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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias
―BONG‖ (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD DELIM alias ―BONG‖, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,1[1] dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 46, Urdaneta City, finding accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The court also
ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums of P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias ―Bong‖ and Robert, all surnamed Delim,
were indicted for murder under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
―That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto
Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and
abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife
and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said
Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.‖2[2]
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were apprehended. Accused
Robert and Manuel remain at-large.
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts3[3]—







Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto
Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he was ―adopted‖ by the
father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modesto‘s wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy,
continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald,
Manuel and Leon as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald
used to visit Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison,
Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their supper in
their home. Joining them were Modesto and Rita‘s two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were
about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and closed the door.
Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and
Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.4[4]
Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also
armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay
where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January
24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Niño, at Sitio Labayog,
informed the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy was
advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his father. He and his
other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan,
around 200 meters away from Modesto‘s house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999,
Randy and his relatives returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again
failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident to the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito
Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time
they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the
state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy
and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modesto‘s cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other
policemen rushed to the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.5[5]
Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and
Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at a loss why the five
malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police
investigators.6[6] Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find







them in their respective houses. The police officers scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and
Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which reads:
―SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- Body - both upper extremities are flexed
- both lower extremities are flexed
- (+) body decomposition
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
- 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
- 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto – occipital area (POEx)
- 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3
rd
left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3
rd
, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3
rd
, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3
rd
, left arm
- #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3
rd,
left forearm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3
rd
, left forearm
- 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
- penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD.‖7[7]
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police
investigators were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their
firearms.8[8]
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had pending cases
for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in
Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.9[9]
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.10[10]
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their
house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modesto‘s house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He theorized
that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him
concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B,
Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan.
Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a hollow-block factory in that city where he was a stay-in
worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leon‘s alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his hometown in
Pangasinan during his employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on January 23, 1999, his
brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She claimed that the distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison,
Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove that he was a
resident of Laoag City from January 1998 up to February 1999.11[11]











Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999.
During his stay there, he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he
immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his
sojourn in Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the trial
court‘s decision reads:
―WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald Delim,
Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald
Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law; the
Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of
P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the Honorable Supreme
Court, and to prepare the mittimus fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City is hereby ordered
to transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City,
fifteen days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.‖12[12]
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of superior strength,
nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief, assail the decision alleging that:
―I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS‘ DEFENSE OF ALIBI.‖13[13]





Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime charged in the
Information is murder or kidnapping. During the deliberation, some distinguished members of the Court opined that
under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code and not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that the accused ―willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto
Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of
Modesto Delim from helping the latter.‖ They submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation of
liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the Information went
further to charge accused with the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature of the criminal charge
being determined not from the caption or the preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law alleged
to have been violated – these being conclusions of law – but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. They further submit that since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of Marlon, Ronald and
Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death of the victim but only for kidnapping the victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited
therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific intent
of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the
information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al.,14[14]
that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to
deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in
the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. This Court further held:
―x x x. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that the
detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the
primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses
they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims‘ liberty does not constitute kidnapping
or serious illegal detention.‖15[15]
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim‘s liberty
does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into,
or absorbed by, the killing of the victim.16[16] The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal
complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential element
of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances
indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to







follow his act or failure to act.17[17] Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific
intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a
prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.18[18] Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the
circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record.19[19]
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the
accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the
prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged
does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime
charged such as murder.20[20] The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives
comparatively trivial.21[21] Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping,
the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be
convicted for kidnapping.22[22] In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to
avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the
house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying
circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of
killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the
malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to
kidnapping.23[23] Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.















The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt. The
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused.
The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.24[24]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the
criminal act and second, defendant‘s agency in the commission of the act.25[25] Wharton says that corpus delicti
includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes.26[26] In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death
was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause
or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act
which produced the death.27[27] To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence,
direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill.
Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the
killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial or presumptive evidence.28[28]
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained five
(5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained seven (7) stab wounds,29[29] defensive in nature. The use by the
malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as the
nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to













kill the victim with all the consequences flowing therefrom.30[30] As the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in
Cupps v. State:31[31]
―This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts, is
applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and
not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears.
Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves
show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the
slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.‖
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It relied on
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants of murder. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience.32[32] What was once a rule of account respectability is now
entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence,
sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the
following requisites concur:
―x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.‖33[33]
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial
evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by
mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the offense charged.34[34] For circumstantial evidence
to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.35[35] If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial













evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove that
accused-appellants, in confabulation with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:
1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed with a
handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded
him out of his house:
―FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?
A We were eating, sir.
Q You said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked
answered Marlon Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who,
when his name was asked he answered Ronald Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm were they carrying at that
time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short firearms, what did they do
then when they entered your house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?
A None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, ‗Stay in your house,‘ and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my father, sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside?
A Inside our house, sir.
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir.‖36[36]
Randy‘s account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:
―PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at around 6:30 in the
evening while preparing for your supper three (3) armed men entered inside your house, who were these three (3)
men who entered your house?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to answer, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong entered your house, are these
three (3) persons who entered your house in Court now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?
A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir.‖37[37]
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a
lookout when he stood guard by the door of the house of Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next
day:
―FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three persons, what did you and
your mother do while these three persons were taking out of your house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.





FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three persons Marlon, Robert and
Ronal (sic), where were Leon and Manuel then?
A They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?
A Because they were at the door, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were guarding you, these Leon
and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?
A They have gun, sir.
Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who when his name was asked,
answered, Leon Delim).‖38[38]
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house with
Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent them
from seeking help from their relatives and police authorities.
4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found
under the thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing project located about 200 meters away from the house of
Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was already in the state of decomposition:
―Q So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father?



A The same place and at 3:00 o‘clock P.M., we were able to find my father.
COURT: Where?
A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look for your father on January 27,
1999 at 3:00 o‘clock P.M.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My Aunt, sir.
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Who else?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.
COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition?
A He was dead, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then when you saw him dead?
A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic).‖39[39]
The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of Modesto was in a state
of decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum were inflamed.
The victim sustained five gunshot wounds and defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:
―PROS. TOMBOC:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?
WITNESS:



A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper extremities are flexed and
both lower extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the victim, Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were so many worms
coming out from the injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim was an igorot (sic)
and they have tradition that they will bury immediately. Whether they like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was also 20 ml x 20 ml. GSW,
mandibular area, right; I cannot also determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose,
directed upward (POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).
Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Five (5) sir.
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left; 1 x 1 cm.
stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm.
stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1
cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm.
Q How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora?
A Yes sir.‖40[40]
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it and the distention of
his scrotum and penis are evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction and that the victim had been
dead for a period ranging from three to six days.41[41] Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the exact
death of the victim. An equally persuasive authority states:
―Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:
Time Since Death Condition of the Body
48 hours Ova of flies seen.
Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters present.
Moving maggots seen.
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and
disfigured. Hair and nails loose.
Tissues soft and discolored.‖42[42]
The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23, 1999 to the
discovery of his cadaver which was already in the state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, about
200 meters away from his house, is consistent with and confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution that the
victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999.
5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and were
nowhere to be found:
―COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto Delim?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects?







A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his brothers, sir.
Q What are the names of the brothers?
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for investigation?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be found, they all left the
place, sir.
Q In what place did you look for the brothers Delim?
A Within the vicinity, sir.
Q In what place?
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where the cadaver was
found in Paldit, sir.
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers?
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
Q Wherelse (sic)?
A Labayog, Sison, sir.
Q Wherelse?
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir.
Q What was the result?
A Negative result, sir.‖43[43]
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto
and Rita:
―COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day, January 23, 1999?



A Yes, sir, I know them.
Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999?
A They are my neighbors, sir.
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23, 1999?
A I know them, sir.
Q Why do you know them?
A They used to go to our house, sir.
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your husband‘s name is
Modesto Delim are they related with each other?
A Yes, sir.‖44[44]
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong
circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of Modesto. Although flight after the commission of an offense
does not create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the same is admissible in evidence against them and if not
satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with their innocence, will tend to show that they, in fact, killed
Modesto.45[45]
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill Modesto. Indeed,
Randy and Rita testified that they were not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on the one
hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-accused on the other before the incident, or any motivation on the
part of the three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be concluded that a person
or persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter
of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all.46[46] In this
case, the inscrutable facts are that Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took
Modesto from his house at the gunpoint, hogtied, put a piece of cloth in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had
left the house with Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was found
concealed under the bushes and already in a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto
sustained several gunshot wounds and died because of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the
connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some causes or influences moving the







mind.47[47] The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the prosecution should not be trashed simply because the
malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and Leon to rebut
the same and explain what happened to the victim after taking him from his house in the evening of January 23,
1999. They may have freed the victim shortly after taking him, or the victim may have been able to escape and that
thereafter a person or some other persons may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed to give
any explanation. Instead, they merely denied having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as their
defense.
Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he conspired with
accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.48[48] Conspiracy
must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy
is deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.49[49] To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime.50[50] It is sufficient if, at
the time of the commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. If
conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually
shot and killed the victim.51[51] This is based on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of
the common plan:
―x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered and treated as the acts
and declarations of his principal. ‗What is so done by an agent, is done by the principal through him, as his mere
instrument.‘ Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). ‗If
the conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its existence, the acts of one in











furtherance of the common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common design,
he does as the agent of the co-conspirators.‘ R. v. O‘Connell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710.‖52[52]
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm
and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the
acts, words and declarations of all.53[53]
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun.
Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had
left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood
guard by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the
malefactors were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the
malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in
the commission of the crime were – (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to
prevent them from seeking assistance from police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto
shall have been a fait accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.54[54] Patently, Leon, a lookout for the
group, is guilty of the killing of Modesto.55[55] Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed
by Marlon and Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation.56[56] If part of a crime has been
committed in one place and part in another, each person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as
principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan
for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as principals.
Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime. 57[57]
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same were marred by
inconsistencies:
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father. Later however, Randy
claimed that the malefactors proceeded to the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan;













2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into their house. She later
changed her testimony and declared that it was Robert, together with Marlon and Ronald who barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she testified that after the
three men brought out the victim, the two other accused entered the house and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999, and she was
accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy testified that he was alone when he looked for his father from
January 24 to 26, 1999.58[58]
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its
conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect,
because of its unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the
witnesses as they give their testimonies before the court. In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full
probative weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution. Moreover, there is no evidence on record
that Randy and Rita were moved by any improper or ill motive in testifying against the malefactors and the other
accused; hence, their testimonies must be given full credit and probative weight.59[59] The inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them incredible or their testimonies barren of probative weight. It must
be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a person‘s sense of observation is
impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is
that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses‘
credibility nor the veracity of his testimony.60[60] Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with
respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent
facts.61[61] Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of
witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.62[62]











Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms and the true
meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due consideration of all
the questions propounded to the witness and his answers thereto.63[63]
Randy‘s testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent with his testimony
that Ronald and Marlon brought his father towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Randy may not have
known the destination of accused-appellants but he saw the direction to which they went. While it may be true that
when asked to identify the three who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as one of them, however, Rita had
been consistent throughout her testimony that those who barged into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leon‘s
counsel never cross-examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her identification of Leon as one of those who
barged into their house to give her an opportunity to explain her perceived inconsistency conformably with Rule 132,
Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
―Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.‖64[64]
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired impeachment of
her.65[65] As to whether Rita and Randy were together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely stood guard by the
door of the house or entered the house are inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood guard throughout the night
to prevent Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the earmarks
of truth and sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-examination, they responded with consistency upon
material details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before their
eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to disregard the findings of the trial court regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving credence and
probative weight to their evidence to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that their collective evidence to prove
their defense is strong.
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution
because the same is easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender.66[66] It is
hard for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit approbation by the trial court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald









and Leon are burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that they were in a place other than the situs
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the
said crime.67[67] They failed to discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and spontaneously
identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits. The house of Ronald, where he claimed he was when the crime
was committed, was only two kilometers away from the house of Modesto and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon
failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced fact that he
was a resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of the
crime. With respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that he resided in,
left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the
killing of Modesto. The trial court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of superior strength and the use of
unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that indeed
treachery was attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder defined in
and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and penalized by Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and
conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot
produce the effect of qualifying the crime.68[68] As this Court held: ―No matter how truthful these suppositions or
presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of
defendant.‖69[69] Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously
adopted.70[70] Although the victim may have been defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no evidence
as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.71[71]
In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to











present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was
attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in
the same situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked.72[72] What is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio Francisco73[73] is that the assailants
deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to
show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength.74[74]
In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took advantage of their
numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and
were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical
superioty and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.75[75]
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is
no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license
to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No.
8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.76[76] Neither can dwelling,
although proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by
Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.77[77] Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after
the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the rule
is favorable to the accused.78[78]















There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should be meted
an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which shall be taken from the entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6
years and one day to 12 years and the maximum period of which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The sum of P75,000.00
awarded as moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.79[79] The
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.80[80] In addition, civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.81[81]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty
of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Accused-appellants are
hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Vitug.


THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109250. September 5, 1997]







PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORIEL LACERNA y CORDERO & MARLON LACERNA y
ARANADOR, accused.
MARLON LACERNA y ARANADOR, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The unrelenting and pervading war against illegal drugs has absorbed the attention of all branches of government,
both national and local, as well as media, parents, educators, churches and the public at large. This case is one
more intrepid battle in such all-out war. Herein appellant seeks acquittal on the ground that his acts did not constitute
the crime of ―giving away prohibited drugs‖ penalized by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (The
Dangerous Drugs Act). Nonetheless, he cannot escape the law because the very same deeds, which appellant
admits to have performed, show his culpability for ―illegal possession of prohibited drugs‖ -- penalized in Section 8 of
R.A. 6425, as amended -- which is necessarily included in the crime charged in the Information.
Statement of the Case
This ruling is explained by the Court as it resolves this appeal from the Decision,i[1] dated February 24, 1993, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16,ii[2] convicting Appellant Marlon Lacerna y Aranador ―of violation of Section
4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended x x x.‖
Asst. City Prosecutor of Manila Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. charged appellant and Noriel Lacerna in an Information,iii[3]
dated September 16, 1992, which reads as follows:iv[4]
―The undersigned accuses NORIEL LACERNA Y CORDERO and MARLON LACERNA Y ARANADOR of a violation
of Section 4 Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Art. IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1675, xxx
―That on or about September 12, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by
law to sell, deliver or give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
jointly sell, deliver or give away to another the following, to wit:
Eighteen (18) blocks of marijuana
flowering tops - weight – 18.235 kilograms
which is a prohibited drug.‖
When the case was called for arraignment on October 7, 1992, appellant and his co-accused appeared without
counsel but they alleged that they had engaged the services of a certain Atty. Kangleon. Thus, the trial court
provisionally appointed Atty. Rodolfo P. Libatique of the Public Attorney‘s Office as counsel de oficio, in case Atty.
Kangleon did not appear for the arraignment on October 28, 1992.v[5] Because the alleged counsel de parte failed to
show up during the arraignment on that date, Atty. Libatique assisted the accused who pleaded ―not guilty.‖vi[6]
After trial on the merits, the court a quo promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:vii[7]
―WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
I. The guilt of the accused Marlon Lacerna having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended, he is found guilty of the same, sentencing him to life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P20,000. With costs.
II. The guilt for the crime charged of accused Noriel Lacerna not having been established beyond reasonable doubt
he is hereby ACQUITTED. The warden of the Manila City Jail is ordered to release his person, unless held on other
charges.
The evidence seized in this case is to remain in the custody of the NBI Director as Drugs Custodian of the Dangerous
Drugs Board. (RA 425, Sec. 36; Supreme Court Circular No. 9 dated July 18, 1973) to be properly disposed of after
the final disposition of this case.‖
Hence, only Marlon Lacerna (his co-accused having been acquitted) interposed this appeal direct to the Supreme
Court in view of the life penalty imposed.viii[8]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Carlito P. Valenzuela, Forensic Chemist Aida A. Pascual,
and PO3 Rafael Melencio. Their testimonies are summarized by the Solicitor General in the Appellee‘s Brief as
follows:ix[9]
―On September 12, 1992, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela, a member of the Mobile Patrol Division of the
Western Police District (WPD), was assigned to man the checkpoint and patrol the area somewhere along the
sidestreets of Radial Road near Moriones Street. The assignment to monitor strategic places in the city and
barangays of Manila was a direct order from General Nazareno. Thus, he and his companion PO3 Angelito Camero
went about cruising the area in their Mobile Patrol car, with PO3 Valenzuela at the helm. At about 2:00 p.m.,
appellant and co-accused, who were aboard a taxicab, passed by PO3 Valenzuela‘s place of assignment, which was
then heavy with traffic, looking suspicious (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 3-4; Nov. 20, 1992, pp. 2-7).
Appellant was seated beside the taxi driver while co-accused was seated at the left back seat of the taxi. When PO3
Valenzuela looked at the occupants of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads and slouched, refusing to look at him.
Feeling that something was amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and his companion stopped the vehicle, signaling the driver to
park by the side of the road (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 3-4).
PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked permission to search the vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed,
the police officers went about searching the luggages in the vehicle which consisted of a knapsack and a dark blue
plastic grocery bag. They asked appellant what the contents of the plastic bag were. Co-accused Noriel Lacerna
immediately answered that the bag contained his vomit (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 4-5).
Skeptical of what appellant and co-accused disclosed as regards the contents of the plastic bag, PO3 Valenzuela
made a hole in the bag and peeped inside. He found several blocks wrapped in newspaper, with the distinct smell of
marijuana emanating from it. PO3 Valenzuela opened one of the boxes and saw dried marijuana leaves. He told
appellant and co-accused that the contents of the bag were marijuana, which co-accused readily affirmed. According
to both Lacernas, the bag was a ‗padala‘ of their uncle. Specifically, they claimed that the bag was sent by their
uncle, who happened to be in Baguio City, for shipment to Iloilo (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 5-7; Nov.
20, 1992, pp. 8-10).
Appellant and co-accused, and the plastic bag containing blocks of marijuana were brought by PO3 Valenzuela and
PO3 Camero to the WPD Headquarters on UN Avenue, Manila.x[10] At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, both
appellant and co-accused were turned over to PO3 Rafael Melencio for investigation while the blocks were turned
over to Lt. de Soto (tsn., PO3 Melencio, Dec. 11, 1992, pp. 3-5. 20).
Lt. de Soto counted the blocks of marijuana, numbering eighteen (18) in all. Each block was wrapped in newspaper.
After seeing what the contents of the blocks were, the specimens (Exhs. ‗B‘ to ‗B-19) were brought to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further examination.xi[11] On the other hand, PO3 Melencio investigated appellant
and co-accused, informing them of their constitutional rights during a custodial investigation. Thereafter, he prepared
the Affidavit of Apprehension and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhs. ‗A‘, ‗G‘, List of Exhibits, pp. 1, 15; tsn.,
PO3 Melencio, Dec. 11, 1992, pp. 15-24).
NBI Forensic Chemist Aida A. Pascual examined the eighteen (18) confiscated blocks which tested positive of
containing marijuana (Exhs. ‗C‘, ‗F‘ to ‗F-9‘. List of Exhibits, pp. 2-14; tsn., A. Pascual, Dec. 2, 1992, pp. 2-5).‖
Version of the Defense
Appellant sets up the defense of denial, alleging that the blue plastic bag was owned by his uncle who requested him
to bring it to Iloilo. He also denied knowing that it contained marijuana. In his Brief prepared by the Public Attorney‘s
Office, he narrated his version of the factual circumstances of this case, as follows:xii[12]
―On September 12, 1992, at about 2:00 P.M., accused Marlon and Noriel Lacerna were riding in a taxicab on their
way to (the) North Harbor to board a boat bound for Iloilo City. While plying along Pier 15 their taxicab was flagged
down by a patrol mobile car. Accused Marlon Lacerna (appellant herein) was sitting in front while accused Noriel
Lacerna was at the back of the taxicab. The accused carried two bags. One bag contained their personal
belongings and the other bag contained things which their uncle Edwin Lacerna asked them to bring along. When
their taxicab was stopped, the two policemen in the Mobile car requested them that they and their baggage be
searched. Confident that they have not done anything wrong, they allowed to be searched. During the (search), the
two accused were not allowed to alight from the taxicab. The knapsack bag which contained their clothes was first
examined in front of them. The second bag was taken out from the taxi and was checked at the back of the taxicab.
The accused were not able to see the checking when the policemen brought the plastic bag at the back of the taxi.
After checking, the policemen told them its ‗positive‘. The accused were (asked) to alight and go to the patrol car.
They were brought to the WPD Headquarters at United Nations. While there, they were brought inside a room. They
asked what wrong they have done but the policemen told them to wait for Major Rival. At about 8:00 o‘clock P.M.,
Major Rival talked to them and asked them where the baggage came from and they answered that it was given to
them by their uncle. Then Major Rival asked them to hold the marijuana and pictures were taken. Later, they were
brought inside the cell where they were maltreated by the ‗Kabo‘. The ‗Kabo‘ forced them to admit ownership of the
marijuana. Noriel was boxed on the chest, blindfolded and a plastic (bag) was placed on his neck and was strangled.
The mauling took place for about 30 minutes inside the toilet. They refused to sign the Booking and Arrest Report
but they impressed their fingerprint on a white bond paper. They were brought by Melencio to the Inquest Prosecutor
at the City Hall. On the way to the Inquest Prosecutor, Melencio told them to admit the charge against them before
the Inquest Fiscal, because if they will deny, something (would happen) to them in the afternoon and Melencio even
uttered to them ‗vulva of your mother.‘ Because they were apprehensive and afraid, they admitted the charge before
the Inquest Fiscal.
(Appellant) Marlon Lacerna first met his uncle Edwin Lacerna at Munoz Market. The second time was on September
11, 1992, when his uncle went to his brother‘s house in Caloocan City and requested him to bring his (uncle)
personal belongings upon learning that he (Marlon) is leaving for Iloilo city the next day, September 12, 1992. He
told his uncle to bring his personal belongings either in the evening of that day or the following day at the (Grand)
Central (Station), Monumento because he was going to buy a ticket for Noriel as he intend (sic) to bring the latter with
him in going home to the province. His uncle already gave a ticket for him. When he and Noriel (arrived) at the
Grand Central at about 10:00 o‘clock A.M. on September 12, 1992, their uncle was already there. The latter placed
the plastic bag besides their baggages. They no longer inspected the contents of the bag as the same was twisted
and knotted on top. After getting a ticket from the office of Don Sulpicio Lines, Marlon told Noriel to hail a taxi and
then they proceeded to the pier.
(Appellant‘s) purpose in going home to Iloilo was to get all the requirements needed in his application to enter the
Marines.
Accused Noriel just arrived in Manila three days before September 12, 1992 to look for a job and was staying with
(appellant) at Caloocan City. In the evening of September 11, 1992, (appellant) requested him to come xxx with him
to Iloilo and assured him that he (would) be the one to pay for (Noriel‘s) fare. (TSN., January 6, 1993, pp. 3-23;
January 8, 1993, pp. 2-12; January 11, 1993, pp. 2-18; January 20, 1992, pp. 2-6; January 22, 1993, pp. 2-14)‖
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo observed that appellant could not be convicted of ―delivering‖ prohibited drugs because the
Information did not allege that he knowingly delivered marijuana. Neither could he be convicted of ―transporting or
dispatching in transit‖ such prohibited drugs because these acts were not alleged in the Information. The trial court
mused further that appellant could not be convicted of ―selling‖ marijuana because the elements constituting this
crime were not proven. However, the Information charged appellant with ―giving away to another‖ prohibited drugs, a
charge which was different from ―delivery‖ defined under Section 2 (f) xiii[13] of R.A. 6245, as amended. Citing
People vs. Lo Ho Wing,xiv[14] the trial court ruled that ―giving away‖ to another is akin to ―transporting‖ prohibited
drugs, a malum prohibitum established by the mere commission of said act. Thus, the court a quo convicted
appellant of ―giving away‖ marijuana to another on the following premise:xv[15]
―It is not denied by (appellant) that he did give to his co-accused cousin Noriel Lacerna the bundled 18 blocks of
marijuana who thereupon seated himself at the rear of the taxi with the marijuana. His claim that he did not know the
contents of the blue plastic bag can hardly be believed because it is within judicial notice that the marijuana contents
readily emits a pungent odor so characteristic of marijuana as what happened when the 18 blocks were displayed in
open Court. But as stated, guilty knowledge is not required by the phrase ‗GIVE AWAY TO ANOTHER‘ (Sec. 4). It
was clearly established that he gave the stuff to another, that is, to his co-accused Noriel Lacerna. The law does not
distinguish as to whether the word ‗another‘ refers to a third person other than a co-accused or to a co-accused. The
information, as in the case at bar, need not allege guilty knowledge on the part of Marlon Lacerna in ‗giving away‘ to
another the marijuana. (Appellant) should, therefor be found culpable for violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as
amended, as charged for ‗giving away to another‘ the marijuana.‖
Accused Noriel Lacerna, on the other hand, was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court a quo reasoned
that ―it cannot be said that he did ‗give away to another‘ the marijuana for it was (appellant) who gave the marijuana
to (Noriel).‖ Besides, unlike appellant who was urbanized in mannerism and speech, Noriel Lacerna manifested
probinsyano traits and was, thus, unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs.
The Issues
Appellant objects to the trial court‘s Decision and assigns the following errors:xvi[16]
―I
The lower court erred in making a sweeping statement that the act of ‗giving away to another(‘) is not defined under
R.A. 6425 specifically requiring knowledge what intent one (sic) is passing is a dangerous drug, as
contradistinguished from the term ‗deliver; where knowledge is required.
II
The lower court erred in not giving credence to the assertion of accused-appellant that he had no knowledge that
what were inside the plastic bag given to him by his uncle were marijuana leaves.
III
The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.‖
The Court‘s Ruling
After meticulously reviewing the records of the case and taking into account the alleged errors cited above and the
argument adduced in support thereof, the Court believes that the issues can be restated as follows: (1) Was
appellant‘s right against warrantless arrest and seizure violated? (2) Was the trial court correct in convicting appellant
for ―giving away to another‖ 18 blocks of marijuana? and (3) May the appellant be held guilty of ―illegal possession‖ of
prohibited drugs? The Court answers the first two questions in the negative and the third in the affirmative.
First Issue: Appellant’s Right Against
Warrantless Search and Seizure
The defense argues that the bricks of marijuana were inadmissible in evidence as they were obtained through illegal
search and seizure. Appellant alleges that at the time of the search and seizure, he and his co-accused were not
committing any crime as they were merely riding a taxicab on the way to Pier 15, North Harbor in Manila. Hence, the
precipitate arrest and seizure violated their constitutional right and the marijuana seized constituted ―fruits of the
poisonous tree.‖
The Solicitor General disagrees, contending that the search and seizure were consistent with recent jurisprudential
trend liberalizing warrantless search and seizure where the culprits are riding moving vehicles, because a warrant
cannot be secured in time to apprehend the mobile target.
Both contentions are inaccurate. In the recent case of People vs. Cuison,xvii[17] this Court reiterated the principles
governing arrest, search and seizure. To summarize, let us begin with Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides:
―SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.‖
The Constitution further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of the provision mentioned is inadmissible in
evidence:
―SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.‖
However, not being absolute, this right is subject to legal and judicial exceptions. The Rules of Court, Section 12 of
Rule 126, provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for ―dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.‖
Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest have also been judicially formulated as
follows: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs
searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.xviii[18]
Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant
under said circumstances. In such cases however, the search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause,
i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.xix[19] Military or police
checkpoints have also been declared to be not illegal per se as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely visual.xx[20]
In the case at bar, the taxicab occupied by appellant was validly stopped at the police checkpoint by PO3 Valenzuela.
It should be stressed as a caveat that the search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to routine
checks -- visual inspection or flashing a light inside the car, without the occupants being subjected to physical or body
searches. A search of the luggage inside the vehicle would require the existence of probable cause.xxi[21]
In applicable earlier Decisions, this Court held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where
the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused;xxii[22] (b) where an informer
positively identified the accused who was observed to have been acting suspiciously;xxiii[23] (c) where the accused
fled when accosted by policemen;xxiv[24] (d) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and
searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large
quantity of marijuana;xxv[25] and (e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the
drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged -- that said accused were bringing
prohibited drugs into the country.xxvi[26]
In the case at hand, however, probable cause is not evident. First, the radio communication from General Nazareno,
which the arresting officers received and which they were implementing at that time, concerned possible cases of
robbery and holdups in their area.xxvii[27] Second, Noriel Lacerna‘s suspicious reactions of hiding his face and
slouching in his seat when PO3 Valenzuela‘s car passed alongside the taxicab might have annoyed the latter, or any
other law enforcer, and might have caused him to suspect that something was amiss. But these bare acts do not
constitute probable cause to justify the search and seizure of appellant‘s person and baggage. Furthermore, the
Claudio ruling cannot be applied to this case because the marijuana was securely packed inside an airtight plastic
bag and no evidence, e.g., a distinctive marijuana odor, was offered by the prosecution.
Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not because he was caught in flagrante
delicto, but because he freely consented to the search. True, appellant and his companion were stopped by PO3
Valenzuela on mere suspicion -- not probable cause -- that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise. But
Valenzuela expressly sought appellant‘s permission for the search. Only after appellant agreed to have his person
and baggage checked did the actual search commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being
a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.xxviii[28]
We are aware that this Court in Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on an implied acquiescence,
because such acquiescence was not consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty, but was merely
passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive circumstances.xxix[29] In the case before us,
however, appellant himself who was ―urbanized in mannerism and speech‖ expressly said that he was consenting to
the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.xxx[30] In his brief, appellant explicitly,
even if awkwardly, reiterated this: ―Confident that they [the accused] have not done anything wrong, they allowed to
be searched.‖ This declaration of appellant is a confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the
search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and seizure. They were
admissible in evidence; there was no poisonous tree to speak of.
Second Issue: Did Appellant
―Give Away‖ the Prohibited Drug?
The trial court justified the conviction of appellant for ―giving away to another‖ the prohibited drugs, because he
literally handed to Noriel the plastic bag containing marijuana, manually transferring the plastic bag from the front
seat to the backseat of the taxicab. We hold, however, that this is not the act penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972.
Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended, the violation of which is charged in the Information, penalizes ―any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.‖
The phrase ―give away‖ is commonly defined as ―to make a present of; to donate, or to make a sacrifice.‖xxxi[31] As
used in a statute making it an offense to ―sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of‖ liquor without a license, this phrase
was construed as extending only to a disposition in ejusdem generis with a sale or a gift.xxxii[32] It is synonymous
with ―to furnish,‖ a broad term embracing the acts of selling and giving away with the intent of transferring ownership.
Selling by itself is one distinct mode of committing the offense, and furnishing is intended only to include other modes
of affording something to others besides selling it.xxxiii[33]
As distinguished from ―delivery,‖ which is an incident of sale, ―giving away‖ is a disposition other than a sale. It is,
therefore, an act short of a sale which involves no consideration. The prohibited drug becomes an item or
merchandise presented as a gift or premium (giveaway), where ownership is transferred.
According to appellant, he gave the plastic bag and the knapsack to Noriel because the latter got into the taxicab first
and because there was more room in the backseat than in the front. By handing the plastic bag to Noriel, appellant
cannot be punished for giving away marijuana as a gift or premium to another. In Cuison,xxxiv[34] this Court
acquitted an accused of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs because the act per se of handing over a
baggage at the airport cannot in any way be considered criminal.
Further, adopting the trial court‘s interpretation would lead to absurd conclusions. Following the trial court‘s line of
reasoning, Noriel should have been held liable for the same crime when he gave the plastic bag to PO3 Valenzuela
for the latter‘s inspection. And yet, the trial court inexplicably acquitted him. Valenzuela would similarly be criminally
culpable as he testified that he turned over the plastic bag to his superior, Lt. de Soto. It is a well-settled rule that
statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to give effect to the legislative intention and to avoid an unjust
or an absurd conclusion.xxxv[35]
Third Issue:
May Appellant Be Convicted
of Illegal Possession?
Appellant‘s exoneration from giving away a prohibited drug to another under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
does not, however, spell freedom from all criminal liability. A conviction for illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
punishable under Section 8 of the same Act, is clearly evident.
In People vs. Tabar,xxxvi[36] the Court convicted appellant of illegal possession under Section 8 of said Act,
although he was charged with ―selling‖ marijuana under Section 4, Article II thereof.xxxvii[37]
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is
further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale
and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.xxxviii[38]
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs. It is indispensable that the
prohibited drug subject of the sale be identified and presented in court.xxxix[39] That the corpus delicti of illegal sale
could not be established without a showing that the accused possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly
indicates that possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in cases of delivery of prohibited
drugs and giving them away to another.
In People vs. Manzano,xl[40] the Court identified the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the
accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a
dangerous drug.

