an 8-oot wire and it tangles with an adjacent trolley linewalking and he along is burned The jury nds or the plain  o Appellate court reversed The trolley has a duty to adopt all reasonable precauons to minimize the resulng perils and the court says that there is no evidence to show that this was ignored Only extraordinary circumstances would allow this to happen ( probability  is  is very low) The precauons that were taken were reasonable (wires could not be insulated) but the burden o removing the trolley lines and pung them underground is unreasonable In balance, there can be no liability  Alami v. Volkswagen Volkswagen of America, America, Inc (766 N.E.2d N.E.2d 574) (N.Y. 2002) (pg. 586) 









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Facts

The plain was drunk driving a Jea when he hit a pole and was killed Plain's wie sued the deendant claiming that the car's deecve design led to her he r husband's death Deendant sought summary judgment on the ground that the plain's sued was barred by the raonale in Manning The trial court granted summary judgment to the deendant on the basis o Manning The court o appeals reversed Comparave ault principles apply in this case (paral recovery) The raonale in Manning  can only be applied to claims where the pares to t o the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct The court held that i the manuacturer did deecvely design the vehicle, it breached a duty to any driver involved in a crash regardless o the inial cause 







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The wie did not seek to prot rom her husband's intoxicaon, she asked only that the manuacturer honor its duty to produce a product that did not unreasonably enhance or aggravate a user's injuries Dissent The injury was the direct result o his unlawul unlawul acvity (drunk driving) and that this acvity is just as bad as joy riding  Alexander v. Town Town of New Castle Castle (17 N.E. 200) (Ind. 1888) (pg. 371) 





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Facts

A man was thrown into an open pit that had been dug in the deendant town's street The trial court ound or the deendant and the plain appealed o Indiana Supreme Court armed The third party man was clearly an intervening orce as well as an independent human agency in the inicon o the injuries  American Tobacco Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell Grinnell (951 S.W.2d 420) (Tex. 1997) (pg. 494) o Facts A man smoked the deendant's cigarees or about 33 years and developed lung cancer; he and then his estate sued or ailure to warn on the deendants part about the risk o addicon to cigarees and the risk o injury they presented The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendants on all claims The court o appeals reversed 











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Texas Supreme Court armed in part and reversed in part Ulmately summary judgment is not appropriate here and the acts need to be evaluated by the jury The existence o a duty to warn o dangers or instruct as to the proper use o a product is a queson o law -- generally a manuacturer has a duty to warn i it knows or should know o the potenal harm to a used because o the nature o its product There is however, no duty to warn when the risks associated as within the ordinary knowledge common to the community I the danger comes rom only excessive use beyond the norm then the manuacturer does not have a duty to warn Second restatements 402A comments i and j connote c onnote a general societal understanding o the risks inherent in a specic product or class o products Common knowledge has been dened as encompassing those acts that are so 













well known to the community as to be beyond dispute (it needs to be actually true) The deendant asserts this common knowledge deense The deendant must assert and show that when the plain started smoking that the risks were common knowledge Armed The court concluded that the general health dangers aributable to cigarees were commonly known as a maer o law by the community when the plain began smoking Reversed The court concluded that it could not say that the specic danger o nicone addicon was common knowledge when the plain began smoking The deendants argue that the plain was warned several mes afer he started smoking that the product was addicve and he should stop but this is 

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not ound to be conclusive evidence that he would not have heeded the warning had it come beore he started smoking at all 2

 



Rebuable presumpon or the plain is given by law (it is presumed that the plain would have heeded the warning but i the deendants can product evidence that rebuts that presumpon then it will be dropped) It is ound in this case that it should be lef to a jury to decide whether or not he would have heeded that warning (not enough evidence or summary judgment) 

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Stated he would arm both claims be decided on summary judgment or the deendant -- addicon should be considered one o the harmul eects (dangers aributable) to smoking The court nds that addicon is a separate risk in itsel but the dissent eels that the addicon and the risks o smoking are one in the same Because nicone is what makes tobacco good it needs to have the addicve quality to be good in its inherent nature The plain should only be entled to damages because he was addicted, not because o any o the carcinogenic or other damaging qualies Baker v. Snell (2 K.B. 825) (1908) (pg. 405) o Facts The plain worked or the deendant at his inn where he kept a dog he knew to be 









dangerous; one day another inn employee who was charged with chaining the dog outside let the dog go in the vicinity o plain and she was bien The trial court held the deendant liable despite the employees intervening act because the owner o a savage animal is strictly liable or its acons o House o lords armed The keeping o an inherently dangerous animal that is known to be dangerous is an inherently wrongul act and thereore the deendant must be liable even though the immediate cause o the harm is a third-party It was a wrongul act in itsel to keep kee p the savage animal Banks v. Maxwell (171 S.E. 70) (N.C. 1933) (pg. 402) o Facts The plain works or the deendant on his arm and is injured by his bull when he is told to drive it out o its pen 







The trial court nonsuited the plain  N.C. Supreme Court armed A person injured by a domesc animal must show two things 1. The The a ani nima mall iin nic icn ng g tthe he in inju jury ry must must be da dang nger erou ous, s, vi vici ciou ous, s, mi misc schi hiev evou ouss o orr erocious or one termed in the law as possessing a vicious propensity 2. The The ow owne nerr must must ha have ve ac actu tual al or cons constr truc ucv ve e know knowle ledg dge e o the the vi vici ciou ouss propensity, character and habits o the animal There is no evidence in this case that the bull had ever aacked a person, shown a  desire to do so or evidence that the owner knew the bull was dangerous Barnes v. Geiger (446 N.E.2d 78) (Mass. App. 1983) (pg. 302) o Facts A mother witnesses an accident near an area where w here she knows her son is playing and or a ew moments believes that it is her son who was involved in the accident; she dies o a 

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vascular hemorrhage the next day 3

 

Woman's husband sues the deendant and claimed that his wie's death was the result o the stress she endured while thinking that her son was the one injured in the accident The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant Court o appeals armed They court concluded that a eeng moment o ear or excitement does not present a set o circumstances against which a toreasor can airly be asked to deend Though the mistake was reasonable, this would open up an expansive possibility o





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people claiming to have mistakenly thought a vicm was a relave Barnhill v. Davis (300 N.W.2d 104) (Iowa 1981) (pg. 302) o Facts The plain was driving in his car and being ollowed in another car by his mother; his mother's car was involved in an accident rom which she received no lasng or substanal injuries The plain sued or the suering he endured as a result o worrying about his mother's health ollowing the accident The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendants o Supreme Court reversed and remanded or trial It is reasonably oreseeable as a maer o law that a son who witnesses an accident involving his mother may suer mental distress Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus, Ltd. (2 WLR 404) (1957) (pg. 396) 







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Facts

Plains were midgets in a circus and were injured when a circus elephant was spooked by a small dog and trampled their booth The court nds or the plain  As a maer o law an elephant is an animal erae naturae There can be no disncons or specic genres o animals or specic animals themselves There needs to be a bright line rule to make these disncons -- the legislature should enact a negligence standard to help deal with these cases Currently the court is bound by precedent and cannot make ne tuned disncons by parcular origin or gender -- the rule would lose all eect i  judges began to make subdivisions subdivisions creang disncons The mens rea o an animal cannot be considered



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Animals o this sort are concluded to be dangerous whenever they get out o the control o their handler There was a ailure o control in this instance Even i the act by the animal is not savage and vicious the animals stu must always be under complete control o the deendant The deendants are liable or any damage while the animal is out o control (strict liability) -- but i the animal is under control and causes damage then there is a queson o negligence or a jury Bell v. Campbell (434 S.W.2d 117) (Tex. 1968) (pg. 376) o Facts The deendant pulled onto the highway without properly looking or yielding and was subsequently hit by another driver which caused the trailer o the second vehicle to overturn on the highway  





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Someone aempted to warn oncoming cars while others tried to move the trailer rom the highway but a man ignored or missed the warnings and ran into the trailer, killing the people who were trying to move it The decedent's sued the third man and also the two drivers drivers in the inial crash Negligent driving caused the inial accident and thereore increases the chances o the subsequent accident But this case is dierent or two reason 



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The plain was a rescuer The driver o the third car was drunk By the me that the third car struck the rescuers all the actors o the rst collision had come to rest and thereore the second accident was a separate incident The deendant was ound not liable (this is an excepon and many courts nd the other way) Benwell v. Dean (57 Cal. Rptr. 394) (Cal. App. 1967) (pg. 530) o Facts The plain brought suit or loss o support and loss o society afer her husband's death The deendant was denied quesoning the plain about whether she had remarried The jury gave verdict to the plain and the deendant appealed o The court o appeals armed 











It is a common rule that the surviving spouse's remarriage (or possibility o remarriage) does not aect the damages recoverable in an acon ac on or wrongul death The cause o acon arises at the me o the decedent's death and the damages are determinable as o that me It is too dicult to compare the prospecve earnings, services and contribuons o a new spouse and a deceased spouse The court also reerenced another case that determined de termined that a spouse should not be punished because she is migang her loss through a new relaonship (compare this acon to an insurance policy) The deendant should not be able to benet rom this (deterrence) Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch (43 A. 240) (Pa. 1899) (pg. 365) o Facts The plain was a trolley driver and one day when he was w as driving through the 











deendant's borough high winds caused a large tree to all onto his trolley The plain claimed the tree was negligently maintained and the deendant claimed that the plain was contributorily negligent or driving at an excessive speed Liability ound The court ound that the act that the motorman was operang at a speed greater than that permied by an ordinance which allowed his employer to operate its cars on the borough's streets did not aect his right to recover The court ound that the speed at which the motorman was traveling did not contribute to the cause o the accident The trolley speeding did not increase the probability that the tree would all on the trolley car I the deendant had hit the tree or the tree had allen across the road then the speeding would have had a more direct eect 

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Biakanja v. Irving Irving (320 P.2d 16) (Cal. 1958) (pg. 277)

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Facts 



Deendant notary prepared a will that was to designate the enrety o an estate to the plain but the deendant ailed to have a witness present a att the creaon o the will, thus rendering it invalid Plain sued the deendant and recovered the dierence between the amount she would have received in the original will and the amount she was awarded when that will was invalidated

The deendant appealed Caliornia Supreme Court armed The deendant, despite not being in privity o contract, was under a duty to exercise due care to protect the plain rom harm and was thereore liable or damage to the plain caused by his negligence The deendant must have been aware rom the terms o the will itsel that i it was deemed invalid that plain would suer harm (knew the specic person who would be harmed) The deendant's negligence in preparing the will directly led to the deendant's harm The "end and aim" o the transacon was to provide to estate to the plain  Blaak v. Davidson (529 P.2d 1048) (Wash. 1975) (pg. 189) 

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Facts

A man is driving a truck when a dust storm makes him lose all visibility and he must slow to 5-10 mph; the man hits the rear o another car traveling at 2-3 mph because o the same dust Jury brought verdict or the deendant, the trial court entered e ntered judgment n.o.v. (notwithstanding the verdict) or the plain and the deendant appealed Judge over rules the verdict o the jury because the trial court views the juries decision as unreasonable The Washington Supreme Court reversed the n.o.v When the visibility o a driver o a vehicle is completely obscured by atmospheric condions the queson o negligence should ordinarily be submied to the jury or consideraon in view o the acts and surrounding circumstances Reject the rule holding a driver o a vehicle negligent as a maer o law or 





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ailure to stop when his vision is obscured because such a rule would be too rigid to cope with the numerous situaons presenng new or addional actors and variable (i.e. dust, og, danger o stopping at that me) There is a saety trade-o juscaon in this case Bright-line rules v. exible standards There can be no bright-line rules or automobile cases because the acts can vary so widely rom case to case The jury should determine whether the deendant's ailure to stop constutes negligence under the general test o whether the deendant acted reasonably under the acts and circumstances Bloomberg v. Interinsurance Exchange Exchange (207 Cal. Rptr. 853) (Cal. App. 1984) (pg. 235) o Facts 







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The plain's son and another boy become stranded on a highway at night and call or assistance and are reerred to the deendant company who dispatches a tow truck that is unable to locate the boys A drunk driver causes an accident in the me when the tow truck is searching or the boys and the plain's son is killed The plain sued the deendants but they moved to have the complaint dismissed on the grounds that the owed the plain's son no duty

Duty exists and the deendant is liable The son reasonably relied on the idea that the tow truck t ruck would be providing assistance and thereore took no urther measures to help himsel  The tow was negligent in ailing to aempt to reach the car "A deendant who entered upon a course o conduct aecng the interests o another was regarded as assuming a duty to act and would be liable or negligent acts or omissions because one who undertakes to do an act must do it with care." Bolton v. Stone (1 All ER 1078) (1951) (pg. 146) o Facts A woman living next door to a cricket pitch (surrounded by a 7 oot wall) is hit by a ball that ies into her property and is injured The deendants were awarded judgment o The court o appeals reversed and the House o Lords reversed again, holding that there must o











be judgment or the deendant The probability o this happening is close to zero The cricket pitch has already taken a burden in creang a 7 oot wall around it There is always a risk and it can not be eliminated (Lord Reed) Not necessary to take urther precauon and impose urther burden (Lord Radclie) Bostock-Ferari Amusements Amusements v. Brocksmith (73 N.E. 281) 28 1) (Ind. App. 1905) (pg. 404) o Facts The plain was driving a horse down the road when it was spooked by a bear being led across the road in restraints and the horse caused injury to the plain  The jury brought verdict or the plain and the deendant appealed o Court o appeals held or the deendant and ordered a new trial The injuries to the plain were not the result o any dangerous tendencies o the bear  













The horse can be spooked by any number o things and the bear was not in any manner threatening Brauer v. N.Y. Central & H.R.R. Co. (103 A. 166) (N.J. App. 1918) (pg. 368) o Facts The deendant's train collided with the plain's wagon at a crossing and the plain's horse was subsequently killed and his wagon destroyed Unknown pares then stole the contents o the wagon The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict or the plain  o Court o appeals armed The controversy o the damages was whether the plain could recover the costs o the stolen items rom the deendant The thef was both oreseeable and inevitable The thef and the other damage were joint torts because they happened 

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simultaneously and occurred concurrently with the deendant's negligence 7

 

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The negligence which caused the collision was the ault o the deendant This event caused the plain to no longer be able to protect his property which was then stolen This occurrence was oreseeable because the deendant had two people guarding the contents o his train and thereore knew o the risk o thef Dissent The collision created the opportunity or thef, but was not the proximate cause o it  

The chain o events is not connuous Crime should not be presumed (considered oreseeable as a maer o

law) Brauner v. Peterson (557 P.2d 359) (Wash. 1976) (pg. 197) o Facts Plain drove his car into the deendant's cow which had strayed onto the highway Plain had no evidence o how the cow had escaped Trial court ound or the deendant and dismissed the plain's acon o Supreme Court armed The plain's evidence o negligence was insucient to support his claim The cow could have escaped rom perectly good connes, thereore there may have been no negligence on the part o the deendant 

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Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc. (750 F.2d 1227) (4th Cir. 1984) (pg. 506) o Facts The plain had a heart aack and, on the advisement o his doctor, was equipped with a pacemaker made by the deendant company The original pacemaker needed to be replaced because the lead would not properly operate The plain sued the deendant claiming that the product was deecve and that they had ailed to warn him o the risk o the lead coming loose It was undisputed at trial that dislodgment o a lead is a common risk when a pacemaker is implanted and the deendant gave all doctors wrien warnings o this danger but the plain's doctor never passed this warning onto him The jury brought a verdict or the deendant based on instrucon that the deendant had a duty to warn doctors o the risks associated with pacemaker leads; the plain 









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appealed and claimed that the jury should have been instructed that they had a duty to warn him as well Court o appeals armed Prescripon drugs get a dierent approach or warnings than other products Is the prescribing doctor has received adequate noce o possible complicaons then manuacturer has not duty to warn the consumer The doctor acts as a "learned intermediary" between the manuacturer and the consumer because he is in the best posion to understand the paent's needs and assess the risks and benets o a parcular course o treatment The plain contends that the excepon or prescripon drugs should not apply here because All cardiac pacemaker paent ace idencal risks and do not rely on doctors to to act as learned intermediaries 











The manuacturer in this case ofen has the opportunity to contact its users prior to surgery 8

 

The court rejects these arguments arg uments under the asseron that doctors are in a beer posion to disclose risks and once a warning is given to a doctor the choice c hoice o treatment and the duty to disclose properly all on the doctor Broshman v. Western Air Lines (892 F.2d 730) (8th Cir. 1989) (pg. 237) o Facts Plain is injured when he is sing aboard an airplane and another passenger aempng to load his luggage into the overhead compartment drops the luggage on him 



Plain sues the airline with the claim that a ight aendant should have been present to assist the other passenger and henceorth prevent the injury Trial jury brought verdict or the plain, trial court gave judgment n.o.v. to the deendant o Court o Appeals Reversed An airline has a duty to supervise the enre boarding process unl it is completed The plain was injured when orce's created by the airline's negligence were in play Brown v. McDonald's Corp. (655 N.E.2d 440) (Ohio App. 1995) (pg. 501) o Facts The plain purchased a meatless simulaon o a hamburger rom the deendant restaurant and subsequently had an allergic reacon to a seaood ingredient and sued the restaurant or ailing to warn o the ingredient Deendant conceded that it did not give a warning on the product but that a ier was 











available that listed the ingredients and urther argued that the sandwich posed no risk to ordinary customers and thus they had no duty to warn Trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant Court o appeals reversed A relevant statute asks whether a manuacturer exercising exerc ising reasonable care would warn o that risk in light o both the likelihood and the seriousness o the potenal harm There is a duty to warn when the deendant knew or should have known o the danger and the seriousness o it There must be a consideraon o the extent o the duty (there was a ier, but did they need to go urther to meet their duty) Hand ormula The cost is likely low (B) because it would be cheap to add a warning But it is not trivial in B to ask McDonald's to invesgate every



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single possibility o an allergy rom every one o their oods -- basically the burden is a lot bigger than it may seem on the surace at rst look Brune v. Belinko (354 Mass. 102) (1968) (pg. 165) o Facts A woman is given a certain dose o anesthesia during childbirth and aferward suers numbness and weakness. She claims the dose was too large (8mg in New Bedord v. 5mg in Boston) Trial court is instructed to apply the "locality rule" (measures a physicians by the standards o other doctors in similar communies) The trial court nds or the deendant o The Supreme Court reverses and abandons the locality rule The proper standard o care should be whether a praconer has exercised the degree o care and skill o the average qualied praconer, taking into account advances in the 







proession and medical resources available 9

 

Rejecon o the "locality rule" The decision o whether custom was ollowed or not is usually based on expert tesmony (doctor) about whether or not the physician in queson met the standard o care Many doctors may not want to tesy against a local doctor or may hold the same sub-standard o care based on the community Brzoska v. Olson (668 A.2d 1355) (Del. 1995) (pg. 20) o Facts o





A denst is diagnosed with HIV/AIDS and does not inorm his paents o his condion and connues to pracce unl shortly beore his death Trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant o Delaware Supreme Court armed Consent was given to the healthcare provider and the procedure was perormed by them in the way consented to It was not reasonable or the plain's to state that this was a pernent act or them to know about their denst beore giving consent Plain's were not able to establish actual exposure to HIV Where is the line drawn in what needs to t o be disclosed and what does not? Can not begin to open that door (it is not the court's place to do so) Opens the door or raudulent cases based on various acts Byrd v. English (117 Ga. 191) (1903) (pg. 285) 













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Facts

The deendant was building a house and in the course o excavaons caused damage to power lines while removing earth under an adjacent sidewalk, which was against city ordinance The plain's company subsequently lost power or several hours The plain sues or the prots lost and the deendant moves to dismiss the case o The court held no liability or loss o prots Though the deendant was negligent, the losses were purely economic The deendant would be liable to the power company or damage to their property and then economic losses on top o that Byrne v. Boadle (159 Eng. Rep. 299) (Exch. 1863) (pg. 192) o Facts The plain is walking by a warehouse when he is struck by a barrel o our that alls 











rom above The plain can not say how the our barrel ell and no witness w itness can aest to any more then him being hit with the barrel The plain was nonsuited on the grounds that no evidence against the deendant was available or the jury to consider The Court o Exchequer (English Superior Court) brought verdict or the plain Deense argued that because the accident could have been caused by negligence does not mean that the plain is entled to a presumpon o negligence The court stated that the barrel could not roll out o the warehouse without some type o negligence The deendant is responsible or the warehouse, its workers and its content and thereore is negligent in allowing the barrel to roll out o it The court holds that the plain does not need to witness the





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negligence 10

 

Two theories o support or the deendant's negligence The accident very likely resulted rom negligence (Pollack) The pares did not have the same access to evidence bearing on how the accident occurred (Bramwell) Candler v. Smith (179 S.E. 395) (Ga. App. 1935) (pg. 401) o Facts A baboon escapes rom the deendant zoo and gets into a woman's car, subsequently 







scaring her back into her house and destroying some o her belongings A jury ound or the plain and the deendant appealed o Held or the plain (no new trial) A baboon is an animal erae naturae and thereore it is not necessary or the owner to be negligent in allowing the animal to escape because the owner is bound to keep ke ep the animal or be liable Central of Georgia Ry. v. Price (32 S.E. 77) (Ga. 1898) (pg. 363) o Facts Plain was a passenger on deendant's train and the deendant was negligent in not leng her o at her spot and taking her to a urther stop The deendant put the plain in a hotel or the night where a kerosene lamp in her room caught re and caused her injury The jury returned verdict or the plain and then overruled the deendant's moon or 









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a new trial; deendant appealed Georgia Supreme Court reversed The injury was cause by the negligence o the hotel or its workers, not by the negligence o the train company A third party's negligence (intervening acon between the harm and the railroad's negligence) caused the actual harm The injuries were not the natural or proximate consequences o taking the plain past her stop The actual harm that happened was not oreseeable based on the reasonable expectaons o the railroad when they were negligent The harm that occurred was not more likely because o the deendant's negligence (the deendant's negligence did not increase the probability o the harm to the plain) 









Charles v. Seigfried (651 N.E.2d 154) (Ill. 1995) (pg. 239) o Facts The deendant is hosng a party where he serves a 16 year old girl alcoholic beverages and subsequently permits her to drive him with a BAC o .299 where she is killed in an auto accident The plain's estate sues the deendant The trial court dismissed the plain's complaint o The Supreme Court Arms It is the drinking o the alcohol not the urnishing o it that causes the resulng damages The court was unwilling to open the "Pandora's box" that would hold all social hosts liable in similar situaons Leave imposions o civil liability in these situaons to the legislature Many states have instuted social host and bar tender responsibility 

 









statutes 11

 

Moon to dismiss phase The court is unwilling to accept the acts o the plain as true City of Boca Raton v. Maef (91 So. 2d 644) (Fla. 1956) (pg. 263) o Facts Plain's decedent was a sign painter and oered to paint the town water tower; his oer was accepted by the Town Council i the Town Aorney drew up the proper contracts The Town Aorney delayed the contract because he needed more inormaon but the 







plain connued with the work anyway and was killed when he ell rom the tower because o a breaking tower ladder rung Plain brought suit or her husband's death claiming that the city breached its duty to provide the deceased with a reasonably sae place to work The trial court instructed the jury that the deceased was an employee o the city (invitee) and was owed a duty o reasonable care; jury ound or the plain  Deendant appealed, claiming mis-instrucon o the jury (argued that the plain was a volunteer and thereore a licensee, not an invitee) Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded or a new trial The court concluded that the deceased was a volunteer and thereore equivalent to a licensee The deceased had not yet been ocially invited by the deendants to undertake the job (the contract had not yet been ormed)







