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[G.R. No. 138366. September 11, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RUBEN CAÑETE (deceased), ALFREDO
CAÑETE, SERGIO CAÑETE (deceased), TRINIDAD CAÑETE and SOTERO CAÑETE
(deceased), appellants.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
This is an appeal from the decision dated December 15, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XXVIII, Mandaue City, in Criminal Case No. DU-5985, convicting the appellants of
murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
Ruben, Alfredo, Sergio, Trinidad and their father, Sotero, all surnamed Cañete, were
charged with murder in an Information dated June 27,1997 which read:
That on the 24
th
day of May, 1997, at 10:20 o’clock in the morning, more or less, at Sitio
Kanagahan, Barangay Tabla, Municipality of Liloan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another with abuse of superior strength and
by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot Leonaldo Tanjay Tumayao, hitting him on the vital parts of his body which
resulted in the death of the victim shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[1]

Before his trial, on June 1, 1997, Ruben died in detention.
[2]
Sotero likewise died in
detention on June 3, 1997.
[3]
The remaining accused (Alfredo, Trinidad and Sergio) separately
pleaded not guilty during their arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution’s version of the incident follows.
On May 24, 1997, at about 10:20 a.m., in Sitio Canagahan, Barangay Tabla, Liloan, Cebu,
Leonaldo Tumayao, Joel Quimod and Lilio Tundag were on their way home after attending a
wedding party. Tumayao was walking ahead of Tundag and Quimod. As they passed by the
houses of the accused, Quimod and Tundag heard successive gunshots. Quimod and Tundag
immediately looked in the direction where the bursts of gunfire were coming from and saw
Ruben, Alfredo, Sergio, Sotero and Trinidad shooting at Tumayao who slumped to the
ground. Apparently not satisfied, all the accused approached the fallen Tumayao and continued
shooting him. On order of his father Sotero, Alfredo shot Tumayao in the head.
[4]

Quimod, who was ten meters behind the victim, ran and hid behind the bushes. As soon as
the accused left, Quimod went home and narrated the incident to Tumayao’s wife.
[5]

On the other hand, Tundag, who was behind Tumayao, saw Ruben fire his gun at the
victim. Tundag attempted to come to the aid of Tumayao but the latter shouted at him to flee.
Thus, he ran back to the wedding party while hearing more gunshots. At the wedding party,
Tundag informed the people about the ambush. Thereafter, he went back to the crime scene
where he saw Tumayao’s lifeless body on the road.
[6]

Vilma Tumayao, daughter of the victim, went to the crime scene after she was informed of
the shooting. She saw all the accused near the dead body of her father. Vilma, however, could
not approach him because Alfredo aimed his gun at her.
[7]
It was only after the arrival of the
policemen that Vilma was finally able to get near the body of her father.
The policemen ordered the accused to come out of their houses and surrender. After an
hour, Sergio, Sotero and Trinidad surrendered to the authorities while Ruben and Alfredo
managed to escape.
[8]
But after learning they were included in the criminal complaint, they
surrendered to the Talamban Police Station, Cebu City.
Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the PNP, conducted an autopsy on
Tumayao.
[9]
According to him, the victim sustained five wounds from a shotgun and one grazing
wound which could have been caused either by a pellet or a cartridge of a shotgun, or by a
bullet fired from a gun.
[10]
The cause of death of Tumayao was “shock, secondary to shotgun
(pellet wounds) body and extremity.”
[11]

The defense had a different story.
On May 23, 1997, Ruben’s wife, Teresita Cañete, was in Barangay Lanipga, Consolacion,
Cebu, to help prepare food for the wedding of her husband’s cousin. She stayed there
overnight. At the wedding reception the following morning, Leonaldo Tumayao, alias Eduardo
or Edit, approached Ruben who was then looking for a cold soft drink. Tumayao said “Here is
something cold,” and suddenly punched Ruben. Teresita summoned her husband and asked
him to go home with her. The latter acquiesced. Before they left, however, Teresita saw
Tundag give Tumayao what looked like a .45 caliber pistol.
[12]

Seconds later, Tumayao, together with Quimod, Tundag and the latter’s son followed
Ruben to his house on a motorcycle or habal-habal. Tumayao alighted and thereafter shouted
“This is now a combat” while firing a gun.
[13]

Hearing the gunshots, Teresita brought her children to the safety of a neighbor’s house. As
she went back for her other child, Teresita saw her husband Ruben standing beside a coconut
tree. Tumayao stood in front of the house of Alfredo who was shouting at him not to throw
stones as he might hit the children.
[14]
At that point, Ruben shot Tumayao with a pugakhang, an
improvised shotgun. Tumayao slumped to the ground.
[15]

Quimod ran away when Tumayao began firing his gun. Tundag and his son also sped away
on board the motorcycle. Tumayao was left alone.
[16]

When the shooting erupted, Teresita also ran away. She did not see Alfredo approach
Tumayao or fire at the latter’s head. Moreover, she did not see Sotero, Trinidad and Sergio in
the vicinity during the shooting incident.
[17]

Alfredo declared that, during the shooting incident, he was in his house in Canagahan,
Barangay Tabla, Liloan, Cebu. He and his wife saw Ruben shoot Tumayao. Alfredo then
brought his wife to Tayud, Consolacion, as the latter was in a state of shock after witnessing the
shooting incident.
[18]
He voluntarily surrendered to the police upon learning that he was
implicated in the killing of Tumayao.
[19]

For their part, Trinidad and Sergio declared that they were in the mango plantation of their
aunt, Cirila Cañete, at Sitio Canagahan, Barangay Tabla, Liloan, Cebu from 6:00 to 11:30 a.m.
on the day of the incident. Trinidad was spraying insecticide on the mango trees while Sergio
was with him, fetching water from the creek to be mixed with the chemicals being used by
Trinidad. Thereafter, Trinidad and Sergio went home and were surprised to see many people
gathered in front of their house. They were told by their father, Sotero, that Ruben killed
Tumayao with a pugakhang.
[20]

The police arrived at the scene of the crime at around 12 noon and immediately ordered the
appellants to come out of their houses and surrender. Sotero, Trinidad and Sergio heeded the
order. The policemen thereafter handcuffed them. When the appellants asked why they were
being handcuffed, the policemen replied: “This is your obligation because he died in your
land.”
[21]

The trial court found the three accused, appellants herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder for the killing of Leonaldo Tumayao:
WHEREFORE, finding the herein accused SERGIO, TRINIDAD and ALFREDO, all surnamed
CAÑETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of MURDER, said accused are
hereby sentenced to each undergo the penalty by imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally the legal heirs of the deceased
Leonaldo Tumayao the following amounts:
(1) P10,000.00 after deducting from the total expenses of P52,000.00 the amount
of P42,000.00, which the legal heirs of Leonaldo Tumayao received form (sic) the SSS as actual
damages; and
(2) P50,000.00 by reason of the death of the deceased Leonaldo Tumayao, all without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay their proportionate share of the cost.
Accused being detention prisoners, shall be credited in (sic) the service of their sentence full
time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
[22]