Although it did not expressly state it, the Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of
the prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of the
prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited
drugs, the Court will thus determine appellant‘s culpability under Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the prohibited drug.xli[41]
The evidence on record established beyond any doubt that appellant was in possession of the plastic bag containing
prohibited drugs, without the requisite authority. The NBI forensic chemist‘s identification of the marijuana or Indian
hemp was conclusive.
Appellant protests the trial court‘s finding that he knew that the plastic bag contained marijuana. The lower court
ruled that appellant could not have possibly missed the pervasive pungent smell emitted by marijuana which was
duly noted when the marijuana was exhibited in open court. This reasoning, however, is not supported by the
evidence; the plastic bag, at the time of the search and seizure, was ―twisted and tied at the top,‖ and thus airtight.
PO3 Valenzuela did not even notice this pervasive characteristic smell until he poked a hole in the plastic bag and
unwrapped the newspaper covering one of the marijuana bricks.
It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. On grounds of
public policy and compelled by necessity, courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, as ―the greater
master of things,‖ to forbid certain acts in a limited class of cases and to make their commission criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer.xlii[42] Such legislative enactments are based on the experience that repressive
measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer‘s knowledge or of his intent are of little use and
rarely accomplish their purposes; besides, the prohibited act is so injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of
the person‘s intent, it is the crime itself.xliii[43]
This, however, does not lessen the prosecution‘s burden because it is still required to show that the prohibited act
was intentional.xliv[44] Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person
may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the
very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum.xlv[45] Intent to commit the
crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown. In Bayona, the
Court declared:xlvi[46]
―xxx The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. x x x x The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to
interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an offender
actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to
intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the
prohibited act was intentionally done. ‗Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. * * *‘ (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128).‖
In illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the prosecution is not excused
from proving that possession of the prohibited act was done ―freely and consciously,‖ which is an essential element of
the crime.
In the case at bar, appellant was found to have in his possession a plastic bag containing 18 kg of marijuana formed
into 18 bricks which were separately wrapped. His possession thereof gives rise to a disputable presumption under
Section 3[j], Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,xlvii[47] that he is the owner of such bag and its contents. His bare,
unpersuasive, feeble and uncorroborated disavowal -- that the plastic bag was allegedly given to him by his uncle
without his knowing the contents -- amounts to a denial which by itself is insufficient to overcome this
presumption.xlviii[48] Besides, this defense, unless substantiated by clear evidence, is invariably viewed with disfavor
by courts, for it can just as easily be concocted. Verily, it is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions involving dangerous drugs.xlix[49]
Further, the trial court did not give credence to appellant‘s denial. It is axiomatic that appellate courts accord the
highest respect to the assessment of witnesses‘ credibility by the trial court, because the latter was in a better
position to observe their demeanor and deportment on the witness stand.l[50] The defense failed to present sufficient
reasons showing that the trial court had overlooked or misconstrued any evidence of substance that would justify the
reversal of its rejection of appellant‘s defense of denial.
Appellant is, therefore, liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.li[51]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs under Section 8 of R.A. 6425; SENTENCED, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
to eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum; and ORDERED to pay a fine of twelve thousand
pesos (P12,000.00). Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80089 April 13, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SATURNINO REY, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Julius L. Abela for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
Saturnino Rey was charged with the crime of Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, committed as follows:
That on or about 8:40 o'clock in the evening of May 28, 1983, at Poblacion, Pilar, Capiz,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with a .45 caliber
pistol, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one NICOLAS PAGAYUNAN in
a sudden and in unexpected manner, thereby inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound above the
nipple and sternum, right, thru and thru which caused his death thereafter;
1

After trial, Judge Rodrigo V. Cosico found the following facts to have been established:
... On the evening of May 28, 1983, which was a fiesta day, while Rosette Pagayunan, a teacher at
the San Esteban Elementary School, was preparing to cook food at her house, she found out that
there was no water. Accordingly, Mrs. Pagayunan instructed her two (2) children, Babette and
Nicolas, to get water from the faucet of the accused Saturnino Rey, also a public school teacher. At
that time, Mr. Rey's faucet was allegedly the only one with water at the neighborhood because of
the long drought. Nicolas was then a nineteen-year old fourth year high school student at the
Colegio de la Purisima Concepcion, Roxas City. Babette and Nicolas proceeded towards the
house of Mr. Rey to get water. Babette and Nicolas found Roban Rey, son of the accused, near the
faucet. Roban was sitting atop the steps of the kitchen stairway talking with Nicolas. While Nicolas
was standing beside the faucet waiting for his pail to be filled with water, he was shot twice by
Saturnino Rey from the window of his bedroom which was about four (4) meters away. The
shooting was witnessed by Roban Rey and Babette Pagayunan, who was about three (3) meters
away from the faucet. After he was hit, Nicolas said to Roban: "I was hit." Soon after, Nicolas fell in
front of Roban Roban went up their house and told Saturnino Rey: "Daddy you hit Colas." Babette
went home and reported the shooting incident to her mother who fainted. The Pagayunan sisters

and their group went to the place to get the body of Nicolas, who was taken to the Medicare
Hospital in Pilar, Capiz, where he was given a first-aid treatment. Thereafter, Nicolas was taken to
Roxas City but died before reaching the hospital.
On the morning of May 29, 1983, Patrolmen Jose Ballera and Hanzel Villareal conducted an
investigation at the place of the shooting incident and found an empty shell (Exh. C) below the
window of the room of Saturnino Rey. During the investigation, Roban Rey, in the presence of the
police investigators and Romeo Bacalocos, pointed to the direction of the window of the room of
his father, Saturnino Rey, as the place where the firing came from.
2

The trial court found the defendant-appellant guilty, as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00, to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 for moral damages and to pay the costs.
From this judgment, the accused Saturnino Rey appealed. His counsel assails the trial court for completely believing
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Counsel points to certain facts and circumstances of weight and
substance which the trial court allegedly overlooked, misapplied or misinterpreted, and which, if considered, will
materially alter the result, to wit: "1) the fact that it was summer and the water system connections, particularly those
in the higher level of the town, were not functioning; 2) the fact that the water faucet at the backyard of the accused-
appellant was not functioning, not merely because the water pressure was too weak for the faucet to function but also
because the water connection had been disconnected (t.s.n., p. 283); 3) the fact that the houses of both the
deceased and the accused-appellant and their immediate neighborhood are on the same higher level of the town; 4)
the fact that the household of the accused-appellant were getting their water supply from Martin Cunada, their
nearest neighbor, because he had a water pump, several water storage tanks, and a well; 5) the fact that the
immediate neighbors of the Pagayunans had wells, water storage tanks, as well as water system connections and
some of their neighbors were relatives and close friends of the Pagayunans; 6) the fact that the Pagayunans were
known and seen to obtain their water supply from these immediate neighbors; 7) the fact that the Pagayunans (who
were relatively new in the neighborhood) had never drawn water from the faucet of the accused-appellant; 8) the fact
that the house of the accused-appellant was at least 120 meters away from the house of the deceased; 9) the fact
that the only access to the accused-appellant's bedroom window from the outside was through the shuttered gate of
the wire-enclosed vegetable garden; 10) the fact that the six-foot-high chicken and barb-wire fence of the vegetable
garden was covered with climbing plants, thereby blocking the view from the windows as well as from the outside into
the bedroom; 11) the fact that the accused- appellant's house was of the bungalow type and the sill of the bedroom
window was only about 3.5 feet from the ground; 12) the fact that the deceased was found just below or near the
bedroom window and within the enclosed vegetable garden, not only by members of the accused-appellant's family
but also by Martin Cunada, a friend and barkada of the deceased, who happened to be passing by just after gunfire
sounded; 13) the fact that Martin Cunada, who stayed for some five minutes at the scene of the incident right after
the shooting, did not see Babette Pagayunan or any other member of the deceased's family anywhere in the vicinity;
14) the fact that after the shooting only Babette Pagayunan of the Pagayunan household was seen with the
deceased and the Rey children at the Medicare Hospital and in Roxas City; 15) the fact that none of the four water
containers the deceased allegedly brought with him to the accused-appellant's backyard faucet was ever found or
seen before, during, or after the shooting; 16) the fact that except for Dr. Buenvenida, all the other four (4) witnesses
of the prosecution concocted some material portions of their testimonies; 17) the fact that in a small rural town in the
interior the inhabitants sup and sleep early; and 18) the fact that it was the night of the town fiesta and older folks
tend to be more security-conscious."
3

The appeal is without merit. The circumstances enumerated by the counsel for the appellant are of little importance
because the accused-appellant, Saturnino Rey, had admitted having fired the shot that killed the deceased Nicolas
Pagayunan. His testimony in court reads, as follows:

Q Now, will you please inform the Honorable Court at about 8:40 in the night of
May 28, 1983 where you were and what you were doing.
A I was inside my room of my house.
Q And what were you doing.
A I was lying down.
Q Did you have any companion in your room that night and at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Inform the court who were your companions.
A My child aging four years of age with my second wife.
Q What happened while you were in your room that night and that time with your
child?
A There was a person who opened my window, the window of my room where I
was lying down.
Q Now do you know who was that person who opened the window of your room
where you were, lying down?
A No, sir. At first I did not know.
Q Will you please describe to the Honorable Court the room where you were
staying in and the window which was opened?
A The frontage of my house is facing (witness pointing to the western direction).
The elevation of the flooring is one foot. The height of the window from the floor
is this high (witness referring to the window of the courtroom estimated to be 2
1/2 feet).
Q After you noticed that a person opened your window, the window of your
bedroom, what happened?
A I felt for my pistol.
Q What happened after that?
A I sat on the bed and asked, Who are you?'
Q And did you receive an answer after asking who was that person?
A No, sir.

Q What happened after you received no answer?
A I fired a shot.
Q How many times did you fire your pistol?
A Twice.
Q By the way, how wide was that window in your room?
A About 1 1/2 meters wide.
Q And did you see anybody to whom or at whom you fired your pistol?
A The first shot that I fired was upward, on the air.
Q My question to you is, did you see any person outside the window?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to discern the facial features of the person you saw at the
window?
ATTY. PATRICIO:
Objection, your Honor.
COURT:
All right, reform.
ATTY. ABELA:
Q How well did you see the person you saw at your window?
A Silhouette.
Q Will you be able to recognize the person you saw at your window that night?
A No, sir.
Q And what was the person you saw at your window doing when you fired the
shot?
A You mean the first shot?
Q The first shot what was the person doing.?

A After he pushed the shutter of the window he put his hand down.
Q And at that time you fired the second shot what was the man doing.?
A I was looking at him and he had the action of drawing something and that was
the time I fired the second shot.
Q By the way how close was the man to your window that night?
A Just like this, from myself up to Atty. Abela (distance estimated to be 1 1/2
meters).
Q My question to you is, how close was that man to the window of your room?
A He was right at the window.
Q And what part of the body of that man can be seen by you?
A From the waist.
Q And how far were you seated on your bed, how far was your bed from the wall
of the window?
A About one foot.
Q What happened after you fired the second shot directed at that man at your
window?
A I gave out an alarm to my children.
4

Having invoked self-defense, it was incumbent upon the defendant-appellant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the fact that he acted in self-defense. The defendant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself admitted the killing.
5
In this regard, defendant-appellant failed to discharge the burden reposed upon him by
law to prove self-defense. The trial court found that the testimony of the defendant-appellant gave evasive and
ambiguous answers before the court.
6
We have examined the record of the case and we find no cogent reason to
disturb said findings of the trial court. The witnesses for the prosecution had no evil motive to testify falsely against
the appellant.
Besides, defendant-appellant's testimony, even if true, does not establish a case of self-defense. There is no
evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. The defendant-appellant merely testified that he saw a
person open the window of his bedroom and when he inquired who the person was and received no answer, he fired
a shot into the air then, when said person lifted his right arm chest high,
7
he fired the second shot. The interval
between the two shots was only about three (3) to five (5) seconds.
8
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated in
self-defense, there must be an actual sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.
9
The raising of the right arm chest high alone by an unarmed person cannot be
considered unlawful aggression. Absent unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased, there cannot be self-
defense on the part of the accused.

The defendant-appellant also failed to rebut the presumption that the shooting was done with criminal intention. His
conduct after the shooting incident was inconsistent with the conduct of a person who had innocently shot a person
by accident. It would appear that he did not do anything to help his victim who was lying down on the ground,
bleeding and moaning. He did not go down from his house even after finding that the person he had shot was Nicolas
Pagayunan. Instead, he uttered curses.
10
Then, very early the next morning, at about 5:30 o'clock, he left his house
and stayed with his brother in a neighboring municipality,
11
and did not go home even to help the police in their
investigation.
12
Flight is an indication of a guilty mind.
The defendant-appellant also contends that treachery or alevosia was not charged in the information filed against
him, or proven by the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
The contention is without merit. The information filed in this case specifically stated that the accused, Saturnino Rey,
armed with a.45 caliber pistol, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot Nicolas Pagayunan "in a sudden and
unexpected manner." This is sufficient allegation of treachery because a sudden and unexpected attack, without the
slightest provocation on the person of the one attacked is the essence of treachery or alevosia. It is not necessary
that the information should use specifically the word "alevosia" or treachery. It is sufficient if the information alleges
facts in clear and explicit language which would show treachery or alevosia without the use of the specific word.
13

Treachery in the shooting of Nicolas Pagayunan was established by the testimony of Babette Pagayunan who
declared that the accused-appellant suddenly and without warning shot the deceased as the latter was waiting for his
pail to be filled with water and while talking to the son of the accused-appellant. The attack was sudden, unexpected,
without warning, and without giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression. In fact, the
deceased did not sense any danger that he would be shot by the defendant-appellant as there was no previous
grudge or misunderstanding between them.
The claim of the defendant-appellant that he had fired a warning shot into the air appears to be an afterthought.
Babette Pagayunan categorically declared that her brother, Nicolas Pagayunan, was hit on the first shot. Her
testimony, on cross examination, reads as follows:
Q How many shots did Saturnino Rey the accused, direct to your brother?
A Two shots were delivered by Saturnino Rey. The first shot hit my brother. I did
not know whether the second shot hit my brother. After the first shot my brother
staggered towards Roban.
14

Besides, the shots were fired in rapid succession so that the first shot could not serve as a warning shot. Babette
Pagayunan stated:
Q How long after the first shot did you hear the second shot?
A Seconds only. The interval was seconds.
Q So that the second shot came right after the first shot?
A Yes, sir.
15

The defendant-appellant, Saturnino Rey, also testified, as follows:

Q You testified a while ago that you fired two shots. How long after you fired the
first shot that you also fired the second shot?
A The interval was only seconds.
Q About two seconds?
A Three seconds or more.
Q But it could not be more than five seconds, right?
A No, sir.
16

As the People's counsel observed, if the version of the defendant-appellant were true, the empty shell would have
fallen near the defendant-appellant's bed, inside his room, and not outside the house where Pat. Hanzel Villareal
found it; and that the first shot would have hit a part of the house.
The trial court, therefore, correctly found the offense committed by the defendant-appellant to be murder, qualified as
it was by treachery.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, Regalado, JJ, With reservations as to the penalty only
consistent with my dissent in P. vs. Millora.



















































































SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116918. June 19, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONFILO MARTINEZ y DE LA ROSA, JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE, accused.
BONFILO MARTINEZ y DELA ROSA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
In an information filed before Branch 121 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City on March 8, 1994,
accused-appellant Bonfilo Martinez and two other unidentified persons were charged with the special complex crime
of robbery with rape allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th of December, 1991 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with
intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation employed upon the persons of MICHAEL BUENVINIDA Y
SOLMAYOR, POL BONGGAT, SHERWIN SOLMAYOR, JONATHAN BONGGAT, JUNIOR SOLMAYOR, GLORIA
SOLMAYOR and GLORIVIC BANDAYANON Y QUIAJO while the aforesaid persons were inside the house of
ERNESTO BUENVINIDA viewing television program, said accused, all armed with guns of unknown caliber, tied the
hands of the occupants of the house, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away
the following articles belonging to ERNESTO BUENVINIDA, to wit:
1. Radio Cassette Recorder worth P3,000.00
2. Assorted imported perfumes 30,000.00
3. Assorted imported canned goods 5,000.00
4. Cash money amounting to 8,000.00
5. Cash money in U.S. Dollar $1,000.00

that in the course of said robbery, said accused, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with one GLORIVIC BANDAYON Y QUIAJO,
against the latter‘s will and without her consent.
[1]

Although the two Does remained unknown and at large, appellant was arrested on March 3, l994 for soliciting
funds for a fictitious volleyball competition.
[2]
After his arrest, he was confined at the Bagong Silang Sub-station
detention cell for an hour and was later transferred to the Caloocan City Jail.
[3]
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty
during his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-46704 (94) on March 21, 1994.
[4]

As collated from the transcripts of the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Glorivic Bandayanon
[5]
and
Michael Buenvinida,
[6]
the indicated coverage of which yield the particular facts hereunder narrated, the
circumstances attendant to the crime charged are detailed in the paragraphs that follow.
Michael Buenvinida, Michelle Buenvinida, Gloria Solmayor, Sherwin Solmayor, Junior (JR) Solmayor, Paul
Bonggat, Jonathan Bonggat and Glorivic Bandayanon were in Ernesto and Cornelia Buenvinida‘s house situated at
Lot 25, Block 20, Wallnut St., Rainbow Village, Caloocan City when the crime was committed on December 28, 1991.
Michael and Michelle are the children of Ernesto and Cornelia. Gloria is a sister-in-law of Cornelia who was in
the house for a visit, while Sherwin, Junior, Paul and Jonathan are Cornelia‘s nephews. Glorivic is a friend of
Cornelia who volunteered to look after the latter‘s children while she is in Sweden. Ernesto was at the office at the
time of the commission of the crime.
While the occupants of the house were watching a television show in the living room at around 6:30 P.M.,
Michael noticed a man wearing short pants and holding a handgun jump over the low fence of their house. The man
entered the house through its unlocked front door and introduced himself to the surprised group as a policeman. The
intruder then told them that Michael‘s father got involved in a stabbing incident in the local basketball court. As if on
cue, two men followed the first man in entering the house and promptly thereafter covered their faces with
handkerchiefs. These two were wearing long pants and also carried handguns. The first man who entered the house
did not cover his face.
With guns pointed at them, the occupants of the house were brought to the master‘s bedroom where they were
tied and detained by the three intruders.
Later, one of the armed men, identified by Michael as herein appellant, untied Michael and ordered him to pull
out the plugs of the appliances in the house, such as the television set, the V.H.S. player and the radio cassette
recorder. Appellant and the other masked man then began to search the house for valuables in the living room and
in the kitchen.
Meanwhile, the first man remained in the master‘s bedroom and found cash money, in pesos and dollars, and
bottles of perfume. The men then placed in a big bag the radio cassette player, canned goods, money and perfumes
that they had found inside the house.
Thereafter, the first intruder, whom Glorivic referred to as the mastermind of the group, returned to the master‘s
bedroom and asked the terrified group for jewelries. Unable to get any jewelry, he brought Glorivic to the children‘s
(Michael and Michelle‘s) bedroom opposite the master‘s bedroom. Upon entering the room, the man turned on the
lights there. In the meanwhile, his two masked companions continued looking around the house for other valuables.
Inside the bedroom, the ostensible leader of the gang untied Glorivic and ordered her to search the room for
jewelries. After Glorivic failed to find any, the man directed her to remove her clothes and pointed his gun at
Glorivic‘s head. Despite her pleas and cries, the man removed the shirt, long pants and underwear of Glorivic while
keeping the gun leveled at her. Shortly after, the man put the gun on top of the ironing board beside the bed, then
pushed Glorivic towards the bed and lay on top of her. Glorivic‘s resistance proved to be futile as the man was able
to violate her chastity.

Before the first man could leave the room, another member of the group entered and pushed Glorivic again to
the bed when she was just about to put on her dress. Upon entering the room, the second man‘s cloth cover tied
around his face fell and hang around his neck. After threatening to kill her, the man put a pillow on her face, forcibly
spread Glorivic‘s legs and has sexual congress with her. Glorivic would later point to appellant during the trial as this
second man.
After the second man was through, the third man came in. While Glorivic was still sitting on the bed and crying,
the third man took the bed sheet and covered her face with it. Just like what his companions did before him, the third
man had sexual intercourse with Glorivic through force and intimidation, but not without first removing the
handkerchief tied over his face.
Michael was able to see the three malefactors enter and leave the room one after the other as the door of the
master‘s bedroom was left open. He was also able to hear Glorivic crying and her implorations to her tormentors in
the opposite room.
After the consummation of the odious act, the third man told Glorivic to dress up. Glorivic felt blood flowing
down her thighs as she put on her clothes. Thereafter, the third man tied her up and brought her back to the
company of the other occupants of the house. Michael saw Glorivic with disheveled hair and wearing her pants
turned inside out, with blood on the lower parts.
The felons left after intimating to the group by way of a threat that they were going to explode a hand
grenade. Around five minutes later, after ascertaining that the culprits had left, Michael and the others untied each
other. Thereafter, they went to the house of his father‘s friend located two blocks away and, from there, they
proceeded to the Urduja police detachment.
Glorivic met appellant again on March 7, 1994. Policemen came to her place of work and asked her to come
with them as they had a person in custody whom they suspected to be herein appellant. At the Caloocan City Jail,
Glorivic was made to face eight detainees. She was able to readily recognize appellant among the group because of
the mole on his right cheek. Before she picked him out from the other men, she carefully saw to it that the one she
pointed out was really appellant.
On the part of Michael, he stated that he was fetched by policemen on March 7, 1994 at his school to make an
identification at the Dagat-Dagatan police station. Appellant was with six other inmates when they arrived at the
station. Michael pointed to appellant as one of the robbers who entered their house, after readily remembering that
he was the one who ordered him to unplug the appliances. Michael could never be mistaken in appellant‘s identity
because he could not forget the prominent mole and its location on appellant‘s right cheek.
Testifying at the trial,
[7]
appellant denied any participation in the robbery with rape committed in the Buenvinida
residence. Appellant claimed that it was only on March 7, 1994 that he first met Glorivic Bandayanon and insisted
that he does not know Michael Buenvinida.
He claimed that he was in his house in Wawa, Parañaque together with his wife and children the whole day of
December 28, 1991. He moved to Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in 1993 after he was able to find work as a mason
under his brother who lives in the same district. On cross-examination, appellant denied having visited his brother at
Bagong Silang from 1991 to 1992. However, upon further questioning by the public prosecutor, appellant admitted
that he made several visits to his brother in 1991. Moreover, he explained that it usually took him three hours to
travel to Caloocan City from Parañaque by public utility bus.
Giving credence to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and rejecting appellant‘s defense of alibi,
the trial court
[8]
found appellant guilty of the composite crime of robbery with rape. Although the proper imposable
penalty is death,
[9]
considering the lower court‘s finding of two aggravating circumstances of nocturnidad and use of a
deadly weapon, appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua in observance of the then constitutional prohibition
against the imposition of capital punishment. With regard to his civil liabilities, appellant was ordered to indemnify

Ernesto Buenvinida in the sum of P73,000.00 as the value of his stolen and unrecovered personal properties, and to
pay Glorivic Bandaya P30,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
[10]

In this present appellate review, appellant inceptively faults the lower court for convicting him despite the
supposedly undependable and untrustworthy identification made by the eyewitnesses. He claims that Glorivic
Bandayanon and Michael Buenvinida could have been mistaken in their identification
[11]
because (l) of the long
interval of time before they were able to confront him; (2) his face was covered with a handkerchief as they
themselves narrated in court; and (3) they could have been so gravely terrified by the criminal act as to have their
mental faculties impaired.
When an accused assails the identification made by witnesses, he is in effect attacking the credibility of those
witnesses who referred to him as the perpetrator of the crime alleged to have been committed.
[12]
The case then turns
on the question of credibility.
It has long been a well-entrenched rule of evidence and procedure that the issue of credibility of witnesses is
almost invariably within the exclusive province of a trial court to determine, under the principle that the findings of trial
courts deserve respect from appellate tribunals.
[13]
The foregoing rule notwithstanding, we expended considerable
time and effort to thoroughly examine the records and objectively assay the evidence before us, considering the
gravity of the offense charged. However, we find no compelling reasons to overturn the lower court‘s conclusion on
the accuracy and correctness of the witnesses‘ identification of appellant as one of the persons who robbed the
house of the Buenvinidas and raped Glorivic.
The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the prosecution were not only consistent with and corroborative of
each other. The transcripts of stenographic notes which we have conscientiously reviewed, further reveal that their
narrations before the lower court were delivered in a clear, coherent and unequivocal manner.
There was no perceptible hesitation or uncertainty on the part of Glorivic and Michael when they unerringly
identified appellant during the trial. The unhurried, studious and deliberate manner in which appellant was identified
by them in court added strength to their credibility
[14]
and immeasurably fortified the case of the prosecution.
The records also show that the memory of these witnesses were not in any way affected by the passage of two
years and three months since the tragedy. Glorivic categorically stated on the witness stand that the lapse of those
years did not impair her memory and she could still identify those who raped her.
[15]
Michael asserted that he could
still positively identify appellant because of the latter‘s mole, as well as the several opportunities of the former to take
a good look at appellant‘s face during the robbery,
[16]
and the same is true with Glorivic. Appellant‘s mole on his right
cheek provided a distinctive mark for recollection and which, coupled with the emotional atmosphere during the
incident, would be perpetually etched in the minds of the witnesses.
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of
the assailants create a lasting impression on the victim‘s minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.
[17]

While appellant claims that his face was covered during the commission of the crime, there were providential
points in time when the two witnesses were able to freely see his face and scan his facial features closely to as to
enable them to identify him later on.
Although appellant placed a pillow on her face. Glorivic declared that when the latter two offenders raped her,
their faces were no longer covered. In the case of appellant, the handkerchief on his face fell upon his entering the
room and he left it that way while he raped Glorivic.
[18]
And when the latter two transgressors entered the house, their
faces were then exposed and it was only when they were already inside the house that they covered their faces with
handkerchiefs.
[19]
These circumstances gave Michael and Glorivic sufficient time and unimpeded opportunity to
recognize and identify appellant.

There is no evidence to show that the two eyewitnesses were so petrified with fear as to result in subnormal
sensory functions on their part. Contrarily, in a recently decided case, we held that fear for one‘s life may even cause
the witness to be more observant of his surroundings.
[20]
The ample opportunity to observe and the compelling
reason to identify the wrongdoer are invaluable physiognonomical and psychological factors for accuracy in such
identification.
The records do not disclose any improper motive on the part of the witnesses to falsely point to appellant as
one of the robber-rapists. Appellant even admitted that he did not know Glorivic and Michael prior to the commission
of the crime. It is doctrinally settled that in the absence of evidence showing that the prosecution witnesses were
actuated by improper motive, their identification of the accused as the assailant should be given full faith and
credit.
[21]

Where conditions of visibility are favorable, as those obtaining in the Buenvinida residence when the crimes
were committed, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertions as to the identity of the malefactor
should be accepted as trustworthy.
[22]

For his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court should not have ordered him to pay
the value of the unrecovered personalties to Ernesto Buenvinida, damages to Glorivic Bandayanon, and the costs of
suit because he is not criminally liable as shown by the failure of the witnesses to properly identify him.
We find speciosity in this second contention of appellant because such argument flows from the premise that he
is not guilty. As the trial court found, and with which we resolutely agree as already explained, appellant is culpable
beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime of robbery with rape committed in the early evening of
December 28, l99l at Caloocan City.
However, we deem worthy of elucidation the matter of the value of the items established to have been stolen
from the house of the Buenvinidas. Incidentally, appellant claims in his brief that the amounts alleged in the
information as the bases of his civil liability for robbery were just concocted and founded on speculation and
conjectures.
[23]

To prove the value of the burglarized properties, the prosecution presented an affidavit executed by Ernesto
Buenvinida
[24]
on March 7, 1994, containing a list of the stolen movables and with their corresponding values, as now
found in the information. This affidavit was identified and marked as Exhibit H
[25]
for the prosecution during the
testimony of SPO4 Abner Castro,
[26]
the police officer who conducted an investigation of the incident on December
28, 1991. In addition to testifying on the arrest and investigation of appellant, Castro repeated in open court the
respective values of the personal properties as explained to him by Ernesto Buenvinida and how he helped
Ernesto in the preparation thereof.
[27]
The same was formally offered in evidence
[28]
to prove, among others, the facts
and amounts contained therein and as testified to by witness Castro. Although objected to by appellant as self-
serving,
[29]
the lower court admitted said document for the purpose for which it was offered and as part of the
testimony of said witness.
[30]

It may be theorized, and in fact appellant in effect so postulates, that the prosecution has failed to prove the
value of the stolen properties and, for lack of evidence thereon, the civil liability therefor as adjudged by the court
below may not be sustained. It is true that the evidence presented thereon consisted of the testimony of the
investigator, Abner Castro, who based his evaluation on the report to him by Ernesto Buenvinida. These are legal
aspects worth discussing for future guidance.
While it is claimed that hearsay testimony was involved, it is actually and not necessarily so. The rule that
hearsay evidence has no probative value does not apply here, since SPO4 Abner Castro was presented as a witness
and testified on two occasions, during which he explained how the value of the stolen properties was arrived at for
purposes of the criminal prosecution. During his testimony on his investigation report and the affidavit of Ernesto
Buenvinida on the amounts involved, appellant had all the opportunity to cross-examine him on the correctness
thereof; and it was this opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by the

witness are hearsay. And, said documents having been admitted as part of testimony of the policeman, they shall
accordingly be given the same weight as that to which his testimony may be entitled.
Again, even under the rule on opinions of ordinary witnesses, the value of the stolen items was established. It
is a standing doctrine that the opinion of a witness is admissible in evidence on ordinary matters known to all men of
common perception, such as the value of ordinary household articles.
[31]
Here, the witness is not just an ordinary
witness, but virtually an expert, since his work as an investigator of crimes against property has given him both the
exposure to and experience in fixing the current value of such ordinary articles subject of the crime at
bar. Incidentally, it is significant that appellant never dared to cross-examine on the points involved, which
opportunity to cross-examine takes the testimony of Castro out of the hearsay rule, while the lack of objection to the
value placed by Castro bolsters his testimony under the cited exception to the opinion rule.
Also not to be overlooked is the fact that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice, in this case of the
value of the stolen goods, because these are matter of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration.
[32]
The lower court may, as it obviously did, take such judicial notice motu proprio.
[33]
Judicial
cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being
equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve.
[34]
Surely, matters like the value of
the appliances, canned goods and perfume (especially since the trial court was presided by a lady judge) are
undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Finally, as a matter of law and not on the excuse that after all appellant cannot satisfy his civil liability, the real
value of the asported properties would nonetheless be irrelevant to the criminal liability of appellant. Insofar as the
component crime of robbery is concerned, the same was committed through violence against or intimidation of
persons, and not through force upon things, hence the value of the property subject of the crime is immaterial.
[35]
The
special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his
cohorts, with all acts of rape on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime. The value of the objects of
the apoderamiento relates only to the civil aspect, which we have already resolved.
One final complementary disposition is called for. Victim Glorivic Bandayanon was subjected by appellant and
his co-conspirators to multiple rape, and under humiliating circumstances equivalent to augmented ignominy since
she was abused by the three accused successively and virtually in the presence of one after the other. The award
of P30,000.00 for moral damages made by the court below should accordingly be amended.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in full, with the sole
MODIFICATION that the damages awarded to the offended party, Glorivic Bandayanon, is hereby increased
to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.



SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130613. October 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTEMIO AQUINO a.k.a. ARTEM and ERNESTO AQUINO
a.k.a. ERNING, accused.

ARTEMIO AQUINO a.k.a. ARTEM, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The brothers ARTEMIO AQUINO a.k.a. Artem and ERNESTO AQUINO a.k.a. Erning were charged with murder for
the killing of Ricardo Junio on 29 July 1984 in Sitio Parongking, Bgy. San Miguel, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Soon after,
Ernesto Aquino was apprehended, tried, but eventually acquitted, while Artemio Aquino remained at large until he
was finally arrested sometime in December 1996. Thereafter he was tried. On 23 May 1997 the Regional Trial Court -
Br. 43 of Dagupan City found Artemio Aquino guilty of murder; hence, this appeal pertains only to him.
The evidence for the prosecution adduced through witness Eduardo Barte was that at around 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of 29 July 1984 he was in Sitio Parongking, Bgy. San Miguel, Calasiao, Pangasinan, to buy cigarettes when
he saw accused Artemio Aquino stab Ricardo Junio. Artemio first approached Ricardo who was seated on a bamboo
bench and talked to him. After a short while, Artemio stabbed the unsuspecting Ricardo with a 10-inch bladed
weapon. Wounded, Ricardo stood up and ran towards the makeshift bamboo bridge; Ernesto pursued him. In the
process, the victim fell from the bamboo bridge into the water. Artemio then proceeded to his house nearby.
According to Eduardo, he pulled Ricardo out of the water but the latter was already dead so Eduardo placed his body
on the river bank and informed Rosario, wife of Ricardo, about the incident.
Artemio denied participation in the crime. He averred that at the time of the incident he was at home taking care of
his children.
Finding the qualifying circumstance of treachery to have attended the commission of the crime, the court a quo
convicted accused Artemio Aquino of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of Ricardo Junio P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P38,700.00 as actual
damages, plus the costs of the suit.xliv[1]
Accused-appellant Artemio Aquino submits that the testimony of prosecution witness Eduardo Barte was fabricated
as he did not see the actual stabbing.
This contention is untenable. Other than this sweeping conclusion, the defense did not cite instances, much less
present evidence, that would persuade this Court to conclude that Eduardo's testimony was a mere concoction.
The trial court found the testimony of Eduardo Barte to be "direct, clear cut, straightforward and positive." On the
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment made by the trial court
because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity and
credibility of witnesses in the process of unearthing the truth.xliv[2] Unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses must be respected.xliv[3] In the instant case, we agree with the trial court that Eduardo Barte
identified accused-appellant as the assailant. His identification was positive, categorical, consistent and without any
showing of ill motive which should prevail over the negative, unsubstantiated, and self-serving evidence of alibi and
denial of accused-appellant.xliv[4]
Accused-appellant next claims that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. This
insistence is meritorious. Circumstances qualifying a killing to murder, such as treachery, must be proven as
indubitably as the crime itself. Thus, the elements of treachery in a given case must be proved as well: (a) the

employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and, (b)
that said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.xliv[5]
In the instant case, Eduardo first saw accused-appellant and the victim engage in a casual conversation prior to the
attack, but when he looked at them again accused-appellant was already stabbing Ricardo with a 10-inch knife.
Admittedly, the attack was frontal as shown by the stab wound sustained by the victim. Ricardo was unarmed and
totally unsuspecting of the attack. Nonetheless, the prosecution failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that
accused-appellant deliberately adopted such means of execution. Significantly, Eduardo did not even testify on how
the attack was commenced -
Pros. Finez: Sometime on July 29, 1984 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, do you remember where you were?
Witness Barte: Yes, sir x x x x I was at Barangay Parongking, sir.
Q: Who were your companions at that time 6:00 p.m.?
A: I was alone, sir.
Q: Why did you go to Parongking on that day?
A: Because I intended to buy a cigarette in a certain store, sir.
Q: Were you able to buy a cigarette on that day?
A: Not anymore, sir.
Q: Why, Mr. Witness?
A: Because I already witnessed a crime involving the stabbing of Ricardo Junio by Ernesto Aquino and Artemio
Aquino, sir.
Q: What was that crime about?
A: That crime about the stabbing of Ricardo Junio by Artemio Aquino, sir.
Q: What kind of weapon was used in stabbing Ricardo Junio by Artemio Aquino?
A: A bladed weapon, sir x x x x Around ten (10) inches in length, sir.
Q: What was the position of Ricardo Junio when he was stabbed by Artemio Aquino?
A: He was seated, sir.
Q: How about Ernesto Aquino, what was his participation if any in stabbing Ricardo Junio?
A: x x x x when Ricardo Junio was about to leave, he still chased him, sir.
Q: When Ricardo Junio was stabbed by Artemio Aquino, what did Ricardo Junio do, if any?