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The deceased entered onto the land and aempted to perorm the job by his own volion and thereore was not owed a duty o reasonable care that an invitee would be owed (the deendant is not obliged to make provisions or the saety o the deceased under these circumstances) The court states that the plain can not be considered an invitee because there was no established contract at the me o the incident (creates incenve or proper business) Not a trespasser because the superintendent o the property knew he was there and consented to his presence Because the plain was decided to be a licensee the only duty o care owed by the deendants was to warn o condions they were aware o in terms o passive negligence I there was acve negligence (i.e. injured by an act o the 









superintendent) then there would be liability Cleveland Electric Illuminang Illuminang Co. v. Van Benshoten (166 N.E. 374) (Ohio 1929) (pg. 257) o Facts Plain aempts to use a make-shif outhouse constructed by the deendants on a work site and when he lit a cigaree it ignited a gas line below and caused an explosion Plain sued the deendants or negligence in construcng the building and in ailing to warn o its dangers Trial court directed a verdict or the deendant o Ohio Supreme Court armed The plain was neither an invitee nor a licensee but rather a trespasser There are no acts that show that an ordinarily prudent person could reasonably have ancipated or oreseen that plain would use use the building or any purpose or that he would light a cigaree while in it 











Evidence comes solely rom the plain and rom it there appears to be no duty or breach o duty 12

 



I the plain had asked permission to use the outhouse then some dierent things t hings may apply The deendants would owe a duty o due care and would need to warn the deendant o any oreseeable dangers The court would need to decide i it was reasonably re asonably oreseeable or the deendants to know that the plain may light a cigaree while using the outhouse 



Cohen v. McIntyre (20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143) (1993) (pg. 600) o Facts The deendant took her dog, who had a history o bing people, to be neutered and the dog snapped at the veterinarian and the vet made the dog be muzzled during the procedure and when the procedure was over and the muzzle removed the t he dog bit the vet The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant o Court o appeals armed The deendant owed no duty o care to the plain in this case unless she either engaged in intenonal concealment or misrepresentaon or her conduct was so reckless as to all totally outside the range o behavior expected o those who avail themselves o vet services The plain had made an assumpon o the risk Cohen v. Smith (648 N.E.2d 329) (Ill. App. 1995) (pg. 21) 







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Facts

Woman is admied to the hospital to deliver her baby and tells her doctors that she can not be seen nude by a man, however during her C-secon she is seen and touched by a male nurse The trial court dismissed her complaint o Court o appeals reversed Plain needed to prove that she had expressed her need not to be touched in advance (which she had) and she had the right to do so In Brzoska, there was no evidence that the paent expressed non-consent in certain circumstances beore hand Colonial Inn Motor Lodge v. Gay (680 N.E.2d 407) (Ill. App. 1997) (pg. 360) o Facts Deendant was in plain's parking lot and backed up his car into a heang unit on the 









side o the building which subsequently severed the gas line and caused a re and the closing o the motel The deendant claims that he thought he had only hit the building and that the events were not oreseeable The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant Court o appeals reversed and remanded The plain has at least some evidence that the deendant's car struck the heang unit and was thereore the proximate cause o the damage The court holds that oreseeability in this case can not be held as a maer o law I the deendant's conduct is a substanal actor in bringing about the injury then it is not necessary that the extent o the harm or the exact manner in which it occurred be reasonable oreseeable The acts should be brought to the jury 



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13

 

"eggshell skull" menoned in that i the plain has some inherent weakness that results in an injury at the hands o the deendant then the deendant is sll liable The deendant set o a chain o events that led to the harm without any intervening third party Combuson Engineering v. Hunsberger (187 A. 825) (Md. App. 1936) (pg. 193) o Facts Plain was working in a boiler room when a workman o the company was hammering 





a metal wedge which then ell and hit the plain  The jury ound or the plain  Court o Appeals reversed Held that there was not sucient evid evidence ence o negligence The act that the wedge ell cannot be held as the denite result o negligence because there are situaons that it could all when there was no negligence It may be expected that a tool may all rom me to me despite all precauons because to expect otherwise would presume perecon among workmen Must consider the reasonable care o everyone around the incident A person walking in a building site had more o a duty to reasonably expect that something would all than a person who is walking down a public street



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Conboy v. Mogelo (567 N.Y.S.2d 960) (App. Div. 1991) (pg. 276) o Facts The plain was prescribed a medicaon by the deendant doctor and told that, despite its side eect o drowsiness, that she could drive a car The plain was driving while on the medicaon and blacked out at the wheel, causing an accident and injury to her passenger children The plain brought suit against the deendant or the injuries to her children The appellate division help that the plain's complaint should be dismissed because the doctor owed no duty to the children o Armed The court reasoned that to establish a duty owed to a third party by the doctor there would be a need or actual privity or something close to it that would show a link between the deendant and the third party's reliance and an understanding by the deendant o that 









reliance The deendant cannot reasonably oresee that the children were relying on his conduct In order or a duty to be established the deendant must understand that the injured party is relying on his conduct not to be negligent Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel (95 N.W.2d 657) (Minn. 1959) (pg. 196) o Facts The plain was walking by a hotel when she suddenly had mud in her eye At the me o the incident the hotel was host to a convenon which had, in many ways, goen out o control and caused a great deal o destrucon to t o the hotel Jury entered verdict or the plain, but the court gave judgment n.o.v. (notwithstanding the verdict )to the deendant because they claimed the plain ailed to show negligence o the hotel 









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The Court o Appeals reversed 14

 

Negligence may be inerred rom all the acts and surrounding circumstances The mayhem at the hotel at the me suggested a higher level o oreseeability which in turn lowers the burden o taking precauons Dissent What urther precauons could have been taken by the deendant? Crabtree v. Dawson (83 S.W. 557) (Ky. App. 1904) (pg. 89) o Facts 







Man orcibly removes another drunken man rom a party and then is told by someone that the same man is coming back up the stairs so he hits the man with a musket when he appears, but it turns out it is another man The trial court ound in avor o the deendant o Court o appeals reversed and remanded or a new trial on jury misinstrucon o The court suggested, however, that the deendant may sll be ound not liable The deendant must show two things 1. Used all due care to nd the identy o the per ersson 2. Use no no mo more o orce th than n ne eces cessary iin n tth he ci circum cumstances Crosby v. Cox Aircra Co. (746 P.2d 1198) (Wash. 1987) (pg. 429) o Facts An airplane owned by the deendant ran out o uel and crashed into the plain's garage 







The trial court held that the deendant was strictly liable or the damage to the plain's property o Liability or damage by airplanes is bound by negligence The ight o airplanes has become a common acvity and technology exists to make it saer There was obvious negligence in this case (not properly ueling the plane) Restatement secon 24(a) -- the passengers came into contact c ontact with the dangerous acvity in order to gain the benet o the air travel while the people on the ground had no inherent benet Daugert v. Pappas (704 P.2d 600) (Wash. 1985) (pg. 332) o Facts Deendant represented the plain in a contract dispute and ailed to led a mely peon or review o a court o appeals decision so the plain led a malpracce suit Both pares presented expert tesmony on the likelihood that the state supreme court would have reviewed and reversed the decision in the contract case i the peon had been mely led Jury ound that there was a 20% chance and thus rewarded rew arded the plain 20% o the damages incurred in losing the original suit (based this on the loss o chance doctrine) Deendant appealed o Washington Supreme court The court held that the tradional more-like-than-not standard applied (not loss o chance) The burden alls on the plain to show that but or the deendant's negligence the claim would have been successul Davies v. McDowell Naonal Bank (180 A.2d 21) (Pa. 1962) (pg. 261) o Facts 



















15

 







Plains go to visit the a worker at the deendant business business where they nd him unconscious in his oce; doctors are able to revive him and the plains agree to stay and make sure he is stable enough to get home later Authories later visited the oce and ound Mrs. Davies and the worker dead o carbon monoxide poisoning due to a blocked chimney Plains sue the business claiming that the death was caused by negligence in maintaining the premises 

The deendant worker was told he needed to have his chimney/venlaon checked Trial court stated they could assume negligence but sll nonsuited the plain's because there was no evidence that the deendant knew o the unsae condions Pennsylvania Supreme Court armed The reasonable conclusion is that the plains were social guests at the oce (licensees) and thereore the deendant would be liable only i he had knowledge o the dangerous condion and ailed to give warning Would need to realize (1) that the danger involved an unreasonable risk to the guests and (2) that they are not likely to discover the danger on their own The plain had no knowledge and thereore could have no duty to warn Key disncons in this case Private space (dierent rom Ehret) 

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Lack o acon as opposed to an armave act (dierent rom Ehret) Visitors were licensees not invitees

 

Davis v. Feinstein (88 A. 2d 695) (Pa. 1952) (pg. 134) o Facts A blind man is using a walking sck while going down the street and alls through the cellar door o another man who lef it open. The blind man is injured and sues. The trial court nds or the plain  o Appellate court arms The plain took all the precauons that he could to compensate or his disability and used due care under the circumstances so he was not negligent 







The property owner had a responsibility o due care to not make the sidewalk a dangerous place He was negligent in creang an obstacle that a reasonable person could not expect (not oreseeable obstacle) Dawson v. Chrysler Corp. (630 F.2d 950) (3d Cir. 1980) (pg. 482) o Facts A police ocer was driving a patrol car when he lost control and the car skidded o the road and wrapped around a pole causing him to be rendered quadriplegic The plain based his claim on strict products liability and alleged that the patrol car was deecve because it did not have a ull and connuous steel rame and a cross-member I the vehicle had been designed as such he alleged he would not be paralyzed Expert tesmony agreed and said that the design was possible but it would add several hundred pounds to the car and increase the price and it would also most likely 









not absorb as much o the impact o the crash 16

 

The jury awarded to the plain and the deendant's moved or judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial; the court denied both Circuit Court o Appeals armed The queson is whether the jury verdict or the plain was reasonable The deendant argues that it is not because as a maer o law the product was not deecve The determinaon o whether a product is "reasonably t, suitable and sae or its



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intended or reasonably oreseeable purposes" is determined by a "risk/ulity analysis" A product is deecve i "a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude o the sciencally perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the me o trial outweighed the benets o the way the product was so designed and marketed" 7 actors on pg. 484 The deendant alleges that the plain ailed as a maer o law to prove that the patrol can was deecve They urge that the substute design proposed would be less socially benecial and they argue that their design meets the saety standards o the me However, Congress explicitly stated that complying with saety standard does not mean that there was not a deect The car was saer in a head on collision, but in the present crash it was not saer 











 



The plains evidence by expert tesmony was sucient Chrysler is going to have to bear the costs o claims that say the car is not heavy enough and others who say it is too heavy -- these costs will likely be passed on to the consumer The outcome may vary on a case by case basis and needs to be or a jury to decide The court expresses concern about inconsistent standards across jurisdicon 

Desnick v. American Broadcasng Broadcasng Companies (44 F.3d 1345) (7th Cir. 1995) (pg. 29) o Facts ABC sent reporters into the oces o Desnick under the impression that they wanted eye examinaons and they used secret ootage on a TV special but Desnick claims he would not have consented to work on them i they had revealed re vealed who they really were The district court dismissed the trespass counts in the complaint 



Court o appeals armed the dismissal o the trespass counts and remanded the rest or trial The raud that was commied did not inringe on the interests o the oce or disrupt the premises There was no invasion o a person's private space The law gives eect to consent procured by raud under the circumstances that the acon is not an intererence with the ownership or possession o the property Restaurant Reviewer Analogy There is a potenal or a posive outcome that would come with a posive review The ABC Corp would never have aired what they would at Desnick i there was nothing interesng and scandalous to report Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co. (163 A. 111) (N.H. 1932) o Facts o















A boy was sing on the edge o a bridge when he lost his balance and grabbed one o the deendant's wires; he was electrocuted and thrown back onto the beam 17

 

Boy's ather sues or negligence and the deendant moved or a directed verdict which was denied Court o appeals armed The boy was owed no protecon rom alling but was owed protecon rom the danger o the wire Several situaons may arise Boy would all and either be maimed or killed



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I the jury concludes he would have been killed than the deendant would not be liable because there was no aconable negligence (unless or addional suering) I the jury concludes he would have been maimed than the deendant would be liable and would owe damages measured to the value o the lost lie and earning capacity in its injured condion In this case there was no background risk o electrocuon absence negligence o the deendant, but there was a background risk o death rom a all (more similar to Wendland   than Herskovits) The loss o a chance doctrine is not essenally applicable because the cause o death and any background risk are not the same source DiPonzio v. Riordan (679 N.E.2d 616) (N.Y. 1997) (pg. 361) o Facts 







The plain was a customer at the deendant's gas staon and was pinned between two cars when an aendant lef a running car unaended There was a rule that all cars needed to be turned o when ueling The court o appeals held that the deendant was entled to summary judgment When a vehicle's engine is lef on at a gas staon there is a reasonably oreseeable risk o re or explosion -- it is this class o oreseeable risk that denes the scope o the deendants duty The plain is owed a duty because he was a customer o the deendant's business The queson o duty would be more dicult i the plain was not a customer The incident that led to the injury o the plain was outside the scope o the deendant's duty 



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The oreseeable risk establishes the scope o duty -- it must then be examined i the actual harm is within the scope o the duty Doughty v. Turner (1 Q.B. 518) (1964) (pg. 359) o Facts Plain worked in the deendant's actory The actory worked with cauldrons o cyanide kept at 800 degrees cengrade and a cement cover was knocked into one cauldron and two workmen watched it sink into the t he molten liquid; moments later, the cauldron erupted and injured the plain  The trial court ound that the deendants had not know that the immersion o the cover into the cauldron would cause the chemical reacon The court held the deendant's workman negligent in knocking the cover into the cauldron and thereore gave judgment to the plain  The plain argues that it is oreseeable that the cyanide would harm someone  







i it touched them on their skin not that the chemical reacon was oreseeable 18

 

A splash o the cyanide was oreseeable and the explosion is just an extension o that oreseeable splash House o Lords reversed I the lid had been dropped into the cauldron and caused a splash that injured the plain there would be liability; but the events are not equal to this The explosion which caused injury was the result o an unoreseeable chemical reacon, not the agitaon caused by the dropping o the cover into the cauldron 

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There was a two minute gap between the cover dropping in and the injury, thereore the explosion was not just a magnied splash The negligent act did not cause the harm Dissent Discusses the reasonable man The deendant, under the majority's opinion, would not be liable even i he intenonally immersed the lid Doyle v. Pillsbury Co. (476 So. 2d 1271) (Fla. 1985) (pg. 478) o Facts The plain's husband opened a can o green beans distributed by the deendant and the plain looked into the can and observed a large insect oang and she recoiled in alarm and ell and was injured o The deendant is liable or oreseeable injuries rom the insect being in the can (physical and  

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mental injuries rom consuming the insect) but not rom the random injuries rom merely observing Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. (489 F.2d 1066) (4th Cir. 1974) (pg. 490) o Facts The plain was a passenger in a Volkswagen "microbus" that crashed into a telephone pole and caused her various injuries or which she brought suit A judge ound the deendant liable or ailing to make the bus crash-worthy o The court o appeals reversed Sacrices o saety were made or the design benets o the bus (more space) and these designs changes/benets were readily known to the consumer There was no evidence presented that the was any praccal way o improving the "crashability" o the vehicle that would have been consistent with the purpose o its design In Dawson the tradeo was one type o saety or another while here the tradeo would be between adding a saety eature and losing the unique advantage o the bus Earl v. Van Alsne (8 Barb. 630) (N.Y. 1850) (pg. 400) o Facts Deendant maintains his bees on his property adjacent to a highway and one day a man's horse is killed when they go past the bees The trial court ound or the plain  o N.Y. Court o appeals reversed Bees are a useul animal that is necessary to the existence o man and thereore they can be considered domesc Bees have been studied and they have been ound to be manageable and it is rare that they will cause serious injury The bees had been kept in the same locaon or several years and caused no damage and thereore did not have violent tendencies Eckert v. Long Island R. Co. (43. N.Y. 502) (1871) (pg. 148) 14 8) 



















19

 

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Facts 

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A man talking to another man noces a boy sing on a set o railroad tracks in the path o an oncoming train (the train gave no noce it was approaching) and goes to the boy and throws him to saety but is himsel killed by the train as a result The plain won a jury verdict and the court entered judgment upon it The deendant claimed that he could not be liable because the plain was contributorily negligent

Court o Appeals armed The railroad was negligent Plain was not negligent The child was not aware and was not going to rescue himsel  The plain had to have had a slight chance o being able to rescue re scue himsel and not just be throwing himsel into undue danger and being outwardly reckless Necessary risk was taken in order to save a lie, not property Economics Did the plain expose himsel to an unreasonable risk? Magnitude o Risk (man's probability o death) was great and the principle object (man's lie) was very valuable but the collateral object (child's lie) and the great ulity (probability man saves child) and necessity o the risk (probability child does not save himsel) counterbalanced those rst consideraons and made the risk  







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reasonable Hand Aspects B = loss o the chance o saving a child (value o the child's lie) The untaken precauon would be doing nothing P = probability that either the child or man is killed L = value o loss o lie (magnitude o harm that would be eliminated i the precauon was taken) Posner "Almost any tort problem can be solved as a contract problem…" I the values o the lives are equal, then the expected benet o the rescue to the railroad in reducing expected liability cost to the child's parents are greater than the expected costs o the rescue (probability that the man would die) (probability (probability the child will be saved and lawsuit costs will be avo avoided ided 

 

 



v. probability the man will be able to save the boy and not die)...based on this, the railroad would have hired the man to save the child, thereore they should compensate him ex post Would this be viewed as a posive cost-benet analysis i gured out beore hand? I the railroad owned the train, the man and the boy, would it be worth it or the railroad to risk the man in order to save the boy? This view considers the private benets o the opposing pares The hand ormula tends to look at all the social benets o the situaon Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale (199 N.E. 56) (N.Y. 1935) (pg. 257) o Facts A company laid drainage pipes under under the street by newly built houses and during during the process encased an exisng gas main within it which subsequently began to leak and gas 









entered the drainage pipes and asphyxiated a trespasser who had enter one o the t he vacant houses 20

 

The trespasser's estate (plains) won a judgment against the deendants or ordinary negligence in laying its pipe Court o Appeals armed The rule that an owner o land is not liable to a trespasser should not be extended so ar as to coner immunity upon the deendant in this case The trespasser may have assumed the risks o using the land unlawully, but could not reasonably expect or assume the risk o danger that would arise rom an 

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exisng condion on a public street A trespasser assumes the risks/dangers associated with the private land that they trespass on The danger that caused the harm was not on the private land that was trespassed on but on a surrounding public area A trespasser does not assume the risks o surrounding public area Einhorn v. Seeley (136 A.D.2d 122) (N.Y. App. 1988) (pg. 279) o Facts The plain was raped by an unknown aacker while vising an apartment building and she alleged that the assailant was able to enter the building because the lock on its ront door had been negligently installed/maintained by the deendant Deendant moved to dismiss in that there was no privity between himsel and the plain  









Summary judgment or the deendant Deendant could not reasonably ancipate harm to the plain rom his negligence No special relaonship between the deendant and the plain  Farmilant v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd. (561 F. Supp. 1148) (N.D. Ill. 1983) (pg. 376) o Facts The plain bought an airline cket rom the deendant that would take him rom Los Angeles to Madras and back with several stopovers The plain aempted to change his ight inerary during the trip and when he arrived in the last stop beore his desnaon, he was told there were not seats on any ights to his desnaon or 3 weeks so he took a dierent ight to another stop over locaon where he took a train to Madras During a stop on the train trip he ate some bad ood and became very ill and then tried to book an immediate ight back to the U.S. but was told his wait would be over a month He booked a ight home on another airline The plain sued the airlines to recover his medical expenses and alleged that his injuries were aributed to the airline's negligence in ailing to have a sear or him on a ight rom his last stop over to Madras o The deendant's negligence did not substanally increase the risk o the plain geng ood poisoning The deendant was not ound liable The purchase o the ood rom the vendor was a superseding cause Federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensaon Act (33 U.S.C. 901-950) (pg. 551) o Fixed rate o compensaon This is a basic trade-o o airness or eciency Forbes v. Parsons (9 F.Cas. 417) (E.D. Pa. 1839) (pg. 111) o Facts o





















21

 

A sea captain beats the cook on his ship or ailure to maintain his kitchen and cook edible ood The captain claimed that his acons were jused while at sea The court ound or the captain The court rules that, while at sea, the captain may discipline his crew as he sees t in order to maintain order Seriousness o the oense v. the seriousness o the harm done





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The captain o the ship is able to jusy how serious the oense o preparing a bad meal or men at sea really is o Congress rules 11 years later that corporal punishment on a ship is no longer allowed (commerce vessels) Forster v. Red Top Sedan Service (257 So. 2d 95) (Fla. App. 1972) (pg. 441) o Facts The two plains were driving when a driver or the deendant company began trying to run them o the road, approached their vehicle and physically assaulted both o them The trial court gave a directed verdict to the deendant o Florida court o appeals reversed The court ound that a reasonable jury could bring in a verdict or the plains Frank v. United States (250 F.2d 178) (3d Cir. 1957) 1957 ) (pg. 233) o Facts A man is aboard a ship when it becomes disabled and is given an aempted tow by a U.S. Coast Guard heavy motor lieboat The man is on the deck when a handrail breaks and he is drowned in the water beore the Coast Guard can reach him and successully save him The plain sues on behal o the deceased, claiming negligence on three counts 1. The The b boa oatt h had ad a de deec ecv ve e rev rever erse se hear hear whic which h del delay ayed ed it in re reac achi hing ng the the dec decea ease sed d or rescue 2. The The lli ie e rin rings gs we were re ov over er se secu cure red d and and coul could d not not be thro thrown wn to the the dec decea ease sed d iin n me 3. The The ccre rew w o the the boa boatt was was in inco comp mpet eten entt in term termss o Co Coas astt Guar Guard d st stan anda dard rdss The district court ound or the deendant  o Court o Appeals armed An obligaon to render aid does not exist in this case because there is no relaonal basis or the duty It was only a diligent rescue eort that was not successul and had nothing to do with inadequate equipment (claim 1), preparaon (claim 2) or personnel (claim 3) The court concludes there was no duty to aempt rescue A stronger argument may be that... There was a duty to aempt the rescue that was established once the boat aempted tow, but no breach o that duty in that they aempted rescue re scue to the best o their ability Fris v. McKinne (934 P.2d 371) (Okla. 1997) (pg. 585) o Facts Plain was driving his pickup truck drunk and ran into a tree and was seriously injured and required surgery or which he needed a tracheostomy The plain's artery was ruptured during surgery and he died 



























22

 

The plain's wie asserted that the doctor had negligently cut the artery while perorming the tracheostomy The deendant asserted that it was the plain's own negligence which led him to need the surgery so he should not be liable The jury brought a verdict or the deendant Court o appeals reversed The court held that a physician cannot avoid liability or negligent treatment by