Thus, the instant appeal with a lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING ACCUSED
SERGIO CAÑETE, TRINIDAD CAÑETE AND ALFREDO CAÑETE, PRINCIPALLY, ON THE
BASIS OF THE EVIDENTLY BIASED AND HIGHLY INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
WITNESSES JOEL QUIMOD, LILIO TUNDAG AND VILMA TUMAYAO, MUCH LESS, FOR
MURDER.
[23]

During the pendency of the appeal, the Court was informed by Assistant Director Reinario
F. Albano of the Bureau of Corrections that appellant Sergio Cañete died on May 11, 2003 of an
undetermined cause at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. On account thereof, Sergio’s criminal
liability was extinguished.
Appellants allege the existence of glaring inconsistencies and bias in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Tundag, Quimod and Vilma Tumayao. Specifically, Quimod’s testimony
that Alfredo shot Tumayao in the head at close range contradicted that of Tundag and the
findings of the medico-legal officer in the necropsy report which noted no gunshot wound in the
head of the victim.
Likewise, Quimod’s testimony was purportedly against the natural course of things since
Tumayao’s body should have been riddled with pellets and slugs had five armed men
simultaneously fired at him at close range. All the police investigators recovered at the crime
scene were one spent .45 caliber shell, three fired shotgun shells and one live shotgun round.
Appellants also claim that prosecution witnesses Tundag and Quimod were bedfellows of
Tumayao who had an ax to grind against the appellants. At any rate, according to appellants,
the killing was preceded by sufficient provocation on the part of the victim, hence, the crime
committed, if any, was only simple homicide and not murder.
It is apparent that appellants’ posture rests mainly on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. The rule is well-settled that the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness
and its factual findings are accorded not only the highest respect but also finality, unless some
weighty circumstance has been ignored, overlooked or misunderstood which, if appreciated,
would alter the result of the case. Given the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the
stand, the trial judge is in a vantage position to assess his demeanor and determine if he is
telling the truth or not.
[24]
In People vs. De Guzman, we held that -
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation
of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the
trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere
reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-
tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer
or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in
evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to
distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in
remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and
on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.
[25]
(underscoring
ours)
We find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions of the trial
court. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses proved credible during the trial. In fact, Tundag did not
waver in his testimony regarding the details of the crime, whether on direct or on cross-
examination, thus:
Q. You could not have committed an error in describing the gun he was holding
whether it was long or short?
A. It was short. I could not be wrong.
Q. I would show to your affidavit and in fact, I will read to you your affidavit, a portion
of which says:
“ x x x diha sa ibabaw sa buntud sa balay ilang amahan diha sa kilid sa batu
nagpahipi nga nagdala gihapon sa iyang armas nga taas x x x”
Can you explain this very glaring discrepancy between your statement and your
affidavit?
A. What I saw was a short firearm. It was the police who stated that but what I saw
was a short firearm but the police said it was long.
Q. How about the place where he was hiding? Your affidavit says that he was hiding
behind a rock but you testified that he was standing beside his house. Which is
which now?
A. What is correct is my statement here that he was standing beside his house. But
the police insisted to state that it was behind the rock.
Q. Did you not ask the police why it should be stated that way and not your way?
A. But the police said that we will just go on with this and I also said that it is up to
you.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. You said that you have read this affidavit before you signed it?
A. I read it but those two facts reflected in my affidavit are wrong and I know that they
are wrong.
Q. Let us go to another point. You said that you were at the wedding place at 10:30
per your affidavit but then according to your statement now, you said that at 8:30
you already left the place. Which is true now?
A. That is an estimate of the police because at that time I cannot really give the exact
time because at that time I was scared.
Q. You signed it before Judge Dagatan?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you not tell Judge Dagatan that there were so many things in this affidavit that
were place (sic) by the policeman despite your objection?
A. I told Judge Dagatan that some were inserted by the police.
Q. What did Judge Dagatan do?
A. He said that you will sign this in my presence, so you have to sign this and I told
him “Judge there are insertions.
[26]

Tundag’s tenacious insistence on the minute details of what happened suggested nothing
else except that he was telling the truth. We do not doubt his credibility.
The presence of spent shells of more than one caliber, i.e., .45 and shotgun ammunition, at
the scene of the crime negated the version of the defense that it was only Ruben who shot and
killed Tumayao. On cross-examination, Quimod even testified:
Q: And let us talk of Sotero Cañete. Can you tell us what was the firearm he was
holding, if it was a firearm?
A: I do not know but he was holding his pistol and I do not know the caliber.
Q: How did you know that it was a pistol?
A: It was short.
x x x x x x x x x
Q: How far were you to (sic) Sotero when you saw him carrying that short thing, which
you said is (sic) a firearm?
A: Around 20 meters.
x x x x x x x x x
Q: How far were you from Ruben?
A: A little more than 20 meters.
x x x x x x x x x
Q: So what was Ruben carrying then?
A: Shotgun.
[27]

Tundag also testified:
Q. Whose house among the Cañetes would you be (sic) passing first?
A. Alfredo.
Q. Was there anything unusual that happened when you passed by the house of
Alfredo Cañete?
A. There was. Alfredo fired [his gun].
Q. How far were you as well as Leonaldo Tumayao from Alfredo Cañete when you
made mention earlier that he was firing his gun?
A. Around two arms length more or less.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. When you saw Alfredo Cañete firing his gun to whom was it directed?
A. To Leonaldo.
Q. And aside from Alfredo Cañete whom you saw firing his gun aimed at Leonaldo
Tumayao, were there other persons whom you saw?
A. I saw Ruben Cañete who was carrying a long weapon.
COURT TO WITNESS:
Q: Who else?
A: Sotero Cañete.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. And were you able to see Sotero bringing anything?
A. He was holding a short firearm.
[28]

The perceived contradictions in the testimonies of Quimod and Tundag referred only to
minor matters. There was no inconsistency as far as the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the assailants were concerned.
[29]
Minor discrepancies do not damage the
essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole nor reflect adversely on the witnesses’
credibility.
[30]
We have previously held, in fact, that minor inconsistencies, far from detracting
from the veracity of the testimony, even enhance the credibility of witnesses for they remove
any suspicion of a contrived or rehearsed testimony.
[31]