A: He stood up and ran, sir.
Q: To what direction when he ran?
A: He intended to cross the bridge at Sitio Balani, sir.
Q: Was he able to cross the bridge?
A: He was not able to cross the bridge, sir x x x x [b]ecause he was chased by Ernesto Aquino, sir.
Q: And what happened after that chasing?
A: He fell on the bridge, sir.
Q: When you saw Ricardo Junio fell from the bridge, what did you do, if any?
A: I went down to the river, sir x x x x To help him sir.
Q: Were you able to help Ricardo Junio?
A: Not anymore because when I lifted his body from the river, he is (sic) already dead, sir.
Q: What did you do after lifting the body of Ricardo Junio?
A: I placed his body on the bank of the river, sir.
Q: By the way, have you signed any sworn statement in connection with this case?
A: Yes, sir.xliv[6]
The attendance of treachery in the commission of the crime when alleged in the information qualifies the killing to
murder. As a qualifying circumstance, treachery must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the
instant case, we find that the second requisite for treachery to be present, i.e., that the accused deliberately adopted
the means of execution, was not satisfactorily proved. It was not even established how the initial attack was
launched. In People v. Adocxliv[7] we held that the failure of the prosecution to present evidence as to the manner in
which the altercation started precludes a finding that the killing was qualified by treachery. Thus, in the instant case,
treachery could not be properly appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. Accused-appellant is, therefore, guilty
only of homicide.
Under Art. 249 of The Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal the range of which is from
twelve (12) years one (1) day and twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no
modifying circumstance, the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree
or prision mayor the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods,
while the maximum shall be taken from reclusion temporal medium or from fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and
one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.

The trial court erred in awarding P38,700.00 as actual damages to the heirs of Ricardo Junio, the same not having
been adequately established. No receipts were presented to support the claim. However, we deem it proper to award
P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages pursuant to People v. Candarexliv[8] -
Anent accused-appellant's civil liability, the award of P30,165.00 actual damages for the expenses incurred as a
result of the death of the victim should be deleted as there were no receipts presented evidencing the same.
However, as the heirs of the victim clearly incurred funeral expenses, P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages should
be awarded. This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and
not for the purpose of indemnification.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, instead of convicting
accused-appellant of MURDER and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, the Court declares ARTEMIO AQUINO
a.k.a. Artem guilty of HOMICIDE and imposes upon him an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years two (2)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, and orders him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Junio P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as nominal damages, and the costs of the suit. The
award of P38,700.00 as actual damages is DELETED for lack of sufficient factual basis.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City
Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to resolve.
Considering the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We impleaded the People of the Philippines as party
respondents herein in a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:

Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three
other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan)
placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their
game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the
unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which
ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. The information dated
9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with
discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid
accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in
a reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt
operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO
PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused his
untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A
LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED
AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon.
However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)

Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the first
issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes 'intent' (p. 96,
Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that
the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the
accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the
accused acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be
fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction
tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or
exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense
under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We agree with
the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a
person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence
being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC,
in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong . . . (Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are
products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates
to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but
may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently
handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of
age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason
behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.
1
In expounding
on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert
2
has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because ... the
infant
3
(has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)

lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act.
On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they are
presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were
"capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. "
4
The
preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment
as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not
therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two different concepts.
Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence,
freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an
essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with
intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must
discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but
below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said Article would
reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non
distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he cites
the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the ruling
he now invokes, which reads:
That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that she. .
."with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla .
. ." into a deep place of the Peñaranda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got
drowned and died right then and there.' This allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew
what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of pushing her victim into deep water and that
she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment." What We meant
was that the combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the part of the
accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly contend that since the
information now in question alleged "discernment", it in effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the
Idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him should
have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). He
submits that, considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to his minority, P.D.
1508 applies to his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an
original arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not
correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the
offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314;
Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3)
of P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; ...
(emphasis supplied)

Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for
by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after
considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability.
5

The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of
P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any
circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case
ofRoyales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary
Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial
on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book 1, 12th Ed., 1981, p. 213.
2 Albert, the Revised Penal Code, Manila: University Publishing Co., Inc., 1946, p. 22.
3 Ibid., referring to article 12, Number 2. See footnote, p. 22.
4 Ibid., P. 82.
5 Pe Cecillio and Tadiar, Alfredo, 'Katarungang Pambarangay': Dynamics of Compulsory
Conciliation. Manila': UST Press, 1979 p. 65-66.
G.R. No. L-3008, Soriano v. People, 88 Phil. 368
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

March 19, 1951
G.R. No. L-3008
FEDERICO SORIANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Felix V. Macalalag for petitioner.
First Assistance Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Acting Solicitor Antonio Consing for respondent.
JUGO, J.:
Federico Soriano was charged on August 22, 1945, with the crime of theft of one electric motor marked "Cyclix," with
Western Electric Company cable, and one lantern slide projector, with their corresponding accessories, for the
operation of motion pictures, valued at P6,000, belonging to the eagle Cinema Co., Inc., represented by its President
Manager, Teodoro S. Benedicto.
After trial he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and sentenced to suffer and indeterminate penalty
of from six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. He appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which modified the above judgment and sentenced him to three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of
the law, and to pay the costs, ordering the lantern slide projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator (Exhibit
D) be returned to the owner, the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc.
The defendant filed a petition for certiorari in this Court against the Court of Appeals. Only questions of law are raised
which may be reduced to the issue whether or not the acts of the accused, as found by the Court of Appeals,
Constitute theft.
The Court of Appeals, in a carefully prepared opinion, held as follows:
Taking into account the respective contentions of the parties and the evidence produced in support thereof, We are
of the opinion despite Emilia Saenz' letter (Exhibit E) where she writes to Benedicto that Federico Soriano was only
in charge of collecting the rents and of transmitting them to her, that appellant was their representative and duly
appointed substitute administrator in her stead. It seems also clear that, because of the disturbance caused by the
war, the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., was indebted to the Saenz for rents due on account of the lease; and that appellant
in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him (Exhibit 16) could have sued said debtor to foreclose the mortgage

executed by the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., in favor of his principals, if he could not have come to a better
understanding with Teodoro S. Benedicto. It is no longer disputed that the properties of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc.,
in the building were losts, and that the lantern slide projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator (Exhibit D)
have been found in the house and in the possession of the appellant after having repeatedly denied any knowledge
of the equipment and accessories of the Cine and disclined any responsibility for their loss. Considering these facts
that have been fully established in the case, and particularly the manner and circumstances under which said
projector and generator were taken from the building of the Eagle-Theater, can appellant be held liable for the crime
of theft of such properties?
Counsel for appellant contends that the latter is entitled to an acquittal, because in the case at bar
1. All the elements of theft are not present;
2. There was no criminal intent (on the part of the appellant);
3. The action of the appellant is susceptible of two interpretations, both consistent with his innocence or guilt.
Therefore, he should be acquitted; and
4. The guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The crime of theft of which appellant stands charged and convicted, is covered by the 1st paragraph of Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code, which read as follows:
ART. 308 Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent of gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's
consent.
and we agree with counsel for appellant that in order to justify a conviction for theft the following elements must
concur, namely:
(a) that a chattel or personal property must have been taken or abstracted; (b) that there be intent of gian when the
taking away of the article took place; (c) that the property stolen be owned by another; and (d) that in the taking,
neither violence of intimidation against persons or force upon things be employed.
With regard to the "taking," appellant contends that he did not execute this element of theft because being an
attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Saenz, he acted for his principals, and for all intents and purposes of the power

conferred upon him, he was the principal himself and, naturlly, he could not steal something belonging to him under
the principle that "Rei nostrae furtum facera non pos sumus". The power of attorney (Exhibit 16) clearly empowered
the appellant "to ask, demand, sue for, recover, collect and receipt for any and all sums of money . . . and other
things of value of whatever nature or kind," and gave him "full power to do anything requisite and necessary to be
done in the premises as fully as I (Emilia Saenz) could if persnally preent, hereby ratifying and confirming all that my
said attorney adn substitute attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof." But appellant fails to take
two important factors into condieration, to writ: firstly, that when he took, as he finally admitted to have taken, the
lantern slike projector and the "Cyclix" motor generator from the Eagle-Theater, he did not really act in behal and
representation of this principals, for otherwise he would not have repeatedly denied having taken said properties and
insiunated that they had been taken by the Japanese; and secondly, that even his principals could not have taken
and appropriated said properties for themselves without previous and proper action in court, because no mortgage
creditor can foreclose the property mortgage to him witout judicial proceedings. Thus, the doctrones laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Reyes, (Phil., 441)m People vs. Soriano, (50 Phil., 203), Manila
Mercantile Co. vs. Flores (50 Phil., 759) and Levy Hermanos, Inc., vs. Ramirez (60 Phil., 978), on which appellant
builds up his contention, are of no bearing onte case at bar.
Discussing further this element of "taking," it can be added that the projector (Exhibit C) and the generator (Exhibit D)
were in the premises of the Eagle Theather, and that sometime in September, 1944, when the Japanese Ishii ceased
to operate the Cine, appellant received the keys of the building where said equipment was stored. So, the question
that remains to be determined in connection with this point is whether appellant, having received those properties,
could, for the purposes of the crime of theft, take things already in his possession. If is to be remembered that the
apparatus, accessories and equipment of the Cine belonged to the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., though they were
mortgaged to appellant's principals; that the mortgage was never foreclosed, and that neither Teodoro S. Benedicto,
as President, General Manager and majority stockholder of said corporation, nor any other duly authorized person in
this stead, had ever entrusted said poroperties to him for the execution of the mortgage, or for any other purpose.
And even conceding for the sake of argument that with the return of the keys and the delivery of the building to
appellant, he would have received the physical possessionof the machinery therein located, yet, the acquisition of
such possesion did not carry with it the power to exercise any act of dominion over said chattels. Among the leading
cases that can be cited to illustrate this phase of the problem, we quote the following from Question No. XXXI of
Viada (vol. 3, page 433, 4th ed.):
"Is the shepherd, who takes away and converts to his own use several head of cattle under his care, guilty of the
crime of estafa within case No. 5 of articl 548, or of theft, defined and punished in article 533, No. 2, of the Spanish
Penal Code" — The Supreme Court has decided that it was this latter and more serious crime that was committed:

"Considering that the crime of theft is committed when one, with intent of gain, and without using violence or
intimidation against persons, or force upon things, takes away personal property of another without the owner's
consent; and in the present case Manuel Diaz Castilla undoubtedly commited the crime defined, for, with intent of
gian, he took away two bucks and a female goat, against the will of his mater, the owner of said animals, which were
under his care as shepherd; Considering that, in holding that the crime committed was that of theft and not of estafa,
as claimed by the appellant, ignorant of the true elements which constitute the latter crime, the lower court did not
commit any error of law, nor violate any legal provision, as contended by defendant's counsel in support of this
appeal." (Decision rendered on June 23, 1886, published in the Gazette of September 16, p. 189.)
And this is so, because as stated in the case of United States vs. Nieves de Vera, (43 Phil. 1000):
When the delivery of a chattel or cattle has not the effect of transferring the juridicial possession thereof, or title
thereto, it is presumed that the possession of, and title to, the thing so delivered remains in the owner; and the act of
disposing thereof with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner constitutes the crime of theft.
As to the element of "intent of gain," We further declare that whenever a cattle or other personal property vlaue is
abstracted witout the consent of the owner, an dthe evidence on record does not show any other reason for the
abstraction, it is to be presumed and logically inferred that such act was motivated by an intent of gain. (Decision, pp.
7-12.)
The petitioner shields himself behind the power-of-attorney, Exhibit 16, granted to him by Emilia Saenz, the owner of
the building which was rented by the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., the essential part of which reads as follows:
To ask, take, sue for, recover, collect and receive any and all sums of money, debts, dues, accounts, interests,
demands, and other things of value of whatsover nature or kind as may be or hereafter be due, owing, payable or
belonging to the community entrusted to me (Emilia Saenz) in the City of Iloilo an dto have, use, and take any and all
lawful ways and means for the recovery thereof by suit, attachement or otherwise, and to compromise, settle and
agree for the same; (Decision, pp. 5-6.)
It is clear tha tsaid power of attorney did not authorize the petitioner to take away the projector and the generator,
hiding them in his house and denying to the owner and the police authorities that he had them in his possessions,
which was an illegal act, not covered by his power-of-attorney. He was authrorized only to adk, take, sue for, recover,
collect, etc., sums of money, debts, dues, accounts and other things which were or might thereafter be due, etc., to
his principal Emilia Saenz. This authority referred mainly to the collection of the rents of the building rented by the
Eagle Cinema Co., Inc. The projector and the generator were not due or owing to Emilia Saenz. It is not to be
supposed that Saenz herself would have denied the possession of those articles. It is was the purpose of the

petitioner only to protect those instruments from looting, there is o reason why he should have concealed them from
the owner and denied having them.
Even thogh the equipment, including those articles, were mortgaged to Sanez to guaantee the payment of the rents
due on the building, yet there had been no faoreclosure and neither she nor the petitioner had the authority to take
away and conceal those articles from teh owner or the police authorities. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., had the right to
possess said articles.
With regard to the element of taking or asportation, there is not doubt that it existed, notwithstanding that the
peititioner had been entreusted with the keys of the building werhe they were kept. This point has been settled by
Viada, numerious decisions of the Supreme court of Spain and of the Philippines, some of which authorities are cited
above.
As to the element of intent, it is clear that whent the petitioner caried away and concealed from teh owner and the
police authorities the above-mentioned articles, he acted with intent of gian. Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by the overt acts of a person, which in the present case unmistakably point to that intent.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for the writ of certiorari is denied, with costs against the petitioner. so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Under the facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner cannot rightly be convicted of the crime
of theft, because he had not acted with intent of gain. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., was indebted to the Saenz heirs
(represented by Emilia Saenz) for rents of a building leased by the company. The apparatus, accessories and
equipment of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc, contained in the leased building, were mortgaged to Saenz to secure the
payment of siad rents. The petitioner was the representative and duly appointed substitute administrator of the
premises, in place of Emilia Saenz. Indeed, the petitioner could have sued the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., and
foreclosed its mortgage.

The fact that the lantern slide projector and the "Cyclix" morot generator forming part of the equipment of the Eagle
Co., Inc., were taken by the petitioner (after the Japanese Ishii, who had ceased to operate the business, delivered to
the petitioner the keys of the building where said equipment was stored) and removed to and kept in petitioner's
house, is consistent with the theory that the petitioner, to protect the interest of his principals, in good faith believed
that he had the right to do so under his powers and by virtue of the mortgage covering said equipment, espcially
because the petitioner was empowered not only to recover, collect or receive money, debts or dues, but also to take
or recover "other things of value of whatsover nature or kind" that may be due from the lessee. That the petitioner
was wrong in his belief, or had been so over-zealous in the matter as to have even denied that the articles in
question were in this possession, made him at most civilly liable but does not go to show that he acted with intent of
personal porofit. The intent of gain cannot be inferred from the bare acts of the petitioner, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of the case that supply plausible reasons for said acts. Had he sold or tried to dispose of the articles,
intent of gain would have been established.

SECOND DIVISION


EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus -
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
*
JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:



Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26877, affirming the Decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P.
Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about the 22
nd
day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being
then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence
of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].

CONTRARY TO LAW.
[3]



The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.
[4]
He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for
two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was
39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel
where, despite Tina‘s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on
several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina‘s
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April
22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.
[5]
It appeared in
their marriage contract that Eduardo was ―single.‖

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were
able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself
scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her.
[6]
Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not
return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.


Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy
of the marriage contract.
[7]
She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact
already married when they exchanged their own vows.
[8]


For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to
Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time
when he noticed that she had a ―love-bite‖ on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he
declared he was ―single‖ in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage
was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before
marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit
suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail
after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no
longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to
ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount
of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.
[9]


The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo‘s belief, that his first marriage had
been dissolved because of his first wife‘s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for
bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,
[10]
the trial court further ruled that even if the private
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for
bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained

that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer
subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so
only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into
account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United
States v. Peñalosa
[11]
and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.
[12]


The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo‘s defense of good faith and reliance on the
Court‘s ruling in United States v. Enriquez
[13]
were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code,
which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,
[14]
the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that
the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the
marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainant‘s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State
and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and
sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the
contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the
private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña‘s presumptive death as the absent
spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan
[15]
and Domingo v. Court of
Appeals
[16]
to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.

SO ORDERED.
[17]



Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER‘S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE
390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS INFACT AND IN
LAW.
[18]


The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been ―absent‖
for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points
out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether
or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second
paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse‘s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to
prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or
whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by
operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that
he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the
rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it
require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He
further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or
second marriage.


The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. The private complainant was a ―GRO‖ before he married her, and even knew that he was
already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that
she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioner‘s
conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited
the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.
[19]


The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.


The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el
anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.
[20]
The phrase ―or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings‖ was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of
the law were of the impression that ―in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death
after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy.‖
[21]


For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has
been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage.
[22]
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
[23]
Viada avers that a third element

of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is
an essential element of a felony by dolo.
[24]
On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two
elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a
second marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have
juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.
[25]
As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court
of Appeals
[26]
and Mercado v. Tan,
[27]
under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that
there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent
intention constituting the felony of the act.
[28]
He explained that:

… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in
the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong
evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a
person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first
wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her
whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy,
because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.
[29]



As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as
an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.
[30]
Although the words ―with malice‖ do not appear in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word ―voluntary.‖
[31]


Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification
from which another suffers injury.
[32]
When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been
done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.
[33]
Indeed, it is a legal presumption
of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the
contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.
[34]



For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
[35]


In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.
[36]
The prosecution also
proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in
1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should
have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as
required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial
declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate
criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he
could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase ―or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered on the proceedings‖ in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless
words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the
spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she
could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the ―State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.‖ Marriage is
a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the
marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
causes specified by law.
[37]
The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good
order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the

proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of
life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so
serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of
death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
[38]
after the lapse of the period provided for
under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death
of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of
the death of the first spouse. Indeed, ―men readily believe what they wish to be true,‖ is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead
would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals.
[39]
Only with such proof can marriage be
treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
[40]
Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the
dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily
capable of accurate judicial cognizance,
[41]
namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioner‘s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.
[42]
However,
Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse.
[43]


With the effectivity of the Family Code,
[44]
the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390
of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse,
[45]
without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by
this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:
[46]


In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years
where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to
ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of
the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner‘s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a
valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to

harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings
of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela
[47]
that, for purposes of the marriage law, it
is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
[48]
In In Re Szatraw,
[49]
the Court declared that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that
proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in
another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring
a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and
executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption
is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable
time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.
[50]
The Court also took note that a petition for a
declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,
[51]
the Court declared that the words ―proper proceedings‖ in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the
Philippines,
[52]
the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the
courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court
reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that ―the provision of Article 349 or ―before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings‖ is
erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior

marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a
proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.
[53]
A
second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are
not present.
[54]
Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial
decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith
will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise
to bigamy.
[55]
Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse
who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and
convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.
[56]


The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for
the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead.
[57]
Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage;
thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that
the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in
order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the
present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as
provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the latter‘s reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from
a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the
judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present
spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.
[58]



Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things
are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible

clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment
declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause ―before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead x x x‖ should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.
[59]


According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in
some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive
death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
[60]
Before such declaration,
it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.
[61]
Justice Regalado
opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil
Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, ―which requires a summary
hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.‖

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.
[62]


On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in
favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the
cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the
appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,
[63]
where an award of moral damages for bigamy was
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral
damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced
evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The
appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el articulo
2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de
estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta

enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí los
daños de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.
[64]


The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG,
likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant‘s wrongful act or omission.
[65]
An
award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
[66]


Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article
2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of
this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.



Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party
has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any
reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219
[67]
and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing
analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion,
relation, etc.)
[68]


Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the
offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the
petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, ―every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.‖ This provision contains what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one‘s rights but also in the performance of one‘s duties. The standards are the following: act with justice;
give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal
right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
[69]


Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for
its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said
provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.
[70]
If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that ―every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.‖ On the other hand, Article
21 provides that ―any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.‖ The latter provision
is adopted to remedy ―the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes.‖ Whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil
Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.
[71]



In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her
that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents
made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who
even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her
duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner
heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another
before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner‘s chicanery and heartless deception,
the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned
out was not her lawful husband.
[72]


The Court rules that the petitioner‘s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not
sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,
[73]
the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages
for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply
negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the
authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had
for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation,
and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup.
Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App.
Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant‘s conduct was not merely negligent, but
was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra;
Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, ―Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts,‖ 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant‘s
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and ―ashamed
to go out‖ but ―couldn‘t sleep‖ but ―couldn‘t eat,‖ had terrific headaches‖ and ―lost quite a lot of
weight.‖ No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury‘s reasonable allowance of
$1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117
A.2d 298 (App. Div.
[74]
1955).


The Court thus declares that the petitioner‘s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner‘s perfidy, she is not barred from
claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As
held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:
[75]


Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which,
in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which
is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for
damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes,
[1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the
court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife,
whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to
have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently
committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be
a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by
the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to
assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for
such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v.
Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant‘s misrepresentation. The criminal
relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the
defendant‘s fraud for which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation
have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17
L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434,
97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public
policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was
conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant‘s
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the
law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of
a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an
illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520,
154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.
[76]



Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.


IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR.,
NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision
1
dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No.
13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio
Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest
and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay
the costs."
2
The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's
decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of
Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose
instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole
Division.
3

On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
4
on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified
the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.
Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos,
5
the appellate court certified this case to us for review.
6

The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed

Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities.
Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja
immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion,
Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the
municipal building.
7
Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the
incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went
back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made
to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the
killing incident allegedly occurred.
8
There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an
underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom.
9
The group stayed for about an hour during which time
Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate
surroundings.
10
The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno,
accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta
Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in
Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C.
Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already there conducting
their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken.
The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after
completed, a report was made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the
arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with an
entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm.
in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th
ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic cavity right,
located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located at
the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed toward the left
thoracic cavity.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located
at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd
arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large intestine and
mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed
downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of the medial
border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of the right
elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd,
forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine, thru
and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE
LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND PUNCTURED
WOUNDS.
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1
1

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they
penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased."
12

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the
poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for
"having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in
Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force.
13

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company,
an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of
the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with four other
companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and
deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were
provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different
parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to the record of this case which multifarious
wounds caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981.
14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however,
Jose Huntoria
15
who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie
Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation
of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended
Information,
16
dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant),
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier
explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador
Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of
the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.

Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around
11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy.
17
His findings revealed that the
victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised
wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one
weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined
that due to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were
used is high.
18
The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation
they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she
incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events
surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the
accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the incident. According to
Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982,
19
at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February
21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr.
Piccio, and walked home;
20
he took a short-cut route.
21
While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house
at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help.
22
Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where
the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees.
23
From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and
hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the
accused as the place was then awash in moonlight.
24
Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through
in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses
which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan".
25
Huntoria then proceeded on his way home.
Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife
26
before he went to sleep.
27
Huntoria
explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life.
28
In
October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a
tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he
travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs.
Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981.
29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape
her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed
that he was asleep
30
in his house which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime
31
when
the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him.
32

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court erred in
convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating
his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court
held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-appellant, as the
assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have
difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering that

Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who
was stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant were moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation is
satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is
of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country
to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged
into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10
years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever.
(TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any reason why Huntoria should
implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question.
33

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi.
34
The appellate court, however, found the
sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248
isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal
should have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the award
of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31
(1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27,
1987).
35

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed
being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the
appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of
the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements
36
even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21,
1981." Moreover, the sketch
37
he made of the scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various
blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their
quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on
where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to
which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the
Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground
directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape
asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near
the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon
who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the
reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible

revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation
of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st
P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal complaint
38
four
other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd
Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy
report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed
instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned,
Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then
there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen
described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can
only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of
Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and
stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan"
while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the
crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene
was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or
hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the
stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable
Court who was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant movement,
I could not determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:

They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw
the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was
hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd
Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the
stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons
used because according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.
39

(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the
appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would
categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by
inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof.
What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by
the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit
or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has committed a felony
in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It
has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily
movement tending to produce some effect in the external world."
40
In this instance, there must therefore be shown
an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his
death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who
"hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or
"stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of
specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously
discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as
adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused
could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia
argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the
oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument
to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have
inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is
possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by
Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of
evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove
the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in
October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the
failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,
41
here, the unreasonable delay in
Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity.
42
If the silence of coming out an alleged eyewitness for
several weeks renders his credibility doubtful,
43
the more it should be for one who was mute for eight months.
Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His
lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was
threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused,
44
why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta

Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still free and around; they were
not yet named in the original information,
45
thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and
present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was a
tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim
was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the
stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada
about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by my
conscience and secondly the victim was also my landlord I revealed what I saw
to the wife of the victim.
46

xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of
his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like
Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter.
In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which
would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing
of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the
surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the good graces of his
landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May
1981.
47
Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite
sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was
taken under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided
lodging for his family.
48
Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable
witness, to say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture,
aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is
therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the
aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old
49
father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting
that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer
from the scene of the crime,
50
we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three
robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense,
51
under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in which the
participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look

with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to
acquit the accused.
52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45964 April 25, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RESTITUTO FALLER (alias R. Aguilar), defendant-appellant.
L. D. Lockwood for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and willfully. After
hearing the evidence, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found that the damage was not cause maliciously of and
willfully, but through reckless imprudence, and sentenced Restituto Faller, under paragraph 3 of article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, as principal in the crime of damage through reckless imprudence, to pay a fine of P38 and to
indemnify the offended party Ramon Diokno in the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
From this decision, an appeal was taken.
In this instance the appellant assigns as sole error of the court the fact that he was sentenced for a crime with which
he was not charged, contending that a crime maliciously and willfully committed is different from that committed
through reckless imprudence.
The court has not committed this error. The appellant was convicted of the same crime of damage to property with
which he is charged. Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The information alleges that the appellant acted willfully, maliciously,
unlawfully and criminally. To this information no objection was interposed. Negligence being a punishable criminal act
when it results in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts charged
unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that he acted with negligence.

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring in the result:
If malicious mischief (art. 327, Revised Penal Code) is an offense distinct from damage to property by reckless
imprudence (art. 365, Revised Penal Code) and the latter is not necessarily included in the former or the situation
does not call for the application of other exceptions laid down by this court, the conviction of the accused under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding his prosecution under article 327 thereof, was erroneous. An
accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (par. 17, sec. 1, Art. III,
Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to section 15, par. 2, and section 6, par. 3, of General Orders, No. 58), and
for this purpose the law requires that a complaint or information must charge but one offense, subject to a single
exception (sec. II, General Orders, No. 58). There are two reasons, however, why the decision of the lower court
should be affirmed. First, because the constitutional and legal purpose has been amply served in this case, it
appearing that the accused himself, in the course of the trial, put up the defense that he was at most responsible for
the offense of damage to property by reckless imprudence. This is apparent from the following portion of the decision
of the lower court:
La defensa del acusado, que por cierto no declaro, se hace descansar en el hecho, primero, que el sitio
donde tuvo lugar la coalicion entre el truck y el automovil mencionado es de muy estrecha dimension, y que
no es extraño que ocurriese lo que acaecio. Otra cuestion es la de que no cabe condenar al aqui acusado
con daños a la propiedad bajo el articulo 327 del Codigo Penal Revisado, sino a lo sumo por daños a la
propiedad por imprudencia temeraria, porque no costa que el acusado habia obrado deliberadamente, esto
es, con malicia, y en tercer lugar, se ha discutido principalmente la cuantia de los daños, pues, segun la
defensa, estos no debieran montar a mas de diez pesos.
En cuanto al primera punto de la defensa se vuelve contra el mismo acusado, pues precisamente por ser
estrecha la rampa del puente debio obrar con mayor cuidado antes de hacer andar el autobus; en cuanto al
segundo punto, concurrimos con la defensa de que no procede aplicar al presente caso las disposiciones
del capitulo noveno del Codigo Penal Revisado referente a daños. . . .
Secondly, assuming that the two offenses here are dinstinct, I think that they are at least akin to each other so as to
justify the application of the rule laid down in United States vs. Solis (7 Phil., 195), and United States vs.
Quevengco (2 Phil., 412), On these grounds, I concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6641 July 28, 1955
FRANCISCO QUIZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., respondents.
Moises Sevilla Ocampo and Pedro S. David for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for respondents.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On December 19, 1952, the respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal complaint against the
herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality charging Quizon with the
crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence, the value of the damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon
filed a motion to quash on the ground that, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty which might be
imposed on the accused would be a fine or from P125.00 to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be
imposed by the justice of the peace court. The Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, but the latter returned it to him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice of the peace court had
jurisdiction. The defendant appealed from this ruling of the Court of First Instance to this Court on the question of law
raised.
Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows:
Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a
fine of more than two hundred pesos:
Section 87 of said Acts reads as follows:.
Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered
cities shall have original jurisdiction over:
(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:
(6) Malicious mischief;.
In the cases of People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; People vs. Peñas Y Ferrer and Rey y Rochas, 86 Phil., 596;
andNatividad, et al. vs. Robles, 87 Phil.,, 834, it was held that in the cases provided for in Section 87 (c) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 above quoted, the jurisdiction given to justices of the peace and judges of the municipal courts
is not exclusive but concurrent with the courts of first instance, when the penalty to be imposed is more than six
months imprisonment or a fine of more than P200.00.
The question, therefore , is whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the court of First
Instance when the crime charged is damage to property through reckless negligence or imprudence if the amount of
the damage is P125.

We believe that the answer should be in the negative. To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to
try cases of damage to property through reckless negligence, because it has jurisdiction over cases of malicious
mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but a variant of the latter. This assumption is not legally warranted.
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
ART. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief.—Any person who shall deliberately cause to the property
of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious
mischief.
It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender should have not only the general intention
to carry out the felonious act (a feature common to all willful crimes) but that he should act under the impulse of
a specific desire to inflict injury to another; "que en el hecho concurra animo especifico de dañar"(Cuello Calon, Der.
Penal [6th Ed.] Vol. II, p. 869; Sent. of Tribunal Supreme of Spain, 21 Dec. 1909; 12 Feb. 1921).
El elemento interno de este delito require, ademas de la voluntad de ejecutar el hecho dañoso y de la
conciencia de su ilegitimidad, el animo de perjudicar, la intencion de dañar. Si no existe semejante animo el
hecho no constituey delito. (II Cuello Calon, p.870-871).
The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the requirement of Art. 327 of
our Revised Penal Code, already quoted, that the offender "shall deliberately cause to the property of another any
damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter", i.e., not punishable as arson. It follows that, in the
very nature of things, malicious mischief can not be committed through negligence, since culpa (negligence)
and malice ( or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible. Hence, the Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions of
12 Feb. 1912, 7 Oct. 1931, 13 Nov. 1934 and 5 Oct. 1942, has expressly recognized that this crime is one of those
that can not be committed by imprudence or negligence.
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability" is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent . There are crimes that by their structure can not be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In international crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as
"homicide through reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense is, more accurately, "reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing damages to property".
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should
be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the
willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal
Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.

It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to try cases of malicious
mischief, did so in total disregard of the principles and considerations above outlined. Our conclusion is that
"malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has exclusive reference to the willful and
deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327 to 331 of our Revised Penal Code, and to no other offense.
A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious mischief" used in section 87 of the Judiciary
Act, is that the same constitutes an exception to the general jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts in criminal
cases, which had always stood prior to the said Act at offenses punishable with not more than 6 months'
imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00 or both. To this traditional jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act added eight
(8) specific exceptions in the form of felonies triable in said courts without reference to the penalty imposable; and
malicious mischief is one of these exceptions, while imprudence resulting in damage to property is not one of them.
For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the offense in question lies exclusively in the Court of
First Instance. Hence, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of remand to the Justice of the Peace Court is
reversed and set aside. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
MONTEMAYOR, J. concurring:
There is no question that the offense of malicious mischief, that is to say, causing damage to another's property
willfully and for the sake of causing injury, because of hate, revenge or other evil motive (Art. 327, Revised Penal
Code), is much more serious than damage to property without intent or malice but through negligence (Art. 365,
Revised Penal Code). If the Justice of the peace court has jurisdiction, as Republic Act 296, Sec. 87 gives him, to try
and decide cases of malicious mischief, logically and with more reason, it should also be allowed to try and decide
cases of the less serious offense of damage to property through negligence. Actually, however, under the law, this is
not always so. Under Art. 365, in damage to property thru negligence, "the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of the damage to three times such value." In the present case, the value
of the damage is P125 and three times that amount would be P375 which is beyond the P 200.00 which a justice of
the peace court may impose as fine in criminal cases. For this reason, although I am not convinced of the wisdom
and rationale of the law in this respect, I vote with the majority because the law is on its side.


REYES, A., J., concurring:
While it may not be good law to invest municipal and justice of the peace courts with "original jurisdiction" over
criminal cases involving damage to property where the damage was deliberately cause, but not where the damage
was the result of mere negligence, I am constrained to concur in the majority opinion, because our duty is to apply
the law as we find it and not as we think it should be.
The law has extended the criminal jurisdiction of the abovementioned courts to cases of "malicious mischief," but not
to cases of damage to property resulting from mere negligence. We should not legislate by arbitrarily considering the

latter as comprehended in the former. The two are essentially different. Damage to property constitutes "malicious
mischief" only when the object of the perpetrator is "injury of the property merely for the sake of damaging it." (U.
S. vs. Generale et al., 4 Phil., 216.) It would be an incongruity to apply the term to cases of damages to property
where that object is lacking, as where the damage was due to mere negligence.
I therefore vote to grant the writ.