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asserng that the paent's injuries were originally caused by the paent's own negligence A doctor's obligaon to exercise due care when treang their paents cannot be compromised by the theory o the plain's negligence Gain v. Carroll Mill Co.(spaal proximity) (787 P.2d 553) (Wash. 1990) (pg. 302) o Facts Plain was watching the news when he saw ootage o an accident which he was able to conclude killed his son Plain sued the other driver in his son's accident and the trial court gave summary  judgment to the deendants on the ground that recovery could could not be had unless the plain was present at the scene o the accident o Supreme Court armed The court concluded that mental suering to a relave who is no present at the accident scene is not oreseeable as a maer o law Gambill v. Stroud (531 S.W.2d 945) (Ark. 1976) (pg. 166) o Facts An anesthesiologist and surgeon was supposed to perorm surgery but stopped because o complicaons rom which the paent suered damages. The jury was instructed along the lines that the doctor should have met a reasonable standard o care in a similar locaon and ound or the deendant The plain appealed and claimed the "locality standard" had been used o Supreme court armed Comparison o locaons is not based on parcular locality, but the main ocus should be on the standard o medical acilies, pracces and advantages Not being aware o what is the most medically up to date is not en excuse, but not having the physical technological capabilies is o The "similar" community standard Gives incenves or doctors to pracce in smaller communies May make it necessary or doctors to at least aempt to keep their acilies as up to date as possible Gardner v. Naonal Bulk Carriers, Inc. (310 F.2d 284) (4th Cir. 1962) (pg. 308) o Facts Plain's decedent was a seaman who was discovered to be lost overboard and his ship did not turn around or aempt to look or him at all; all; he was never seen again Plain sued under the Jones Act (ederal statute that allows seamen to recover or injuries caused by negligence o a shop's owner or master) The court exonerated the ship's owners on the noon that they t hey acted reasonably They concluded that there was no reasonable possibility o success in nding the seaman and hence there was no causal relaon between any negligence and the death 





























23

 

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Court o appeals reversed and gave summary judgment to the plain (as a maer o law there was a causal element and that the trial courts judgment was not reason reasonable) able) The court reasoned that many seamen who all overboard survive or many hours Turning back would have entailed no risk or the deendant The inacon o the master was a neglect o the duty o rescue and henceorth a neglect rom which a contribung cause o the seaman's death is airl airlyy and conclusively drawn A duty is owed to the plain because a duty is always owed to a crewmember by their 







superior There is a strong case or breach because the captain made no eort to rescue There is a causal link in this case because the captains acons would most likely have prevented the death (more likely likely than not) There is no way to know whether the plain drowned instantly or was killed in another way instantly or whether he was alive or hours and and would have survived but or the deendant's negligence in not coming ba back ck to get him The court wants to create a precedent that when a captain has an opportunity to deliberate about whether to help a crewmember or not, that they make the decision to help in most cases Glanzer v. Shephard (135 N.E. 275) (N.Y. 1922) (pg. 275) o Facts A bean seller hired the deendants to cery the t he weight o bags o beans which were 









then sold, at the price o the cered ce red weight, to the plains who, upon trying to resell the beans, ound that they had been weighed incorrectly and overcharged The plains sued the deendants to recover the amount they had overpaid to the bean seller The trial judge gave direct verdict to the plains Court o appeals armed The law imposes a duty to the buyer and the seller in the situaon here The plain's use o the weight given to them by the deendants was a direct consequence o the acons o the deendants (incorrectly weighing the beans) Though there is no privity between the plain and deendant (like in H.R. Moch) the deendant knew the purpose o weighing the beans and the direct eect that he would have on potenal buyers (i.e. the plain) The deendant knew the plain would be the immediate intended third party 



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beneciary o the contract "The plain's use o the cercates was not an indirect or collateral consequence o the acon o the weighers. It was a consequence which, to the weigher's knowledge, was an end and aim o the transacon" = intent Can the deendant reasonably predict the scope o liability o their negligence Gorris v. Sco (9 L.R. Ex. 125) (1874) (pg. 184) o Facts Ship owner agrees to take the plain's sheep rom one port to another. The sheep were swept overboard in a storm because they were not penned A statute exists stang that sheep must be penned on voyages to prevent the spread o disease o Not negligence per se because the purpose o the statute was not to stop sheep rom going 







overboard 24

 

Harm sought to be prevented was dierent than the harm that occurred The legislave statutes must be kept clear and explicit Violaon o the statute can sll be presented as evidence Grabowski v. Quigley (684 A.2d 610) (Pa. Super. 1996) (pg. 19) o Facts A man consents to surgery by one doctor who in the end is only present or part o the surgery while another doctor perormed much o the surgery Trial court gave summary judgment to the deendants o Court o appeals reversed Consent given to one person does not necessarily transer to another person or the same acon, even i they are qualied The identy o the healthcare provider does indeed maer When a person is generally admied to the hospital, they give their consent to the hospital and its workers as a whole Graves v. Church& Dwight (631 A.2d 1248) (N.J. App. 1993) (pg. 499) o Facts The plain drank baking soda and water one night to alleviate heartburn and was soon hospitalized when the baking soda combined with his stomach acid to create a large volume o gas that caused a rupture in his stomach The plain contended that there were several ways to warn on the contained (his expert claimed as many as 20) The plain said that he had no read the label on the box but that he usually did read labels and paid aenon to warnings The plain also smoked 3 packs a day despite knowing o the warnings on cigaree cartons The jury ound that the baking soda was deecve in not carrying a warning o the danger o stomach rupture but ound that this ailure to warn was not a proximate cause o the plain's use o it; Graves said he was entled to a presumpon that i the warning had existed he would have heeded it There was a duty, a breach, but no cause c ause o Court o appeals armed The plain was entled to a presumpon that he would have heeded the warning but the deendants had presented sucient evidence to rebut that presumpon It was admissible that a jury make an analogy between the plain's smoking in the ace o health warnings on cigarees and his projected behavior i a warning w arning had been on the baking soda he consumed (the jury's decision was reasonable) It may be arguable that because o the dierences in the danger (long term danger o smoking v. instantaneous danger o ingesng baking soda) that they two situaons were too dierent to make a reasonable analogy The pleasure that is received rom the acvity could also be considered Green v. Smith & Nephew (629 N.W.2d 727) (Wis. 2001) (pg. 487) o Facts The plain claimed that the latex gloves she used as a hospital worker created a new allergy when the proteins in the gloves interacted with her immune system The jury brought a verdict or the plain  o Wisconsin Supreme Court armed 

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25

 

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WI law is at odds with the third restatement The biggest issue is that the restatement sets the bar higher or recovery in strict products liability design deect cases than in comparable negligence cases -- it increases the burden or injured consumers not only by requiring proo o the manuacturer's negligence but also by adding an addional element o proo o an alternave design to the negligence standard There is a ocus on consumer expectaons

The oreseeability standards set orth by the 3rd restatement are too similar to those o the negligence standard and there is no place or that in strict liability Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.(174. Cal. Rptr. 348) (Cal. App. 1981) (pg. 559) o Facts The plain was injured when the Pinto he was driving was rear ended by another car and because o the gas tank placement, exploded The plain alleged that the care was deecvely designed and brought evidence at trial that Ford knew o the deect because o product tesng The trial court awarded compensatory damages and $125 million in punive damages, evaluang Is the sum so large as to raise a presumpon that the award was the result o passion and prejudice and thereore excessive as a maer o law? Does the award bear a reasonable relaonship to the net assets o the 











deendant? Does the award bear a reasonable relaonship to the compensatory damages? The court concluded that the award was excessive and awarded a remitur o $3.5 million The deendant appealed and argued that evidence was insucient under CA law to support any punive damages The court o appeals armed In CA malice can be dened as "a conscious disregard o the probability that the actor's conduct will result in injury to others There does not need to be an intent o harm Ford engaged in a deliberate weighing o opons and chose prots over human lie The primary purpose o punive damages are punishment and deterrence o 





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like conduct by the wrongdoer and others Government saety standards and the criminal law system have ailed to provide adequate consumer protecon against manuacture and distribuon o deecve products Punive damages are thereore the most eecve remedy or consumer protecon against deecvely designed mass produce arcles In the present case injury was a virtual certainty and the deendants showed a callous indierence to public saety Guthrie v. Powell (290 P.2d 834) (Kan. 1955) (pg. 197) o Facts Plain was at a county air in a two-story building when a cow ell e ll rom the second story and landed on her Deendants responded that there was no basis or their liability because "reasonable conclusions other than negligence o the deendants can be drawn to explain the 











occurrence" Trial court held that the plain was entled to a trial 26

 

Supreme Court armed Claimed this was an appropriate case or res ipsa loquitor because reasonable precauons were not taken by the deendant The burden on the deendant to prevent the incident was very low (should have kept the cows on the rst oor) Haasman v. Pacic Alaska Air Express (100 F. Supp. 1) (Alaska 1951) (pg. 204) o Facts A plain traveling rom Seale to Alaska disappeared during the journey; neither the plains nor the deendants have any evidence or knowledge o what happened to it Plain sues or negligence on the doctrine o res ipsa loquitor which the deendant moves to dismiss o Trial Court denies the moon to dismiss Equality o ignorance is not the same as equality o knowledge The deendant and the plain are on equal oong in terms o not having access to the inormaon But the incident which caused the harm sll must have resulted rom inherent negligence The deendant having no knowledge o how the incident occurred is only urther evidence that the deendant was not giving proper care in the situaon Deendant's negligence is the act which can not be possibly known by the plain, but the deendant's equal ignorance does not negate this Hackbart v. Cincinna Bengals (601 F.2d 516) (10th Cir. 1979) (pg. 604) o Facts The plain was a deensive end and afer he perormed a blocking maneuver a player rom the deendant team struck him in the back o the head and caused a neck injury Judgment was entered or the deendant afer a bench trial The judge reasoned that as a proessional ootball player the plain could have reasonably expected the encounter during the game The level o violence in NFL ootball games are at such a level that the plain recognized and accepted the risk that he may be injured o Appellate court reversed The rules o the game prohibit striking someone afer the play has stopped Since the conduct broke the explicit prohibion the acon cannot be assumed by the plain  It is not within the custom o the game to t o strike afer the play Haddigan v. Harkins (441 F.2d 844) (3d Cir. 1970) (pg. 529) o Facts The plain's wie was killed in a three car crash c rash and the plain sued the other drivers under PA's wrongul death statute and won a jury verdict o $64,754.30 o The court o appeals reversed because o trial errors, but armed the method o making case or damages Deendant claimed that it was an error to admit expert expe rt tesmony on the economic value o services rendered by a wie and mother The plain claimed she was using various skills during 18 hours o the day (cook, baker, waitress, laundress, nurse, etc.) o







































27

 

The court held that the plain had submied ample proo that allowed or a air determinaon The deense did not pose argument about what it would cost to "maintain" her Haskins v. Grybko (17 N.E.2d 146) (Mass. 1938) (pg. 256) o Facts The deendant was hunng woodchucks one night in order to protect his crops when he unknowingly shot and killed the plain's intestate thinking it was a woodchuck The plain brought suit and won in trial court on the nding that the deendant was ordinarily negligent o Supreme Court reversed The intestate was a trespasser and thereore the deendant was not liable or mere negligence He was under an obligaon to rerain rom intenonal injury and rom willul and reckless conduct and did not breach this obligaon He was negligent but not liable He was ordinarily negligent but it was not his duty to exercise reasonable care (Second Restatement 333, pg 258) but rather rathe r liability would have been aached i his acons were intenonal or reckless I there had been consistent trespassers on his land then Second Restatement 334 would apply I both men had been on public land or both were trespassers, they would owe the same duty to each other Hendricks v. Broderick (284 N.W.2d 209) (Iowa 1979) (pg. 602) o Facts The plain and deendant each went turkey hunng and the deendant was calling to a turkey when the plain rustled in some bushes nearby so the deendant shot into the bushes and injured him The trial court instructed the jurors that they should bring in a verdict or the deendant i they ound that the plain was negligent in that he placed himsel in a posion o assuming whatever risk there would be when he voluntarily went turkey hunng and i they ound that his negligence was a proximate cause o his injuries The jury ound or the deendant The plain appeal arguing that the jury instrucons misstated the law o Court o appeals held or the plain that the instrucon was incorrect and ordered a new trial The plain had a right to assume unl he knew otherwise that other hunters would exercise due care under the circumstances, c ircumstances, including the circumstance o the nature o the orest The plain does not assume every possible risk He had the right to assume that other hunters would not be negligent There may be a contributory or comparave negligence claim in this case 























 









Henry v. Houston Lighng & Power Co. (934 S.W.2d 748) (Tex. App. 1996) (pg. 375) o Facts The plain was hired to x a gas line that was severed by the deendants and when he was doing so he heard another employee shout "Fire!" as a reacon reac on to og machine og that 

28

 

had drifed into the hole; the plain rushed out o the hole and ran into a pole causing injury The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendants o The scope o the risk created by the t he deendant includes explosions and the harm which may beall a deendant as they aempt to escape explosion The deendant was ound liable Because the plain believed he was in imminent danger o an explosion then his injury while trying to escape it is within the scope o the duty o care o the deendant Herrick v. Wixom (80 N.W. 117) (Mich. 1899) (pg. 256) o Facts A man sneaks into a circus event and is subsequently injured by a recracker recracke r that is used during the show The jury brought verdict or the deendant having been instructed that i the plain was a trespasser then there was no duty and thereore no liability o Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded a new trial due to jury mis-instrucon A trespasser is not beyond the reaches o the law and any negligence on the part o the deendant that results in injury will render liability The presence o the plain (the audience) was known and the danger o the t he negligent act was known by the deendant Whether the plain is a trespasser or not is irrelevant, the same standard o care is owed to a known audience member who has a cket and one who does not The circus was aware that the plain was present in the proximity o their dangerous and subsequently negligent act Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperave of Puget Sound (664 P.2d 474) (Wash. 1983) (pg. 317) o Facts Plain's decedent was improperly diagnosed with a cough and later ound out that he had lung cancer which he died rom Plain's decedent brought an acon under Washington's wrongul death statute afer the deendant ailed to make an early diagnosis diagnosis o his lung cancer The deendant moved or summary judgment on the ground that the plain probably would have died rom lung cancer even i he had been diagnosed diagnosed earlier The trial court granted the moon and dismissed the acon o Court o appeals reversed and reinstated cause o acon The court concluded that the relaonship between the increased risk o harm and the plain's death is sucient enough enough to state a cause o acon A 14% (39% to 25%) reducon in chance c hance o survival is sucient evidence o causaon and thereore the jury must be allowed to consider the possib possibility ility that the deendant's ailure (negligence) was the proxi proximate mate cause o his death death I liable, damages should be awarded based on direct eects, like lost earning and medical expenses There can not be blanket immunity or doctors who have paents with less than 50% survival chances -- deterrence goal o the tort system Concurring "Loss o chance" doctrine: what caused the loss must be a separate queson rom what the nature and extent o the loss are (the loss o the chance o a cure must be examined, not just the ulmate loss o o his lie) 

 

































29

 

Recovery should be allowed or the loss o the chance o cure even though the chance was small (less than 50% survival) Though the plain can not show that he was denied a cure, he can show that he was denied the chance chance o a cure An all or nothing approach is wrong Its arbitrary It subverts the deterrence objecve o tort law It creates pressure to manipulate and distort rule aecng causaon and damages It gives deendants the benet o uncertainty It denies the loss o a chance as worthy o redress H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. (159 N.E. 896) (N.Y. 1928) (pg. 273) o Facts The deendant water works company entered into a contract with the city to provide, among other things, water to the hydrants within the city A building caught re and spread to the plains warehouse, which was destroyed The plain claims that though capable, the deendant was negligent in its omission o not providing adequate water and pressure to stop the re The plains claim that the deendants ailed to meet their contract with the city and thereore must pay the damages caused by the re A moon to dismiss was denied and the appellate division reversed o N.Y. court o appeals armed The plains complaint alleged two points (1)A cause o acon or breach o contract (2)A cause o acon or a common-law tort (1) No legal duty rests on a city to supply its inhabitants with protecon against re The contract in queson makes promises directly to the city to benet it in the corporate and private capacity The benet that would be provided to the plain is incidental and secondary (not primary and immediate like it would need to be to impose a duty) The deendant company owes a duty to the city not to its inhabitants The consequences o owing a duty to every inhabitant would be very un-proporonal (2) Liability would be unduly extended to an indenite degree by an enlargement o the zone o duty The deendant cannot be held responsible to every person who may indirectly benet rom their contract with the city The assumpon o one relaon cannot mean the involuntary assumpon o a series od new relaons Hull v. Scruggs (2 So.2d 543) (Miss. 1941) (pg. 91) 9 1) o Facts A man's dog is consistently going onto another's property and stealing all the eggs rom his coop, the neighbor shoots the dog and kills it to stop it rom stealing the eggs The jury brought in a verdict or the plain  o Mississippi Supreme Court reversed All other alternaves had been exhausted at this point (progressively becoming more aggressive) 







 

 













 























30

 

Tried many dierent ways to make the dog stop Consistent behavior that can not be altered at this point (dog will not stop) Magnitude o the value o the property that is trying to be protected (eggs may have been his livelihood) In Re Exxon Valdez (1995 WL 527990) (D. Alaska 1995) (pg. 564) o Facts The deendant's tanker spilled 11 million gallons o oil into an Alaskan sound Exxon and their boat captain were both held liable and had separate punive damages held against them Exxon appealed claiming that the jury was improperly instructed and there was a misstatement o the law The jury was instructed that even i Exxon was not itsel negligent, the company could be held liable or punive damages on the reckless acts o their employees Exxon argued that by deying its regulaons, the captain was acng outside the scope o  his employment and thereore they could not be liable or punive damages The court held that this is not necessarily determinave o The district court armed Restatement 217C(b) the captain was an alcoholic and thereore Exxon was negligent in employing him because he was essenally unt Restatement 217C(c) the captain can be considered to be in a managerial posion and thereore he himsel has some policymaking authority In re Polemis (3 K.B. 560) (1921) (pg. 351) o Facts Plain chartered a ship he owned to the deendants who, through their negligence, caused the ship to explode and be destroyed There was gas leaking rom its cargo into the hold A panel o arbitrators ound the ollowing to be acts That the ship was lost by re That the re arose rom a spark igning petrol vapor in the hold That the spark was caused by the alling board coming into contact with some substance in the hold That the all o the board was caused by the people employed by the deendant The plain was negligent because he allowed the plank to all There were oreseeable harms (harm to a person or property) The unoreseeable harm (the explosion) does not actor into the queson o negligence That the causing o the spark could not be reasonably ancipated rom the alling board, though some orm o damage may have been reasonable ancipated o House o Lords awarded ull damages to the plains It is immaterial that the cause o the damage (the spark) could not be reasonably ancipated Given the breach o duty that constutes negligence and given the damage as a direct result o that negligence, the ancipaons o the person whose negligent act has produced the damage appear to be irrelevant I an act would or might cause damage, the act that the damage was not the exact type o damage ancipated is immaterial  

























 



















31

 

The damage must be caused directly by the negligent act and not by independent causes The deendant argues that there should be a disncon between the type o harm and the extent o the harm in terms o oreseeability There may be more extensive harm that is o the oreseeable type, but there may also be a completely dierent type o harm that is not oreseeable The court rejects this disncon Indiana Harbor Belt Ry. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. (916 F.2d 1174) (7th Cir. 1990) (pg. 419) o Facts American Cyanamid is a manuacturer o chemicals and in this case the one in queson is acrylonitrile, which is used or many things but is highly ammable, toxic and carcinogenic Acrylonitrile is used or a variety o things American loaded 20,000 gallons o this onto a railroad car and sent it on its way where it was to switch lines at Indiana's switching line It was discovered by employees o the switching line that the car c ar was leaking the chemical due to a broken lid and subsequently a massive evacuaon a cleanup was ordered at the expense o the plain Indiana Indiana brought two claims against American Negligently maintaining the leased tank car That the transportaon o this chemical through this area is an abnormally dangerous acvity and the shipper should be strictly liable or the damages caused The district court gave summary judgment to the plain Indiana on the grounds o strict liability o Court o Appeals reversed and remanded The issue on appeal is whether this acvity is an abnormally dangerous one that is subject to strict liability This should be decided as a maer o law This issue is governed by second restatement secon 520 The Supreme Court o Illinois treats the second restatement secon as authoritave 

















 





 



Guilles v. Swan



Paradigmac case or strict liability Covers all the aspects o secon 520 The court bases its decision in considering the 6 actors set out in the second restatement's secon 520 (based in 19th century cases) -- discusses them in a dierent order Briey discusses how these would apply but not impose strict liability Incenve is created to experiment with methods o prevenng accidents that involve changing the way that the actor operates Moves beyond just asking the actor to exercise due care, asks them to change their acvity Common acvies are likely to have technology o care available and the hazards are not seen as great on a social whole -- risks outweighed by the social value The accidental spill was caused by carelessness -- it is not clear how the acvity could be altered to reduce the risks associated It is irrelevant that the chemical is dangerous and it was not the properes o  















the chemical that caused the damage (not corrosiveness, etc.) 32

 

I a tank car is careully maintained the danger o a spill is any chemical is negligible The deendants could have properly inspected and maintained the rail car Other pares could have been negligent in their handling o the car I the case moves orward on a negligence theory then the possibility is opened that other pares (plain, any third pares, etc.) may be responsible in part or the damage There is no compelling reason to move to a regime o strict liability When a lack o care can be shown in court such accidents are adequately deterred by the threat o liability or negligence Because it is easy to see how the accident in this case might have been prevented at reasonable cost by greater care on the part o those who handled the tank car, this is not a case o strict liability I strict liability was ound here there would be the possibility that the shipping o all other dangerous chemicals would be subject to the same liability (Pandora's Box) But i due care is used then the accidents acc idents won't happen very ofen anyway so the strict liability imposed won't be invoked very ofen -- the Pandora's Box will not necessarily be opened to the degree that the plain argues There may only be a slight increase in insurance i the vast majority o spills are preventable by proper due care The railroad network is a hub and spoke system and all the hubs are in major cies It is unreasonable to think that major transports would not go through metropolitan areas Strict liability would not impose incenves or alternave routes It would be extremely costly The route would likely be longer Even i the magnitude o the risk is decreased (L), the probability would likely be increased (P) The deendants are not experts in rail road routes (the shipper/transporter/carrier would be in a beer posion to make determinaons about routes) I a less hazardous substute or the chemical existed then the case would be dierent 



































-- strict liability would make more sense because an alternave orm o acon would be incenvized reasonably It would make sense to create a strict liability incenve to manuacture the less dangerous chemical substute Posner's applicaon o 520 actors (c) there is the possibility to decrease or eliminate the risk with reasonable care (d) the parcular hub is very commonly used to transport hazardous chemicals -- there is most likely technology that is available to reduce the risk (b) magnitude may be high but priority is low (e) railroad used ofen or this type o transport, alternave routes were not praccal () products created have a greater social good Restatement approach 







 







Is Allocave: Who was in the best posion to lower the risk o the harm, i.e. can do so most eecvely? This person is who the responsibility should all on 33

 

Not Distribuve: Who is best able to incur the cost, i.e. will suer the least in doing so? This person is who the responsibility should all on It is not the chemical acrylonitrile that is at issue here, it is the transp transportaon ortaon o it The manuacturer o a product is not considered to be engaged in abnormally dangerous acvity merely because the product becomes dangerous when it is handled or used in some way afer it leaves his premises even i this danger is oreseeable Strict liability is not appropriate here, but negligence claims can sll be brought and should be tried in court -- the burden on the plain is higher now (they need to show negligence) I you can eliminate the risk by due care (c) then because the risk did occur there must be negligence (res ipsa), but who is the negligence on? Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States (398 F.2d 167) (2d Cir. 1968) (pg. 434) o Facts A U.S. coast guard ship was being overhauled in a oang drydock when one o its sailors opened valves that caused ooding and subsequent sinking o parks o the drydock and the ship The drydock owner sought damages and was granted them by the district court o Court o appeals armed The lower court applied the move test The actor's conduct needs to be closely related to a move that is intended to benet his employer, whether it actually does benet them or not The court determined that the sailor's act were too ar removed rom anything personal to not be considered within the scope o his employment The sailor's conduct was not so unoreseeable as to make it unair to impose liability Some type o damage by the sailors crossing the drydock is oreseeable so it is immaterial that the exact type o acon and harm were not oreseen The oreseeability o the event is sll conngent on the scope o employment It all basically alls under a airness raonale There is inherent risk o damage and this is enough to impose liability Policy raonales that are rejected The distribuve argument is that just because the employer might be in a beer nancial place to pay the damages does mean they need to be held liable The allocave argument is to allocate the risks/burdens in the most ecient and least costly way -- the deendant should be in the best posion to avoid this type o harm But in this case the court argues that the drydock owners are the ones in the best posion to prevent this harm (put locks on valves, etc.)  Jacobsma v. Goldberg's Goldberg's Fashion Forum Forum (303 N.E.2d 226) (Ill. App. 1973) (pg. 265) o Facts Deendant (manager o the store) calls "Stop thie!" and points in the direcon o the plain who sees a man (the thie) running in his direcon; the plain aempts to stop the thie and dislocates his shoulder in the process The trial court reuses to instruct the jury on the issue o whether the plain was a volunteer and thereore determined that the was not a volunteer as a maer o law Jury gave verdict to the plain and the deendant appealed stang that the court had erred in reusing instrucons or the jury on volunteer status o Court o Appeals armed 











































