De Motu Cordis (On The Motion of The Heart) - St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. Bart A. Mazzetti

 

St. Thomas Aquinas  De Motu Cordis Cordis On the Motion of the Heart Text, Translation, Supplemental Texts and Notes § (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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 De Motu Cordis

On the Movement of the Heart

Quia omne quod movetur, necesse est habere motorem, dubitabile videtur quid moveat cor, et qualis motus eius sit.

1. Since everything that moves must have a mover, what moves the heart, and what kind of  motion it has is a matter for inquiry.

 Non enim videtur eius eius motus esse ab anima. Ab 2. For it does not appear to be moved by the anima ani ma eni enim m nutrit nutritiva iva non mov movetu etur, r, animae animae soul. For it is not moved by the nutritive soul, forr the the ac acti tivi viti ties es of the the nutr nutrit itiv ivee soul soul are are enim nutritivae opera sunt generare, alimento fo  generation, the use of food , and increase and  uti, et augmentum et diminutio: quorum nullum  generation, decrease,, none of which appear to have anymotus mot us cordis cordis esse esse videtu videtur. r. Et ani anima ma qui quidem dem decrease nu nutr trit itiv ivaa et etia iam m pl plan anti tiss in ines est; t; motu motuss au aute tem m thing to do with the heart. For the nutritive soul exists exi sts even in plant plants; s; but but the motion motion of the the cordis animalium proprius est. heart is proper to animals.  Neque sensitivae animae motus esse videtur, sed nec intellectivae, intellectus enim et sensus non movent movent nisi nisi med median iante te appeti appetitu: tu: motus motus autem cordis involuntarius est.

3. Nor does it appear to be moved by either the sensitive or intellective souls, for the mind and sense move only by means of desire: but the motion of the heart is involuntary.

Sed neque naturalis esse videtur. Est enim ad 4. But neither does it appear to be natural. For  contrarias partes: componitur enim ex pulsu et it goes in different directions: for it is comtractu; motus autem naturalis ad unam partem  posed of a push and a pull; but a natural motion goes in one directio direction, n, as fire only only moves upest, ut ignis sursum, et terrae deorsum. ward and earth downward. Dicere autem motum cordis esse violentum, est omnino omn ino extra extra ration rationem. em. Man Manife ifeste ste enim enim hoc motu subtracto, moritur animal, nullum autem violentum conservat naturam. Videtur quidem igitur igitur hic mot motus us maxime maxime nat natura uralis lis ess esse, e, vita vita enim animalis et hic motus se inseparabiliter  consequuntur.

5. Now to say that the motion of the heart is violent would be completely irrational. For it is obvious that when this motion is done away with the animal dies, since nothing violent preserves a nature. It therefore seems that this motion is indeed most natural to it, since the life of  the animal and this motion inseparably follow one another.1

Dicunt autem quidam hunc motum naturalem

6. No Now w so some me sa say y that that this this na natu tura rall moti motion on

esse non ab aliqua particulari intrinseca animal ani mali, i, sed ab ali aliqua qua natura naturanatura un unive iversa rsali, li, vel etiam ab intelligentia.

comes not frombut any particular nature intrinsic to the animal, from some “universal” nature, or even from an [angelic] intelligence.

Sed hoc ridiculum apparet. In omnibus enim rebus naturalib naturalibus us propriae propriae passiones passiones alicuius alicuius generis vel speciei aliquod principium intrinsecum consequuntur. Naturalia enim sunt quorum principium motus in ipsis est. Nihil autem est magis magis propri proprium um animal animalibu ibuss quam quam motus motus cordis; quo cessante, perit eorum vita. Oportet igitur igit ur inesse inesse ipsis ipsis animalibu animalibuss aliq aliquod uod principrinci pium huius motus. motus.

But this seems ridiculous. For in every natural th thin ing g the the prop proper er pa pass ssio ions ns of any any ge genu nuss or  species follow upon some intrinsic principle. For natural things are those of which the principle cip le of mot motion ion is in them. Now nothin nothing g is more proper to animals than the motion of the heart, upon the ceasing of which their life ends. There must, then, be some principle of this motion in animals.

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That is to say, where there is life there is a heartbeat, and vice versa. versa.

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Adhuc, si aliqui motus corporibus inferioribus 7. What is more, if any such motion in lower  ex natura universali causentur, non semper eis  bodies were caused by a universal nature [aadsunt: sicut in fluxu et refluxu maris apparet lone], this motion would not always be in them: quod consequitur motum lunae, et secundum as, for instance, is clear in the ebb and flow of  ipsum variatur. Motus autem cordis semper ad- the sea, which is a consequence of the moon’s motion ion,, and varies varies accord according ing to it. But the est animali. Non igitur est ab aliqua causa sep- mot motion of an animal’s heart is always in it. arata tantum, sed a principio intrinseco. Therefore it is not from any separated cause alone, but from some intrinsic principle. Dicunt igitur Dicunt igitur alii principium principium huius huius motus motus in animali anima li esse ipsum ipsum calorem, calorem, qui per spiritus generatos movet cor. Sed hoc irrationabile est. Illud enim quod est principalius in aliqua re, oportet esse causam. Principalius autem videtur  esse in animali motus cordis et magis contem poraneum vitae, quam quaecumque alteratio secundum calorem. Non igitur alteratio secundum calorem est causa motus cordis, sed magis e converso motus cordis est causa alterationis secundum calorem. Unde et Aristoteles dicit in Lib. de motu Anim.: oportet quod futurum est movere, non alteratione tale esse.

8. Others therefore say that the principle of this motion in animals is heat itself, which being generated by spirit moves the heart. But this is irrational. For that which is most principal in a thing must be the cause. Now the most princi pal thing in an animal, and more contemporaneous with life, seems to be the motion of the heart rather than any alteration involving heat. Therefore an alteration involving heat is not the cause of the heart’s motion; rather the heart’s motion is the cause of such an alteration as involving heat. And so the Philosopher in On the Movement of Animals (ch. 10, 703a 24-25) says: “what is about to initiate movement, not  by alteration, is of this this kind”.

It Item em an anim imal al pe perf rfec ectu tum, m, qu quod od est est move movens ns 9. Again, a perfect animal, which is one that seipsu seipsum, m, maxime maxime accedi acceditt ad simili similitud tudine inem m moves itself, most approaches to a likeness of  totius universi: unde et homo qui est perfec- the whole universe: and so man, who is the tissimum animalium, dicitur a quibusdam mi- most perfect of animals, is by some called a universee the first nor mundus. In universo autem primus motus “microcosm”.2 Now in the univers est motus localis, qui est causa alterationis et motion is local motion, which is the cause of  alteratio tion n as well well as the the other other mot motion ions, s, for  alioru aliorum m motuu motuum. m. Unde Unde et in animal animalii magis magis altera videtu vid eturr motus motus locali localiss esse esse altera alteratio tionis nis prinprin- which reason even in animals the principle of  cipium, quam e converso. Unde et Aristoteles alteration appears to be local motion. And so in octavo Physic., hanc similitudinem sequens, the Philosopher in the eighth book of the  Phy14-15), pursuing this resemdicit quod motus est ut vita quaedam natura  sics (ch. 1, 250 b 14-15),  blance, says that motion is “like a kind of ‘life’ existentibus omnibus. existing in all things”.3 2 3

For further remarks on this comparison, see the supplemental texts given below. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Theol., Ia, q. 18, art. 1. obj. 1, ad 1 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso): Objection 1: In Physics In  Physics 8 the Philosopher says that motion is, as it were, a sort of life in all things that exist by nature. But all natural things participate in motion. Therefore, all natural things participate in life. <…> Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first motion, viz., the movement of the celestial bodies, or to motion in general. And in both senses motion is said to be like the life of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. For the motion of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the motion of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. Similarly, every natural motion is, as it were, a certain likeness of a vital operation in natural things. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal, so that (as some have claimed) its motion were from an intrinsic mover, then it would follow that its motion is the life of all natural bodies.

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Adhuc, quod est per se, prius est eo quod est  per accidens. Primus autem motus animalis est motus cordis; calor autem non movet localiter  nisi per accidens: per se enim caloris est alterare, per accidens autem movere secundum locum. Ridiculum igitur est dicere, quod calor sit  principium motus cordis, sed oportet ei assignare causam quae per se possit esse principrinci  pium motus localis. localis.

10. What is more, what is  per   se is prior to what is per is per accidens. accidens.4 But the first motion of an animal is the motion of the heart; but heat does not move locally except accidentally: for it belongs to heat to alter  per  per se, se, but to move someth thing ing in pla place ce  per accidens. accidens. It is ther theref efor oree ridiculous to say that “heat is the principle of  the motion of the heart;” rather one must assign a  per   se cause which can be an intrinsic cause of motion in place.

therefore accept as the principle principle Principium Principiu m igitur igitur huius huius considera consideration tionis is hinc 11. One must therefore oportet accipere quod, sicut Aristoteles dicit in of this inquiry that, as Aristotle says in the the  Physics (ch. 7, 254b 16-20), octavo oct avo Physic Physic., ., [Quod [Quod enim enim ipsum ipsum a seipso seipso eighth book of the Physics movetur, natura movetur, ut quodlibet animal- “[a thing which is moving by itself is moving ium. Movetur enim animal a seispso,] quorum-  by nature, e.g. each of the animals. For an cumque principium motus in seipsis est, haec animal moves itself by itself, but] we say that natura natu ra dicimus dicimus moveri. moveri. Unde animal quidem whatever things have a principle of motion in totum totum nat natura ura ips ipsum um seipsu seipsum m movet; movet; cor corpus pus themselves are moving by nature. Whence the tamen eius contingit et natura et extra naturam animal as a whole by nature, moves itself by itself; nevertheless its body can be moving both moveri.  by nature and beside nature. nature. Differt enim secundum Differt secundum qualem qualem motum motum quod movetur eveniat, et ex quali elemento constet.

For it makes a difference what sort of motion what wh at is moving moving chanc chances es [to have] and from from what wh at sort sort of elemen elements ts it is consti constitut tuted. ed.”” (tr (tr.. Glen Coughlin)

Cum enim animal movetur deorsum, quidem es estt motu motuss ei eius us na natu tura rali liss et to toti ti an anim imal alii et corpori, eo quod in corpore animalis elementum grave praedominatur.

For when an animal moves itself downward, it is indeed a motion that is natural to the entire animal and its body, since in the body of an animal the heavier elements predom predominate inate [, the nature of which is to move down.] But when an animal moves upward, this motion is indeed natural to the animal since it comes from an intri trinsi nsicc pri princi nciple ple which is the the soul; soul; but it is nevertheless not natural to a heavy body, and so in [under [undergo going ing]] this this kind kind of mot motion ion the animal tires out more.

Cum autem animal movetur sursum, est quidem naturalis motus animali, quia est a princi pio intrinseco ipsius quod quod est anima; non tamen est naturale corpori gravi; unde et magis fatigatur animal in hoc motu.

Motus autem secundum locum in animalibus causatur ex appetitu et apprehensione sensitiva vel intellectiva, ut Aristoteles docet in tertio de anima. In aliis quidem animalibus totus processuss motus na cessu natural turalis is est: non enim enim agunt a  proposito, sed a natura: naturaliter enim et hirundo facit nidum et aranea telam. Solius autem hominis est a proposito operari, et non a natura.

12. Now in animals, motion according to place is caus caused ed by des esir iree and and by a se sens nsit itiv ivee or  intellect inte llective ive apprehens apprehension, ion, as the Philosoph Philosopher  er  te teac ache hess in the the thir third d book book of the the  De Anima (433a 9-b 30). In other animals, to be sure, the entire process of motion is natural: for they do no nott ac actt by inte intent ntio ion n bu butt from from na natu ture re:: for for a swallow builds its nest naturally and a spider a web. But to act intentionally and not by nature  belongs solely to man.

N.B. For St. Thomas, the motion of the heavens comes from a conjoined mover; cf. Ia, q. 70, art. 3. That is to say, the essential comes before the accidental.

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Sed tamen cuiuslibet suae operationis princi-  Nevertheless, the principle of any of his own  pium naturale est. Quamvis enim conclusiones activities is natural. For although he does not scientiarum speculativarum et practicarum non naturally know the conclusions of the speculanatura nat uralit liter er sciat, sciat, sed ratioc ratiocina inando ndo inveni inveniat, at, tive and practical sciences, but discovers them  prima tamen principia indemonstrabilia sunt ei  by reasoning, still, the first indemonstrable naturaliter nota, ex quibus ad alia scienda pro-  principles are known to him naturally, from whic ich h he proc procee eeds ds in orde orderr to kn know ow othe other  r  cedit. ced it. Simil Similite iterr ex parte parte appeti appetitus tus,, app appete etere re wh ultimu ultimum m fin finem, em, qui est felici felicitas tas,, est homini homini things. Likewise in the case of desire, to desire naturale, et fugere miseriam; sed appetere alia the last end, which is happiness, and to flee non est naturale, sed ex appetitu ultimi finis from misery, is natural to man; but to desire  procedit in appetitum aliorum: sic enim est other things is not natural but proceeds from finis in appetibilibus, ut principium indemon- the desire for his last end to the desire for other  thing ings: s: for in this this way the end in desira desirabl blee strabile in intellectualibus, ut dicitur in secundo th things is like an indemonstrable principle in inPhysic. tellectual things, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the  Physics (ch.15, 200a 1524).5  Sic igitur et cum motus omnium aliorum mem- And so therefore since the motion of all the  brorum causentur ex motu cordis, ut probat other members of the body is caused by the Aristoteles in Lib. de Mot. Anim., motus qui- motion of the heart, as the Philosopher proves dem alii possunt possunt esse voluntari voluntarii, i, sed primus in On the Movement of Animals (ch. 10, 703a  —703b 2), the other motions can indeed by motus qui est cordis, est naturalis. voluntary, but the first motion which is of the heart, is natural. Oportet autem considerare quod motus sursum est naturalis igni eo quod consequitur formam eius: unde et generans, quod dat formam, est  per se movens secundum secundum locum.

13. Now we must consider that upward motion is natural to fire as a consequence of its form: and so the generator, which gives the form, is its per its per se mover in place.

Si Sicu cutt au aute tem m fo form rmam am el elem emen enti ti co cons nseq equi uitu tur  r  aliquis motus naturalis, nihil prohibet et alias formass alios forma alios motus motus naturales naturales sequi. Videmus Videmus enim quod ferrum naturaliter movetur ad magnetem, qui tamen motus non est ei naturalis secundum rationem gravis et levis, sed secundum quod habet talem formam. Sic igitur et animal inquantum habet talem formam quae est

 Now just as any natural motion follows the form of the element, in the same way other  natural motions follow upon other forms. For  we observe that iron is naturally moved toward the magnet, which motion is nevertheless not natural to it according to its character of being he heav avy y or li ligh ght, t, but but inso insofa farr as it ha hass such such a form.6 Thus inasmuch as an animal has such a

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 17, art. 9, ad 2 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

 Reply to Objection Objection 2 2:: In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, firs t, when whence ce all other things are derived: thus from the know knowledge ledge of principle principless that are natur naturally ally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature.  Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their  generator, as the Philosopher states ( Phys  Phys.. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is called ‘vital.’ For  which reason Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius,  De Nat. Hom Hom.. xxii] says that, just as the movement of  generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins. 6 Cf. St. Thomas’s opusculum opusculum,, De operationibus occultis naturae naturae,, excerpts of which are given below.

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anima, nihil anima, nihil prohibet prohibet habere aliquem aliquem motum motum naturalem; et movens hunc motum est quod dat formam.

form which is the soul, nothing prevents it from having a natural motion; and the mover [which gives it] its form gives it this motion.

Dico autem motum naturalem animalis eum qui est cordis: quia, ut Aristoteles dicit in Lib. de motu Anim., existimandum est constare animal quemadmodum civitatem bene legibus rectam. In civitate enim quando semel stabilitus fuerit ordo, nihil opus est separato monarcho quem oporteat adesse per singula eorum quae fiunt, sed ipse quilibet facit quae ipsius ut ordinatum est, et fit hoc post hoc propter consuetudinem.

14. I take the position that the natural motion of  an animal is that of the heart, seeing that, as the Philosopher says in his book On book  On the Movement  of Animals (ch. 10, 703a29-b2), “In a sense, an animal can be compared to a city governed by good laws. For once a stable order exists in a city, no action is performed by an individual agent that is truly separate from the monarchical rule, but everything is done by custom and in accord with due order.

In animalibus autem idem hoc propter naturam  Now in animals this comes about by nature: fit: et quia natum est unumquodque sic con- and since each one is naturally constituted to stantium facere proprium opus, ut nihil opus sit  perform its proper work, so that there is no in unoquoque esse animam, scilicet inquantum need for a soul to be in each one, insofar, naest principium motus, sed in quodam principio mely, as it is a principle of motion, but rather  corporis existente alia quidem vivere, eo quod existing in a certain principal part of the body, adnata sunt, facere autem proprium opus pro- the other parts live indeed because they are naturally adapted to perform their proper work   pter naturam. according to nature.” (tr. John Y. B. Hood) Si Sicc ig igit itur ur motu motuss co cord rdis is est est na natu tura rali liss qu quas asii consequens animam, inquantum est forma talis corporis, et principaliter cordis. Et forte secundum hunc intellectum aliqui dixerunt motum cordis esse ab intelligentia, inquantum posuerunt animam ab intelligentia esse, sicut Aristoteles dicit motum gravium et levium esse a generante, inquantum dat formam quae est princi cipi pium um mo motu tus. s. Omni Omniss au aute tem m pr prop opri riet etas as et motus consequitur aliquam formam secundum condition condi tionem em ipsi ipsius, us, sicu sicutt formam formam nobiliss nobilissimi imi elementi, puta ignis, consequitur motus ad locum nobilissimum, qui est sursum.

15. The motion of the heart is therefore natural as following upon the soul, inasmuch as it is the form of such a body, and principally of the heart. And perhaps in accordance with this understanding of the matter some have said that the motion of the heart is caused by an [angelic] intelligence, inasmuch as they held the soul to be from an intelligence, just as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the  Physics (ch. 4, 256a1), the motion of heavy and light things comes from that which generates them, inasmuch as it gives the form f orm which is the principle of motion. For every property and motion follows on some form according to its condition,  just as upon the form of the noblest7 element, for example fire, follows motion to the noblest  place, which is above. above.

Forma autem Forma autem nobili nobiliss ssima ima in inferi inferiori oribus bus est  Now the noblest form in lower things is the anima, quae maxime accedit ad similitudinem soul, which most approaches to a likeness to  principii motus caeli. Unde et motus ipsam the principle of the motion of the heavens. And consequens simillimus est motui caeli: sic enim so the motion following upon it is most similar  est motus cordis in animali, sicut motus caeli in to the motion of the heavens: for the motion of  the heart in an animal is like the motion of the mundo. heavens in the world. Sed tamen necesse est motum cordis a motu 7

16. But the motion of the heart necessarily falls

“Noblest”—that “Noblest”— that is, that which has “the highest rank”, so to speak.

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caeli defice caeli deficere re sic sicut ut et princ principi ipiatu atum m defici deficitt a short of the motion of the heavens, just as what  principio. Est autem motus caeli circularis et is from a principle falls short of the principle. contin con tinuus uus,, et hoc compet competit it ei inquan inquantum tum est  Now the motion of the heavens is circular and  principium omnium motuum mundi: accessu continuous, and this is appropriate to it inasenim et recessu corpus caeleste imponit rebus much as it is the principle of every motion of   principium et finem essendi, et sua continuitate the world: for the approach and withdrawal of a conser con servat vat ordine ordinem m in motibu motibus, s, qui non sunt sunt celestial body imposes upon things the beginning and end of their existence, and by its consemper. tinuity preserves the order in motions, which are not always [occurring]. Motus autem cordis principium quidem est omnium motuum qui sunt in animali; unde Aristoteles dicit in tertio de Part. Anim. quod motus delect del ectabi abiliu lium m et tri tristi stium um et totali totaliter ter om-nis om-nis sensus hinc incipientes videntur, scilicet in corde, et ad hoc terminari. Unde ad hoc quod cor  esset ess et princi principiu pium m et fin finis is omnium omnium motuu motuum, m, habet quemdam motum non quidem circularem sed similem circulari, compositum scilicet ex tractu et pulsu; unde Aristoteles dicit in tertio de Anim. Anim.,, quod quod movens movens organice organice est ubi est  principium et finis idem. Omnia autem pulsu et tractu moventur; propter quod oportet sicut in circulo manere aliquid et hinc incipere motum.

17. Now the motion of the heart is the principle of all the motions that are in an animal; and so the Philosopher in the third book of  On the  Parts of Animals (ch. 4, 661a 13-14) says that “the motion involved in pleasure and pain and all other sensations seem to begin there, namely, in the heart, and terminate there.” And so in order for the heart to be the principle and end of every motion that exists in the animal, it has a certain motion not in fact circular, but similar  to the circular—one, namely, composed from a  pull and a push; and so the Philosopher says in the third book of the  De Anima (433b 20-25) “what moves instrumentally is found wherever  a beginning and an end coincide” [, as in a ball and socket joint]. But “all things are moved by a push and a pull, on account of which there must be something remaining stationary, as in a wheel, and from that point motion begins.” 8 

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Sc. as with the pivots of the axle of a wagon wheel, or, to take the obvious point of comparison, as with the  poles of the axis of the celestial sphere; “for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place  by the immobility of the centre and the poles” (St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, Humphries, O.P., Book III, lectio 15, n. 835). “However, if we desire to apply it to the fixed stars, then we must take the word “center” as meaning the “pole” since, just as the center center is to a circ circle le on a plane surface surface,, so is the pole in a way to a circle on a spher spherical ical surface. surface.”” (St. Thomas Aquinas, In Aquinas,  In II De Caelo, Caelo, lect. 11, n. 400; tr. Conway & Larcher, rev. B.A.M.) It is to be understood, then, that for motion takethe place, there muston bethe a fixed point excerpted of immobility as its as with a fulcrum. Cf. the entire passagetofrom Commentary De Anima above, nn.‘center’, 832-835: § 832. Next, at ‘Now, in short” he briefly states his view on the organ of local motion. He says that the primary organic motive-principle must be such that the movement starts and finishes in the same  point, proceeding in a circle, as it were, were, and having a swelli swelling ng out at the starting starting point and a concavity at the end. For the contr contractu actual al move movement ment draws the organ into concavit concavity, y, whil whilee the expansive expansive impulse, whence movement begins, follows a swelling out of the organ. § 833. Now, granted that this  primary organ is both the starting point and term of movement, it must, as starting point, be motionless, and, as term, in movement; and both these at once. For in any movement the starting point itself does not move, all movement must proceed from the motionless,—as, for instance, while the hand is moving the arm is still, and while the arm moves the shoulder is still. However, these two factors in the organ, the motionless and the moved, though distinct in thought, are substantially and spatially inseparable. § 834. And that the organ is both starting point and term (and therefore both motionless and moved) is clear from the fact that all animal movements consist of impulsions and retractions. In impulsion the motive force comes from the starting point, for the impelling agent thrusts itself forward against what is impelled. But in retraction the motive force comes from the term, for the drawing power draws something back to itself. Thus the first organ of local motion in animals

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Est eti etiam am motus motus ist istee contin continuus uus durant durantee vi vita ta animalis, nisi inquantum necesse est intercidere morulam mediam inter pulsum et tractum, eo quod deficiat a motu circulari.

And this motion continues throughout the life of the animal, except inasmuch it is necessary for a pause to intervene between the push and the pull, by reason of which it falls short of  circular motion.

Pe Perr ho hocc ig igit itur ur de fa faci cili li solv solvun untu turr qu quae ae in contrarium obiici possunt. Neque enim dicimus motum cordis esse naturalem cordi inquantum est grave vel leve, sed inquantum est animatum

18. Based on this, we can easily dispose of the ob obje ject ctio ions ns to the the cont contra rary ry.. Fo Forr we are are not not saying that the motion of the heart is natural to the heart inasmuch as it is heavy or light, but

tali anima; et duo motus qui videntur contrarii inas-much as it is animated by a soul of this suntt quasi sun quasi partes partes unius unius mot motus us com compos positi iti ex sort; and the two motions that appear to be utroque, inquantum deficit a simplicitate motus contrary are like the parts of one motion comcircularis, quem tamen imitatur inquantum est  posed from both, inasmuch as it falls short of  ab eodem in idem. Et sic non est inconveniens the simplicity of circular motion, which it nesi quodammodo sit ad diversas partes, quia et vertheless imitates inasmuch as it returns to the motus circularis aliqualiter sic est. Neque etiam same point it started from. And thus it is not oporte opo rtett quod quod causet causetur ur ex appreh apprehens ension ionee et inappropriate if in some way it goes in different direction ctions, s, be-cause be-cause circular circular motion motion in some appetitu, quamvis causetur ab anima sensitiva; dire non enim causatur ab anima sensitiva per op- way is like this. Nor is it necessary that it be caus used ed by appr appreh ehen ensi sion on and and de desi sire re,, even even erationem suam, sed inquantum est forma et ca though it be caused by the sensitive soul; for it natura talis corporis. is not caused by the sensitive soul by its own activi act ivity, ty, but inasmu inasmuch ch as it is the form form and nature of such a body. Motus autem autem progressi progressivus vus animalis animalis causatur  causatur   per operationem sensus et appetitus; et propter  hoc medici distinguunt operationes vitales ab operation opera tionibus ibus animalibu animalibus, s, et quod animalibu animalibuss cessantibus remanent vitales, vitalia appellantes qu quae ae motu motum m co cord rdis is co conc ncom omit itan antu tur. r. Et ho hocc rationabiliter. Vivere enim viventibus est esse, ut dicitur in secundo de Anim.: esse autem unicuique est a propria forma.

19. Now the progressive motion of an animal is caused by an operation of sense and desire, and on this account medical men distinguish vital activities from animal activities, and they say that even when animal activities cease the vital ones remain, naming ‘vital’ ‘vital’ thos thosee which which accompany the motion of the heart. And they do so with good reason. For “in living things, to live is to be,” as is said in the second book of  the De the  De Anima (ch. 7, 415b13): but the being of  each thing is from its proper form.

Hoc autem differt inter animam et principium motus caeli, quod illud principium non movetur  neque per se neque per accidens, anima autem sensit sen sitiv ivaa etsi etsi non moveat moveatur ur per se, mov movetu etur  r  tamen per accidens: unde proveniunt in ipsa diversae dive rsae apprehens apprehensiones iones et affec affectione tiones. s. Unde motus caeli semper est uniformis, motus autem cordis cord is variatur variatur secundum secundum diversas diversas appr apprehenehensiones et affectiones animae. Non enim affec-

20 20.. Now Now the the soul soul and and the the prin princi cipl plee of the the motion of the heavens differ in this, that the latter principle is moved neither  per  per se nor  per   per  accidens,, but the sensitive soul, though it not accidens  be moved  per se se,, is nevertheless moved  per  accidens:: and so there arise in it diverse appreaccidens hensions and sensations. And so the motion of  the heavens is always uniform, but the motion of the heart varies according according to diverse diverse appre-

must be at once both a starting point and a term. § 835. So then there must be in it something that stays still and yet initiates motion. And in this it resembles circular movement: for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles. In thought it may move as a whole, but not in reality. In reality it keeps to one place. But its parts are changing their places really, and not only in thought. And so it is with the heart: it remains fixed in the same  part of the body while it dilates and contracts and so gives rise to movements of impulsion and retraction. Thus it is, in a sense, both motionless and moving.

8

 

tiones animae causantur ab alterationibus cordis, sed potius causant eas; unde in passionibus animae, utputa in ira, formale est, quod est ex  parte affectionis, scilicet quod sit appetitus vindictae; dict ae; materiale autem quod pertin pertinet et ad alteralterationem cordis, utpote quod sit accensio sanguinis circa cor.

hensions hensio ns and sen sensat sation ionss of the soul. soul. For the sensations of the soul are not caused by alterations of the heart, but rather they cause them; and so in passions of the soul, in anger, for  example, what is formal is on the part of the sensation, namely, that it be a desire for revenge; but material which pertains to the alteration of the heart, for example that there be a  boiling of blood blood around the heart.9 

 Non autem in rebus naturalibus forma est  propter materiam, sed e converso, ut probatur  in secundo Physic., sed in materia est dispositio ad formam. Non igitur propter hoc aliquis ap petit vindictam quia sanguis accenditur circa cor, sed ex hoc aliquis est dispositus ad iram; irascitur autem ex appetitu vindictae.