JUGO, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion seems to hold that there is no crime of damage to property through reckless negligence, for the
reason that in the crime of damage to property there should be malice or deliberate intent to cause it. If that is so,
then why remand the case of the court of first instance? If there is no such crime neither the court of first instance nor
the justice of the peace court can punish it. The result would be that the numerous crimes committed almost daily of
damage to property through reckless negligence would go unpunished. Reckless negligence alone without any
damage is not penalized by the Penal Code. Article 327 of the Penal Code provides "Any person who shall
deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter,
shall be guilty of malicious mischief. "That does not mean that a person who causes damage to property, without
deliberate intent, could not commit it through reckless negligence, for the deliberate intent to commit it through
reckless negligence, for the deliberate intent to commit a crime is common to all crimes.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines crimes as follows:
Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight. or lack of skill.
In the present case damage to property was committed through culpa "imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill". We should not be mislead by the word "malicious" in the phrase "malicious mischief" for that is only a
translation of the word "daños" as used in the Spanish text which governs. (People vs. Abilong, 46 Off. Gaz., 1012.)
The drafter of Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code in using the word "malicious" in the phrase "malicious mischief"
did not add anything to the general concept of crimes as defined in Article 3, but may have used the word "mischief"
simply to distinguish it from damages which may give rise only to civil liability. However that may be, it is clear that he
referred to damage in general which may be committed with deliberate intent or through reckless negligence.
In the case of People vs. Faller, 67 Phil., 529, it was was held by this Court through Chief Justice Avaceña that a
person accused of malicious mischief may be convicted of damage to property through reckless negligence. If the
latter crime is essentially different from malicious mischief, then the accused could not have been convicted of it.
For the above reasons, I dissent.


G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376, Samson v. CA et al., 103 Phil. 277
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 31, 1958
G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376
RUFINO T. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Baizas, Macadaeg and Baviera for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara and two others whose names are
unknown in two separate informations with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of two checks of the
Philippine National Bank before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Cases Nos. 12802 and 12803). On a plea of
not guilty, they were tried and found guilty as charged, the court sentencing each of the three defendants to suffer in
each case a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day and not more than 9 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
mayor, to pay a fine of P2,500 and the costs. In addition, they were sentenced to indemnify the Philip-pine Ryukyus
Command, the payee of the checks, in the sum of P5,417.11 in each of the two cases.
The trio appealed from the decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same but with a reduced penalty with
regard to appellants Cruz and Vergara. Appellant Samson was only found guilty of committing the crime through
gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor in each of the two cases.
Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out the present petition for review contending (1) that the acts done by
him, as found by the Court of Appeals, do not constitute gross imprudence; (2) that there is no such offense as estafa
through (falsification by) negligence; and (3) that the Court of Appeals erred in denying his motion for new trial.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are: "Espiridion Lascaño, father of the late Felipe Lascaño, a lieutenant of
the USAFFE, who died during the last World War, and his widow Rosanna Paras, through the latter filed, is Felipe

Lascano's only legitimate surviving heir, their claim papers with the Red Cross Chapter in the Province of Sorsogon
in the early part of 1946.
"On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help of his former classmate Rufino T. Samson in getting the checks
of the two claimants who were with him at Camp Murphy by approaching an officer of the Philippine Army who could
identify said persons assuring Samson that he had known said claimants for a long time. Having been assured twice
of the identity of the supposed claimants and after examining their residence certificates attached to the claim
papers, Samson accompanied by Cruz and the supposed claimants went to talk to Lt. Manuel Valencia and
requested him to act as guarantor to secure the claimants check. Believing in the representations made by Samson,
Lt. Valencia accompanied them to the Deceased Check Delivery Section, Finance, AFP, and secured the release of
PNB Check No-754497J, Exhibit C, in favor of Rosalina Paras for the sum of P6,417.11 and the PNB Check No.
754498J, Exhibit D, in favor of Espiridion Lascaño for the sum of P6,417.10. Thence, the party repaired to the Bureau
of Treasury, Finance Building, where again through the help of Rufino T. Samson on, the two checks above-
mentioned were cashed by the teller Rosario Mallari who knew Samson. In accordance with the regulations of the
Bureau of Treasury to payee Rosalina Paras, not knowing how to write or sign her name, was required to thumbmark
on the back of the check, Exhibit C, and below her thumbmark Rufino T. Samson and Francisco Ordoñez signed as
witnesses. Espiridion Lascaño who knows how to sign his name was asked to do so on the back of the check, Exhibit
D, and below his signature Samson signed not as a witness but as the last indorser. The accounts called for in said
two checks were delivered to a son and Cruz, who, as will be shown hereafter, was the person who signed as
Francisco Ordoñez, counted the money and delivered it to the supposed claimants. The party then proceeded to the
Aristocrat Restaurant where together with about eleven others took their lunch for which Vergara paid P60, besides
giving Samson P300 sup-posed to be paid to the officers who helped them in securing the checks plus P10 for
Samson's taxi fare. Samson left the party and went to the movie to meet a friend from Camp Murphy.
"On October 4, or just two days after cashing the checks, while at Camp Murphy Samson was informed by Severino
Anda, one of those who were with the party which cashed the checks, thus said cheeks were delivered to the wrong
parties. Worried by such news he left for Sorsogon the following day to locate the real claimants. While on the train
he saw an old couple whom he suspected to be the fake claimants because they had been throwing furtive glances
at him. Upon arriving at Sorsogon he reported the matter to the matter to police and caused to be taken the couples
finger prints names and address. At about 10 a.m., October 6, he went to look for the house of the Lascaño family.
He found Espiridion Lascaño, too old and weak to leave the house. He saw Rosalina at the school where she was
teaching and inquired from her whether she had received a check from Camp Murphy as well as the cheek of the old

man and he was answered in the negative. He returned to Manila the following day and on October 8 reported the
matter to Sgt. Luis Balignasan, G-2 PC, who after taking his affidavit promised to help him and conduct the
necessary investigation. He submitted a copy of the finger prints of the suspects."
Analyzing the criminal responsibility of appellant Sam-son, the court made the following comment:
Coming now to appellant Rufino T. Samson, we believe that the following facts are admitted; that on the strength of
the assurances given by Amado L. Cruz that the supposed claimants were the real ones he requested the help of Lt.
Manuel Valencia to act as guarantor and Valencia, relying on his representations, accompanied him and the
claimants to the Delivery Window and secured the checks for them; that again Rufino T. Samson helped Amado T.
Cruz and the supposed claimants by signing as witness together with Cruz so that the supposed claimant Rosalina
Paras could cash her check and went to the extent of signing as last indorser on the back of the check, Exhibit D, in
favor of Espiridion Lascaño and then later at the Aristocrat Restaurant accepted from Vergara and Cruz the sum of
P300 to be paid to the officers who helped them and the further sum of P10 for his tax fare. There is no evidence that
he was aware that the supposed claimants were not the real ones and his subsequent conduct shows it to be true;
but although he did not know them personally he induced another friend of his, Lt. Manuel Valencia, to believe in the
identity of said claimants thus helping his co-accused Amado L. Cruz, Bonifacio Vergara and John Doe and Maria
Doe to perpetrate the crime of estafa through falsification. It is unbelievable that he would accept as his share the
meager amount of P310 if he were a co-conspirator in the commission of a fraud amounting to over P12,000. We see
nothing strange in his acceptance of P310 as a token of gratitude on the part of the claimants, but he has
undoubtedly acted with reckless imprudence for having taken no precaution whatsoever in assuring himself that the
supposed claimants were the real ones. The mere assurances given him by Amado L. Cruz were not sufficient to
justify his acting in the manner he did.
We find no error in the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the appellant herein acted with gross
negligence in assuring Lt. Valencia and the Cashier of the identity of the supposed claimants, as a result of which the
impersonators managed to secure possession of the checks in question and to cash the same. Appellant was, or
must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos, and ordinary
prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons
claiming said amounts, since they we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would
certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a large amount if the funds belonged to
appellant; and we see no justification for him treating government fund is with less care and diligence than if they
were his own. Nor does the submission to this appellant of residence certificates constitute adequate identification,

since these certificates are tax receipts and not means of establishing the identity of persons; and appellant as a
Lieutenant of the Army is sufficiently intelligent and educated to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be
forged or stolen.
There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through
falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact,
there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability. Even assuming that he had no intention to defraud the
offended party if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the culprits, appellant's
participation together with the participation of his co-defendant the commission of the offense completed all the
necessary for the perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document (Article
17,Revised Penal Code). Anyway and for the purposes of the penalty that was actually imposed upon appellant, it is
immaterial that he be considered only guilty of falsification of a commercial document through reckless negligence,
because the penalty for the crime of falsification of a commercial document under Article 172, No. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 which
under the provisions of Articles 25 and 26 of the same Code is a correctional penalty. Consequently, if in the cases at
bar the crimes of falsification were due to reckless imprudence, the corresponding penalty would bearresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods (Art. 365, opening paragraph of theRevised Penal Code), which comprehends the
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals upon appellant.
Under the facts found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of appellant constitute in each case the crime
of estafa through falsification of a mercantile document by reckless imprudence, because in so far as the falsification
is concerned, his acts of endorsing the respective checks by way of identification of the signatures of the payees
entitled to said checks and their proceeds, constituted a written representation that the true payees participated in the
indorsement and cashing of the checks aforesaid, when in truth and in fact the true payees had no direct intervention
in the proceedings (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code). Even if such indorsement and identification were extraneous to
the official duties of appellant, he would be nevertheless liable as a private person under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code. Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court of Spain assert the juridical standing of the crime of
falsification by imprudence since in falsifying public or mercantile document, of intent to cause damage is not
required because what the law, seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these documents.
An act executed without malice or criminal purpose, but with carelessness, negligence, or lack of precaution, which
causes harm to society or to an individual, should be classified as either reckless negligence or simple imprudence;
the person responsible therefor is liable for such results could have been anticipated, and for acts which no one
would commit except through culpable indifference.

The courts heretofore dealing with acts punishable under the Penal Code of Spain which, with slight modifications, is
practically the same as the one in force in these Islands, have heard and decided cases involving falsification of
documents with reckless negligence. They therein applied the provisions of article 581 of the Spanish Code, which is
identical with article 568 of the Code in force in these Islands, as may be seen among others, in judgments in
cessation of July 8, 1882, December 21, 1885, November 8 1887, and December 7,1896; also in case No. 2818,
United States vs. Mariano Vega, decided by this Court. (U.S. vs. Maleza, 14 Phil., 468).
[[
1
]]

It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime ofestafa through falsification by
imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains
no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.
The rule regarding variance between allegation and proof in a criminal case, is: "When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged, is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved" (Section 4, Rule
116. Rules of Court). As a complement we have also the following rule: "An offense charged necessarily includes
that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And the offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proves,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule
116,Idem.)
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held inQuizon vs. Justice of the Peace
of Bacolor,
[[
*
]]
G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal
Code, it may however be said that conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that
obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the
parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in
question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure
himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information
alleges acts which charge willful, falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case
covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases
decided by this Tribunal.

Under a charge of forcible abduction, the defendant may be convicted of illegal detention if the evidence does not
show that the kidnapping was with lewd designs. (People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil., 775.)
The crime of theft is included necessarily in that of robbery and therefore a defendant can he convicted of the former,
notwithstanding that he was charged the latter offense. (U.S. vs. Birueda, 4 Phil., 229; People vs. Rivera, 54 Phil.,
578)
The crime of robbery en cuadrilla is necessarily included in that of bandolerisimo(brigandage),and therefore the
defendants can be convicted of the former on an information charging the latter. (U.S. vs. De la Cruz 4 Phil., 430.)
Where the information charges brigandage, but the evidence fails to show that the crime was committed by an armed
band, the defendants can be convicted of robbery. (U.S. vs. Mangubat, 3 Phil., 1.)
Under a charge of malversation a public official may be found guilty of estafa. (U.S.vs. Solis, 7 Phil., 195.)
Moreover, Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the essential elements of the offense
charged in the information be proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be
established toconstitute the crime proved. This conclusion is strengthened by the provisions of Section 9, Ruled 113,
of the Rules of Court under which appellant could no longer be prosecuted for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents by reckless negligence were we to acquit him in the cases at bar on the obviously technical
theory of the dissenters.
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for
here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven
beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongrous to allege at
the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept
of negligence.
With regard to the motion for new trial filed by appellant for the purpose of introducing an allegedly newly discovered
evidence which consists of an affidavit of one Emiliano Salangsang-Salazar, it appearing that the same if admitted
would only be corroborative in nature and would not have the effect of altering the result of the case, the same is
denied.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Reyes, A., J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
FELIX, J., concurring:

I concur in the majority decision for the reasons therein stated. I, however, desire to state a few words in answer to
the arguments adduced in the dissenting opinion to the effect that "under the ruling of the majority, each and every
charge of a willful offense will necessarily imply an alternative charge of criminal negligence" and that this, is a way of
"getting around the established rule that not more than one offense should be charged" and of preventing the
accused from guarding against such hidden multiplicity of charges. It is claimed that in such situation the defendant
would be unable to determine whether tie is being tried for committing the crime or for not preventing its commission,
when he could have done so.
This argument is, in my opinion, utterly untenable. In, the first place, there is no multiplicity of accusations but, a
charge that is included in another which is considered in operative and ceases to have any effect on the defendant
for lack of supporting evidence. In the second place, no one better than the defendant knows what he has done in
connection with the crime he is charged and he must have in mind that section 4, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court
already warned him that he could be convicted of any crime included in the crime charged in the information if there
were any variance between the latter and the crime establish by the evidence. So that he cannot now claim that he
was caught by surprise or prejudiced in any way if the crime he was accused in the information degenerated into a
case of criminal negligence. Although I do not deny that in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, (97 Phil., 342),
We held that criminal negligence is a distinct crime established in our Penal Code, I cannot pass unmentioned the
more juridical and more realistic point of view expressed in People vs. Faller, 7 Phil., 529, where it was held that:
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability. The information alleges, that the appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and
criminally. To this information no objection was interposed. Negligence being a punishable criminal act when it results
in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts charged unlawfully and
criminally includes the charge that acted with negligence.
For the foregoing considerations, I vote with the majority in affirming the decision appealed from, with costs against
appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., dissenting:
If I regret my inability to agree that under a charge of intentionally committing a crime, an accused may be convicted
of committing such crime through negligence or imprudence.
We have shown in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor (97 Phil., 342), July 28, 1955, that criminal negligence
is not a mere variant of the intentional misdeed; that it is a distinct and separate in itself. We also pointed out in that
case that while willful crimes are punished according to their result in crimes of negligence, what the law punishes is
the carelessness itself, the failure to take the precautions that society has a right to expect will be taken under the

circumstances of each case. So that, while the intentional crime of lesiones is substantially different from that
of falsification, lesiones by imprudence and falsification by imprudence are in themselves substantially identical
offenses, being but two instances of criminal negligence punishable under one and the same article (365) of
the Revised Penal Code.
It is argued that negligence is not a crime but a way of committing it. That view may be true from the philosophical
standpoint, but not from that of the Penal Code, withstanding People vs. Faller, 67 Phil., 529, which was questioned
in the Quizon case. The stubborn fact is "Que la culpa es un delito propio como el homicidio, las lesiones, etc. lo cual
tambien es absurdo; on obstante ello en nuestra sistema legislativo hay que partir de esa base, que por otra parte el
Tribunal Supreme acentua" (Puig Peña Der Penal, Tomo 1, pag. 316). And this is emphasized by the designation
of quasi-offenses by our Penal Code, that the Spanish Penal Code does not even use.
As a consequence, it must be admitted that intentional falsification and falsification by negligence not only differ in
seriousness, but in essence; they are, by their nature, two different offenses altogether. Wherefore, an offender who
is accused of intentional falsification cannot be held to answer for falsification by negligence, because the essential
element of the latter offense, the ingredient that characterizes it and separates it from all other offenses, to wit, the
criminal negligence or carelessness, is not involved in the elements of the crime charged. Not only is it not
included: it is excluded by incompatibility, because malice or intent cannot co-exist with negligence. Intent
presupposes that the offender actually visualized or contemplated the act of falsification and determined to realize it;
negligence implies that the offender should have foreseen or anticipated, but did not actually anticipate or foresee,
the consequences of his act. In the former, the law punishes the culprit for his decision to breach the law, in the latter,
for his failure to foresee that his action would result in such a breach.
The difference being so radical, I can not see how the appellant can be held as a co-principal of the crime of estafa
with falsification through his reckless imprudence considering that the negligence negates the appellant's knowledge
of, or participation in, the intent to commit the fraud. It is urged that appellant's imprudent act wasindispensable and
that without it, the estafa could not be successfully accomplished, hence, he should be deemed a principal by
cooperation under par. 9 of Art. 17, R.P.C. I consider the argument fallacious. Art. 17 says:
ART. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished.

Now, to cooperate is to help, to aid; and necessarily presupposes, knowledge of the ultimate purpose in view. This
very Court, in People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil., 571, has ruled that —
to cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not necessarily mean
a previous understanding.
What common will or purpose can exist between one acts maliciously and another who acts negligently? If the
appellant deliberately omitted to take precautions in order to facilitate the estafa, he would not be guilty of estafa with
falsification through imprudence, but of intentional estafa with falsification. Such deliberate intent, however, was
expressly declared not to exist by the Court of Appeals, and that finding is conclusive.
In U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil., 386, 389, this Court, through Mr. Justice Mapa, decided that —
In view of all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that the assault was committed, without the concurrence
of the will of Isidro and Clemente Magcomot, and in the absence of that volition, which is the fundamental source of
criminal liability, these co-defendants can not lawfully be held liable for the agrression and its consequences. On the
other hand, it can not be pleaded that the acts committed on the body of the body of the deceased by said co-
defendants and by Epifanio were perpetrated at the same time, because this simultaneousness does not of itself
demonstrate the concurrence of wills nor the unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of
two or more individuals, and in the absence of which, it is strictly just, in accordance with the sound principles of law,
that each one should only be held liable for the acts perpetrated by him. (Emphasis supplied)
Other cases to the same effect are collated in People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38. Let me note also that if it is
unquestioned doctrine that it is an essential condition of complicity that the accomplice, "With knowledge of the
criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime"
(People vs.Tamayo, 44 Phil., 49, cit. Dec. May 23, 1905; Viada, 5 Sup. 169; Dec. June 28, 1901; Viada, 4 Sup. 196).
If to cooperate as an accomplice demands knowledge of the criminal intent, how may one cooperate as principal
without it? It seems to me that such ruling would violate the basic principles of the Revised Penal Code on joint
criminal responsibility.
On the procedural side, the objections to appellant's conviction of estafa by falsification through negligence are much
more serious.
Section 5, Rule 116, upon which the majority relies as justifying the conviction, expresses the following rule:
An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as this alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. (Italic mine)

It is not enough, therefore, that the elements of the crime for which an accused is convicted should be proved, but
then must also be charged or alleged. This means, if it means anything at all, that the crime proved may be
constituted by, some, i.e., a lesser number, of integrating elements or requisites than the offense charged,
provided allsuch constituent elements are alleged. Thus, in the cases cited by the majority opinion, a charge of
robbery includes that of theft, because to constitute theft, we merelyeliminate or subtract the element of violence from
the alleged components of robbery. One accused of forcible abduction can be convicted of illegal detention, because
the elements are common except for the lewd designs; robbery is included in brigandage (bandolerismo) because
their elements are identical except for the organization of the band for the purpose of committing highway robbery.
And malversation a public official and estafa only differ in that the former must be committed by taking advantage of
public office; by discarding the latter constituent element, the remainder alleges a crime of estafa. All these cases,
therefore, proceed on the theory that by striking out some of the averments in the information the remainder charges
the crime of which the accused is convicted. But it has never been held that a crime is included in the offense
charged when not only must one element alleged be discarded but another one,not alleged, must be supplied.
Illustrative of this case is People vs. Oso, 62 Phil., 271, it where we quashed a conviction for abduction with rape,
because the charge was plain abduction, carnal knowledge through violence did not appear in the original
accusation.
It is very common to say that an accused may he convicted of any lesser crime than the one charged, without
realizing that by lesser crime is meant one that is constituted by a number of elements smaller than those alleged;
not a crime that carries a lighter penalty.
Now, let us apply, the rule to the present case. What are the ingredients of the crime of falsification in the
information?
(1) That the accused made a false statement in a narration of facts (certifying that the impostor's signature was the
genuine signature of the true payee);
(2) That he made the, false statement in a commercial paper (check);
(3) That he knew that the signature certified to by him was not that of the payee;
(4) That he acted wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously.
Clearly these allegations cannot constitute the crime of falsification by negligence by merely striking out any number
of them. And for a plain reason: the averment ofimprudence, which is the distinctive characteristic of the latter crime,

is lacking; it must be supplied from outside the information. Consequently, criminal negligence is not included in the
offense charged.
That falsification through imprudence does not include intentional falsification is self-evident. Negligence can not
include wilfulness or vice-versa. As pointed out previously, one excludes the other. It is thus unavoidable to conclude
that a charge of wilful falsification does not charge falsification by negligence; neither does the latter include the
former. Therefore, regardless of the evidence, a conviction for falsification by imprudence can not be had on a charge
of wilful forgery, the two being incompatible offenses.
But there is more, and worse. Under the ruling of the majority, each and every charge of a wilful offense (except
those where malice is indispensable) will necessarily imply an alternative charge of criminal negligence, since the
accused may be convicted thereof. Is this not getting around the established rule that not more than one offense
should be charged? And how can the accused guard against such hidden multiplicity? If the information should
expressly allege that the accused "wilfully, intentionally and/or negligently, by failing to take the requisite precautions"
committed an offense, unquestionably the accused could object on the ground that the information on its face
charges two offenses, criminal negligence and the wilful crime; and he could demand that the prosecution should
elect to stand on one charge alone, and strike out the other. But under the majority ruling, without any specific
charge, the accused must stand trial and risk conviction of either the intentional offense or criminal negligence. Is
such a procedure at all compatible with the right of the accused to fair play? The accused can not determine whether
he is being tried for committing the crime or for not preventing its commission, when he could have done so.
The unfairness to the accused becomes compounded when it is recalled that negligence under our Penal Code
admits two varieties: reckless imprudence and simpleimprudence, the latter involving a lesser penalty. Under the
majority ruling, therefore, a person accused of a wilful offense is actually compelled to face three ways and defend
himself against three different offenses: the wilful act, reckless negligence, and simple imprudence. He can not object
to any prosecution evidence tending to establish any or all of these multifarious charges; he must also see that his
own evidence protects him against all three charges, altho I the information recites only one, the intentional offense. I
submit that to force an accused to guard against all three possibilities at once is against all fairness, justice and
equity. Pitted against the resources of the state, an accused is already at a disadvantage; I see no need to make his
position worse.
To cap it all, the accused-appellant in the present case was convicted of criminal negligence on appeal, when he no
longer could ask for a reopening of the trial to introduce evidence against such a charge. The least that he is entitled
to, it seems to me, is a new trial. It has been the practice hitherto that where the evidence shows the accused to be

guilty of a crime different from the one charged, to acquit him of the charge and, without release from custody,
remand him to answer for the proper offense, see no reason why that rule should not be followed in the present case.
Concepcion, J., concurs.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19660 May 24, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant,
vs.
AMBROCIO CANO Y PINEDA, defendant and appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor R. I.
Goco for plaintiff and appellant.
Angel A. Sison for plaintiff and appellant as private prosecutor.
G. F. Yabut, R. Monterey and F. R. Sotto for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
On or about August 2, 1961, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed with the said court an information accusing
defendant-appellee Ambrocio Cano y Pineda of the crime of damage to property with multiple physical injuries, thru
reckless imprudence, alleging:
That on or about the 21st day of September, 1960, on the National Highway at San Isidro, municipality of
San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused Ambrocio Cano y Pineda, being then the driver and person in charge of La Mallorca
Pambusco bus with body No. 846, Plate No. TPU 23177 (Pampanga '60), in utter disregard of traffic rules
and regulations and without exercising due precaution to avoid accident to persons and/or damage to
property, and by driving at a speed more than that allowed by law and on the wrong side of the road, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said vehicle in a careless,
negligent and imprudent manner, causing, as a result thereof the said bus driven by him to hit and bump a
Philippine Rabbit Bus with body No. 257, bearing Plate No. TPU-25589 (Tarlac '60), then driven by
Clemente Calixto y Onia, thereby causing damages to the said Philippine Rabbit Bus in the amount of
P5,023.55, to the damage and prejudice of the owner, the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., in the said
amount of P5,023.55, Philippines Currency, and on the same occasion inflicting physical injuries to the
passengers of said buses, namely, Francisco Feliciano, Hilario Pasamonte Linda Ongria, Lorenzo Calixto,
whose physical injuries, barring complications, required and will require medical attendance for a period of
not less than three (3) months; Regina Mendoza de Gacuain, Virginia Camba, Francisco Guevarra, George
Sebastian, Francisco Rabago, Oscar Favorito, Lida Toledo, whose physical injuries, barring complications,
required and will require medical attendance for a period ranging from one week to one month; Adelaida

Buenconsejo Vda. de Shaup, Eulogio Catalico, Marina Gonzales, Abraham Serrano, Epifanio Payas,
Seprando Fontanilla, Pedro Bingcang, Tomas Ortega, Mateo Estaris, Andres Espinosa, Ligaya Garcia,
Romeo Rivera, Mateo Estacio, Jaime Castillo, Clemente Calixto, Dedicacion San Juan, Antonio Calixto,
Teofilo Raon, Francisco Mallari, Alfonso Aquino, Esmeralda Cayasi, Salvacion Vda. de Ortega, Patrocinio
Caasi, Lily Ortarsa, Eulogio Canlas, Esperanza de la Cruz, Benita Cesar, Laulita Batalia, Miguela Quilay,
Benjamin Tiglao, Ligaya Garcia Bindua, Marlita Balmonte, Geronimo Briones, Juan Velasco, Tomasa
Mateo, and Bobby Galhoun whose physical injuries, barring complications required and will require medical
attendance for a period ranging from seven to nine days, and incapacitate said injured persons from
performing their customary labor for the same period of time, respectively.1äwphï1.ñët
All contrary to law.
Upon arraignment,
1
defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Months later,
2
he filed a motion to quash the information
upon the ground:
1. That the crime charged, slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, has already prescribed;
2. That this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction of the crime charged, slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence; and
3. That the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with damage to
property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.
After due hearing, the lower court issued an order
3
holding that, "without discussing whether or not this particular
misdemeanor of slight physical injuries" — through reckless imprudence — "has prescribed ... it is clear that said
misdemeanor cannot validly be complexed with grave or less grave felonies", and, accordingly, granting the motion
to quash and ordering the prosecution "to amend the information within ten (10) days" from notice, by "deleting
therefrom all reference to slight physical injuries". A reconsideration of this order having been denied, the prosecution
interposed the present appeal.
The order appealed from is predicated upon the theory that the offense of slight physical injuries thru reckless
negligence cannot be complexed with that of damage to property with multiple physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence, because "misdemeanor" may not, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, be complexed with grave
or less grave felonies.
However, the information herein does not purport to complex the offense of slight physical injuries with reckless
negligence with that of damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. It
is merely alleged in the information that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another
bus causing upon some of its passengers serious physical injuries, upon others less serious physical injuries and
upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to damage to property. Appellee and the lower court have
seemingly assumed that said information thereby charges two offenses, namely (1) slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence; and (2) damage to property, and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru reckless
negligence — which are sought to be complexed. This assumption is, in turn, apparently premised upon the
predicate that the effect or consequence of defendants negligence, not the negligence itself, is the principal or vital
factor in said offenses. Such predicate is not altogether accurate.
As early as July 28, 1955 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, had the occasion to state, in Quizon vs.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga (G.R. No. L-6641), that:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability" is too
broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure can not be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt separately from wilful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia punible." Much of the confusion has arisen from the
common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence", and the like; when the
strict technical offense is more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide", or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property."
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Article 13, specially the lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, tile theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed wilfully. For each penalty for the wilful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional minimum if the wilful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to
death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation
to the individual wilful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
Thirdly, regardless of whether the issue adverted to above should be decided in the affirmative or in the negative the
proper procedure for the lower court was to reserve the resolution thereof until after the case has been heard on the
merits, when decision is rendered thereon, there being no question that the court has jurisdiction and can properly try
the defendant for damage to property and serious or less serious physical injuries thru reckless negligence. It may
not be amiss to add that the purpose of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting
from a single act, or one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the
imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime, instead of the penalties for each one of the aforesaid crimes
which, put together, may be graver than the penalty for the most serious offense.
Fourthly, from the viewpoint both of trial practices and justice, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether the prosecution
should split the action against the defendant, by filing against him several informations, namely, one for damage to
property and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru, reckless negligence, before the court of first instance,
and another for slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence, before the justice of the peace of municipal court.
One thing is, however, certain. Such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the
administration of justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation of
substantially the same evidence before two different courts, the municipal court and the court of first instance. Worse,
still, in the event of conviction in the municipal court and appeal to the court of first instance, said evidence would still
have to be introduced once more in the latter court.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for trial on the
merits and the rendition of the judgment that the facts proven and the applicable law may warrant, with the costs of
this instance against the defendant-appellee, It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
On August 23, 1961.
2
On January 18, 1962.
3
On March 6, 1962.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131588. March 27, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
One may perhaps easily recall the gruesome and tragic event in Cagayan de Oro City, reported over print and
broadcast media, which claimed the lives of several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) who were
undergoing an ―endurance run‖ as part of the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training. Not much effort
was spared for the search of the one responsible therefor, as herein accused-appellant Glenn de los Santos
(hereafter GLENN) immediately surrendered to local authorities. GLENN was then charged with the crimes of
Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The information reads as follows:
That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate
intent to kill, taking advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, and with treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from … behind in a sudden and unexpected manner
with the use of said vehicle … members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training
Course (Scout Class 07-95), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an ―Endurance Run‖ of 35
kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training Headquarters in Camp
Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, running in a column of 3, with a distance of two feet, more or less, from one trainee to
another, thus forming a [sic] three lines, with a length of more or less 50 meters from the 1st man to the last man,
unable to defend themselves, because the accused ran or moved his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of
the PNP joggers in spite of the continuous warning signals made by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan Tabacon
Espana, Waldon Sinda Sacro, Lemuel Ybanez Pangca, Artemio Jamil Villaflor, Nardo Omasas Collantes and Joselito
Buyser Escartin, who were at the rear echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously waving their hands at
the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from a distance of 100 meters away
from the jogger‘s rear portion, but which accused failed and refused to heed; instead, he proceeded to operate his
driven vehicle (an Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the joggers, thus forcing the rear guard[s] to throw
themselves to [a] nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting, bumping, or ramming the first four (4) victims, causing
the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield, and upon being aware

that bodies of the victims flew on the windshield of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake, continued to
travel on a high speed, this time putting off its headlights, thus hitting the succeeding joggers on said 1st line, as a
result thereof the following were killed on the spot:
1. Vincent Labis Rosal 7. Antonio Flores Lasco
2. Allan Amoguis Abis 8. Igmedio Salinas Lituanas
3. Jose Arden M. Atisa 9. Roberto Cabussao Loren
4. Nathaniel Mugot Baculio 10. Raul Plaza Martinez
5. Romil Gosila Legrano 11. Jerry Pedrosa Pajo
6. Arnulfo Limbago Jacutin 12. Rolando Paremcio Pancito
While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while the following eleven (11)
other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, the accused thus performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause other
than said accused‘s spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered on the
following victims which prevented their death, to wit:
1. Rey Go Boquis 7. Melchor Hinlo
2. Rene Tuako Calabria 8. Noel Ganzan Oclarit
3. Nonata Ibarra Erno 9. Charito Penza Gepala
4. Rey Tamayo Estofil 10. Victor Malicse Olavo
5. Joel Rey Migue Galendez 11. Bimbo Glabe Polboroza
6. Arman Neri Hernaiz
While the following Police Officers I (POI) sustained minor injuries, to wit:
1. Romanito Andrada 6. Romualdo Cotor Dacera
2. Richard Canoy Caday 7. Ramil Rivas Gaisano
3. Rey Cayusa 8. Dibangkita Magandang
4. Avelino Chua 9. Martin Olivero Pelarion
5. Henry Gadis Coubeta 10. Flordicante Martin Piligro
after which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims afore-
enumerated helpless.