34

 

The plain was a business invitee upon entering the store and thereore the deendant owed him a duty to exercise ordinary care or his saety When the deendant called "Stop thie" it was concluded that it was reasonable or the plain to iner that this was an acve call or his assistance The deendant's acve call or assistance and the plain's purpose in aempng to stop the shoplifer was to benet the deendant and is sucient to connue his characterizaon as an invitee The deendant was also ound to have had prior knowledge o the shoplifer's illegal acvies and it was thus concluded that the deendant became charged with the responsibility (owed a duty) to protect its invitees rom other illegal acts by the shoplifer  Johnson v. Douglass Douglass (723 N.Y.S.2d 627) o Facts The plains were out walking their dog when the deendant came speeding down the road and nearly hit them and also killed their dog Plain's allege negligent inicon o emoonal distress Plain's could claim a bystander posion or a near miss posion Bystander: argument would be that the dog was closely related to them and that witnessing its death was emoonally distressing Pets are not usually viewed as "amily members" but as property Near miss: argument would be that the couple had to jump out o the way o the speeding car but they would need to note some type o physical ailments that they suered as a result It may be reasonably oreseeable that in a residenal neighborhood there would be pedestrians Foreseeability is not weighed as highly in these cases o Court ruled against both claims in NY (can not recover or property, can not recover or emoonal injury when there is no pre-exisng duty)  Johnson v. Jamaica Jamaica Hospital (467 N.E.2d N.E.2d 502) (N.Y. 1984) (pg. 297) 297) o Facts Plain's inant child was abducted rom the deendant hospital shortly afer her birth and missing or a period o 4 months beore being recovered by the police Plains sued the hospital or the emoonal distress that they suered at the hands o what they reerred to as the hospitals negligence Trial court held the complaint stated a good cause o acon Appellate division armed o Court o appeals reversed The court stated that there was no basis or establishing a duty between the parents and the hospital and thereore there could be no liability The direct injury allegedly caused by the negligence was to the inant and thereore the plain's grie was not directly related and thereore not aconable Though the parents are in a pre-exisng contractual relaonship with the hospital, there is concern that a Pandora's box will be opened and that liability will be expanded too ar The general rule in contract cases is that absent a duty upon which liability can be based, there is no right o recovery or mental distress In this case, the inant was a more direct vicm but the parents would have diculty showing evidence o emoonal distress in an inant 









































35

 

Dissent

 

Plains were subjected to the hospital's ailure to protect their right to custody o their child and thereore there is sucient guarantee that the claims o emoonal distress are indeed legimate

 Johnson v. Kosmos Kosmos Portland Cement Cement Co. (64 F.2d 193) (6th Cir. 1933) (pg. 374) o Facts The deendant owned a barge that was moored in a river and had recently been used to haul oil and had thereore accumulated gas in its hold The deendant's negligently ailed to remove the gas beore having the plain's work on the barge using an acetylene torch The gases were ignited by a lightning strike and not by the torch, killing the workers The trial court ound that the deendant's negligence was not the proximate cause c ause o the atal injuries to the plains and thereore gave judgment to the deendants o I the plain can convince the court that the oreseeable harm is the risk o explosion then the deendant is liable because the risk that was oreseeable is within the class o the actual harm This was the case and the deendant was ound liable The deendant negligently created the risk o an explosion  Johnson v. Wills Memorial Memorial Hospital (343 S.E.2d 700) (Ga. App. App. 1986) (pg. 168) o Facts An unstable man is in a hospital under guard but he escapes rom a window and is ound later rozen to death The plains sue because they claimed the man was not properly cared or The jury ound or the deendant o Court o Appeals armed "Similar" community modied locality rule is appropriate because it is the adequacy o the acilies and services that is in queson Services may be limited by locaon and resource by no ault o the hospital o Facilies may be judged by custom because it allows a judgment based on the custom o the best that can be done under the uncontrollable circumstances Katko v. Briney (183 N.W.2d 657) (Iowa 1971) (pg. 85) o Facts A couple uses a house or storage purposes and experiences mulple aempts o trespass so they set up a spring gun which injures an intruder The trial court nds or the deendant o Court o appeals armed Lie must be valued more than property One may cause bodily injury i there is a physical threat to sel, not otherwise Harm to a person must be at stake I Briney had been there and concerned or his own lie then shoong the intruder would be under dierent circumstances Dissent There must be a consideraon o whether there was an intent to seriously injure or kill an intruder and that queson o act should be lef to a jury with proper instrucons I what is contained on the property is "his lie" then he should be allowed to use the threat o orce to protect it 







































36

 

Keel v. Hainline (331 P.2d 397) (Okla. 1958) (pg. 8) o Facts Students were in class beore it was called c alled to order throwing erasers back and orth at each other intenonally, a student not involved in the throwing or receiving was caught in the line o a throw and lost an eye rom the impact Plain sues the thrower o the eraser and the target o the eraser Jury brought a verdict or the plain against both deendants The deendant at whom the eraser had been thrown appealed o Court o appeals held or the plain  The basics o a baery have been established A intenonally threw the eraser at B (intenonal contact) The acon is unlawul in its essence (inappropriate in the current situaon (the classroom)) Transerred Intent A's intenons toward B are combined with harmul contact with C to create a baery A throws eraser at B and hits C, A is liable "Transerred" transerred intent A throws eraser at B (a willing parcipant) but hits C instead, B is liable as well They were willing parcipants who either aided, abeted, encouraged, procured, promoted or insgated the act Kee v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. (21 Minn. 207) (1875) (pg. 259) o Facts A young boy caught his leg in a railroad turntable and subsequently needed it amputated The turntable was unenced, revolved easily and was located near the plain's home The trial court ound or the deendant on the grounds that the plain was a trespasser o Minnesota Supreme Court reversed The deendant knew that by leaving the turntable as it was he was alluring young children to the scene which they could not know was dangerous (Second Restatement 337, pg 259) This parcular duty deals specically with respect to children (aracve nuisance) A child cannot be blamed or not resisng temptaon beore them There are dierent expectaons o adults and their percepons o danger The deendant was bound to use care to protect the plain rom the danger which they led them to because the plain could not be expected to protect himsel  Kemezy v. Peters (79 F.3d 33) (7th Cir. 1996) (pg. 555) o Facts Plain sued deendant policeman under the claim that he had wantonly beaten him with his nightsck in an altercaon in a bowling alley where the deendant was working security The jury gave verdict to the plain  













































37

 

The deendant appealed the punive damages awarded on the ground that it was the plain's burden to introduce evidence concerning the deendant's net worth or purposes o equipping the jury with essenal inormaon to a just determinave o punive damages o Court o appeals armed The court laid out their juscaons or punive damages Compensatory damages do not always compensate ully because they must be based in objecve evidence they ofen all short, especially i the damage is intangible Punive damages are necessary in some cases in order to make sure that torous conduct is not under deterred Punive damages are necessary in some cases to make sure that people channel transacon through the market when the costs o voluntary transacons are low When a torous act is concealable, a judgment equal to the harm done by the act will un-deter (person who assaults is caught only hal the me) An award o punive damages expresses the community's abhorrence at the deendant's act Punive damages relive the pressures on the criminal jusce system The eliminaon o punive damage may result in a burden on the criminal  jusce system which may lead to people using a sel-help sel-help method instead o the  judicial system The actor o the deendant's wealth is not a crical part o any o the above elements The plain does not have the burden to show the deendant's net worth Punive damages serve as a type o bounty that give the plain an incenve to act in a when that is benecial to the public at large, which is why they are awarded to private plains rather than the state (in cases that involve crimes that may inuence the state) Kennen v. Checker Cab Co. (620 N.E.2d 1208) (Ill. App. 1993) (pg. 563) o Facts The plain was a blind man who was assaulted afer geng in the deendant cab because he brought his guide dog into the cab with him The jury returned a verdict or the plain or compensatory damages and punive damages The deendant appealed, claiming that they should not be liable or punive damages based on the driver's conduct o The court o appeals reversed in part (concerning the punive damages) The court applied the complicity rule (2d Restatement o Agency) In order or an employer to be held he ld liable or punive damages based on the conduct o an employee there must be some deliberate corporate parcipaon in the acon 217(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner o the act In this case there was no deliberate acon, only a possible knowledge that some cab drivers did not take blind passengers, which was not the cause o the injury Kerr v. Conneccut (140 A. 751) (Conn. 1928) (pg. 133) o Facts A man with very poor hearing was walking along a trolley line and, despite the driver trying to warn him by horn to move, was hit by a trolley when he ailed to move away rom the tracks when the trolley came by The plain's negligence is in queson here (a negligent plain can not collect damages even is the deendant was at ault) The trial court ound negligence on the part o the plain but not on the deendant 











































38

 

Conneccut Supreme Court armed The plain was contributorily negligent as a maer o law The law required the deendant to exercise that care or his own saety which a reasonably prudent dea man would exercise The plain is responsible or compensang or his own deciency (he should not have been walking on the trolley tracks) Kershaw v. McKown (196 Ala. 123) (Ala. 1916) (pg. 92) o Facts A mans dog had been aacking another's goat so the goat owner shot the dog o Liability in this case depends on the relave value o the two animals in queson The court is ocusing on the economic end result o the acons Goat > Dog or Goat = Dog then deendant not liable Goat < Dog then deendant liable o















Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. (211 N.W. 913) (Wis. 1927) (pg. 334) o Facts The plains property is damaged by re; the deendant caused one re which joins with another equal re beore it reaches and destroys the plain's property Jury brought verdict or the plain, deendant appealed arguing that the other re would have burned down the plain's property anyway o Court o appeals arms The plain established the cause o the origin o the re and the course o the re up unl it reached his property No principle o jusce requires that the plain be placed under the burden o idenying the origin o mulple res or the damage which one o the res could have done on its own The plain has the burden to show the source o one o the res and that it would have burned down its property (that it would reach his property) The burden then shifs to the deendant to show that i his re had not united with the other re then his re would not have burned down the property because the other re was o much greater proporons He also could show that the other re was the result o natural causes and thereore the property would have been destroyed anyway Most courts use the approach that as long as the deendants negligence contributed substanally to the harm then they are liable Even i the other re was natural or larger, liability would exist This most closely ollows 433b (illustraon 10 and 11) in the second restatement, but would be similar to 433A (illustraon 3) i the source o the other re was another deendant In Summers both deendants were negligent but only one actually caused harm, in this case the deendant certainly contributed to the harm In Dillon the deendant's negligence did cause the injury, but the uncertainty lies in what would have happened to the plain i the deendant had not been negligent, but in this case the uncertainty lies with the causaon (how much was the deendant's negligence a contribung actor) 























39

 

Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp. (810 P.2d 917) (Wash. 1991) (pg. 427) o Facts The deendant company was hired or a reworks show and knocked one rework sideways and sent it into a crowd causing various injuries The trial court gave summary judgment to the plains on the ground that the deendants were strictly liable or damage caused by its reworks o Washington Supreme Court armed There is an inherent risk o personal injury or property damage when reworks are used No maer how much care is taken, the high risk cannot be eliminated when the acvity is done near crowds o Some courts have rejected this raonale on the idea that reworks are a maer o common usage on appropriate occasions I something is common then it is most likely not viewed by society as "abnormally dangerous" or parcularly hazardous The more common something is the more likely it is that there are saeguards available to reduce any inherent dangers associated with the acvity 











Knight v. Jewe (275 Cal. Rptr. 292) (1990) (pg. 3) 3) o Facts Two people playing touch ootball end up with the P on the ground and D steps on her hand which causes serious injury to her hand that leads to amputaon The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant o Caliornia Supreme Court Armed o Like Vosburg, the D did not intend harm with the conduct c onduct The dierence is that in Vosburg the physical contact was intended, in Knight the physical contact that caused the injury was not intended Kopczick v. Hobart Corp. (721 N.E.2d 769) (Ill. App. 1999) (pg. 558) o Facts The plain was a proessional meat cuer who lost a nger using the deendant slicer The slicer was a dierent type o design that held the blade at a new angle The plain claimed the design caused the cuer to "sel eed" The plain brought other butchers who aested that someme the saw did "sel-eed" and there had been as many as 30 other injuries rom the saw The jury ound or the plain and awarded compensatory damages and $20 million in punive damages o The court o appeals reversed Such a small number o injuries does not jusy the large punive damages The injuries were inherent and could essenally be somewhat expected through the use o the machine The evidence does not provide support that the deendant's conduct was wanton and willul because such a small number o injuries did not put the deendant on noce o the danger Konradi v. United States (919 F.2d 1207) (7th Cir. 1990) (pg. 438) o Facts A mailman was driving to work when he collided with the plain's car and killed him 























40

 

The estate sued the U.S. under the Federal Torts Claims Act which allows the ederal government to be liable under state tort law in circumstances where private pares would be held liable The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant government o The court o appeals reversed and ound summary judgment premature The idea o this doctrine overall is to provide incenve or employers to alter not their care but their acvity itsel  Businesses should consider tradeos and are more likely to do so i they are liable or the torts o their employees within the scope o the employment The scope o employment can be unconally dened by reerence to the likelihood that liability would induce benecial changes in acvity In this case the postal service had rules in place which guaranteed that an employee would need to drive to work and take a parcular parc ular route It is viewed that the Postal Service had control c ontrol over the aspects that led to the accident Laidlaw v. Sage (158 N.Y. 73) (1896) (pg. 6) o Facts Man comes into an oce and threatens to blow up the building unless he is paid a substanal amount o money, D uses a coworker as a shield and when the explosives go o he is not injured but P is The case was tried several mes due to evidence as to whether P would have been injured even i she had not been used as a shield In the ourth jury trial the court entered verdict or the plain  o The NY court o appeals reversed and remanded or new trial They stated that the jury had been mis-instructed as to whether the deendant had commied a voluntary act The issue becomes whether or not the act o moving the coworker in ront o them was voluntary or not Court says anything done in imminent danger or to protect yoursel is not a voluntary act but more reexive and insnctual Very subjecve decision as to what is to be considered imminent danger and under what circumstances can this be applied The urther a person gets rom a situaon where they are acng purely insnctually the weaker becomes the argument that the act was involuntary Landers v. Ghosh (491 N.E.2d 950) (Ill. App. 1986) (pg.527) o Facts The plain was shot and taken to the hospital where the contacted deendant doctor said he would be there shortly but did not arrive or several hours; the plain died The plain used an expert witness to esmate her deceased husband's lost earnings He was a trained carpenter The jury awarded $400,000 or loss o support and loss o consorum (society) (it does not dierenate how much o the award was or each) The plain appealed claiming that the award was inadequate o The court o appeals armed The court held that there was no evidence e vidence to show that the award amount was inadequate Lander v. Seaver (32 Vt. 114) (1859) (pg. 113) 









































41

 

o

Facts

A boy makes a rude comment about his school master outside o school and the master hears it; at school the next day the school master beats the boy at school The trial court ound or the school master I the school master was acng with good moves then he is not liable o The Supreme Court reversed and remanded They held that the jury had been mis-instructed Good moves need to go along with reasonable behavior and judgment Larson v. St. Francis Hotel (188 P.2d 513) (Cal. App. 1948) (pg. 195) o Facts The plain was walking along the sidewalk when an armchair ell rom the sky and hit her on the head; it was later presumed, despite a lack o witnesses, that the air chair ell rom the hotel window The plain pled her case relying o the doctrine o res ipsa loquitor The court, however, granted the deendant's moon or nonsuit The plain had no way to prove negligence without reliance on res ipsa loquitor o The Court o Appeals armed Followed the standard set in Gerhart v. So. Cal. Gas Co. Doctrine only applied where the cause o injury is shown to be under the exclusive control and management o the deendant Does not apply to cases o divided responsibility "V.J. Day" is an extraordinary day that constutes extraordinary circumstances A hotel does not have "exclusive control" o its urniture (patrons have control at most mes) The accident was such that it can be presumed that it ordinarily might happen despite the best precauons o the deendants Lawson v. Management Acvies, Inc. (81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745) (Cal. App. 1999) (pg. 296) o Facts An airplane crashes near a car dealership where the workers o the dealership witnessed the crash and subsequently led a claim because they elt they were in danger during the ordeal The trial court dismissed o Court o appeals armed There were not physical ailments to the plains as the result o the incident ( Robb) There was not a special relaonship in that the pilot does not owe a duty to keep those on the ground sae ( Third Restatement ) The plane may not have crashed as the result o negligence and thereore the deendant may not hold a duty or moral blameworthiness Policy raonale There are so many other plains who can le a claim in this situaon that there is no need or a concern that the deendants will have no liability in any case (not like Robb where the plain was the only vicm and potenal plain) Liebeck v. McDonald Corp. (pg. 513) o The plain was burned severely by McDonald's coee and she got a selement during ligaon 





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One o the key things that led to victory was w as that the coee had burned a lot o people in recent years and the coee sold by McDonald's was kept at 20 degrees de grees hoer than the compeon Litzman v. Himboldt County (273 P.2d 82) (Cal. App. 1954) (pg. 335) o Facts A boy is at the county air when he nds what he thinks is a are and lights it only to have it explode and he nds out it is really an aerial bomb The aerial bomb could have come rom one o two sources (one o them was negligent, but the plain cannot show which one it was) The jury is instructed that i they can not conclude c onclude which source lef the bomb unaended then they need to dismiss the claims against both deendants The jury nds ore the deendants The plain appealed, stang that under res ipsa loquitur and under alternave liability the jury should nd or him o Res Ipsa Loquitor There is no way to know that both o the sources were negligent in leaving the bomb -one is completely blameless But, should there be a burden on the deendants to show that it was not them based on their inventory? I they cannot prove it this way, they may be negligent or not keeping proper inventory o dangerous materials Unlike in Ybarra, the two sources had no duty to monitor each other as part o a team o Alternave liability Both deendants were not necessarily negligent -- only one could have lef the bomb o Outcome -- liability Court accepted both the res ipsa argument and the argument o alternave liability The burden was shifed to the deendants o







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London Borough of Southwark v. Williams (2 All ER 175) (1971) (pg. 104) o Facts A group o homeless squaers take residence in an abandoned home and the city evicts them and they claims a necessity to be in the house o The court denied the use o the privilege o private necessity The town does not want to open the ood gates to claims o private necessity by the homeless "I homelessness were once admied as a deense to trespass, no one's house could be sae." This case does not constute an acute and immediate need o protecon rom threat The problem o homelessness itsel is chronic and does not constute the right to invoke private necessity Economic Perspecve In cases where transacon costs are high and it is dicult or pares to bargain the law should take more lenient view o property rights however when transacon costs are low then the two pares should be able to take the me necessary to bargain The homeless are not able to bargain in any way (no means to compensate) Lordi v. Spioa (45 A.2d 491) (N.J. 1946) (pg. 262) o Facts 















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Plain and his son are vising the deendants bungalow when the deendant's son turns on and lights the gas heater and then later asks his ather (deendant) to turn it o; the deendant ails to properly shut o the gas and later there is an explosion that kills the plain's son when the deendant asks the plain to light the gas heater The plain sued or negligence The jury gave a verdict to the t he plain which the deendant appealed rom an order denying his moon or directed verdict o New Jersey Supreme Court armed The "guest rule" cannot establish immunity or the deendant when the guest (plain) is injured by an unknown danger created by the deendant's negligence (armave act o negligence) The deendant's act (not properly closing the gas valve) amounts to acve negligence Key disncon rom Davies is the acve negligence (does not maer that the t he danger was sll unknown i it is the result o acve negligence) Acve or passive negligence would not maer in a trespasser situaon (negligence but no liability: a person may be negligent (either acvely or passively) but i they owe no duty o care then they are not liable) Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Creighton (50 S.W. 227) (Ky. 1899) (pg. 531) o Facts The plain's child ran across RR tracks and was killed by a negligent train driver The jury awarded the administrator o the child's estate $10,500 or lost earnings The deendant appealed claiming that the award was excessive o Court o appeals reversed and ordered a new trial t rial There is no assurance that the child will reach manhood and unl that me he would need to be supported There are many childhood diseases and other obstacles to reaching adulthood Comparable to awards given to adults, the amount is too high Dissent The jury had just as much right to assume that the child would earn a large amount o money as the court has to assume that he would w ould not The decision is speculave either way There needs to be some deterrence or killing a child Lowe v. California League of Professional Baseball (65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105) (Cal. App. 1997) (pg. 603) o Facts The plain was hit by a oul ball and claimed he was distracted rom the game by the team mascot who was hing the plain in the back o the head with his tail, causing him to turn his aenon away rom the game The team claimed that the plain assumed the risk by aending the game Summary judgment or the plains o Appellate court reversed Deendant owed a duty not to increase the risk that t hat the plain had assumed, but the plain needs to provide evidence that the distracon by the mascot did increase the risk (a  jury is needed) Luthringer v. Moore (190 P.2d 1) (Cal. 1948) (pg. 429) o Facts 

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The deendant was hired to exterminate vermin in the basement o a restaurant and did so by releasing hydrocyanic acid gas which which overcame the plain the next day when she arrived or work at the pharmacy next door The trial court instructed the jury that umigang with the gas g as was an ultra hazardous acvity or which the deendant would be strictly liable even i he had taken all reasonable precauons The jury returned verdict or the plain  o Liability was ound or the exterminator 520 Factor (c) -- even i all due care was taken the deendant himsel admits that the harm sll has potenal to occur Acvity level economic raonale -- was a substute inseccide available that is inherently less harmul 520 Factor (d) -- gas was not considered a maer o common usage 520 Factor (e) -- the place was a common business area and thereore not necessarily appropriate Another way to think about it is that to use the gas at all was inherently negligent in itsel  532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. (750 N.E.2d 1097) (N.Y. 2001) (pg. 283) o Facts The south wall o the deendants oce building collapsed and caused the surrounding area to be closed o; the plain's deli was eected e ected and was closed rom business or 5 weeks The plain brought suit alleging that the deendant's negligence cause the collapse and sought to collect lost prots The trial court dismissed the complaint o Appellate division reversed Deendants should have ancipated that pre-exisng problems with their structure would be eected by the planned renovaon and could oreseeably result in injury to others and because they did not they are to be considered in reckless disregard Causes incenve to act reasonably in regard to the saety o others o New York Court o Appeals then consolidated this case with others and ordered all complaints dismissed While a landowner owes a duty to those around him to take reasonable re asonable care to avoid injuring them, it can not be held that the landowner owes a duty to protect an enre urban neighborhood against purely economic losses By liming the scope o the deendant's liability to those who have suered injury or property damage aord a reasonably apporoned liability Policy-driven line-drawing is too arbitrary Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigaon Co. (125 P.2d 794) (Utah 1942) (pg. 429) o Facts The plain ran a mink arm and the deendant owned a nearby property where they were using explosives during repairs The plain claimed that the vibraons rom the explosions caused the mother mink to become rightened and caused her to kill a large number o her young The trial court sustained the deendant's demurrer to the complaint o The Utah supreme court armed 





