 Now in natural things the form is not for the sake of the matter, but the other way around, as is clear in the second book of the  Physics  Physics;; but in matter there is a disposition for the form. Therefore someone desires vengeance not because blood boils around his heart, but by this one is disposed toward anger; but one is angered from a desire for vengeance.

Quamvis autem aliqua variatio accidat in motu cordis ex apprehensione diversa et affectione, non tamen ista variatio motus est voluntaria, sed involu involunta ntaria ria,, quia quia non fit per imperi imperium um voluntatis.

21. Now although some variation occur in the motion of the heart from different apprehendsions and sensations, nevertheless this variation of motion is not voluntary because it does not come about through the command of the will.

Dicit enim Aristoteles in Lib. de causa Mot. Anim., Anim ., quod multoties multoties apparente apparente aliquo, non tamen iubente intellectu, movetur cor et pudendum,, et hu dum huius ius causam causam assign assignat at quoni quoniam am necesse est alterari naturali alteratione animalia;

For Aristotle says in the book  On the Cause of  the Motion of Animals (ch. 10, 703b 7-8, 1121), that “oftentimes upon something appearing, and not by the intellect commanding, the heart and private parts are moved,” and he assigns the cause of this, since it is necessary for  the animal to be altered by a natural alteration;

9

Cf. Commentary on the De Anima, Anima, op. cit ., ., lectio 2, n. 22: § 22. Next, when he says ‘Now all the soul’s,’ he draws out what had been presupposed above, namely that certain modifications affect soul and body together, not the soul alone. And this he shows  by one argument in two parts; which runs as follows. Whenever the physical constitution of the body contributes to a vital activity, the latter pertains to the body as well as the soul; but this happens in the case of all the ‘modificati ‘modifications’ ons’ of the soul, such as anger, meekness, fear, confidence, pity and so forth, hence all these ‘modifications’ would seem to belong partly to the body. And to show that the  physical constitution plays a part in them he uses two arguments. (1) We sometimes see a man beset  by obvious and severe afflictions without being provoked or frightened, whereas when he is already excited by violent passions arising from his bodily disposition, he is disturbed by mere trifles and  behaves as though he were reall really y angry. (2) At ‘This is still still more evide evident:’ nt:’ what makes makes this point eeven ven clearer is that we see in some people, even when there is no danger present, passions arising that resemble one such ‘modification’ of the soul; for instance melancholy people, simply as a result of  their physical state, are often timid when there is no real cause to be. Obviously then, if the bodily constitution has this effect on the passions, the latter must be ‘material principles’, i.e. must exist in matter. This is why ‘such terms,’ i.e. the definitions of these passions, are not to be predicated without reference to matter; so that if anger is being defined, let it be called a movement ‘of some body’ such as the heart, or ‘of some part or power’ of the body. Saying this he refers to the subject or material cause of the passion; whereas ‘proceeding from’ refers to the efficient cause; and ‘existing for’ to the final cause.

9

 

alteratis autem partibus, alteratis partibus, haec quidem augeri, augeri,  but upon the parts being altered, one part will haecc autem hae autem de detri trimen mentum tum pati, pati, ut iam mov movee- grow larger, but another suffer decrease, such antur ant ur et permut permutent entur ur natis natis hab haberi eri pe permu rmutata- that they are immediately moved and changed  by the influences they are naturally apt to have tionibus invicem. upon each other. 22.. Now Now the the caus causes es of the the moti motion onss [are [are]] Causae autem motuum caliditas Causae caliditas et frigidita frigiditas, s, 22 quae de foris et intus existentes naturales. Et warmth and coldness, whether from without or   praeter rationem utique facti motus dictarum occurring naturally within. And motions of the afores resaid aid par parts, ts, i.e i.e.. of the hea heart rt and privat privatee  partium, idest cordis et pudendi, alteratione afo incidente inci dente fiunt. Intellectu Intellectuss enim et phantasia phantasia  parts, [of those] at any rate produced against factiva passionum afferunt, ut concupiscentiae, reason, come about by an incidental alteration. irae et huiusmodi, ex quibus cor calescit et in- For the mind and the imagination are productive of the passions, passions, such as concupisc concupiscence, ence, frigidatur. anger and the like, by reason of which the heart is heated or cooled.   Et haec de motu cordis ad praesens dicta suf- 23. And let these things said about the motion of the heart suffice for the present. ficiant.

§ N.B. For an additional witness on the movement of the heart, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,

 Disputed Questions on Sp Spiritual iritual Creatures, Creatures , translated translated by Mary C. Fitzpatrick Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth (Milwaukee, 1949), art. 2, c. (excerpt): It must be said that the truth of this question depends to some extent on the preceding one. For if the rational soul is united to the body only through virtual contact, like a mover, as some have asserted, nothing would prevent us from saying that there are many intermediates  between the soul and the body, and more so between the soul and prime matter. But if it be asserted that the soul is united to the body as a form, it must be said that it is united to the  body immediately. For every every form, whether substantial substantial or accidental, is united to matter or to a subject. For each individual thing is one on the same basis on which it is a being. Now, each individual thing is actually a being through a form, whether in the case of actual substantial being or in the case of actual accidental being. And hence every form is an act, and as a consequence it is the reason for the unity whereby a given thing is one. Therefore,  just as we cannot say that there is any other medium whereby matter has actual being through its own form, so it cannot be said that there is any other medium uniting a form to matter or to a subject. In consequence of the fact that the soul, then, is the form of the body, there cannot be any medium between the soul and the body. But in consequence of the fact that it is a mover, from this point of view nothing prevents our asserting many media there: for obviously the soul moves the other members of the body through the heart, and also moves the body through the spirit.7 7

Cf. Q. De An.. An.. (9 ad 13): “It must be said that the heart is the primary instrument by means of which the soul moves the other parts of the body; and therefore through it as a medium the soul is united to the other parts of the body as mover”; ibid. ibid.,, ad 7: “although the same effect is partly produced by the dissolution, caused by the blood, of those humors, whereby the heart is dilated and contracted.” Perhaps then our text ought to read: “and also moves the heart and the spirit.” (emphasis added)

§ 10

 

St. Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart VINCENT R. LARKIN*  Introduction Cordis, which is here translated, is regarded as an authentic work of  The letter   De Motu Cordis, a Thomas Aquinas by Mandonnet and Grabmann. The letter is addressed to a Master Philip. Mandonnet says he was a professor of medicine in Bologna and afterwards in Naples, b but, as Eschmann observes, this has not been established by Mandonnet. c We conclude that nothing definite is known about Master Philip. Mandonnet sets the date of composition at 1273, but Eschmann prefers 1270/1. The opusculumd is found in the following editions of Thomas’ works:   Opera Omnia, Omnia, Rome, 1570-71, vol. XVII, p. 24. Piana edition. Opera Omnia, Omnia, Parma, 1852-73, vol. XVI, p. 358. Parma edition. Opera Omnia, Omnia, Rome, 1889, vol. XVII, p. 508. Vives edition. Opuscula Omnia, Omnia, Paris, 1927, vol. I, p. 28, ed. Mandonnet.   Opuscula Omnia, Omnia, Paris, 1949, vol. I, p. 62, ed. Perrier.   Opuscula Philosophica, Philosophica, Turin, 1954, p. 165, ed. Marietti edition. The present translation has been made from the Marietti text edited by R. M. Spiazzi, O.P.e Because the argument of this opusculum is not easy to follow, I have numbered the  paragraphs. It is hoped the following outline will be helpful: * Immaculate Heart College, Los Angeles.   a P. Mandonnet, O.P., Des O.P.,  Des écrits authentiques de St. Thomas d’Aquin. d’Aquin. ed. II, Fribourg. 1910, p. 104, n. 18, M. Grabmann,  Die Werke des hl. Thomas T homas von Aquin, Aquin , Munster, 1949,  pp. 347-348.    b Opuscula omnia, omnia, Paris, 1927, vol. I, pp. xxv, xxvi. c   I. T. Eschmann, O.P., “A Catalogue of St. Thomas’ works” in E. Gilson, The Christian  Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas, New York, 1956, p. 419.   d For a summary of the contents of this work, see Walter Pagel, “The philosophy of  circles—Cesalpino—Harvey, a penultimate assessment,” J. assessment,” J. Hist. Med., Med., 1957, 12, 141-143. e   The translation of Thomas in the footnotes were made from the Summa theologiae, theologiae, Ottawa, 1941 and from Summa contra gentiles in Opera Omnia, Omnia, Rome, 1888-1906. The Aristotelian references are to the Greek text,  Aristotelis opera, opera, ed. Immanuel Bekker, Berlin, 1831; the Platonic ones to the Greek text,  Platonis opera, opera, John Burnet, Ed., Oxford, 1899-1906. [ 22 ] PART I I. TheTMovement HE PROBL M Heart ofEthe 11

 

A. What What is its its ori origin gin?? (par. (par. 1) B. What What is its nature nature?? (par. (par. 1) 1) II.

OPINIONS  As to origin The principle of heart movement is A. not not the the soul soul:: neither 1) the nutritive soul (par. 2) nor 2) the sensitive soul (par. 3) Refutation (par. 23) 2 3) nor 3) the5) intellectual (par. B. an intelli intelligence gence (par. (par. Refutation Refutationsoul (par. 22) 3) C. heat heat (par. (par. 8) Refuta Refutatio tion n (par. (par. 9, 10)  As to nature Heart movement is not natural because it is A. in opposite opposite directio directions ns (par. 4) Refuta Refutation tion (par. (par. 22) B. violen violentt (par. (par. 4) Refuta Refutatio tion n (par. (par. 4)

III. SOLUTION  As to origin The principle of heart movement is the soul  As to nature Heart movement is natural because the soul is the form of the body (par. 15, 16, 17) PART II I.

HEART MO MOVEMENT CO CONSIDERED IN IN IT ITSELF Cardiac cycle consists of a push and a pull with a rest period in between (par. 19, 20)

II. II.

HEAR HEART T MOV MOVEM EMEN ENT T CON CONSI SIDE DERE RED D IN IN REL RELAT ATIO ION N TO TO EMO EMOTI TION ON Emotions cause modification of cardiac rhythm (par. 25, 27) TEXT

1. Because everything that is moved must have a mover, 1 we can pose the problem: what is it that moves the heart and what is the nature of its movement? 2 2. Now its movement does not seem to proceed from the soul. 3 The heart is not moved by the nutritive soul, for the functions of the nutritive   1 Cf. Aristotle, Physics Aristotle,  Physics,, vol. I, Bk. VII, ch. 1, 241 b 24. Also Aquinas, Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 2, art. 3, p. 13 b.   2 Aquinas, ibid. ibid.,, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 37, art. 4, c. p. 918b: “Man’s life consists in a certain movement which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body.”   3 Plato defines the soul as the self-moving source of motion in  Laws  Laws,, vol. V, Bk. X, 896 a 1-2. Aristotle says in De in  De anima, anima, vol. I., Bk. I, ch. 3, 406 a 2 that the soul is not self-moving, though it is the principle of living things. His definition of the soul as the first act of a physically organized  body having life in potency potency is found in De in De anima, anima, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 1, 412 a 27, 412 b 5.

12

 

[23-24] soul4 are reproduction, nutrition, growth, and decay. None of these seems to account for  the movement of the heart. The soul is found also in plants; the movement of the heart, however, is characteristic of animals. 3. The movement does not seem to belong to either the sensitive or the intellectual soul  because the intellect and the senses move only o nly by means of desire, while the movement of  5 the heart is involuntary. 6

4. This movement does not seem to be a natural one either, since it goes now in this direction, now in that, for it consists of a push and a pull, whereas natural movement extendss in one direction, extend direction, as fire tends only upwards upwards and earth downwards. downwards. It is, however, completely unreasonable to say that the movement of the heart is a violent 7 one, for it is  plain that when this movement ceases, the animal ceases or dies, whereas nothing that is contrary contr ary to a thing’s thing’s nature preserves it. Indeed, it appears that this movement is entirely entirely natural, for the life of the animal and this movement are inseparably related to one another. 5. But some say that this natural movement flows not from some determinate nature within the animal, but from some universal nature, or from an intelligence. 8 6. But this is ridiculous. In all natural things the attributes characteristic of any genus or  species depend on some intrinsic principle. Those things are natural whose principle of  move mo veme ment nt resi reside dess in them them.. But But nothi nothing ng is more more ch char aract acter eris isti ticc of anima animals ls th than an th thee movement of the heart, for when it ceases, their life perishes. It follows then that a  principle of this motion resides in animals themselves. themselves. 7. Further, if some movements were produced in earthly bodies by a universal nature, they would not remain always in them, as we observe in the case of the ebb and flow of the sea which depend on the movement of the moon and vary in accord with it. But the movement of the heart   4 Plato speaks of three parts or functions of the soul in  Republic  Republic,, vol. IV, Bk. IV, 435 c 5 and in  Phaedrus,, vol. II, 246 a 6—257 a 2. He identifies them in  Phaedrus in Republic  Republic,, Bk. IV, 439 d 5, 439 d 8 & 439 e 3 as the rational part, the striving part, and the desiring part. Aristotle recognizes three kinds of  soul, namely, the nutritive, the sensitive, and the rational in the  Nicomachean ethics, ethics, vol. II, Bk. I, ch. 13.   5 Aristotle, Aristotle, Nicomachean  Nicomachean ethics, ethics , vol. II, Bk. III, ch. 1, 1109 b 35, 1110 a 1: “Those things are thought involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance.” For Aristotle’s distinction between voluntary, nonvoluntary, involuntary and violent, vide: loc. cit .   6 For the various meanings of the word “natural” in Aquinas, vide: Deferarri and Barry, A Barry,  A lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas , Baltimore, 1949, Fascicle IV, p. 724. 7   Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 6, art. 5, p. 756 b: “Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as well as to the natural. The voluntary and the natural have this in common, that each  proceeds from an intrinsic intrinsic principle, but the violent violent proceeds from an extrinsic extrinsic principle.” 8   I.e., an immaterial substance. The use of the word ‘intelligence’ is explained in Summa theologiae,, vol. I, Pars I, q. 79, art. 10 c. p. 491 b: “In some works translated from Arabic, the theologiae separate substances, which we call angels, are called intelligences, perhaps because such substa stance ncess are alw always ays exerci exercisin sing g the act of unders understan tandin ding.” g.” The medica medicall opinio opinion n referr referred ed to in Thomas’ De Thomas’  De motu cordis depends perhaps on the philosophical doctrine of Avicenna. Thomas says, ibid.,, vol. I, Pars I, q. 65, art. 4, c, p. 399 b: “Avicenna and certain others did not hold that the ibid. forms of corporeal things subsist essentially in matter, but in the intellect only.”

13

 

is always present in the animal. It does not then depend on a separated cause but on an intrinsic principle. 8. Others say that the principle of this movement in the animal is heat which, generated through a spirit, moves the heart. But this is unreasonable. That which is prior in a thing must be the cause. Now the movement of the heart seems to be prior in the animal and more closely related to life than any alteration in heat. Therefore alteration in heat is not the cause of the movement of the heart, but on the contrary the movement of the heart is rather the cause of this alteration. Hence the Philosopher says in his book, The Movement  of Animals:9 “Movement must come first, not such and such an alteration.” 9. Likewise, a perfect animal, which is one that moves itself, resembles most of all the entire universe. Hence man, who is the most perfect of animals, is called by some a world in miniature.10 Now the first movement in the universe is local movement, 11 which is the cause of alteration and of the other movements. Hence in the animal also local movement seems more the principle of alteration than the converse. Hence the Philosopher, pursuing this analogy, says in the eighth book of the Physics the  Physics12 that movement is, as it were, a kind of  life that is naturally present in everything that exists. 10. Further, that which exists essentially is prior to that which exists accidentally. Now the first movement of an animal is the movement of the heart; heat, however, causes local movement only in an accidental way; for it is of the essence of heat that it alter, but it is accidental to it that it cause local movement. It is then ridiculous to say that heat is the  principle of the movement of the heart, but we must assign to it a cause which can be essentially the principle of local movement. 11. Therefore let us take as the principle of our contemplation what the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the  Physics  Physics,,13 “We say that those things that have a principle of  movement within them are moved naturally. Hence an animal as a whole moves itself in a natural way, but it happens that its body can be moved both naturally or in a way that is contrary to its nature. It depends on the nature of the movement and the nature of the elements of which the body is composed.” For when an animal is moved downwards, its movement is natural both to the whole animal and to its body by the fact that in the body of  the animal the heavy element, which by nature moves downwards, is predominant. But when an animal is moved upwards, the movement is natural to the animal because it  proceeds   9 10 Aristotle, The movement of animals, animals, vol. I, ch. 10, 703 a 2 24-25.   Cf. Democritus, fragment 34, in  Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker , H. Diehls, Ed., vol. II, Berlin, 1956, p. 153. Also Aristotle,  Physics  Physics,, vol. I, Bk. VIII, ch. 2, 252 b 26. Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 91, art. 1 c, p. 563 a: “Man is called a little world, because all the creatures of the world are in some way found in him.”   11 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics Aristotle, Metaphysics,, vol. II, Bk. XII, ch. 7, 1072 b 9, 1073 a 12. 12   Aristotle, Aristotle, Physics  Physics,, vol. I, Bk. VIII, ch. 1, 250 b 14-15.   13 Ibid   Ibid ., ., vol. I, Bk. VIII, ch. 4, 254 b 16-20.

[25-26] from its intrinsic principle, which is the soul; but it is not natural to a heavy body; hence in this movement the animal becomes more tired. 12. Local movement in animals is caused by desire and by sensitive4 or intellectual cognizance, as the Philosopher teaches in the third book of the De the De Anima.1 Anima.1 14

 

13. In other animals, then, the entire process of movement is natural; for they do not act  by purpose, but bu t by nature; for the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web in a way that is natural.16 It is characteristic of man alone to act by will, and not by nature. 14. Nevertheless the principle of any of o f his acts is a natural one. For although he does not naturally know the conclusions of the speculative and practical sciences, but discovers them them by reas reason onin ing, g, the the firs firstt indem indemons onstr trab able le pr prin inci cipl ples es,, fr from om which which he go goes es on to knowledge of other things, are naturally known to him. Likewise, it is natural for man, led  by desire, to seek the ultimate end,16 which is happiness, and to flee misery. It is not natural for him to seek other things, but because of his desire for the last end, he goes on to desire other things. Thus the end is related to things desirable as the indemonstrable principle is to things intellectual, as is said in the second book of the  Physics  Physics..17 Since then the movement of the all the other members is caused by the movement of the heart, as the Philosopher shows in the book, The Movement of Animals, Animals,18 other movements can be voluntary, but the first movement, which is that of the heart, is natural.19 15. Now let us take into consideration that upward movement is natural to fire because it results from its form; hence also the efficient cause, which produces the form, is essentially one that causes local movement. Just as any natural movement results from the form of the element, so also nothing keeps other natural movements from proceeding from other  forms. We see that iron naturally is moved towards a magnet, although this is not a movement natural to it inasmuch as it is heavy or light, but inasmuch as it has such and such a form. Therefore nothing keeps an animal, inasmuch as it has certain kind of form whic wh ich h is the the so soul ul,, from from ha havi ving ng a na natu tura rall move moveme ment nt;; an and d th that at which which is ca caus usin ing g th this is movement is that which accounts for the form. 16. Now I say that the natural movement of the animal is that of the heart because, as the Philosopher says in the book, The Movement of    14 Aristotle, Aristotle, De  De Anima, Anima, vol. I, Bk. III, ch. 10, 433 a 9-b 30.   15 Cf. Aristotle, Physics Aristotle, Physics,, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 8, 190 a 26.   16 Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 18, art. 3 c, p. 128 b: “Although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied to it by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot not will.”   17 Cf. Aristotle, Physics Aristotle, Physics,, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 9, 200 a 15-25. 18   Cf. Aristotle, The movement of animals, animals , vol. I, ch. 10, 703 a 14. 19     Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 17, art. 9. ad 2, p. 809 a: “In bodily movement the  principle is according to nature. But the principle of bodily movement proceeds from the movement of the heart. Therefore the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to will.”

[26-27]  Animals,20 “an animal must be regarded as resembling a state that is well and lawfully  Animals, governed. For when order is once established in a state, there is no need for a special overseer to supervise every activity, but each man does the work assigned him, and one task succeeds another in an accustomed order. In animals this same thing takes place by nature, and because each of the organs is naturally suited to execute its own function, there is no need for the soul to be in each part as the principle of movement but it is in some  principal part21 such as the heart which gives life to the other parts, for they execute naturally their own functions.” 15

 

17. Therefore the movement of the heart is natural because it results from the soul, inasmuch as it is the form of one particular body22 and primarily of the heart. 23 18. And perchance because of this notion some have said that the movement of the heart comes from an intelligence, as the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Physics the  Physics24 that the movement of heavy and light bodies comes from an efficient cause inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of movement. Now every property and movement  proceeds from some form according to its rank, as movement to the noblest place which is above results from the form of the noblest element, namely, fire. But the noblest form that exists in earthly bodies is the soul, which resembles most of all the principle of the movement of the heavens. Hence the movement that results from it is most like the movement of the heavens. Thus the movement of the heart in the animal is like the movement of the heavens in the world.   20 Cf. Aristotle, The movement of animals, animals , vol. I, ch. 10, 703 a 14. 21   Thomas does not oppose Aristotle on this point for he interprets him as referring here not to the essence of the soul but merely to its power of originating movement. Cf. Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 76, art. 8, ad 1. p. 462 a. Also Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 72, vol. XIII,  p. 457.   22 Thomas argues in Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 76, art. 1 c., p. 447 b that the soul is the form of the body. As a consequence of this, man has but one soul. Cf. ibid. ibid.,, vol. I, Pars I. q. 76, art. 3 c, p. 453 b.   23 Thomas does not mean that the soul resides in the heart as its domicilium domicilium.. Its being the form of  the body precludes this. Because the soul is not united to the body as its mover, as in Platonic  psychology, it does not act on the body through an organ, but is whole and entire entire in each and every  part of the body. Vide: Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 76, art. 8 c, p. 461b. Thomas’ thinking is in accord with St. Augustine who says in the  De trinitate, trinitate, Bk. VI, 6, 8 that the soul is “wholly in the whole body, and whole in each part of it.” Migne,  Patrologia latina, latina, t. XLII, Paris, 1841, p. 929. However, Thomas departs from the teaching of his master, St. Albert Magnus, who adopted the opinion of Alfred of Sareshel. Alfred in his  De motu cordis written about 1210 says: “The heart is the dwelling place (domicitium ( domicitium)) of the soul.” “Des Alfred von Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift de Motu Cordis” von Clemens Bauemker in  Bë itrage itrage zur Geschicte der Philosophie des in  De anima,  Mittelalters,, Band XXIII, Munster i. W., 1923, ch. VIII, p. 33. Albert in De  Mittelalters anima, II, tract. I, ch. 7, says: “The soul is in the heart, and from there it pours out its powers on the whole body, and so it is not wholly in the whole body, in such a way that it would be whole in each part, but it is in each  part by some of its powers. . . . And this is the opinion of the Peripatetics. But there were and are certain men who say that the soul is wholly in the whole body, but this was not the opinion of a certain Philosopher.” Opera omnia, omnia, A. Borgnet, Ed. Paris, 1890. vol. 5, pp/ 204-205. By “a certain  philosopher” Albert Albert indicates his debt debt to Alfred. 24 Aristotle, Physics Aristotle,  Physics,, vol. I, Bk. VIII, ch. 4, 255 b 31—256a 3.

[27-28] 19. But the movement of the heart necessarily falls short of the movement of the heavens as the effect falls short of the cause. The movement of the heavens is circular and continuous, and this is appropriate to it inasmuch as it is the principle of all the movements of the world; for by approach and recession a heavenly body confers on things the origin and end of being, and by its continuity preserves the order in the movements that are not eternal. The movement of the heart is the principle of all the movements that exist in the animal. Henc He ncee the the Ph Phil ilos osop ophe herr sa says ys in the the thir third d bo book ok of  The Part Partss of Anim Animal alss25 tha thatt “the “the movements of delight and sadness, and, in general, all the emotions seem to begin here,” 16

 

namely, in the heart, and to end here. Therefore in order that the heart be the principle and end of all the movements in the animal, it has a certain movement, not circular but like circular movement, namely, one consisting of a push and a pull. Hence the Philosopher  says in the third book of the  De Anima26 “that which moves instrumentally is found wherever a beginning and an end coincide. All things are moved by pushing and pulling;  because of this something must remain at rest, as we see in the case of the wheel, and motion must originate from this position.” 20. This movement is continuous throughout the life of the animal, except that a rest  period is inserted midway between the push and the pull 27 because it falls short of circular  motion. 21. By this principle then we can easily solve the objections of an adversary. 22. For we do not say that the movement of the heart is natural to it inasmuch as it is heavy or light, but inasmuch as it is animated by a certain kind of soul; and the two movements which seem opposed are, as   25 Aristotle, The parts of animals, animals, vol. I, Bk. III, ch. 4, 666a 11-13. 26   Aristotle, Aristotle, De  De anima, anima, vol. I, Bk. III, ch. 10. 433b 21-22, 25-27 27   Modern physiologists do not speak of a rest period between systole and diastole, but within diastole, which is itself the resting place of the ventricle, there are periods of inactivity such as those of isometric relaxation and diastasis. Vide: Best and Taylor, The living body, body, New York, 1958. pp. 169-173. In Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 44, art. 1,  sed contra, contra, p. 943 b, Thomas cites the definition of fear given by St. John of Damascus (c. 674-749) in which the word ‘systole’ appears. John says in  De fide orthodoxa, orthodoxa, Bk. III, ch. 23, 1088: “Natural fear is a force which maintains being by means of  systole.”  systole.” Migne, Patrologia Migne, Patrologia Graeca Graeca,, t. XCIV, Paris, 1964. John had taken over this definition from the work of Maximus the Confessor (580-662),  Disputatio cum  Pyrrho,, 297 D. Migne,  Patrologia Graeca,  Pyrrho Graeca, t. XCI, Paris, 1865. As used here, the word ‘systole,’ which we can translated by ‘retreat’ or ‘contraction,’ lacks medical significance. But in the  De motu cordis of Alfred of Sareshel we find specifically medical meanings attributed to ‘systole’ and ‘diastole.’ However, they are used only with reference to the arteries. He first gives the explanation of those who speak of a spirit flowing through the arteries: “They say that diastole results when the arteries are full and stretched by spirit that flows through them; systole results when it leaves the arteries.” Op. cit ., ., ch. 11, p. 46. He then gives the explanation of those who oppose the doctrine of  the flowing spirits. According According to this group, “Radiation “Radiation cause causess diastole diastole;; its cessation cessation causes causes systole.” (op. (op. cit., cit., ch. 11, p. 47). Thomas in Summa theologiae (vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 24., art. 2, ad 2,  p. 850 b) uses these terms in reference to cardiac activity: “In every emotion of the soul there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart according as the heart is moved more or  less intensely in systole or diastole.”