Contrary to Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The evidence for the prosecution disclose that the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training held at
Camp Damilag, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, started on 1 September 1995 and was to end on 15 October 1995. The
last phase of the training was the ―endurance run‖ from said Camp to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City. The run
on 5 October 1995 started at 2:20 a.m. The PNP trainees were divided into three columns: the first and second of
which had 22 trainees each, and the third had 21. The trainees were wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and
green and black combat shoes. At the start of the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging trainees. When they
reached Alae, the driver of the Hummer vehicle was instructed to dispatch advanced security at strategic locations in
Carmen Hill. Since the jogging trainees were occupying the right lane of the highway, two rear security guards were
assigned to each rear column. Their duty was to jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand signals
for other vehicles to take the left lane.
[1]

Prosecution witnesses Lemuel Y. Pangca and Weldon Sacro testified that they were assigned as rear guards of
the first column. They recalled that from Alae to Maitum Highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, about 20 vehicles
passed them, all of which slowed down and took the left portion of the road when signaled to do so.
[2]

While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed towards
them. The vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of 100 meters, the rear security guards started waving
their hands for the vehicle to take the other side of the road, but the vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring
their signals and coming closer and closer to them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them, the rear guards told
their co-trainees to ―retract.‖ The guards forthwith jumped in different directions. Lemuel and Weldon saw their co-
trainees being hit by the said vehicle, falling like dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown, and others were
overrun by the vehicle. The driver did not reduce his speed even after hitting the first and second columns. The
guards then stopped oncoming vehicles to prevent their comrades from being hit again.
[3]

The trial court judge, together with the City Prosecutor, GLENN and his counsel, conducted an ocular inspection
of the place where the incident happened. They then proceeded to inspect the Isuzu Elf at the police station. The
City Prosecutor manifested, thus:
The vehicle which we are now inspecting at the police station is the same vehicle which [was] involved in the October
5, 1995 incident, an Isuzu Elf vehicle colored light blue with strips painting along the side colored orange and yellow
as well as in front. We further manifest that … the windshield was totally damaged and 2/3 portion of the front just
below the windshield was heavily dented as a consequence of the impact. The lower portion was likewise damaged
more particularly in the radiator guard. The bumper of said vehicle was likewise heavily damaged in fact there is a
cut of the plastic used as a bumper; that the right side of the headlight was likewise totally damaged. The front signal
light, right side was likewise damaged. The side mirror was likewise totally damaged. The height of the truck from
the ground to the lower portion of the windshield is 5 ft. and the height of the truck on the front level is 5 ft.
[4]

PO3 Jose Cabugwas testified that he was assigned at the Investigation Division at Precinct 6, Cagayan de Oro
City, and that at 4 a.m. of 5 October 1995, several members of the PNP came to their station and reported that they
had been bumped by a certain vehicle. Immediately after receiving the report, he and two other policemen
proceeded to the traffic scene to conduct an ocular inspection. Only bloodstains and broken particles of the hit-and-
run vehicle remained on the highway. They did not see any brake marks on the highway, which led him to conclude
that the brakes of the vehicle had not been applied. The policemen measured the bloodstains and found them to be
70 ft. long.
[5]

GLENN‘s version of the events that transpired that evening is as follows:
At about 10:30 p.m. of 4 October 1995, he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez and the latter‘s fellow band
members to provide them with transportation, if possible an Isuzu Forward, that would bring their band instruments,
band utilities and band members from Macasandig and Corrales, Cagayan de Oro City, to Balingoan. From there,

they were supposed to be taken to Mambajao, Camiguin, to participate in the San Miguel-sponsored ―Sabado Nights‖
of the Lanzones Festival from 5-7 October 1995. It was the thirteenth time that Enting had asked such a favor from
him.
[6]
Since the arrangement was to fetch Galindez and his group at 4:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995, GLENN
immediately went to Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, to get his Isuzu Elf truck. After which, he proceeded back to his
house at Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, and told his wife that he would go to Bukidnon to get his aunt‘s Isuzu Forward
truck because the twenty band members and nine utilities and band instruments could not be accommodated in the
Isuzu Elf truck. Three of his friends asked to go along, namely, Roldan Paltonag, Andot Peña, and a certain Akut.
[7]

After leaving GLENN‘s house, the group decided to stop at Celebrity Plaza Restaurant. GLENN saw his
―kumpare‖ Danilo Cosin and the latter‘s wife, and joined them at the table. GLENN finished three bottles of pale
pilsen beer. When the Cosin spouses left, GLENN joined his travelling companions at their table. The group left at
12:00 midnight for Bukidnon. The environment was dark and foggy, with occasional rains. It took them sometime
looking for the Isuzu Forward truck. Finally, they saw the truck in Agusan Canyon. Much to their disappointment, the
said truck had mechanical problems. Hence, GLENN decided to go back to Cagayan de Oro City to tell Enting that
they would use the Isuzu Elf truck instead.
[8]

GLENN drove slowly because the road was slippery. The vicinity was dark: there was no moon or star; neither
were there lampposts. From the Alae junction, he and his companions used the national highway, traversing the
right lane going to Cagayan de Oro City. At the vicinity of Mambatangan junction, as the Elf was negotiating a left
curve going slightly downward, GLENN saw a very bright and glaring light coming from the opposite direction of the
national highway. GLENN blinked his headlights as a signal for the other driver to switch his headlights from bright to
dim. GLENN switched his own lights from bright to dim and reduced his speed from 80 to 60 kilometers per hour. It
was only when the vehicles were at a distance of 10 to 15 meters from each other that the other car‘s headlights
were switched from bright to dim. As a result, GLENN found it extremely hard to adjust from high brightness to
sudden darkness.
[9]

It was while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 km./hr., and immediately after passing the oncoming
vehicle, that GLENN suddenly heard and felt bumping thuds. At the sound of the first bumping thuds, GLENN put his
right foot on the brake pedal. But the impact was so sudden that he was astonished and afraid. He was trembling
and could not see what were being bumped. At the succeeding bumping thuds, he was not able to pump the brake,
nor did he notice that his foot was pushing the pedal. He returned to his senses only when one of his companions
woke up and said to him: ―Gard, it seems we bumped on something. Just relax, we might all die.‖ Due to its
momentum, the Elf continued on its track and was able to stop only when it was already very near the next curve.
[10]

GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit, especially since the right headlights of the truck
had been busted upon the first bumping thuds. In his confusion and fear, he immediately proceeded home. GLENN
did not report the incident to the Puerto Police Station because he was not aware of what exactly he had hit. It was
only when he reached his house that he noticed that the grill of the truck was broken; the side mirror and round
mirror, missing; and the windshield, splintered. Two hours later, he heard on Bombo Radyo that an accident had
occurred, and he realized that it was the PNP group that he had hit. GLENN surrendered that same day to Governor
Emano.
[11]

The defense also presented Crescente Galindez, as well as Shirley Almazan of the PAG-ASA Office, Cagayan
de Oro City. The former testified that when he went to GLENN‘s house at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995, there
was heavy rain; and at 12:00 midnight, the rain was moderate. He corroborated GLENN‘s testimony that he
(Crescente) went to GLENN‘s house that evening in order to hire a truck that would bring the band instruments, band
utilities and band members from Cagayan de Oro to Camiguin for the Lanzones Festival.
[12]
Almazan, on the other
hand, testified that based on an observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City, there was rain
from 8:00 p.m. of October 1995 to 2:00 a.m. the next day; and the sky was overcast from 11:00 p.m. of 4 October
1995 to 5:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995. What she meant by ―overcast‖ is that there was no break in the sky; and,
definitely, the moon and stars could not be seen.
[13]


The prosecution presented rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita whose house was just 100 meters away from the
place where the incident occurred. He testified that he was awakened on that fateful night by a series of loud
thuds. Thereafter, a man came to his house and asked for a glass of water, claiming to have been hit by a
vehicle. Danilo further stated that the weather at the time was fair, and that the soil was dry and not muddy.
[14]

In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying
circumstance. It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P75,000; each of the victims of frustrated murder in the amount of P30,000; and each
of the victims of attempted murder in the amount of P10,000.
Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred (a) in finding that he caused
the Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees even after seeing the rear guards waving and the PNP trainees jogging; (b) in
finding that he caused the truck to run even faster after noticing the first thuds; and (c) in finding that he could still
have avoided the accident from a distance of 150 meters, despite the bright and glaring light from the oncoming
vehicle.
In convicting GLENN, the trial court found that ―the accused out of mischief and dare-devilness [sic], in the
exhilaration of the night breeze and having dr[u]nk at least three bottles of beer earlier, merely wanted to scare the
rear guard[s] and see them scamper away as they saw him and his vehicle coming at them to ram them down.‖
[15]

Likewise, the OSG posits that ―the evil motive of the appellant in injuring the jogging trainees
was probably brought by the fact that he had dr[u]nk a total of three (3) bottles of beer earlier before the incident.‖
[16]

Not to be outdone, the defense also advances another speculation, i.e., ―the possibility that [GLENN] could
have fallen asleep out of sheer fatigue in that unholy hour of 3:30 in the early morning, and thus was not able to stop
his Isuzu Elf truck when the bumping thuds were occurring in rapid succession; and after he was able to wake up
upon hearing the shout of his companions, it was already too late, as the bumping thuds had already occurred.‖
[17]

Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more scrupulous in weighing the
evidence. If we are to subscribe to the trial court‘s finding that GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear
guards, then intent to kill was wanting. In the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for an intentional
felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent, should be indulged.
[18]

From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of
reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENN‘s part.
First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was ―very dark,‖ as
there was no moon. And according to PAG-ASA‘s observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro
City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was
absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon and
stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.
Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black
and green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had
neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.
Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees
were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENN‘s vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the
same direction as GLENN‘s truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.
Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENN‘s testimony that he had been momentarily
blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the
curve. He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he
plowed into the group of police trainees.

Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one ‗to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a
cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same‖; and more so if the one on the road is a
person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and
three very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.
The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that GLENN intentionally rammed and hit the jogging trainees
was premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead
of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene.
For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of GLENN‘s vehicle to the confluence of the
following factors:
1. The Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the truck
would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a reduced speed, and would
have stopped only after a certain distance.
2. The national highway, from Alae to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, was made of fine and smooth asphalt,
free from obstructions on the road such as potholes or excavations. Moreover, the highway was going
a little bit downward, more particularly from the first curve to the place of incident. Hence, it was easier
and faster to traverse a distance of ―20 to 25 meters which was the approximate aggregate distance‖
from the first elements up to the 22nd or 23rd elements of the columns.
3. The weight of each of the trainees (the average of which could be 50 kilograms only) could hardly make
an impact on the 3,900 kilograms truck, which was moving at a speed ranging from 60 to 70 kilometers
per hour.
4. Considering that the width of the truck from the right to the left tires was wide and the under chassis
was elevated, the truck could just pass over two persons lying flat on the ground without its rubber tires
running over the bodies. Thus, GLENN would not notice any destabilization of the rubber tires.
5. Since the police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the truck was proceeding, the forward
movements constituted a force parallel to the momentum of the forward-moving truck such that there
was even much lesser force resisting the said ongoing momentum.
It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations -- one consistent
with the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver
responsibility -- the Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused.
[19]

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously
injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that
GLENN had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent
to kill.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is positively
identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more
likely to be true.
[20]
Thus, in People v. Godinez,
[21]
this Court said that the existence of a motive on the part of the
accused becomes decisive in determining the probability or credibility of his version that the shooting was purely
accidental.
Neither is there any showing of ―a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of police elements disguised in
a vehicular accident.‖
[22]
Even if there be such evidence, i.e., that the motive of the killing was in furtherance of a
rebellion movement, GLENN cannot be convicted because if such were the case, the proper charge would be
rebellion, and not murder.
[23]


GLENN‘s offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the
moment he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would have been spared.
We have once said:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and
prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone
might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his
own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and
injury.
[24]

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so,
the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
[25]

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition;
and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have known to apply the
brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other
trainees. By his own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and,
worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in accordance with the
conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side
even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the
opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving
within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing circumstances and
conditions at the time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of
reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is
applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as ―acts or omissions
punishable by law‖ committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).
[26]
In Reodica v. Court of
Appeals,
[27]
we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies,
a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,
[28]
the accused was convicted, in conformity with
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of ―homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence,‖ and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two
penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals,
[29]
the accused was convicted of the complex
crime of ―multiple homicide with damage to property through reckless imprudence‖ for causing a motor boat to
capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.

The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had
they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they
should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.
It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple
attempted murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the
multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such
defect.
[30]
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last paragraph
thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to render assistance to the victim,
therefore, constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one
degree.
[31]
Moreover, the fifth paragraph thereof provides that in the imposition of the penalty, the court shall exercise
its sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies through
imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
[32]

In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that GLENN ―escaped from
the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims.‖ It being crystal clear that GLENN failed to render aid to the
victims, the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, the penalty would
be prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the
maximum of said penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses
of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for each count, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period.
Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel Pangca
[33]
and of GLENN
that the latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental, such mitigating circumstance need not be
considered pursuant to the aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose
maximum is that which could properly be imposed taking into account the modifying circumstances. Hence, for the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccionalin its medium period,
as minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries, since the maximum term for each count is only two months the Indeterminate Sentence
Law will not apply.
As far as the award of damages is concerned, we find a necessity to modify the same. Conformably with
current jurisprudence,
[34]
we reduce the trial court‘s award of death indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each
group of heirs of the trainees killed. Likewise, for lack of factual basis, we delete the awards of P30,000 to each of
those who suffered serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who suffered minor physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is hereby SET
ASIDE, and another one is rendered holding herein accused-appellant GLENN DE LOS SANTOS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of (1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical

injuries and less serious physical injuries, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to the penalty of two (2)
months of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of death indemnity for each group of heirs of the trainees killed
are reduced to P50,000; and the awards in favor of the other victims are deleted. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., abroad on official business.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998]
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad
Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the
car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car
amounted to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint
[1]
against
petitioner with the Fiscal‘s Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information
[2]
was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as
Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with ―Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight
Physical Injury.‖ The information read:
The undersigned 2
nd
Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17
th
day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the
driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without
regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to
property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to
bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing
damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount
of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required
medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor
for the same period of time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision
[3]
convicting petitioner of the ―quasi
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries,‖ and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y
Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without
subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
[4]

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs.
D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but
imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio‘s book, p. 718).
[5]

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses
(P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No.
14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal
for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant‘s Brief. However,
respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief.
[6]

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
decision
[7]
on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration
[8]
raising new issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE
THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR
TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT
OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN
ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
[9]

. . . . . . . . .
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK
OF JURISDICTION.
[10]

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS‘ DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN
THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME

OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A
CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.
A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,
[11]
THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A
QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF
SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT
IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER
MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL
ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE
EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE TRIAL COURT‘S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling
of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was
that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor – not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that there
were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2)
reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she
insists, ―do not … rate a single penalty ofarresto mayor or imprisonment of six months,‖ citing Lontok v.
Gorgonio,
[12]
thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property
amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and
damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
. . . . . . . . .
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case
because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to
property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless
imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.
She then suggests that ―at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and
computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower
courts.‖
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here,

since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision
occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless
imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it
prescribes in two months, Lontok‘s criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and
91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok‘s motion to quash that part of the
information charging him with that light offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal
with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and
thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court
could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.
[13]

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with
petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant
to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of
Appeals,
[14]
which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to ―complex‖
reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to penalize is
the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate
informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to
impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case
because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to
thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia.
[15]

The OSG then debunks petitioner‘s defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period
here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal‘s office three days after the incident, pursuant to People v.
Cuaresma
[16]
and Chico v. Isidro.
[17]

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining
cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG‘s reliance on Buerano v. Court of
Appeals
[18]
as misplaced, for nothing there validates the ―complexing‖ of the crime of reckless imprudence with
physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed -- one for slight
and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron
[19]
and Lontok v. Gorgonio,
[20]
two
informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia
[21]
would only apply here on the
assumption that it was proper to ―complex‖ damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro
[22]
is likewise ―inapposite,‖ for it deals with attempted homicide,
which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma
[23]
should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would
either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia
[24]
favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light
felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.
I. The Proper Penalty.
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the trial
court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their submission
that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if
it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which
should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the
offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto
menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then
under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article
365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for

reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree
to arresto menor.
[25]

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of
Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not
result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless
imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the
extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months
and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under
Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365
would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in
its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the
discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein
provided ―the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64.‖
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is
deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
[26]

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure
only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25
of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code
as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized
with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayoris a correctional penalty under Article 25
of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony – not a light felony as claimed by
petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code
on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex
crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio,
[27]
this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses
in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses
may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light
felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence,
do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate
offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil.
513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property
amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and
damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed
waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information.
[28]
Under Section 3, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
[29]

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions
pending before its enactment.
[30]

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as ―The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.‖ Section 32(2)
[31]
thereof provided that except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original
jurisdiction over ―all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof.‖

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the
amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction
over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,
[32]
this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had
jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years,
which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of
the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty
than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable
to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the
jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty
lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1
to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also
under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods -- the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of
Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries,
being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine
whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal‘s office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of
the prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period ―shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information,‖ does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or
investigation only or for an action on the merits.
[33]
Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals
[34]
and People v.
Cuaresma,
[35]
this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal‘s office suspends the running of the
statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9
[36]
of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered
thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, ―the
prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without
need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities,
said cases may be commenced only by information.‖ However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the
prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights.
[37]
Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by
this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation
of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326,
as amended, entitled ―An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run.‖ Under Section 2 thereof, the period of
prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this
Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period
there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the
rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for thequasi offenses in question was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal‘s office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained
tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner‘s defense of prescription of the
offenses charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to
kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda
which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed
Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to
weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a
decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of
murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance
in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The
accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00
plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following errors
committed by the court a quo:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY
OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE
POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands
for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public
plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book
with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons
appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started
making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from
under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do
so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people
around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the
Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly
act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought
Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer
Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The
two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of
the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written statements to the
police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased
believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused
Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the
person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of
eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.

While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that they were
extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also
engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the
decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the
decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the
incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was
presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these
persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there appears
on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the
same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-
appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed.
Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as
to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested
by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also
because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and
experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth
about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw
the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his
friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with
Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased
and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-
examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and
that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading
comics when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted
by Samson. How could you possibly see that incident while you were reading
comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.

Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted
and burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him
from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay
and as a matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to
know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say
you come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did
that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried
according to you to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour
gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour
gasoline that is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but
it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later
got hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to
pour gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the
process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).

It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading
when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from
under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body
of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no
animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was
accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence,
the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased
is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et.
al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from
under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this
accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped
his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were
making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14
Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is
responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have
performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all
those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months
ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect
to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper
considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is
characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an
outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before
the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making
that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased
was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were
otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to
set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the
clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the
Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held
responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is
only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We
are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion
testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1,
1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years
ofprision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his
hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages
and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32477 October 30, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO APOSAGA and CONSTANCIO MONTE, accused-appellants.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Automatic review of the decision dated April 28, 1969 of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in
Criminal Case No. 1625 for murder, imposing the death penalty on accused-appellants Francisco Aposaga and
Constancio Monte for the murder of Atty. Jose Barranda.
The victim, who was popularly called "Attorney", was a law practitioner in Cotabato and Agusan. At the time of his
death, he lived in his 36-hectare farm at Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, with his common-law wife Gloria
Salongcong and their four children namely, Ruth, Samuel, Ester and Jose, Jr. Gloria had four other children by a

previous liaison, namely, Fe, Noe, Felomena and Fely, all surnamed Cabrera, who were likewise staying with the
couple at their house on the said farm. In the same barrio live the two accused-appellants as well as Sotera
Salongcong Resaba a sister of Gloria, whose house near the highway is about 1/2 kilometers away from the
Barrandas', Jesus Francisco, an ousted ex-tenant of "Attorney" and a nephew of Gloria and Sotera, whose house is
also along the highway; and Doroteo Estorque, father of the common-law wife of accused-appellant Aposaga.
Monte was recruited by the deceased from his former employment as security guard of Lianga Industries, Inc. in
Tumbis ,Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to be the administrator of his farm. He arrived in Polomolok with his family in July,
1965 and stayed in a house owned by the Barrandas near their own.
From the house of the Barrandas there were three then as now possible routes to the provincial highway, one
passing through the house of Sotera and Jesus on the General Santos side, another through the house of Aposaga
and Estorque on the Marbel side, and the third was a short cut through a small road, to the highway.
The deceased was last seen alive in the morning of December 13, 1965. lie had summoned Monte to their house at
about six o'clock that morning, and they conferred about the farm. Afterwards, Monte had breakfast with "Attorney's"
family before leaving the house. "Attorney's also left shortly thereafter to go to Dadiangas, taking the second route
(Marbel side) described above. Gloria Salongcong also left the house one minute later for Dadiangas, taking the first
route on the General Santos side, to pass by the house of her sister Sotera to fetch her daughter Fe, who was then
staying with Sotera, to bring her to Dadiangas for her medical examination.
While walking on the trail to the highway, Atty. Barranda was chased by 3 men armed with bolos or knives, who
acted concertedly in hacking or stabbing the victim to death. His lifeless body was later buried inside a dry well, while
his portfolio and personal papers were buried around 300 meters away from the body,
Nothing was mentioned or heard about the death of Atty. Barranda until on January 20, 1966, Pio Francisco came to
Barrio Palkan to barter fish and visit his son Jesus. The latter told his father that he could hardly sleep at night
because he was being "abused" or raided by Aposaga, Monte and alias Calbo, and that these three had killed the
attorney. Pio verified the matter from Sotera Salongcong, who confirmed the killing of the deceased. He decided to
report to the authorities, but waited for the picture of accused Aposaga in the possession of Gloria Salongcong before
he made a report.
Pio first mentioned the matter to a Sgt.Edoria of the Philippine Constabulary when he saw him in front of their house
on January 30, 1966 or 48 days thereafter. Sgt. Edoria immediately brought him, together with Felomena Cabrera, to
the office of Sgt. Ricardo Vargas of the 101st PC Company. They showed Sgt. Vargas a newspaper clipping about a
certain Francisco Lozada, who was wanted by the authorities with a prize of P10,000.00 on his head for a series of
robbery and murder cases After being told that the wanted man was in barrio Palkan, Sgt. Vargas lost no time in
going to the said barrio, together with other PC soldiers. When they reached the said barrio, Felomena pointed to
them the house of Aposaga. But when he confronted Aposaga, he found out that his name was Francisco Aposaga
and not Francisco Lozada, and that his physical features did not tally with the description in the newspaper clipping.
He therefore returned to headquarters without making an arrest.
At noon of the same day, Felomena Cabrera came to see him again, this time with Jesus Francisco, informing him
that Aposaga was the killer of Atty. Barranda. It was only then that he learned of the murder of Atty. Barranda. He
therefore returned to Palkan with 2 other PC officers to conduct an investigation. when they arrived there, Aposaga
was no longer in his house, having left for Norala to harvest palay, according to his wife. Nevertheless, he proceeded
with his investigation.

On February 1, 1966 he took the statements of Constancio Monte (Exh. "k", pp. 19-20, Folder of Exh. Vol. 1) and his
wife, Bienvenida Ferrer Monte (Exh. "M", pp. 24-25, Folder of Exh. Vol. I), both pointing to Aposaga and Calbo as the
killers, and of Noe Cabrera (Exh. "I ", p. 1, Folder of Exh. Vol. 11), naming Aposaga, Monte and Calbo as the culprits.
Thereafter he filed a motion to exhume the body of the deceased (Exh. "D", p. 10, Folder of Exh. Vol. I).
The examination was conducted on February 2, 1966 in the presence of Dr. Teodoro J. Reyes, municipal health
officer of Polomolok, the PC provincial commander, the chief of police, and members of the Rural Health Unit of
Polomolok. They found the already decomposing body of Atty. Barranda, which was Identified through the Identifying
information furnished by his wife, like the dentures, the clothes he was wearing, his height and built, as well as the
I.D. and personal papers in his wallet and other things found on his body. After the exhumation, they also unearthed
the valise or portfolio of the deceased which was buried about 300 meters away from the body and 15 meters from
the house of Jesus Francisco. The spot was pointed to them by Jesus Francisco himself who admittedly buried the
same. The valise contained the raincoat and other personal things of the deceased. They also recovered a
cellophane bag containing some legal documents and land titles purportedly removed from the bag of the deceased.
On the basis of the above, a criminal complaint dated February 1, 1966 was filed against Francisco Aposaga, alias
Calbo, alias Pedoy, Sotera Salongcong and Constancio Monte (p. 5, CFI rec.).
On February 14, 1966, after more statements were taken, the complaint was amended (p. 4, CFI, rec.), such that the
name of alias Calbo was indicated as Alfredo Villanueva, that of alias Pedoy as Jesus Francisco, and Gloria
Salongcong was included among the accused. Of the six accused named in the amended complaint Aposaga Monte,
Villanueva, alias Calbo, Francisco, alias Pedoy, Sotera Salongcong and Gloria Salongcong), Villanueva remained at
large and never faced trial; Gloria Salongcong was ordered excluded from the complaint on June 10, 1966 for
insufficiency of evidence (p. 29, CFI rec.); and Jesus Francisco alias Pedoy was likewise dropped from the complaint
on January 10, 1967 upon motion of his counsel (pp. 45-48, CFI rec.) for the purpose of utilizing him as a state
witness (p. 54, CFI rec.); and Sotera Salongcong was also excluded from the complaint upon her own motion (pp.
5051, CFI rec.) on January 27, 1967. The warrant issued for Gloria Salongcong was therefore recalled, while
Francisco and Sotera, who had been under detention, were ordered released. On August 4, 1967, Jesus Francisco
was ordered re-included in the complaint and a new warrant issued for his arrest (p. 76, CFI rec.). Yet, despite his
appearance in court as a witness for the prosecution, he was never re-arrested. Thus, only Aposaga and Monte
faced trial after they waived their right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation (p. 79, CFI rec.), and an
information was filed against them on April 24, 1968 (p. 81, CFI rec.).
After trial, the trial court in its decision (pp. 136-179, CFI rec.) dated April 28, 1969, found the two accused guilty of
murder and sentenced them to the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of ?12,000.00 as well as to pay the costs.
The trial court noted that the evidence for the prosecution suffered from many flaws and some inconsistencies (p. 31,
rec.). Nevertheless, it gave credence to the testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses and other corroborative
witnesses for the state.
Noe Cabrera, 13 years old, student, and a resident of Pag-asa, General Santos City, testified that at about six o'clock
in the morning of December 13, 1965, while he was riding his carabao, he saw his stepfather, Atty. Barranda, walking
towards the highway. Paran (Francisco Aposaga) and Calbo (Alfredo or Jessie Villanueva) ran after him. All at once
Paran hacked him in the neck while Calbo thrust his knife at the victim. The deceased ("Attorney") was trying to parry
their blows with the sweater he was carrying. Then Constancio Monte arrived and also hacked the victim. When the
victim stumbled and fell, Monte rode on him and thrust his knife through the victim's stomach. He was just about 25
meters away from them. Later, the two dragged the victim's body to the cogonal area, after which they approached
the witness (Noe), and Paran threatened him that if he should squeal, he and his mother, sisters and brothers were

going to be killed. Monte got the bag carried by the deceased and they left towards the direction of the highway. The
witness went home to eat. His mother was not in the house yet, having left earlier for Dadiangas.
When his mother arrived home in the afternoon, she asked him if he had seen his stepfather, to which he answered
no. She therefore asked him to accompany her in looking around for the victim. They went to the house of Dorot
(Doroteo Estorque) where they saw Dorot, Monte, Paran and Calbo, the wife of Monte, and others, drinking. His
mother made several inquiries about his stepfather.
The wife of Dorot said that Attorney rode a yellow bus going to Marbel. Dorot and his son Vicente also gave the same
information. She asked other persons, who gave negative information. When they went home, Monte and his wife
came also. His mother told them that she was going to San Francisco (Agusan) to look for Attorney. But Monte
advised her not to go any more because there were three persons who came to fetch him to go to Davao. Noe went
downstairs. Monte followed him to borrow his sledge, which he lent to him. Afterwards, he brought his horse to
Crossing Palkan to drink. When he was returning home, he saw Vicente, Calbo and Paran Vicente was riding the
carabao while Calbo and Paran were following the sledge, where the body of their stepfather was loaded. They were
going towards barrio Palkan. He let his horse run and headed for home. He did not tell his mother or his brothers and
sisters about the attack on Ms stepfather because he was afraid. It was only when he was brought to the PC
headquarters in Dadiangas that he talked of the incident for there he was no longer afraid (pp. 5-63, TSN).
Felomena Cabrera, 16 years old, student and residing at Pag-asa, Lagao, General Santos City, testified that she was
living with her mother, stepfather (the victim), brothers and sisters at their house in crossing Palkan on December 13,
1965. In the morning of the said date, her stepfather summoned Monte to their house, and the two talked for
sometime. Thereafter, Monte ate breakfast with them before returning to his house. When he had gone, Attorney
prepared to leave for Dadiangas. He left via their kitchen towards the west to the national highway. One minute later,
her mother also left, leaving her to care for her younger brother. She cooked soup rice. While cooking, she went to
the balcony to get her younger brother. From there she saw Monte running towards the direction of Attorney. She
followed him with her eyes, and saw him hacking her stepfather with two others, namely Aposaga and alias Calbo.
She went to the house of Monte and asked Monte's wife, Bienvenida, why they killed Attorney. Bienvenida answered
"because the attorney is a bad man". The two of them went down towards the road. They met Monte who warned
them not to reveal, otherwise they will kill first Felomena's mother. She just went home and fed her younger brother.
When her mother arrived home that afternoon, she (mother) asked if the Attorney had returned home, to which she
answered in the negative. Her mother then asked Noe to accompany her in looking for the Attorney. The two went
out and were away for more than an hour, while she stayed in the house to take care of her younger brother.
Drawing a sketch, the witness explained the relative position of their house with those of Dorot (D. Estorque), Sotera
and Monte, and the national highway, as well as the three (3) possible routes from their house to the highway (pp.
65-84, TSN).
On cross-examination, the witness indicated on the sketch prepared by her, the specific spot where she saw her
stepfather being hacked, and where she first saw Monte running. She also described the attacks on her stepfather
how Aposaga hacked him first while he was walking, followed by the thrusting by Monte. She averred that when she
later talked with her brother Noe, they agreed not to tell anyone about what they saw; otherwise they will all be killed
starting with their mother (pp. 85-135, TSN).
Dr. Teodoro Reyes, 51 years old, Municipal Health Officer of Polomolok, South Cotabato, testified that he has been
the Municipal health Officer of Polomolok for more than 10 years. On February 2, 1966, he was fetched by a
policeman of Polomolok to exhume the body of Atty. Jose Barranda. He went to a field about 500 meters north of the
residence of Atty. Barranda, together with a few policemen and PC soldiers. they found the already decomposing

body buried in a well 5 feet deep and about 3 meters in diameter, covered with bloodstained newspapers, a jacket
and soil about one foot deep. He established the Identity of the cadaver as that of Atty. Barranda from the description
furnished by Mrs. Barranda (Gloria Salongcong). Besides, he knew Atty. Barranda when he was still alive as he had
been handling cases in Polomolok. When he examined the body, he found 4 fatal wounds, 3 of which were caused
by sharp-bladed instruments and one by mauling. His findings are embodied in his medico-legal post-mortem
certificate (pp. 2-4, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1), as follows:
DIRECT CAUSES OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED:
Under this, are other pertinent findings on this cadaver and its clothings which have bearings on
the injuries sustained or direct causes of death. Premise or statement of the General Condition of
the Cadaver during time of examination: The cadaver although in a state of much decay there are
still some or big portions of the skin left specially on the chest, back and abdomen; big portions of
muscles much softened and some parts melting; big portions of abdominal viscerae are inside and
soft; and semi-melted. So also is the condition in the chest,
(a) One stab wound of the right chest, entering into the interspace between the 5th and 6th costal
cartilage. This stab wound coincides with the cut through the polo shirt of the cadaver and that of
his camiseta T-shirt he was wearing. The cut is about four (4) cm. wide, going inside the chest to a
depth of at least five (5) inches. The direction is towards the back. The medial edge of the wound is
2-1/2 cm. lateral to the right lateral border of the typhoid. The width of the cut is parallel to the
direction of the rib. Wide area of old blood stain can be seen on the clothing over the chest, also
some part of the upper abdomen. This is a fatal wound.
(b) A big cross-wise cut of the left upper abdomen, with a length of about five (5) inches, as can be
seen on the intact part of skin of the cadaver, and cut portions of loops of intestine inside. The
medial edge of this cut or wound starts from about the middle portion of the front part of the
abdomen going lateralwards to the left to a length of about five (5) inches. This is a fatal wound.
Remarks: There is no evidence of cut on the clothing, for we found that all the clothings on the left
side of the body were lifted or raised that might have escaped the cutting.
(c) Fracture of the left part of the skull:
Description is divided into the upper portion of the skull and that of the lower mandible or jaw.
Upper portion of the skull:
There is a rounded depressed fracture of the bone beneath the left upper gum, about a ten centavo
coin size. Its medial border is about 1-1/2 inches distant from the center of the upper gum. Also,
the zygomatic process of the left temporal bone is broken (fractured) and detached. That
completely broken piece is still attached only by a ligament.
Lower portion of the skull or lower jaw: The neck of the head (the posterior elevation for
articulation) of the left mandible or left side of the lower jaw is completely fractured, and the head
portion is missing. The fractured head is missing.
The picture taken for this is herewith attached. The back part of this picture is marked 'C'.