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There was the intervenon o a third party between the explosion and the damage thereore breaking the chain and causing queson o proximate causaon One who res explosives cannot be liable or every occurrence ollowing the explosion which has a semblance o connecon to it Malouf v. Dallas Athlec Country Club (837 S.W.2d 674) (Tex. App. 1992) (pg. 34) o Facts People who live next door to a gol course c ourse ofen experience gol balls ying onto their property and hing their house or car Deendant won judgment afer a bench trial o Court o appeals armed There is no liability in this case due to the act that t hat there is no evidence that there was any intent to violate a property right The gol balls ending up on the property was an "unintended consequence" Manning v. Brown (689 N.E.2d 1382) (N.Y. 1997) (pg. 584) o Facts Two unlicensed drivers decide to take an unaended car and take turns driving around One girl suggests to the other that she should change the radio staon which causes the driver to crash; the passenger at that me was injured and sued the driver and the car owner The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendants o Court o appeals armed The court holds that where a plain engaged in unlawul conduct the courts will not entertain suit i the plain's conduct constutes a serious violaon o the law and the injuries or which the plain seeks recover are the direct result o that violaon The act in this case was considered a serious violaon Unlicensed drivers engaged in an acvity which was hazardous not only to themselves but also to the public at large Criminal conduct that puts the public at grave risk constutes a serious violaon Manning v. Grimsley (643 F.2d 20) (1st Cir. 1981) (pg. 10) o Facts Pitcher was irritated by ans who were heckling at a baseball game and threw a ball into the stands intenonally and hit a an The trial court gave a directed verdict to the deendants o Court o appeals reversed and remanded The intent to create a direct ear o imminent danger is sucient or liability when the intent transers to actual contact The other hecklers can not be held liable or the injury because the act o heckling can be reasonably expected at a baseball game The hecklers were not a necessary part o the acon which caused injury Diers rom Keel because there was not a back and orth mutual and proporonal exchange Shows that transerred intent requires some type o mutual and proporonal exchange The Margharita (140 F. 820) (5th Cir. 1905) (pg. 151) o Facts A man ell overboard and beore he was recovered his leg was bien o. There was no doctor on the ship and the closest doctor was ar out o the ship's course (3 weeks) so the 









































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ship simply connued on its prescribed path and upon reaching its desnaon (3 months later), the man's leg is cared or and slightly urther amputated Trial court says the man is owed a duty to make up or his pain and suering o Court o appeals reverses that verdict There was no addional loss or disability that was substanal enough to warrant the danger o turning back and nding aid The delay would be o an indenite me period and the owner's would have been subjected to high and un-proporonal damages o Economics Hand Aspects B = cost (danger, monetary) o reroung the ship to the other port with a doctor (really big in this case...very risky, very dangerous) P = probability o harm (i no detour is taken, will the man suer?) (yes, the man will suer) L = magnitude o the resulng harm (long-term consequences, suering) Would the cost o being sued be more than the cost o re-roung the ship? There was no addional injury to the man on the remainder o the journey (no urther damage to be incurred) but there would have been substanal damage i the ship was re-routed Posner Contractual perspecve How much will the man accept to incur the suering? How much would the man pay to avoid the suering? Wright Aggregate Risk Ulity Test The creaon o signicant risk to others is reasonable i  1. The risks are not too serious 2. The risks are necessary (unavoidable) to obtain a benet 3. The risks have been reduced to the maximum easible 4. The risks are outweighed by the desired benet There are benets in preserving the willingness o men to sail  Marn v. Herzog (126 N.E. 814) (N.Y. 1920) (pg 171) o Facts Man and his wie are traveling by buggy when the deendant rounds the corner and strikes the buggy in his automobile which causes the death o the husband Plains claim the deendant was negligent or not keeping to the right side o the road Deendant claims the plains were contributorily negligent or not having headlights Jury ound or the the plains (no negligence on them them at all) o Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial (Supreme Court arms) A new trial is ordered because the jury was mis-instructed They should have been told that the omission o lights was "prima acie (adequate) evidence o contributory negligence" not just a "consideraon or negligence" Appellate says that to willully not use headlights (a saeguard prescribed by law) is to all short o the duty o care that people in organized society need to conorm to Omission o the lights was a negligent wrong 





















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The absence o the lights must be a contribung actor to the "disaster" that is at claim or negligence (the deendant must demonstrate a causal connecon or it to be relevant) The plain needs to show that despite their violang the statute, the accident sll would have happened (i.e. there was so much light elsewhere etc.) o Appellate court claims that the collision was due to the deendants ailure to see the buggy at a me when the headlights o the buggy should have alerted him to it (i there were lights) Marzolf v. Stone (temporal proximity) (960 P.2d 424) (Wash. 1998) (pg. 301) o Facts Plain's son was killed in an accident which the plain came upon 10 minutes later in me to see his gravely injured son and the accident acc ident afermath Plain sued the deendant or negligent inicon o emoonal distress and the trial court dismissed the complaint o Supreme Court reversed The court held that the emoonal trauma caused by seeing a loved one injured at an accident scene stems not merely rom witnessing the transion rom health to injury, but also rom witnessing the afermath o an accident Allowing recovery only to those who are present at the impact o the accident creates an arbitrary disncon that the court is not willing to make McCarthy v. Olin Corp. (119 P.3d 148) (2d Cir. 1997) (pg. 490) o Facts A man boarded a train and opened re on the passengers (killing 6, injuring 19) using "black talon" bullets which are designed to bend on impact and cause more damage than an average bullet The deendant manuacturer had pulled the bullet rom the market but the gunman had purchased them beore this me The plain alleged that the deendant should be held strictly liable because the bullets were deecvely designed The district judge granted the deendant moon to dismiss the complaint or ailing to state a claim upon which relie can be granted o The court o appeals armed The plains ailed to allege that the bullet was unreasonably dangerous or its intended use Some product must by their very nature be dangerous in order to be unconal The risk/ulity test is inapplicable because the risks arise rom the uncon o the product and not a deect The purpose o the risk/ulity analysis is to determine whether the risk o injury might have been reduced or avoided is the manuacturer had used a easible alternave design The risk/injury to be balanced with ulity must be a risk not intended as the primary uncon o the product Dissent A possible alternave does exist in this case (eliminaon o talons on bullet) Cites restatement: the designs o some products are so maniestly unreasonable in that they have low social ulity and a high degree o danger that liability should aach even absent proo o a reasonable alternave design McIntyre v. Balenne (833 S.W.2d 52) (Tenn. 1992) (pg. 577) 



































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o

Facts Deendant's tractor collided with plain's truck and caused the plain various injuries The evidence at trial showed that the deendant had been drunk but the plain had been speeding The trial court gave judgment to the deendant when the jury ound the two men equally at ault The court used the doctrine o contributory negligence The court o appeals armed Afer urther appeal, remanded or new trial with instrucons "All-or-nothing" bar o contributory negligence (rejected by most states at this me -1992) Plain's contributory negligence completely bars recovery Plain should be penalized or his misconduct Plain should be deterred rom injuring himsel  Plain's negligence supersedes the deendant's so as to render the deendant's negligence no longer proximate Does not apply when Deendant's conduct was intenonal Deendant's conduct was grossly negligent Deendant had the "last clear chance" with which, through the exercise o ordinary care, he could have avoided plain's injury Plain's negligence can be classied as remote Court concluded that it was me to abandon the outmoded and unjust common law doctrine o contributory negligence and adopt in its place a system o comparave ault Pure comparave ault Damages are reduced in proporon to the percentage o negligence aributed to the plain  The plain can always collect unless they are 100% at ault Modied comparave ault Plain's recover like in pure orm, but only i the plain's negligence is either less than the deendants (≤49% o o total) or is equal to but does not exceed deendants (≤50% o total) I there are more pares than 2 the pares are looked at collecvely as plains and deendants or their percentages o ault This court chose the modied comparave ault or recovery i the plain's negligence is less than the deendant's negligence (≤49% o total) Special verdict or modied contributory negligence (≤49% comparave ault) (pg. 579) (1) Was the deendant negligent? Yes or No (I the answer is no, do not go any urther) (2) Was the deendant's negligence a proximate cause o injury or damage to the plain? Yes or No (I the answer is no, do not go any urther) (3) Did the plain's own negligence account or 50 percent or more o the total negligence that proximately caused his/her injuries or damages? Yes or No (I the answer is yes, do not go any urther) (4) What is the total amount o plain's damages, determined without reerence to the amount o plain's negligence? Amount in dollars

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(5) Using 100 percent as the total combined negligence which proximately caused the injuries or damages to the plain, what are the percentages o such negligence to be allocated to the plain and deendant? Plain % Deendant % (total must equal 100%) McMahon v. Bunn-O-Mac Corp. (150 F.3d 651) (7th Cir. 1998) (pg. 509) o Facts Plain was a passenger in a car driven by her husband who had purchased a cup o coee and the plain was aempng to transer the coee into a smaller smaller cup when she spilled it on hersel and suered 2nd and 3rd degree burns She claimed the makers o the coee coe e machine had ailed to warn consumers about the severity o burns that hot coee can produce and that any coee served at more than 140 degrees is deecve The district court gave summary judgment to the deendant o Court o appeals armed The court concludes that the average serving temperature o coee is between 170 and 205 degrees so the plain's contenon o 140 being appropriate is unreasonable (Failure to warn) The plains argued that they knew coee could burn but did not know the extent to which it could burn and the damage it could cause The court held that to give what would be adequate warning in the plains eye there would need to be a medical and scienc explanaon in ny ne print on the coee Indiana law expects consumers to educate themselves about the hazards o daily lie (Design deect) The plains contend that the coee maker was w as deecve in design because it kept coee too hot but Indiana does not condemn product as deecve just because they are designed to do things that create serious hazards Without evidence that coee at 180 degrees is o lile use to consumers the plains cannot show that the high temperature makes the coee deecve I the product was held deecve, Mobil would be held liable as well because selling coee was part o their regular business The proper means o compensaon or the plain is rst-party health insurance and accident insurance and this alternave means is only urther reasoning or why this should not be a case or the torts system Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court (822 P.2d 1292) (Cal. 1992) (pg. 477) o Facts The plain was injured when he swallowed a chicken bone ound in the ood he was served at the deendant's restaurant The plain based his claims on the second restatement's secon that stated that there should be strict liability when the ood was more dangerous than would be normally thought The trial court dismissed the claims They relied on the raonale in Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.  which held that liability could not be held or injuries caused by substances "natural" to ood o Supreme Court o CA armed The court agrees with the plain that a reasonable expectaon rule should be adopted but in applying the test sll connued to disnguish between oreign and natural substances 

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50

 

It stated that i the injury-producing substance is natural to the preparaon o the ood served then it can be said that it was reasonably expected by its very nature and the ood cannot be determined unt or deecve Dissent Claimed that the term natural could be construed to include too vast an array The reasonableness should means that the consumer could ancipate nding the object in the meal Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Kendall (88 So. 2d 276) (Fla. 1956) (pg. 442) o Facts A worker o the deendant was delivering newspapers and ran over the plain  The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict or the plain  o Florida supreme court reversed Held as a maer o law that an independent contractor is not an employee and the doctrine does not apply I the one securing the services controls the means by which the task is accomplished, the one perorming the service is an employee I not, he is an independent contractor The means o the accident was the vehicle selected and in this case the paper boy selected his own vehicle In this case any control directed by the deendant was to the result, not to the manner o perormance by the independent contractor Small regulaons in manner do not override this Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc. (651 N.E.2d 239) (Ill. App. 1995) (pg. 428) o Facts The deendants operated a ring range and the plain was hit by a stray bullet as he drove down a nearby road The plain claimed on one count that the deendants were strictly liable because "discharging rearms is an ultra hazardous and highly dangerous acvity" The trial court dismissed the strict liability count o The court o appeals armed The risk o harm to persons or property, even though great, can be virtually eliminated by the exercise o reasonable or even utmost care There needs to be a clear disncons between requiring a deendant to exercise a high degree o care when involved in potenally dangerous acvies and requiring a deendant to insure absolute saety o others while engaging in the acvity The use o rearms is a maer o common c ommon used and the harm comes rom misuse rather than rom their inherent nature 520 Factor (c) reasonable care could result in the reducon o risk The target pracce is o some social ulity (police ocers used the range) 520 Factor () social ulity The place where this was happening was the appropriate place 520 Factor (e) acvity in relaon to place Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Co. (598 P.2d 20) (Wyo. 1979) (pg. 437) o Facts The deendant employed a man who was given permission to leave work to deposit a check; on his way back to work the man was in a car accident and the plain's sued the man's employer (deendant) or damages associated with the accident 















































51

 

The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant The plain argued that the determinaon o whether or not the trip was in the scope o employment was a queson o act or the jury o Wyoming supreme court armed A reasonable mind would not nd the acvies o the accident to be under the scope o employment Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center (635 N.E.2d 331) (Ohio 1994) (pg. 561) o Facts The plain alleged a malpracce because o a ailure to diagnose a tumor and treat it The deendant doctor did not properly diagnose the ailment, did not perorm a biopsy and then altered medical records to try to cover their mistakes The jury brought a verdict or the plain and awarded compensatory and punive damages o $3 million o Ohio Supreme court held the punive damages excessive and ordered a remitur re mitur An intenonal alteraon, alsicaon or destrucon o medical records by a doctor, to avoid liability or his or her medical negligence, is sucient to show actual malice Punishment does not mean conscaon -- they are not meant to completely ruin the deendant Suggested $1 million in punive damages Mouse's Case (77 Eng. Rep. 1341) (1609) (pg. 106) 

















o

Facts

Man on a ship has his casket thrown overboard because o a storm and the ship will sink i it is not lightened o No liability is ound because all o the passengers were in danger and the preservaon o their lives is more valuable than Mouse's belongings o Law o Admiralty (general average) Compensaon can be sought rom those whose belongings were saved by Mouse's belongings being thrown overboard o Boat Overload I the erryman was negligent in overloading the cargo, he may be liable or damages Murphy v. Hobbs (5 P. 119) (Colo. 1884) (pg. 552) o Facts 







The plain is bringing acon to recover damages or malicious prosecuon and alse imprisonment The trial court ound in avor o the plain  The deendant appeals on the grounds o trial error The appeal court examines whether damages as punishment can be recovered in this type o case Court o appeals reversed The court considered several actors which may contribute to double jeopardy and unair punishment The ne awarded as punishment in the civil acon does not prevent indictment and prosecuon in a criminal court Evidence o punishment in a criminal c riminal suit is not admissible even as migaon o exemplary damages in a civil acon  



o







52

 

The court holds that there may be more juscaon j uscaon or punive damages i there was no criminal trial, but this would not necessarily change things There ought to be no disposion to take rom the deendant or give to the plain more than equity and jusce require When he is awarded pain and suering damages, lost earnings, etc. it seems excessive to allow awards to punish the deendant as well The unair rule allows... Torts unaccompanied by malice will consider only the actual injury to the person or property Torts accompanied by malice will consider the injury as well as exemplary damages The court accepts the deendants argument that the previous decision allowed or double prosecuon and punishment The compensatory damages essenally covers all the damages that the plain is entled to o This case was overruled 5 years later by the Colorado General Assembly and punive damages were re-allowed in cases o intenonal-like torts Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. (166 N.E. 173) (N.Y. 1929) (pg. 597) o Facts The plain chose to go on an amusement park aracon called "The Flopper" which consisted o a moving belt that was meant to cause people to lose their balance The plain ell and ractured his knee cap The trial court and court o appeals gave judgment to the plain  o Those judgments were reversed and a new trial was granted The court held that a all was one o the obviously oreseeable risks o the aracon The plain complained that the aracon was too dangerous and was not properly equipped to prevent injury to those who did not know o its dangers The court holds that because the risk o the all was obvious it was not negligent or it to exist They state it would have been dierent i the danger was unobservable or i there had been so many accidents like the plain's in the past to warrant a change The plain may have a claim i the padding to catch the alling people was inadequate and there was a concealed danger where it looked like there was padding Neal v. Neal (873 P.2d 871) (Idaho 1994) (pg. 24) o Facts A husband has an aair and his wie sues him or baery based on the argument that she would not have consented to sexual relaons with him i she had known about the aair o There would seem to be no liability because there were no condions to the consent I there was liability, it would open the ability o anyone to le a suit i they wanted to essenally withdraw their consent afer an incident Also, there is a deterrence raonale here in that i an aair is had that tthe he person can be held liable or baery 

















 

















Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries (882 P.2d 347) (Cal. 1994) (pg. 601) o Facts

53

 

Some employees o the deendant company negligently tried to unplug a valve which resulted in a leaking stream o ammable petroleum that the plain saety supervisors, as part o the re brigade, were supposed to clean up and when they did the petroleum ignited The trial court gave summary judgment to the deendants on assumpon o risk grounds o Supreme Court o Caliornia reversed A special rule does exist liming the duty o care the public owes to reghters and police ocers whose need or employment arises rom certain inevitable risks that threaten the public welare Fire is inevitable, but industrial accidents are not Because the saety employees in this case are privately employed, a third party lacks the relaonship that juses exonerang him or her rom the usual duty o care They are paid by their employer, but can sll collect rom a third party (here the maintenance company) who had nothing to do with paying or and providing those rescue services With a reghter and a police man taxes paid by the public essenally pay or the service provided and or immunity rom liability The person who is being rescued paid directly or the rescue services in this instance Newlin v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. (54 N.E.2d 929) (Mass. 1944) (pg. 285) o Facts The plain had a mushroom actory and the deendant company owned a telephone pole nearby; the telephone pole ell over and caused a loss o electricity in the plain's actory causing all the mushrooms to spoil The plain sued to recover the losses and claimed the telephone pole had been negligently maintained; deendant moved to dismiss the complaint o Held or the plain  The complaint stated a good cause o acon There was direct property damage in this case (ruined mushrooms) and thereore the claim o economic losses can be added New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad (264 F. 334) (2d Cir. 1920) (pg. 308) o Facts Plain's husband was the captain o a barge that was moored in a harbor; when the plain emerged rom the cabin to check things on the deck she saw that her husband husband was in the water (he did not know how to swim) and and then tried to etch a line to throw to him but was too late and he drowned Plain sued the owner o the barge claiming c laiming negligence on his part or ailing to provide liesaving liesaving equipment on the vessel Jury ound or the plain and the trial entered judgment on that o Court o appeals reversed The proximate cause o the decedent's death was alling into the water There is no evidence to show…. That the husband did not die because he could not swim That i there was a lie buoy on board it would have been successully used to save him A duty existed between the barge owner and the captain because there is a special employee/employer special contractual relaonship 







































54

 

There was a breach because the burden o having saety equipment on a ship is not high There was no causal link between this breach and the injury I the claim o negligence was or something like saety nets on the sides o the boat, then the cause- in-act issue is established, but the saety measure may have gone against customary saety procedures and thereore the duty duty would not h have ave been breached (analyze with the Hand ormula) I the plain had established the prima acie case and the suit turned to the deendant to assert a deense, then he may have made a claim o contri contributory butory negligence because the the captain could not swim 







1977 NYC Power Outage (pg. 275) o

o

A massive power outage lef 3 million Consolidated Edison customers without power or 25+ hours Food Pageant v. Con. Ed. (429 N.E.2d 738) (N.Y. 1981) (pg. 276) 

o

Deendant ound negligent in perming the blackout and was held liable to the plain or damages resulng rom spoiled ood and lost business caused by the blackout

Lilpan Food Corp. v. Con. Ed. (493 N.Y.S.2d 740) (Sup. Ct. 1985) (pg. 276)

Plain supermarket sued deendant to recover damages or loong o its store during the blackout but their claim was dismissed o In both cases there was a contract with the stores Disncon: the thrust o the plain claim in Food Pageant  was  was directed to the ailure to supply electricity to the market while the thrust o the t he claim in Lilpan was directed to the ailure to supply electricity to the city in general (street lights, trac lights) which contributed to the vandalism A duty is owed to the market directly, but cannot be owed to the city as a whole The cases need to be examined in the intent o the contract (providing electricity to run the store) not the other eects overall (the streets being dark and thereore allowing loong) Food Pageant : Contracted to provide electricity, which they did negligently and a oreseeable consequence resulted Lilpan: Contracted electricity o the store but their claim ocused on the electricity lost elsewhere which caused the loong (not a oreseeable consequence) Olin Corp. v. Smith (990 S.W.2d 789) (Tex. App. 1999) (pg. 539) o Facts The plain and a riend were hunng when driving in a truck and the plain opened re on a wild pig unl he heard a click rom his gun and he assumed it was empty The gun then discharged into his leg due to a deect which then had to be amputated A bench trial led to a verdict or the plain who was awarded $6 million+, with $5 million+ or "physical pain and mental anguish, disgurement and physical disability The deendant appealed, arguing that the damages were excessive o The court o appeals armed The plain was 16 at the me and had a lie expectancy o 55.8 more years and went through months o agony while the doctors aempted to save his leg He experienced blistering and phantom pain 























55

 

Opelt v. Al G. Barnes Co. (183 P. 241) (Cal. App. 1919) (pg. 405) o Facts The plain was scratched by a circus leopard when he deliberately crossed under a saety rope and put himsel within reach o the animal The trial court gave judgment to the deendant on the nding that the plain was injured solely because he willully w illully placed himsel within reach o the wild animal which he knew to be dangerous o Held or the deendant o I the leopard had been let out o its cage and injured a third party then there would likely be liability because there would be no assumpon o risk Ouellee v. Carde (612 A.2d 687) (R.I. 1992) (pg. 585) o Facts The deendant was working on his car when he was pinned under it and in the process o releasing himsel he caused a gas leak rom his car Upon escaping rom under the car he called his neighbor plain and while on the phone passed out so the plain came to help and revived him The two decided to leave the garage and when they opened the door the gasoline ignited 











The plain was negligent in creang the situaon while the deendant claimed that the claimed plain that was he negligent in her rescue aempts The trial court reused to allow the deendant to argued contributory negligence or or the jury to consider that o The Rhode Island Supreme Court armed One who voluntarily aempts to save a lie o another should not be barred rom recovery due to their own negligence The law and our society puts a high value on human lie The principles o comparave negligence only apply i a deendant establishes that the rescuer's acons were rash or reckless Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd; Wagon Mound (No. 1) (1961) (pg. 352) o Facts 









Deendants which accidentally which eventuallyowned led to aa ship re and severe propertydispersed damage oil throughout a plain's whar The trial judge ound that the re started when molten metal ell rom the plain's whar onto a rap which ignited the oil (the reason o oil is to burn) The judge also ound that the deendant did not know and could not reasonably be expected to have known that the oil could be set on re in the water The deendant was indeed negligent in allowing the oil to leak into the water and not cleaning it up, leaving a dormant danger The deendant could not have oreseen the harm that resulted, however The deendant's negligence was indeed the cause o the harm House o Lords grants appeal The court holds that the decision in Polemis is no longer good law 









o

 

Establishes the appropriate rule or causaon and proximate cause is reasonable oreseeability 56

 