Despite the absence of any wound in the head allegedly caused by a final shot by Alfredo,
the shots fired at Tumayao by the appellants nevertheless resulted in his death. As established
by the prosecution through the testimony of Dr. Jesus Cerna:
Q – How do you consider these five pellet wounds, are they fatal?
A – Yes, sir, because pellet wounds or the wound caused by the pellet in case of
wound no. 2 was able to penetrate the abdominal cavity and perforated a portion
of the small intestines. In wound no. 3, the pellet was able to penetrate the thoracic
cavity and lacerated the upper and lower lobes of the right lung. In wound no. 4,
the pellet was able to penetrate the right thoracic cavity and lacerated the lower
lobe of the right lung. Of all the pellet wounds, three of them were fatal.
Q – They are fatal in the sense that it would result to (sic) immediate death of the
victim?
A – Almost instantaneous death.
x x x x x x x x x
Q – If you were to be asked, doctor, what was the cause of death?
A – The immediate cause of death was due to shock secondary to massive loss of
blood, internal bleeding secondary to pellet wounds.
[32]

In this case, the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellants as the persons
who fired their guns at Tumayao. It was of no moment who among the appellants actually hit
and killed the victim. The fact that the witnesses’ testimonies were consistent regarding the
commission of the crime as well as the positive identification of the appellants as the
perpetrators thereof, far outweighs the minor inconsistencies therein.
[33]
Thus:
So long as the witnesses’ testimonies agree on substantial matters, the inconsequential
inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the witnesses’ credibility nor the verity of their
testimonies. When the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such
inconsistency is insignificant and can not have any bearing on the essential fact testified to, that
is, the killing of the victim.
[34]

The time-tested rule is that, between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and
the mere denials of the accused, the former undisputedly deserve more credence and are
entitled to greater evidentiary value.
[35]
More so in this case where appellants failed to
sufficiently explain why a shotgun was found at Sotero’s hut or why Trinidad was found positive
for gunpowder burns.
Neither could appellants’ alibi prosper, since they failed to prove that they were at another
place at the time of the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for them
to be at the crime scene.
[36]
Appellants Sergio and Trinidad’s claim that they were at the mango
plantation, just one kilometer away from the scene of the crime, did not negate the possibility
that they had gone home before the incident to commit the crime. Their alleged presence at the
mango plantation was not even established by a positive declaration from an independent
witness.
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were not shown to have been driven by any ill will or
false motive in testifying against appellants. The fact that there were pending civil and criminal
cases between the prosecution witnesses and the Cañetes did not per se establish that the
prosecution witnesses were improperly motivated to impute a very serious accusation against
appellants for which the possible penalty could either be death or life imprisonment. The trial
court did not perceive such motivation on the part of the prosecution witnesses as would make
them falsely implicate appellants in the commission of the crime.
Our consistent ruling has been that the witness’ testimony deserves full faith and credit
where there exists no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why he should
testify falsely against the accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a serious
offense.
[37]

Appellants likewise assail the trial court’s finding that conspiracy, treachery and evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime.
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the acts of
the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together,
would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design.
[38]
Gleaned from the records is the
following chain of events which proved that there was a community of design among the
appellants: (1) appellants positioned themselves strategically before ambushing Tumayao; (2)
Alfredo fired at Tumayao although there was no certainty that he hit the victim; (3) Ruben shot
and hit the victim with his shotgun; (4) appellants fired their guns successively at Tumayao; (5)
appellants, still holding their firearms, surrounded Tumayao after he slumped to the ground; (6)
Sotero was holding a pistol and he ordered Alfredo to deliver the coup de grace to the victim; (7)
Alfredo obeyed Sotero’s order by shooting Tumayao one last time; (8) Alfredo and Ruben
escaped from the scene of the crime; (9) Sotero, Sergio and Trinidad hid inside the latter’s
house away from the crime scene until they were ordered by the police to come out and
surrender.
Therefore, even presuming for the sake of argument that the wounds inflicted on Tumayao
were the result of a single shot from a shotgun, appellants’ presence and participation
nonetheless made possible the execution of the crime. Accordingly, the appellants should all be
held liable for the death of Tumayao for, in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
We likewise agree that treachery attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means or methods in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender, arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of
the person being attacked.
[39]
In this case, the events narrated by the eyewitnesses point to the
fact that Tumayao could not have been aware that he would be attacked by appellants. There
was no opportunity for Tumayao to defend himself as appellants, suddenly and without any
provocation, fired their guns at him, one after the other.
However, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. There was no proof that the appellants deliberately
planned to liquidate the victim. On the contrary, the killing of the victim was the immediate
impulsive reaction of appellants to Tumayao’s act of punching Ruben. Moreover, the time that
elapsed between the punching incident and the commission of the crime was not sufficient for
Ruben and the rest of the appellants to reflect upon the consequences of their intended
act. The elements of evident premeditation, namely: (1) the time when the offender appeared
determined to commit the crime; (2) the act evidently indicating that the offender clung to his
determination, and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime
and the execution thereof during which the offender was able to reflect on the consequences of
his act,
[40]
were wanting in this case.
We agree with the trial court that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should
be appreciated in favor of Alfredo and the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense conceded in favor of all the appellants. Saving the authorities the trouble and
expense for his search and capture, and freely placing himself at their disposal, Alfredo should
be given the favor of a mitigated penalty for his voluntary surrender. The mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, being personal however, can only be appreciated in favor
of appellant Alfredo.
It must be recalled that, immediately prior to the incident, Tumayao punched Ruben in the
presence of many people at the wedding party. Although the incident did not immediately
precede the killing, its impact, by reason of its seriousness and the circumstances under which it
was inflicted, festered till the commission of the crime.
[41]
The mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense must, therefore, be appreciated in favor of the
appellants.
All told, we are convinced that appellants Alfredo and Trinidad are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder which carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Since the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and immediate vindication of a grave offense were
present in this case, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the trial
court.
As regards damages, there is need to modify the award by the trial court. The prosecution
was able to prove the amount of P7,000 only as actual damages.
[42]
In People vs.
Villanueva,
[43]
we declared that the legal heirs shall be entitled to temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000 when the amount of actual damages proven is less
than P25,000. However, the victim’s daughter testified that she received P12,000 from the
Social Security System as reimbursement for burial expenses.
[44]
This amount should be
deducted from P25,000 and the victim’s heirs awarded the balance of P13,000 as temperate
damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Mandaue City, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Trinidad Cañete and Alfredo Cañete are
hereby found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Appellants are also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Leonaldo
Tumayao, P50,000 as civil indemnity and P13,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.