Remarks: I honestly believe the deceased was mauled on the left face so hard that caused the
fatal fracture. The rounded depressed fracture is most probably due to the elevated portion or the
nail of the hard object used for mauling. This is fatal The brain cannot escape big injury.
(d) A big cut on the apple green jacket the cadaver is covered (with) [picture taken of said jacket
herewith attached. The back part of the picture is marked "D")
Description: There is about 6-1/2 inch cut of the right shoulder of this jacket going medial-ward and
more on its back portion. The inner shirts on this part are stained with old blood stains. The jacket
is somewhat loose for the cadaver.
Remarks: I strongly and sincerely believe that this cut involved the lower part and the base of the
right side of the neck. It is a big cut. This is a fatal wound.
With the big cut on the jacket the cadaver is covered on its right shoulder area and reaching up to
the base of the right side of the collar, with the corresponding cuts on the inner shirts the cadaver is
wearing, but no evidence of cut could be found on the bones as scapula and right clavicle, simply
means that the big cut involved only the muscles, big blood vessels and vital nerves of the right
side of the lower part of the neck and shoulder area near that side of the neck-in short, the soft
tissues were cut, without cutting the bones (called the hard tissue).
Conclusion: (a) With all honesty and sincerity, it is very definite that the cadaver now exhumed is
Atty. JOSE BARRANDA'S.
(b) The causes of death are mentioned under the item
DIRECT CAUSES OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
(c) The causes of death are purely foul play or murder. All the cuts are due to sharp-bladed
instruments; the fracture on the face due to blunt hard object with hard protection on it.
xxx xxx xxx
According to the doctor, the wound described in paragraph (a) was a thrust wound inflicted while the victim was
standing in front of the assailant (p. 219, TSN); the one under paragraph (b) could have been inflicted while the victim
was lying down; the other one under paragraph (c) could have been caused by mauling while the victim was lying
down; and the wound in paragraph (d) was inflicted while the victim was standing, with the assailant at the back of
the deceased, probably ahead of the other wounds (p. 222, TSN).
Sgt. Ricardo Vargas of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to the 27th Traffic Team, 45 years old, and residing at
Cotabato City, declared (pp. 262-320, TSN) that in 1966 he was assigned to the 101st PC Company at General
Santos, Cotabato, having been transferred thereto since December 1, 1965. He did not know the accused before,
and he met them only on January 30, 1966. He first met Francisco Aposaga on said date when Felomena Cabrera
came to his office with Pio Francisco and Sgt. Edoria to report the presence in their barrio of a certain Francisco
Lozada who was wanted by the police with a prize of P10,000.00 on his head for a series of robbery and murder
cases. After being shown a newspaper clipping with a picture and description of Lozada, he went to Palkan,
Polomolok, South Cotabato with 2 other PC soldiers to verify the report. The house of Aposaga was pointed to them
by Felomena when they were about 300 meters therefrom. Proceeding to said house, they called for Francisco
Lozada, but it was Francisco Aposaga who came and Identified himself as Aposaga, not Lozada. When Sgt. Vargas

compared the photo and description of Lozada from the newspaper clipping to the person of Aposaga, the
Description did not tally, as there was no mole, scar or tattoos at the back of his body. As a result, they returned to
the PC headquarters without making an arrest.
After lunch on the same day, Felomena Cabrera showed up again at the PC headquarters with Jesus Francisco, the
son of Pio. Jesus was ask; 'ng him why he released Aposaga when he was the killer of Atty. Barranda. That was the
only time he learned of the death of Atty. Barranda. He lost no time in returning to Palkan. But when he arrived there,
Aposaga was no longer in his house. His wife informed him that Aposaga went to Norala to harvest palay. He (Sgt.
Vargas) proceeded to the house of Monte, who informed him that Aposaga killed Attorney in the morning of
December 13 (1965). Sgt. Vargas invited Monte and his wife to the headquarters for investigation. While there, they
gave corroborative statements to the effect that Aposaga and a companion known as Calbo hacked and killed Atty.
Barranda upon inducement by Sotera Salongcong who paid them P 200.00 (Exhs. "K" and "L", pp. 19-21, Folder of
Exh. Vol. 1). He also took the statements of Noe and Felomena Cabrera, then filed a motion to exhume the body,
which was actually done by the municipal health officer in his presence as well as in the presence of their
commanding officer, Capt. Adriano Bulatao the Polomolok chief of police and some other persons.
Jesus Francisco, 36 years old, farmer and resident of Marbel Crossing, Tampacan, Tupi South Cotabato, declared
that on December 13, 1965, he was in his house near Crossing Awas in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Constancio
Monte passed by his house that morning, then left in the direction going to Sulit. At about 6:30 a.m., he went to his
sanguta (where tuba is extracted). He met Sotera Salongcong, who was going to Dadiangas. She gave him P 200.00
from Francisco Mendez, telling him to deliver it to Aposaga, which he did at the latter's house at about 8:00 or 9:00
o'clock. Aposaga was then with Constancio Monte and Wilfredo Villanueva, alias Calbo. After that he saw these three
again at about 11:00 a.m. near their house which was near his sanguta. The three told him that Atty. Barranda was
already dead, and gave him the bag of the Attorney with instructions to bury it. In the bag was a cellophane folder
containing papers and documents. He buried the bag in the land of Cestua and kept the papers in the cellophane
under a banana tree. These he did because the trio told him he will be killed if he didn't, which made him afraid.
When he asked them why they killed the Attorney, their answer was "Don't talk". He did not report the matter to the
authorities because they had been threatening him with death if he did so (pp. 322-350, TSN).
The statement of accused-appellant Monte (Exh. "K", pp. 17-18, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I) on February 1, 1966, may
be summarized as follows: that he has been a tenant of Atty. Barranda since July 1965; that sometime in the morning
of December 13, 1965, Atty. Barranda was hacked and killed by Francisco Aposaga and a companion known to him
only as Calbo; that Aposaga told him they were given P 200 by "Suterania" (Sotera) Salongcong; that the latter hired
them to kill Barranda because he had raped Fe Cabrera; that Fe Cabrera confirmed this raping to him; that the
cadaver of Atty. Barranda was thrown into a deep Japanese dug-out somewhere in the farm lot of Alfredo Acejo that
Aposaga used a bolo while Calbo used a knife (flamingo); that at the time of the killing, Barranda was carrying a
leather bag (portfolio) containing land titles and records of cases he was handling; that the said bag was given to
Pedoy a nephew of Suterania (Sotera) Salongcong; and that the said bag was buried while the contents were
wrapped in cellophane and covered by banana leaves among banana plants near the house of Pedoy.
These allegations were mostly reiterated by Monte in Exhibit "L" (pp. 21-23, Folder of Exh. Vol. I ) In addition, he
stated that the killing was plotted by his family, as he accidentally learned when he overheard a conversation
between Gloria and Suterania (Sotera) Salongcong where the latter was saying "If in case somebody went up the
house Gloria and the children will just go upstairs and they will not be disturbed because the purpose is just Atty.
Barranda" (sic).
The other prosecution witnesses were:

(1) Gloria Salongcong, the common-law wife of the deceased who narrated that the latter failed to appear at their
appointed meeting in Dadiangas on December 13, 1965, and that she and her son Noe went out to look for him upon
her return to Palkan in the afternoon of the same day (pp. 137-173, TSN).
(2) Pio Francisco, who learned of the slaying of the deceased from his son Jesus on January 20, 1966, and who first
brought it to the attention of the authorities on January 30, 1966 (pp. 187-205, TSN).
(3) Epifanio Doria, the PC sergeant who was first told by Pio Francisco about the killing, and who brought him to the
PC headquarters for the actual reporting (pp. 178-187, TSN).
(4) Sotera Salongcong, who narrated that a certain Francisco Mendez gave her P 200 for delivery to accused
Aposaga without explaining what the money was for, and who delivered it to Aposaga through Jesus Francisco
without her asking for what purpose it was (pp. 230-260, TSN).
The theory of the defense is that the charge is a frame-up on the part of the victim's family, whose members plotted
his murder, with Jesus Francisco as the mastermind and alias Calbo the lone hatchetman. Testifying on their own
behalf, both accused- appellants denied knowledge of and participation in the commission of the crime, and
maintained that they never knew of the death of the deceased until investigations were already under way some two
to four months thereafter.
The testimony of accused-appellant Aposaga, 27 years old, farmer and resident of Palkan, Polomolok, South
Cotabato, dealt mainly in explaining about his sudden departure from Palkan on January 30, 1966, the date the PC
went to his house. He narrated that when Sgt. Vargas came to his house (the date of which he could not remember),
he was looking for Francisco Lozada. He informed Vargas that his name was Francisco Aposaga and not Lozada.
Vargas examined his body and was convinced that he was a different person. So Vargas left, but not before he told
him that he was going to Iloilo for a vacation. He proceeded to Norala (South Cotabato) that same afternoon. When
he reached Norala, his aunt told him that his mother was sick so he should proceed to Iloilo. Because of such
information, he left Norala hurriedly, taking MV Legaspi at Cotabato City and disembarking in Iloilo. He learned of the
murder of Barranda 3 or 4 months later when his wife wrote him informing that he was wanted for the murder. He
then went to the PC in Iloilo, requesting for an escort to Mindanao as he was afraid he might be killed. But the PC in
Iloilo could not provide him with any escort, so he stayed in Iloilo. He visited the PC in Iloilo for about 5 times, until the
PC from Polomolok came to get him. He admitted having been a tenant of the deceased, but denied participation in
his killing. He also denied having received P200.00 from Jesus Francisco. He did not know the person of alias Calbo.
On cross-examination, he stated that he threw away the letter of his wife when he went to the PC because he did not
think it was important. He did not know what was the company or organizational unit of the PC he visited in Iloilo, nor
the name of its commanding officer. He stayed in Iloilo for 8 to 10 months.
His cousin, a certain Jose, who is married to his first cousin Clomia Viana fetched him at Palkan because his mother
was ill. He had to go to Norala, however, to inquire from his aunt, Paz Aposaga, how serious his mother was. His
aunt told him in tears to go home to Iloilo because his mother was serious, per information of the same Jose. He
never received any letter from his parents, brother or sister or any relative from Iloilo asking him to go home (pp. 440-
462, TSN).
Defense witness Doroteo Estorque, father of the common-law wife of Aposaga, 58 years old, farmer, and resident of
Crossing Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato declared that on December 13, 1965, he and Aposaga were plowing in
the farm lot of the deceased from 6:00 A.M. to 5:30 P.M., stopping only for breakfast and lunch. There was no
unusual incident that transpired on said date, except that in the morning he heard someone call "wait, wait" and saw
Gloria Salongcong coming down their house. At that time Aposaga was 30 meters behind him, also plowing. The

place where they were plowing was about 150 meters from the house of Barranda. He did not see Atty. Barranda that
morning. He only learned about his death through the PC. He knows that Atty. Barranda and Gloria Salongcong
usually quarrelled about Gloria's children because the place he is working is near their house. On cross-examination,
he admitted having subscribed to an affidavit (Exh. "J", p. 16, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1) wherein he had stated that he
could not see Aposaga because of the tall talahibs, but he explained that such answer was wrong and his real
answer was, "I cannot see him when he was covered by talahibs but if we will be out from the talahibs I can see him"
(P. 386, TSN).
Vicente Estorque, 20, married, son of Doroteo and brother-in-law of Aposaga and likewise residing at Crossing
Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, corroborated his father's testimony about the whereabouts of Aposaga on
December 13, 1965. He testified that on that day, he had been plowing from 10:00 A.M. with his father and brother-
in-law Aposaga. In the afternoon he plowed from 2:00 to 5:00 P.M. Afterwards he met Vicente or Jesus Francisco
(Pedoy) on his way home. Francisco borrowed his sledge, so he had to carry his plow on his shoulder because he
lent his sledge to Francisco. The sledge was returned two hours later with bloodstains and with its bamboo breast
missing. He could not, however, recover the missing part because Francisco had been avoiding him. On questioning
by the court, he stated that they did not go back to plow in that field any more (p. 407, TSN); in fact, that land was
never planted because Aposaga left for Panay (p. 409, TSN).
Accused-appellant Constancio Monte, 38 years old, farmer and resident of Crossing Palkan, Polomolok, South
Cotabato, testified (pp. 463-525, TSN), that he met Atty. Barranda when the latter was a lawyer of Lianga Industry in
San Francisco, Agusan, where he used to work as guard of its bulldozer department. In July of 1965, Atty. Barranda
convinced him to go with him to Palkan, South Cotabato, to be the overseer of his 36-hectare farm, as a condition of
which he need not give any share of the harvest to Barranda as landowner but only to his wife, Gloria Salongcong. In
addition, he (Monte) will get 25% of the proceeds of the 18-hectare land in Matatum which was planted to potatoes
and cabbage, plus P5.00 monthly per head of the carabaos, horses and cattle he was supposed to care for. When he
arrived with his family in Palkan in the same month, Atty. Barranda called for Sotera Salongcong and Jesus
Francisco, his erstwhile tenants, and told them that it was their last day as Monte was taking over. Atty. Barranda
instructed him (Monte) to get the carabao and plow from Jesus Francisco.
In the month of December, Fe Cabrera informed him that she was raped by Atty. Barranda. Sometime later, while he
was under the Barranda's house to fetch the cow, he overheard a conversation among Jesus Francisco, Sotera
Salongcong and Gloria Salongcong, wherein Sotera was saying, "We better have Attorney killed ... so that we can
revenge of what he has done to your child who was being raped (sic).
Early one morning, about the second week of December, 1965 (he could not exactly remember the date), Barranda
called for him to instruct him to take care of the carabaos and cows because he was leaving for Agusan to become a
judge. After their talk, he took breakfast with the Barranda family. Thereafter, he brought the children Ruth, Fely,
Samuel and Noe to his house upon instruction of Atty. Barranda. He went to the toril with Noe to tie the carabao.
While there, Noe told him that Atty. Barranda was leaving. At the same instance he heard someone shouting, "wait
for me", and saw Jesus Francisco running, followed by Calbo. He did not know who Calbo was, but Noe told him that
he is from Polomolok. However, he did not know what transpired afterwards as he did not look anymore. From the
toril he could see Aposaga plowing with Doroteo Estorque. He stayed in the toril for about 30 minutes.
Monte admitted having gone to the PC headquarters for investigation and having executed an affidavit (Exh. "K", p.
19, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1); but when he appeared before Judge Mirabueno (municipal court of Polomolok), he
was made to sign by Sgt. Vargas although he told the judge that there was an error. The error was that when he
mentioned the name "Francisco" as the person who hacked and killed the deceased, he meant Jesus Francisco and
not Francisco Aposaga. However, since he had no lawyer then, he did not know how to go about the correction. It
was only when Francisco Aposaga, who is his friend, contacted his lawyer that he was accommodated in his defense

by Atty. Velarde, as he had no money. As for the second affidavit which he executed one week after (Exh. "L", P. 21,
Folder of Exhibits, Vol. 1), he was made to sign the same without appearing before Judge Mirabueno.
On cross-examination, he maintained that he did not know who is Pedoy whose name is mentioned in his affidavit as
the nephew of Sotera Salongcong to whom the killers gave the bag of Atty. Barranda. He denied having been asked
the question and having given the answers found in his affidavits referring to Aposaga. He did not know what he was
signing as he does not know how to read.
Against this background, the trial court promulgated its aforementione d decision on April 28, 1969 and denied the
defense's motion for reconsideration and new trial on May 31, 1969 (p. 200, CFI rec.).
Hence, this appeal.
Appellants now raise only one issue that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They try
to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of the two eyewitnesses which, they
claim, are corrupt, bias, unreliable and incompetent because of their inherent improbabilities" pp. 86, rec.), as shown
by the following circumstances:
A. As to Noe Cabrera
1. If Noe really witnessed the murder of his stepfather, why did he not shout for help (pp. 32-33,
TSN)? Why did he not tell his mother about it when the latter arrived home from Dadiangas and
was asking about the victim (p. 35, TSN)? Why did he have to go with his mother around the barrio
to look for his stepfather if he knew — after having witnessed the killing — that his stepfather was
dead (pp. 15-18, TSN)?
2. If he were really threatened by the culprits (p. 10, TSN) so as to produce fear in him, why did he
have to go riding his horse by himself that evening of the incident (p. 20, TSN)? Why did he
consent to sleep in the house of Monte after the PC arrived to conduct the investigation (p. 23,
TSN)? Why did he continue to visit the houses of Monte and Aposaga after December 13, 1965
(pp. 163-164, TSN)?
B. As to Felomena Cabrera
1. How could Felomena have witnessed the murder of her step- father from the kitchen of their
house when, according to the PC investigator, Sgt. Vargas, the place of the incident was not visible
from the kitchen or balcony of the Barranda house because it was covered by banana hills, talahibs
and calamansi trees (pp. 301-302, TSN)?
2. Why did she not secretly tell her mother about the incident (p. 72, TSN)?
3. Why was her first report to the PC not about the murder of her stepfather but about the presence
of a certain wanted man in their barrio (p. 264, TSN)? Why did it take her 48 days to make such
report?
WE find the above observations insufficient to warrant the exculpation of the appellants. While it is true that the
testimonies of the two eyewitnesses may have suffered flaws and inconsistencies, the same refer only to minor
details which are not sufficient to destroy their credibility. Their actuations after witnessing the commission of the

crime (i.e., not shouting or running for help, not reporting earlier, etc.), do not indicate that they were not present
when the killing of their stepfather took place. Likewise, the testimony of the PC investigator that the place of the
incident is not visible from the kitchen of the victim's house, because of the presence of banana hills, talahibs and
calamansi trees, cannot overcome the positive assertion of Felomena that she saw her stepfather killed, especially
so since the investigation took place about 50 days after the incident and conditions obtaining them may be different
from those at the time of the offense.
A closer scrutiny of their testimonies shows convincingly that they had indeed witnessed the commission of the
crime. The only doubtful portion is their allegation that they were threatened with death—with their mother the first to
be killed—against revealing it. Because, even if there were such a threat, they could have secretly revealed it to their
mother who would certainly take steps to protect them. Besides, if the danger of the threat was real to them, they
should have stopped going to the houses of the accused, instead of maintaining normal relations with them after the
incident; Felomena should not have gone to the PC headquarters twice on January 30, 1966; and Noe should not
have slept in the house of Monte after his family had gone to Dadiangas to make the report,
These actuations are inconsistent with the reality of the threat. It is easier to believe that they discussed the incident
with their mother but had to deny it to protect her. The maxim "blood is thicker than water" must have prompted these
two (2) eyewitnesses to insist that their mother did not know anything about it. Otherwise, the involvement of their
mother and other close relatives will be an undeniable conclusion.
Besides, the trial court, while noting the same flaws and inconsistencies, gave credence to the testimonies of the said
eyewitnesses who, despite their minority, the excitement generated by the court proceedings and the long and
searching cross-examinations, firmly stuck to their testimonies which pointed to the appellants and a companion
known as Calbo as the killers of their stepfather. Time and time again WE have ruled that where the issue is
credibility of the witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial judge, who heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless he has plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This exception does not
obtain here. (People vs, Laguisma 98 SCRA 69 [1980]; People vs. de la Cruz, 97 SCRA 386 [1980]; People vs.
Bautista y Aquino, 92 SCRA 465, 472 [1979]).
Furthermore, no motive was shown why the two eyewitnesses should testify against them falsely; hence, they must
be telling the truth. (People vs. Arevalo, 92 SCRA 207 [1979]; People vs. Lim 71 SCRA 249 [1976]).
The appellants likewise theorize that the prosecution witnesses Sotera Salongcong, Jesus Francisco and probably
Gloria Salongcong must have plotted against the life of the deceased. Sotera and Jesus harbor resentment against
the victim for having ousted them from their tenancy in favor of Monte. Besides, Sotera wanted to revenge the raping
of her niece by the deceased. These are strong motives to do away with the victim, whereas the appellants have no
motive to kill him.
In the case of People vs. Veloso (92 SCRA 515, 524 [1979]), WE held that motive, as distinguished from criminal
intent, is not an essential element of a crime and hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction. Motive is
essential to conviction in murder cases only when there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit, something which
does not obtain in this case (also People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA 1403 [1967]; People vs. Caggauan 94 Phil. 188
[1953]).
The defense vainly tried to utilize the apparent involvement of the prosecution witnesses Gloria and Sotera
Salongcong and Jesus Francisco in claiming a frame-up and a scheme to lay the blame on the two (2) accused-
appellants. While WE agree with the observation that these 3 witnesses are probably involved in various ways and
degrees, and their exclusion from the charge is questionable, WE cannot find any reason to believe that the

appellants are innocent as they pretend to be. As aptly held by the trial court, "that there were principals by induction
in the commission of a crime who were not prosecuted is no legal impediment to a finding of guilt of the principals by
direct participation for the same crime. ... [T)he non-prosecution of Gloria and Sotera Salongcong in the case at bar
did not make the indictees before us less guilty much more, innocent was to be blessed with a judgment of acquittal"
(pp. 52-53, rec.).
On the contrary, the guilt of both appellants appear to be a moral certainty, even without the testimonies of Gloria,
Sotera and Jesus. Aside from the positive Identification of the two eyewitnesses, the evidence even of the defense
tend to establish the guilt of the appellants.
The tale woven by Aposaga about his sudden departure from Polomolok as soon as the authorities started the
investigation, was not only uncorroborated but was also too improbable to believe. First, he said he told Vargas that
he was going to Norala for a vacation. When Vargas returned after he had gone, his wife told Vargas that Aposaga
went to Norala to harvest palay. When he reached Norala, his aunt told him to proceed to Iloilo because his mother
was ill. But the source of his aunt's information was the same cousin who allegedly fetched him from Polomolok for
the self-same reason the alleged illness of his mother. He allegedly stayed in Iloilo for about 8 to 10 months although
according to the records, he was there for more than a year until the policemen from Polomolok came to arrest him. It
should be pointed out that his sudden departure must have left his wife and child in Polomolok without any means of
support, as the land he was plowing was never planted after he left (p. 409, TSN). All these could lead to but one
conclusion that he had to flee and hide with his guilty conscience to avoid arrest. Flight and going into hiding indicate
a guilty conscience. (People vs. Guevarra, 94 SCRA 642 [1979]; People vs. Moreno, 85 SCRA 649 [1978]).
Defense witnesses Doroteo and Vicente Estorque, father and brother, respectively, of Aposaga's common-law wife,
tried to establish an alibi for Aposaga. Their testimonies, however, are inherently weak and doubtful in many
substantial aspects, and appear to be nothing more than vain attempts to save a "family member" from conviction.
For instance, they testified that Aposaga was plowing with them at the time of the incident. Doroteo, however, stated
that when he heard the shout "wait, wait", Aposaga was 30 meters behind him although he could not see him as he
was hidden by talahibs (p. 385, TSN; Exh. J-1). Vicente, on the other hand, plowed with Aposaga and his father only
from 10:00 to 10:30 that morning (p. 404, TSN), whereas the incident occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 A.M. Doroteo
further declared that there was nothing unusual that happened on December 13, 1965 and he does not remember
what day it was. Yet, he could recall at the witness stand four (4) years later that he saw Gloria Salongcong running
at five o'clock that morning; what dress Gloria was wearing; what time they started plowing (6:00 A.M.); what time
they left the farm; what time they took their meals; what they ate for breakfast and lunch, and other minor details of
daily life. Doroteo claimed that he does not know Calbo but he admitted seeing him in the house of Monte that fateful
morning of December 13th (p. 394, TSN). He never tried to find out who uttered the words "wait, wait" (p. 394, TSN).
He was surprised to learn of the death of the victim whom he had believed to be in Bislig (p. 386, TSN); but he never
visited the remains after exhumation when he already knew he was dead (p. 379, TSN). Is this the natural reaction to
a surprising death of barrio-mate who owned the land he was plowing? Vicente's testimony likewise suffered from
similar inconsistencies and improbabilities as to command little, if any, probative value. The testimonies of these
defense witnesses are mere concoctions that cannot neutralize the positive Identification of the appellants by the two
prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable, it must be shown that the place where the
accused was alleged to be must be located at such a distance that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime when it was committed (People vs. Tirol, L-30538, January 31, 1981; People vs. de la Cruz, 97
SCRA 387 [1980]; People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232 [1980]; People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 [1979]). Such was
not the situation in this case; for the place where Aposaga was allegedly plowing was only about 150 meters from the
house of the victim (p. 368, TSN) and within hearing distance from the place of the incident. The place of the incident
in turn was only 60 to 70 meters from the victim's house (p. 314, TSN). It was therefore very convenient for Aposaga

to slip away from his plowing and participate in the murder of the deceased even if he actually plowed the farm in the
morning of December 13, 1965.
Furthermore, Aposaga was named as a killer of the deceased in two sworn statements executed by his co-accused
Monte (Exhs. "K" and "L"), which sworn statements were corroborated by his wife Bienvenida (Exh. "M"). Monte tried
to retract these statements on the witness stand by explaining that when he said "Francisco" he meant Jesus
Francisco, and not appellant Francisco Aposaga, and that the said affidavit was never read to him by Municipal
Judge Narciso Mirabueno, before whom he signed and swore to it. The latter claim was belied by Judge Mirabueno
who testified that he read the contents of all affidavits to the affiants and made sure they understood. He also asked
searching questions to determine the truth of their statements (pp. 557-569, TSN). Since it has not been shown that
the said judge has any interest in the case, it is not difficult to determine which of the two (2) testimonies deserves
consideration.
As to the claim of mistaken Identity of the person named "Francisco", it is obvious from the very substance of Monte's
sworn statements that the "Francisco Aposaga" he named therein as a killer of the deceased was different and
distinct from the "Jesus Francisco" (Pedoy) who buried the leather bag of the deceased. Besides, it is
understandable that Monte will try his best to save his co-accused who had so gallantly provided him a defense
counsel which he could not afford.
For his part, Monte tried to establish his innocence by pointing out that it was unnatural for him to kill Atty. Barranda
after the latter had satisfactorily explained about the problems of his work and after they had breakfast together (p.
82, rec.). Besides, he had no motive to kill his employer and benefactor who had given him better opportunities and
sufficient means to support his family by taking him as tenant and supervisor (pp. 89-90, rec.). Unfortunately, these
allegations cannot overcome the incriminating testimonies of the two (2) eyewitnesses. Besides, even from his own
testimony, the following circumstantial evidence appear to be inconsistent with his innocence:
1. Monte testified that he heard of a threat against the life of the deceased in a conversation among Gloria
Salongcong, Sotera Salongcong and Jesus Francisco (p. 471, TSN). Yet, when he saw Jesus running after the
deceased carrying a bolo, he did not even look to see what Jesus intended to do (pp. 485486; 500-501, TSN).
2. He did not do anything about the disappearance of his employer for forty-eight (48) days, even though the last time
he saw him (deceased) was when somebody Jesus Francisco) was running after him (pp. 500-501, TSN).
3. If it were true that the deceased had told him he was going to Agusan to become a judge (p. 475, TSN), why did
he not remind Gloria of such fact when Gloria came looking for her husband (p. 489, TSN)?
4. Although he saw Jesus running after the deceased that morning, he did not say so when Gloria asked him about
the deceased; and when Gloria expressed the possibility that the deceased might have been waylaid, his answer
was, "Nobody could do that because it is daytime" (p. 490, TSN).
5. Monte escaped from the municipal jail on July 9, 1966, allegedly because his wife was sick in San Francisco,
Agusan, He explained that when he wired his wife to inform her that their hearing will be in May (1966), his father-in-
law replied that she was sick (p. 524, TSN). If that were true and this allegation was never corroborated, his escape
should have been timed around May, 1966, and not July of that year. The records do not disclose any hearing in July
1966. Surely, it is more logical to conclude that Monte's flight, like that of his co-accused, indicated a guilty
conscience.
All the above could lead but to one conclusion, that the guilt of the two (2) accused-appellants has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

This case should, however, be further investigated to determine the participation of Sotera Salongcong, Jesus
Francisco and Gloria Salongcong in the perpetration of the crime. Their own respective statements implicate
themselves. Moreover, as pointed out by the appellants, these prosecution witnesses have strong motives to kill the
deceased: Sotera and Jesus for their ouster from tenancy, and Gloria for the rape of her daughter Fe.
However, for lack of necessary votes. the death penalty cannot be imposed,
WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH THE MODIFICATION THAT
APPELLANTS ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA, WITH COSTS AGAINST THEM.
LET A COPY OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
SO THAT OTHERS WHO APPEAR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIME MAY BE DULY PROSECUTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself,
because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these
proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We
think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those
details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts
disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province,
and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters
No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was
occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied

a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of
the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock,
and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in
the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room
there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there
were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very
dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it
is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it
rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder
who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps
in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight.
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to
his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of
which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because
of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior
to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and
acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his
friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house
to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their
room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally
wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who
immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's
warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the
boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his
way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was
being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from
the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that
he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception
from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room
had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and
resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the
property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were
as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known
the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular
intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in
murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases
where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases

where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited;
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as
most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the
crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally
liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of
the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the
United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly
declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of
article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes
and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those
touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And
it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in
degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is
criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s.
313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm
that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime
consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater
or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the
same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints.
C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say
that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con
malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the
code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included
in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of

negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the
code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the
exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no
crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no
act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law,
folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May
31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects
of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can
be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or
ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted
to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which
are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in
its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less
than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto
in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful"
as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word
"willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a
little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or
"causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the
word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying
rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with
the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who
supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important,
not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It
is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is
the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does
not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done
by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence
differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame
ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In
times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act
from his neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an

evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the
want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the
plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering
one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in
nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no
man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of
necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the
lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle
that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if
suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases
cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to
be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here
is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs.Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the
question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to
him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according
to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and
he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large
array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief,
and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the
attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger
at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the
real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of
malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in
cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code,
that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against
him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such
design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the
degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a
pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant
the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and
that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he
would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that
the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set
out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his
wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending
to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the
stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the
floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left
the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon
as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting
from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his
father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he
be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances
related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid
found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational

necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal
Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by
the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the
facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in
his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than
fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that
they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he
was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally
necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there
was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for
the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc."
(Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city,
upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces,
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two
shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying
upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had
been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired
from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as
having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code?
The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of
the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack,
and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting
justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown
against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is
answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and
observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he
fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man
be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites
of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds
that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused
to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court
acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in
a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would
have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty
of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted
by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.


Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the
case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was
committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or
criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who
assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person
who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced
to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article
61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
reversing the judgment appealed from

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of
police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by
the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of
from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod
accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta,
and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the
office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper
clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of
police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and
failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two
groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the
house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida
Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place
and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned
to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then
went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene
saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still
firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the
notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the
deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to
the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a
.45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of
Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when
he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated
the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in
the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If
you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit

up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is
Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if
you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on
bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the
door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from the
floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are
vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory.
Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up
something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit
up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of
the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and
corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson
was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both
appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was
still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson,
the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe
her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in
rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony
will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her
cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to
the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing
the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door,
Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but
without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they
may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants
acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson
was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them
guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the
circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances
to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by
someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that
precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then
being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-
mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night
and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He
was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was

loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there
is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or
opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but
to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case,
appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain
his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end
had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course
of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at
sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and
detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating
him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S.,
par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force
shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal
liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S.vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It
may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the
peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he
offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid
down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he
has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers
resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how,
as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the
officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify
precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a
reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de
imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion,
debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar
un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And,
as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act
is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance ofalevosia.
There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in
article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability
when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order

that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is
present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or
to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-
anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person
whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to
his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years
of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs
of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.


Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form Manila to the provinces.
Receiving information to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the
Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25,
1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive". Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio
Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram
received by the Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a
Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him
and, if overpowered, to follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the place where the house of
Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks in
the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked by Oanis to tell
where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping with Irene. Upon reaching
the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting
the man who was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but Balagtas was still
alive, for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, however, convicted them only of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta
have appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly followed the order issued by the
Constabulary authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or alive, in
the honest belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers

in his possession and a record that made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities
were justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by the
appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly believed by
them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did
not want to take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence. On the contrary, they should be
commended for their bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or ascertaining
whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without hesitation and thereby
exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their revolvers only after being
overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in
violation of the express order given by the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the appellants.
In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to
have waited until they have been overpowered before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In the third
place, it is immaterial whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and proper,
because the facts exist that the appellants acted in conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary
authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological or sentimental, in view only
of the fact that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep."
Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life of
Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to
follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly constituted authorities will, upon proper order,
enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was in fact Anselmo
Balagtas for the reason that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally
liable even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under
an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable
since the killing of the person who was believed to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point, inasmuch as the
defendant therein, who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake,
would not be exempted from criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious
design on his part. The other case involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in
point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and
allowed himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities to
capture Almasan dead or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
acquitted, with costs de oficio.



HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal "must be taken by
storm without regard to his life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers
resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which
confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of December 24, 1938,
was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive"
and according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial
inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis to the first part; namely, to
take him dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case, Capt. Monsod
stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned
honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had escaped from his
guards and was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met upon
arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was
upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are
Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily
explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was
peacefully lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants
to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according
to their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into
consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid
down in the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an innocent
mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having no time to make a
further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case which favored the accused-
appellants, arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore,
according to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law. This incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office." I believe that the application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code provides
as follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one
or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of
the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the
several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The
courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and
nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, and which
was also taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the
Department of Justice for the drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying
circumstances and circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject matter of this article are the
following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere

accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful
exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of
1870 which is the source of Article 69 of our Code says:
Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por una
fuerza inrresistible o impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un
deber, o en el ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que
incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al
articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad de requisitos.
La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho
es o no menor de nueve años; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que
respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto,
imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga al
autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que falten algunos requisitos de los que la
ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los
casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones.
It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required by the law to justify the same or exempt from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not
be confused with the word "requisites". In dealing with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There
are two requisites in order that this circumstance may be taken into account: (a) That the offender acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is evident that
these two requisites concur in the present case if we consider the intimate connection between the order given to the
appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a
bailarina named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the
supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are more reasons in favor of the
acquittal of appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit Serapio
Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so
testified and was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica.
According to this witness, since Galanta was made a corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his
equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly used by Galanta, and, according
to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it from his trunk in the barracks on the night
of December 24, 1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to the witness with
five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant
Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of December 24,
1938, when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession of the non-commissioned
officers and privates of the constabulary post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and
missed. This testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets exhibits F and O, — the
first being extracted from the head of the deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second
found at the place of the shooting, — had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from any other revolver of the
constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver
because when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the deceased was none other than
Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no reason why Galanta should carry

along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from wound No. 3 as above
stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record
gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record
gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter
of the wound's entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because according to the medico-
legal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12
mm. diameter. All other wounds found by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have been caused by
bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio
Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he should be declared criminally responsible for said death.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
November 29, 1954
G.R. No. L-6189
SAMSON VILORIA CALDERON, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
Col. Fred Ruiz Castro, Capt. Eleuterio S. Abiad and Capt. Juan G. Esguerra for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor Jesus A. Avanceña for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Accused of homicide, defendant Samson Viloria Calderon was, after due trial, convicted, by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, of homicide thru reckless negligence and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4
months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 6 months of prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of Eustacio Rodil,
deceased, in the sum of P3,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs. On appeal
taken by said defendant, the Court of Appeals found him guilty of homicide and imposed upon him an indeterminate
penalty of homicide and imposed upon him an indeterminate penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor nor more than 14 years , 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor nor more than 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal and, in all other respects, affirmed the decision of the court of first instance, with costs against
the defendant. The latter has brought the case to us for review by writ of certiorari.
The pertinent facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which we quote:

En la noche de dia primero de abril de 1951, el Teniente del jercito, Leopoldo Regis, al mando de un peloton de
solados, desplego doce de los mismos, entre ellos Samson Viloria Calderon, en el lado izguierdo del area Tejeron-
Herran, Santa Ana, Manila, que se pusobajo cordon, por sospecharse que dentro de ella estaban tres jefes de los
Huks. Samson formaba la linea del cordon paralela at cerco de "square type wire fence" (t.s.n. p. 8) de solar de unos
dos mil metros cuadrados de la casa No. 227 de la calle Tejeron, Santa Ana, donde vivian Eustacio Rodil, su esposa
y sus hijos. El cerco de alambre estaba reforzado con plantas de gumamela de trecho en trecho. En el solar habia
alguno que otro grupo de platanos y una zahurda detras de la case. Entre 11:00 y 12:00 de esa noche, Benjamin
Rodil, uno de los hijos de Eustacio, se desperto por los ladridos de los perros y el ruido que luego observo producia
el paso de un hombre. Abriola ventana y se puso obsrvar, y al convencerse que habia una persona fuera del cerco,
desperto, a sus hermanas, Elisea y Virginia, y a su sobrino, Bernardo, informoles que alguien estaba fuera del cerco
y ordeno a Elisea que abriera las dos bombillas electricas de a cien bujias cada una, puestas detras de la casa para
alumbrar la zahurda, pues que, como hubo tentativo de hurto de sus cercos en dos anteriores ocasiones, creia que
otro se intentaba llevar a cabo. Encendidas las luces, Benjamin y su sobrino Bernardo bajaron al solar, recogieron
piedras y triaronlas hacia el lugar donde se oian los pasos, hacienda al mismo tiempo ruido para ahuyentar. Asi
estuvieron por unos quince minutos en que, a veces, no oian los pasos del individuo que estaba fuerea del cerco,
hasta que Eustacio Rodil bajo y pregunto que era lo que habia. Le contestaron que se oian pasos fuera de cerco. Y
Eustacio se dirigio hacia alli, llevando en la mano derecha un bolo que llaman army bolo, que solia usar para cortar
la hierba del solar. Apenas se habia alejado unos quince pies de Benjamin se oyo un tiro y Eustacio volvio diciendo
que le habian tocado palpano al afecto la parte anterior de su hombro izquierdo, de la que manaba sangre. Se
desmayo antes de llegar a su casa y le tuvieron que alzar y colocarle en su cama. Mientras le quitaban la ropa par
descubrir sus heridas, llegaron dos soldados del ejercito. Samson Viloria y Ernes Lemos, y despues el teniente
Leopoldo Regis, que sugirio el traslado de Eustacio al Hospital General, sugestion a la que se conformo el Dr.
Deogracias Rodil, uno de los hijos de Eustacio que avisado del suceso llego poco antes que Regis, porque no tenia
a mano medios para contener la hemorragia que manaba de las heridas de su padre. Embarcaron a Eustacio en un
jeepney, y el Dr. Deorgracias y los soldados lellevaron al Hospital General. Segun el Dr. Deogracias, el pregunto por
el que disparo a su padre y ninguno de los dos soldados le contesto, pero, segun Samson, el le contesto que habia
sido el. En el Hospital Eustacio fallecio al dia siguiente, 2 de abril, y el resultado de la autopsia de su cadaver,
practicada por el Dr. Mariano B. Lara, Chief Medical Examinar MPD, consta en el Exh. B, .
xxx xxx xxx

Segun Benjamin, no oyo mas que que el estampido de un tiro, y de acuerdo con el soldado Lemos, que estaba a
tres metros de distancia de Viloria, no vio a este disparar sino una sola vez. El cadaver de Eustacio, sin embargo,
presentaba tres heridas de entrada, en la parte anterior del hombro izquierdo, y una de salida en la espalda, en la
region escapular izquierda, heridos que tales como estan marcadas en los diseños del Exh. B-1, la unica de salida
aparece mas baja que las de entrada.
Villoria admite que fue el quien disparo el tiro, que hirio y mato a Eustacio en la ocasion de autos, y expliicando el
suceso, dijo:
A. I believe that time he was a Huk to kill me, so I shot him.
Q. What made you believe that he was a Huk?
A. Because there was information to the effect that there were many Huks in this area.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you know the place where the civilian came from?
A. I know sir.
Q. From where?
A. From my front. He came from the direction opposite the place where I was at that time. (t.s.n. p. 35).
Q. Was there any conversation between you and the civilian before you shot him?
A. The civilian and I had a conversation.
Q. What was that conversation about?
A. I told him three times to halt and he said, if we did not clear out of the area he would kill us.
Q. Who would kill?