Foreseeability is more important and air than directness A man must only be held responsible or the probable consequences o his act Negligence is judged by a reasonable man and thereore it is air and just that causaon be judged by reasonable oreseeability It is the oresight o the reasonable re asonable man which alone can determine responsibility Foreseeability replaces "directness" as the acceptable test I the re had been immediate as opposed to delayed the deendant would sll have been negligent The consequence o the spill is unoreseeable and it is irrelevant even i there is no temporal separaon Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship; Wagon Mound (No. 2) (1967) (pg. 355) o Facts Previous case acts, but the plain this me is the owner o a ship that was destroyed in the re Trial court gave judgment to the deendants o Privy Council reversed The court ound that the deendants would have regarded the oil as "very dicult to ignite in water" but not impossible (the harm was oreseeable) The plains in the rst case had to be concerned about the risk o the re being oreseeable because i it was they could have been held contributorily negligent or connuing work when the oil was in the water In this case however, the plains took no acons that could c ould have caused the re and thereore they did not need to be concerned about contributory negligence They were able to argue oreseeability ully without concern and the court accepted it The court held that it was clear that the reasonable man would have realized or oreseen and prevented the risk and thereore there must be liability Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. (162 N.E. 99) (N.Y. 1928) (pg. 378) o Facts Plain was on the plaorm o the deendant's railway when a train stopped at the staon and two men ran to catch it; one o the men made it onto the plaorm while the other jumped on but was unsteady so the guards tried to push and pull him onto the train The man was carrying a package which ell as he was pushed and pulled onto the train; the package, though it looked innocent, contained reworks which exploded when they ell The explosion caused a scale to all on the plain  The trial court and the appellate division gave judgment to the plain  o Court o Appeals reversed (minority approach to proximate causaon) The conduct o the guards was negligent in relaon to the t he man trying to board the train and was not negligent to the plain  The plain aempted to sue in her own right or a wrong to her personal sel, not as a beneciary o a breach o duty to the other man The cause o acon by the plain, even though they are ar away, must primary and original The duty in this case was owed to the passenger, not to Palsgra hersel  The plain ails to show an actual wrong to hersel  The reasonably oreseeable risk denes any duty that may be owed 































 













57

 

Negligence is not a tort unless it results in a wrong (intenonal v. unintenonal) I the harm was not willul then the plain must show that the act had obvious apparent dangers that warrant protecon despite no oreseeability Even i the package had been thrown intenonally then Palsgra would sll not have a claim because the explosion was not oreseeable ( Doughty ) Thereore, because they would not be liable or an intenonal act, then they would denitely not be liable or an unintenonal act The issue is that the rights that are said to have been violated are not o the same type The man experienced damage to his property when the package ell e ll The plain claims damage to her person The undamental dierence between a tort and a crime is that in a criminal case the "people" are the plain because the crime is against society (public at large) where in a tort case the individual is the plain because it is a harm to one person A tort harm to one person can not be thought o as a harm against the people The court emphasizes that because there is no duty owed there the re is no issue o causaon to even consider in this case I a duty was ound to be owed to the plain then liability would entail any and all consequences no maer how novel or extraordinary This may be subject to some discreon on a case by case basis The line is being drawn between who can bring a suit and who can not (who a duty is owed to not how vast the scope o that liability should be) Introduces the idea that a case brought by an unoreseeable plain should ail or want o a duty rather than or want o proximate cause The line needs to be drawn with who can bring a case c ase Dissent (majority approach to proximate causaon) Notes that everyone owes a reasonable duty o care to the world at large People owe a reasonable care to each other -- there is a public law aspect to torts This approach seems to state that the duty owed is presumed in many cases where there is an injury that results re sults rom an acon The issue should be proximate cause, not negligence There needs to be an emphasis on praccality and reasonable policy bounds Support or the judgment in  Polemis I the act is wrongul then the actor is liable or the proximate results Everyone owes the world a duty o not acng in a way that may unreasonably threaten saety Any damage must be connected to the negligence so that it can be the proximate cause The scope o the harm is immaterial The court should consider whether the harm resulted rom a natural and connual sequence that can be traced to the negligence In this case, the act was negligent and the plain's injuries were the proximate result o this negligence There was a direct connecon between the two events (no temporal or geographic separaon) 

























































58

 

The judgment should be armed (he most likely would have sent the case back to a jury to be re-evaluated re-evaluated as to whether the deendant's deendant's acons were the proximate cause -- he cannot decide this case as a maer o law) o Cardozo (ocus on duty, private acon) v. Andrews (ocus on proximate cause, public law) Cardozo's approach would limit the number o plain's while Andrews would let most all injured pares be plains and draw the lines within proximate cause Cardozo's approach makes it more likely that the result will be a queson o law or the  judge rather than a queson o act or the jury in Andrew's approach approach With Cardozo, less cases would reach the jury (it is more likely to reach a jury when the issue is ramed with proximate causaon) o Duty Palsgra was an invitee and is owed a duty by the railroad because o the duty owed by common carriers to their passengers o Breach The untaken precauon was the guards not taking proper care in geng the passenger onto the train or to stop him rom trying to jump on the train late Foreseeable damage to the package and to the passenger i care was not taken o Causaon Cause-in-act: but or the guard pushing the man onto the train, the package would not have allen and exploded and then caused the scale to all onto Palsgra  Proximate Cause: There is a direct sequence o events between betwee n the package alling and the injury to Palsgra but it is a very remote and unoreseeable consequence Is the type o harm similar because it is to a passenger or is it dierent because it was rom an explosion and not an impact (push or all)? There was a direct consequence and oreseeable or not does not maer (Polemis) Colonial Motor Lodge -- impact which led to an unoreseeable explosion Pegg v. Gray (82 S.E.2d 757) (N.C. 1945) (pg. 33) 33 ) o Facts The deendant was driving his dogs, in pursuit o oxes, onto another's land which in turn scared the mans cale and caused damage to his land The trial court nonsuited the plain  o The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed There would be no liability i the dogs were unprovoked; however, in this case, the dog's were intenonally sent with the knowledge that it was likely that they would cross property lines in pursuit o the game Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories (734 A.2d 1245) (N.J. 1999) (pg. 508) o Facts The plains were women who used a contracepve device that t hat is implanted under the skin; the women complained o un-warned side eects The contracepve device was widely adversed in a campaign directly targeted at women rather then at doctors and had no menon o the side eects The trial court dismissed the plain's complaint on the ground that the learned intermediary doctrine shielded the deendant rom liability 





































o

New Jersey Supreme Court reversed

59

 

The doctrine does not apply in cases where the manuacturer o a drug is alleged to have marketed it directly to consumers in a misleading ashion The dramac shif in pharmaceucal markeng to consumers is based in large part on signicant changes in the health-care system rom ee-or service to managed care The direct markeng o drugs to consumers generates a corresponding duty requiring manuacturers to warn o deects in the product The deendant is aorded the presumpve deense that they were complying with the FDA requirements in their adversing It is air to enorce the FDA's regulatory scheme by allowing paents who are deprived o reliable medical inormaon to establish that the misinormaon was a substanal actor contribung to their use o a deecve pharmaceucal product I the FDA regulaons must always be gone beyond, then these regulaons may not be enough and they may need to be changed c hanged and enhanced (should these requirements be the oor or the ceiling?) This is generally a queson o causaon when the manuacturer potenally argues that the doctor should have warned the paent when they wrote the prescripon Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju (723 N.Y.S.2d 28) (App. Div. 2001) (pg. 297) o Facts Plains underwent in vitro erlizaon at the deendant's clinic and the embryo they created was mistakenly implanted into another woman who subsequently gave birth to the child and then there was a court order needed nee ded to return the child to the biological parents Plains sued the clinic to recover or their emoonal distress Trial court held that the complaint stated a good cause o acon o Appellate division armed Plains seek damages or the emoonal harm caused by having been deprived o the pregnancy and birthing experiences Damages or emoonal harm can be recovered even in the t he absence o physical injury when there is a duty owed by the deendant to the plain (to properly care directly or them and implant the embryo in a direct procedure) and a breach o that duty resulted in the emoonal harm A plain must produce evidence sucient to guarantee the "genuineness o the claim" Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (887 F.Supp. 71) (E.D.N.Y 1995) (pg. 528) o Facts A bomb exploded on an airplane and caused it to crash, killing all the passengers It was decided that the plane company had commied willul misconduct in ailing to nd the bomb The plain's husband worked or BP and had several advanced degrees The jury awarded $9 million or lost earnings and $5 million or loss o society The deendant moved or a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was excessive o The district court denied the moon, the court o appeals armed The jury acted reasonably when considering the compensaon or top execuves at major corporaons similar to BP Peon of Kinsman Transit Co. (338 F.2d 708) (2d. Cir. 1964) (pg. 357) o Facts 





































60

 

A ship is moored to a dock when large chunks o ice in the water create pressure which eventually causes the post holding the ship to come loose; the ship oats downstream where it unmoors another ship and the two oat downstream together Eventually the two ships collide with a bridge and cause collapse o the bridge and damming o the river, ooding the bank or several miles Mulple cases were led rom various pares One party sued the original dock owner or negligently maintaining his post Trial court held or the plain that the post was not adequately maintained o Court o appeals armed The deendant was negligent because the boat was able to come ree and there is a lot o risk in a ree oang boat (any burden o maintaining the post is less than the potenal harm) The events were oreseeable and thereore the deendant was negligent Where damages resulted rom the same physical orces whose existence required re quired the exercise o greater care than was displayed and were o the same general sort that was expectable, unoreseeability o the exact developments and o the extent o the loss will not limit liability The deendant needs to be liable or all the harms that are o the same general sort o those that were oreseeable Takes into consideraon the extent o the harm (the actual extent may not have been oreseeable but the type o harm was) It is necessary to oresee the type o harm, not necessarily the extent o damage by that type o harm Peon of Trans-Pacic Fishing & Packing Co. (152 F.Supp. 44) (W.D. Wash. 1957) (pg. 237) o Facts Three men are thrown overboard during a rough me at sea The captain did not make an aempt to look or the crewmen cre wmen and only sent out a may day Two o the men were recovered rec overed with serious injuries and the third was never ound Plains sued the ship owner and operator or negligence o Trial court ound or the plain  There is an inherent duty o a ship owner or operator to assist or rescue any member o the crew (a special relaonship exists) The skipper and those aboard ailed to Use due care to make an eort to turn the boat around Keep the vessel in good working condion Cast a line to the men Throw any lie saving device to the men This provides incenve or ship owners to maintain their vessels His inacon caused urther harm to the plains Phoenix Professional Hockey Club, Inc. v. Hirmer (502 P.2d 164) (Ariz. 1972) (pg. 285) o Facts The plain owned a hockey team and hired a new goalie g oalie when his was injured in an accident caused by the negligence o the deendant The plain sued the deendant to recover the costs o hiring the new goalie o Held or the deendant The complaint ailed to state a good cause o acon 



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61

 

There was no physical injury to the plain and the goalie is not the hockey clubs property and thereore there is no claim on which the economic e conomic loss can be added Ploof v. Putnam (81 Vt. 471) (1908) (pg.97) o Facts Man and his amily dock the ship against a stranger's dock during a storm, the dock 



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servant unaached the boat and the ship was destroyed and the amily injured The owner's judgment was armed and cause remanded The plain is the one invoking the privilege in this case Under the circumstances the plain had the right to be on the property to protect his property and his amily The court states that the deendant can not expel the plain rom the property because o the privilege but the deendant has no armave acon requirement to help the plain reach the property 





Polmaer v. Russ (537 A.2d 468) (Conn. 1988) (pg. 5) o Facts A man shoots his ather in law and kills him and is then ound later in the woods in a 

stateA that appearsound to be "insane" (crying, naked, holding inant daughter) psychiatrist D to be suering rom schizophrenia Criminal trial: not guilty by reason re ason on insanity Civil trial: ound guilty The Conneccut Supreme Court Armed Reason o policy: incenve or the guardians o insane people to prevent these types o things rom happening (variaon on the idea o deterrence) Based on D's state o mind, he sll shot and killed someone, no maer who he thought that person was and what his reason was or doing so The court deems that everything is an act (unless it is purely reexive, convulsive or epilepc) and that a raonal choice is not a requirement or baery, just the intent to invade the interests o another (intenonal conduct) Though the deendant could not make a sane choice he could sll make an 





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insane choice and Center a choice(359 is a A.2d choice Pridham v. Cash and Carry Building 193) (N.H. 1976) (pg. 363) o Facts Plain is injured in the deendant's showroom when a worker negligently uned a rope that was securing vinyl panels, which then ell and landed on the plain  The plain was taken to an ambulance and on the way to the t he hospital the driver had a heart aack and drove into a tree, killing the plain  Plain won a jury verdict and the trial court entered judgment upon it The deendant appealed and contended that the jury had been improperly instructed o New Hampshire Supreme Court armed The jury was instructed correctly They were told that the law states that i a deendant is liable or the plains injuries then the is also liable or any addional harm that results rom the normal 











eorts o a third person in rendering aid

62

 

But or the inial negligence, the plain would not have been in the ambulance and would not have been harmed Purtle v. Shelton (474 S.W.2d 123) (Ark. 1971) (pg. 134) o Facts A 17 year old and a 16 year old are out hunng and the 17 year old shoots the 16 year old 





The jury aributesunder an equal sharethat o responsibility the accident to thei he plain and deendant the idea the deendantor would only be liable did not exercise the degree o care expected o someone at his age and his intelligence The plain appeals and contends that the court should have instructed the jury that the 17 year old was required to use the same degree o care that would be observed by an adult in the like circumstances Court o Appeals armed The standard is that is a minor is to be held to an adult standard o care he must be engaging in an acvity that is (a) dangerous to others (b) normally engaged in only by adults Hunng was not an acvity that is usually engaged in by adults only 

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This is standard is something or opinion not willing to set orth a legislature new rule to change and modiy and the majority Quill v. Trans World Airlines (361 N.W.2d 438) (Minn. 1985) (pg. 296) o Facts Plain is on an airplane that goes into a tailspin or about 40 second beore the pilots are able to recover the plane Plain alleged that, because he must travel ofen or work, that he now suered rom anxiety and other ailments when ying in a plane Trial court allowed the case to jury where the plain was awarded damages o Court o appeals armed There is most likely a duty o care between betwee n the plane and the passengers (pre-exisng contractual relaonship, duty owed to passengers by common carriers) There is not the concern o expanding the scope o liability indenitely 









Reina v.Facts Metropolitan Dade County (285 So. 2d 648) (Fla. App. 1973) (pg. 442) o

The plain was a passenger on the deendant's bus when he got into an argument about the are o the bus with the driver and urther conict when the bus driver did not stop at his stop; the driver eventually let the plain o and subsequently chased him down and beat him when he made an obscene gesture afer leaving the bus The trial court gave a directed verdict to the deendant o Florida court o appeals armed Richardson v. Ham (285 P.2d 269) (Cal. 1955) (pg. 375) o Facts A bulldozer was lef atop a mesa unlocked over night when two drunk men ound it and drove it around the mesa unl the abandoned it because they couldn't gure out how to stop it; the bulldozer drove down the side o the mesa and across a reeway, through a 





house and into an automobile beore it was stopped by a retaining wall and ulity pole

63

 

The plain's brought suit claiming that their damages were aributed to the negligent ailure o the deendant's to lock the bulldozer The trial judge granted the plain's moons or a new trial and the deendants appealed The unlocked bulldozer was a tantalizing opportunity or the drunk men and thereore the deendant was liable because they had created the opportunity or the 3rd party 



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The liable Rinehart v. Board ofdeendant Educaonwas (621ound N.E.2d 1365) (Ohio App. 1993) (pg. 115) o Facts A boy makes a rude comment about a teacher and the teacher whacks him with a paddle to punish him ollowing the school's policy; the boy and his parents sue or damages Ohio has a corporal punishment policy or schools "...may inict...reasonable corporal punishment upon a pupil...whenever such punishment is reasonably necessary in order to preserve discipline while such pupil is subject to school authority" Board o Educaon has a urther policy on corporal punishment in school Other methods o punishment had ailed The punishment could not be out o malice or anger No danger o physical injury 







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Only acceptable or o is with the approved paddle Another adult must bepunishment present Trial court gave summary judgment to the deendants  o Court o appeals armed The teacher had ollowed the policy or the punishment and thereore was within his bounds Riss v. City of New York (240 N.E.2d 860) (N.Y. 1968) (pg. 253) o Facts The plain ends a relaonship with a man who subsequently repeatedly threatens her i she will not come back to him; though she goes to the police mulple mes, she is awarded no protecon unl the man causes her permanent blindness and scarring The plain sues the city The trial court gave a directed verdict to the deendant 





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Court o Appeals armed The amount o protecon that can be aorded is limited to the resources o the community and is not or the judiciary to dole out Robb v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (210 A.2d 709) (Del. 1965) (pg. 291) o Facts Plains car became lodged on the deendants railroad tracks and she only narrowly escaped beore a train hit her car Plain suered no physical injuries but claimed to have suered "great right and nervous shock" The trial judge gave summary judgment to the deendant on the ground that the plain had claimed no physical impact ("impact rule"); plain appealed o Supreme Court reversed and remanded The plain was in the immediate zone o danger created by the deendant's negligence 











The court is not concerned with right that does not lead to physical injury or sickness or situaons in which the right arises rom the peril o another 64

 

There must be physical consequences as a result o the right Advances medical sciences allow a legimate diagnosis o emoonal distress The court determines that there is more support or rejecng the "impact rule" The court concludes that where negligence proximately caused right to someone within the zone o danger and that right results in physical ailments that would be similar or comparable to injuries as the result o physical contact that the injured party has the right to recover The plain should have the opportunity to present proo o her own physical injuries as a result o the emoonal distress she suered at the hands o the negligent deendant Here the plain claims that she is no longer able to nurse her child (physical consequence) Compensaon goals o the tort system need to take precedent over eciency and expediency Roberts v. Ring (173 N.S. 437) (Minn. 1919) (pg. 137) 1 37) o Facts An old man ran over a 7 year old boy who ran into the street o The jury brought a verdict or the deendant and the plain appealed 

















Held the or the that theojury was properly because they were told to consider ageplain and inrmies both thenot man and theinstructed c hild child The child does not know any beer and has not developed good judgment The old man, however, should know o his limitaons and his abilies in driving and the inrmies that he claims should only have stopped him rom driving a car Court should not say that the old man is not liable because he is old Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint (275 U.S. 303) (1927) (pg. 280) o Facts The plains chartered a steamboat and as part o their agreement agree ment with the boat owners it was cleaned every 6 months During a cleaning a crack was ound in the propeller and the boat owners hired the deendant company to install a replacement but one o the deendant's employees negligently dropped and cracked the new propeller causing the boat to be in dry dock or an 









addional two week while a new propeller was to cast The plains sued the deendant company collect the losses they incurred while in dry dock The district court gave judgment to the plains and the court o appeals armed United States Supreme Court reversed The issue is whether the respondents (Flints, plain) have an interest protected by the law (under their contract) against unintended injuries inicted on their chartered vessel by third persons Jusce does not permit that the peoner be charged with the ull value o the loss o use unless there is someone who has a claim to it against the peoner The respondents have no claim The respondents can not recover on the grounds that i someone else recovered, they would get part o that





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The deendant would be liable to the owners o the boat because there t here was physical damage to their property The plains did not own any o the property that was damaged 

65

 

"The injury to the propeller was no wrong to the respondents but only to those to whom it belonged" The general noon is that a plain who suers no physical injury generally cannot recover or pure economic losses caused by deendants negligence Rodi Yachts v. Naonal Marine (948 F.2d 880) (7th Cir. 1993) (pg. 162) o Facts 





A barge lashed a dock Naonal Marine and should unloaded by TDI but and beore it is itisslips reetorom theby dock and damages other ships.be Naonal Marine is sued impleads TDI. Trial court nds Naonal Marine 2/3 responsible and TDI 1/3 responsible The deendants appealed, each claiming the other was solely at ault Court reversed and remanded The relevant customs are how the ropes should be ed and how ofen the barge should be checked once it is ed (The queson is not whether the deendants were negligent and liable to the deendant (they were and are), it is which o the deendants is liable or what part o the damages) Posner Custom should be determinave when there is not potenal or contractual relaons





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I there is a potenal contractual relaonship, customs should determine the outcome A contractual relaonship exists because they have a oreseeable relaonship with each other in the present situaon (related through third party customers) People who should unload the boat, people who should be watching the ship, people who lashed the ship to the dock, etc… What has happened is beyond the scope o the contract but the act that the pares have a contractual relaonship with each other should inuence how the case is viewed rom a torts t orts perspecve I there is no potenal contractual relaonship, customs shouldn't be the standard Third pares who were not at all involved in the situaon prior to damages (plain barge damaged by deendant's negligence) Both collecvely ace third party customers and i the two groups work together eciently than they will create customs to help avoid damages which represent the ecient allocaon o the risks The Roman Prince (275 F. 712) (S.D.N.Y 1921) (pg. 373) o Facts The plain was on a barge that was struck by the deendant's boat and began to leak The plain did not think the ship would sink so stayed aboard unl realizing that the ship was actually sinking and then tried to climb rom one boat to the other and injured her knee o The trial court gave judgment to the deendant The collision between the two ships was not the proximate cause o the injury 

















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The stumble plain chose to ault stay aboard the ship and aferthere the collision The was the o the plains was plenty o me to deliberate leaving the ship and to take due care in doing do 66

 

This me to deliberate makes it dierent than  Sco (Squib) because the plain was not acng out o compulsive necessity (she is her own superseding cause in this instance) Rowland v. Chrisan (443 P.2d 561) (Cal. 1968) (pg. 267) o Facts Plain cut his hand on a aucet in the deendant's bathroom; the deendant knew the 



aucet broken and had not theinplain o the Thewas deendant claimed thatwarned the crack the aucet thatdanger caused the injury was obvious and that the plain was aware o it because he had used the bathroom beore Trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant on the grounds that the plain was a licensee Caliornia Supreme Court reversed Landmark decision that the tradional disncons between dues owed to trespassers, licensees and invitees had become obsolete Classicaon as a trespasser, licensee or invitee does not ofen reect the major actors o a case that should determine whether immunity should be given to a deendant The actors that should be considered are not necessarily related to the plain's status The court concluded that a man's saety does not become less valuable based on his 



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status on the depending onparcular this statusland and that reasonable people to not vary their conduct To ocus on status in terms o determining duty o care is contrary to modern social mores and humanitarian values The proper test to be applied, under secon 1714 o the Civil Code, is whether in the management o his property the deendant has has acted as a reasonable man in view o the probability o injury to others Although the status o the plain on the property may have some eect eec t on liability, it is not determinave Under the present case, the court c ourt concludes that the deendant was aware o the risk and ailed to remedy it or warn the plain that they were in danger When a deendant is aware o a hidden danger on their land and ails to warn the plain o it, they are negligent 











A plain should be ableprecauons to rely on warnings o risk romlikely a takes) deendants so that theyreasonably may take special (like the deendant to avoid harm Roth v. First Naonal State Bank of New Jersey (404 A.2d 1182) (N.J. App. 1979) (pg. 441) o Facts The plain ran a check-cashing business and rounely went to the bank every morning to cash checks; one day he was robbed because one o the bank tellers told her boyriend o  the acvity o the plain and he pped o the robbers The trial court gave summary judgment to the bank on the ground that the teller had not been acng within the scope o her employment o Court o appeals armed In examinaon o the restatement the court notes that the teller had no apparent connecon with her dues at the bank when she commied the torous act 









She potenally was also not involved in the transacons the plain  A claim sll exists or negligent hiring, but with the strict liability o the employer does not t 67

 

Rufo v. Simpson (103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492) (Cal. App. 2001) o Facts The deendant was prosecuted and acquied o a stabbing murder in criminal court The deendant was then convicted in a civil suit Based on the esmated net worth o the t he deendant the court awarded $12.5 in compensatory and $25 million in punive damages 

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The appealed by claiming the award was excessive The court o deendant appeals armed The proper level o punive damages is an amount not so low that the deendant can absorb it with lile no discomort, nor so high that it destroys, annihilates, or cripples the deendant To review the damages, they should consider The reprehensibility o the deendant's conduct The actual harm suered by the vicms The wealth o the deendant The deendant's conduct was outrageous, thereore making the damages jused Ryan v. Towar (87 N.W. 644) (Mich. 1901) (pg. 259) o Facts A company owned a water wheel which was enclosed in a pump house; children made a o