[G.R. No. 134759. September 19, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLANDO M. GUERRERO, SR.,
and ORLANDO A. GUERRERO, JR., accused,
ORLANDO A. GUERRERO, JR., accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
On appeal is the decision
[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
27, in Criminal Case No. 4402, finding appellant Orlando A. Guerrero, Jr., guilty of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the amount of P62,000 as
actual damages and P50,000 as moral damages. Co-accused Orlando M. Guerrero, Sr., was
acquitted.
On April 4, 1997, Orlando Guerrero, Jr., also known as “Pablo,” together with his father
Orlando Guerrero, Sr., nicknamed “Dino,” was accused of murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 7
th
day of January 1997, in the Municipality of San Juan, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to
kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and without justifiable cause, attack, assault, club, beheaded and cut off the penis of
the victim Ernesto Ocampo, which caused his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of
his lawful heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[2]

Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Appellant interposed self-defense. His father,
Dino, denied any complicity in the killing.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
DR. EUMELIA T. SANGLAY,
[3]
the municipal health officer of San Juan, La Union, testified
that she performed the autopsy on the body of the victim, Ernesto Ocampo. She confirmed the
Certification
[4]
she issued, dated January 13, 1997, with the following findings:
A. EXTERNAL
1. Decapitated about the level of 5
th
cervical vertebra
2. Amputated penis
3. Lacerated wound, 8.0 cm. occipito-parietal area right
4. Lacerated wound, 3.9 cm. frontal area, right
5. Incised wound, 6.0 cm. anterior aspect, proximal 1/3, arm, right
6. Incised wound, 3.4 cm. lateral, 1/3 shoulder, right
7. Incised wound, 2.3 cm. maxillary area, right
8. Incised wound, 7.0 cm. mandibular area, right
9. Linear abrasions, multiple (3) anterior chest
INTERNAL
1. Complete laceration of the trachea, esophagus thyroid gland
2. Complete laceration of the muscles of the neck; Platysma, Sternocleidomastoid,
Scalene muscles, Levator scapulae, splenius capitis, Infrahyoid muscles
3. Complete laceration of the common carotid artery, external jugular vein, anterior
jugular vein, interior jugular vein
4. Complete laceration of the spinal accessory nerve, inferior laryngeal nerve,
vagus nerve, phrenic nerve
The cause of death is hypovolemic shock secondary to MULTIPLE HACKING WOUNDS.
Dr. Sanglay said that the victim had been beheaded, and his penis was cut off totally. Two
wounds were found on his head, one on the front, and another a little bit backwards on the right
side of the head. There were other wounds, she said, in different parts of Ernesto’s body. But of
these injuries, she added that decapitation or separation of the head from the body was the fatal
one.
[5]
However, she could not ascertain the order in which the wounds were inflicted.
[6]
She
could not likewise determine whether they were inflicted while the victim was standing up or
lying down.
[7]

SPO2 BIENVENIDO JACALNE,
[8]
a member of the PNP at San Juan, La Union, testified
that on January 7, 1997, he responded to a report regarding an incident at Brgy. Taboc, San
Juan, La Union. He rode on a minibus, accompanied by PO2 James Lewis and SPO2 Alberto
Patubo, while SPO1 Emilio Taracatac proceeded to the scene on a motorcycle. They were
followed by the Chief of Police Michael Nicolas and PO2 Dominador Gamal. When they arrived
at the scene, they saw the victim Ernesto Ocampo lying dead, his head having been separated
from the body while his penis was completely severed and placed on his abdomen. Witness
Jacalne said he was informed that one Dino Guerrero was inside the house nearby. Dino
Guerrero came out with his hands extended forward. SPO1 Emilio Taracatac immediately
frisked and handcuffed him. Before Dino was handcuffed, according to the witness, he said that
it was his son who had killed the victim. Thereafter, Dino was brought to the police station for
custodial investigation.
SPO2 Jacalne prepared a sketch of the scene of the crime. He identified the things found
therein including the bladed weapon, Exhibit “B,” and the wooden club, Exhibit “C”. Pictures
were taken by photographer FLORENCIO BUCCAT,
[9]
who later authenticated them as Exhibit
“E” to “E-3” in court. According to Jacalne, there was no sign of disorder or disarray in the place:
chairs and tables were in place at the porch. After the police officers had gathered information
from bystanders, they prepared a “spot report”. It was then signed by the Chief of Police, Lt.
Michael Nicolas, and transmitted to the police headquarters. There it was copied verbatim by
SPO4 ROGELIO GARCIA,
[10]
who entered it in the police blotter. According to SPO2 Jacalne,
no verification of the report was made because nobody wanted to give verified information.
Further, Jacalne testified that appellant Orlando Guerrero, Jr., was not at the scene of the
crime during their investigation. But upon their return to the police station, appellant was
already there.
[11]
Appellant admitted killing the victim, according to Jacalne, by clubbing the
victim first with the wooden stick, and then cutting his head and his penis with a knife.
[12]

SPO1 EMILIO TARACATAC,
[13]
one of the officers who went to the crime scene, testified
that co-accused Dino Guerrero voluntarily extended his hands to be handcuffed when the
officers apprehended him. Taracatac then asked Dino what he knew of the killing of Ocampo,
but Dino replied that he will just give his statement when he had a lawyer present.
[14]
Dino’s
daughter, Ana Costales, was around but did not say anything to the policeman while he was
putting handcuffs on her father. Ana denied knowing anything about the incident.
[15]
He also
noticed that when Dino came out, he was only wearing shorts, his hair appeared wet, as if he
had just taken a bath or had just finished washing.
[16]

NANCY C. OCAMPO,
[17]
widow of the victim, testified that she knew appellant Orlando
“Pablo” Guerrero, Jr. and his father Orlando “Dino” Guerrero, Sr. According to Nancy,
appellant’s mother Rosa, together with his sisters Ana, Rina and Nora Guerrero, all worked at
one time or another as household help for Nancy’s parents-in-law. Sometime in October 1996,
according to Nancy, she caught her husband Ernesto and Nora Guerrero embracing each other
near the kitchen of their house. Nancy screamed and then slapped Nora. As a result, Nora and
her family were asked to leave the employ of the Ocampos, for the purpose of putting an end to
the illicit relationship between Ernesto and Nora. However, according to Nancy, she believed
that her husband and Nora continued to see each other. Thus, on December 20, 1996, Nancy
went to see Dino, asking him to stop his daughter Nora from seeing her husband, or send her
far away to cut the relationship.
[18]
According to Nancy, Dino told her, “If ever I will see your
husband, I will kill him.” Nancy implored him not to do that and to please pity their
children.
[19]
During the conversation, Nancy said, Pablo was on the porch of the house, a duplex
with a common porch. She added that she informed Ernesto, her husband, about Dino’s
statement, but her husband replied that “they (Guerreros) could not do that to me because of
the goodness of my mother and my father to their family.”
[20]