[28-29] it were, parts of a single movement composed of both, in so far as it falls short of the simplicity of circular movement, which it imitates in so far as it goes from a point back to the same point. And so it is not contradictory if it goes somehow in different directions,  because circular movement also is in some respects like this. 23. Nor must it be caused by apprehension and desire, although it comes from the sensitive soul;28 for it is not caused by the sensitive soul through its own operation, but inasmuch as it is the form and nature of one particular body. 24. The locomotion of the animal is caused by the operations of the senses and the emotions emoti ons;; and becaus becausee of this this medica medicall men distin distingui guish sh vit vital al operati operations ons from from animal animal 17

 

operations, and say that when the animal ones cease, the vital ones remain. They call vital those operations which accompany the movement of the heart, for when they cease, life is at an end; and this is reasonable. For “to live” is the “to be” of living things, as is said in the second book of the  De Anima: Anima:29 the “to be” belongs to each thing in virtue of its own form. 25. There is this difference between the principle of movement of the heavens and the soul: this principle is moved neither essentially nor accidentally; but the sensitive soul, althou although gh not moved moved essent essential ially, ly, is moved moved accide accidenta ntall lly. y. Hence Hence divers diversee cognit cognition ionss and emotions it. Hence the movement the heavens always uniform butsoul. the movementarise of theinheart varies according to the of diverse emotionsisand cognitions of the For the emotions of the soul are not caused by the modifications of the heart but rather  cause them.30 Therefore in the passions of the soul, as for example in anger, 31 the formal element is that which comes from the   28 Thomas here tacitly concedes that the heart is moved neither by the nutritive nor by the intellectual soul but maintains that its movement is caused by the sensitive soul. He is challenging the statement of an adversary as presented in paragraph 3,  supra  supra.. It is easy to take paragraph 3 for  Thomas’ own position, since this opusculum opusculum,, being a letter, does not exhibit the clearly defined didactic structure of Thomas’ major works. Dr. Walter Pagel in his splendid article ( loc. cit. [see note d]) seems not to have avoided this snare, for he writes of Thomas: “The author first analyses the relati relations onship hip between between the heart heart and the soul. soul. To sta start rt with with he reject rejectss the pos possib sibili ility ty that that individual faculties of the soul cause the movements of the heart: plants possess a nutritive, augmentative, and generative soul, but no heart. Nor are the sensitive or intellectual faculties responsible, since the heart moves involuntarily” (p. 141) and “The motion of the heart cannot be explained in terms of action by any force outside the organism, or even any partial faculty of the soul.”   29 Aristotle, Aristotle, De  De anima, anima, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 2, 413b 1-2. 30     Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q, 38, art. 5, obj. 3, 922 b: “Sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, bring about a certain change in the heart.” Also loc. cit., cit., ad 3, p. 922 b: “Every good disposition of the body reacts in some way on the heart, as on the principle and end of bodily movement.; ibid ..,, vol. I, Pars I, q. 20, art. 1, ad 1, p. 144 a: “The act of the sensitive appetite is always accompanied by some change in the body, especially in the heart, which . . . is the first  principle of movement in animals.”   31  Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q, 48, art. 2 c, 962 b: “The movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and spirits about the heart, which is the instrument of the soul’s emotions. And hence it is that, because of the great disturbance of the heart when one is angry, certain signs are especially evident in the exterior parts of those who are angry.”

[29-30] will. namely, the desire for vengeance; but the material element 32 is what pertains to the movement of the heart, namely, excitement of blood about the heart. 26. In natural things the form does not exist for the sake of the matter, but conversely, as is made clear in the second book of the  Physics  Physics,,33 but in matter there is disposition for  form. Therefore it is not because the blood about the heart is excited that someone seeks vengeance, but because of this someone is inclined to anger. 34 He becomes angry, however, out of desire for vengeance. 27. Al Alth thoug ough h so some me va vari riat atio ion n in the the rhyt rhythm hm of th thee heart heart oc occur curss due to di diver verse se apprehensions and emotions, this variation of rhythm is not voluntary but involuntary, 18

 

 because it does not take place at the command of the will. For the philosopher says in the  book, The Cause of the Movement of Animals, Animals,35 that often at the sight of something the heart and genitals are moved without a command of the intellect, and he gives this reason: that animals necessarily are affected by physical changes; but when the parts are affected, one undergoes increase, and another decrease, so that each is moved and modified by natural changes that are related to one another. 28. The causes of the movements of the animal are warmth and cold, 36 which, naturally  present internally and externally, make the movements of the aforementioned parts, the 37 heart genitals, take innation any case whence, an anger, alteration occurs.and The intellect andplace imagination imagi causeindependently emotion, suchofasreason concupiscence, concupiscen and 38 the like on account of o f which the heart grows warm or becomes chilled. 29. Let these words on the movement of the heart suffice.

  32  Ibid  Ibid ., ., vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 22, art. 2, ad 3, p. 843 b: “In the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part some natural change of an organ is found from the standpoint of matter; as it is said that “anger is the excitement of blood about the heart.” Also, ibid. ibid.,, vol. I, Pars I, q. 20, art. 1, ad 2,  p. 144 a: “Let us distinguish in the emotions of the sense appetite a certain material element, namely, the bodily change, and a certain formal element, which belongs to appetite. Thus in anger . . . the material element is the excitement of blood about the heart, or something like this; but the formal element is the desire for revenge.”   33 Aristotle, Aristotle, Physics  Physics,, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 9, 200 a 30-34.   34  Summa contra Gentiles, Gentiles, vol. XIII, Bk. I, ch. 89, p. 240: “Every emotion comes about concomitantly with some bodily changes: for example, concomitantly with the contraction or  dilation of the heart, or something like this.” 35 Aristotle, The movement of animals, animals, vol. I, ch. 11, 703b 7-20. 36   This is explained in Summa theologiae, theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 6, art. 1, ad 2, p. 753a. 37 A discussion of this is found in ibid. ibid.,, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 17, art. 9, ad, p. 809 b. 38   Cf. ibid. ibid.,, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 44, art. 3, ad 3, p. 945 b, where Thomas illustrates the chilling effects of fear: “Because in fear heat leaves the heart, and goes from the higher parts to the lower, the heart especially trembles in those who are afraid, and the members which are connected to the chest, where the heart resides, also tremble. Hence the fearful tremble especially in their speech,  because the artery of speech is near the heart. The lower lip, and the entire lower jaw, because of  their connection with the heart, also tremble. Because of this, the teeth chatter. For the same reason, the arms and hands tremble.”

§

Source: Vincent R. Larkin, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Heart,”  Journal of the History of Medicine, Medicine, xv, 1 (January 1960), 22-30. Transcribed from: Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 1960 XV(1):2230; doi:10.1093/jhmas/XV.1.22 © 1960 by Oxford University Press [N.B. I have silently corrected a few typographical errors in the text.]

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1. ON THE DATE OF THE WORK. Cf.  Friar Thomas D’Aquino. His Life, Thought, and Works: With Corrigenda and   Addenda.. By James A. Weisheipl (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1983),  Addenda  pp. 394-395: A Brief Catalogue of Authentic Works 73.  De motu cordis ad Magistrum Phillipum de Castrocaeli  (Paris 1270-71). Extant MSS: 119. According to the catalogue of Bartholomew of Capua, this letter and another on the mixture mixtu re of the element elementss (n. 74) were both addressed addressed to a certain certain “master Philip of Castr Castroocaeli,” who is otherwise unknown. Mandonnet suggested that master Philip may have been a  physician, professor first at Bologna and later at Naples; but no evidence is given. The  purpose of this letter is to show that the motion of the blood 10 and heart is produced by “nature” and not by “soul” or any outside forces. Both Mandonnet and Walz give the date as  Naples 1273; Eschmann suggests Paris 1270-71. This is one of the treatises preserved by Godfrey of [394-395] Fontaines (Paris MS Bibl. Nat. lat. 14546) as a topic of special current interest. * EDITIONS” Perrier, Opuscula Opuscula,, I, 63-93 (basic text: Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 14546); Parma v, *16, 358-60; Vivès v. 27, 507-11; Marietti 1954, Opuscula Phil., Phil., 165-68. No English translation. *

Cf. ibid ., ., p. 485: CORRIGENDA AND ADDENDA 395. 395.1 1

Bib ibll.Nat .Nat.. la lat. t. 1454 14546: 6: Bi Bibl blee Nat at.. lat at.. 1629 16297 7;

395.3

EDITIONS: add : Leonine ed., v.43 (Rome 1976), preface 95-122; text 127130;

39 395. 5.6 6

No En Engl glis ish h ttra rans nsla lati tion on:: Eng Engli lish sh tr tran ans. s.:: “St “St.. T Tho homas mas Aqui Aquina nass o on n tthe he Mo Move veme ment nt of the Heart”, Vincent R. Larkin, Larkin, Journal  Journal of the History History of Medicine, Medicine, 25 (1960), 22-30.

2. 2. DE  DE MOTU CORDIS : AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW. Cf. Walter Pagel, William Harvey’s Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical   Background . (Basel (Basel/Ne /New w York, York, 1967), 1967), Circul Circular ar Symbol Symbolism ism,, Heart Heart and Blood Blood Before Before Harvey, pp. 90-93: (b) St Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart (pl. 5, 6) The Opusculum or rather  Letter rather  Letter de motu cordis of St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 10 has occasionally been looked upon as a work on the motion of the blood—an appraisal that was largely due to a misunderstanding of the term “circular.” 11 The latter does occur in this Opusculum,, but appertains to the motion of the heart and Opusculum heart  and not of the blood . It is, however, a work that displays interesting aspects and deserves a short discussion in the present context, 10

Contrary to what is here asserted, the word “blood” nowhere appears in the letter; cf. the next excerpt.

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if only to the show the variety of meanings attaching to “circular” and “circulatio” and for  the influence it exerted in the era of the Renaissance. It is regarded as a genuine work and has been translated and commented upon in recent times.12 Ever since the reception of the philosophy of Aristotle and the acceptance of his psycho physical ideas in the early thirteenth century, the heart had formed the central focus of   biological speculation. This is seen in the role which it played in Alfred of Sareshal’s  De motu cordis, cordis, writte written n before before the death, death, in 1217, 1217, of Alexande Alexanderr Neckha Neckham m to whom whom it is dedicated.13 Some of St Thomas’ statements seem to be directed against Alfred. 14 St Thomas’ speculation is mainly concerned with the soul as the vital principle causing and directing the motion of the heart, its character as a “natural” motion and its analogy with the motion of the heavens—its “circularity”. Its result is that the movement of the heart is due to the soul as the form of the body and  primarily of the heart. With this St Thomas does not mean that the soul resides in the heart. Differing from Alfredus who made it the dwellingplace (domicilium ( domicilium)) of the 10

  De De motu cordis ad Magistrum Phillipum, Phillipum , Opusculum Omnia, Omnia, Antwerp 1612 opus XXXV,  p. 214. First ed. (folio) Milan, Beninus et Joh. Ant. de Honate. – Edition also used by the  present writer: Venetiis 1490 (ed. with a life of St Thomas by Anton Pizamanus) published in 4 o by Herman Liechenstein Coloniensis, sig. J verso to J 2 verso = a separate edition with another opusculum another  opusculum – Libelli doctoris Sancti Thomae aquinatis occultorum naturae effectum  Et proprii cordis motus motus causas declarantes declarantes studentibus phusice phusice summe necessar necessarii appeared at Leipzig—per Jacobum Thaner of Würzburg—1499. 11 BAYON, H. P. William Harvey, Physician and Biologist: His precursors, opponents, and   successors Part III , Annals of Sci. 1958, III, 445. 12 LARKIN, VINCENT R. St Thomas Aquinas on the movement of the heart. J. Hist. Med. 1960, XV, 22-30. See also idem, St Thomas Aquinas on the combining of the elements .  Isis 1960, LI 67-72—a translation of St. Thomas’  De mixtione elementorum, elementorum, like  De motu cordis,, a letter addressed to a Master Philip (ab. 1270). cordis 13   Excerpta a libro Alfredi Anglici de motu cordis item Costar-ben-Lucae de differentia animas et spiritas liber translatus a Johanne Hispalensi Hispalensi.. ed. C.S. BARACH  BARACH  Innsbruck 1878.  – C. BAEUMKER, C.  Des Alfred von Sareshal (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift De motu cordis cordis,, Münster 1923. – Idem,  Die Stellung des Alfred von Sareshal (Alfred Anglicus) und seiner  beginnenden XIII. Jarhunderts. Sitzber, Kgl. Bayer, Akad. d. Wiss. Philos-hist. Kl. 1915, IX München 1913. 14 See below. [90-91] soul,15 St Thomas regarded the latter as the form the  form of the body as a whole. In this he followed Plotinus and St Augustine who regarded the soul as “wholly in the whole body, and whole in each of its parts.” 16 The movement of the heart that appears first in the developing organism is the principle of all the movements that exist in the animal, and under this aspect is linked with the soul, the vital principle of the organism as a whole.17  Secondly, the motion of the heart is natural . It is so, however, not in the ordinary sense of  motus naturalis, naturalis, predicated of a body because it is heavy or light and thus follows one direction, but because movement is immanent to the heart that is animated by a certain kind of soul18 and not due to external force causing the so called motus violentus. violentus.19 Nor finally is it caused by such external force as heat—for it is the very movement of the heart that engenders heat.20 In all these points opposition to Alfred’s stipulations is recognisable. The latter had denied the intimate connexion of the motion of the heart with the soul: it is not a motus animalis as it is indepe independe ndent nt of  appetitus and intelligentia practica. practica. Alfred Alfredus us refute refutess its natural 

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character, as the heart does not follow its weight and move to the centre, but remains on its level; moreover it is moved by an outside force, namely the heat which distends air and  blood. Its movement, therefore, belongs belongs to the same category as the movement o off smoke that moves upwards and that of a burning torch which leads the fire in a downward direction.21 According to St Thomas the movement of the heart is a rhythmically repeated series of   pushing and pulling actions. Though continuous throughout the life of the animal this movement is not strictly circular because there is a rest period inserted midway between the  push and the pull. It is a movement not circular, but “like circular movement” ( habuit   —  namely, cor   — quendam quendam motum non circularem, sed similum circulari compositum). compositum ). This circularity comes about because the heart and its movement are the principle and end of all the movements that exist in the animal. It results from the soul, the “form” of the body and  primarily of the heart—the noblest form that exists in earthly bodies—and thus resembles the principle of the movement of the heavens. It follows that the movement of the heart must  be like that of the heavens. It necessarily falls short of the latter, as the effect falls short of  the cause. On the other hand, it imitates its perfect and uninterrupted—“simple”—circular  movement in so far as it goes it  goes from the a point back to the same point ( point  (quem tamen imitator  in quantum est ab eodem in idem). idem ). Though consisting of two parts—systole and diastole 22 —  it is 15

Cor igitur domicilium est. Alfred  De motu cordis cordis,, ed. Baeumker loc. cit. in note [13], p. 35, l. 18; p. 45, l. 10; p. 45, l. 20; anima igitur, quae sensus et motus et vitae principium est, arcem corporis, id est cor, inhabitat: p. 86, l. 8 and similar passages as compiled in the index to Baeumker’s ed. p. 103. See also Barach loc. cit. in note [13], p. 70: [remainder of note omitted]. 16   Hoti Hoti hole en pasi kai en hotooun autou hole: Plotinus, Plotinus, Ennead   Ennead . IV, 2, 1. ed. H.F. Mueller  Berol. 1880, vol. II, p. 6. – ARISTOTLE,  De Anima lib. I , cap. 5; 412b. – We return to this in the chapter on Marcus Marci later in this book, see p. 314. 17 Therefore the movement of the heart is natural because it results from the soul, in as much as it is the form of one particular body and primarily of the heart. Thomas Aquinas on the Heart 17 tr. VINCENT R. LARKIN loc. cit. in note [12]. To this [see] LARKIN’S long note 23 on Thomas’ departing from the teaching of his master Albertus Magnus who adopted the opinion of Alfred of Sareshal. See above our footnote [25] with the passage from Baruch. The basic ref. to Aristotle is [91-92]  De motu animal. cap. 10; 703 a 29 and 703 b 1 seq. and 703 a 19. really a single movement. Its composite structure does not therefore exclude it from being “natural” although its “naturalness” does not follow from this, but from its animation by a certain kind of soul—the sensitive soul as the form and nature of a particular kind of body. 23  Nor is its going in different directions a point against its circularity, also as circular  movement is in some respects like this. From this short analysis of St Thomas’ treatise it emerges, then, that he indeed speaks of a circular movement or at least one that comes close to the “simple” circular motion of the heavens. It is not the movement of the blood with which he is concerned, however, but that of the heart. In this “circular” means that it starts from one point and returns to it—so does the blood, but in quite a different way. The blood sets out from the heart and returns to it after having travelled a long distance. St. Thomas knows nothing of this or at all events does not mention it. The circularity with which he deals merely indicates the rhythmical repetition of a movement that is uniformly composed of two acts: that of pull and push, of  pulsus of  pulsus and tractus,, of systole and diastole. tractus

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Perhaps this should be associated with a term used by the—older—Maimonides (11351204). The latter speaks of  the circular movement of the arteries. arteries . This is compared with the “moving of a ball, since the palpitation of the artery is explained to the senses by the termination of the circuit ( gemirath ha-sibbuh ha-sibbuh).” ).”24 This seems to allude to the very passage which St Thomas quotes from Aristotle,  De  Anima:: “that which is the instrument in the production of movement is to be found where a  Anima  beginning and an end coincide, coincide, as for example in a ball and socket jo joint; int; for there the convex and the concave sides are respectively an end and a beginning (that is why one remains at rest while the other is moved): they are separate in definition, but not separate spatially. For  everything is moved by pushing and pulling. Hence just as in the case of a wheel, so here there must be a point which remains at rest, and from that point the movement must originate.”25 The similar way in which this matter is treated by Maimonides and St Thomas may justify the suggestion that the latter was influenced by Maimonides therein. An additional influence on St Thomas may be found in the use of the terms  systole and diastole with regard to the arteries by Alfred of Sareshel. He stipulates that the spirit of life is not moved, but emanates from the left ventricle of the heart by irradiation. He says, the flux of the spirit through the arteries causing them to be repleted and elevated has been called diastole and its cessation systole. Alfred, then, in common with Maimonides speaks of the rhythmically repeated movement 18 19

Tr. LARKIN 22. Tr. LARKIN 4.

20

Tr. LARKIN 8. ALFREDUS ANGLICUS, ed. Bauemker, loc. cit. in note [13], cap. IX;  De specie motus cordis,, p. 35-37. cordis 22 Tr. LARKIN 19-22, referring to Aristotle, De Aristotle,  De anima, anima, III, 10; see below note [25] and text to this note. 23 Tr. LARKIN 22. 24 LEIBOWITZ, J.O. in  Korath 1935, I, 7-8 with ref. to the IVth  Particula of Maimonides,  Aphorismi,, which deals with the pulse. [remainder of note omitted]  Aphorismi 25 ARISTOTLE, De ARISTOTLE,  De anima lib.III, cap. 10; 433 b 21-22; 25-27 tr. J.A. SMITH, Oxford 1931. See also ARISTOTLE  De motu animal. cap. 10; 703 a 19; see above note [22] and below  p.276, note [115]. Also: Also: GALEN, Defin. GALEN, Defin. med., med., cxii, Kühn, XIX, 377. 21

[92-93] of the26arteries—he does not mention it with reference to the heart. By contrast, St Thomas does. 26

ALFREDUS ANGLICUS, ed. Bauemker, loc. cit. in note [13], cap. XI; Quod spiritus vitae non movetur, sed fit irradiatione virtutis p. 461L diastolen igitur irraditio, sistolen spadulatio fecit, as against: repleta et elevata arteria per fluentem spiritum diastolem fieri dicunt; sistolen vero, cum arterio egressus fuerit, p. 46-47. See to this: Larkin loc. cit. in note [12], p. 28 note 27 to passage 20 of Thomas’  De motu cordis on the medical meanings attributed by Alfred to systole and diastole, but used exclusively with reference to the arteries. By contrast Thomas speaks of the rest period inserted midway between push and  pull of the heart (paragr. 20) and the increase or decrease in its natural movement in systole and diastole in every emotion. For the latter Larkin quotes from Summa theolog. vol. II, pars I-II, q. 24, art. 2, ad 2, p. 850b, ed. Ottawa 1941.

§ 23

 

3. SUPPLEMENTAL TEXTS. a. Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 17, art. 9 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):   Objection 1: 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their  acts. For it is evident that the members of the body are more m ore distant from the reason, than the  powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above (A[8]). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.   Objection 2: 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the movement of  the heart is not subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De  Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that “the pulse is not controlled by reason.” Therefore the movement of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.   Objection 3: 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that “the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and and wh wher erea eass th thee he hear artt is wa warm rm with with de desi sire re,, th thee body body remai remains ns cold cold.” .” Ther Theref efor oree the the movements of the members are not obedient to reason.   On the contrary, contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): “The mind commands a movement of  the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command.”    I answer that , The members of the body are organs of the soul’s powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of  members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.    Reply to Objection 1: 1 : The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the  powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with the reason than are the  powers of the vegetal soul. soul.    Reply to Objection 2: 2 : In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature nat ure sta stands nds first, first, whence whence all other other things things are deriv derived: ed: thus thus from from the knowle knowledg dgee of   principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now the principle of bodily movements  begins with the movement of the the heart. Consequently the movement movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their  generator gener ator,, as the Philosopher Philosopher states ( Phys ( Phys.. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is called “vital.” For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De (Nemesius,  De Nat. Hom. Hom. xxii) says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.

24

 

   Reply to Objection 3: 3: As Augustine says ( De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason: in this sense, that the soul is  punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity. But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of  our first parent parent was that his nature nature was left to its itself elf,, throug through h the withdraw withdrawal al of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural cause of  this particular member’s in submission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle ( De ( De Causis Mot.  Animal .) .) who says that “the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary,” and that the reason of this is as follows. These members are st s tirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things things as arouse arouse the passio passions ns of the soul soul,, of whi which ch pas passio sions ns these these moveme movements nts are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which change is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular,  because each is as it were a separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the  principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ org an of genera generatio tion n procee proceeds ds the sem semin inal al virtue virtue,, which which is virtua virtuall lly y the ent entire ire animal animal.. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply obj. 2).

§

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 b. On the causes of animal motion: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven, 1951), Book III, lectio 15: TEXT 433a9–433b27 BOOK III, CHAPTER X THE PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS CONTINUED WHAT THEY ARE It seems that there are two motive-forces, mind and appetency (if one is to account imagination a sort of mind. For many follow the imagination instead of intellectual knowledge, while in other animals there is no intellect or reason at all, but only imagination). Both of  these effect movement in place then,—intellect and appetency. §§ 818-19  Now, the intellectual power which reasons r easons to some purpose in view, and is practical, differs in its end from the speculative. Appetition also is always for a purpose; for that of which there is desire is the principle of the practical ‘intellect. The last end is the first principle of  action. Hence, it seems reasonable to take these two as the motive forces, appetition, and the  practical reason. For the object of appetite causes motion; and it is for this that reason also initiates movement, the desirable being its principle. And when imagination moves, it only does so with appetition. Therefore there is one single mover,—the object desired. For if there were two movers, intellect and appetition, they would move in virtue of some common  principle. Now reason does not appear to cause movement apart from appetency; for will is an appetency. When there is movement by reason there is also movement by will. But appetition moves apart from reason, for concupiscence is a sort of appetition. §§ 820-5 All intellect, then, is right, but imagination and appetition may be right or not right. Hence, while the object of appetite is always what motivates, this can be either a good or only a seeming good. Not, however, every good, but the practical good. Now a practical object is that which is able to be other than it is. It is therefore evident that what moves the soul is a  power of this kind called called appetite. §§ 826-7 For those who divide the soul into parts, if they split it up by: distinguishing its powers, a great many parts result: the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellective, the deliberative, and lastly the appetitive. These differ from one another much more than do the concupiscible and irascible. § 828 Since appetites may run counter to one another, this occurs when reason and desire are contrary (and only in beings possessing a time-sense. Reason commands restraint for the sake of some future thing, but desire is for what is now present. For what appears desirable at any given instant appears desirable without qualification and good without qualification,  because the future is not not apparent). § 829 The motive-force will therefore be specifically one,—the desirable, or the appetite itself; and first of all the desirable, for this is what causes motion without itself being moved, simply through being understood or imagined,—but numerically there are several moving factors. § 830

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Since there are these three: the mover; secondly, that by which it moves; thirdly, that which is moved; and since the mover is double (the immobile one, and the mover that is also moved) the immobile mover is, accordingly, the practical good, whereas that which both moves and is moved is the appetite. For the subject desiring is moved in so far as it desires, and its desire is an act or movement of a certain kind. What receives the motion is the animal. But that by which it moves is an organ, already something corporeal. Hence, what  pertains to it must be be studied along with activities common to body and soul. § 831  Now, in short, organic movement arises where the principle and term are the same: as in the  joint of a hinge are the convex and the concave,—the latter being the end, the former the  beginning. Hence one is at rest while the other moves They are distinct in idea, but inseparable spatially. All things move by pushing and pulling. Hence there must, as in a circle, be something that stays still; from which [point] movement begins. §§ 832-5 ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY LECTIO FIFTEEN § 818. So far the Philosopher has pursued his enquiry into the principle of local movement in animals by the method of refuting unsatisfactory solutions; but now he states the positive tru truth th on the mat matter ter:: fir first st,, showin showing g in genera generall wh what at that that princi principl plee is is;; and secondly secondly,, at ‘Generally then’, how it varies in different subjects. The first point again divides into (a) a statement of the motive principle in animals; and (b), at ‘The motive-force will therefore’, an analysis of the factors at work when this principle is in action. Again (a) subdivides into three points: (1)power’, That there arewith two(3) motive-principles; which (2) reduces to one, atalready ‘Now the intellectual while he answers an objection (athe ‘Since appetites.’) raised. First, then, he says that the foregoing examination makes it clear that neither the vegetative nor the sensitive part is the motive-principle, since they are found in things that do not move. So it would seem that the moving principles are two: intellect and appetency. Note, however, that he includes imagination under intellect; for it resembles intellect in that it impels to action in the absence of sense-objects. § 819. For in their actions many people follow the changes in their imaginations rather than rational knowledge; for instance, those who act impulsively without reflection. Besides, otherr animals othe animals ate obviously obviously only impelled impelled to actio action n through through imaginati imagination, on, not through through intellect or reason; but men through both intellect and imagination. Clearly, then, both these are motive-principles: intellect (including imagination) and appetition. § 820. Then at ‘Now the intellectual,’ he reduces the two to one; and this in three stages: (1)  justifying the reduction; (2), at ‘All intellect, then, is right,’ using it to show the cause of a  particular accidental factor in animal movements; and (3) refuting, at ‘For those who divide’ an early division of the powers of the soul. First, then, he says that the mind as a motive-principle is the mind in so far as it reasons for  some purpose other than mere reasoning; in other words, it is the practical reason, which differs from the speculative by a different finality; for while the latter regards truth for its own sake and nothing else, the practical reason relates its knowledge of truth to some deed to  be done. § 821. Now obviously every appetition is for some end beyond itself. It is absurd to say that desire is for the sake of desiring; desire is essentially a tendency to ‘the other’. Moreover, an object of desire is always the practical reason’s starting point; what is first desired provides

27

 

the end whence its deliberations begin. If we wish to weigh a course of action we first lay down some end and then deliberate about the means, moving back, so to say, from what is to come later on to what is immediately to be done at the beginning. So he adds that the last thing that the practical reason considers is the first thing that has to be done—i.e. the starting  point of the whole action. This is why it is reasonable to assert that both appetition and the  practical reason are motive-principles; motive-principles; for the object desired certainly in incites cites to action, and it is also what the practical reason first considers; so that the latter is said to impel to action  because the starting point point of its deliberat deliberations, ions, the object desi desired, red, does so. § 822. And what is said of the intellect may be applied to the imagination; if it moves it does so only in virtue of an object desired: of which it contains, like the intellect, a representation. § 823. So it is clear that there is ultimately one mover, the object desired. For this both moves appetition and affords a starting point for the practical intellect—the two motive principles which have have been assumed. § 824. And it is reasonable that these two principles should be reduced to unity in the object of desire; for if both intellect and appetition are principles with respect to one and the same movement they must, as such, share the same specific nature; since a single effect implies always a single cause of precisely that one effect. Now it cannot be said that appetite is a moving principle through sharing the specific nature of intellect, but rather  e converso; converso; for  intellect only moves anything in virtue of appetition. It moves by means of the will, which is a sort of appetition. § 825. The explanation of this (given in Book IX of the  Metaphysics  Metaphysics)) is that the practical reason reaso n is essential essentially ly balan balanced ced between between alternativ alternatives; es; nor can it initiate initiate movement unless appetition fixes it exclusively upon one alternative. Appetition, on the other hand, can move to action independently of reason, as we see in the case of the concupiscible desire which is a sort of appetite. He mentions this desire rather than the irascible because, unlike the irascible, it has no admixture of rationality (as he shows in Book VII of the  Ethics ). Clearly,  Ethics). then, the motive-principles are reducible to the one object of appetition. § 826. Next at ‘All intellect then’ he applies what has been said to a particular accidental factor in movement or action, explaining why we go amiss in our actions. ‘All intellect’, he says, ‘is right’, by which he means that we never err about the first principles of action, about such truths as ‘it is wrong to do harm to anyone’, or ‘injustice is never right’, and so on. Those principles correspond to the equally infallible first principles of the speculative reason. But as for the consequences of these first principles, if we apprehend them aright it is  because our thought is consistent with our grasp of the principles, whereas if we deviate from the truth the fault lies in our reasoning. Appetition and imagination (motive-principles likewise) may be, on the other hand, either right or wrong. Hence if we act amiss it is, in the las lastt analys analysis, is, becaus becausee we fall fall short short of what what we intell intellect ectual ually ly kno know; w; and our previo previous us conclusion stands, that the final motive-impulse comes from the object of desire. § 827. Now this object is either a real good or a seeming good: it is a real good if the mind’s original correct judgement is maintained; it is only a seeming good if appetite or imagination cause a deflection from that judgement. Yet not every good is desirable as a cause of action,  but only the good-as-term-of-action, good-as-term-of-action, i.e. a good that is actually related to our actions. And  precisely as such no such good is always good in the same way; for it must vary in relation to ourselves. That is why the ultimate and absolute good, regarded in its universality, does not, as such, move us to act. Clearly, then, the final motive force derives from the soul itself  acting through the appetitive power.