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hole ingirl thewho pump wall and played on theand wheel young gothouse caught between the wheel the which pit subsequently caused injury to a Trial court gave directed verdict to the deendant Michigan Supreme Court armed The current remedy or dealing with trespassing children is inadequate The burden would be too high or the company to put more eort into enclosing the pump house Second Restatement 339 The plain would need to show that the deendant Knew there would be children on the property Know that a risk or danger existed Know that because they are children they would not recognize the risk Would not take on the appropriate burden to prevent the harm



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this case, the deendant that they did take on burden o In enclosing the water wheel can and argue that any urther burden is the disproporonate to any risk that exists to children Failed to exercise reasonable care Sanderson v. Internaonal Flavors and Fragrances, Fragrances, Inc. (950 F. Supp. 981) (C.D. Cal. 1996) (pg. 343) o Facts Plain alleges that the scents and her exposure to the aldehydes in them caused serious injury to her including brain damage and sense o smell damage The plain asked the court to apply the market share theory in determining liability o Summary judgment to the deendants A plain cannot shif the causaon burden to deendants The plain was not injured by a ungible product made by many dierent manuacturers 











thedamage products to disnguish which product Because caused the is were sll innot theungible hands othe theability deendants 68

 

The plain has not joined a substanal share o the market There must be a substanal chance that one o the deendants caused the harm to the plain  The larger the poron o the market the t he plain joins, the smaller the chance o error in liability Schuster v. City of New York (154 N.E.2d 534) (N.Y. 1958) (pg. 253) 





o

Facts 





A man provided inormaon to the police which aided in the capture o a well-known criminal; the man's assistance to the police was widely televised and he subsequently began receiving threats on his lie The police did not take the treats seriously and aorded no protecon to the man and he was eventually murdered The plain's estate sued, alleging That the city had a duty to protect people who had cooperated in law enorcement eorts That the city ailed to exercise reasonable care in not supplying protecon to the man That the death o the man was due to the t he city's negligence in recklessly exposing him to the danger 







trial court dismissed the complaint Court oThe Appeals reversed The city owes a special duty to use reasonable care or the protecon o person who have collaborated with it once reasonable dangers appear The public authories made acve use o a private cizen Even i the police do not solicit the help o the cizen's, c izen's, there may be an argument that the police were sll acvely using the cizens c izens Sco v. Shepard (K.B. 1773) (pg. 372) o Facts A recracker was thrown into a crowded market and then tossed around unl it blew up and took out the plain's eye o The important queson was whether the plain had stated a good claim or trespass or whether the claim should have been brought as an acon or trespass "on the case" c ase" o











The court thatathe plainbetween had a good trespass There is noheld longer disncon trespass andclaim case but this case (the squib case) is precedenal in terms o proximate causaon Because the third party acts were not the acts o a ree agent but o people who were acng under compulsive necessity or their own well-being their intervenon does not eliminate liability or the deendant Segler v. Steven Brothers Inc. (222 Cal. App. 3d 1585) (1990) (pg. 177) o Facts A store owner opens his store each day and cleans the lef behind dog poop that has accumulated over night; on this day the store owner did not get around to cleaning the sidewalk and a woman walking by slipped and ell The woman sues the store owner or not keeping ke eping his sidewalk clean as is required under city law 









o

The trial court nds or the plain  Court o Appeals reversed 69

 

 

Evidence against the deendant was insucient as a maer o law The jury was instructed that i they ound that the store owner did not keep his sidewalk clean, like the statute says, then he should be ound negligent per se This was incorrect The ordinance was not meant to create a standard o care owed to the public, but to the city 





intent o the statute wasaesthec not to protect the public, but to make the businessThe owner liable to the city or reasons

Sellers and Non-Sellers o Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. (364 N.E.2d 502) (Ill. App. 1977) (pg. 477 477)) 



o

The plain was pushing a shopping cart in the deendant's grocery store when the cart inexplicably pped over; she was hurt when she tried to stop it rom overturning and sued on a theory o strict products liability claiming that the cart was deecve No strict liability -- the grocery store is not in the business o selling or renng shopping carts, rather they just oer them as a convenience (the store was a user o the carts just like their customers and the customer could pursue a strict liability claim against the manuacturer or a negligence claim against the store)

Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. (329 N.E.2d 785) 785 ) (Ill. 1975) (pg. 477)

The plain's decedent was killed when she was run over by an automobile that had





o

been purchasedonrom the deendant's used-car dealership; the plain brought suitrom against the dealership theories o strict products liability, alleging the accident resulted various deects in the car's brakes that were present when the car lef the dealer's control No strict liability -- one o the raonale or liability on wholesalers and retailers is to put pressure on them to choose a good manuacturer but since the car was used there was an intervening person and there was no allegaon that the deect came rom the manuacturer (once the car came into the control o the original customer the chain o distribuon was completed)

Nung v. Ford Motor Co. (584 N.Y.S.2d 653) (App. Div. 1992) (pg. 477) 

HP computer makes annually bought thousands o cars or its employees to use then auconed them o a couple o year later; the plain bought one o the cars at aucon then was injured when it stalled on the highway and sued HP on the theory o strict products liability



liability -- HP o regularly buys and aucons o cars and thereore makes it soStrict that the incenve good business exists; the third restatement saysthis thatliability the business does not need to be the primary business i it goes beyond the casual occasional sale (HP sells computers primarily but they also aucon these cars on a regular basis) Siegler v. Kuhlman (502 P.2d 1181) (Wash. 1973) (pg. 426) o Facts The deendant's driver was transporng a truckload o gasoline and even though he perormed all the necessary saety checks the trailer came c ame loose on the highway and ell to another street where the plain drove over some spilled gasoline which subsequently ignited and killed her o Washington Supreme Court held the deendant strictly liable Gasoline develops even greater dangerous qualies when it is carried as reight Gasoline is highly likely to cause re or explosion which would likely destroy 





evidence o any negligence

70

 

I the plain can not rely on strict liability they must move to negligence but i all the evidence was destroyed then the plain would not be able to show negligence The hazards to third persons are so great as to be almost beyond calculaon The transportaon o gasoline in large quanes creates dangers that cannot be eliminated by the exercise o reasonable care 







The act thatbetween this is the only way to American transport Cyanamid  gasoline is is The dierence here this case and  isirrelevant that the transporter is the actual deendant in this case (although it is suggested that it may have not made a dierence) 520 Factor (c) -- in this case the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise o due care The deendant took all necessary saety checks but the incident sll occurred In this case, there is one single party that was obviously negligent (in  American Cyanamid  there  there may have been mulple pares that were w ere negligent) 520 Factor (b) -- there was a death in this incident (magnitude o harm) Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories (607 P.2d 924) (Cal. 1980) (pg. 336) o Facts 











Plains were as aoresult o a drug administered to their mothers during pregnancy with theinjured intenon prevenng miscarriages Daughters o the mothers who took the medicine have vaginal and cervical tumor issues The deendant companies were aware o the risks o the drugs as experimental medicine and did not properly label the drugs, adequately warn doctors who would prescribe the drugs, or ollow FDA regulaons concerning the drugs It is taken as a maer o act that the deendants should have known (or knew) that the drug was a carcinogenic substance Deendants demurred to the complaint stang that the plain was unable to make the idencaon o which deendant had caused her injury and thereore there could be no liability There is not an issue o duty or breach, rather a duty o causaon 











o

The trial court dismissed Caliornia supreme court reversedthe acon Plain places primary reliance on the cases dealing with alternave liability that hold that is a party cannot ideny which o two or more deendants caused an injury, the burden o proo may shif to the deendants to show that they were not responsible (Summers) This case diers rom Summers because there is a signicant chance that none o the deendants were the ones whose negligence caused c aused the injury Though the collecve deendants did represent a majority o the market Neither the plain nor the deendant is in a notably beer posion to ideny the actor whose negligence caused the harm The absence o evidence is not the ault o the deendants, but rather rom the passage o me The court establishes that under the raonale o   the deendant does  Summers not necessarily need to have greater access to inormaon regarding causaon 











71

 



Advances is science and technology create ungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specic producer There needs to be a remedy to harms caused by the changing mes The court holds that the proper soluon is to measure the likelihood that any o the deendants supplied the product which allegedly injured the plain by percentage which the company sold verses the enre producon sold by the industry industry 







Each deendant willobe held liableunless or the o the represented by its share the market it proporon demonstrates thatjudgment it could not have made the product that injured the deendant (burden shifs to the deendant) Deendants argue that to hold them responsible is unair and contrary to public policy because there is an absence o proo as to which one caused the injury Court argues that it is air because the liability will be directly proporonal to the damages caused by each deendant The court extends the theory o alternave liability to market share liability A modicaon o the rule in Summers is warranted because this involves ungible goods which can not possibly be traced to any specic producer (through no ault o either party) so there must be some way to give relie in cases like this Dissent There is an essenal e ssenal unairness in holding only a small number o deendants, in 









this case 5, responsible orindustry the acons an enre industry It hurts the as a o whole (chilling eect) 

There is an issue with plains who have the ability to sue or not I other states do not adopt this policy then the companies in the states that do will need to take responsibility or the enre market The deendant's wealth and ability to pay damages should play no part in a decision (deep-pocket theory o liability) Smith v. Cuer Biological, Inc. (823 P.2d 717) (Haw. 1991) (pg. 343) o Facts Plain, a hemophiliac, received mulple blood transusions and claims to have contracted HIV/AIDS as a result o the blood manuacturers negligence in ailing to screen donors and warn recipients Plain asserts his claim under market share theory o liability 









o

The court allowed market-share liability The product is not necessarily as ungible as it has been required to be in other cases The plain does ideny the enrety o the market as deendants There is a strong deterrence incenve The court ound that general state tort law would allow the acon and recognized the market-share theory o recovery to supply causaon with modicaons Since the court was aced with a minimal number o manuacturers, it believed that the culpability or markeng the product was the beer policy and advocated several liability, holding a parcular deendant only liable or its market share Smith v. Pelah, Hilary Term (20 Geo. 2) (pg. 402) o A dog had previously bien someone and was kept anyway and when the dog was upset again in the uture it bit another person -- the deendant was strictly liable or the dogs second bite The animal which was originally mansuetae naturae had exhibited violent tendencies 











and thereore could not longerinbe harmless The harm caused theconsidered uture must be o the same type as the violence 

exhibited in the past 72

 

Many states have replaced the common law approach with animal control statutes that hold a dog owner strictly liable or any bites a dog inicts, regardless o the dog's past record or reputaon Soldano v. O'Daniels (141 Cal. App. 3d 443) (1983) (pg. 225) o Facts Deendant owns two businesses and an employee o one o his establishments is told by o



a man that the plain's relave was being threatened in the other establishment The man asked to use the phone but was denied by the employee and the employee reused to call or help; the plains relave was subsequently shot and killed The plain brought suit against the owner o the two businesses The trial court dismissed the complain o Court o Appeals reversed The use o a telephone in a public part o a business should not be reused or a legimate emergency call No innocent cizens would impose any risk The stranger's asseron o an emergency would not create a duty unless it was clear that there was an imminent danger Stangle v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. (198 Cal. App. 3d 971) (1988) (pg. 225) o Facts 













Plain purchases a diamond ring with the intent to sell it or prot and asks a ormer girlriend to do so or him She nds a buyer or the ring and meets him at his "oce" to make the transacon; the man disappears with the ring While the thef is in progress, the ormer girlriend aempts to use the buildings phone to contact the police but was stopped by the receponist; rece ponist; when the police are nally reached it is too late Plain sues on the theory that the deendant had a duty, afer being inormed that a thef was in progress, to make its telephone available Trial granted the deendant a directed verdict Court o Appeals armed There is a disncon between a public business and a private business area There is a dierence between the t he value o a human lie and a material object 







o

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Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp. (421 F.2d 1169) (2d. Cir. 1970) (pg. 362) o Facts The plains and deendants were in a car accident together at the ault o the deendants Though there were no inial bodily injuries, one plain passenger began to exhibit psychoc reacons and was soon afer diagnosed with schizophrenia The doctor determined that she had a "prepsychoc" personality and that the accident caused her psychosis Injured party and her parents sued or damages associated with her condion o Liability ound "eggshell skull" plain -- the deendant has to take the plain as they are 









73

 



The psychoc tendencies were a pre-exisng condion o the plain and thereore because the deendant's acons led to the exacerbaon exace rbaon o this condion there is liability There may be adjustment or damages under the consideraon that the plain would most likely have developed the psychoc tendency with or without the accident 

Struve v.Facts Droge (62 How. Pr. 233) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1881) (pg. 108) o

An apartment owner noced smoke coming rom the apartment o a tenant and broke in to invesgate and potenally stop the re; the smoke had a dierent source and the property was damaged in the process o the apartment owner coming c oming in Trial court gave judgment to the deendant o The court o appeals reversed Because there was no actual public necessity the deendant is liable It does not maer to the court that it was a reasonable mistake or that there was no actual intent to perpetrate a wrong Sullivan v. Dunham (55 N.E. 913) (N.Y. 1900) (pg. 428) o Facts The deendants were using explosives to remove a tree and one blast sent a secon o 









stump ying onto a highway which then struck the plain and killed her The trial court instructed the jury that the plain did not have to show negligence on the deendants' part in order to recover rom them The jury returned verdict or the plain  o The court o appeals held the evidence sucient to support the outcome This consequence is a reasonable expectable one -- the kind o harm is the same type that makes the acvity dangerous (restatement secon 519) Summers v. Tice (199 P.2d 1) (Cal. 1948) (pg. 332) o Facts Plain and both deendants were quail hunng when an errant shot by one o the deendants struck the plain in the ace The trial court ound that the deendants had been negligent in ring in the plain's direcon and entered judgment against both o them 











o

The deendants appealed on the ground that the plain ailed to prove which o them red the shot that hit him Court o appeals armed Both deendants were negligent toward the plain and brought about the situaon where the negligence o one o them caused the injury The burden thereore lies with the deendants to absolve themselves i they can The deendants are in a ar beer posion to oer evidence to determine which one caused the injury (analogous to Ybarra) Prevents two negligent deendants rom poinng the nger at each other and escaping liability The plain would need to argue that the tradional rules o causaon in terms o negligence do not apply (plain unable to know needed inormaon) and thereore a case o alternave liability exists 











I it were to come c ome out that one deendant's bullet was certainly the one to cause the injury, the prima acie case would all apart because the causaon necessity o negligence 74

 

would be lost (though the deendant was negligent, his negligence did not cause injury to the plain) It may be sae to say that, on average, a person who causes injury with their negligence is more reckless than someone who causes no injury with their negligence Surocco v. Geary (3 Cal. 70) (1853) (pg. 107) o Facts 



The mayor o San Francisco orders a house to be destroyed in order to stop a spreading wild re; the amily claims they should have had more me to get their belongings out Trial court gave judgment to the plains o Caliornia Supreme Court reversed Public necessity is invoked in this case The plains were as much beneted rom the acons as everyone e veryone else "The right to destroy property, to prevent the spread o [disaster], has been traced to the highest law o necessity" Taraso v. Regents of The University of California (551 P.2d 334) (Cal. 1976) (pg. 243) o Facts The plain's daughter was murdered by a psychiatric paent who had disclosed to his psychotherapist his plans or the killing The killer was detained or a short me by the police, then released when he seemed 











mentally stable The plains sue the police or ailure to detain the man and the psychotherapist or ailure to warn the vicm or her amily The plains argue that both pares had a duty to warn them Trial court dismissed the plains complaints Court o Appeals reversed in part and armed in part Armed that the police were in no way liable because there was no individualized special relaonship between them and the vicm or them and the killer (no special relaonship = no duty) The police have a duty to the general public, no to specic individuals The police do not have the special skills o a therapist to determine when psycho threats are legimate or not Reversed and stated that the psychotherapist was liable because o the special







o









relaonship that existed between him and the killer (special relaonship = duty) There is an excepon to the "no duty" rule where a special relaonship exists The therapist ailed to exercise "that reasonable degree o skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members o [that proession] under similar circumstances" Reerence to custom The court nds that the right to "protecve privilege (paent/doctor condenality) ends where public peril begins" There is no sucient interest in not warning the vicm or her amily This precedent creates a disincenve…. For paents to ully divulge homicidal thoughts to their therapists in ear o their therapists telling others For doctors to take on paents who are psychopathic 















Tedla v. Ellman (19 N.E.2d 987) (N.Y. 1939) (pg. 173) o Facts

75

 



 

A man and his sister are walking along the side o a highway with no ootpaths carrying a lantern at dark; the two are struck by a care driving on the highway and the man is killed, his sister injured The sister brings suit against the driver o the car The deendant claims that the brother and sister were walking along the wrong side o the road or the direcon they were headed in and thus were violang a state law 

Thethey plains road that wereclaim on that it was saer because o trac to be on the side o the The trial court ound the deendant liable due to his negligence; he appealed, saying that, as a maer o law, the brother and sister should have been negligent as well o Court o Appeals armed Though there was a law in place, it can not be construed so strictly that to ollow it a person would need to put themselves into more danger than i they were to break it The law was meant to protect people and thereore should be allowed some leniency when the breakers o the law are just trying to protect themselves Texas Midland v. Geraldon (128 S.W. 611) (Tex. 1910) (pg. 103) o Facts A man and his amily miss the train and want to stay at the staon overnight to wait or the next train because o a storm; the train staon aendant orces the amily to leave 







despite the act that the man explains that his wie's health will be compromised i she is orced into the rain; she becomes ill and they blame the train staon The trial jury ound or the plain  Texas Supreme Court armed Because the court can reasonably iner rom the trial courts c ourts judgment that the deendant knew o the wie's condion and that the weather was bad enough to exacerbate this condion, it was essenally unlawul or him to orce her out into the rain Ploof  Analogy  Analogy In both cases the plains claim the private necessity to be there and because they were deliberately expelled by the deendant the deendant is liable or subsequent damages Vincent  Analogy  Analogy I the amily sought reuge in the train staon and the staon incurs expenses to keep them there out o their necessity then the amily would owe the cost o the expenses to the



o



o



o



train staon Theisen v. Milwaukee Automobile (118 N.W.2d 140) (Wis. 1963) (pg. 188) o Facts Male high school student is driving home ve emale students when he alls asleep at the wheel and, despite the calls o the girls to try to wake him, he veers o the road and hits a tree stump, causing injury to the plain  o Wisconsin Supreme Court ound the driver (deendant) negligent per se Failing to heed to the bodies signs o sleep and ignoring those signs while driving a car must be negligent as a maer o law The occurrence o sleep should have been reasonably oreseen An outside orce causing the deendant to all asleep would be dierent and unoreseeable (i.e. seizure) o Analogy to Marn v. Herzog (buggy with no lights) 









The acons o the deendant are never sae, thereore there is no saety trade-o that makes the acon ok

76

 

Thompson v. County of Alameda (614 P.2d 728) (Cal. 1980) (pg. 246) o Facts A juvenile oender, who has made previous threats that i released he will murder a child and has a criminal history involving violence toward children, is released and subsequently murders a young boy within 24 hours o his release The vicms parents (plain's) le suit against the county alleging that they owed a duty 



to the community to warn the parents o young children that the juvenile oender was being released The trial court dismissed o Supreme Court armed No special relaonship exists in this case (the vicm was not a named vicm) A warning would not have been helpul in this situaon because it would either cause panic or not have been taken as seriously when given to a broad secon o the community Warnings o this sort would also hinder the rehabilitaon and parole processes Thompson v. White (149 So. 2d 797) (Ala. 1963) (pg. 373) o Facts Plain was injured when the deendant's car ran into hers Clowns were perorming at a roadside gas staon and had caused a mild distracon to the plain so she also sued the Gul gas staon or distracng the deendant 













The trial court brought verdict against the deendant driver (White) but sustained a demurrer to the plain's complaint against Gul  o The Alabama Supreme court reversed the judgment involving Gul and remanded The acvity o the clowns naturally distracted the deendant driver because evidence reasonably supports that i the plain was distracted then so was the deendant White was not a ree agent but acng under the inuence o the clowns ( Sco (Squib) acng under a third party inuence) White's negligence was a concurring cause o the accident acc ident and not an independent intervening cause which would insulate Gul rom liability Tingle v. Chicago (14 N.W. 320) (Iowa 1882) (pg. 175) o Facts The deendants train hits the plain's cow on a Sunday Plain sues because operaon o a train on a Sunday is prohibited by law (not or 





 

negligence) Trial court gave judgment or the plain  Supreme Court reversed The accident was not the result o the deendants negligence (there was no negligence) in operaon o the train and resulted rom a situaon or which he was not responsible and thereore he is not liable Acng illegally does not necessarily create a tort case or negligence



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T.J. Hooper (60 F.2d 737) (2d Cir. 1932) (pg. 159) o Facts Two tugboats towing barges lost them in a storm because they were unaware o the impending weather because o unworking radios on the tugboats Trial court ound the tugboats "unseaworthy" (meaning the deendants were negligent) 



Deendants argue that it is not customary to have radios on tugboats Court o appeals armed



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77

 



The court responds that "there are precauons so imperave that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission" Even i it is not custom to have a radio, it is so necessary to have one that custom is disregarded Because some tugs have radios and deemed it necessary those tugs are right and the others standards are too slack 



 

Hand Formula Cost o equipping boats with radios is less than the cost o damages as the result

o the storm, then the radios need to be there or there is negligence Customs are a good starng point because they have historical basis They reveal what the pares close to the situaon have already come up with on their own (what has been developed by those who are most amiliar with the situaon) Customs can not be the standard because i one just adheres to custom there is no incenve or innovaon Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (174 N.E. 441) (N.Y. 1931) (pg. 278) o Facts Stern hired the deendants, an accounng rm, to prepare and cery a balance sheet or the condion o their business; the deendants presented Stern with a balance sheet 







that they knew they would reerence in their borrowing and other nancial dealings The plain made loans to Stern in reliance on the balance sheet prepared by the deendants; Stern was in act insolvent and could not pay back the loans The deendant negligently has ailed to discover that Stern had doctored its books The jury returned verdict or the plain; deendants appealed Appellate court reversed They held that the trial court should have dismissed the negligence count I negligence were to exist it would expose accountants to a liability in an unknown amount or an unknown me to an unknown class Unlike Glanzer , this preparaon o inormaon was not primarily or a third party It was primarily or use by Stern in its business development and was only collaterally or the use o those who Stern did dealings with (the privity was with Stern, not the others)



 

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The deendants could not not reasonably predict the scope o their liability i they were negligent (they could reasonably oresee who the potenal plains would be) More like H.R.Moch  than Glanzer  I there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere proession o an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability or negligence is one that is bounded by the contract and is to be enorced between the pares by whom the contract was made The pares could have gone beyond the deault rules o tort law and contract new rules that will deal with oreseeable risk (deendants could explicitly state no liability to avoid suit like this while the plains could impose liability in the contract) United States v. Carroll Towing Co. (159 F.2d 169) (2d Cir. 1947) (pg. 140) o Facts A barge is chartered to a company (bargee included) and then ed to the end o a pier. 