On January 6, 1997, the day before the incident, Nancy saw appellant. She said that he
told her, “Ninang, if ever I will meet your husband, I will cut-off his head including his
penis.”
[21]
Nancy observed that appellant appeared to have made the statement “lightly”, as the
latter was “laughing.”
[22]
She said that her husband did not believe the threat and even scolded
her, saying, “Do not believe whatever you hear.”
[23]

MONICO GUINITARAN, a construction worker,
[24]
testified that he knew the victim, Ernesto
Ocampo alias “George/Takel” because the father, Pedro Ocampo, was his employer. He also
knew appellant and the co-accused, whom he identified when asked by the prosecution by
pointing at them in open court. On January 7, 1997, as he was walking with companion Cirilo
Garcia, they met appellant, who was running towards them. According to the witness he jokingly
said: “Bayaw, let us have a shot.”
[25]
On hearing this, Pablo responded, saying in Tagalog, “Itago
mo kami, bayaw. Nakapatay kami.” (“You hide us, brother-in-law. We have killed somebody.”)
Monico could not ask Pablo any question as Pablo continued running fast, away from them.
Later on, Monico testified that before he could ask Pablo what he meant, or to whom Pablo
referred in saying “kami,” appellant again broke into a run.
[26]
While they were speaking, Monico
noticed that appellant’s hands, as well as the front of his shirt, were stained with blood.
CIRILO GARCIA, a hollow blocks factory worker also employed by the victim’s father,
corroborated the testimony of Monico Guinitaran that between eleven to twelve o’clock noon of
January 7, 1997, they met appellant. His hands and shirt had bloodstains, according to the
witness. In addition, he said that Pablo seemed afraid. According to Cirilo, appellant uttered in
the Ilocano dialect, “Illemeng dak” (You help us), adding “because my father and I killed a
person.”
DANILO GARCIA,
[27]
an 18-year-old student, testified that on January 7, 1997, he and his
friends were cutting a tree near the house of Pablo Guerrero. Danilo said that earlier, Pablo had
come to help their group in cutting the tree. It was sometime after Pablo had left, and while they
were cutting the tree, that they heard a woman screaming, “AHHH.” Danilo stated he stopped
what he was doing for about five minutes, then proceeded toward the direction where the
scream came from, which turned out to be the house of appellant and co-accused. There, he
saw appellant severing the head of the victim, Ernesto Ocampo, with a “rambo” knife.
[28]
Danilo
identified the weapon in court as the same knife recovered from the crime scene.
[29]
Ernesto
was not moving while lying down on the cement floor as appellant was slicing the victim’s neck
to sever his head.
[30]
Danilo ran away because he was afraid of what he saw.
SATURNINO CUELLO, JR.,
[31]
a furniture worker, testified that while he and friends Rodel,
Sekel, Nolan and Mente were cutting the tree near the house of the Guerreros, he saw Ernesto
Ocampo talking with the co-accused, Orlando “Dino” Guerrero, Sr. He also noticed that
appellant, whom he called “Pablo,” was holding a club. With this club (Exhibit F, Item J),
appellant struck Ernesto at the right side of the back of the head causing the victim to fall down,
face up. Appellant struck him again, said the witness, while his co-accused, Dino, got a bolo
and hacked Ernesto in the neck below the jaw. He later cut Ernesto’s penis. Then after Dino
left, added the witness, appellant severed the victim’s head from his body.
[32]
Witness Cuello
said he also heard appellant’s sister, Ana, screaming “already dead, already dead.” He was
about nine (9) meters away
[33]
from the scene of the killing, which was at the porch of the
Guerreros’ house.
ALEXANDER ATIJERA, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Taboc, testified
[34]
that at past
11:00 A.M. of January 7, 1997, he met Ernesto Ocampo at the side of the house of Ana
Costales, the appellant’s sister. According to Alexander, Ernesto informed him that he went to
Ana’s house to ask her help to make Nora return. Ana then told Ernesto to go speak with her
father Dino at the latter’s house, as Dino was waiting for Ernesto, according to
Alexander. Alexander also testified that Lorena Acierto came to him later that morning, telling
him, “Uncle, you come to our house because they are going to kill George Ocampo.” According
to Alexander, Lorena told him that her father and brother might kill Ernesto Ocampo, also known
as George. Alexander went there immediately but when he arrived, Ernesto Ocampo was
already dead. He reported the incident to the police through his two-way radio.
NOLAN
[35]
ATIJERA, a construction worker, testified
[36]
that on January 7, 1997, he was
among those helping Danilo Garcia cut a tree. While they were pulling the tree’s branches, they
heard a woman’s voice saying, “He is dead.” Nolan’s companions immediately ran, while he
waited a few minutes before proceeding to the place where the woman’s voice came from.
Nolan passed between the houses of the Guerreros and the Aciertos and while doing so, he
saw appellant on the Guerreros’ porch, swinging a bloodstained club in his hand. Appellant
warned him, “Do not come near, I will kill you also.”
[37]
On re-direct examination, Nolan affirmed
that he only saw appellant, alone, at the porch of the Guerreros, although he could see only the
porch and not the inside of the Guerreros’ house.
[38]

Further, Nolan testified that prior to the incident, appellant had come to help them in cutting
the tree. Nolan corroborated appellant’s testimony that appellant got a bolo for cutting the tree
but he handed the bolo to one of the tree cutters. Appellant merely helped in pulling the rope
tied to the branches of the tree. According to Nolan, appellant was no longer with them when
they heard the woman’s cry. But the bolo was left behind with the woodcutters.
[39]

For the defense, the appellant and the co-accused, appellant’s two sisters, namely Lorenza
Costales and Lorena Acierto, as well as his brother-in-law, Ireneo Costales, were presented as
witnesses.
Appellant ORLANDO GUERRERO, JR., also known as “Pablo,” testified that on December
22, 1996, his mother told him about the illicit relationship between Ernesto Ocampo and
appellant’s sister, Nora.
[40]
There and then he decided to bring Nora to Manila, because he did
not want her sister to become a married man’s mistress.
[41]
He found the situation to be very
shameful.
[42]
Immediately the following day, appellant left with Nora and proceeded to their
aunt’s house in Mandaluyong. Ernesto was able to catch up with them there and told appellant
that he wanted to get Nora. Appellant pleaded with him not to take his sister, and said that Nora
was to be brought to Laguna to help a sister-in-law who had just given birth. Brother and sister
immediately boarded a taxi and appellant succeeded in bringing Nora to the house of their
brother in Laguna.
[43]