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§ 828. Then at ‘For those who divide’, he rejects an old division of the motive parts of the soul into the rational, irascible and concupiscible potencies. If, he says, the intention was to enumerate the potencies which are really distinct from each other, others should have been included, namely the vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, deliberative and appetitive powers. These last two are distinguished in the same way and for the same reason as, in the  Ethics  Ethics,2 ,2 Book VI, Aristotle distinguishes the ratiocinative faculty, which has to do with contingent matters, from the scientific faculty which has to do with necessary objects. All these parts of  the soul differ more than the irascible and concupiscible, which are both included in the sensitive appetite. Hence that old division was incomplete. § 829. Next, at ‘Since appetites may’, he meets an objection already touched upon, namely that if desire were a motive force, nobody would be continent; the continent, by definition, do not follow their desires. But this difficulty vanishes if we consider that in man there are contrary appetites, of which the continent follow one and reject the rest. Contrariety of  desires springs out of an opposition between reason and the concupiscible appetite; and this happens ‘in beings possessing a time-sense’, i.e. that are aware, not of the present moment only, but of past and future as well. For sometimes the mind forbids a man to indulge a desire in view of what will happen in the future if it is indulged: thus a man in a state of  fever sees with his mind that he ought to abstain from drinking wine. But desire prompts one to take things for the sake of ‘what is now’ i.e. in the present moment. For what is here and now pleasant seems absolutely pleasant and good if it is not related to the future. § 830. Then at ‘The motive-force’ he analyses the process of the movements in question; and this inatthree stages. he shows the factors in they movement are atted. once many and one.  Next, ‘Since thereFirst, are these three’,how he explains how are interrelated. interrela Finally, at ‘Now, in short’, he briefly defines each of the factors on which movement depends. First, then, he observes that if the moving principles are considered formally and specifically they are reducible to one, to the object of desire or appetite; for this is the absolute starting point of  movement, inasmuch as, being itself unmoved, it initiates movement through the mind or the imagination. And because the secondary motive-principles only move in virtue of their share in the primary one, therefore they all as such partake of the nature of this primary one. And yet, though specifically one, they are numerically many. § 831. Then at ‘Since there are these three’, he interrelates three factors in movement: (1) the mover, (2) the organ by which it moves, and (3) the thing moved. Now the mover is twofold: an unmoved mover, and a mover that moves through being moved itself. In the case of  animals, the unmoved mover is some actual good influencing desire through the intellect or  imagination. The mover moved is the desire itself, for whatever desires is moved inasmuch as it desires, desire itself being a certain act or movement in the sense that we give to the term ‘movement’ when we apply it to activities that are consequent upon actuality, such as sensing and understanding. Then the thing moved is the animal itself. And the organ by means of which desire issues into movement is a part of the body; it is the primary motororgan; hence it has to be treated along with the activities common to body and soul (and is, in fact, examined in the  De Causa Motus Animalium). Animalium). But here and now we are concerned  particularly with the the soul. § 832. Next, at ‘Now, in short” he briefly states his view on the organ of local motion. He says that the primary organic motive-principle must be such that the movement starts and finishes in the same point, proceeding in a circle, as it were, and having a swelling out at the starting point and a concavity at the end. For the contractual movement draws the organ into concavity, while the expansive impulse, whence movement begins, follows a swelling out of  the organ.

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§ 833. Now, granted that this primary organ is both the starting point and term of movement, it must, as starting point, be motionless, and, as term, in movement; and both these at once. For in any movement the starting point itself does not move, all movement must proceed from the motionless,—as, for instance, while the hand is moving the arm is still, and while the arm moves the shoulder is still. However, these two factors in the organ, the motionless and the moved, though distinct in thought, are substantially and spatially inseparable. § 834. And that the organ is both starting point and term (and therefore both motionless and moved) mov ed) is clear clear from from the fact fact that that all animal animal moveme movements nts consi consist st of impul impulsio sions ns and retractions. In impulsion the motive force comes from the starting point, for the impelling agent thrusts itself forward against what is impelled. But in retraction the motive force comes from the term, for the drawing power draws something something back to itself itself Thus the first organ of local motion in animals must be at once both a starting point and a term. § 835. So then there must be in it something that stays still and yet initiates motion. And in this it resembles circular movement: for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles. In thought it may move as a whole,  but not in reality. In reality it keeps to one place. But its parts are changing their places really, and not only in thought. And so it is with the heart: it remains fixed in the same part of the body while it dilates and contracts and so gives rise to movements of impulsion and retraction. Thus it is, in a sense, both motionless and moving.

N.B. For purposes of comparison, I give next an alternate translation of the last part of St.

Thomas’s Commentary Commentary.. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle. Aristotle . trans. R. A. Kocourek  (Minn.: College of St. Thomas, 1946), Bk. III, lect. 15, nn. 830-835, pp. 170-171: 830. Then, when he says, “it follows that while that which originates…”, he shows the order  of motion. And with respect to this he does three things. First he shows how the moving  principles are one and how they are many. Secondly, he shows how they are ordered to each other, where he says, “All movement involves three…”. Thirdly, he treats in summary each on onee of th thes esee whic which h ar aree re requ quir ired ed fo forr moti motion on,, wher wheree he sa says ys,, “T “To o st stat atee the the matt matter  er  summarily…” Therefore he says first that if the moving principles are considered formally and according to species, there will be one mover, namely the appetible; for this is the unmoved mover, in so far as it is imagined or understood. For it is clear that the second movers are not moved except in so far as they participate in the first. And therefore all things agree in the species of the first mover. m over. But although all things agree in the species of the first mover, still they are many in number. 831. Then, when he says, “All movement involves three…”, he assigns the order of motion; and he says that there are three things which are found in motion. One which is the mover, another is the organ by which the mover moves, and the third is that which is moved. But the mover is twofold; one indeed immobile, and another which is a moved mover. Therefore in the motion of the animal, the mover which is not moved is the actual good which moves the appetite in so far as it s understood or imagined. But the moved mover is the appetite itself;  because everything which seeks in so far as it seeks is moved, and to seek itself is a kind of  act or motion in the sense that motion is the act of the perfect as was said of the operation of  the intellect and sense. But what is moved is the animal. But the organ by which the appetite moves is something corporeal, namely what is the first organ of motion; and therefore we must consider an organ of this sort among the operations common to soul and body. For he treats of this in a book on the cause of motion of animals. For in this book he intends to treat of the soul by itself.

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832. Then, when he says, “To state the matter summarily…”, he treats in summary of local motion; and he says, in summary, that the first mover organically must be such that the  beginning and end of the motion are the same thing, just as in a kind of ball and socket joint, in which there is convex and concave, one of which is, as it were the end and the other the  beginning. For the concave is as the end, but the convex seems to be the principle of the motion. For according to concavity it is contracted in itself, according to convexity its dilation is noticed, as the principle of motion and pulsation is produced by it. 833. And because in itself there is the beginning and end of motion; but the beginning of  motion must be immobile in each thing moved, just as when the hand is moved the arm is at rest, and when the arm is moved the shoulder is at rest, and just as every motion proceeds from something immobile, it is necessary that in the very organ of motion itself, which is the heart, there be something at rest, in so far as it is the beginning of motion, and something which is moved, in so far as motion is terminated in it. And these two in themselves, namely the resting and the moved are diverse in definition, although they are inseparable from each other in subject and in magnitude. 834. And that it is necessary that it be the beginning and end of motion and consequently at rest and mobile is clear from the fact that every motion of the animal is composed of pushing and pulling. But in pushing, that which is moving is only the beginning of motion because that which pushes removes from itself that which is pushed. But in pulling that which moves is the end of the motion, because the pulling moves to itself that which is pulled. And  because of this it is necessary that the first organ of local motion in the animal be both as the  beginning of motion motion and the term. 835. And therefore it is necessary that in this there be something fixed, and still that [is] whence the motion begins, just as appears in circular motion. For the body which is moved circularly because of the immobility of the center and pole, does not change place totally excep exc eptt percha perchance nce in reason reason;; bu butt accord according ing to the whole it remain remainss in the the same same place place according accor ding to subject; subject; but the parts vary their place in subject, subject, and not in reaso reason n only; thus also it is in every motion of the heart. For the heart remains fixed in the same part of the  body, but it is moved according to dilation and constriction, [170-171] so that it causes the motion of pushing and pulling; and thus in a way it is mobile and in a way at rest.

Cf. Aristotle, Movement Aristotle, Movement of Animals, Animals, ch. 4 (799b 33-800a 11) (tr. A.S.L. Farquharson): To resume, must there be something immovable and at rest outside of what is moved, and no part of it, or not? And must this necessarily be so also in the case of the universe? Perhaps it would be thought strange were the origin of movement inside. And to those who so conceive it the word of Homer 2 would appear to have been well spoken: [35] ‘Nay, ye would not pull Zeus, highest of all from heaven to the plain, no not even if ye toiled right hard; come, all ye gods and goddesses! Set hands to the chain’; [700a] for that which is entirely immovable immov able cannot possibly possibly be moved by anything anything.. And herein lies the solution solution of the difficulty stated some time back, the possibility or [5] impossibility of dissolving the system of the heavens, in that it depends from an original which is immovable. Now in the animal world there must be not only an immovable without, but also within those things which move in place, and initiate their own movement. For one part of an animal must be moved, and another be at rest, and against this the [10] part which is moved will support itself and be moved; for example, if it move one of its parts; for one part, as it were, supports itself  against another part at rest. 2

See Iliad  See  Iliad VIII VIII 20-22.

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Cf. Aristotle, ibid. ibid.,, ch. 10 (703a 3—703b 2) (tr. A.S.L. Farquharson): Although from the point of view of the definition of [5] movement—a definition which gives the cause—desire is the middle term or cause, and desire moves being moved, still in the material animated body there must be some material which itself moves being moved.  Now that which is moved, but whose nature is not to initiate movement, is capable of being  passive to an external force, while that which initiates movement must needs possess a kind of force and power. Now experience shows us that animals do both possess connatural spirit and derive power from this. [10] (How this connatural spirit is maintained in the body is explained passages of our works.) this spirit appears stand to the soul-centre or originalininother a relation analogous to that And between the point in a to joint which moves being moved and the unmoved. Now since this centre is for some animals in the heart, in the rest in a [15] part analogous with the heart, we further see the reason for the connatural spirit being situate where it actually is found. The question whether the spirit remains always the same or  constantly changes and is renewed, like the cognate question about the rest of the parts of the  body, is better postponed. At all events we see that it is well disposed to excite movement and to exert power; and the functions of movement are thrusting and pulling. Accordingly, the organ of movement must be capable of expanding [20] and contracting; and this is precisely the characteristic of spirit. It contracts and expands naturally, and so is able to pull and to thrust from one and the same cause, exhibiting gravity compared with the fiery element, and levity by comparison with the opposites of fire. Now that which is to initiate movement without [25] change of structure [i.e. without alteration (B.A.M.)] must be of the kind described, 11 for the elementary bodies prevail over one another in a compound  body by dint of disproportion; disproportion; the light is overcome and kept down by the heavier, and the heavy kept up by the lighter. We have now explained what the part is which is moved when the soul originates movement in the body, and what is the reason for this. And the animal organism must be conceived after the similitude of a well-governed commonwealth. When [30] order is once established in it there is no more need of a separate monarch to preside over each several task. The individuals each play their assigned part as it is ordered, and one thing follows another in its accustomed order. So in animals there is the same orderliness—nature taking the place of custom custom—an —and d each each part part natura naturally lly doing doing his own work work as nature nature [35] has composed them. There is no need then of a soul in each part, but she resides in a kind of  central governing place of the body, and the remaining parts live by continuity of natural structure, and [703b] play the parts Nature would have them play.

Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, Animals, III. 4 (665a 27-666b 1) (tr. William Ogle): We have now dealt with the neck, the oesophagus, and the windpipe, and have next to treat of the viscera. These are peculiar to sanguineous animals, some of which have all of them, others only a part, while no bloodless animals have any at [30] all. Democritus then seems to have been mistaken in the notion he formed of the viscera, if, that is to say, he fancied that the reason why none were discoverable in bloodless animals was that these animals were too small to allow them to be seen. For, in sanguineous animals, both heart and liver are visible enough when the body is only just formed, and while it is still extremely small. [665b] For  these parts are to be seen in the egg sometimes as early as the third day, being then no bigger  than tha n a point; point; and are vis visibl iblee also also in aborte aborted d embryo embryos, s, while while st still ill excess excessive ively ly minute minute.. Moreover, as the external organs are not precisely alike in all animals, but each creature is  provided with such as are suited to its special mode of life and motion, so is it with the internal parts, these also differing in different animals. 11

Notice that St. Thomas adduces these words as being said of the heart, rather than of the spirit; cf.  De  Motu, n. 8.  Motu,

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Viscera, then, [5] are peculiar to sanguineous animals; and therefore are each and all formed from sanguineous material, as is plainly to be seen in the new-born young of these animals. For in such the viscera are more sanguineous, and of greater bulk in proportion to the body, than at any later period of life, it being in the earliest stage of formation that the nature of the material and its abundance are most conspicuous. There is a heart, then, in all sanguineous animals, [10] and the reason for this has already been given. For that sanguineous animals must necessarily have blood is self-evident. And, as the blood is fluid, it is also a matter of  necessity that there shall be a receptacle for it; and it is apparently to meet this requirement that nature has devised the blood-vessels. These, again, must necessarily have one primary source. For it is preferable that there shall be one such, [15] when possible, rather than several. This primary source of the vessels is the heart. For the vessels manifestly issue from it and do not go through it. Moreover, being as it is homogeneous, it has the character of a  blood-vessel. Again its position is that of a primary or dominating part. For nature, when no other more important purpose stands in her way, places the more honourable part in the more honourable position; and the [20] heart lies about the centre of the body, but rather in its upper than its lower half, and also more in front than behind. This is most evident in the case of man, but even in other animals there is a tendency in the heart to assume a similar   position, in the centre of the necessary part of the body, that is to say of the part which terminates in the vent for excrement. For the limbs vary in position in different animals, and [25] are not to be counted with the parts which are necessary for life. For life can be maintained even when they are removed; while it is self-evident that the addition of them to an animal is not destructive of it. There are some who say that the vessels commence in the head. In this they are clearly mistaken. the first to their representation, there would bebemany sources forFor the in vessels, andplace, these according scattered; and secondly, these sources would [30] in a region that is manifestly cold, as is shown by its intolerance of chill, whereas the region of  the heart is as manifestly hot. Again, as already said, the vessels continue their course through the other viscera, but no vessel spreads through the heart. From this it is quite evident that the heart is a part of the vessels and their origin; and for this it is well suited by its structure. For its central part consists of a dense and hollow [666b] substance, and is moreover full of blood, as though the vessels took thence their origin. It is hollow to serve for the reception of the blood, while its wall wall is dense, that it may serve to protect the source of heat. For here, and here alone in all the viscera [5] and indeed in all the body, there is  blood without blood-vessels, blood-vessels, the blood elsewhere being always contained within vessels.  Nor is this but consistent with reason. For the blood is conveyed into the vessels from the heart, but none passes into the heart from without. For in itself it constitutes the origin and fountain, or primary receptacle, of [10] the blood. It is however, from dissections and from observations on the process of development that the truth of these statements receives its clearest demonstration. For the heart is the first of all the parts to be formed; and no sooner is it formed than it contains blood. Moreover, the motions of pain and pleasure, and generally of all sens sensati ation, on, plainly plainly have have the their ir source source in the heart, heart, and find in it their their ultima ultimate te 12 termination. This, indeed, reason would lead us to expect. For the source must, whenever  [15] possible, be one; and, of all places, the best suited for a source is the centre. For the centre is one, and is equally or almost equally within reach of every part. Again, as neither  the blood itself, nor yet any part which is bloodless, is endowed with sensation, it is plain that that part which first has blood, and which holds it as it were in a receptacle, must be the  primary source of sensation. And that this part is the heart is [20] not only a rational inference, but also evident to the senses. For no sooner is the embryo formed, than its heart is seen in motion as though it were a living creature, and this before any of the other parts, it 12

  Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,  De Motu Cordis Cordis,, n. 17: “Now the motion of the heart is the principle principle of every

motion which is in an‘the animal; andinvolved so the Philosopher in the third of  On the Parts of Animals 4, 661a 13-14) says that motion in pleasure and pain andbook all other sensations seem to begin (ch. there, namely, in the heart, and terminate there.’” (tr. B.A.M.)

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 being, as thus shown, the starting-point of their nature in all animals that have blood. A further evidence of the truth of what has been stated is the fact that no sanguineous animal is without a heart. For the primary source of blood must of necessity be present in them all. It is true that [25] sanguineous animals not only have a heart but also invariably have a liver. But no one could ever deem the liver to be the primary organ either of the whole body or of  the blood. For the position in which it is placed is far from being that of a primary or  dominating part; and, moreover, in the most perfectly finished animals there is another part, the spleen, which as it were counterbalances it. Still further, the liver contains no spacious receptacle in its substance, as [30] does the heart; but its blood is in a vessel as in all the other viscera. The vessel, moreover, extends through it, and no vessel whatsoever originates in it; for it is from the heart that all the vessels take their rise. Since then one or other of  these two parts must be the central source, and since it is not the liver which is such, it follows of necessity that it is the heart which is the source of the blood, as also the primary organ in other respects. For the definitive [35] characteristic of an animal is the possession of  sensation; and the first sensory part is that which first has blood; that is to say is the heart, which is the source of blood [666b] and the first of the parts to contain it.

On the heart of an animal as being analogous to the “middle” of the universe, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Exposition Aquinas,  Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens, Heavens , trans. P. Conway and F. R Larcher (Ohio, 1964), Book II, lect. 20, n. 485: 485. Then at [343] he refutes the aforesaid reason [argument] and says that in the aforesaid reason [argument] the Pythagoreans used the word “middle” as though one called “middle” absolutely, i.e., univocally, both the middle of a magnitude, and the middle of a thing according to nature, i.e., that through which the nature of a thing is preserved – as we see in animals that the middle by which the nature of an animal is preserved, namely, the heart, is not the same as the middle of the body’s size, for that would be the umbilicus. A similar  viewpoint must be taken with respect to the whole heaven, i.e., to the whole universe. Hence they should not be concerned with the whole universe as though it needs a guardhouse in such a way that such a prison or guardhouse would have to be assigned to the center, which is the middle of magnitude. It is necessary, rather, to seek that which is the middle of nature in the universe, as in the case of an animal, and ask what is its condition according to nature, and which place naturally befits it. He explains these two things, showing first how the middle of the universe is as corres ponding to the heart of an animal. And he says that it is a principle of other bodies, and most honorable among other bodies: and this is the sphere of the fixed stars. But it is not the middle place but rather the place of the outermost container that belongs to it, for that which is the magnitudinal middle among the places of the universe is more like an ultimate than like a principle. The reason is that the middle is contained and determined by all the others, while that which is the “end,” i.e., the extremity, among bodies according to the order of place, has the nature of a determinant and container. But it is manifest that the container is more honorable than the contained, and the end more honorable than the thing ended – since the contained and the terminated pertain to the notion of matter, but to be a container and that which terminates to the notion of form, which is the substance of the whole consistency of things. Consequently, containing bodies are more formal and contained  bodies are more material. And therefore, in the whole universe, just as the earth which is contained by all, being in the middle, is the most material and ignoble among bodies, so the outermost sphere is most formal and most noble, while among the elements fire is above all containing and formal.

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Finally, he sums up [344] and concludes that in regard to the place of earth, some have an opinion such as has been described.

For the text of Aristotle, cf.  De Caelo (On the Heavens) Heavens) II. 13 (293a 15—293b 15) (tr. J. L. Stock): [15] It remains to speak of the the earth, of its position, position, of the question whether whether it is at rest or in motion, and of its shape. I. As to its  position ther theree is some difference difference of opinion. opinion. Most people—al people—all, l, in fact, who regard the whole heaven as finite—say it lies at the centre. But the Italian [20] philosophers known as Pythagoreans take the contrary view. At the centre, they say, is fire, and the earth is one of the stars, creating night and day by its circular motion about the centre. They further furth er construct another another earth in oppositi opposition on to ours to which they give the name coun counterterearth. In all this they are not seeking for theories [25] and causes to account for observed facts,, but rather forcing their observations facts observations and trying trying to accommodate accommodate them to certain certain theories and opinions of their own. But there are many others who would agree that it is wrong to give the earth the central  position, looking for for confirmation rather to theory theory than to the facts of observation observation.. Their [30] view is that the most precious place befits the most precious thing: but fire, they say, is more  precious than earth, and the limit than the intermediate, and the circumference and the centre are limits. Reasoning on this basis they take the view that it is not earth that lies at the centre of the sphere, but rather fire. The Pythagoreans have a further reason. They hold that the most important part of the world, [293b] which is the centre, should be most strictly guarded, and name it, or rather the fire which occupies that place, the ‘Guardhouse of Zeus’, as if the word ‘centre’ were quite unequivocal, and the centre of the mathematical figure were always the same with [5] that of the thing or the natural centre. But it is better to conceive of the case of the whole heaven as analogous to that of animals, in which the centre of the animal and that of the body are different. For this reason they have no need to be so disturbed about the world, or to call in a guard for its centre: rather let them look for the [10] centre in the other sense and tell us what it is like and where nature has set it. That centre will be something primary and precious; but to the mere position we should give the last place rather  than the first. For the middle is what is defined, and what defines it is the limit, and that which contains or limits is more precious than that which is limited, seeing that the latter is the matter and the former the essence of [15] the system.

§

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c. c. Pneuma  Pneuma as vital spirit and its relation to the fifth element called aither : On pneuma On  pneuma in general, cf. Galen II. Claudius Galenus. Philosophy: 13 On the basis of his philosophical studies, Galen came to the conclusion that the various  bodily functions were induced by the Pneuma or universal spirit. He believed the  pneuma to  be a fine, spirit-like material which drifted through the universe and which controlled and organized physical bodies. Galen distinguished between three types of spirit: the  spiritus vitalis or life spirit, originating in the heart and flowing through the arteries; the  spiritus animalis or animal spirit to be found in the brain and nerves; and the  spiritus  spiritus   naturalis naturalis,, or  natural spirit, formed in the liver. However, Galen also believed that the life process was sustained by food, which was converted into blood in the liver. Blood from the liver nourished the heart, lungs and other organs, including the brain. Waste materials were also thought to be removed by the blood. Thus, blood circulation and metabolism are critical elements of Galenic physiological theory, and Galen was the first person to suggest a relationship between food, blood and air.

Cf. Stefan Stenudd, Qi-energy Info. Qi synonyms: 14 But pneuma was central in the theories of the Greek physician Galen (Klaudios Galenos, 131-201 CE), which were the basics of medicine all the way to the 17 th century. His thoughts on pneuma can be described as biological applications of Aristotle’s ideas about the quintessence. According to Galenos, pneuma entered through the lungs, and was in the liver  transformed to natural spirit ( pneuma physikon, physikon, in Latin  spiritus naturalis), naturalis), which entered the blood. He also talked about a vital spirit ( pneuma zotikon, zotikon, in Latin spiritus Latin  spiritus vitalis vitalis), ), which traveled through the heart and the blood, setting the body in motion, and a spirit of the  psyche ( pneuma psychikon, psychikon, in Latin spiritus Latin  spiritus animalis), animalis), which traveled from the brain out to the nerves, for the senses to function.

For Aristotle, cf. On the Generation of Animals, Animals , II. 3 (736b 29—737b 6) (tr. Arthur Platt): Now it is true that the faculty of all kinds of soul seems to have a connexion with a matter  different from and more divine than the so-called elements; but as one [30] soul differs from another in honour and dishonour, so differs also the nature of the corresponding matter. All have in their semen that which causes it to be productive; I mean what is called vital heat. This is not fire nor any such force, but it is the spiritus included in the semen and the foamlike, and the natural principle in the spiritus [ pneuma  pneuma], ], being analogous to the element of the stars. Hence, whereas fire generates [737a ] no animal and we do not find any living thing forming in either solids or liquids under the influence of fire, the heat of the sun and that of  animals does generate them. Not only is this true of the heat that works through the semen,  but whatever other residuum residuum of the animal nature there may be, this also has has still a vital principle in [5] it. From such considerations it is clear that the heat in animals neither is fire nor  derives its origin from fire. Let us return to the material of the semen, in and with which comes away from the male the spiritus conveying the principle of soul. Of this principle there are two kinds; the one is not connected with matter, and belongs to those animals in which is included something divine (to wit, [10] what is called reason [nous]), while the other is inseparable from matter. This material of the semen dissolves and evaporates because it has a liquid and watery nature. Therefore we ought not to expect it always to come out again from the female or to form any part of the embryo that has taken shape from it; the case resembles that of [15] the 13 14

(www.geocities.com/IslamPencereleri/ga (www.geocities.com/Islam Pencereleri/galen_2.htm len_2.htm [10/25/09]) (http://www.qi-energy.inf (http://ww w.qi-energy.info/qi-synonyms-P.ht o/qi-synonyms-P.htm m [10/30/09])

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fig-juice which curdles milk, for this too changes without becoming any part of the curdling masses. It has been settled, then, in what sense the embryo and the semen have soul, and in what sense they have not; they have it potentially but not actually.  Now semen is a secretion and is moved with the same movement as that in virtue [20] of  which the body increases (this increase being due to subdivision of the nutriment in its last stage). When it has entered the uterus it puts into form the corresponding secretion of the female and moves it with the same movement wherewith it is moved itself. For the female’s contribution also is a secretion, and has all the parts in it potentially though none of them actually; it has in it potentially even those parts [25] which differentiate the female from the male, justthe as young the young are sometimes mutilated and sometimes not, sofor also bornofofmutilated a femaleparents are sometimes female born and sometimes male instead. For the female is, as it were, a mutilated [or ‘defective’] male, and the catamenia are semen, only not pure; for there is only one thing they have not in them, the principle of soul. For this reason, [30] whenever a wind-egg is produced by any animal, the egg so forming has in it the parts of both sexes potentially, but has not the principle in question, so that it does not develop into a living creature, for this is introduced by the semen semen of the male. When such a  principle has been imparted to the secretion of the female it becomes an embryo. [35] Liquid  but corporeal substances become surrounded by some kind of covering on heating, like the solid scum which forms on boiled foods when cooling. All bodies are held together by the [737b] glutinous; this quality, as the embryo develops and increases in size, is acquired by the sinewy substance, which holds together the parts of animals, being actual sinew in some and its analogue in others. To the same class belong also skin, blood-vessels, [5] membranes, and the like, for these differ in being more or less glutinous and generally in excess and deficiency.

Cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Animals , II. 4 (739b 20-32) (tr. Arthur Platt): [20] When the material material secreted by the female in the uterus has been fixed by the semen of  the male (this acts in the same way as rennet acts upon milk, for rennet is a kind of milk  containing vital heat, which brings into one mass and fixes the similar material, and the relation of the semen to the catamenia is the same, milk and the [25] catamenia being of the same nature)—when, I say, the more solid part comes together, the liquid is separated off  from it, and as the earthy parts solidify membranes form all round it; this is both a necessary result and for a final cause, the former because the surface of a mass must solidify on heating as well as on cooling, the latter because the foetus must not be in a liquid but be separated [30] from it. Some of these are called membranes and others choria, the difference being one of more or less, and they exist in ovipara and vivipara alike. (emphasis added)

Cf. A. L. Peck,  Aristotle, Generation of Animals (London, 1942, rprt. 1963). From the Introduction, Sec. 32:  

It may be noted here that the physical substance concerned throughout the theory of  generation is pneuma is  pneuma [= [= spiritus  spiritus]] (a substance “analogous to aither ,” ,” the “fifth element,” the 15 “element of the stars”), with which Soul is “associated”; and it is this  pneuma which Soul charges with a specific “movement” and uses as its “instrument” in generation just as it does in locomotion, and as an artist uses his instruments, to which he imparts “movement,” in order to create his works of art.

15

It being the vital  vital heat in the pneuma the pneuma which makes it to be the element element analogous to that of the the stars. As we

shall see,too, justwith as there is a material material pneuma  pneuma thesomething soul as form uses to produce in things below, so, the heavenly bodies: therewhich must be like like pneuma  pneuma which motion the mover of the here heavens makes use of to move other things.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Theol., Ia, q. 118, art. 1, obj. 3-4, ad 3-4 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):   Objection 3. 3. Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the  body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a  particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.   Objection 4. 4. Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker  and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been  proved above (76, 4) that that in one animal there is but one one formal principle, which is the soul. If  on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.

<…>    Reply to Objection 3. 3 . This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, generator, is, as it were, a certain certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe,  but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the  production of the species as stated above (115, 3, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the  power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that “man and the sun generate man.” Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul’s power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated ( De  De  Anima  Anima ii, 4).    Reply to Objection 4. 4 . In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says ( De ( De  Gener . Animal . ii, 3); but the foetal matter is  provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. 16 But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter  therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen  becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced. 16

In contrast, the seed of the male possesses a prior grade of potency (cf.  De An. II. 1, 412b 27—413a 3); cf. also St. Thomas, comm. ad loc.; loc.; also de Pot., Pot., q. 3, art. 9, s.c.; ibid. ibid.,, ad 9; SCG II, c. 89, n. 3.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Aquinas,  In II Sent., Sent., dist. 18, q. 2, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.): …But the position of Aristotle is much more reasonable, seeing that nothing begins either to come to be or to be generated except in accordance with the manner in which it has being: 17 and so we concede the sensible and vegetative soul to be transmitted. Now the manner of its transmission is like this; for, since every univocal and proximate agent introduces into its its patient its species species,, and food, insofar as it undergoes change change and is altered, turns into nourishment for the body (the reason being that it nourishes insofar as it is in potency to flesh, as is said in On the Generation of Animals I,text 39, and in On the Soul , text 45), it [namely, the food that is to be turned iinto nto the substance of the body body]] must, at the end of the process, receive the species and virtue of nourishment. Therefore before the final assimilation, when it is turned into a determinate part in act such as flesh and bone, the virtue of the species exists in it indeterminately to this or that [species] with respect to the proper  virtue of a determinate part. And so since the seed is the final residue of food at its closest approximation to its final conversion, there is in it a potency to the whole and not any part in act. But before it is resolved by the act of the generative virtue in separation from the rest of its kind, that indistinct potency exists in it just as the form of the whole which does not exist in the part except in potency. But when it is separated, it is produced in act having such a potency and form; just as we also observe in annulose animals, 18 in which, according to the Philosopher, there is one soul in act, and many in potency; whence, when it is divided an animate part is produced having a distinct soul. Still, they differ in this, seeing that by reason of the slight differentiation into organs in those animals the part is practically identical to the whole, and so a perfect soul remains in the part just as existed in the whole. Now the seed when it has been separated is not yet similar to the whole in act, but is in  proximate potency. And therefore after its division the soul does not remain in act but in  potency, on account of which it is said in On the Soul II, Soul  II, that the seed lives in potency and not in act.  Now this potency is not passive in the seed of the male in the way in which we say that wood and stones are in potency to a house (for in this way there is a power in the menstruum of the woman) but it is an active potency, just as we say the form in the mind of the artisan is in potency to a house. Whence the Philosopher in Book 17 of  On Animals compares it to art; and this power Avicenna and the Commentator in Book 7 of the  Metaphysics call the formative virtue: which virtue, in fact, with respect to the mode of operating is a mean between the intellect and the other powers of the soul. For the other powers in their operations use determinate organs: but the intellect uses none. But this uses something bodily in its operation which does not yet have a determinate species. Now the subject and organ of this  power is the vital spirit enclosed in the seed; whence in order for a spirit of this sort to be contained in the seed it is foamy, and this is the cause of its whiteness. Now to this spirit the formative virtue is conjoined in the manner of a mover rather than in the manner of a form, even if in some way it is its form. Whence the Commentator in Book 7 of the  Metaphysics says that that virtue is included in the seed in some way just as the movers are united to the orbs.19

17

That is to say, if the result of generation is a composite of matter and form, the generator must also be such, and so the principle of such a composite cannot be a form separated from matter. 18 Cf. Collins English Dictionary, Dictionary, s.v. “annulose: adj. (of earthworms, crustaceans, and similar animals) having a body formed of a series of rings; segmented.” Since the part possesses the same species as the whole from which it was severed, it must possess that form in act right from the start. Conversely, the seeds of both the male and the; the female are its in proximate potency to such a form: the male containing its active principle, albeit virtualiter  female, passive one. On this comparison see our remarks below.

19

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For the basis of the foregoing doctrine in Aristotle, cf. On the Generation of Animals (tr. Arthur Platt), Bk. I, c. 19 (726b 1—727a 3): We have previously stated that the final nutriment is the blood in the sanguinea and the analogous fluid in the other animals. Since the semen is also a secretion of the nutriment, and that in its final stage, it follows that it will be either (1) blood or that which is analogous to blood, or (2) something formed from this. But since [5] it is from the blood, when concocted and somehow divided up, that each part of the body is made, and since the semen if   properly concocted is quite of a different character from the blood when it is separated from it, but if not properly concocted has been known in some cases to issue in a bloody condition if one forces oneself too [10] often to coition, therefore it is plain that semen will be a secretion of the nutriment when reduced to blood, being that which is finally distributed to the parts of the body. And this is the reason why it has so great power, for the loss of the  pure and healthy blood is an exhausting thing; for this reason also it is natural that the offspring should resemble the parents, for that which goes to all the parts of the [15] body resembles that which is left over. So that the semen which is to form the hand or the face or  the whole animal is already the hand or face or whole animal undifferentiated, and what each of them is actually such is the semen potentially, either in virtue of its own mass or because it has a certain power in itself. I mention these alternatives here because we have not yet made it clear from the distinctions drawn hitherto whether it is the [20] matter of the semen that is the cause of generation, or whether it has in it some faculty and efficient cause thereof, for the hand also or any other bodily part is not hand or other part in a true sense if it  be without soul or or some other power, but is only only called by the same name as the the living hand. [30] On this subject, then, so much may be laid down. But since it is necessary (1) that the weaker animal also should have a secretion greater in quantity and less concocted, and (2) that being of such a nature it should be a mass of sanguineous liquid, and (3) since that which Nature endows with a smaller portion of heat is weaker, and since it has already been stated that such is the character of the female—putting all these considerations together we see that the [727a] sanguineous matter discharged by the female is also a secretion. And such is the discharge of the so-called catamenia. It is plain, then, that the catamenia are a secretion, and that they are analogous in females to the semen in males.

On the relation of the celestial element to the sublunar, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol.,, Ia, q. 91, art. 1, ad 2 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso): Theol. Reply to objection 2: Even though a celestial body is, absolutely speaking, more noble than an earthly body, nonetheless, a celestial body shares less in common with the activity of the rational soul. For in a certain way a rational soul takes its knowledge of truth from the sensory powers, whose organs cannot be formed from a celestial body, because a celestial  body cannot be acted upon upon ((cum cum sit impassibile). impassibile).  Nor is it true that a bit of the fifth essence (aliquid ( aliquid de quinta essentia) essentia ) enters materially into the composition of the human body; this claim is made by some who hold that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of a certain sort of light (cf. q. 76, a. 7). First of all, their claim that light is a body is false (cf. q. 67, a. 2). Second, it is impossible for  any part of the fifth essence to be divided off from a celestial body or to be mixed in with the elements—and this because of the celestial body’s impassibility. Hence, a celestial body can enter into the composition of mixed bodies only through the effect of its power.

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But to return to our immediate object, it is now clear that the vital heat belonging to the seed stands to it just as the corresponding quality in the stars—which is their  their vital vital heat—  stands to the aither , the  pneuma being its immediate subject, while the element aither  stands to it as its ‘principle’. But inasmuch as the one bears “the principle of soul”, the virtus formativa of Thomas, so, too, would the other: cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol.,, Ia, q. 118, art. 1, sc. (tr. English Dominican Fathers): Theol.   On the contrary, contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the  power in the elements of the world is is to animals produced from these ele elements—for ments—for instance  by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Genesis 1:20: “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life.” Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power.

With respect to the comparison of the natural motion of the heart to that of the heavens, as Aristotle shows, the expansion and contraction of the heart is due to that of the  pneuma which he held to be diffused throughout the body. Now as we have seen, Aristotle and St. Thomas explain the way in which the heart moves as being comparable to the motion of a wheel, which requires a fixed point as its center, the counterpart of which in the heavens lies in the two poles of the celestial sphere. But if the former requires vital spirit in order to  produce motion, would not also the heavens? That is to say, corresponding to the material  principle the soul uses as an instrument must there not likewise be such a principle em ployed by the mover of the celestial orb? In other words, corresponding to the sublunary  pneuma there must be a celestial ‘spirit’ with respect to which the former is said to be the likeness: “I mean what is called vital heat . This is not fire nor any such force, but it is the  spiritus included in the semen and the foam-like, and the natural principle in the  spiritus [ pneuma],  pneuma], being analogous to the element of the stars” stars ” (GA II. 3, 737b 33-34). But “the element of the stars” whose analogue here below is the principle of  pneuma of  pneuma is nothing other than aither , the fifth element, which moves with an everlasting circular motion and so presupposes as its instrument a vital v ital spirit pervading the cosmos as such. On this matter, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Aquinas,  In II Sent., Sent., dist. 18, q. 2, art. 3, obj. 2, ad 2. (tr. B.A.M.):  praeterea, omnis operatio naturae inferioris reducitur reduc itur in virtutem virtutem caelestem, caelestem, sicut sicut in virtutem primi alterantis.

Further, every activity of a lower nature is reduced to a heavenly virtue precisely as to the virtue of the first altering thing.

sed per virtutem caeli anima sensibilis educi non potest, potest, cum corpus corpus caeleste caeleste inan inanimatu imatum m si sit, t, et ni nihi hill ag agat at ul ultr traa suam suam spec specie iem; m; qu quia ia effectus non potest esse potior causa agente.

But the sensible soul cannot be educed by the virtue of the heaven, since the heavenly body is not alive, and nothing acts beyond its species, seeing that an effect cannot be more powerful than its agent cause.

ergo videtur quod non per operationem naturae, Therefore it seems that it is educed in being not  by the activity of nature, nature, but by creation. sed per creationem in esse educatur. <…>

<…>

ad tert tertium ium dicendum, dicendum, quod supposit supposito o secunsecun- To the third it must be said that, having supdum fid fidem em nostra nostram m quod quod caelum caelum sit cor corpus pus  posed according to the Faith that the heaven is inanimatum, nihilominus tamen ponimus quod an inanimate body, we nevertheless hold that motuss ejus sit ab aliqu motu aliquaa substanti substantiaa spiritual spiritualii its motion comes from some spiritual substance as mover. sicut motore:

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et cum motus sit actus motoris et mobilis, oportet quod in motu non tantum relinquatur virtus corporalis corpo ralis ex parte mobilis, mobilis, sed etiam virtus virtus quaedam spiritualis ex parte motoris:

And since motion is the act of the mover as well as the mobile, it must be the case that there remain in the motion not only a bodily virtue on the part of the mobile, but also a certain spiritual virtue on the part of the mover.

et quia motor est vivens nobilissima vita, ideo And because the mover is a thing living with non est inconveni inconveniens, ens, si motus caelest caelestis, is, in- the noblest life, it is not unfitting if the motion quantum est in eo intensio et virtus motoris, per  of the heavenly body, inasmuch as it exists in it and power mover, in the modum quoest virtus agentis principalis qualis est in inwaythe inintensity which the virtue ofof thethe principal agent strumento, causa vitae materialis, est  by exists in the instrument, is the cause of material  per animam sensibilem et vegetabilem. vegetabilem. life, of the sort which comes by the sensitive and vegetative souls.

In the foregoing passage St. Thomas distinguishes a bodily virtue from a spiritual one. In the case of reproduction, a bodily virtue can only be the pneuma the  pneuma enclosed in the seed of the male by reason of which it is foamy and white, and so must be something like the effervescence observed in an active substance (about which see the following note); whereas a spiritual virtue, as he also explains, is the movement imparted to the seed by the generator  whereby his form comes to exist in it virtualiter  virtualiter in in the manner of an instrument, and therefore stands to it just as the idea in the mind of an artisan stands to the instrument he em ploys in producing hisaswork. Applying principlesinto the movement of the we maintain that, just the seed of the these male consists  pneuma possessing vitalheavens, heat as founded on the analogue of the element of the stars, so, too, the heavenly body, understood as “the first altering thing”, must possess a vital heat in the form of  pneuma of  pneuma,, itself founded on the element in which it consists, it  consists, the aither , or fifth element. Now as Aristotle explains in the case of animal motion, “this spirit appears to stand to the soul-centre or original in a relation analogous to that between the point in a joint which moves being moved and the unmoved” ( De  De motu. animal., animal. , ch. 10 (703a 12-14), for which reason must we not also sup pose there to be a cosmic  pneuma standing in the same relation to the axis of the celestial sphere the poles of which, as we have seen, are the counterparts to such a pivot-point? But, as is elsewhere explained, 20 such a virtue would move by being moved by the love that moves the sun and the other stars.21 §

20

Cf. Cf. Metaph.  Metaph. XII. 7 (1072a 19-1073a 12); for the correlative in animal motion, cf. De cf. De An. III. 10.  Paradiso, Canto XXXIII, at the end.  Paradiso,

21

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N.B. On the aforementioned quality of the  pneuma  pneuma,, cf. the following definition: “Effervescence. The bubbling of a solution due to the escape of gas. The gas may form by a chemical reaction, as in a fermenting liquid, or by coming out of solution after having been under pressure, as in a carbonated drink.” 22 For evidence of the Philosopher’s understanding stand ing of this property, property, cf. Gad Freudenthal Freudenthal,,  Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance:  Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul (Oxford, Soul  (Oxford, 1995), Ch. III, sec. 2.2, pp. 121-124; 128-129: ...To improve our insight into Aristotle’s ideas in  pneuma we should consider here not only the word, but the world too. I suggest that when Aristotle referred to the formation of   pneuma within the blood through the action of vital heat, he had in mind the singular  characteristic features of the process in which fresh milk is heated and eventually boiled, a  procedure we may safely assume he had occasion to observe. The action of heat on milk  [121-122] almost from the outset (above 30 o C) causes the formation of minute bubbles throughout the throughout  the liquid. These tiny bubbles do not coalesce to form large ones and they do not immediately rise to the surface, where they would vanish; rather, they persist in the liquid and rise only very slowly. Thus, as long as milk is maintained warm, it contains bubbles through throu gh and through—i through—itt remains remains thorough thoroughly ly “pneu “pneumatiz matized” ed” in the precise sense sense of the term. ...The continued existence of bubbles throughout the liquid—its pneumatization—thus is a phenomenon which is characteristic of milk and indeed is due to some very specific chemical features.34   Now Aristotle considers milk one of the fluids produced in the body through the concoction of the blood, and my suggestion is that he took it as a model of how the  pneuma can durably remain suffused in the blood: milk is the paradigmatic instance lurking behind the notion of a pneumatized  a pneumatized fluid fluid as a fluid in which an aeriform substance continuously inheres without separating off and rising to its natural place. That this is how Aristotle pictured the  pneumatization seems to be confirmed by his description description of male semen, which, like milk, is  blood that has undergone further concoction: Aristotle says that the semen contains  pneuma in the form of tiny bubbles (GA (GA 2. 2)—manifestly the pneuma the pneuma of the semen does not separate off the fluid.35 Similarly, when pneuma when pneuma   34 35

[footnote omitted] [footnote omitted] [122-123]

is produced in water by the action of the heat of the sun, a ‘frothy bubble’ is formed ( GA 3. 11, 736a24).36 Our interpretation of Aristotle’s view of how connate  pneuma is produced and maintained can be confirmed by considering the four following accounts in which  pneuma is explicitly or implicitly involved: (1) The most impressive one is Aristotle’s account of ‘spontaneous’ generation: ‘Animals and plants are formed in earth and in the water because in earth water is present, and in water   pneuma is present, and in all pneuma all  pneuma soul-heat is present, so that in a way all things are full a of soul. (GA (GA 3. 11, 762 19 ff.) Aristotle here says in so many words that (a) in all moisture  pneuma is—and this means, is  potentially —present, so that (b) upon heating by the sun’s generative37 heat (c)  pneuma is formed (just as in the living body), which (d) carries vital, generative, heat. There is no essential difference, then, between sexual and ‘spontaneous’ generation in Aristotle’s physiology: from a physiological point of view, the only difference relates to the source of the vital heat. ...In

22

The American Heritage® Science Dictionary Copyright © 2005 by Houghton Mifflin Company.

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36

[footnote omitted]  GA 3. 11, 762a14; cf. Also 2. 3, 737 a3; 2. 6 743 a33 f. And Ch. 1, n. 54. [123-124]

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‘spontaneous’ generation that initial pneuma initial  pneuma is produced by the action of the heat of the sun. [intervening text omitted, but cf. GA 3. 4, 755a17 ff. on yeast making dough rise, and  Meteorology,, 4. 3, 380 b23 on the ripening of fruit]  Meteorology On [128-129] what grounds, then, can warmer (and purer)  pneuma be assumed to travel higher than less warm pneuma warm pneuma?? For Aristotle’s answer, we must turn to his theory of exhalations, whose rationale was  precisely to bridge the gap between the two competing construals of the elements [one being according to their proper places; the other according to the primary qualities (B.A.M.)] a gap which forbade one to say that something rises because it is hot.50 Physically speaking, the connate pneuma connate  pneuma is somewhat analogous to what, on the scale of the entire world, Aristotle calls ‘exhalation’. Aristotle, as is well known, postulates the existence of a moist and a dry exhalation, raised by the sun from water (the sea, etc.) and the earth, respectively (e.g.  Meteorology I. 4, 341 b5ff.). In the present context we are interested in the first only. The ‘exhalation from water’, also called ‘vapour’ (atmis ( atmis,,  Meteorology I. 9, 346 b33; 2. 2, 354 b31; 2. 4, 359 b34. ff.), Aristotle says, is ‘most naturally moist and warm’ ( Meteorology ( Meteorology I. 3,  b 51 340 2f f.) The vapour results from the action of heat on water, then, as connate  pneuma results from blood within the body (except that the vapour, unlike the connate  pneuma  pneuma,, separates off). Now the idea that the exhalations produced by the sun rise is self-evident: it is  part of their definition. 52 On the basis of the theory of exhalations, then, the connate pneuma connate  pneuma can indeed be held to rise by virtue of its heat, and the more so the hotter (and purer) it is. ... ... Meteor,  Meteor,,, I. 9, 346 b29ff. 52 [footnote omitted] 51

 Note Freudenthal’s description of  of  pneuma  pneuma as “aeriform substance”. And note as well the comparison of the aither  aither with with semen suggests that the former, like the latter, is of a fluid nature. N.B.B. On the nature of the transformation such as is involved in concoction, cf. Summa Contra Gentiles III, n. 152, arg. 3 (tr. Michael Augros): Whenever something is moved by an agent to something which is the property of that agent, then the thing in motion must in the beginning of the motion undergo the impressions of the agent imperfectly, receiving what the agent gives it as something foreign to it [matter  is reluctant, but then takes on things as its own], but in the end of the motion the things given to it by the agent become proper to it. E.g. wood is heated by fire, and that heat is not proper  to the wood, but beyond its nature; but in the end, when the wood is ignited, the heat  becomes proper and connatural connatural to it.

Cf. ibid , arg. 6: The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect if the action of the agent is ceased, unless the impression is turned into the nature of the effect. For the form and pro perties of generators, in the end, remain in the things generated after the generation, because they are made natural to them. And likewise habits are difficult to change, because they are turned into the nature, but dispositions and passions (properties), either of bodies or of  animals, remain sometime after the action of the agent, but not forever, because they are in them as on the way to nature.

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d. Supplement: On natural definitions: How they are dialectical: Cf. Charles De Koninck, Natural Koninck,  Natural Science as Philosophy (repr.; Québec: Laval University, 1959), p. 1: We are often told of a distinction between philosophical psychology and experimental  psychology. This is a distinction that I do not understand. Take the beginning of the  De  Anima,, whe  Anima where re Ar Arist istot otle le sh shows ows that ev even en here here we must must provid providee natural  defin definition itionss as distinguished from the logical or dialectical. His example is that of ‘anger’. It is true that anger is ‘a desire for vengeance’. But this definition is purely formal, somewhat like the definitions of mathematics, i.e. ‘per species’. Now, in mathematics, formal definitions are sufficient to the subject, since the subject is abstract; anger, however, is also something  physical, as may be seen in the behavior of any person in a rage. If we are to form a natural definition of what anger  anger is, is, we will have to add something to that ‘desire for vengeance’, such as ‘attended by an effervescence of the blood about the heart’. A psychology which would woul d confine confine itself itself to formal formal definitio definitions ns would would be no more than diale dialectica ctical. l. (Notice, (Notice, however, that this natural definition of anger is itself only dialectical, but dialectical in a different sense. For propositions—and a definition is virtually a proposition—may be called dialectical for two different reasons: either because the composition or division of the known terms which it comprises is no more than probable; or because one or both of the terms themselves are insufficient, which is the case of purely formal definitions of natural things. We have to do with something less than dialectical when the terms are themselves no more than likely constructs, even though they have some basis in experience. Such was the case of  Aristotle’s ‘incorruptible’ ‘incorruptible’ heavenly bodies, bodies, and of Dalton’s ‘atoms’.) ‘atoms’.) In the definition of  of  anger as ‘a desire for vengeance attended by an effervescence of the blood about the heart’, the former part is certain, though dialectical; the latter part, taken by itself, is natural, yet dialec dia lectic tical al qua ins insuff uffici icient ent even even as a na natur tural al def defini initio tion. n. Nat Natura ural, l, becau because se it refers refers to something sensible; dialectical because no more than provisional.

Cf. Charles De Koninck, The Unity and Diversity of Natural Science: Science :   We must consider still another difficulty, one which is more obvious in our time, and that seems to justify justify the distincti distinction on between philosophy philosophy of nature nature and natural science. The ancients ancie nts did not respect the prodigio prodigiously usly fruitful role of ficti fictions— ons—“log “logical ical fictions” fictions”,, as Bertrand Russell calls them. Nor did Galileo or Newton, for the matter of that; a fact ironically brought out by Newton’s famous hypotheses non fingo. fingo. (Newton actually contri trived ved most most fruitf fru itful ul fic ficti tions ons, , tho though ughknows he failed faithat led he to can realiz realize e that tha t they ththe ey world were were of fictio ficnature tions. ns.)) only The contemporary mathematical physicist probe into  by means of mental constructions suggested in part by experience, in part by mathematics. They are fictions in the strict sense of this term, whose power we must not underrate. The atom, for instance, is largely a logical fiction. If you have any doubts, look at what has happened to atoms since Dalton’s days. (I say “largely”, for in physics the mental constructs must have some foundation in experience and experiment, else they could hardly lead to further knowledge of nature)…. Now, all this faces us no doubt with a deep enough cleavage between diverse modes of  knowing the things in nature. But does this cleavage restrict natural philosophy to our initial gropin gro pings gs under under inv invest estiga igatio tion? n? What What we are ag agreei reeing ng to call call philo philosop sophy hy of nat nature ure is experimental too, though not quite after the manner of mathematical physics nor even of  advanced biology. I pointed out long ago that in the study of nature we must distinguish  between strictly scientific knowledge (in Aristotle’s sense) and that which is called dialectical, as providing no more than an opinion. Now, opinions are still enunciated in words, and are in fact true or false if it be speculative knowledge that we mean to express.

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 Notice, however, that an opinion is not a fiction in the strict sense of this term. It is, at  bottom an inquisitive inquisitive proposition. The opinion that “the world is eternal” still leaves open the question whether the world really is or has to be eternal. We can unfold what we mean  by “world” and by “eternal”, but can we in truth say the latter of the former? f ormer? The notions of  “world” and “eternal”, though vague, have a relatively stable meaning. What we are questioning is not their meaning, of course, but their connection in a proposition. Is such a  proposition necessary? necessary? Is the eternity of the the world a fact? But in mathematical physics, when words are used to describe, not how things are in fact,  but merely how a certain symbolic construction has been laid down, e.g., e. g., that of the atom, we must be aware that, unlike termstoused in a for statement aboutofnature, the symbols, construction, and the names wethe choose employ the purpose communication do the not have a stable meaning. The only stable meaning the word “atom” ever had was that of  “indivisible”. In other words, we are now entitled to question not merely the connection of  the terms, but the very terms themselves. At any rate, these are utterly provisional, whereas what “world” or “eternal” stand for are not.