A tug came by and needed to une the barge to get by, so they (harbor master) did so and did not e it back up properly. The barge oated away rom the dock and ended up sinking. The bargee was not on board at the me o the sinking

78

 

The tug boat crew is ound negligent or not properly retying re tying the boat and they are parally responsible or the damages Appellate court is deciding whether the bargee being absent rom the barge is negligent as well (determine that he is indeed) Hand Formula Applied (Bargee) P = probability the boat will break away 

o







Higher because it is NY harbor during WWII so it is very busy L = gravity o the resulng injuries The barge and all its cargo sinks B = burden o adequate precauons (requiring the bargee to be present) The bargee was absent or 21 hours, some o those being the work day, so he is negligent because he should have been there during working hours Hand Formula Applied (Harbor Master) Only dierence B = the me it would take to ree the boat properly United States v. Lawter (219 F.2d 559) (5th Cir. 1955) (pg. 231) o Facts The plain and his wie are boang when their ship sinks; they are stuck in the water (4 eet deep with strong waves) with no boats nearby to help them 

















They are spoed by a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter on patrol and an aempted rescue ensues A crew member lowers a cable and retracts it beore the plain's wie can secure hersel in the harness; she is raised to the point o the helicopter but alls beore she can be brought into the vessel; she dies rom the all The plain sues the U.S. claiming that his wie's death was due to their negligence in allowing the man to operate the cable when he clearly c learly was not qualied to do so The district court brought verdict or the plain  The deendant appealed, stang that the complaint did not state a good cause o acon Court o Appeals armed The Coast Guard place the deceased in a worse posion than she was originally in and negligently caused her death When they voluntarily aempted rescue they took on a duty o care not to 



 

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make her dangers worse Once responsibility or rescue it assumed, it must be done with due care Van Alstyne v. Rochester Telephone Corp (296 N.Y.S. 726) (City Ct. 1937) (pg. 36) o Facts The deendant lef lead droppings on the land that they had consent to be on in order to do work, but the lead droppings lef behind cause the plains dog's to die The plain sued on a count o negligence but it was dismissed because the consequence (that the dog would eat the lead) was unoreseeable The plain also sued on a count o trespass which the court ound or in avor o the plain  o The workers were ound to have essenally trespassed when they lef behind the lead There was consent or the company to be on the land to repair the wire, but not to leave dangerous lead droppings behind 











The deendants exceeded the scope o the consent

79

 

They became intruder's and liable or the consequence whether the results could or should reasonably have been oreseen Van Vacter v. Hierholzer (865 S.W.2d 355) (Mo. App. 1993) (pg. 586) o Facts The plain ignored his doctors orders to change his liestyle to improve his heart, did not take his prescribed medicaon and did not visit the doctor when he was told to t o do so 





The plain went to the doctor complaining o chest pains, was sent home as ok and died a ew hours later Plain's wie sued the doctor claiming she was negligent in sending her husband home The deendant asked that the jury be instructed that it could reduce any recovery or the plain by the extent to which the plain's death was caused by his own negligent ailure to ollow the instrucons o his doctor or several years The jury was instructed in this way and said that the deendant was negligent but that the death o the plain was caused by 93% his own negligence and thus no damages were rewarded Plain argued that the jury should not have been instructed to consider comparave negligence The court o appeals reversed and remanded The court agreed and held that although the decedent had a nonchalant atude about

 





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his health, this indierence and consequent inacon was not the signicant and legal proximate cause o the decedent's death -- the proximate cause o his death was the doctor sending him home home when he should not have (similar to Fris) The court held that the jury instrucon was bad because it invited the jury to apporon ault to the decedent or his death on the basis o evidence e vidence which was not a proximate cause o his death There is not necessarily a need or incenves through the tort system in this case because the threat o death serves as a strong incenve and i this is not enough then it is doubul that diminishing the damages awarded will be enough Vaughan v. Menlove (132 Eng. Rep. 490) (C.P. 1837) (pg. 125) 1 25) o Facts A man built a haystack near the edge o his property and though his neighbor warned him o the re hazard that it posed, he did not remove it and only built a chimney through it. 





It caught re and burned down a poron o his neighbor's property Jury nds or the plain under the idea that the deendant was bound to reasonable cauon The deendant appeals based on the argument that he "ought not not be responsible responsible or the misortune o not possessing the highest order o intelligence" Court rejects and holds or the plain  The court reuses to customize the judgment and capability standards or ever case Must adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to cauon such as a man o ordinary prudence would observe 



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Vaughan v. Miller Bros. "101" Ranch Wild West Show (153 S.E. 289) (W. Va. 1930) (pg. 403) o

Facts 

An ape on exhibit at the deendants circus bit o the plain's nger

80

 

The plain sued to recover his injuries and claimed no negligence but that the deendant was strictly liable or the damage done by his animal W.V. Supreme court disagreed (this decision represents a minority view among courts) It the right o every person in this country to exhibit wild animals animals and injury arising rom these animals must stem rom negligence in restraining them The act o the deendant was essenally a lawul acvity



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Village of Carterville v. Cook (22 N.E. 14) (Ill. 1889) (pg. 371) o Facts Deendant village maintained a sidewalk 6 eet o the ground with no railings and the plain, walking with all due care, was jostled o the sidewalk by another pedestrian The jury returned a verdict or the plain and the deendant appealed o Held or the plain  Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportaon (109 Minn. 456) (1910) (pg. 100) o Facts Ship docks and must stay because o a storm; the ship crew kept the boat docked and repeatedly reastened it to the dock which caused damage to the dock The plain was liable or damages as awarded by a jury o Court o Appeals armed The boat had a right to be there to protect itsel but it does need to pay or the damages 









(no trespass but liable or damages) Though the boat owner was acng reasonably, he was avoring his own property over the other's property so he is sll liable I he had let the boat drif reely re ely and then damaged the dock, he would not be liable Dissent Because the boat owner arrived legally and had no way to leave saely, the dock owner is liable or damages o Deense o Property I the dock owner wanted to une the boat in order to protect his dock rom the damage by the boat then he would need to jusy that his dock was more valuable than the boat to not be liable Vosburg v. Putney (80 Wis. 523) (1891) (pg. 1) 









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Facts

One student kicks another student in school afer class has been called to order and the impact exacerbates a preexisng injury which causes the leg to become lame No evidence was presented that states the kicker meant to cause serious injury Special Verdict was handed down Set o answers to more specic quesons Shows the basis o the jury's conclusions and thus makes it easier or the court reviewing the verdict to know what the jury was thinking Court o Appeals armed Even thought the deendant did not intend harm, the act then intended was unlawul and thereore the result was unlawul Relevant that the kick happened in the class and not at recess (playground is a place where certain liberes are taken and there are implied rules o the classroom







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and the playground)

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The act was in violaon o the decorum o the school and was not in any way invited Waltson v. Lambertsen (349 F.2d 660) (9th Cir. 1965) (pg. 205) o Facts A crab shing boat sinks on a clear day; the sinking is essenally unexplainable The plain claims the ship was unseaworthy because a large crab tank made it 





unstable

This claim is based in ordinary negligence in that the plain is claiming a standard o care was not met The plain also claims res ipsa loquitor Trial court enters a verdict or the deendant o Court o Appeals arms The trial court was correct in stang that there was no evidence that the ship was unseaworthy (which would have had to have been established as o its last departure) Because no evidence o unseaworthiness exists, there is no reasonable belie o negligence on which to base the claim or res ipsa loquitor The sea itsel is dangerous and thereore there is an inherent risk that exists without negligence being a actor Wanzer v. District of Columbia (580 A.2d 127) (D.C. App. 1990) (pg. 255) 











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Facts

A man calls 911 complaining o headaches and the operator suggests that it would be logical to take an aspirin as opposed to geng an ambulance The man is ound by his neighbor several hours later and afer being transported by ambulance to the hospital it is determined that he has suered rom a stroke and soon dies The man's daughter (plain) sues D.C. claiming it breached its duty by negligently ailing to train and supervise dispatchers City (deendant) les a moon to dismiss which is granted by the trial court Court o Appeals arms The court held that the city could not have been held liable or the dispatcher's ailure to send an ambulance because the city owed the ather no special duty greater than that owed to the public at large By just answering the call, the dispatcher is not undertaking a duty to provide









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care to the plain  Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. (126 S.W. 146) (Ky. 1910) (pg. 370) o Facts One o the deendant's railroad cars derailed and spilled its cargo o gasoline into the streets The gasoline was ignited by a third party It is unknown whether the man ignited the gas on purpose or by accident The trial court gave a directed verdict to the deendant railroad o Court o appeals reversed and remanded The court determined that liability depended on how the third party came to start the re (this was to be a queson o act or the jury) I the third party accidentally started the re, then liability is on the deendant I the third party purposely started the re, there is no liability or the deendant 















It is oreseeable that someone would accidentally start the gasoline on re, but it is not oreseeable that someone would start it on re maliciously (commit arson)

82

 

Weirum v. RKO Radio General, Inc. (539 P.2d 36) (Cal. 1975) (pg. 223) o Facts The deendant radio staon hosts a contest in which contestants must locate a certain disc jockey in various city locaons in order to win prizes In an aempt to win, two teenagers race along a reeway at 80 mph and cause the death o a ellow driver 



Plain sues one teenager (who went on to win a prize afer the accident) and the radio staon Trial court jury brought verdict or the plains, the deendants mooned or a  judgment n.o.v. and were denied; deendants deendants appealed o Supreme Court armed The deendants appeal is based on a secon o the Restatement that is grounded in an armave act by the deendant that created undue risk o harm Liability in this case is not based on the deendant's ailure to intervene (armave act) (noneasance) but on its creaon o an unreasonable risk o harm (miseasance) The harm that results rom the goading in this situaon is inicted upon a third party (plain), not the actors who were goaded (teen drivers) Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co. (17 F.3d 209) (7th Cir. 1994) (pg. 466) 466 ) 









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Facts

A third party purchases a jar o peanuts or the t he plain and cut o the barcode or rebate purposes; the plain uses them once without incident and then, while he is closing the jar the second me, it shaers and his hand is injured The plain brings suit against K-Mart (who sold the peanuts), Planters (who packaged the peanuts in the jar) and Brockway (who made the jar) The deendants moved or summary judgment and it was granted by the district judge because the plain had ailed to exclude possible causes o the accident other than a deect introduced during the manuacturing process The court o appeals reversed and remanded It was not a queson that the jar j ar was deecve but when the deect was introduced The deect must have been introduced beore purchase when the jar was in the control o the deendants (all o the evidence presented by the plain must be







o







viewed as true and all evidence must be viewed in avor o the plain) The deendants argue that the third party use o a knie on the jar may have led to the deect The court nd this to be a common thing to do The court urther nds that because the deendants had iniated the rebate process they had invited the third party to use a knie on the t he jar K-Mart created the incenve program that encouraged the removal o the label rom the jar (needed to use a knie to take it o properly) The other deendants may not have been directly involved in the promoon but the alleged misuse has not been proved to a level that t hat can jusy summary judgment Invited misuse is no deense to a products liability claim because invited misuse is not misuse  









Misuse is not a deense or strict liability unless the misuse was the sole cause o  the deect I the misuse is not the sole cause then it may only reduce the damages 

83

 

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The deendants argue that the jar could have been damages while sing on the shel  The plain in a products liability suit is not required to exclude every possibility that the deect which led to the accident acc ident was caused by someone other than one o the deendants Relaon to Res Ipsa Loquitur An accident can itsel be evidence o liability i it is the kind o accident 

that would not have occurred but or a deect in the product and it is reasonably plain that the deect was not introduced afer the product was sold An accident happening at all is evidence that the product was deecve when sold It is too remote to expect ex pect a person to lock up their cans and jars -- it is too remote to expect a raonal person to take this precauon Experts rom both sides agreed that the jar must have contained a deect but they could not nd the racture that had precipitated the shaering o the jar The court reasons that the evidence shows that the probability that the deect which caused the accident happened afer purchase is very small and thereore the probability that the deect was introduced by one o the deendants is very high The plain's evidence is strong enough to warrant a act trying by jury and not weak enough to warrant summary judgment 











With respect to K-Mart it does not maer who made the deect, it only maers that they sold a deecve product I trial evidence shows that the deect was caused by a K-Mart employee then liability would be solely or K-Mart (liability is only or those who handle the product afer it becomes deecve) With respect to Planters it does not maer who made the deect, it only maers that they distributed a deecve product I trial evidence shows that the deect was caused by a Planters employee, liability would be or K-Mart and Planters The strict liability element in modern products liability law comes precisely rom the act that a seller subject to that law is liable or deects in his product even i those deects were introduced without the slightest ault o his own or ailing to discover them Wendland v. Sparks (574 N.W.2d) (Iowa 1998) (pg. 328) 







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Facts

A cancer paent went in to cardiac arrest and her doctor did not aempt to resuscitate her as an act o mercy; her husband sued the hospital or negligence on the doctrine o lost chance Trial court gave summary judgment to the deendant Iowa Supreme Court reversed Held that a vicm who suered rom a pre-exisng condion and is then subjected to another source o injury may have a claim or the second event I it were not or the second event they may have survived the rst Two lost chances in this case Eorts o resuscitaon would have been successul She would have been cured o her disease The jury must examine the percentage chance o survival and then take the damages





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 



and award that percent Where there is more than one lost chance, the percentages o each o those chances are considered in awarding damages 

84

 

Werth v. Taylor (475 N.W.2d N.W.2d 426) (Mich. App. 1991) (pg. 26) o Facts Woman is in the hospital and giving birth; she will die without a blood transusion, which she has menoned she does not want, though her husband was not clear about the same maer 

Trial court gave summary judgment to the deendants Court o appeals armed Due to the equivocal nature o their inial reusal (I don’t want the blood, but I don’t want to die) and the act that the reusal re usal was made when the person's lie was not in immediate danger Consent is ofen implied in emergency procedures when the person is not able to give their actual consent because o their condion White v. Levarn (108 A. 564) (Vt. 1918) (pg. 175) o Facts Two men go hunng on a Sunday and one accidentally shoots the other Plain sued claiming that hunng and discharging rearms on a Sunday is illegal Trial gave judgment to the deendant o Supreme Court reversed 

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Because the act that caused injury to the deendant was unlawul in its nature and was the result o the deendants negligence, he is liable or damages it caused White v. University of Idaho (786 P.2d 827) (Idaho 1989) (pg. 4) o Facts Piano lesson taking place and the D (student) is touched by the P (piano instructor) during the lesson in order to demonstrate something and the touch causes a reakish injury that leads to a suit The deendant was ound liable (P led or summary judgment (no reasonable jury would decide against them) and the D was ound liable) o Court o appeals armed In relaon to Vosburg, that case states that the touching must be "wrongul" The student states that the act o the contact was not something that she would have consented to 











The court ruled that that kind o contact was not what could c ould be reasonably expected in the context What is the plain communicang and what would a reasonable person communicate in this situaon Williams v. Hays (143 N.Y. 442) (1984) (pg. 122) o Facts Ship captain is on desk or 48 hours or more trying to save his ship rom a storm. When he is nally able to go below desk he takes a dose o medicaon medicaon to ght malaria that he thinks he contracted. He did not eat or sleep. He then exercises poor judgment and ends up sinking the ship. He claims insanity because o exhauson and illness. Jury instructed "i the deendant was insane then he is not liable, i he was not insane then he was liable" Jury was incorrectly instructed 







The trial judge gave directed verdict or the plain which the deendant appealed Court o appeals reversed and remanded 

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85

 





No man can be expected to do the impossible (perorm to the highest and most raonal degree under that level o stress) Though insanity is not a deense, the deendant in this case did all he humanly possibly could and his temporary insanity was caused solely by the storm which he was ghng The irraonal acon was a result o carrying out his dues Was unable to oresee that he may go into an insane state (not normally prone 



to bouts o insanity) Williams v. United States (747 F. Supp.697) (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (pg. 540) o Facts The plain was a ormer inmate at a ederal prison; he was diabec and contracted a bacterial inecon in his oot which was misdiagnosed by the prison's medical ocer The oot eventually had to be amputated The ederal judge ound the government liable o Assessment o damages The plain was 48 at the me with a like expectancy o 24 more years He suered phantom pain, blisters and complicaons with his prosthec He was unable to perorm certain acvies afer the procedure He was a long-me inmate Drugs, alcohol, psychopathology, no job, diabetes, smoke 

 











The plain requested $1.5 million but was awarded $500,000 (without any oset or comparave negligence) Wilton v. City of Spokane (132 P. 404) (Wash. 1913) (pg. 447) o Facts Deendant's hired a partnership as independent contractors to build a street and the partnership needed to use dynamite at one point and lef behind an unexploded piece which was paved over and later drilled into causing an explosion The plain sued the city arguing that it was responsible or the negligence o the partnership in leaving behind the dynamite o Washington supreme court held or the city The leaving o the dynamite was pure negligence There is no way that the city could c ould have known that the dynamite was there The acvity is inherently dangerous and the harm was wholly collateral to the danger o 





 



the acvity Wolf v. American Tract Society (58 N.E. 31) (N.Y. 1900) (pg. 213) o Facts A man is on the street near ne ar a construcon site when he is hit on the head with a alling brick The plain brings suit against 2 o 19 construcon workers (independent contractors) because he was unable to ideny which man in parcular had dropped the brick Trial court dismissed the complaint o Court o Appeals armed Some proo must be given to enable the jury to ideny who commied the wrong Because the men are independent independent contractors they are not responsible to each other and not involved in a disnctly collaborave act Thereore would be unable to prove who did cause the harm 













Disncon rom the barrel alling case because they are not all employees o a centralized control

86

 

Disncon rom medical malpracce above because there is no suspicion o a "conspiracy o silence" It is assumed that the plain did suer injury because o someone's negligence, but because the person is completely unidenable there must be no redress rather than an innocent person be held responsible The chance o punishing an innocent man is too high 



 





Over deterrence may create disincenves or socially producve acvies I every man is going to be liable, then men may not want to work on construcon anymore We do not want to compel all workers to collaborate with each other in order to aempt to avoid liability

Dissent



The rule itsel was ounded upon a necessity with the goal o protecng the public and should not be abandoned because a multude o people may be responsible or the harm Woodall v. Wayne Stener Producons (20 Cal. Rptr. 572) (Cal. App. 1962) (pg.599) o Facts The plain was a stunt man who was hired by the deendant company to parasail behind a car driven by a driver hired by the deendant 



The plain was assured by the driver that he would ollow the regulaons to assure saety but he did not and caused the plain to crash and be injured The trial court entered a verdict or the plain  The deendant appealed claiming that the plain should be barred rom recovery by assumpon o risk on his part Court o appeals armed The plain assumed the risk o dangers that were not directly associated with the driver's negligence The plain was assured repeatedly as to the competency and care o the driver to be urnished by the deendant The court held that assumpon o risk must be ree and voluntary I it clearly appears rom the plain's words or conduct that he does not consent to relieve the deendant o the obligaon to protect him, the risk will not be







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assumed I the plain surrenders his beer judgment upon an assurance o saety or a promise o protecon, he does not assume the risk unless the danger is so obvious and so extreme that there can be no reasonable reliance upon the assurance The plain did not assume the risk that was the proximate cause o his injury The risk that caused the injury was out o the scope o his assumpon o risk Woodbridge v. Marks (45 N.Y.S. 156) (N.Y. App. 1897) (pg. 90) o Facts Man goes onto another's property and is aacked by watchdogs when he strays rom the path (it is dark and he gets "lost"), the dogs can not reach the house or the walkway when they are chained The jury brought in a verdict or the plain and the court entered judgment upon it o Court o appeals reversed 











The deendant has a right to keep his property sae and he took precauons in his method o doing so

87

 

First purpose o the dog is to scare and protect then aack (unlike with the spring gun where the gun's rst purpose is to shoot) Designed or a means o deterrence not a means o revenge or violence There is a certain degree o noce (visibly seeing the dogs, hearing them) Wright v. Hae (196 N.W.2d 176) (Neb. 1972) (pg 89) o Facts 





Man tries to rob a convenience store and the owner shoots him while the robbery is in process Jury brought verdict or the deendant o Nebraska Supreme Court armed Must be considered that the plain has already commied assault and threat o harm beore the baery takes place Was the retaliaon proporonal to the crimes which had already taken place There was no actual threat o urther harm at the me o the shoong There was also no other alternave means to prevent and stop the robbery at that me Yania v. Bigan (155 A.2d 343) (Pa. 1959) (pg. ( pg. 219) o Facts Deendant was working on a coal-strip mining operaon where he created large 













trenches (16 to 18 eet deep), dee p), one that contained water (8-10 eet) Deendant was prepared to pump the water out o the trench and asked or the assistance o the plain's husband and another man Deendant and the third man were in the trench tre nch where the pumping pipe was when the plain's husband jumped into the trench and drowned The plain led three charges, claiming the deendant was negligent... 1. *By *By urg urgin ing, g, en enc cin ing, g, taun taunn ng g and and in inve veig igli ling ng Yani Yania a to to jjum ump p in into to the the wat water er 2. By a ailing tto o wa warn Ya Yania o o tth he da dangerous cco ondions 3. *By ailing to go to Yania's rescue Deendant led preliminary objecons (demurrers (moon to t o dismiss) (admit the acts  as true)) which were sustained by the lower court (trial) Appellate Court arms The deendant had no legal duty to save the deceased (no armave act)







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The deceased was a man o ull mental abilies and thereore he was not goaded into the water (count 1 o negligence) The mere act that the deendant saw the deceased in the posion o peril in the water did not impose on him any legal legal duty to come to his aid (count 3 o negligence) because he was not responsible or the jump to begin with The result was not the consequence o any conduct by the deendant What i….? Bigan encourages Yania to jump into the water knowing that it is too t oo shallow to do so Baery case (intenonal harm) Bigan encourages Yania to jump into the water without knowing that it is too shallow to do so Negligence (unreasonable assumpon that the water is sae) Contributory Negligence (Yania should have checked the water or himsel; was







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he reasonable in trusng the statements o Bigan?)

88

 

Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Gordon (186 So. 631) (Miss. 1939) (pg. 445) o Facts A carload o cale was being shipped by railway and Yazoo hired a third party to unload and hold the cale while they waited or a connecng train; one steer stee r got loose and gored the plain  o The Mississippi supreme court held or the plain  

The steer was a domesc rather than a wild animals and that the deendant thereore should be held liable i the steer's escape was caused by negligence The court rejected the argument that the steer escaped while under the control o an independent contractor Yazoo owed a duty to the public to prevent the steer stee r rom being at large and could not delegate the perormance o this duty to another and escape liability I the acvity is inherently dangerous (called a peculiar risk in the Second Sec ond Restatement 416) then the employer cannot delegate the duty o care c are to a third party Ybarra v. Spangard (154 P.2d 687) (Cal. 1944) (pg. 208) o Facts The plain was admied to the hospital or a roune appendectomy but experienced severe and debilitang shoulder pain afer the operaon, which non-deendant doctors said was most likely the result o some trauma or injury by pressure 









The plain's theory is that the lack o his ability to produce evidence provides a case o res ipsa loquitor The deense argues that there are too many deendants (mulple doctors, nurses and the hospital owner) to place blame and too many instruments in play to know which deendant controlled the one that may have caused injury The trial court entered judgments o nonsuit or all o the deendants Court o Appeals reversed Hold that where a plain receives unusual injuries while unconscious during an operaon, all deendants who had any control over his body or the instruments which might have caused the injuries may be called upon to [give an explanaon o their conduct] I the doctrine was not applicable then an unconscious paent who is injured during a procedure would have to rely on a doctor or nurse to disclose who was negligent during the procedure







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up)

This chance is given when the burden o proo is shifed (someone needs to ess

I no one knows anything, there will sll be liability (equality o ignorance is not an excuse) Provides an incenve or people to hold each other accountable (deterrence emphasis) I the doctrine was not applicable, then the only air alternave would be to apply strict liability With res ipsa the deendant has a chance to prove they were not negligent With strict liability, the deendant has no chance to prove they were not negligent Three Part Test Applicability Has no problem sasying 1 or 3 











 



When it comes to 2 Plain is unable to ideny a specic instrumentality or the deendant who had exclusive control o it

89

 

 

Deendant Court says that every deendant was responsible to exercise ordinary care The employer is responsible or his employees The doctors are responsible or the nurses under them  

The control at one me or another o every instrumentality was under the control o every deendant Instrumentality It is enough that the plain shows injury resulng rom an external orce applied during the operaon The number o people in whose care a paent is placed is not excuse or negligence 







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