A. The man.
Q. When you said to the civillian to halt did you identify yourself?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. In what way did you identify yourself?
A. I told him I am a soldier.
Q. What did the man say if there is any?
A. I identified myself to him that I was a soldier, and that I told him not to move, but he said, that if we did not clear
out the area he would kill, and he swung his bolo to me and I retreated.
Q. What more did he do?
A. He nevertheless continued advancing forward and he made movement as if to put one of his legs over the fence.
(t.s.n. p. 36)
Q. At the time that the civilian was going toward you, could you see him?
A. I could see him only when he was two meters distance from me.
Q. In that distance of two meters that was you could see him already, do you remember if that civilian carried with
him something?
A. He has. He had an army bolo in his hand.
Q. In what hand was he carrying the bolo?
A. On the right hand.

Q. When he was at a distance of two meters, that was when he was going toward you, what did he do?
A. He was about to hack me with his bolo.
Q. Did he hack you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times did he hack you? What did he do?
A. Three times.
Q. At the time when the civilian was hacking you, could you demonstrate the position of the body and the weapon in
his hand?
A. (Witness demosntrate by placing the witness chair in front of him and letting it be supposed as the fence in front of
the witness and bends forward over the top of the fence so that the upper part of his body is bent and over the top of
the fence with his right hand raised as if to strike, the left leg being placed on the witness chair, supposed to be the
fence.)
Q. What was the distance of the civlian when he was hacking you?
A. One meter.
Q. After hacking you three times, what did you do?
A. I shot him.
Q. Would you demonstrate before this Hon. Court you position at the time when you shot the civilian?
A. (Witness demonstrated in a squatting position with his left foot forward, his left elboy on his knee and with left hand
a little bit raised and his right hand drawn back as if holding the trigger part of a rifle.)
Q. At the time when you were shoot him, what did you feel in your person?

xxx xxx xxx
A. I thought he was trying to kill me.
Q. What made you believe that he was trying to kill you?
A. I thought he was a Huk.
Q. After having shot the civilian, what did you do?
A. I told my companion, Ernesto, to report the matter to Ltd. Regis. (t.s.n. p. 37)
Appellant maintains that:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that late Eustacio Rodil did not commit acts of unlawful aggression against
the petitioner-appellant;
II. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner-appellant fired the shot under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a n equal or greater injury;
III. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the shot fired by the petitioner-appellant did not proceed from an
innocent mistake of fact;
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the ruling held by this Honorable Court in People vs. Oanis et al. (74
Phil. 259), is applicable in the instant case.
In support of the first, second and third assignments of error, it is urged that Eustacio Rodil gave appellant three bolo
slashes, which misses him; that he believed Rodil to be a Huk; and that appellant fired at Rodil in selfdefense and
acting under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. In this connection the Court of
Appeals said:
Eustacio venia de su casa, se dirigia al cerco de su solar, tendido fuera del cordon, y no estaba, por lo tanto, dentro
del area sospechosa, accorralada en esa ocasion poor la fuerza armada a que pertenecia Viloria. el solar detras de
la casa de Eustacio, a cuyo cerco este se dirigia, estaba alumbrado po dos bombillas electricas de a cien bujias cada

una. Mas aun, antes de que Eustacio bajara de su casa y fuera al cerco, al otro lado del cual se encontraban Viloria,
a este estuvieron Benjamin y Bernardo tirandole piedras y ahuyentandole con la voz. Todas estas circunstancias no
daban lugar a suponer que habia Huks en el solar de la casa de Eustacio, porque ningun Huk atacaria encendiendo
primeramente las luces electricas, para exponerse asimismo a los que estaban en la sombra, y menos aun tieraria
piedras y ahuyentaria hacindo ruido con la voz. No se concibe, pues, como Viloria, que debe estar entrenado contra
las emboscadas de los Huks, podia creer que Eustacio era un disidente; sobre todo porque, segun el mismo, fue
advertido que despejara aquel sitio o de otro modo seria muerto. Esta advertencia nopuede proceder de un Huk, y
es toda la advertencia de un hombre que vive dentro de la ley, y quiere proteger sus intereses. Pero esta
conversacion, que segun Viloria tuvo con Eustacio, no fue oida por Benjamin, ni la confirma Lemos, quien ni siquiera
corrobora a Viloria en su afirmacion de que fue atacado tres veces por Eustacio con un army bolo, y eso que, segun
Lemos, el le vio a Viloria en el acto de disparar a Eustacio, lo que indica que el estaba tambien en condiciones de
haber podido ver si Eustacio hubiera atacado a Viloria. Por el hecho de que entre Viloria y Eustacio habia de por
medio el cerco de "square type wire fence", no era de creer que aunque este pudiera saltarlo, cosa dificil a su edad
de 68 años y su avitaminasis que, segun el Dr. Deograicas, lo impedia mover libremente las extremidades inferiores,
lo intentaria, sabiendo que con ello se exponia a un ataque, sin defensa de su parte. Ademas, estando Viloria fuera
del cerco, Eustacio no era sino un espantajo dentro del cerco, que se levantaba su bolo, lo hacia para espantar, sin
colocar de ninguna manera a aquel en situacion peligrosa. Y debe ser asi, por que de acuerdo con las heridas que el
Dr. Lara localizo el cadaver de salida en la espalda, en la region clavicular, aparece mas baja que las de entrada, en
la cara anterior del hombro izquierdo, y su direccion, como se ven en la figura B-1, es de un angulo de unos 60
grados, lo que denota que el acusado cuando dispare su arma estaba a un nivel mas alto que Eustacio, y no como
trato de demostrarlo, aquetandose con la pierna izquierda hacia delante y apoyando su codo izquierdo en su rodilla
ezquierda.
No siendo exculpatoria la explicacion dada por Viloria, y admitido por el que fue quien disparo el tiro que hirio y mato
a Eustacio, el debe responder por esta agresion criminal, sin que pueda a su favor invocar que en esa noche estaba
en su puesto de soldado, por exigencias del deber y el servicio, publico, porque estos, en un gobierno de orden y de
ley, no immunizan al abuso, el exceso y el crimen. El resultado de sus actos, no siquiera puede considerarse
justificado por una falsa o erronea identification de su victima, porque esta se hallaba dentro de su solar, fuera del
cordon, caminaba a la luz electrica de doscientas bujias, le advertia, segun el, que despejara el sitio, todo lo cual
revela claramente que no era disidente, ni quiera dañarle, y el no estaba de ningun modo en peligro par optar por
una determinacion extrema, porque se interponia entre el y Eustacio el cerco de alambre, que este no trato de
saltarlo para agredirle, maliciosa y resueltamente."

It is the apparent from the foregoing that the Court of Appeals found the theory of the defense unworthy of credence.
Not being subject to our review, this finding is conclusive in the determination of our assignments of error under
consideration, which thus turn out to be based upon false predicates and are, accordingly, untenable. At any rate, if,
the fatal shot fired by appellant, as testified to by him, Rodil had just raised his left foot and placed it — or was about
to raise his left foot and place it — on the lower portion of the wire fence, which was slightly over one yard in height,
for the purpose of climbing it, he could not have given, at the same time, a bolo slash, for appellant was on the other
side of the fence, squatting about a yard away therefrom, and hence, beyond his reach. Besides, Rodil — who was
weak, for apart from being over 68 years of age, he had avitaminosis, which impaired the freedom of movement of
his legs — could not have gone over the fence without holding it with both hands and would have lost his balance
had he swung his bolo while he was in the position described by appellant. Even more unbelievable is the latter's
testimony to the effect that, when Rodil was still about a yard from the fence, and hence, two (2) yards away from
appellant, the former had already tried to hack him twice with his (Rodil's bolo), which, in view of the distance and the
fence separating them, had no possibility of landing on appellant. It is, likewise, interesting to note that, according to
the evidence for the defense, appellant was, at the time of the occurrence, squatting upon a ditch, whereas Rodil
was, not only standing, but also, trying to climb fence, and, consequently, at a higher level than appellant. Yet, the
former's injury had a downwarddirection, although it would have gone upward, if appellant's testimony were true. It is
thus apparent, from the record, that appellant was neither candid nor truthful in the narration of facts; that the Court of
Appeals was fully justified in giving no credence to hi testimony and in accepting the version of the prosecution; and
that the first three assignments of error cannot be sustained.
It is contended, under the last assignment of error, that, having acted under a mistake of fact, appellant is exempt
from criminal liability and that, at most, he is merely guilty of homicide thru negligence. In support of this pretense, it
is urged that, in deciding the case, we should consider the condition of emotional stress under which appellant must
have been when he fired the fatal shot, not the objective facts, as the same appeared after the event, and that, being
a peace officer, he was entitled to act in conformity with his honest belief at the time of the occurrence. Although
generally material, the belief and intent of the accused are not necessarily decisive in the disposition of the case. The
judgment and discretion of public officers, in the performance of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously
nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear legal provision to the contrary, they must act
in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and with the spirit and purpose of the law. This is specially true
in the case of members of the armed forces, whose main duty is to defend the state, and consequently, the people
who, in a democratic society like ours, are the repository of sovereignty. Such duty would be a myth if a law abiding
tax payer could be slain in his own home with impunity.

The army bolo held by Rodil at the time of the occurrence does not suffice to justify his killing for, does the
fundamental law not guarantee the inviolability of the domicile? Was it not, accordingly, the legal obligation of the
appellant to respect and even protect the same? Was Rodil not entitled, therefore, to defend it as his own "castle" or
citadel? Another view would create the impression that peace officers are public , not public servants, thus alienating
the faith and confidence of the people in the government, and undermining the foundation of all democratic
institutions.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals did not believe that appellant had acted under a mistake of fact. Indeed, he had no
reason to assume, or even suspect, that Rodil was a Huk, the latter being inside his property, which was fenced, as
well as outside the area then guarded by the army. Moreover, shortly before the shooting, members of the Rodil
family had switched on two 100-watt electric bulbs, which illuminated their light brightly. Then, they went to the yard
and started throwing stones in the direction of the place where appellant and other soldiers were posted, believing
them to be marauders with evil designs. In addition, the former made some noises in order to scare the latter
away. This lasted for about 15 minutes, after which Eustacio Rodil appeared in the scene holding an army bolo in his
right hand, and proceed to the spot where supposed marauders were posted, at the same time bidding to go away.
As Rodil approached or reached the fenced aforesaid, he was fatally shot by appellant. Obviously, no individual, who
is a Huk, bent on killing the appellant, would have lighted the place with said electric bulbs. Much less would said Huk
have performed or caused to be performed the acts above referred to — the effect of which in advance — before
attacking him. In other words, appellant had absolutely no jurisdiction whatsoever to believe — and could not have
believed — either that Rodil was a Huk or that he intended to kill said appellant.
In the light of these facts, and considered that Rodil was shot with the intent of killing him, it is clear that appellant
does not deserved an acquittal. The cases of People vs. Lara(48 Phil., 153), U.S. vs. Mojica (42 Phil., 784), U.S. vs.
Ah Chong (15 Phil., 448), and People vs. Bayambao (52 Phil., 311), cited by the defense, are not in point. In the first
two cases,there was actually an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. In the last two cases, the
defendant had reasonable grounds — which herein appellant did not have — to believe that their lives were in
imminent danger. We have, likewise, considered the applicability of the rule laid down in the case of People vs.
Mamasalaya, (50 Off. Gaz., 1104), involving among others, an officer of the Philippine Constabulary, one Lt. Cabelin,
in command of several members of said force, who, in compliance with his instructions, had fired at some houses in
the barrio of Sapalan, Cotabato, Cotabato, thereby killing several innocent persons. In acquitting him, this Court said:
. . . There is no charge or claim that he acted deliberately and criminally in killing the four innocent civilians knowing
that they were innocent. In good faith he believed that the tree houses pointed out of him by Bulalakao were being
occupied by bandits and lawless element whom he was ordered to disperse, capture or destroy. The question is
whether he incurred in negligence or reckless imprudence in ordering his men to fire upon the houses. As previously

stated, the witnesses for the defense including Lt. Cabelin told the court under oath that the patrol was first fired upon
from the three houses and called out of the inmates of the houses not to fire because they (members of the patrol)
were P.C. soldiers; and it was only when the firing persisted that he ordered his men to return the fire. Of course, the
prosecution denies this claim. But even assuming as claimed by the prosecution that the patrol had not been first
fired upon, and that Cabelin and his sergeant had not shouted or called out to the circumstances, we believe that the
shooting was justified for having been done and effected under an honest mistake. (Emphasis supplied).
We do not believe that appellant herein is substantially in the same predicament as Lt. Cabelin for: (1) the former had
not been told by anybody that Eustacio Rodil was a Huk or an outlaw, unlike Cabelin who had been advised that the
inhabitants of the houses in question were proceed against them as such; (2) Cabelin was in Cotabato, in a region
known to be infested by said elements, whereas Rodil was in Manila, outside the area cordoned by the peace
officers; (3) the Mamasalaya case involved an appeal directly from a decision of the court of first instance, whose
findings of facts are not binding upon the Supreme Court, which accepted and believed the version of Cabelin, or
most of it whereas the case at bar is before us upon a petition for review, by writ of certiorari, of decision of the Court
of Appeals defense to be unworthy of credence, and this finding is conclusive upon us; and (4) a majority of the
members of this Court — with one member writing a strong dissenting opinion and 3 members not taking part in the
decision — found that Cabelin had acted under the "honest mistake" that the deceased were dissidents and/or
outlaws, and that he was "justified" in ordering the shooting, unlike the case at bar in which the court of first instance,
the Court of Appeals and the majority of the Court agree that appellant had no reason to "mistake" Rodil for a Huk
and that the former was not justified therefore, in shooting him.
Is appellant herein guilty of homicide or, merely, of homicide through either simple or reckless negligence? We have
given considerable thought to this question and devoted a good deal of our time in the study of the authorities
pertinent thereto, and the conclusion reached by the majority of the members of this Court is in favor of the first
alternative, for the following reasons, namely:
1. In People vs. Guillen (47 Off. Gaz., 3433, 3440)
[[
1
]]
it was held that "a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232). Where such an
unlawfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
(Peoplevs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)." In People vs. Castillo (42 Off. Gaz., 1914, 1921)
[[
2
]]
, this Court declared that there
can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, without which the crime of
frustrated homicide can not exist. In the case of People vs. Dumon (72 Phil., 41, 49), the court convicted of double
homicide a person who killed a couple, allegedly in the act of copulation, in the erroneous belief that the woman was
his wife committing adultery, the theory that the offense had been committed thru reckless negligence, having been

committed thru reckless negligence, having been committed thru reckless negligence been rejected, for the reason,
among others that "the act of firing the fatal shot was intentional" on the part of the accused. Similarly, a peace officer
who killed a person asleep, in the mistaken belief that he was a notorious criminal and escaped convict, whom the
authorities wanted dead or alive, was found guilty of murder in People vs. Oanis (74 Phil., 256). In disposing of the
case, this Court said:
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil.,
939). In the words of Viada, 'para que se califique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el
malicia ni intention alguna de danar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha
producido, por mas que no haya sido la intention del agente el causar un mal de tanta granvedad como el que se
producio.' (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comemtado, 5, ead., pag. 7). And, as once held at this Court, a deliberate to
do intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is will be considered as reckless imprudence
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigating liability.
2. The case of People vs. Fernando (49 Phil., 75), in which the defendant was convicted of homicide through
reckless negligence, is substantially different from the case at bar. It was satisfactory established in said case that
the defendant had some reason to believe the information to be true. In the Fernando case, the language used was:
The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of
the presence of suspicious looking persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal
Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of a man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the
prisoners' uniform, who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of Patencia Delgado, who did not at the
time recognized the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown to him, dressed in clothes
similar in color to the prisoners' uniform, who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of Paciencia
Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown
man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling around the place. The suspicion
became a reality in his mind when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand,
heeding his question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances and believing undoubtedly that he was a
wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that
what to him appeared to be a wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was carrying three bolos
tied together. At that psychological moment when the forces of fear and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused
was not able to take full account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in
the hands of a suspicious character who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a circumstance that should

have made him suspect that the man was not only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact
that he called "Nomg Miong," which indicated that the owner of the house might be an older relative of the one
calling, or an intimate friend; and in not asking Paciencia Delgado who it was that was calling her father with such
familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such final action.
Taking into consideration the state of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of
the unknown persons, in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty be defending the owners of the
house against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder, however, as principal, with
malicious intent, because he thought at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only
because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating
whether or not the unknown man was really what the thought him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising
reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.
The crime committed by the accused, therefore, is homicide through reckless negligence . . . (pp. 78-79).
Upon the other hand, appellant herein had never been informed that Rodil was a Huk. As clearly adverted to, the
conditions obtaining at the time of the occurrence were such as to leave no room for doubt that Rodil could not be
Huk and did not intend to kill the herein appellant. Incidentally, the Fernando case is clear authority against
appellant's bid for acquittal.
3. Appellant herein has much in common with the defendant in People vs. Oanis (74 Phil., 257). The latter was a
peace officer who had been ordered to apprehend, "dead or alive" a notorious gangster and escaped convict known
as Balagtas. Having been informed that the latter was living with a taxi dance girl, named Irene, the accused
proceeded to the house in which she lived. As he opened the door of her room (defendant) shot and killed him.
Although, acting under erroneous belief that the victim was Balagtas, this Court convicted the accused, not merely of
homicide, but of murder. Obviously, the main reason behind this conclusion was the fact that the accused had acted
with such disregard for the life of the victim — without checking carefully the latter's identity — as to place himself on
the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously. In shooting Rodil — who,
obviously, could neither be a Huk nor a killer — appellant herein has acted under similar conditions.
4. The view of the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of April 26, 1883, is substantially the same. In connection
therewith, we quote from Viada:

El Morador de un cortijo que oyendo ladrar los perros, y temeroso de que alguien se acercase a sustraer las
caballerias, se asoma al balcon, dando el 'quien vive', y como nadie contestase, dispara la escopeta sobre un bulto,
apareciendo al dia siguiente en dicho sitio el cadaver de un sujeto, intimo amigo de aquel, cuya familia no supo
explicarse el motivo que le condujera al lugar donde fue enoctrado muerto, sera responsable del delito de homicidio,
o simplemente del de imprudencia temararia? — El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que la primera y mas grave
calificacion es la procedente: 'Considerando que en la sentencia recurrida se declara como hecho probado que
Pedro Molina, despues de preguntar repetidamente 'quien vive?' y como nadie le contestase, disparo su escopeta
sobre un bulto que distiguio a distancia de seis varas, lo cual demuestra que ejecuto este hecho voluntaria e
intencionalmante sobre una persona, porque de una persona debio creer que era el expresado bulto, cuando le
pregunto 'quien vive?', y por lo tanto, que cometio el delito de homicidio por que ha sido penado: Considerando que
para que se entienda que un hecho se ha cometido por imprudencia temeraria y puede tener aplicacion el parrafo
primero del art. 581del codigo penal, es requisito indispensable que en la ejecucion no haya medialdo malicia, lo
cual no ocurre en el caso del recurso porque con malicia, y voluntad obro Pedro Molina disparando un arma de
fuego sobre el bulto de una persona a la que causo la muerte, etc. (S. de 26 de abril de 1883, Gaceta de 5 de
septiembre.) (Viada, Vol., 7 5th ed., p. 23.)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be as it is
hereby affirmed. However, in view of the appellant's youth and considering that he had joined the Philippine Army a
few months only, prior to the occurrence, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to forward a copy of this decision to
the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice for reconsideration of the propriety of extending to
appellant herein the benefits of executive clemency, after service of such period of the sentence imposed as maybe
deemed sufficient to satisfy the demands of justice and public interest. With costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.
MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting.
Appellant Samson Viloria Calderon, hereafter referred to as Viloria, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila, of homicide thru reckless negligence and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and six (6)
months of prision correctional, to indemnify the heirs of Eustacio Rodil in the amount of P3,000, witty subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, said Tribunal found him
guilty of homicide and sentenced him an indeterminate penalty of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day

of prision mayor nor more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal with the
same indemnity of P3,000 imposed by the trial court. The case is now with us on appeal.
In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals the majority opinion accepts and makes its own the finding and
conclusions, saying that the same are not subject to review by the Supreme Court and are conclusive in the
determination of the case. In this dissent I venture to assert hold that while the findings of fact by the Court of
Appeals in this case, as in other cases appealed to it, are conclusive and while I accept said findings of fact, the
conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals on the basis of said facts or findings of fact, involved no longer
questions of fact but rather of law, and are subject to review and correction by his highest Tribunal. some of those
conclusions, to me erroneous, the majority of this Court has unwittingly also fallen into error. Furthermore, I believe
that if the Court of Appeal fails to make findings on certain point which are important and relevant, even decisive, we,
in order to complete the mental picture of all that really happened and the circumstances and conditions then
obtaining of facts of the Court of Appeals, as long as our own findings are supported by the evidence and are not
contrary to the said findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, the contrary to its conclusions. to fill said gap in said
findings of the Court of Appeals I propose to state that facts as I find them in the record, not only to certain
conclusions of the Court of Appeals which led the majority of this Tribunal to unwittingly fall into error, are not
supported or warranted by the aid findings of fact.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals and accepted by this high Tribunal and not disputed, briefly stated, are as
follows. On or before April 1, 1951 the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Camp Murphy thru its
Intelligence Department was informed that as a result of the infiltration of Huks in Manila, the Huk organization had its
regrouping center in the Tejeron-Herran area, Manila, and that its members were holding regular meetings there and
that three top Huk Commanders, among them Nick Pamintuan, could be found in that area. The Army therefore
decided to conduct as it did conduct on April 1, 1951, a raid through its Military Intelligence Service (MIS). To support
this raid and to prevent the escape of the dissidents sought to be apprehended, a platoon of 36 soldiers under the
command of Lt. Leopoldo Regis was dispatched to the area. He deployed his men in three squads of 12 men each,
and Viloria was assigned to the left flank of the cordon. This line of 12 men was parallel to the square-type wire fence
which surrounded the yard or lot of the deceased Eustacio Rodil, and where his house stood. At about 11:30 that
night appellant Viloria took his position next to and outside the fence of Eustacio, squatting in a depression or canal.
It seems that the movements and steps of the soldiers were noticed by a son of Eustacio named Benjamin who later
woke the inmates of the house up and turned on the lights behind the house. A word about said lights.

According to the prosecution the house of Eustacio had previously been the object of three robberies; in the first two,
the robbers could enter the house and were able to carry away some things, but in the third, the robbers failed to
enter the house because of the precautions taken by Eustacio's family. To discourage four attempts at robbery, two
electric lights each with a 100-watt bulb were installed behind the house, not only to light up the outside of the house
but also that of the pig pen behind the house where many pigs were kept. Whenever the inmates of the house felt
that there were marauders prowling around, these two lights were turned on to discourage them.
For fifteen minutes Benjamin was at the window looking out and observing but he could not see anybody. In order to
better observe, he and a nephew went down and posted themselves behind the house and because they continued
hearing some noise in the direction of the pig pen although they could not see anyone, they emitted some sounds as
if to challenge or scare away possible prowlers in that area, and they even threw stones in that direction. Explaining
on direct examination why he could not see those who were making the noise near or outside the fence, Benjamin
testified as follows:
Fiscal:
Q. During the time that you were making hollering sounds could you see the person making sound?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why could you not see?
A. Because in that place of the sounds where it is coming from, it is very dark while in our place, it is very lighted.
That is why we cannot see. (t.s.n. p.8).
Not long thereafter, the father Eustacio came down the house to make inquiries, carrying an army bolo which he was
in the habit of using to cut grass in the yard, and upon being informed that there seems to be people in the direction
of the pig pen, he proceeded thereto with his bolo. After a short time a shot was heard and Eustacio was seen
staggering towards the house fatally wounded in the shoulder and back. He was taken up the house and examined
by the children and then a son who is a doctor was sent for. Not long thereafter, Lt. Regis, having been informed of
the shooting, went up the house with two soldiers including Viloria, and at his suggestion and with the conformity of
the son doctor who had already arrived, Eustacio was taken to the hospital accompanied by Viloria and the other
soldier. Eustacio later died of his wound.

No witness for the prosecution testified as to the actual shooting which was owned and accepted by Viloria. Only
Viloria gave testimony on this point although a fellow soldier named Limos said that he saw Viloria fire at Eustacio.
Consequently, any finding as to the manner Eustacio was shot and the circumstances surrounding the shooting must
be based solely on the testimony of Viloria if found reasonable and acceptable, or it may be based on mere
inferences from the attending circumstances. Viloria told the court that as he was squatting near and outside the
fence observing and awaiting developments as he was instructed to do as a member of the raiding party in that
troubled area, presumably to prevent the escape of those sought to be apprehended, he suddenly saw a figure
(Eustacio) brandishing a bolo and advancing toward the fence in his (Viloria's) direction ordering whoever was there
to leave otherwise he would kill him.
Viloria said that he explained to the advancing figure that he was a soldier and three times ordered him to stop; but
the man continued advancing not only brandishing the bolo in front of him in slashing fashion but when he reached
the wire fence he raised his left leg and bent over forward as if to climb over this moment or instant that Viloria fired
his carbine, assuring the Court that he honestly believed that the man was a Huk determined to kill and so he shot
him in self-defense. Without much if any explanation the Court of Appeals evidently discarded and rejected this
testimony of Viloria about the warning and exchange of words between him and Eustacio merely saying that his
fellow soldier Limos failed to corroborate him on this point, nor was the alleged conversation heard by Benjamin.
Then, the Court of Appeals makes this rather ambiguous and starting statement and conclusion which to me is
unfortunate as it is unfounded.
No se concibe, pues, como viloria, que debe estar entrenado contra las emboscadas de los Huks, podia creer que
Eustacio cra un disidente; sobre todo porque; segun el mismo, fue advertido que despejara aquel sitio o de otro
modo serial muerto. Esta advertencia no puede proceder de un Huk, y es toda la advertencia de un hombre que
vivee dentro de la ley, y dentro de la ley quiere proteger sus intereses. Pero esta conversacion, que segun Viloria
tuvo con Eustacio, no fue oida por Benjamin, ni la confirma Lemos, . . .
How shall we interpret the above statement of the Court of Appeals. Did the conversation between Eustacio and
Viloria take place, namely that Eustacio warned and ordered any one in the area to clear out and leave, otherwise he
(Eustacio) would kill him, and the explanation of Viloria that he was a soldier and that he ordered Eustacio three
times to halt, take place, or did it not? Apparently, to the court of Appeals, to show that Eustacio was a peaceful
citizen within his own premises who merely asserted his rights, the conversation took place; but to support Viloria's
claim that he halted him three times and even identified himself as a soldier, it did not take place. This ambiguity is
rather disconcerting and was what probably prompted Viloria's counsel to say in his brief:

It is clear that by this statement, the Court of Appeals dismisses the idea that the petitioner-appellant could not have
mistaken the deceased as a Huk for the reason that no person not within the law will ever give the warning so given
by Eustacio. But, the Court of Appeals in continuing stated, "Pero esta conversacion, que segun Viloria tuvo con
Eustacio, no fue oida por Benjamin, ni la confirma Lemos . . ..' In effect, for the purpose of showing that no Huk could
be in the yard and Eustacio should not have been mistaken for a Huk, the conversation took place; but for purposes
of showing that the deceased did not halt as ordered and that Eustacio was menacing in attitude and determined to
drive or kill the intruder by the fence, the conversation was deemed not to have taken place?
Again the Court of Appeals makes the following statement and conclusion:
El solar detras dela casa de Eustacio, a cuyo cerco este se dirigia, estaba alumbrado por dos bombillas electricas de
a cien bujias cada una. Mas aun, antes de que Eustacio bajara de su casa y fuera al cerco, al otro lado del cul se
encontraban Viloria, a este estuvieron Benjamin Bernardo tirandole piedras y ahuyentandole con la voz. Todas estas
circunstancias no daban lugar a suponer que habia Huks en el solar de la casa de Eustacio, porque ningun Huk
atacaria encendiendo primeramente las luces electricas, para exponerse asimismo a los que estaban en la sombra,
y menos aun tiraria piedras y ahyentaria haciendo ruido con la voz.
And the majority approving the said statement and conclusion adds:
. . . Obviously, no individual, who is a Huk, bent on killing the appellant, would have lighted the place with said
electric bulbs. Much less would said Huk have performed or caused to be performed the acts above referred to — the
effect of which upon appellant and his companions was to warn them in advance — before attacking him. In other
words, appellant had absolutely no justification whatsoever to believe — and could not have believed- either that
Rodil was a Huk or that he intended to kill said appellant.
They both assume and take for granted that Viloria saw and knew that Eustacio came from the house; that he was
the owner of the same; that it was he who turned on the lights and that he was the same person who approached the
fence outside of which Viloria was stationed. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact testified to by the very witness
for the prosecution (Benjamin) and found by itself that the fence was nailed to and supported by gumamela shrubs
and that near or around the pig pen there was a clump of banana trees and that it was very dark in that vicinity and
so he (Benjamin) could not see what was behind those gumamela and banana trees. Let me again quote what he
said, "Because in that place of the sounds where it is coming from, it is very dark while in our place, it is very lighted.
That is why we cannot see." Besides, the yard is quite extensive, containing 2,000 sq. meters according to the very

finding of the Court of Appeals, and if the house was constructed on one end as it probably was, because it fronted
Tejeron street (bearing street No. 227 Tejeron) according to the evidence, then the backyard must indeed be quite
big so that the two lights installed behind the house despite their power, could not have illuminated all that area,
especially that part of the fence behind which Viloria was stationed, taking into account the gumamela and banana
trees growing there and which according to Benjamin himself, Eustacio's son, was very dark. It was therefore
possible, if not probable that Viloria who was squatting behind those banana trees and gumamela shrubs and even
outside the fence, intent on observing what was happening in the direction of the house or houses being raided by
the MIS, did not notice or could not even see what was happening in the yard of Eustacio, and that even if he noticed
the light from the place where he was squatting, he could not have possibly seen who turned it on nor seen Eustacio
as the latter walked towards the gumamela shrubs and banana trees. For all he knew, Eustacio may have been one
of the Huks scared by the MIS raiders, who was trying to escape through the yard of Eustacio and who, when
surprised by the turning on of the lights in the yard sought refuge and protection in the gumamela shrubs and banana
trees and then tried to get away by going over the fence, when he was confronted by Viloria.
Again, the Court of Appeals says that Viloria being a trained soldier and alerted in the ambuscades of Huks could not
possibly believe that Eustacio was a dissident. It said "no se concibe, oues, como Viloria, que debe estar entrenado
contra las emboscados de los Huks, podia creer que Eustacio era una dididente; . . .." This statement about Viloria
being trained on ambuscades by Huks is not a finding but only a conclusion. Because Viloria was an Army soldier
then, the Court of Appeals jumped to the conclusion that he must have been trained in dealing with Huks. This
unfortunate conclusion not only is not supported by the record but it is contrary to the evidence itself which is to the
effect that Viloria was a raw recruit, having enlisted in the Army only on January 8, 1951, less than three months
before the raid. In fact, the majority of this Court, disregarding the above conclusion of the Court of Appeals, takes
notice of Viloria's being very new in the service and for this reason suggest that Viloria might merit Executive
Clemency.
Both the majority of this Court and the Court of Appeals would not even grant Viloria without any criminal intent,
acted recklessly in firing his gun, without taking the necessary precautions to ascertain the identity of Eustacio, and
so is guilty only of homicide thru reckless imprudence as was found by the trial court, and in support of their stand,
both courts cite the case of People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 262. It may be stated in this connection that said case was
decided by a divided court, — five for the majority, with Justice Paras and Hontiveros strongly dissenting, the first
being presently our Honorable Chief Justice. The case of Oanis involved the shooting of an innocent citizen (Serapio
Tecson) sleeping in a room, with his back to the door where the appellant were, shot by the latter in the honest belief
that Tecson was the dangerous criminal they were after. Chief Justice Paras in his dissent said:

In view of said order and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have acted
feloniously in shooting the person honestly believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that
Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to take chances and should not be penalized
for such prudence. On the contrary, they should be commanded for their bravery and courage bordering
recklessness because, without knowing or ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they
proceeded thereto without hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
And in relation to this aspect of the case, as to whether or not Viloria, if guilty at all, is guilty only of homicide through
reckless imprudence, I am inclined to believe that the case of People vs. Fernando, 49 Phil., 75 cited by the trial court
in support of its decision is more applicable. In reversing the judgement of the trial court finding Fernando guilty of
murder, and sentencing him to twenty years of cadena temporal, the Supreme Court in finding him guilty only of
homicide thru reckless negligence said:
Taking into consideration the state of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of
the unknown person, in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the
house against an unexpected attack, and such act account constitute the crime of murder, but only that of simple
homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal, with malicious intent, because he thought at the time that
he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which,
under the circumstances, he should have been investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he
thought him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.
The case of Fernando above cited, to me, is really similar to the present case, assuming that Viloria is guilty at all.
We, who are now in possession of all the facts disclosed by the evidence presented at the trial know that Eustacio
was a peaceful citizen inside his own yard merely trying to drive or chase away the person or persons whom he
believed to be potential robbers or thieves, and on the basis of said facts, one may say as do the Court of Appeals
and the majority that Viloria's action in shooting him as wholly unwarranted and uncalled for, because there was
absolutely no danger to him and besides, considering the age of Eustacio who was 68 years old, and that he was
suffering from avitaminosis, he could not anyway have gone over the fence to carry out his empty threats to kill. But
how was Viloria, at the time, to know all these facts? How was he to know that Eustacio was a peaceful citizen; that
he was the owner of the house and of the yard enclosed by the fence; that he was 68 years old suffering from
avitaminosis and so could not possibly climb over the fence, and that he was merely trying to scare him (Viloria) and
his companions?