§

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e. On the principle of the motion of the heavens: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Gentiles, Book II: Creation. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by James F. Anderson (Notre Dame, 1975), cap. 70, nn. 1-7: Chapter 70 THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE THE INTELLECT MUST BE SAID TO BE UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM [1] Now, since Averroes seeks to confirm his doctrine especially by appealing to the words and proof of Aristotle, it remains for us to show that in the Philosopher’s judgment we must say that the intellect, as to its substance, is united to the body as its form. [2] For Aristotle proves in the  Physics [VIII, 5] that in movers and things moved it is impossible to proceed to infinity. Hence, he concludes to the necessity of a first moved thing, which either is moved by an immobile mover or moves itself. And of these two he takes the second, namely, that the first movable being moves itself; for what is through itself  is always prior to that which is through another. Then he shows that a self-mover necessarily is divided into two parts, part moving and part moved; whence it follows that the first selfmover must consist of two parts, the one moving, the other moved. Now, every thing of this kind is animate. The first movable being, namely, the heaven, is therefore animate in Aristotle’s opinion. So it is expressly stated in  De caelo [II, 2] that the heaven is animate, and on this account we must attribute to its differences of position not only in relation to us,  but also in relation to itself. Let us, then, ask with what kind of soul Aristotle thinks the heaven to be animated. [3] In Metaphysics In  Metaphysics XI [7], Aristotle proves that in the heaven’s movement two factors are to  be considered: something that moves and is wholly wholly unmoved, and something that moves and is also moved. Now, that which moves without being moved moves as an object of desire; nor is there any doubt that it moves as a thing desirable by that which is moved. And he shows that it moves not as an object of concupiscent desire, which is a sense desire, but of  intellectual desire; and he therefore says that the first unmoved mover is an object of desire and understanding. Accordingly, that which is moved by this mover, namely, the heaven, desire des iress and unders understan tands ds in a nob nobler ler fashio fashion n th than an we, as he sub subseq sequen uently tly proves proves.. In Aristotle’s view, then, the heaven is composed of an intellectual soul and a body. He indicates this when he says in De in  De anima II [3] that “in certain things there is intellect and the  power of understanding, for example, in men, and in other things like man or superior to him,” namely, the heaven. [4] Now the heaven certainly does not possess a sensitive soul, according to the opinion of  Aristotle; otherwise, it would have diverse organs, and this is inconsistent with the heaven’s simplicity. By way of indicating this fact, Aristotle goes on to say that “among corruptible things, those that possess intellect have all the other powers,” thus giving us to understand that some incorruptible things, namely, the heavenly bodies, have intellect without the other   powers of the soul. [5] It will therefore be impossible to say that the intellect makes contact with the heavenly  bodies by the instrumentality of phantasms. On the contrary, it will have to be said that the intellect, by its substance, is united to the heavenly body as its form. [6] Now, the human body is the noblest of all lower bodies, and by, its equable temperament most closely resembles the heaven, which is completely devoid of contrariety; so that in

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Aristotle’s judgment the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any  phantasms, but as its form. form. [7] As for the heaven being animate, we have spoken of this not as though asserting its accordance with the teaching of the faith, to which the whole question is entirely irrelevant. Hence, Augustine says in the  Enchiridion  Enchiridion:: “Nor is it certain, to my mind, whether the sun, moon, and all the stars belong to the same community, namely, that of the angels; although to some they appear to be luminous bodies devoid of sense or intelligence.” 23 (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Theol., Ia, q. 70, art. 3 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):   Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. For the nobler a  body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.   Objection 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have nobler forms.  Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence Augustine ( De  De Vera Relig . xxix) says: “Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life.” The lights of heaven, therefore, are living beings.   Objection 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies a living soul.   Objection 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural ( De ( De Coel . i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is from an intrinsic principle. Now the principle of  movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the desirer is moved by the object desired ( Metaph ( Metaph.. xii, text. 36). Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living  beings.   Objection 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is proved in  Phys  Phys.. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living move themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the heavenly bodies are living  beings.   On the contrary, Damascene says ( De Fide Orth. Orth. ii), “Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have neither life nor sense.”   I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions ( De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), “was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being.” On the other oth er hand, hand, th thee Platon Platonist istss held held that that th thee heaven heavenly ly bodies bodies have have life. life. Nor was there there less less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. It was the belief of Origen ( Peri ( Peri  Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles. 1:6), “The spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about.” 23

See the excerpt from the Prima the Prima Pars below.

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But Basil ( Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) Hexaem.) and Damascene ( De Fide Orth. Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature ( Gen. ad lit . ii, 18; Enchiridion 18;  Enchiridion lviii). In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of  the body; for the form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature andend. power the soulof are apprehended through its operation, which is tobody a certain extent its Yetoffor some these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our is a necessary instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. There are, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the  bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although although capable of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which whi ch the nutrit nutritiv ivee soul soul operat operates, es, can be exe exerci rcised sed by the hea heaven venly ly bod bodies ies,, for such such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly  body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of  th thee senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of  understanding and moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the  purpose of the operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of   power, as a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle ( Phys  Phys.. viii, text. 42,43), after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a  body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly  bodies to be living beings, this means m eans nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved  by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of  specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life ( De  De  Trin Trin.. iii, 4). From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words.

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  Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by reason of  their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved by a living substance.   Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but not in a  particular respect. While, While, then, it is not conceded that the sou souls ls of heavenly bodies are nob nobler  ler  than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the  power that moves the heavenly heavenly bodies is of a nobler nobler kind.   Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent.   Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of  their active principle, but on account of their passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power.   Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of  mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the form, with the moved, as the matter,  but by contact with the motive power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active  principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Exposition Aquinas,  Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens, Heavens , trans. P. Conway and F. R Larcher (Ohio, 1964), Book I, lect. 18, n. 458: Lecture 18: The first difficulty, concerning the number of motions of the stars, is solved. The number shown to agree with modern astronomers. 458. Having proposed the two doubts, the Philosopher here starts to solve them. First he solves the first question; Secondly, the second one (L. 19). As to the first he does two things: First he shows what ought to be assumed in order to make the first question easier to resolve; Secondly, he he gives the solution, at 459. He says therefore first [324] that the reason why the first question is difficult is that we investigate the heavenly bodies as though they were merely an orderly system of bodies without being animated. As a consequence, it seems to us that the order of their motions should be in accord with the order of numbers and according to the position of the bodies. But if the problem at hand is to be settled, we must assume that they have not only some sort of life but also actions – this being proper to things with a rational soul, which act for an end as being masters of their act, and do not act by the sole impulse of nature as do all irrational things. If this is assumed, nothing is seen to be occurring unreasonably if the number of their  motions does not proceed according to the position of the bodies. For the diversity and number of the motions is to be taken more in terms of a relation to the final good, which is

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the principle in all things able to be done [i.e., voluntary actions], as is plain from the words of the Philosopher in Ethics in  Ethics VII and Physics and Physics II. One should note in this regard that it makes no difference whether we suppose that the heavenly bodies are moved by intellectual substances united to them after the manner of a soul, or by these as separated. But there would be no way to solve this question if they were moved by the sole impulse of nature, as heavy and light bodies are.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard , Book II, Distinction 14, Question 1, art. 3 (tr. Erik Norvelle): 24 Article 3: Whether the motion of the heavens is due to an intelligence Regarding the third issue, we proceed as follows. 1) It appears that the motion of the heavens is not from a soul or from an intelligence. For  the motion of the heavens is a natural motion, as the Philosopher states in On the Heavens, Heavens , Book I. But a natural motion is that whose principle is a form of a natural body. Therefore it appears that the motion of the heavens is from its natural form, and not from anything which moves by understanding. understanding. 2) Further, every motion [caused] by a soul is accompanied by labor and suffering, as is stated in On the Heavens, Heavens, Book II. But the motion of the heavens is not of this sort, because it would not be able to be continuous and uniform. Therefore it is not moved by a soul. 3) Further, an intellective soul is not connected to a body except by the sensitive and vegetative soul, as is clear from the comparison of the parts of the soul with the species of  figures figu res in On the Soul , Boo Book k II. But the heavenly heavenly bodies bodies can cannot not have a sensit sensitive ive or  vegetative soul, because they do not have a composite body, which would be required in order that it be an inst instrumen rumentt for a veget vegetative ative and sensitiv sensitivee soul. soul. Therefore Therefore it appe appears ars that [the heavens] cannot be moved by an intellective soul. 4) Further, every body moved by a soul has a left and a right, as well as other differences of   position. But the heavenly body, being completely uniform, does not have this kind of  diversity of parts. Therefore it appears that it cannot be moved by a soul. But on the contrary, 1) it is proven in  Physics  Physics,, Book VII, that [the heavenly body] is moved by itself. But something moved by itself cannot exist, as is shown in the same place, unless it is that sort of  thing of which one part is a mover, and another part the moved. But every such motion is the motion of an apprehensive power. Therefore it is necessary that the motion of the heaven be from some apprehensive power. 2) Every natural motion is from a body existing outside of its own location. But this is impossible to posit in the heavens. Therefore, the motion of the heavens is from some kind of apprehension.

24

* This translation is based on the Latin text contained in Scriptum super Sententiis Petri Lombardi. Parma,

1856. This translation is for informational purposes only, and should not be cited for the purposes of  academic publications without prior comparison with the Latin text. Translation by Erik Norvelle, published under a Creative Commons 2.0 Non-Commercial Non-Commercial Share-Alike license. (Norvelle’s note)

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I respond by saying that concerning this issue there are multiple opinions. For some say that,  just as the motion of other simple bodies is from their corporal natures, so also will be the motion of the celestial body. But this appears not to be true. For every motion is from some motor. But in the motion of simple bodies, even though the natural form is the principle of  motion, it is nevertheless not the motor. The essential motor, however, is the generator  which gives form, and the accidental [motor] is that which removes that which blocks motion, as is proven in Physics in  Physics,, Book VIII, but this is totally inappropriate for the celestial  body. And further, a natural motion is to one place only, and is perfected by natural rest, and is of a body which exists outside of its natural place, all of which is also foreign to the heavenly body. And thus others say that it must be the case that the motion of the heavenly  body is from another intelligent being endowed with will, but not immediately from God Himself: for this does not correspond to the order of divine wisdom, the effect of which comes to the last things through middle things, as Dionysius states. And thus Gregory [the Great] states that corporeal creatures are governed by spiritual creatures; and thus it is  probable that some created intellect is the proximate motor m otor of the heavens. Nevertheless it should be known that the philosophers posited diverse motors in diverse moved and mobile things, and thus they demonstrated the number of intelligent movers on the basis of the number of these [moved and mobile things]. However, they assigned to every sphere two motors: one conjoined, which they called the soul of the sphere, and another separated, which they called an Intelligence. The reason for this position was that an Intelligence, according to these thinkers, possesses universal forms, and is therefore not appropriate for  immediately directing the renewals of the diverse motions of the heavens, or those things which are educed by the motor of the heavens. Hence it is necessary that there be a motor in which there are the particular forms which direct [the lesser things] in motion, and this they called the soul of the sphere. But this position is partly heretical, and partly can be held in a Catholic manner. For these sa same me [t [thi hink nker ers] s] ho hold ld th that at th thin ings gs pr proc ocee eed d in an orde ordere red d fash fashio ion n from from Go God, d, i. i.e. e. the the Intellige Intel ligences nces are created created immediate immediately ly by the First Cause, which is God, and from [the Intelligences] the soul of the sphere proceeds; and from this there is produced the substance of the sphere itself. Therefore it can be said that the proximate motor is its form or soul,  because it gives itself existence, like a cause proportioned to itself. But this our faith does not suffer, since it posits that only God is the creator of things, as was stated above.  And  thus we can say that the Angels, which move the spheres in a proximate fashion, are motors, moto rs, but not forms or souls, souls, because because the spheres spheres receive receive only motion motion from them, but  not existence. But we can sustain [their position] in this respect, as we said, in that the higher Angels, which have more universal forms, are separated and remote motors; whereas the inferior Angels, which have more particular forms, as was stated before, are proximate motors. Thus also Avicenna says that [those beings] called Intelligences by the philosophers are what, according to the Law, are called higher Angels, such as Cherubim and Seraphim; whereas the Souls of the spheres are said to be lesser, and these are called ministering Angels. 1) In response to the first argument, it should be stated that, just as the Commentator says in the first book of his commentary on On the Heavens, Heavens , the motion of the heavens is said to be natural, not because its active principle is some natural form, but because the celestial body itself is of such a nature that it naturally is susceptible to such a motion [imparted] by some intellect, not having a natural repugnance to this voluntary motion, as there is in us. For  nature is not said only in regards to the form, but also in regards to matter. 2) Regarding the second argument: the Philosopher is speaking against those who posited the heavens to be of the [same] nature as the inferior bodies, for then that motion would be caused by a soul against the nature of the moved body, and thus labor and suffering would

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 be necessary present in causing motion. But if we posit that that motion is from f rom an intellect according to the condition of the body moved, there will not then be violence nor labor. 3) Regarding the third argument: as the Commentator states in his book On book  On the Substance of  the Spheres, Spheres, the heavenly body is neither generable nor corruptible, as are our bodies; and thus it does not need any vegetative form. Similarly, also, its motor does not acquire cognition from things, but has a kind of active knowledge; and thus it does not need a sensitive soul; and thus according to the philosophers the soul of the heavens and that of man are not said univocally. 4) Regarding the fourth argument: according to the Philosopher, the celestial body can be assigned differences of position; and thus its ‘right’ is said to be the East, from whence the motion originates; and its ‘left’ is the West, and ‘above’ is the southern pole, and ‘below’ is th thee Nort Northe hern rn po pole le,, an and d ‘a ‘ahe head ad’’ is th thee up uppe perr he hemi misp sphe here re,, and and ‘beh ‘behin ind’ d’ is the the lowe lower  r  hemispher hemis phere. e. Neverthele Nevertheless, ss, thes thesee parts, parts, as the Commen Commentato tatorr himself himself states, states, are assi assigned gned differently to the heavenly body and to our bodies, in two regards. First, in us these parts are diversified by figure and power, but this is not the case in the heavenly body, since it is spherical everywhere. Secondly, in us that determin determinate ate part which is right never becomes left, but in the heavenly body that part of the sphere which is now right, later becomes left,  because the part which is now in the East will later be in the West. This occurs because the  power which brings out motion in us is the act of the body to whom organs are affixed, i.e. muscles and nerves, but this is not the case in the heavenly body. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,  Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens, Heavens, trans. P. Conway and F. R Larcher (Ohio, 1964), Book I, lect. 3, nn. 313-315: Lecture 3: How, according to the Philosopher’s opinion, the differences of position  befit the parts of the heaven heaven 313. After determining the question of the positional parts of the heaven according to the opinions of others, the Philosopher here discusses them according to his own opinion. As to this he does three things: First he shows that such positional differences must be in the heaven; Secondly, he explains which dimension determines “up” and “down” in the heaven, at 320; Thirdly, he shows which part of the heaven is up, and which is down, 323. About the first he does two things: First he proves his proposition; Secondly, he excludes certain objections, at 317. 314. With respect to the first he gives the following argument [236]: It has been previously determined that in things possessing a principle of motion, namely, in living bodies which possess a moving principle within themselves, there are found “such  powers,” i.e., differences of position according to the respective virtues in the parts, and not merely with respect to us, as in the case of non-living bodies which do not possess within themselves an active principle of motion but a passive one only, as is said in  Physics VIII. But the heaven is animated and possesses a principle of motion.

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That the heaven is animated he supposes from something proved in  Physics VIII, namely, that all mobile beings must be reduced to one first self-mover that possesses its own active  principle of motion and not merely its own passive principle, as some mentioned by Simplicius would claim. For they say that Aristotle called the heaven animate not because it had a rational soul but inasmuch as it had a kind of life implanted in its body in such a way, however, that the soul in it is nothing other than the nature of such a body. But that this is false is clearly shown by the words of Aristotle in  Metaphysics XII to the effect that the first mover, which is completely immobile, moves the heaven as an object of thought and desire moves something. Consequently, it follows that, according to his opinion, the heaven is according to its soul something that desires and understands. And according to this, the motion of the heaven proceeds from its nature and from its soul: from its nature, indeed, as from a secondary and passive principle, inasmuch, namely, as such a body is apt to be moved in such a way; from its soul, however, as from a primary and active principle of  motion. 315. Now in regard to this way of causing motion, it makes little difference whether the heaven is moved by a conjoined spiritual substance called its soul, or by a separated  spiritual substance, except that a greater dignity accrues to the heaven if it is considered  moved by a conjoined spiritual substance. This last consideration led Plato and Aristotle to posit an animated heaven.

Someone could object, however, that although it is more noble for a body to have a spiritual substance conjoined to it, yet for the spiritual substance it is nobler to be separated from a  body. For this reason Plato was led to say that it is for the good of the rational soul to be separated from the body at some time. Now according to this, since the mover is nobler than the moved and since motion depends more on the former, it seems better to say that the substance moving the heaven is separated from the body than to say that the heaven is animated; for this will give greater nobility to the motion of the heaven. Otherwise it would seem, following Plato’s opinion, that the soul of the heaven would be in a worse condition than the human soul. But an answer to this could be that in one sense it is nobler for the human soul to exist outside the body than in the body, namely, to the extent that it moves the body with labor  against its nature. But in respect to the natural existence of the soul it is better for the soul to  be in the body, because through it the soul attains the perfect existence of its species. Consequently, if there be a spiritual substance whose power is determined to the motion of  the heaven, which it moves without labor, as was said above, then for that substance it is nobler to be in such a body than to be separated; because the action is more perfect which is  performed through a conjoined instrument than with a separated instrument. But a separated substance whose power is not determined to this effect is absolutely nobler…. (emphasis added)

That the soul is the noblest form in lower things St. Thomas Aquinas explains in On the  Motion of the Heart  ( De   De Motu  Motu Cordis), Cordis), n. 15 (tr. (tr. B.A.M.): 15. The motion of the heart is therefore natural as following upon the soul, inasmuch as it is the form of such a body, and principally of the heart. And perhaps in accordance with this understanding of the matter some have said that “the motion of the heart is caused by an [angelic] intelligence,” inasmuch as they held the soul to be from an intelligence, just as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the the Physics  Physics (ch. 4, 256a1), the motion of heavy and light things comes from that which generates them, inasmuch as it gives the form which is the  principle of motion. For every property and motion follows on some form according to its

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condition, just as upon the form of the noblest 25 element, fire, for example, follows motion to the noblest place, which is above. Now the noblest form in lower things is the soul, which most approaches to a likeness to the principle of the motion of the heavens. And so the motion following upon it is most similar to the motion of the heavens: for the motion of the heart in an animal is like the motion of the heavens in the world.

That the body is the noblest of all lower bodies he explains in Summa Contra Gentiles, Gentiles, Book II: Creation. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by James F. Anderson (Notre Dame, 1975), cap. 70, n. 6: [6] Now, the human body is the noblest of all lower bodies, and by its equable temperament most closely resembles the heaven, which is completely devoid of contrariety; so that in Aristotle’s judgment the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any  phantasms, but as its form. form.

f. The circular movement of the heart h eart in relation to that of the heaven heavens: s: Cf. Walter Pagel, William Harvey’s Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical   Background . (Basel/New York, 1967), William Harvey’s Circular Symbolism, pp. 82-83: In Harvey’s own words: “I began to think by myself whether it (the blood) has a certain motion, as it were in a circle, which afterwards I found to be true, and that the blood is  propelled from the heart through the arteries into the body and all parts … and back again through the veins … to the right auricle…. This may be called circular motion, in the same way in which, accord- [82-83] ing to Aristotle, air and rain emulate the circular motion of  the bodies above. For the moist earth evaporates when heated by the sun; the vapours lifted up are condensed, and condensed into rain come down again, moisten the earth and in this manner generation takes place and similarly tempests and atmospheric phenomena develop through the circular motion of the sun, his approach and recession.26 In the same way in all likelihood it should happen in the body through the motion of the  blood that all parts are nourished, warmed and quickened by the warmer, more perfect, va porous, spirituous and so to speak nutritious blood: that by contrast the blood in these parts is cooled down, thickens and as it were becomes effete—whence it returns to its principle, namely the heart, the fountain and hearth of the body in order to recuperate its perfection; here, through the natural, potent, fervent heat, as it were the treasure of life, it is made fluid again and pregnant with spirits and so to speak balsam is dispersed from here again, and a nd all this depends upon the motion and beat of the heart. Thus the heart is the principle of life and the sun of the microcosm (just as proportionally the sun deserves to be called the heart of the world); it is through its virtue and heat that the  blood is moved, perfected, quickened and protected against corruption and clotting. It is this intimate hearth—the fundament of life and author of all—that is devoted to the whole body, nourishing, heating and quickening it.”[31] 25

“Noblest”, that is, that which has “the highest rank”, so to speak. In the foregoing passage Harvey has in mind mind Post.  Post. An., An., II. 12 (96a 5-8), which I give next. And notice how his understanding of the circulation of the blood seems to demand the circular motion of the heart: for just as the cycle of evaporation and condensation follows the circular motion of the heavens, so would the blood that of the heart. Harvey, however, does not pursue this part of the analogy, but rather considers the blood’s effect 26

on the body as resembling that of rainfall on the earth. Conversely, whereas St. Thomas does not consider the relation of the heart’s movement to that of the blood, its circulation would seem to follow from Harvey’s  principles.

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[31]

HARVEY,  De motu cap. VIII. ed. 1628, p. 42, ed. Roterod. 1648, p. 102 (“coepi egomet HARVEY, De mecum cogitare, an motionem quandam quasi in circulo haberet.”), tr. WILLIS, p.46.

Cf. Aristotle, Post. Aristotle, Post. An., An., II. 12 (95b 37—96a 8) (tr. E.S. Bouchier): We see with regards to matters in process that production is effected in a circular manner, and we observe that this may happen when the major and minor and also the middle terms are each of them consequences of the other, and it is then that conversion takes place. Now we proved at the outset [96a] ( Pr. ( Pr. An. II. 5-7) that causes and effects may be proved circularly, and that is the meaning of the circular process. In the case of matters of production the method may be regarded as follows. [5] When the earth has been moistened vapours must arise. When that happens a cloud is produced. From the cloud comes rain, and as a result of the rain the earth must be moistened. Hence the process has returned to its starting  point, and when any one of the terms is present another follows, when that is present a third follows, and when the third is present the first recurs again.

Cf. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas translated by Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., Bk. II, lect. 12: Lecture 12 (95b38-96a20) HOW IN THINGS THAT COME TO BE RECIPROCALLY, A CAUSE WHICH IS NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE EFFECT IS TAKEN AS MIDDLE IN A DEMONSTRATION HOW ONE DEMONSTRATES THROUGH CAUSE DIFFERENTLY, IN THINGS THAT OCCUR ALWAYS AND IN THINGS THAT OCCUR AS A GENERAL RULE  b38. Now we observe in Nature— a2. In actual fact— a8. Some occurrences are universal—  a12. For if A is predicated— a20. We have already explained After showing how one must take the middle, which is the cause, in things that come to be in a direct line, the Philosopher now shows how one should take it in the case of things that come to be in reciprocal generation. First, he proves his proposal. Secondly, he elucidates it with examples (96a2). In regard to the first it should be noted that because the circular movement of the heavens is the cause of generation in sublunar things, it is stated in On On   Generation II that a kind of  circular reciprocity is found in generation in the sense that earth is generated from water, and water in turn from earth. He says therefore (95b38) that since we observe a certain pattern of generation in things that are generated circularly, it is possible in these cases also to follow what has been established above, namely, to syllogize from what is subsequent, provided that the terms of the demonstration are taken in such a way that middle and extremes follow one upon the other: because in the case of things that are generated in that way, there is a kind of circular conversion in the sense that one passes from the first thing to the last thing, and then a return is made from the last to the first; although these things are not numerically but specifically the same, as is explained in On On   Generation II. Hence it does not follow that the same numerical thing is prior and subsequent, or is cause and effect.

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And this is suitable to the process of demonstrations, for, as has been established in the foregoing, whenever conclusions are converted, i.e., whenever some of the premises can be syllogized from them, this is a circular demonstration. And although this is not fitting if the very same thing which was first the conclusion is later the principle of the same numerical th thin ing g (o (oth ther erwi wise se th thee same same th thin ing g woul would d be at once once be bett tter er know known n and and le less ss know known) n),, nevertheless if they are not entirely the same, as happens in things that are circularly generated, there is nothing unfitting. Then (96a2) he uses examples to elucidate what he has said, saying that a circular process is seen to occur in the works of nature. For if the earth is saturated with rain, it is necessary that the action of the sun release vapors from it; when these are released and borne aloft, it is necessary that clouds be formed; and after they are formed, it is necessary that rain water be formed; and when this is formed, it is necessary that in falling upon the earth it saturate it. Now this saturation of the earth was the very thing we took as being first; however, it is not the same saturation as the one from which we first began. Thus it is clear that a cycle has been achieved in the sense that with one of them existing, another comes to be; and that other existing, still another comes to be; and that one existing, a return is made to the first, which is not numerically the same, but specifically the same. Yet this cycle of causes cannot be found according to the order which is found in per  in  per   se se causes; for in per  in  per   se se causes it is necessary to reach some one thing which is first in each genus of causes as is proved in  Metaphysics II. But the fact that water is

generated from fire, and fire in turn from water, is not  per   se se but but per  per accidens. accidens. For being is generated  per se not from actual being but from potential being, as it is stated in  Physics I. generated per Therefore, if we proceed from cause to cause in  per se causes, there will not be a cycle. For  we will accept as the efficient cause of the rain-soaked earth, the heat of the air which is caused by the sun, but not vice versa; but the material cause we take as water, whose matter  is not vapor but the common matter of the elements. Then (96a8) he shows how one demonstrates through the cause differently in things which occur always and in things which occur as a general rule. Concerning this he does three things. First, he proposes what he intends. Secondly, he proves what he has proposed (96a12). Thirdly, he sums up (96a20). He says therefore first (96a8) that there are some things which come to be universally both as to time, because always, and as to subject, because in all cases; either because they maintain themselves as unchangeable things which are not subject to coming to be, or   because they come to be as changeable things which always follow a uniform pattern, as in the case of heavenly movements. Again, there are other things which do not occur in the sense of always, but as a general rule. An example of this is that every human male develops a beard as a general rule, although it does not occur always. Therefore, just as in the case of  things that occur always, it is necessary to take a middle which is always, so in the case of  things which occur as a general rule, it is necessary to take a middle that occurs as a general rule. Then (96a12) he proves that if one is to conclude to something that occurs as a general rule it is necessary to take a middle which occurs as a general rule. For if one were to assume the opposite by taking a middle which occurs universally and always; for example, if A, which is the major extreme, is predicated universally of B, which is the middle, and B of C, which is the minor extreme, then it follows of necessity that A is predicated universally of C both as to time and as to subject, which is the same as being predicated always and of each thing. Hence, we are now saying that for something to be predicated universally is the same as

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 being predicated of all and always. But it has been assumed that A is predicated of C as a general rule. Therefore, it is necessary that the middle, which is B, should be taken as existing as a general rule. Thus it is obvious that certain immediate principles of things which occur as a general rule can be taken, such that those principles exist or come to be as a general rule. Yet such demonstrations do not enable one to know that what is concluded is true absolutely but only in a qualified sense, namely, that it is true in the majority of cases. And this is the way that the principles which are taken possess truth. Hence sciences of this kind fall short of  sciences which deal with things absolutely necessary, so far as the certitude of demonstration is concerned. Then (96a20) he sums up what has been said, saying that we have now established how the quod quid which quid  which is practically identical with the  propter quid is quid  is assigned among syllogistic ter terms, ms, inasmuch inasmuch as we have have sh shown own how the several several genera genera of cause causess are middles middles of  demonstration according to the respective diversities of things. We have also shown in what sense there is or is not demonstration or definition of the quod quid . (emphasis added)

g. On cyclical processes: Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Corruption , II. 11 (336b 35-338b 19) (tr. H. H. Joachim): Wherever there is continuity in any process (coming-to-be or ‘alteration’ [337b] or any kind of change change whatever) whatever) we observe observe consecutivenes consecutiveness, s, i.e. this coming-to-be after  that  without any interval. Hence we must investigate whether there is anything which will necessarily exist, or whether everything may fail to come-to-be. For if it be true to say of something that it will be, it must at the same time be true to say of it that it is; whereas, [5] though it be true to say of something now that it is going to be, it is quite possible for it not come-to be—thus a man might not go for a walk, though he is now going for a walk. And since in general amongst the things which are some are capable also of not-being, it is clear that the same character will attach to them no less when they are coming-to-be: in other words, their  coming-to-be will not be necessary. Then are all the things that come-to-be of this character? Or, on the contrary, [10] is it absolutel absol utely y necessary for some of them to come-to-be? come-to-be? Is there, there, in fact, a distincti distinction on in the field of coming-to-be corresponding to the distinction, within the field of being, between things that cannot possibly not-be and things that can not-be? For instance, is it necessary that solstices shall come-to-be, i.e. impossible that they should fail to be able to occur? Assuming that what is prior must have come-to-be if what is posterior is to be (e.g. that foundations must have come-to-be if there [15] is to be a house: clay, if there are to be foundations), is the converse also true? If foundations have come-to-be, must a house cometo-be? It seems that this is not so, unless it is necessary absolutely for the latter to come to  be. If that be the case, however, a house must come-to-be if foundations have come-to-be, as well as vice versa. For the prior was assumed to be so related to the posterior that, if the latter is to be, the prior also must have come-to-be before it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the posterior should come-to-be, the prior [20] also must have come-to-be: and if the prior  has come-to-be, then the posterior also must come-to-be—not, however, because of the  prior, but because the future being of the posterior was assumed as necessary. Hence, in any sequence, when the being of the posterior is necessary, the nexus is reciprocal—in other  words, when the prior has come-to-be the posterior must always come-to-be too. Now if the sequence of occurrences is to proceed ad infinitum downwards, the [25] coming to-be to-be of any deter minate ate later member member will wi ll not beother absolutely, absolutely , but only conditionally, necessary. Fordetermin it will always be necessary that some member shall haveconditionally come-to-be,  beforehand, on account of which it is necessary that this should come-to-be: consequently,