On January 7, 1997, however, appellant saw Ernesto Ocampo in Taboc, San Juan, La
Union. According to the appellant, in the early morning of January 7, 1997, he arrived home
from his night shift duty at Bolong Farm where he worked. He immediately washed and went to
sleep. At around 9:00 A.M., he woke up, had breakfast with his wife, and thereafter seated
himself at their porch. It was then that he saw people cutting an “umbrella tree.” He decided to
help and so, he handed his bolo to the person on top of the tree cutting its branches. He also
pulled the rope tied to the felled branches of the tree, in order to prevent them from damaging
the roof of his uncle. A little while later, he returned to his house and since he still felt sleepy, he
went back to sleep.
He was roused from his sleep by someone calling his name outside the kitchen door. He
rose and proceeded to the door. Then suddenly, the door was kicked open, and there he saw
his godfather, Ernesto Ocampo a.k.a. “George” and “Takel”. Ernesto immediately put his left
foot inside appellant’s house. Ernesto wanted to know the whereabouts of appellant’s sister,
Nora. Appellant replied that he did not know where she was. Ernesto then warned that if ever
appellant could not present Nora to him, “blood will be spilled” around their house. Ernesto
suddenly rushed towards appellant and lunged at him (“dinuklos nak”), and while doing so, drew
out a knife from his waist.
Appellant immediately reached for a wooden club they kept beside the door, usually used to
secure the door at night, as its knob had long ago been broken. Using the club, appellant struck
Ernesto on the head, which sent Ernesto reeling and caused him to step backward. Appellant
struck again, this time causing Ernesto to fall down on the porch of the house. After Ernesto fell,
appellant got Ernesto’s knife and used it to slash his neck, to the point of completely severing
the head from the body. He then proceeded to cut off Ernesto’s penis. Pablo placed Ernesto’s
head beside his body, and then went out of the house.
Appellant proceeded westward. Along the way, he ran into his father, co-accused Dino
Guerrero. Dino asked what had happened, and appellant replied, “I caused the death of Takel
Ocampo.”
[44]
Dino told him to surrender to the authorities in order to mitigate his liability. Leaving
Dino, appellant continued on his way to the house of his uncle, Joe Acierto. Appellant requested
his uncle to accompany him to the Police Station, where he surrendered later that same day.
Appellant vehemently denied that he met witnesses Monico Guinitaran and Cirilo Garcia on
his way to his uncle’s house. Thus, he also denied their claim that he admitted to them that he
and his father killed someone. With regard to his conversation with the victim’s wife, Nancy
Ocampo, appellant testified that when they spoke to each other on January 6, 1997, the only
thing he told her was for her to tell her husband not to repeat what he (Ernesto) had done to his
sister. Appellant refuted her testimony that he threatened to cut off her husband’s head and
penis.
Co-accused ORLANDO “Dino” GUERRERO, SR., testified that from 8:30 A.M. to around
noontime of January 7, 1997, he was at the seashore waiting for fish to be brought in by
fishermen, from whom he would buy wholesale for her daughter to re-sell to others. There being
no fish that day, however, Dino said he went back home. On the way he met his son, the
appellant, who was covered with bloodstains. He asked him what had happened and appellant
replied that he had caused the death of Ernesto Ocampo.
[45]
Dino told appellant to surrender to
the authorities so that the penalty to be imposed upon him may be mitigated. Appellant then ran
from him, said Dino. He did not prevent appellant from running away because he was afraid
that someone else would react and another incident would occur. Dino said he proceeded to his
own house, and inside his room, he sat on the bed and thought about what his son had done.
[46]

After a while, Dino testified, he heard someone outside asking for any person inside the
house to come out. He opened the door and saw that it was a policeman who was calling from
outside. According to Dino, he was immediately handcuffed and brought to the police station for
“safekeeping and investigation.” His daughter Ana, who was then present, cried out to the
policemen, telling them not to take her father as “he did not do any wrong.”
[47]

With regard to the presence of his cigarettes at the scene of the crime, Dino said that he left
them at one of the tables in the porch before he went to the seashore. As he was about to get
them, he was immediately handcuffed by the police, and thus, the cigarettes were scattered all
over the place.
Dino denied that Nancy Ocampo came to the Guerreros’ house on December 20, 1996. He
also denied telling Nancy that he intended to kill Ernesto Ocampo.
LORENZA “Ana” COSTALES,
[48]
appellant’s sister, testified that on July 7, 1987, she was in
her house. At around 11:00 A.M., she saw Ernesto Ocampo with two companions. Ernesto
asked permission from her to use a small hut west of their house where Ernesto and his
companions wanted to go drinking. They were carrying a case of beer and one bottle of gin.
After finishing her wash, she went to the house of her sister Lorena “Rina” Acierto to roast
eggplants.
According to Ana, while roasting the eggplants, she again saw Ernesto Ocampo
approaching, on his way to the house of the Guerreros. Ernesto asked her where her brother
Pablo was, to which she replied that appellant was inside the house, sleeping. Ana knew where
her father and brother were because she had earlier asked her sister Rina. Ernesto then
entered the common porch and called out “Pablo, Pablo!” She reminded Ernesto that appellant
was sleeping. But Ernesto called for Pablo again, asking him to come out. As he was doing this,
Ernesto kicked the door open. Ana observed that Ernesto was angry.
[49]
When Ernesto kicked
the door open, Ana immediately called her sister Rina and told her to ask for help from
the barangay captain.
Thereafter, Ana said, she proceeded to the seashore to call her father. But she couldn’t find
him at the seashore so Ana went back home, in time to see in their porch her brother Pablo,
herein appellant, cutting off the head of Ernesto.
[50]
It was then that she screamed and called out
for help.
Together with her brother-in-law, Ireneo Acierto, she tried to pacify appellant by saying that
it was enough, and that he should stop. But appellant only told them not to intervene and go
away. Hence, Ireneo left. She then sat on the railing of the porch, and thereafter, her brother ran
out. She followed him and saw appellant meeting her father and telling him that appellant had
caused the death of “Takel.”
[51]
Dino responded, saying that Pablo should immediately
surrender. Her brother Pablo continued to run. Her father, Dino, proceeded to enter their house.
She herself sat down on a bench.
Soon thereafter, according to Ana, she noticed that many people were milling around their
house. After that, the police came. The police called out, asking for any person inside the
Guerreros’ house to come out. Her father then came out, and SPO1 Taracatac immediately
pulled her father’s hands and handcuffed him. Ana objected, saying that her father should not
be handcuffed as he had nothing to do with the incident. The police replied that Dino was only
being taken for custodial investigation and safekeeping.
Ana further testified that Ernesto kicked the door only once.
[52]
She also said that at the time
her brother, the appellant, was severing Ernesto’s head, Ernesto was not moving. According to
her, Ernesto was already dead.
[53]
Ana stated in her affidavit that after Ernesto had kicked the
door, a heated argument then ensued between him and appellant.
LORENA “Rina” ACIERTO,
[54]
another sister of appellant, testified that while she was
washing clothes, her sister Ana called her. When she went near Ana, she was told by Ana to
fetch the barangay captain. Rina then saw Ernesto Ocampo at the porch shouting. She
immediately went to the house of barangay captain Alexander Atijera for help. But Alexander
refused to come with her, saying that he feared going to the place of the Guerreros. Rina
decided to go to the house of the Ocampos instead. She asked Ernesto Ocampo’s mother to
come with her to bring home her son, Ernesto. However, Ernesto’s mother only said: “Why is it
that Ernesto still went there… let him die. Why is it that he still went there when he is at
fault.”
[55]
According to Rina, she then left for home, and on her way back to her house, she met
her husband, Ireneo, who informed her that Ernesto was already dead. Hearing that, Rina said
she fainted.
IRENEO ACIERTO,
[56]
appellant’s brother-in-law, testified that while he was resting in his
house at past 11:30 in the morning of July 7, 1997, he heard someone screaming. When he
looked out from his window, he saw that the person screaming was his sister-in-law, Ana. He
went out of the house and went near the porch of the Guerreros, where he saw Ernesto
Ocampo’s head about to be severed by appellant. When the head was cut off, appellant placed
the same on the right side of the victim’s trunk. After that, appellant cut off Ernesto’s penis.
Ireneo noticed that while the head was being severed, the victim was lying down on the floor,
but not moving. Ireneo then told appellant, “That is enough, bayaw. Stop it.” According to the
witness, his wife Ana was also saying, “That is enough, Manong.” Appellant angrily turned to
Ireneo, telling him not to interfere or else he might also be implicated. Ireneo hurriedly went
away after that. Ireneo did not see his father-in-law, Dino, at the time of the incident and did not
know where Dino was.
On November 14, 1997, the trial court rendered its judgment, which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused ORLANDO GUERRERO,
JR. alias “Pablo” GUILTY of the crime of Murder for which this Court imposes the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all its accessory penalties and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Ernesto Ocampo the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of
62,000.00 actual damages; ACQUITS ORLANDO GUERRERO, SR. alias Dino from the crime
charged, and without any responsibility whatsoever with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
[57]