It is a settled rule and principle of law that a person accused of and being held responsible for a criminal act must be
judged, not by the fact as they turned out to be after investigation and trial but rather what he at the time honestly
believed them to be so, and that if the facts he then believed them to be, justified his act, then he must be held
innocent. In the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488, this Court said:
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were
as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known
the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
. . . . On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability,
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part' and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him.". .
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will
justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the
life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense
and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in
acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends
himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in
truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme measure. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, se. 305, and
large array of cases there cited.)
I quote with approval the citation made by appellant's counsel on page 20 of his brief, to wit:
A person need not be in actual imminent peril of his life or of great bodily harm before he may stop his assailant. It is
sufficient if in good faith he has a reasonable belief, from the facts as they appear to him at the time, that he is in
such imminent peril; if he is threatened with death or some great bodily harm, and has reasonable ground to believe

and does believe that his life is about to be taken or such great bodily injury to be inflicted, he may act safely upon
appearances and kill his assailant, if that be necessary to avoid the apprehended danger, though it may afterwards
turn out that there was in fact neither design to do him injury nor danger that it would be done. (Warren on Homicide,
Vol. I, p. 716; citing Glass vs. state, 201 Ala. 441, 78 so. 819; Dieburn vs. State, 16 Ala. app. 371, 77 So. 983).
Viloria in his testimony said that he shot Eustacio believing him to be a Huk who was attacking him with a bolo. Was
Viloria justified in thinking as he did? To answer this question we must try to analyze the state of mind of Viloria at the
time. Before the raid, he and his companions had been briefed by their officer and told that there were dangerous
Huks in that area among them Nick Pamintuan, the overall Huk Commander of the Manila Area, a man who was
fearless and determined to shoot it out with the officers of the law. As a matter of fact, on September 22nd of the
same year this same Huk Commander Nick Pamintuan was finally cornered by a combined posse of Army officers
and soldiers and Manila Policemen in Pandacan, Manila. Alone he battled them and although he was killed, he also
was able to kill Capt. Juan Panopio of the Armed Forces and wound an agent of the Military Intelligence Service
(although according to paragraph 24 of the third amended information against Luis M. Taruc, the casualties were the
killing of Lt. Jose Reyes of the MPD and Lt. Juan Panopio of the AFP, and the wounding of Sgt. Rafael Redultin of
the AFP), this according to the records of the Armed Forces and the Manila Police Department (See page 13,
Appellant's Brief). As a result of that raid on April 1, 1951, 21 Huks suspects were apprehended, thus showing that
the information about the presence of Huks in the area raided was well founded . Far from being a veteran soldier in
the Army, as erroneously concluded by the Court of Appeals, Viloria was a raw recruit, and it was not his fault that he
was pressed into this secret and dangerous mission of raiding or cordoning an area said to contain desperate
dissidents and Huk Commanders; and it was not in broad daylight either, but at midnight. Then, suddenly from the
darkness and the shadows of the gumamela shrubs and banana trees he saw a figure advancing towards him
brandishing a bolo. What was he to think? Peaceful and law-abiding citizens do not usually go about at midnight,
brandishing boloes and making threats. If such a person is met in any other place like a street or yard under ordinary
circumstance, one might yet think that he is a mere prowler or burglar bent on stealing but not otherwise dangerous.
But that night of the raid, the surrounding area was said to be infested with dangerous Huks and precisely Viloria was
sent there to apprehend them if they tried to escape or even shoot them if they resorted to resistance or aggression.
It is true that the yard of Eustacio was just outside the area to be raided but one could not pin point and determine
accurately by metes and bounds the exact place where the dissidents were supposed to be. It could be that their
hideout was well inside the line or cordon of soldiers but that when the dissidents were surprised by the MIS agents
said dissidents may have scattered and some tried to escape into the surrounding area including the yard of
Eustacio, and that for all that Viloria knew the figure he saw that night may have been one of them.

We should not Judge Viloria too strictly nor harshly, divesting ourselves awhile of the serenity of mind and logical
thinking and reasoning of a judicial official, with all the true facts before him, let us try to place ourselves in the
situation and mental state of Viloria at the time, not forgetting his untutored and simple mind and his lack of training.
As this Court well said in the case of U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 853, 855, in the course of its decision reversing a
sentence of conviction of a policeman by the trial court:
One should however not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Often he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his
own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. To err is human. Even the most conscientious officer must at times
be misled to obey the orders of his superior officer and enforce the law, a peace officer make If, therefore, under
trying circumstances and in a zealous efforts a mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise the
courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law.
From the point of view of Viloria, was there aggression which he was justified in repelling? Both the Court of Appeals
and the majority believe that there was no such aggression because Eustacio was a peaceful citizen within his yard
merely trying to scare away potential robbers and marauders and that anyway he could not carry out his threat
because due to his age and his physical affliction, he could not have possibly gone over the fence. I have already
pointed out that Viloria should be judged not by the facts as they turned out to be but what he in good faith believed
them to be. Besides, to repel an aggression, it is not necessary that the latter be consummated. In the case of
U.S. vs. Batungbacal, 37 Phil. 382, this court said:
In order that the assault may be repelled, it is not necessary that it must have been perpetrated; it is sufficient that
there be an attempted assault. The law protects with this exemption from liability not only the person who repels an
aggression, but even the person who tries to prevent an aggression that is expected.
To constitute aggression it is not necessary that the attack or assault be carried out. It is sufficient that it be shown by
the acts and by the attitude of the assailant that he will attack. The mere opening of a knife and making a motion as if
to make an attack constitutes a real aggression; one who brandishes a knife and raises it during a dispute, commits
aggression; and the act of a wounded man raising a club which he held in his hands and advancing towards the
accused with an attitude of hitting him, constitutes real unlawful aggression (Guevarra's Commentaries on
the Revised Penal Code, p. 11, citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. And in the opinion of Viada, even a
mere threat of an attack such as brandishing a knife with which to stab one or pointing a gun to discharge against
one, is aggression (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 173).
Viloria did not have to wait until the menacing figure had gone over the fence and within hitting distance struck at him
for then self-defense may have been too late. Besides, Viloria was not there as a mere civilian permitted only to

protect himself in case of aggression. He was there as a peace officer to apprehend dissidents and when in his
opinion one of them attacked he could shoot him not only to defend himself but also to disable or if necessary to kill a
public enemy.
Was Viloria required under the circumstances to retreat in order to avoid inflicting injury on his assailant? A civilian
under the circumstances may have sought refuge in flight, but Viloria was not a civilian. He was a soldier of the
Armed Forces of the Republic with traditions to uphold, and was expected to observe proper conduct in the presence
of the enemy. Asked by the Fiscal why he did not retreat, like a true soldier he gave a most proper answer. He said:
"I could not retreat from that place without an order from my officer." (t.s.n., p. 42) He was stationed in that place by
his officer. He was as it were occupying a battle or skirmish position, and without an order from his officer he could
leave that position only when driven by superior force. To retreat from his position would have been an act of
cowardice and desertion of his post for which he could be court-martialed and discharged dishonorably and in
disgrace, and so he held his ground and stuck to his post.
In the case of U.S. vs. Mojica, supra, this Court said:
A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot, like a private individual, take
refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differs
somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self-defense. Bearing this in mind, we do not think that the
appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to have employed unnecessary force. The deceased
attacked him with a deadly weapon; he might, duty forbade.
The Court of Appeals and the majority lay stress on the fact that as shown by the wounds of entrance and exit, the
latter was lower, and from this they draw the inference that Viloria did not tell the truth when he said that he shot
Eustacio from a squatting position, because otherwise the exit would have been higher than the entrance. Again, I
am constrained to state that both the majority and the Court of Appeals apparently overlooked the fact as stated by
Viloria without contradiction, he fired the shot at the moment when Eustacio's body was bent over the fence with his
left leg lifted as if to scale the fence preparatory to going over it. In this position and forward inclination of the body, a
shot fired by one even from a squatting position in front would naturally produce a wound where the exit would be
lower from the point of entrance. In this connection, to show that Eustacio was shot right at the fence when he was
bending over it, Lt. Regis testified without contradiction or refutation that the morning following the shooting, he
inspected and went over the scene of the shooting and found blood spots or stains on the ground from the fence to
the house, evidently the blood from the wound of Eustacio as he walked back from the fence being on the dry leaves
of a gumamela shrubs about a foot from the fence. And what was Eustacio doing just before and at the instant that

he was shot? As asserted by Viloria, Eustacio was brandishing his bolo and making threats. This is the finding of the
Court of Appeals itself, accepted by the majority. I quote:
Eustacio no era sino un espantajo dentro del cerco, que si levantaba su bolo, lo hacia para espantar, sin colocar de
ninguna manera a aquel en situacion peligrosa.
Of course we now know that in brandishing his bolo, Eustacio was merely trying to scare and terrify, but this Viloria
did not know at the time. He said that he thought that Eustacio was a Huk bent and determined to kill him. In the
important case of People vs. Bayambao, 52 Phil. 309, these are the facts. One night, while defendant Bayambao was
in his house, his wife told him that someone had thrown a stone at the house. So he took his revolver under the
house but saw no one. At the time there were outlaws in the vicinity and several days before, a soldier had killed two
outlaws not far from the house. As Bayambao was walking back to the stairs, about to go up the house, he heard a
noise and saw a black figure with hands uplifted rushing at him. Without giving any warning, he fired at the black
figure thinking that he was an outlaw, but who later turned out to be his own brother-in-law. Charged with murder for
the killing, he was found guilty by the trial court and sentenced to cadena temporal. On appeal this Tribunal acquitted
him saying:
The latter, on that occasion, acted from the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an ill at least equal in gravity, in the
belief that the deceased was a malefactor who attacked him with a kampilan or dagger in hand, and for this reason,
he was guilty of no crime and is exempt from criminal liability (art. 8, No. 10, Penal Code.)
Furthermore, his ignorance or error of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith, and this rebuts the information of
malicious intent accompanying the act of killing. In an analogous case, this Court acquitted the accused (U.S. vs. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil. 488), and we deem the doctrine laid down in that case applicable to this one.
In the more recent case of People vs. Mamalasaya, et al., 50 Off. Gaz., 1104, cited in the majority opinion, a
Constabulary officer while out on patrol and a mission to apprehend and if necessary kill outlaws, ordered his man to
fire on several houses in the belief and assurance that the inmates thereof were bandits or outlaws. It turned out,
however, that said inmates were innocent civilians. For the death of several of said civilians, the officer was charged
with quadruple murder and after trial was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
On appeal he was acquitted by this Tribunal on the ground that the shooting was justified for having been done and
effected under an honest mistake. To me, the present case of Viloria is stronger in the Mamasalaya case, the
inmates of the houses fired upon had done nothing or committed any act which might lead or cause the Constabulary
officer to believe that they were other than law-abiding citizens. They were peacefully sleeping in their homes and
gave no provocation whatsoever; and yet said Constabulary officer was exonerated just because he honestly

believed that the houses harbored outlaws. In the present case, Viloria was engaged in a secret and hazardous
mission, a raid not on a mere opium joint or gambling den where the inmates would not possibly offer any resistance,
much less make aggression, but on a re-grouping center and hideout of desperate Huks and Huk Commanders who,
Viloria was told, were determined to fight and not to be taken alive, for which reason the Army sent one officer and 36
soldiers armed with rifles. And it was midnight. Viloria did not fire on said hideout but was merely standing guard
observing and awaiting developments. Then suddenly here comes this menacing figure of Eustacio in the darkness
and shadows of gumamela shrubs and banana trees, advancing towards him and brandishing a bolo. Viloria honestly
thought and believed that Eustacio was a Huk advancing towards him to attack with a deadly weapon. So he shot
him, not only to protect himself from what he believed was a real aggression and imminent peril, but also to carry out
the purpose of his mission which was to catch Huks or kill them if they resisted. In my opinion, he had a better reason
and more valid ground to be exonerated than the Constabulary officer in the case of Mamasalaya.
There is absolutely no reason to believe that Viloria intentionally and deliberately shot Eustacio knowing him to be an
innocent citizen, just for the sake of killing or the sheer fun of it. He did not know Eustacio, never met him before nor
never heard of him. Viloria is not a wanton killer. He had already outgrown the impetuosity, rashness or
irresponsibility of youth and teen-age. He was already 26 at the time of the shooting. He is not a product of the slums
and other breeding places of crime of a City. He was raised in a rural community and he was a farmer when he
joined the Army, according to him, to serve his country and possibly make a career of it. Unfortunately, for him, less
than three months after his enlistment and before he could acquire the experience and training of a real soldier, he
was pressed into this dangerous mission of raiding a Huk hideout.
I believe with the Court of Appeals and with the majority that peaceful and law-abiding citizens should be protected.
At the same time, we should equally afford protection and give sympathetic consideration to our peace agents and
soldiers when they make honest mistakes in the performance of their duties, specially when carrying out dangerous
missions where their lives are jeopardized and imperiled. For there is nothing more demoralizing to said peace
agents and officer, nothing more destructive of their morale, than the thought of realization on their part that their
Government which sends them out on dangerous missions, is heartless and entirely lacking in sympathy, and is
quick to punish them mercilessly for any mistake committed, however honest said mistake, and regardless of the
difficult conditions and circumstances under which the mistake was committed. With that "Sword of Damocles" ever
hanging over their heads, to protect themselves, they would always act halfheartedly, without any initiative and play
safe and they would never catch the criminals and dissidents whom they are supposed to apprehend to protect
society. As was said by this Court in the case of People vs. Santos, supra, if the courts did not excuse and exculpate
peace agents for mistakes committed by them in good faith then "the courts will put a premium on crime and will

terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law." And, as we said in the case of People vs.
Mamasalaya, supra.
All these considerations we have taken into account in rendering verdict on the innocence or guilt of appellant
Cabelin. Because, if we make a mistake by holding criminally responsible and sentencing to life imprisonment or
death, a peace officer sent on a special or critical mission, who to accomplish his mission and at the same time
protect and insure the lives of his men, had to act and acted under facts which he honestly and in good faith believed
to be true, and under extraordinary conditions obtaining at the time, just because later the facts turned out to be
different, we might tho without realizing, much less intending it, demoralize our Armed Forces especially their officers,
to the extent that in the future, to avoid any possible criminal prosecution, they would be too slow, very cautious,
vacillating and irresolute to the point of utter inefficiency and impotence.
If I have dwelt rather at length on this case, it is because although I have the greatest respect for the learned opinion
of the majority, I am afraid it failed to give due and sufficient consideration to certain aspects of the case, besides
accepting some, to me, erroneous and unwarranted conclusions of the Court of Appeals, and I cannot get myself to
acquiesce in the conviction and punishment of a soldier of the Republic whose only fault, in my opinion was in acting
quickly as he should and like a true soldier, on what he honestly believed the facts to be at the time, in order to carry
out his mission and to defend himself, although subsequently investigation showed the facts to be otherwise. If guilty
at all, Viloria should be held liable only for homicide thru reckless imprudence as was found by the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that Viloria should be exonerated and I agree with the majority that he is entitled
to Executive Clemency but immediately and not after service of a part of his sentence.
Footnotes
[[
*
]]
92 Phil., 639.
[[
1
]]
85 Phil., 307.
[[
2
]]
76 Phil., 73.

G.R. No. L-22345 October 10, 1924
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FELIPE DIÑO, ET AL., defendants.
FELIPE DIÑO and FORTUNATO LAURISTO, appellants.
Jose Avelino and Vicente de Vera for appellants.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Samar sentenced the appellants to be imprisoned for ten years and one day of presidio
mayor, with the accessories prescribed by law, to indemnify Casimiro Abria jointly and severally in the sum of P10,
and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendants are charged with the crime of arson committed, according to the complaint, as follows:
That on or about midnight of the 4th of May, 1923, in the sitio of Capipian, barrio of Lope de Vega, municipality of
Catarman, Province of Samar, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above named
defendants with premeditation and confederating together, provided themselves with dynamite and criminally place it
and cause the same to explode on the door of the house inhabited by Casimiro Abria and his family, which dynamite
or explosive substance exploded and burnt the ceiling of said house; as a result of which a part of said house was
destroyed; the damage caused not exceeding 6,250 pesetas.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Contrary to law.
The appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment appealed from, while the Attorney-General prays for the
modification thereof in the sense that the penalty of from four months and twenty-one days to six months of arresto
mayor be imposed upon the defendants, under the provision of article 557, paragraph 1, of the Penal
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After a careful study of the record, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the guilt of the defendants does not appear
duly proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as is required for the imposition of the penalty fixed by the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is in the record no direct evidence of the commission of the crime by the defendants. None of the witnesses
has seen the dynamite which, it is said, they caused to explode in the house of the offended Casimiro Abria. Indeed
the Attorney-General says in his brief: "It is true that none of the witnesses for the prosecution has seen the
defendants Felipe Diño and Fortunato Lauristo on the night of May 4, 1923, at the act of firing the dynamite that set
fire to the ceiling of the house of Casimiro Abria and unnailed several boards from its wall, but the circumstances of
record in this case are so clear and conclusive that no other conclusion is possible than that the herein appellants
Felipe Diño and Fortunato Lauristo were the authors of the explosion that caused a part of the ceiling of the house of
Casimiro Abria to burn."chanrobles virtual law library
What are these circumstances? They are made to consists in the facts testified to by Andres Borca and Enrique
Horogon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The witness Andres Borca says that about the month of February, 1923, the accused Felipe Diño proposed to him to
cause a dynamite to explode in the house of Casimiro Abria, telling him, "Andres there is a dynamite here; fire it in
the house of Casimiro Abria," which the witness refused to do, because he did not known how to fire a dynamite.
This seems to indicate the guilt of the accused Felipe Diño; but if it is considered that the testimony of the witness
Borca is not corroborated in any manner and is denied by the accused Felipe Diño, and that Borca has not seen any
dynamite or other explosive substance in Felipe's possession, it cannot be said in reason that his testimony
constitutes a strong and conclusive evidence of guilt of the accused Felipe
Diño.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The witness Enrique Horogon says that he was invited by Gabriel Diño on the night of the 4th of May, 1923, to go out
fishing on a boat. This witness says, further, that upon their arrival at the place known as Iraya of the barrio of Lope

de Vega his companions left them on the boat; that then he heard an explosion and a little later the accused came
back in a hurry to the boat and in their return Felipe Diño warned him not to reveal to anybody that he (Felipe Diño)
had ordered the accused Lauristo to fire a dynamite in the house of Casimiro
Abria.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But is it true that Horogon was invited by Gabriel Diño on the night in question to go out on a boat with the
defendants up to the place known as Iraya? The record does not disclose any confirmation of the testimony of
Horogon; on the contrary it is denied by the Diño defendants and the circumstances of the voyage on the boat and of
the warning that Horogon puts in the mouth of Felipe make it completely incredible. If after all, Horogon had no part
to perform in connection with the supposed igniting of the dynamite, what necessity did the accused have to take him
on the boat? If Horogon, at any rate, did not know where the defendants went after they had left him on the boat, nor
did he see Lauristo fire the dynamite in the house of Abria, what necessity did Felipe have to caution him not to tell
anything about what they (the defendants) had done? By instinct the criminal avoids the presence of witnesses who
may denounce the commission of the crime; and the case now related by the witness Horogon is so rare that without
a strong corroboration, as is the case here, we cannot believe it. And upon this ground, the case must be dismissed
as to the defendant Gabriel Diño.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The fact itself of the explosion of the dynamite related by the offended Abria is not free from doubt. According to this
witness, at about midnight of May 4, 1923, while he was sleeping in company with eight persons in his house situated
in the sitio of Capipian, barrio of Lope de Vega, municipality of Catarman, Province of Samar, he was awakened by a
strong explosion, which he supposed had burst out in his house; he immediately stood up, and went to the place
where he believed the explosion had taken place, and found a part of the wall that was contiguous to the door
destroyed, and the ceiling of the house burning; he called his servant and both of them succeeded in putting out the
fire. As a result of said explosion, the hemp fiber baled and deposited behind the main door of the house was
scattered and a part of the ceiling, which was of anahaw, burnt, thus presenting a hole which was one foot in
diameter, four boards having been unnailed and a hole made on the wooden floor. On the next day he reported the
matter to the municipal president of Catarman who repaired to the place of the event and saw that the damage
caused by the explosion would amount to P10.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the testimony of the witness Abria the explosion seems to have taken place on the exterior part of his
house near the main door, destroying the wall contiguous to the door through which it entered, scattering the hemp
fiber which was baled and deposited behind said door, and unnailing four boards of the wall; but such a hypothesis
cannot be reconciled with the fact of an opening one foot in diameter having been made on the wooden floor of the
house, and another of equal size on the ceiling ofanahaw, unless it is granted that the explosion was so strong that a
part of the explosive was thrown against the unnailed boards, another part against the floor, making an opening
thereon, and still another against the ceiling. But then it cannot be explained how the eight persons who were
sleeping in the same room, which contained an area of only about 12 square brazas and formed one single
compartment, did not suffer the slightest injury.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Without the necessity of expounding other hypotheses which may be drawn from the testimony of Abria, and taking
into account that the same witnesses, Borca and Horogon, have not seen any dynamite in possession of the
defendants, or in those of Felipe, Diño, or in the boat on the night in question, we conclude that if the circumstances
stated by said witnesses indicate anything, they are not so convincing or conclusive as to establish the guilt of the
defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to Rule 52 of the Provincial Law for the Application of the Provisions of the Penal Code, in order that a
conviction may be sustained upon circumstantial evidence alone, it is necessary , first, that the circumstances be
more than one; second, that the facts upon which they are based be proven; and third, that, taken together, they
convince the mind in such a manner as not to leave any room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused in

the natural and ordinary course of things. And this is substantially the same rule established by the jurisprudence of
this court. (U. S. vs.Perez, 2 Phil., 171; U. S. vs. Douglass, 2 Phil., 461; U. S. vs. Reyes, 3 Phil., 3; U. S. vs.Villos, 6
Phil., 510.)chanrobles virtual law library
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the appellants Felipe Diño and Fortunato
Lauristo be, as they are hereby, acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36858 June 20, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MACARIO A. ULEP, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Castor Naval for accused-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J .:
A man must love his wife. He must not lift a finger to hurt her. Indeed he must be her protector.
When against this unwritten rule he beats her, he ceases to be a man. He becomes a beast. And the
law imposes the supreme penalty when in the process he kills her. It is parricide pure and simple.
This is what Macario A. Ulep, was convicted of by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Second
Judicial District. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs in a decision of March 20,
1973.
The facts are undisputed. On May 21, 1970, at nine o'clock in the evening, in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on that very
day by her husband, accused Macario Ulep. The following day, the Chief of Police of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion Pablo who allegedly died of a heart
attack. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health Officer went to the house of the deceased and there
they saw the body on a bamboo bed surrounded by relatives, friends, and the husband of the
deceased, Macario. The Chief of Police suggested that an autopsy be conducted but the husband

refused to allow the same. However, the daughter of the deceased by a previous marriage asked for
a day or two to decide on her preference.
At the behest of the daughter, the request for an autopsy was made shortly before the burial.
Accordingly, the police chief and Dr. Eliseo Bonoan, a physician, caught up with the funeral
Procession at the Catholic cemetery and thereupon conducted an autopsy on the deceased.
The autopsy reports read as follows:
POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: ASUNCION PABLO ULEP
Age: 42
Nationality: Filipino
Address: No. 24, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Date: May 25, 1970
PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS
SKIN:
A rectangular area of about 1" x 3" bluish black in color was noted on
the upper half, anterior aspect of the arm, left.
SKELETAL SYSTEM:
Complete fracture of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs, left. The 4th and
5th ribs fractured along the midolavicular line, left. The 6th and 7th
ribs fractured along the anterior auxillary line, left. Presence of
extravascated blood and injuries of the surrounding tissues of the
broken ribs areas, left.
Complete fracture of the 3rd and 4th ribs at the juncture of the rib and
external cartillages with concomitant injury to its sounding tissues and
extravascated blood, right side.
THORACIC CAVITY:
Presence of about 200 cc. of a serous fluid found within the cavity.
Pleura lacerated at the points of fractures.
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:

Heart with small amount of clotted blood. Coronary vessels
congested. The big blood vessels contained small amount of clotted
blood.
ABDOMINAL CAVITY:
Presence of about 500 cc. of serous fluid within the cavity.
DIGESTIVE SYSTEM:
Apparently normal
CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:
The meningeal vessels were congested.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
CARDIAC ARREST
PRIMARY SHOCK.
(Exh. D, p. 16, rec.).
1

Two weeks after the burial, two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario Ulep. A statement
was prepared and signed by the accused and was subsequently sworn to before Fiscal Cesar Abaya
of Ilocos Norte. In this statement, marked as Exhibit "A", he admitted that he caused the death of his
wife by elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was uttering indecent words. The
following day, PC sergeant Damian Bautista of Camp Juan, Laoag City conducted another
investigation of accused Macario Ulep. His statement was reduced to writing and then subscribed to
before Fiscal Abaya. He reiterated that the cause of death of his wife, Asuncion Pablo, was his
elbowing her on her breast. This statement was marked Exhibit "B".
Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their home at 5:30 in the afternoon. She
vomitted and then went to bed, The accused then left for the fields and returned at around 9:00 in
the evening and found his wife dead on her bed. He reported this death to their barrio captain.
Despite these statements, (Exhibits "A" and "B") admitting his guilt, Ulep retracted his statement in
court by narrating that more than a year before that, and while his wife went to have their palay
milled, their bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast.
With the pain in her chest, she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo."
The accused took exception to his conviction when he raised the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF
ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO THE ELBOW BLOWS BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON HER BREAST, AS ADMIRED BY HIM IN HIS AFFIDAVITS,

EXHIBIT "A" AND EXHIBIT "A-1," ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WHEN SUCH
ADMISSION IS BUT A MERE BELIEF ON HIS PART.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH
OF SAID ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO A LONG STANDING PROCESS OR
CONDITION IN HER BODY SYSTEM, AS TESTIFIED TO BY DR. PEDRO BLANCO
FOR THE DEFENSE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED CONSEQUENTLY IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM OF
THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE.
Our primary concern is to determine the cause of death of Asuncion Pablo, the wife, of the accused.
Was her death a result of cardiac arrest and primary shock due to fractured ribs? The appellant
alleges that the gradual weakening of the heart due to a long standing illness of the body system
caused the cardiac arrest which claimed the life of Asuncion Pablo.
The post-mortem report on the deceased was prepared by Dr. Eliseo V. Bonoan who conducted an
autopsy at the behest of a daughter of tile deceased by a previous marriage. The husband who
previously denied permission to conduct an autopsy was present when the autopsy was performed
shortly before the body was buried at the cemetery of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. In the necropsy
report of Dr. Bonoan, the cause of death was manifestly due to cardiac arrest and primary shock.
We agree and see no fault in this finding made in the necropsy report of Dr. Bonoan.
The defense took exception to Dr. Bonoan's testimony that the fractures in the chest could have
been caused by blows or physical pressure. Could such injuries not have been inflicted by elbow
blows when the victim was standing or by knee or feet blows when the victim was lying on her back
or was sitting with her back against the wall?
While the accused admitted that he delivered several elbow blows on the chest of his wife
immediately before her death and the prosecution attributed these blows as the proximate cause of
the cardiac arrest and primary shock which resulted in the wife's death, the defense assails this
theory of the prosecution in the following manner:
First, there were no contusions on the chest of the victim. This indicates that the
elbow blows were not of sufficient force to fracture the ribs. This is so because a
fracture necessarily results in the extravasation of blood in the fractured area and it is
the extravasated blood that causes the swelling or contusion.
2
Dr. Blanco attributes
the absence of swelling or contusion on the chest, where the fractures were found, to the
fact that the fracture conditions Were of long standing; that is, some repairs has
happened and that sufficient time have elapsed for the swelling to disappear (t.s.n., p.
180).
Second, even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found by Dr. Bonoan
were present, the same could have not caused cardiac arrest and primary shock.
This is so because only extravasated blood was present around the immediate area
of the fractures, This means that the fractures were not depressed or that the
fractured ends did not cave-in, so as to injure the heart and impede its functions to

cause cardiac arrest. The claim of Dr. Bonoan that the chest is pliant and is like an
accordion which can be compressed is puerile to say the least. Even so, the elbow
blows of the accused could not have caused a compression of the chest wall, no
matter how pliant it could be. And even on the theory that the fractures were caused
by stamping the foot on a piece of wood placed on the chest, while the victim was
lying on her back, still the fractures could not have injured the heart or impede its
functions to cause cardiac arrest, because the fractures, were not depressed
fractures or cave-in fractures. The fractures merely caused the extravasation of blood
within the fractured areas. And neither would the fractures cause primary shock
because they were merely complete fractures; which means a mere breakage that
would not cause the stoppage of the heart, because it does not tend to compress the
heart.
3

And third, although the pleura or thoracic cavity was lacerated at the points of fracture,
the same could not have caused cardiac arrest or primary shock because the lacerations
were limited to the pleura. The points of fracture did not cave-in or were not depressed
and they did not injure or impede the heart to cause cardiac arrest. Neither did the
lacerations of the pleura cause primary shock because blood did not spill into the pleura,
which indicates that the hemorrhage was nil. This is so because the serous fluid in the
pleura -as not reddish.
On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution shows that the deceased died of
cardiac arrest because of the weakening of the heart due to a long standing process
or condition in her body system. Thus the theory of the defense is strengthened by
the very evidence of the prosecution.
4

Furthermore, both sides in this case took issue to the presence of 200 cc. of serous fluid in the
pleura. The appellant claims that it is not normal whereas the prosecution says that the pleura
normally contains 100 to 200 cc. of serous fluid and that this is normal. Anyway both agree that there
should be enough serous fluid to lubricate the tissues.
The presence of 500 cc. of serous fluid in the abdominal cavity which, according to Dr. Blanco, the
physician, witness for the appellant, may be due to the chronic condition of the kidney like nephritis
and edema or the hardening of the liver or a long progressively weakening of the heart.
5
Dr. Bonoan
did not concur in this view when he said that the fluid was rather increased as a result of the diffusion of
the medicine used in the embalming.
6
We find cogent basis in the explanation given by Dr. Bonoan.
Another point raised in the necropsy report pertains to the presence of clotted blood in the heart and
blood vessels as well as the congestion of the meningeal vessels. The appellant bares that this is a
sign of the hardening of the heart. Dr. Bonoan of the prosecution disclosed that there were no signs
of circulatory weakening and that blood clots were not found adherent to the heart and such being
the condition there could be no abnormality and thus he further declares that such clots are normally
found in the heart of a dead person or in any part of the circulatory system.
7

There is an admission by Dr. Blanco, the appellant's witness, that he has not "attended a case of
fractured ribs"
8
and that he explains cardiac failure as a "failing of the heart" and his further concept is
that it is "the stopping of the heart." He says that such stoppage could be due to trauma, such as a
fracture of the ribs.
9

A resume of the evidence presented by the parties establishes the fact of death of Asuncion Pablo
on May 21, 1970. She was legally married to Macario Ulep, the appellant herein. The death,

established in two affidavits, Exhibits "A" and "B," was caused by said accused. In these affidavits,
the appellant admitted that he elbowed and attacked his wife. This attack caused the complete
fracture of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs on her left chest and the 3rd, and 4th ribs, right chest of
Asuncion Pablo on the same evening of May 21, 1970. The trial judge observed: "There was never
any attempt on the part of the accused to repudiate the sworn statements wherein he admitted that
the cause of death of his wife was his having elbowed her many times on her breast."
10

Having realized the gravity of his act, the appellant presented a witness to prove that sometime in
February or March, 1969 his wife was pinned down by a sack of rice and the side portion of a
bullcart and was attended to by a town quack doctor called an arbularyo. This witness said that two
(2) ribs on each side of the chest were fractured, without stating which particular ribs were so
affected.
From all these observations, findings, and an incisive study of the necropsy report, the cause of
death of the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest and primary shock caused by the strong
pressure applied on the upper front chest bone. This happens when one steps, kneels or presses
the body of a victim against a wall. The man-size blows coming from the elbow of the aggressor
upon a thin-framed woman can only bring about fatal results.
We find relevance in Wharton and Stilles' findings in their book, Medical Jurisprudence under the title
of "SHOCK," to wit:
Sec. 225. Shock. — Death may also be due to the shock associated with the injury.
The possibility of a person dying from the shock attendant upon an injury which, by
itself appears to be unimportant is attested by experience. No satisfactory
explanation of the cause of the shock seems to have been found, though it is due in
some way to the upsetting of the nervous equilibrium of the body. Shock from an
injury may be fatal even when the blow leaves no trace behind it; as, for instance,
when a person receives a violent blow upon the pit of the stomach, or behind the ear,
or to the larynx. ... In the case of Reg. v. Slane, et al.,
11
the deceased had received
injuries to the abdomen by kick and blows, but there were no marks of bruises present, or
anything to show the cause of death. Death however, had followed twenty minutes after
the maltreatment and was evidently due to the shock. The prisoners were convicted of
murder.
12

We have previously stated that:
Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or
tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused —
(a) is the efficient cause of death; or
(b) accelerated his death; or
(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability.
13

Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused." This is the rationale in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended."

Again, We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any external
wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and cause death, and even
though the victim may have been previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with
the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the death as
the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted.
14

We are, therefore, convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement between the two medical
witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death and that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away
the life of the victim, Asuncion Pablo.
There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for these in human
acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic death.
The indemnity to the heirs of his deceased wife should be increased to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to indemnity, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

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