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since what is infinite has no beginning, neither will there be in the infinite sequence any ‘primary’ member which will make it necessary for the remaining members to come-to-be. Nor again (ii) will it be possible to say with truth, even in regard to the members of [30] a limited sequence, that it is absolutely necessary for any one of them to come-to-be. We cannot truly say, e.g. that it is absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid: for (unless it is always necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that, when foundations have been laid, a thing, which need not always be, must always always be. No: if its coming-to-b coming-to-bee is to be necessary, necessary, it must be always in its coming-to-be. For what is of necessity coincides with what is always, since that which ‘must be’ cannot possibly not-be. Hence a thing is eternal if its being is necessary: and if it is eternal, it is of [338a] necessity necessity.. And if, therefore, therefore, the coming-t coming-to-be o-be of a thing is necessary, its coming-to-be is eternal; and if eternal, necessary. It follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must [5] be cyclical—i.e. must return upon itself. For coming-to-be must either be limited or not limited: and if not limited, it must be either rectilinear or cyclical. But the first of these last two alternatives is impossible if coming-to-be is to be eternal, because there could not be any  beginning , whether the members being taken downwards (as future events) or upwards (as  past events). Yet coming-to-be must have a beginning [10] (if it is to be necessary and therefore eternal), nor can it be eternal if it is limited. 30 Consequently it must be cyclical. Hence the nexus must be reciprocal. By this I mean that the necessary occurrence of this involves the necessary occurrence of something prior: and conversely, given the prior, it is also necessary for the posterior to come-to-be. And this will hold continuously throughout the sequence: for it makes no difference whether we take two, or by many, members. [15] It is in circular movement, therefore, and in cyclical coming-to-be that the absolutely necessary is to be found. In other words, if the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical, it is necessary that each of them is coming-to-be and has come-to-be: and if the coming-to-be of any things is ‘necessary’, their coming-to-be is cyclical. And this is reasonable; for circular motion, i.e. the revolution of the heavens, was seen on other grounds to be eternal since precisely those movements which [338b] belong to, and depend upon, this eternal revolution ‘come-to-be’ of necessity, and of necessity will be. For  since the revolving body is always setting something else in motion, the movement of the things it moves must also be circular. Thus, since the upper movement is cyclical, the sun 31 moves in a determinate manner; and since the sun moves thus, the seasons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle, i.e. i.e . r eturn eturn upon themselves; and since they come-to-be cyclically, so in their turn do the things [5] who whosse coming-to-be the seasons initiate. Then why do some things manif  manif estly estly come-to-be in this cyclical fashion (as, e.g. showers and air, so that it must rain if there is to be a cloud and, conversely, there must be a cloud if  it is to rain), while men and animals do not ‘return upon themselves’ so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time (for [10] though your coming-to-be presupposes your  father’s, his coming-to-be does not presuppose yours)? Why, on the contrary, does this coming-to-be seem to constitute a rectilinear sequence? In discussing this, we must begin by inquiring whether all things return upon themselves in a uniform manner; or whether, on the contrary, though in some sequences what recurs is numerically the same, in other sequences it is the same only in species. species . In consequence of  this distinction, it is evident that those things, whose substance—that which is undergoing the process—is imperishable, will be numerically, as well as specifically, the same in their  recurrence: for the [15] character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it. Those things, on the other hand, whose substance is perishable (not imperishable) must ‘return upon themselves’ in the sense that what recurs, though specifically the same, is not the same numerically. That is why, when Water comes-to-be from Air and Air  from Water, the Air is the same ‘specifically’, not ‘numerically’: and if these too recur  numerically the same, at any rate this does not happen with things whose ‘substanc ‘substance’ e’ comesto-be-whose ‘substance’ is such that it is essentially capable of not-being.

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30 31

The text is corrupt at this point. Reading ku/kl% o) h(/lioj.

Cf. Commentary on Aristotle’s Generation and Corruption by Thomas Aquinas, tr. by Pierre Conway & R. F. Larcher (Columbus, 1964), Bk. I, lect. 7 complete: Lecture 7 The cause on the part of matter in generation never fails. 52. After After presen presentin ting g an object objection ion agains againstt the afores aforesaid aid solut solution ion,, the Philos Philosoph opher er her heree introduces another question, the answer to which resolves the previous objection. About this he does two things: First, he introduces the question and resolves it; Secondly, he uses this solution to resolve the main question (L. 8). With respect to the first he does three things: First, he presents the question; Secondly, he tackles the question, at 54; Thirdly, he resolves it, at 57. Regarding the first he does two things: First he introduces the question [52] and says that “these,” namely, the previous objection should be handled to the extent that the proposition requires requires,, and that, in order to get a better  understanding, we should inquire into the reason why generation always exists, i.e., both absolute generation and generation “with respect to a part,” i.e., generation in a qualified sense. Now those who posit that the world and motion are perpetual must also posit perpetual generation. What the force of Aristotle’s arguments is with regard to the perpetuity of motion and the eternity of the world we have explained in  Physics VIII and in On the Heavens I.  53. Secondly [53], he explains the question he has introduced and says that one cause that may be assigned assigned of the eternity of generation generation is that which is called “whence the principle [beginning] of motion comes,” i.e., the moving or efficient cause; another cause may be assigned, which is matter. And this is the one to be assigned now, namely, the material—for the moving cause has been discussed in the tract on motion,” i.e., in  Physics VIII, where it was said that there exists a certain immobile mover for all time, namely, the mover of the heavens, and a mover which is always moved, namely, the heavens.

To determine concerning one of these, namely, the first mover, pertains to another part of   philosophy, the part which is first among all the parts; hence in  Metaphysics XII the Philosopher determined concerning the cause of the perpetuity of motion and of generation. But regard regarding ing the oth other er mov mover, er, namely namely,, the mov mover er which which cau causes ses perpet perpetua uall genera generatio tion n  because it is itself continually continually being moved, it will will later be assigned, at the end of the presen presentt  book, how this is the cause “of each of the aforesaid,” i.e., of the perpetuity of generation absolutely speaking and in the qualified sense.

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But now we must assign the cause why in perpetuity, generation and corruption do not desert nature, and which is the cause “classed under the head of matter,” namely, the material cause. And lest this seem to be foreign to the proposition, he [Aristotle] adds that  perhaps it will at the same time be shown both what must be said about this question and what must be said of absolute generation and corruption.

54. Then [54] he pursues the question brought up. First, he presents an objection that would deny perpetuity of generation; Secondly, he rejects some answers to this objection, at 55. He says therefore first [54] that there seems to be sufficient reason to inquire as to the cause why generation is “folded around,” i.e., eternally revolves in nature, if that which is corrupted absolutely falls into non-being. For just as what is generated absolutely comes to be from non-being absolutely, so what is corrupted absolutely would seem to fall into non-being absolutely, in the sense that this non-being would be absolutely nothing. For that into which it falls cannot be a “something,” i.e., a substance, for since absolute corruption is of substance, what is corrupted absolutely must fall into nonsubsta sub stance nce.. Conseq Consequen uently tly,, neithe neitherr can the non non-be -being ing at which which corrup corruptio tion n ends ends be quality, or quantity, or “where,” or any of the other predicaments, since accidents cannot exist without substance.

If, therefore, generation and corruption go on forever, it seems that some being will always  be falling into non-being. Consequently, there is always being subtracted some one or other  of the things having natures. Now, it is plain that whatever is finite will be consumed if  something is continually removed from it. Hence, if the whole universe, from which each and every being is generated, is finite, and if generation is ab aeterno, aeterno, then all being should have been exhausted long ago, so that nothing should be left now but emptiness, i.e., the void. 55. Then [55] he excludes two answers. The first was that of the ancient natural philosophers who, in order to account for the perpetuity of generation, attributed infinity to the principles. For all who posited one principle, such as fire or air or water or something in-between, endowed that principle with infinity. Democritus however assumed infinite empty space, as well as an infinitude of indivisible bodies. Likewise, Anaxagoras posited an infinitude of  similar parts as principles. All these tenets are rejected by the Philosopher, who says that it cannot be that the reason why generation does not cease is because that is infinite from which something is generated, whether there be one principle or many principles. For such a thing is impossible, since, as was proved in Physics in Physics III and in On the Heavens I, there is in nature no infinite in act. 56. A second answer is now presented and refuted [56]. For someone could say that, although there is not present in nature any infinite in act, there is nevertheless an infinite in  potency, as is evident in the division of a continuum. Consequently, someone could say that,  just as, even though it is not infinite in act, something can be taken ad infinitum by division from a continuum without its being consumed, so too, from natural body, out of which all things are generated, even though it is not infinite, something can be taken which, by corruption, falls away to non-being, yet without its ever being totally consumed. But this is excluded. For if, from a finite continuum, as is said in  Physics III, the same quantity is always removed, it will, no matter how large, be finally consumed—for example,

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if one should should continu continuee to remove a palm’s palm’s breadth from the diameter diameter of the heaven. heaven. But a continuum is divided ad infinitum if subtraction is always made according to the same  proportion—for example, if a continuum be divided in half, and the half into half, and so on infinitely. The same holds for any other ratio. Such a division having been made, it is plain that what is taken after the half will always be less than what was taken before—for the half  of the half is always less than the half of the whole. Hence Aristotle concludes that, if this is the way th that at genera generatio tion n and corrupt corruption ion are to endure endure foreve forever, r, i.e i.e., ., in the way that that a continuum is forever divided, then whatever is generated later will always have to be smaller  in quantity, so that, by virtue of what is subtracted from natural body being always less, the original quantity will not be totally consumed. But we do not see this happen, namely, what is generated being always less. Consequently, the way generation and corruption endure ad  infinitum cannot be similar to the division of a magnitude ad infinitum. infinitum. 57. Then [57] having rejected the false solutions, he concludes to the true one, namely, that the reason why the transmutation of generation and corruption must be unfailing, or “unceasing,” i.e., unceasing, is that the corruption of this is the generation of something else, and vice versa. For generation  per se is indeed from a being in potency, i.e., from matter, which is as the subject of natural things—it is accidental to the matter out of which something is generated that it be the subject of another form, with respect to which it is  being in act, and at the same time of the privation of the form f orm to be induced, with respect to which it is non-being in act. On this account Aristotle in Physics in  Physics I says that generation is per  is  per  accidens from a being in act, but per but  per se from a being in potency. Similarly, a thing is per is  per se corrupted into a being in potency, which indeed is now subject to another form, according to which it is a being in act, and to the privation of the previous form, with respect to which it is now non-being in act. Consequently it does not follow that what is corrupted departs completely from the whole nature of things, for although that which is corrupted becomes non-being, yet something else remains, namely, that which has  been generated. Accordingly matter cannot remain without being subjected to some form. That is why, upon the corruption of one thing, another is generated, and upon the generation of one thing another is corrupted. Consequently, there is in generation and corruption a certain cycle which gives it the aptitude to last forever. Finally he concludes with the summary that the aforesaid cause should be considered sufficient as to why there should be absolute generation and corruption with respect to each and every thing in perpetuity. This is true on the supposition that the world and motion are eternal—which, however, the Catholic faith does not suppose, as has been said elsewhere. (emphasis added)

h. That nature is cyclical: Cf. John Henry Newman, The Second Spring: A sermon delivered to the First Provincial Council of Westminster, 1852: A Sermon by John Henry Newman, D.D. [Preached on July 13, 1852, in St. Mary’s College, Oscott, in the First Provincial Synod of  Westminster, before Cardinal Wiseman and the Bishops of England.] Surge, proper Surge, propera, a, amica amica mea mea,, col columb umba a mea, mea, for formos mosa a mea, mea, et veni. veni. Jam enim hiems hiems transiit, imber abiit et recessit. Flores apparuerunt in terra nostra nostra.—Cant., .—Cant., c. ii. v. 10-12. Arise, make haste, my love, my dove, my beautiful one, and come. For the winter is now  past, the rain is over and gone. gone. The flowers have appea appeared red in our land.

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We have familiar experience of the order, the constancy, the perpetual renovation of  the material world which surrounds us. Frail and transitory as is every part of it, restless and migratory as are its elements, never-ceasing as are its changes, still it abides. It is bound together by a law of permanence, it is set up in unity; and, though it is ever dying, it is ever  coming to life again. Dissolution does but give birth to fresh modes of organization, and one death is the parent of a thousand lives. Each hour, as it comes, is but a testimony, how fleeting, yet how secure, how certain, is the great whole. It is like an image on the waters, which is ever the same, though the waters ever flow. Change upon change,—yet one change cries out to another, like the alternate Seraphim, in praise and in glory of their Maker. The sun sinks to rise again; the day is swallowed up in the gloom of the night, to be born out of it, as fresh as if it had never been quenched. Spring passes into summer, and through summer and autumn into winter, only the more surely, by its own ultimate return, to triumph over that grave, towards which it resolutely hastened from its first hour. We mourn over the blossoms of May, because they are to wither; but we know, withal, that May is one day to have its revenge upon November, by the revolution of that solemn circle which never stops,—which teaches us in our height of hope, ever to be sober, and in our depth of  deso-lation, never to despair. (emphasis added)

Cf. Chris Weinkopf, “A Brief History of Time” (April 9, 1995): 27 With or without astronomy, casual observation over the course of one’s life makes the cyclical nature of seasons self-explanatory. One need have no appreciation of the earth’s orbit around the sun to discover that fall invariably follows summer, which is preceded by spring, the successor of winter. This order is unfailing, and easily discernible to the naked or even  blind eye.

On the pagan view, cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, Gods , I. xvi (tr. C. D. Yonge, The Nature of the Gods and Divination Divination,, Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1997, original edition H. G. Bohn, 1853), 18 53), Book II. VII: BOOK II. VII. But where did we find that which excels all these things — I mean reason, or (if  you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding, thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world be possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one, which is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there

is nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world; and not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive anything superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of all perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow to be the most excellent. Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that agreeable, agreeable, uniform, uniform, and continued agreement agreement of things things in the universe? universe?   Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers, at another be covered with snow? Or, if such a number of things regulated their own changes, could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the  flux and reflux of the sea and the height height of the tides be affected by the increase increase or wane of  the moon? Could the differ-ent courses of the stars be preserved by the uniform movement  of the whole heaven? Could these things subsist, I say, in such a harmony of all the parts of the universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit? (emphasis added)

27

(http://old.perseus.tufts.e (http://old.pe rseus.tufts.edu/GreekScience du/GreekScience/Students/Chri /Students/Chris/TIME2.htm s/TIME2.htmll [12/21/09])

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For the Judeo-Christian understanding of this subject, cf.  An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith by St John Damascene. Translated by E.W. Watson and L. Pullan. From  Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Fa thers, Second Series, Vol. 9. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, 1899), Book I, Chapter III: CHAPTER III  Proof that there is is a God. …All things, that exist, are either created or uncreated. If, then, things are created, it follows that they are also wholly mutable. For things, whose existence originated in change, must also be subject to change, whether it be that they perish or that they become other than they are by act of will [5]. But if things are uncreated they must in all consistency be also wholly immutable. For things which are opposed in the nature of their existence must also be opposed in the mode of their existence, that is to say, must have opposite properties: who, then, will refuse to grant that all existing things, not only such as come within the province of the senses, but even the very angels, are subject to change and transformation and movement of various kinds? For the things appertaining to the rational world, I mean angels and spirits and demons, are subject to changes of will, whether it is a progression or a retrogression in goodness, whether a struggle or a surrender; while the others suffer changes of generation and destruction, of increase and decrease, of quality and of movement in space. Things then that are mutable are also wholly created. But things that are created must be the work of some maker, and the maker cannot have been created. For if he had been created, he also must surely have been created by some one, and so on till we arrive at something uncreated. The Creator, then, being uncreated, is also wholly immutable. And what could this be other than Deity?  And even the very continuity of the creation, and its preservation and government, teach us that there does exist a Deity, who supports and maintains and preserves and ever provides for this universe. For how [6]  could opposite natures, such as fire and water, air and  earth, have combined with each other so as to form one complete world, and continue to abide in indissoluble union, were there not some omnipotent power which bound them together and always is preserving them from dissolution? What is it that gave order to things of heaven and things of earth, and all those things that  move in the air and in the water, or rather to what was in existence before these, viz., to  [7] 

heaven and earththese? and airWhat and the of fire and was itthem that mingled  and distributed waselements it that set these in water? motionWhat  and keeps in their   [8]  unceasing and unhindered course ? Was it not the Artificer of these things, and He Who hath implanted in everything the law whereby the universe is carried on and directed? Who then is the Artificer of these things? Is it not He Who created them and brought them into existence. For we shall not attribute such a power to the spontaneous [9]. For, supposing their coming into existence was due to the spontaneous; what of the power that put all in order [10]? And let us grant this, if you please. What of that which has preserved and kept them in harmony with the original laws of their existence [11]? Clearly it is something quite distinct from the spontaneous[12]. And what could this be other than Deity[13]?

5. Read Reading ing προα προαίρεσιν; ρεσιν; a varia variant nt is is τροπ τροπήν. 6. Athan., Cont. Gent . 7. Various reading, Who. 8. Naz 9. Greg. Th Thee Gre GNaz., reek ek.,isOrat  τῳ .α34. ὐτομ τομάτῳ, to to tthe he au auto toma mati tic; c; pe perh rhap apss = to the the aacc ccid iden enta tal, l, or, or, to to chan chance ce.. 10. Or, Whose was the disposing of them in order?

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11. Or, Whose are the preserving of them, and the keeping of them in accordance with the  principles under which which they were first placed? placed? 12. παρα παρα τὸ αὐτόματον; ματον; or, qu quite ite other other than than the sp spont ontane aneous ous,, or, or, th than an chan chance. ce. 13. Athan., De Athan., De Incarn. Verbi, Verbi, near the beginning. Greg. Naz., Naz ., Orat . 34. (emphasis added)

For a witness from the Jewish tradition, cf. M. Friedlaender,  Essays on the Writings of Ibn  Ezra,, Vol. 4 (London, 1886). First Essay. The Philosophy of Ibn Ezra, pp. 1-2:  Ezra 1-2: HE who set a boundary to the ever-flowing billows of the sea, and said, “Thus far shalt thou go and no further,” also limited the sphere of the all-investigating human mind. When, however, in compliance with the exhortation of the prophet, “we lift our eyes on high, and see who created these things,” we are not satisfied with only admiring the grandeur of the Universe and the infinite wisdom of its Creator: we are anxious to know this great Architect, to understand the mysterious art by which He became the Author of all Beauty, and to comprehend the scheme of Providence by which all parts of the divine work are kept in marvellous harmony. Moralists of old, poets and prophets have warned us in vain again aga inst st any att attemp empts ts at realis realising ing such such a des desire ire as useles uselesss and even dange dangerou rous. s. 1 The experience of previous failures, of systems which flourished for some time and faded away, is likewise of no avail. The restless human mind tries to break down every fence, in order to  pass into regions which are beyond beyond its reach. When, on the one hand, change appears to be the rule of nature, when the sun is observed to rise and set, clouds to   1

“Seek not out the things that are too hard for thee, neither search the things that are above thy strength” (Ben Sira iii. 21). “For in much wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow” (Eccl. i. 18) 2 ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF IBN EZRA.

appear and disappear, seasons to come and go, generation to succeed generation, in short  all things to flow in a perpetual tide, and on the other hand, amidst all this change a certain constancy is noticed, the question is naturally asked, When and how did this series of successions commence? When will it end? We are as much at a loss to form a conception of its absence as to comprehend its continuance from infinity to infinity. (emphasis added)

Cf. Archibald Geikie,  Elementary Lessons in Physical Geography (London, 1886), Introduction pp. 2-3: 4. This variety [sc. observable “on the face of the earth”] is everywhere associated with life and movement. Consider, for instance, the unvarying succession of day and night; the orderly march of the seasons; the constant or fitful blowing of the winds; the [2-3] regular circling of the ocean tides; the ceaseless flow of rivers; the manifold growth and activity of plant and animal life! Surely it was no strange thought when men in old times pictured this world as a living being. And even though we cannot look on the earth as a living thing in the sense in which a plant or animal is so called, yet in view of all that multitudinous movement which is ever in progress upon its surface, and on which, indeed, we know that our own existence de pends, there is evidently evidently another sense in which which we may speak of the life of of the Earth.

§

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i. Supplement: The comparison of the universe with a living thing: That the divine encloses (or ‘pervades’) all of nature: Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics Aristotle, Metaphysics,, XII. 8 (1074b 1-14) (tr. W. D. Ross): [1074b] Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth [en muthou schemati], that these [celestial] bodies are  gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. 28 The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form [ta [ ta de loipa muthikos ede prosektai] prosektai ] with a view to the [5]  persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if one were to separate the first  point from these additions and take it alone—that alone—that they thought the [10] first substances to be gods, one must regard this as an inspired utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure. Only thus far, then, is the opinion of our ancestors and of our earliest predecessors clear to us. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Aquinas,  In XII Meta., Meta., lect. 10, n. 31 (tr. B.A.M.): Next, when he says, They are handed on, on , he compares the things that have been discovered about immaterial substances to ancient and popular beliefs. And he says that certain things were handed on by the ancient philosopher philosopherss abou aboutt the separated separated substance substancess and were dismissed by those coming after them as being in the manner of fables, namely, that they are  gods, and that what is is divine contains [or encloses] nature nature as a whole. And this, in fact, may  be gathered from the things above, if all immaterial substances be called gods. But if only the first principle be called God there is only one God, as is clear from the things already said. But the rest [sc. of their traditions] have been introduced in the manner of fable for the  persuasion of the multitude who cannot grasp intelligible things, and insofar as it was the  best [expedient] for delivering the laws, and for their usefulness to human social life [conversationis humanae], humanae], so that from inventions of this sort the multitude would be  persuaded to tend to virtuous acts and turn away from vices. And what was introduced introduced in the manner of fable he explains, adding that they said the gods were similar in form to men and  to certain other animals. For they put down in the manner of fable certain men made into  gods, and certain animals, animals, and certain tthings hings consequent consequent to those things, and they said other   similar things. things. (emphasis added)

Cf. Alexander Wilder, New Wilder, New Platonism and Alchemy: Alchemy: The Eclectic Philosophy: Aristotle declares: “The divine essence pervades the whole world of nature; what are styled the gods are only the first principles. The myths and stories were devised to make the religious systems intelligible and attractive to the people, who otherwise would not give them any regard or veneration.” <…>

28

Cf. Aristotle and St. Thomas on Thales’ understanding of the soul in the excerpts given below. Cf. also

Rose Cherubin, “Notes on Anaxagoras and Philolaus”. George Mason University: “Rather, he [sc. Anaxagoras, speaking of  Nous of  Nous,] ,] seems to mean some sort of cosmic mind,  something that pervades the cosmos (frr. 11, 12, 14)….” (emphasis added) (www.gmu. (www.gmu.edu/courses/phil/a edu/courses/phil/ancient/anph2.htm ncient/anph2.htm [12/18/08])

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He [Proclus] also repeats the words of Aristotle: “There are many inferior theoi inferior  theoi but  but only one Mover. All that is concerning the human shape and attributes of these deities is mere fiction, invented to instruct the common people and secure their obedience to wholesome laws. But the First Principle is neither fire, nor earth, nor water, nor anything that is the object of sense. A spiritual substance is the cause of the Universe, and the source of all order, all beauty, all the motions and all the forms which are so much admired in it. All must be led up to this one  primitive substance, which governs in subordination to the First. This is the general doctrine of the ancients, which has, happily, escaped the wreck of truth amid the rocks of popular  errors and poetic fables.”

On the motion of the heavens as founding the comparison with life, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De nas,  De Motu Cordis (On the Motion of the Heart ), ), n. 9 (tr. B.A.M.): 9. Again, a perfect animal, which is one that moves itself, most approaches to a likeness of  the whole universe: and so man, who is the most perfect of animals, is by some called a “microcosm”. Now in the universe the first motion is local motion, which is the cause of  alteration as well as the other motions, for which reason even in animals the principle of  alteration appears to be local motion. And so the Philosopher in the eighth book of the  Physics (ch. 1, 250 b 14-15), pursuing this resemblance, says that motion is “like a kind of  ‘life’ existing in all things”.29

For related notions, cf. the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima by Thomas Aquinas translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Sylvester S ylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven, 1951): TEXT 404b30–405b30 BOOK I, CHAPTER, II, CONTINUED PREVIOUS THEORIES SOUL AS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ELEMENTS It seems that Thales, from what they recollect of him, was also of opinion that the soul was a cause of motion,—if it is a fact that he said that the magnet had a ‘soul’ because it attracts iron. §58

TEXT 404b30–405b30 29

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Theol., Ia, q. 18, art. 1. obj. 1, ad 1 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso): Objection 1: In Physics In  Physics 8 the Philosopher says that motion is, as it were, a sort of life in all things that exist by nature. But all natural things participate in motion. Therefore, all natural things participate in life. <…> Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first motion, viz., the movement of the celestial bodies, or to motion in general. And in both senses motion is said to be like the life of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. For the motion of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the motion of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. Similarly, every natural motion is, as it were, a certain likeness of a vital operation in natural things. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal, so that (as some have claimed) its motion were from an intrinsic mover, then it would follow that its motion is the life of all natural bodies. [N.B. For St. Thomas, the motion of the heavens comes from a conjoined mover; cf. STh STh,, Ia, q. 70, art. 3.]

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BOOK I, CHAPTER, II, CONTINUED PREVIOUS THEORIES SOUL AS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ELEMENTS § 58. Next, at ‘It seems that Thales’, he states the opinion of a philosopher called Thales who had only this in common with the others mentioned above, that he identified soul with a motive force. This Thales was one of the Seven Wise Men; but while the others studied moral questions, Thales devoted himself to the world of nature and was the first natural  philosopher. Hence Aristotle remarks ‘from what they recollect etc.’, referring to those who said that water was the basic principle of things.   For Thales thought that the way to find  the principle of all things was by searching into the principle of living things, and since all  the principles or seeds of living things are moist, he thought that the absolutely first   principle must be the most moist of things; and this being water, he said water was that   principle.  Yet he did not follow his theory to the point of saying that soul was water; rather, he defined it as that which has motive force. Hence he asserted that a certain stone, the magnet, had a soul because it moved iron. Anaxagoras and Thales, then, are included in the present list; not for identifying the soul with fire, but because the former said that the soul was the source of knowledge and sensation, and the latter that it was at the origin of movement . <…> § 62. Then at ‘Some cruder thinkers’, Aristotle states an opinion of some who made water  the first principle. For there were certain rather crude followers of Thales who tried to make the principle of one particular thing an analogy of the first principle of Nature as a whole. Observing that moisture was fundamental to living things they concluded that it must be the  first principle of all things; in short, that the latter was water. So far indeed they followed  their master, Thales; but whereas he, though admitting water to be the first principle, would  not, as we have seen, allow that the soul was water, but rather a motive force, his cruder  disciples (such as Hippo) asserted that it was water . Hippo tried to refute those who said the soul was blood with the argument that blood is not the generating seed (which they called ‘th ‘thee inchoa inchoate te soul’) soul’) of animat animatee th thing ings. s. He identi identifie fied d this this with with water water on acc accoun ountt of it itss humidity. (emphasis added) TEXT 409b18–411a7 BOOK I, CHAPTER V, CONTINUED EMPEDOCLES’S THEORY OF COGNITION SOUL NOT COMPOSED OF THE ELEMENTS § 190. And a certain philosopher named Orpheus having fallen into a rather similar error in what he said about the soul, he too is mentioned here. Orpheus was one of those three early thinkers thin kers who were, so to say, poet-theo poet-theologi logians; ans; for they wrote in verse on philo philosophy sophy and about God. The other two were Museus and a certain Linus. Orpheus, a wonderful orator  whose words had power to civilise wild and brutish folk, was the first man to induce his fellows to live together in society. For this reason it is said of him that he could make rocks dance to the sweet sounds of his harp, which really means that his eloquence could melt the hardest hearts. And after these three poet-philosophers came the seven sages, of whom Thales was one.  Now this Orpheus thought that the whole air was alive, was indeed a sort  of living soul, and that the so-called souls of living bodies were really nothing but the air  these bodies breathed; and this idea he expressed in verse. But the Philosopher objects to the Orphic theory, saying that it is just as inadequate as the others he has criticised; for there are many animals that do not breathe at all, ‘a fact’, he says, ‘which was overlooked’ by those who held this opinion. The criticism touches the inadequacy of the theory.