Appellant filed seasonably his notice of appeal, anchored on the following alleged errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND IN DISREGARDING THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE;
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE; and
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF CRUELTY AND/OR OUTRAGING AND SCOFFING THE CORPSE IN
ORDER TO CLASSIFY THE KILLING AS MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ALLEGE THE SAME IN THE INFORMATION.
[58]

The following issues call for resolution: (1) Did the trial court err in ruling against appellant’s
claim that he acted in self-defense? (2) Did it also err in appreciating the circumstance of
cruelty and scoffing at or outraging the victim’s corpse? (3) Did it err further in imposing on
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua with actual and moral damages?
Appellant claims self-defense as a justifying circumstance in the killing of Ernesto Ocampo.
He contends that the act of the victim in coming over to the house of the appellant and
thereafter threatening that blood would spill in their house unless appellant produced his sister,
while simultaneously holding a knife, were acts tantamount to unlawful aggression. Appellant
further avers that Ernesto’s violent entry into the house while armed with the deadly weapon
and forcing his way in, showed that Ernesto was ready and looking for trouble. This manner of
entry constitutes an act of aggression which, appellant contends, he had the right to repel. The
threatening attitude of an aggressor was offensive, says appellant, and a positively strong
indication of the victim’s wrongful intent to cause injury.
[59]

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that it is undisputed
that Ernesto Ocampo was clearly the unlawful aggressor at the point where he barged into the
Guerreros’ house, advanced towards appellant, and then drew a knife from his waist. Clearly,
appellant – according to the OSG – was justified in repelling that aggression, which he in fact
did when he got hold of a wooden club and struck Ernesto at least twice. Ernesto then fell to the
floor. The OSG points out that at this juncture, the aggression had already ceased. Further,
when appellant wrenched the knife from Ernesto, whatever aggression that he had manifested
initially, by this time had already completely ceased. Appellant was no longer in peril because
he had already disarmed and completely neutralized the initial aggression, says the
OSG. Thus, appellant’s succeeding acts of decapitating and emasculating Ernesto could not be
considered as acts of self-defense, but rather, of revenge.
[60]

After a careful review of the records, including the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution and the defense, we find appellant liable for the victim’s death. We are in
agreement with the OSG that appellant failed in proving persuasively his claim of self-
defense. The proven sequence of events militates against appellant’s attempt to exculpate
himself. Appellant admitted he was able to strike twice at the victim Ernesto Ocampo with the
wooden club, which caused Ernesto to stagger and step back. By this time, any aggression on
the victim’s part had already been repelled successfully by appellant. Moreover, appellant was
already able to take possession of the fatal “rambo” knife without any sign of struggle from the
victim who lay prostate on the ground. At this juncture, appellant had dramatically turned the
situation in his favor. Thus, further heinous attacks upon the hapless victim’s person could not,
in our view, be considered as acts of self-defense.
As we have previously held in People vs. Enfectana:
[61]

Given the fact that the relationship between the parties had been marred by ill will and
animosities, and pursuant to the rule on the burden of evidence imposed by law on the party
invoking self-defense, the admission of appellant [Eusebio Enfectana] that he killed [Leo Boco]
made it incumbent upon appellant to convincingly prove that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim which necessitated the use of deadly force by appellant. Unfortunately,
appellant miserably failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Having established that there was no more unlawful aggression to speak of at the moment
of killing, there can likewise be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, as the element of the
unlawful aggression by the victim committed against the person defending himself, is a
condition sine qua non
[62]
to the appreciation of this justifying circumstance in appellant’s favor.
The location, number and seriousness of the wounds inflicted on the victim belie appellant’s
claim of self-defense.
[63]
In this case, the victim Ernesto Ocampo suffered multiple mortal
injuries. His head was severed, his penis cut off. But appellant suffered nary a scratch. The
factual circumstances leading to the infliction of the lethal wounds on the victim’s head and body
show graphically that appellant had ample opportunity to take a more prudent course of
action. But he gave vent to his anger, a deep-seated thirst for revenge, and a brutal lust for
blood. Even if the killing was precipitated by a sense of outrage, of family honor lost or of ritual
kinship betrayed, criminal responsibility for the victim’s death could not be washed clean except
by clear and convincing proof of the alleged justifying circumstance. Failing in that, the defense
theory has no leg to stand on. We are thus constrained to rule against appellant for no error
was committed by the trial court in disbelieving appellant’s claim of self-defense.
But, as set forth by the second issue, did the court err in holding that appellant is guilty of
murder, instead of only homicide?
The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of (1) treachery and (2) evident
premeditation. It also states that there was cruelty in the perpetration of the crime, where there
was deliberate and inhuman suffering of the victim and the offender had scoffed at the victim’s
corpse.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 provides:
Art. 249. Murder - Any person who, in falling within the provisions of Art. 246 shall kill another
shall be guilty of Murder and shall be punished by Reclusion Perpetua to death, if committed
with any of the following circumstances:
1. With treachery, x x x
2. x x x
3. x x x
4. x x x
5. With evident premeditation
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
On treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court found that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution fell short of the requirements of the law.
[64]
On this finding, we are in agreement.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to insure
its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.
[65]