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TEXT 41a 8–411a25 BOOK I, CHAPTER V, CONTINUED THE ELEMENTS HAVE NO SOUL  And some say that the soul is intermingled generally with the Universe. That is perhaps why Thales thought that the whole world was full of divinities. divinities. § 192 This, however, involves several difficulties. For why does the soul in fire and air not result in an animated being, whereas it does so in composite beings?—and that, even though it is thought to be more excellent in the former. (And one might well query why the soul in the air should be nobler and more enduring than that in animals.) On either count the theory is absurd and unreasonable. To say that air or fire is an animal is among the most wanton of  absurdities; and if there is a soul in them, it is inconsistent not to call them animals. §§ 193-5 They seem to have held that there was a soul in these on the ground that the Universe is made up of homogeneous parts; so that if animals become animate by partaking of the containing element, they must say that the soul [of the Whole] is homogeneous with its  parts. § 196  If then the air, divided off thus, be homogeneous, but the soul be composed of heterogeneous  parts, something of it [the soul] will exist and something not. It is necessary then, either that it be of homogeneous parts, or that it be not in any and every part of the whole. § 197 It is evident then, from what has been said, that the cause of knowledge being in the soul is not that soul is made up of the elements; and that it is neither true nor apposite to say that it is in motion. § 198 I That the distinction here referred to between parts of ‘soul’ refers to mortal and immortal existence is St. Thomas’s interpretation of this passage (§ 197).

LECTIO THIRTEEN § 192. Having stated and rejected the theories and arguments of those who maintained that the soul was composed of elements, the Philosopher is now led, by the same train of thought, to discuss the notion, upheld by some, according to which a soul is intermingled with the elements. First, then, he states this opinion, and then, at ‘They seemed to have held’, the argume arg ument nt used used to su suppo pport rt it. And the opinion opinion its itself elf is fir first st sta stated ted and then, then, at ‘This, ‘This, however,’ attacked. There are, he says, some who see a soul intermingled with everything, whether simple elements or things composed of these. This perhaps is what Thales meant  when he said that everything was full of gods; perhaps he thought that the entire Universe was alive and its life was divine; that just as soul exists everywhere in each living thing so a god was everywhere in the Universe 30 and everything therefore was ‘full of divinities’.  And perhaps this was the notion notion that underlay idola idolatry try..

30

For an analogue in the Judaic understanding of God, cf. Abraham Cohen, Everyman’s Cohen,  Everyman’s Talmud: Talmud: The Major  Teachings of the Rabbinic Sages (New York, 1949), Chapter I. The Doctrine of God. Omnipresence, p. 6: To assist the comprehension of the place of the incorporeal God in the Universe, an analogy is drawn from the incorporeal part of the human being—the soul. ‘As the Holy One, blessed by He, fills the whole world, so also the soul fills the whole body. As the Holy One, blessed be He, sees but cannot be seen, so also the soul sees but cannot be seen. As the Holy One, blessed be He, nourishes the whole world, so also the soul nourishes the whole body. As the Holy One, blessed be He, is pure, so also the soul is pure. As the Holy One, blessed be He, dwells in the inmost part of the Universe, so also the soul dwells in the inmost part of the body’ (Ber. 10a).

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§ 193, 193, At ‘This, ‘This, howeve however,’ r,’ he point pointss ou out, t, again against st this this opinio opinion, n, that that it presen presents ts certai certain n difficulties. For instance, if a soul exists in air and in fire (and of these two especially this was asserted) it is hard to see why it does not make ‘animated beings’ of them, i.e. why air  and fire are not animals. Things composed of several elements are animals precisely because they contain a soul; and one would expect the soul to be all the more powerful where the element is pure and simple. § 194. Again , one might ask, he says, why the soul which they place in the elements should  be considered higher and more immortal than the soul of things composed of elements. For  the latter constitute knowing, sentient animals; not so the former. § 195. But, however the objections are put, the result is damaging to this theory. To say that fire or air is a living body is most improbable in itself; it is contradicted by experience; and is unsupported by any good reason. And to deny that things which have souls need be living  bodies is most m ost unreasonable; for it would follow that there was no difference between souls that exist in bodies and those that do not. § 196. Then, at ‘They seem to have held’, he states the reason used in support of this theory and refutes it; after which, at ‘It is... evident’ he draws a general conclusion from all the foregoing discussions. The reason, he says, why some philosophers seem to have thought  that a soul existed in ‘these’, i.e. in all the elements, was that they thought that the whole and the parts parts in elemen elements ts were were of the same nature nature,, sin since ce the eleme elements nts are simple simple.. Observing that that part of ‘the containing element’, i.e. the air, which came into contact  with the bodies of animals through their breathing, was the cause and principle of animal  life, they thought it necessary to conclude that the soul of the whole was ‘of the same specific nature as the parts’, that is to say, that all the containing air was alive.

§ 197. At ‘If then’ he refutes this argument. The assumption is that, because the portion of  the air removed and inhaled by an animal is of a like nature to the air as a whole, the soul of  the animal itself is, as it were, a portion of the soul of the whole air. But on their own  principle this is clearly false; for, according to them, the soul of air ‘exists’, i.e. is immortal, as that which has never ceased from vivifying animate beings, whereas the soul of this or  that particular animal ‘does not exist’, i.e. is not immortal. Therefore either of two awkward consequences flow from this theory. If all the parts of air, those outside and those breathed in, are homogeneous, then the same is true of the soul; but this has been disproved. But if the soul’s parts are heterogeneous while the air’s are homogeneous, then the soul is not in every  part ‘of the whole’, i.e. of the whole air; which is against those those who said that all the air had a soul. § 198. Then at ‘It is evident’ Aristotle concludes this part of the discussion of earlier  opinions. Neither of these two predications made’ by the ancients was, he says, either true or  well-expressed; namely that knowledge in the soul is a consequence of its being composed of elements, and that movement is in it for the same reason. So much should be clear to anyone who has followed followed the discussion up to the present. (emphasis added)

One may therefore liken the world to an animal and its motive principle to the soul on the  basis of three things: (1) the ubiquity of motion in the universe; (2) the inference that a ‘motive force’ even in inanimate things like a magnet suggests that all things are full of  soul; and (3) the place of air in the phenomena of ‘life’; the foregoing reasons furnishing the foundation for the comparison of the cosmos to a living thing. But in accordance with the first explanation, one may therefore speak of a ‘soul’ of the world and the like without  being committed to the view that the world as such is an animal. 70

 

For the Christian alternative to the pagan point po int of view, cf. Tatian, Tatian, Address  Address to the the Greeks, Greeks, c. iv (tr. J. E. Ryland): CHAP. IV.--THE CHRISTIANS WORSHIP GOD ALONE. For what reason, men of Greece, do you wish to bring the civil powers, as in a pugilistic encounter, into collision with us? And, if I am not disposed to comply with the usages of  some of them, why am I to be abhorred as a vile miscreant? Does the sovereign order the  payment of tribute, I am ready to render it. Does my master command me to act as a  bondsman and to serve, I acknowledge the serfdom. Man is to be honoured as a fellow-man; God alone is to be feared,—He who is not visible to human eyes, nor comes within the compass of human art. Only when I am commanded to deny Him, will I not obey, but will rather die than show myself false and ungrateful. Our God did not begin to be in time: He alone is without beginning, and He Himself is the beginning of all things. God is a Spirit, not pervading matter, matter, but the Maker of material spirits, and of the forms that are in matter;  He is invisible, impalpable, being Himself the Father of both sensible and invisible things.  Him we know from from His creation, creation, and apprehend apprehend His invisible invisible power by His works. I refuse to adore that workmanship which He has made for our sakes. The sun and moon were made for  us: how, then, can I adore my own servants? How can I speak of stocks and stones as gods? For the Spirit that pervades matter is inferior to the more divine spirit; and this, even when assimilated to the soul, is not to be honoured equally with the perfect God . God . Nor even ought the ineffable God to be presented with gifts; for He who is in want of nothing is not to be misrepresented by us as though He were indigent. But I will set forth our views more distinctly. (emphasis added)

On the right way of understanding the presence of God to the world, cf. Leo XIII,  Divinum illud munus (May 9, 1897), n. 9: It is well to recall the explanation given by the Doctors of the Church of the words of Holy Scripture. They say that God is present and exists in all things “by His power in so far as all things are subject to His power; by His presence, inasmuch as all things are naked and open to His eyes; by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being” (St. Thomas, ST I.8.3). But God is in man, not only as in inanimate things, but because He is more fully known and loved by him, since even by nature we spontaneously love, desire, and seek after the good. Moreover, God by grace resides in the just soul as in a temple, in a most intimate and peculiar manner. From this proceeds that union of affection by which the soul adheres most closely to God, more so than the friend is united to his most loving and beloved friend, friend, and enjoys God in all fulln fullness ess and sweetness. sweetness. Now this wonderful wonderful union, which is properly called “indwelling,” differ[s] only in degree or state from that with which God beatifies the saints in heaven....

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, The Compendium of Theology; Theology; translated by Cyril Vollert, S.J. (St. Louis, 1947), ch. 130: CHAPTER 130 GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD BY GOD Second causes do not act except through the power of the first cause; thus instruments operate under the direction of art. Consequently all the agents through which God carries out the of His government, canjust act as only the power of Godobject Himself. The action of  any order of them is caused by God, thethrough movement of a mobile is caused by the motion of the mover. In such event the mover and the movement must be simultaneous.

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Hence God must be inwardly present to any ag agent as acting therein whenever He moves the agent to act. Another point: not only the action of secondary agents but their very existence is caused by God, as was shown above. However, we are not to suppose that the existence of things is caused by God in the same way as the existence of a house is caused by its builder. When the builder departs, the house still remains standing. For the builder causes the existence of  the house only in the sense that he works for the existence of the house as a house. Such activity is, indeed, the constructing of the house, and thus the builder is directly the cause of  the becoming of the house, a process that ceases when he desists from his labors.  But God is directly, by Himself, the cause of every existence, and communicates existence to all  things just as the sun communicates light to the air and to whatever else is illuminated by the sun. The continuous shining of the sun is required for the preservation of light in the air; simila sim ilarly rly God God must must unceas unceasing ingly ly confer confer exi existe stence nce on things things if they they are to per persev severe ere in existence. Thus all things are related to God as an object made is to its maker, and this not only so far as they begin to exist, but so far as they continue to exist. But a maker and the object made must be simultaneous, just as in the case of a mover and the object moved. Hence God is necessarily present to all things to the extent that they have existence. But existence is that which is the most intimately present in all things. Therefore God must be in all things…. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Theol., Ia, q. 104, art. 1, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers): I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not all, ffor or there there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corrupttion. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another ‘per se’ and directly, namely, when what is  preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (( Moral   Moral . xvi). This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must thatThis an agent may be the cause of the “becoming” of itsbeings: effect, but directly of itsobserve “being.” may be seen both in artificial and in natural for not the  builder causes the house house in its “becoming,” “becoming,” but he is not the direct cause cause of its “being.” For it is clear that the “being” of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder  constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the “being” of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its “becoming” depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of “being” which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its “becoming” only. Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other’s form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as thewords, form ofitthe other; butcause it canthat be “this the cause of this form “this for asform.” much as it is in is matter—In other may be the matter” receives And this to be the cause of “becoming,” as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a

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natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression  specifically the same as in that active cause, then the “becoming” of the effect, but not its “being,” depends on the agent.   Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not   produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the  generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not  merely the cause of “becoming” but also the cause of “being.” Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the “becoming” of the effect: so neither can the “being” of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in “becoming” but also in “being.” This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire’s action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire’s heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of  fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of  the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has no root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun. Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun’s nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ( Gen. ad lit . iv, 12): “If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse.” In the same work (Gen. ( Gen. ad lit . viii, 12) he says: “As the air becomes light by the  presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness.” (emphasis added)

 j. Supplement: The importance of water for life: Cf. “Water”, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Effects on Life:31 From a biological standpoint, water has many distinct properties that are critical for the  proliferation of life that set it in apart from substances. carries out this by allowing organic compounds to react ways thatother ultimately allowItreplication. All role known forms of  life depend on water. Water is vital both as a solvent in which many of the body’s solutes dissolve and as an essential part of many metabolic processes within the body. Metabolism is the sum total of anabolism and catabolism. In anabolism, water is removed from molecules (through energy requiring enzymatic chemical reactions) in order to grow larger molecules (e.g. starches, triglycerides and proteins for storage of fuels and information). In catabolism, water is used to break bonds in order to generate smaller molecules (e.g. glucose, fatty acids and amino acids to be used for fuels for energy use or other purposes). Water is thus essential and central to these metabolic processes. Therefore, without water, these metabolic  processes would cease to exist, leaving us to muse about what processes would be in its  place, such as gas absorption, absorption, dust collectio collection, n, etc. Water is also central to photosynthesis and respiration. Photosynthetic cells use the sun’s energy to split off water’s hydrogen from oxygen. Hydrogen is combined with CO 2 (ab31

(http://en.wikipedia.org/w (http://en.w ikipedia.org/wiki/Water iki/Water [02/01/10])

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sorbed from air or water) to form glucose and release oxygen. All living cells use such fuels and oxidize the hydrogen and carbon to capture the sun’s energy and reform water and CO 2 in the process (cellular respiration).

k. On man as a microcosm: Pagan and Christian views on the divine which pervades all things: Cf. Albert Pike,  Morals and Dogma of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry,, prepared for the Supreme Council of the Thirty Third Degree for the Southern masonry Jurisdiction of the United States: Charleston, 1871: God, in the view of Pythagoras, was ONE, a single substance, whose continuous parts extended through all the Universe, without separation, difference, or inequality, like the soul in the human body.32 He denied the doctrine of the spiritualists, who had severed the Divinity from the Universe, making Him exist apart from the Universe, which thus became no more than a material material work, on which acted the Abstract Abstract Cause, a God, isolated isolated from it. The Ancient Theology did not so separate God from the Universe. This Eusebius attests, in saying that but a small number of wise men, like Moses, had sought for God or the Cause of  all, outside of that ALL; while the Philosophers of Egypt and Phoenicia, real authors of all  the old Cosmogonies, had placed the Supreme Cause in the Universe itself, and in its parts,  so that, in their view, the world and all its parts are in God. The World or Universe was thus compared to man: the Principle of Life that moves it, to that which moves man; the  Soul of the World to that of man. Therefore Pythagoras called man a microcosm, or little world, as possessing in miniature all the qualities found on a great scale in the Universe; by his reason and intelligence partaking of the Divine Nature: and by his faculty of  changing aliments into other substances, of growing, and reproducing himself, partaking  of elementary Nature.  

Thus he made the Universe a great intelligent Being, like man—an immense Deity, having in itself, what man has in himself, movement, life, and intelligence, and besides, a perpetuity of existence, which man has not; and, as having in itself perpetuity of movement and life, therefore the Supreme Cause of all. Everywhere extended, this Universal Soul does not, in the view of Pythagoras, act everywhere equally nor in the same manner. The highest portion of the Universe, being as it were its head, seemed to him its principal seat, and there was the guiding power of the rest of the world. In the seven concentric spheres is resident an eternal order, fruit of the intelligence, the Universal Soul that moves, by a constant and regular   progression, the immortal bodies bodies that form the harmonious system of the heavens heavens.. (emphasis added)

Cf. Mortimer J. Adler, The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago, World  (Chicago, 1952), Vol. II, Chapter 51, “World” (Introduction): HE who does not know what the world is,” writes Marcus Aurelius, “does not know where he is. And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what the world is.” According to the Stoic emperor, for emperor,  for whom “there is one universe made up of all things, and one God who pervades all things,” things ,” man has only to exercise the divine spark of reason in himself in order to be at home in a world which reason rules.    He does not hesitate long before the dilemma that “it is either a well-arranged universe or a chaos huddled together.”  In the belief that it is through and through an orderly world  32

Cf. Aristotle’s obersvations that the divine encloses nature, and that the soul of the world is homogeneous with its elements.

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 – a cosmos rather than a chaos, governed by providence rather than by chance – Aurelius is willing to assume whatever place destiny allots him in the universal scheme. “Everything harmonizes with me,” he says, “which is harmonious to thee, O Universe.” With a Christian’s faith in God’s plan and providence, Montaigne is also willing to conceive the universe as the stage on which man acts his destined part. But suppose, Montaigne adds, that we consider “man alone, without outside assistance, armed solely with his own weapon wea pons, s, and de depri prived ved of divine divine grace grace and knowle knowledge dge,, which which is his his whole whole honor, honor, his strength, and the foundation of his being.” How then does the world appear? Is it, in all its vastness, the human habitat—the home of man, its lord and master?

Man deceives himself, Montaigne thinks, if he pictures the world thus, in terms of his own reason and knowledge. What could lead him to believe, he asks, that the “admirable motion of the celestial vault, the eternal light of those torches rolling so proudly above his head, the fearful movements of that infinite sea, were established and have lasted so many centuries for his convenience and his service? Is it possible to imagine anything so ridiculous as that this miserable and puny creature, who is not even master of himself . . . should call himself  masterr and emperor maste emperor of the universe, universe, the least part of which it is not in his power power to know, know, much less to command?” If, as Montaigne thinks he should, man “feels and sees himself lodged here, amid the mire and dung of the world, nailed and riveted to the worst, the deadest, and the most stagnant  part of the universe, on the lowest story of the house and the farthest from the vault of  heaven,” how absurd for him to imagine himself “above the circle of the moon, and bringing the sky down beneath his feet.” Except “by the vanity of this same imagination” by which “he equals himself to God,” how can he regard himself as occupying an exalted position in the universe? Deprived of the religious faith that he is made in God’s image and that all the rest of the visible universe is made for him, only presumption or conceit can save man from being dwarfed by the world. But science robs man of such conceit, according to Freud. The cosmology that “is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus” displaces man and shrinks him. Humanity cannot hold on to “its naive self-love,” Freud writes, when it realizes that the earth is “not the center of the universe, but only a tiny speck in a world-system of a magnitude hardly conceivable.” NOT ONLY IN THE reflections of Marcus Aurelius, Montaigne, and Freud, but throughout the tradition of the great books, the conception of the world or universe is inseparable from the ideas of God and man. These three ideas always interpenetrate each other, though the resulting pattern of thought varies according to the direction in which thought moves from any one of the three to the other two. Sometimes the whole universe lies on one side of the infinite distance between the Creator  and His creation, and man has a special place of honor in the hierarchy of beings which constitutes the order of the created world. Though man is greater than the earth he treads or  the skies he watches, the whole world is less than God, Who has made it out of nothing and Who, in the freedom of His act of creation, is unaffected by the world’s coming to be or   passing away. On this view, taken by Christian theologians, theologians, God is not part of the world, the world is not part of God, nor is there any whole which embraces both; and if “world” means the physical totality, then man belongs both to this world and to another—the realm of  spiritual creatures which is also part of the created universe.    Sometimes “world” means the all-embracing universe, uncreated and coeternal with the divinity which dwells in it, a thing of soul as well as body, including mind as well as matter. Whether God is the prime mover of the universe; the transcendent One from which emanates in all degrees of being the multiplicity of intelligible and sensible things; the infinite substance which exceeds the sum of all the finite things that exist only as its modifications; or the Absolute Spirit which manifests itself historically in both physical and  psychical nature-on any of these views cosmology merges with theology, as in the theories of Aristotle, Plotinus, Spinoza, and Hegel. For Spinoza and Hegel, as for the Stoics, to know

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the world is to know God. Its order or structure is more than divinely instituted. It is the indwelling divinity itself.    Such views of the world tend, for the most part, to look upon the individual man as a microcosm mirroring the macrocosm. The world’s body and soul, its matter and mind, are there to be seen in miniature. Considering the philosophers who assert that “mind is the king kin g of heaven heaven and earth,” earth,” Socrat Socrates es sug sugges gests ts in the  Philebus tha thatt “in reality reality the they y are magnifying themselves.” Nevertheless, the doctrine of a world soul animating the body of  the universe is repeatedly proposed in the dialogues of Plato as a way of understanding man; and that mad or at least cryptic Platonist, Captain Ahab, gazing on the gold doubloon he has nailed to the mast as a reward for sighting Moby Dick, observes in soliloquy that “this round gold is but the image of the rounder globe, which, like a magician’s glass, each and every

man in turn but mirrors back his own mysterious self.” A third alternative remains. Sometimes, as with Lucretius and later philosophers of a materialist cast, the world is all there is, and all there is of it can be reduced to atoms and the void. It is thrown together by blind chance rather than designed by a presiding intelligence. The universe obeys no laws except the laws of its own matter in motion. 33 “Nature has no tyrants over her,” writes Lucretius, “But always acts of her own will; she has / No part of  any godhead whatsoever.” For their own happiness, Lucretius exiles his papier-mâché gods to the intersp interspace acess whe where re they they “lead “lead lives lives sup suprem remely ely free of car care.” e.” But man is not so fortunate. In a world that is not made for him, and in which, godless, he must be entirely self-reliant, man is burdened with heavy cares. Since he is one of nature’s progeny, he may not be wholly alien in this world of material forces; but neither is he, like a beloved son, assured of  nature’s hospitality. The dominant note here is that of man against the world; and in this unequal struggle science alone gives him the sense-or perhaps the illusion-that at least in his little corner of the world his mind may dominate. Yet from time to time defeat reminds him that the world remains unruly. Bridle its matter and harness its energies as he will, he holds no checkrein to prevent his being overthrown. (emphasis added)

For the Judeo-Christian perspective, cf. “A Theologian’s Brief On the Place of the Human Embryo Within the Christian Tradition.” 34 The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics Reproduced with Permission (Submitted to the House of  Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research by an ad hoc group of Christian theologians from the Anglican, Catholic, Orthodox and Reformed traditions) Prepared by Rev David Jones MA MSt, The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics, London. Some theological principles 16. For a Christian, the question of the status of the human embryo is directly related to the mystery of creation. In the context of the creation of things ‘seen and unseen’ 30 the human  being appears as the microcosm, reflecting in the unity of a single creature both spiritual spiritual and 31 corporeal realities. The beginning of each human being is therefore a reflection of the coming to be of the world as a whole. It reveals the creative act of God bringing about the reality of this person (of me), in an analogous way to the creation of the entire cosmos. There is a mystery involved in the existence of each person. 30

Creed of Nicaea, N. Tanner  Decrees  Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils London: Sheed & Ward, 1990, I. p. 5.

Of course the viewpoint of Isaac Newton finds a way to reconcile a world of matter in motion obeying fixed laws and a belief in a provident cause setting all things on their course. 34 (http://www.lifeissues. (http://ww w.lifeissues.net/writers/ net/writers/mis/mis_02chri mis/mis_02christiantradition1. stiantradition1.html html [11/18/08])

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31

Gregory of Nyssa On the Making of Man; Man ; John Damascene  Exposition of the Orthodox  Faith II.12; Creed of Lateran IV, Tanner p. 230.

Cf. Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, Institutes, Book II, ch. 13. In The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Fathers: transtranslations of the writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325. 325. Vol. 7: For having made the body, He breathed into it a soul ffrom rom the vital source of His own Spirit, which is everlasting, that it might bear the similitude of the world itself, which is composed of opposing elements. For he consists of soul and body, that is, as it were, of heaven and earth: since the soul by which we live, has its origin, as it were, out of heaven from God, the  body out of the earth, earth, of the dust of which we have ssaid aid that it was formed.

N.B. On the ‘vital source’ of man’s soul, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Apostle’s Creed . In The Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas  Aquinas.. Translated with a Commentary by Rev. Joseph B. Collins, S.S., D.D., Ph.D.  Aquinas Introduction by Rev. Rudolph G. Bandas, Ph.D., S.T.D. et M. (Baltimore, 1939), The Eighth Article, pp. 48; 50: The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas THE EIGHTH ARTICLE: “I Believe in the Holy Ghost.” Many benefits come to us from the Holy Ghost. (1) He cleanses us from our sins. The reason is that one must repair that which one has made.  Now, the soul is created by the Holy Spirit, Spirit, because God has made all things through Him; for God, by loving His goodness, created everything: “Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made ma de.”[ .”[18 18]] Th Thus us,, Dion Dionys ysiu iuss says says:: “D “Div ivin inee lo love ve did did not not pe permi rmitt Him Him to be with withou outt offspring.”[19] It is necessary, therefore, that the hearts of men, destroyed by sin, be made anew by the Holy Ghost: “Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit, and they shall be created; and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth.”[20] <…> [49-50] 18. Wis., xi. 25. 19. Div. Nom., IV. 20. Ps. ciii. 30. (emphasis added)

Cf. Contra Errores Graecorum by Graecorum  by St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P. translated by Peter Damian Fehlner, F.I. Re-edited and missing chapters supplied by Joseph Kenny, O.P., Chapter 27: CHAPTER 27 How the assertion that the breath of life which God breathed into the face of man is not the rational soul, but the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is to be understood.

Another doubt arises from Cyril’s statement that “when in Genesis 1 109 God is said to have  breathed the breath of life into the face of man in order that man might become a living  being, we do not call this breath of life the soul. For were it the soul, the soul would be uncangeable and would not sin because it would be of the divine essence; rather Moses said the outpouring of the Holy Spirit was superimposed on the human soul. 110 This is contrary to the explanation of Augustine 111 who claims that by that breath is meant the human soul, and who shows how from this it112does not follow that it is of the divine substance: for it is a figurative way of speaking, meaning not that the Holy Spirit breathed as a body, but  only that he made the spirit, that is the soul, out of nothing. And what is more, it appears to

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contradict statements of the Apostle who says in 1 Cor. 15 (45): The first Adam became a living being; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. But it is not the spiritual which is first but the physical, and then the spiritual”. Here the life of the soul is expressly declared to be different from the life which is through the Holy Spirit. Hence that inbreathing by which man became a living being cannot be understood as the grace of the Holy Spirit. Hence, Cyril’s explanation cannot be described as literal, but only allegorical. 109

Rather Gen. 2:7.  Lib. 36 , 5-12, from the Thesaurus ass. 34 (PG 75, 584 D).  Lib. 111  De Gen. ad litt . VII, c 2 (PL 34. 356), abbreviated by Peter Lombard II Sent., d 17, c 1.  De 112 Figurative way of speaking: thus Peter Lombard, 1. c. (emphasis added) 110

Cf. also The Catechism of the Catholic Church, Church , n. 291:  291. …The Church’s faith likewise confesses the creative action of the Holy Spirit, the “giver of life”, “the Creator Spirit” (Veni, (Veni, Creator Spiritus), Spiritus), the “source of every good”.131  131 Cf. Nicene Creed: DS 150; Hymn “Veni, Creator Spiritus”; Spiritus”; Byzantine Troparion of Pentecost Vespers, “O heavenly King, Consoler”. Consoler”.

As a composite of body and soul, of matter and spirit, then, man is the image of the world, the principles of which are earth and heaven; whereas the heart stands to the body as the heaven to the world. § (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All rights reserved. See also:  De Mixtione Elementorum ad Magistrum Philippum de Castro Caeli (On the Combination  of the Elements to Master Philip of Castrocaeli). Castrocaeli ).  St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. Bart A. Mazzetti

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