On the allegation of treachery, the trial court observed that:
…The evidence is clear that the attack against the victim Ernesto Ocampo was frontal and
preceded by altercation between Pablo or Orlando Guerrero, Jr. and the deceased Ernesto
Ocampo. “No alevosia or treachery where the attack is frontal.”(P.P. vs. Matbagon, 60 Phil. 837;
P.P. vs. Luna, 76 Phil. 101) And more so, when the attack was preceded by a heated
discussion between Orlando Guerrero, Jr. alias Pablo and Ernesto Ocampo. From the evidence,
therefore, there was no means, method or form directly and especially utilized by Pablo
Guerrero or Orlando Guerrero, in giving the clubbing blow on the head of Ernesto Ocampo (P.P.
vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473)
In this case, it was the victim, Ernesto Ocampo, who barged into the family house of
appellant. As a witness for appellant said, the victim indeed was looking for trouble. That
appellant successfully caused Ernesto’s fall appears unintended. It was part of appellant’s
action to repel Ernesto’s attack. The vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately
sought nor contrived by appellant to facilitate the hacking of the victim. The vulnerable position
of the victim was a result of a series of acts, spontaneous on appellant’s part, without manifest
calculation. Where the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of
the victim was vulnerable, because it was not deliberately sought by the accused, but was
purely accidental.
[66]

As to evident premeditation, in order that it may be appreciated, the prosecution must
prove: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
In this case, while the victim’s widow, Nancy Ocampo, testified that a day prior to the killing,
appellant had lightly told her he would kill Ernesto by cutting off his head and penis, she said
appellant’s statement was not taken seriously by her and the victim.
According to the trial court, it found the alleged utterances of appellant and co-accused with
regard to their intent to kill Ernesto insufficient to prove that, at the time the utterances were
allegedly made, there was indeed a determination to kill and that appellant had indeed clung to
that determination, planning and meditating on how to go about carrying on their threat. Hence,
it ruled out evident premeditation.
Indeed, assuming arguendo that appellant did utter those words to his Ninang Nancy, other
antecedent facts do not show that the crime was a product of serious and determined
reflection. Prior to the incident, appellant had not expected Ernesto to visit the Guerreros’
house that day. Earlier that morning, appellant had carried on in his usual fashion, helping his
neighbors cut a tree, even leaving his bolo for them to use. If he had planned on carrying out
any threat to kill the victim, securing a weapon and keeping it in his possession would have
been his first concern.
A threat to kill, unsupported by other evidence which would disclose the true criminal state
of mind of the accused, will only be construed as a casual remark naturally emanating from a
feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation.
[67]
While
the appellant might have nursed a grudge or resentment against the victim, that circumstance is
not a conclusive proof of evident premeditation.
[68]

Moreover, it was the victim himself who sought out appellant by going into the latter’s house
and forcing his way in. As witnesses had testified, the victim and appellant had a heated
argument before the killing occurred. As previously held, there is no evident premeditation when
the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan but of rising tempers,
[69]
or when the attack
was made in the heat of anger.
[70]

Instructive is the case of People vs. Sarmiento,
[71]
where we said:
We disagree with the appellate court that evident premeditation was present in the case at
bar. Note that although threatening remarks were made by appellant on deceased, the same
were made on different occasions. There was no showing that in between, appellant made
plans or sought the deceased to accomplish the killing. In fact, the killing of the deceased
happened when appellant was plowing the field disputed by the deceased and appellant, and
the deceased unexpectedly appeared thereat. In the circumstances, it seems clear that
appellant’s act of shooting the deceased was not premeditated.
Thus, we hold that in the present case, the trial court did not err when it found neither
treachery nor evident premeditation. However, the trial court found there was cruelty as well as
outraging or scoffing at the corpse, thus, qualifying the crime to murder.
As established by the testimony of witnesses, appellant first severed the victim’s head
before his penis was cut-off. This being the sequence of events, cruelty has to be ruled out for it
connotes an act of deliberately and sadistically augmenting the wrong by causing another wrong
not necessary for its commission, or inhumanely increasing the victim's suffering.
[72]
As testified
to by Dr. Sanglay, and reflected in her medical certificate, Ernesto in fact died as a result of his
head being severed. No cruelty is to be appreciated where the act constituting the alleged
cruelty in the killing was perpetrated when the victim was already dead.
What now remains to be considered is whether the act of cutting-off the victim’s penis
constitutes the qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim.
Appellant strongly takes exception to this finding. He states that this circumstance was not
properly alleged with specificity in the information, thereby violating the right of the accused to
be informed. Appellant contends that “beheading and/or cutting-off the penis” were merely
mentioned in the information as the cause of death but not as a qualifying circumstance.
[73]

For the appellee, the OSG avers that the allegations in the complaint, that the accused
“beheaded and cut off the penis of the victim” serves the function of stating specifically the act
which constitutes outraging or scoffing at the victim’s corpse.
On this point, we agree with the OSG’s assertion and interpretation. While the information
did not allege this qualifying circumstance in the exact words of the law, outraging the dead and
scoffing at the victim’s corpse are nevertheless deducible from the recital in the
information.
[74]
The sequence of events as “attack, assault, club, beheaded and cut the penis of
the victim, Ernesto Ocampo” alleged in the information points to the outrage committed on the
dead.
To conclude, appellant’s conviction for the crime of murder has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed on him is
appropriate. However, a modification of the damages awarded by the trial court is in
order. Actual damages should be pegged only at P39,105, the amount properly evidenced by
receipts. But the award of civil indemnity in the sum of P50,000 is in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, and the award of P50,000 as moral damages is substantiated by the testimony of
the victim’s widow. Hence, both awards are sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
27, finding appellant ORLANDO “Pablo” GUERRERO, JR., GUILTY of MURDER and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he should
pay the heirs of the victim, Ernesto Ocampo: actual damages in the amount of P39,105.00; civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
together with the costs.
SO ORDERED.

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